59 information, including defending the country from cyber-attacks”. Regarding misconduct by the agency, the article elaborates:
“[…] it had been gathering all kinds of security information, detaining people and hiding suspects, said Temesgen Tiruneh, advisor to the prime minister on national security affairs in a briefing on Friday April 5th. According to the advisor, the intelligence agency had been engaged in abuse of power and meddling on the internal and security affairs of regional governments and different institutions. […] The advisor highlighted the efforts made over the past year to reform the various intelligence agencies, including INSA. […] He said a lot of work has been done to build up the image of security institutions, and those who were responsible for the crimes committed prior to the reforms, have also been prosecuted, the advisor indicated.” (7D News, 6 April 2019)
Like the NISS, the INSA is accountable to the Ministry of Peace (Proclamation No. 1097/2018, 29 November 2018). As reported by France 24, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had once been “the founding head of Ethiopia's cyber-spying outfit, the Information Network Security Agency”
(France 24, 11 October 2019). In February 2019 Borkena notes that “Intelligence Officers graduated from Kinfe National Security Studies Institute”. They were trained as part of the reform process at the NISS, Defence Forces and INSA. The premier minister attended the ceremony and “told the graduates they need to be free from political, ethnic or religious affiliation as their only allegiance is to Ethiopia and Ethiopians” (Borkena, 5 February 2019a).
According to reports cited by the USDOS, in 2018 “there was a pattern of surveillance and arbitrary arrests of Oromo university students based on perceived dissent, participation in peaceful demonstrations, or both” (USDOS, 13 March 2019, section 2a). Human Rights Watch reports that, when the organisation was visiting Ethiopia in February 2019, “people were speaking very openly about sensitive subjects in public spaces, cafes, and mini buses, which is a marked change from a country once consumed by fears of monitoring and surveillance”
(HRW, 3 April 2019).
Similarily, Freedom House notes in February 2019:
“Wide-reaching surveillance programs and the presence of the EPRDF at all levels of society have inhibited private discussion. However, broad political changes in 2018, including the release of political prisoners and lifting of bans against prominent government critics in the media and other sectors has fostered a more open atmosphere for private discussion. And unlike in some previous years, in 2018 there were no reported arrests of private citizens in connection with antigovernment remarks.” (Freedom House, 4 February 2019, section D4) No further current information (since January 2018) regarding monitoring of persons within Ethiopia could be found. The following reports cover surveillance activities before Abiy Ahmed took office:
In May 2017 Saskia Brechenmacher details surveillance activities by the Ethiopian authorities in a book available under the following link:
Brechenmacher, Saskia: Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia; Surveillance and State Control in Ethiopia, 18 May 2017
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/18/surveillance-and-state-control-in-ethiopia-pub-69960
In March 2014 HRW released a report on telecom and internet surveillance in Ethiopia, available under the following link:
HRW – Human Rights Watch: ‘They Know Everything We Do’, Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia, 25 March 2014
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-we-do/telecom-and-internet-surveillance-ethiopia
4.4.2 Monitoring of Ethiopian diaspora
A September 2018 report based on interviews in Ethiopia by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) cites information obtained from a researcher in the country in May 2018:
“The interlocutor noted that the Government monitors the Diaspora ‘every single day’, and is very active in this regard, because that is the only field of resistance that where Ethiopian law cannot be enforced by the Ethiopian authorities, since they cannot physically go there.
The Diaspora community is composed of a certain number of ‘hardliners’ with no room for any ‘middle ground’. Their extremist positions might be explained by the fact that some of them have been victims of torture and persecution in Ethiopia and forced to leave the country.” (DIS, September 2018, p. 25)
61 The report also provides some information on the situation of the Ethiopian diaspora on p. 17:
DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Ethiopia: Political situation and treatment of opposition, September 2018
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1450527/1226_1542183917_ethiopia-political-situation-report-2018.pdf
A November 2018 report by the DIS cites information obtained from the British Embassy and the US Embassy in Addis Ababa on 18 May 2018 and in July 2018:
“The interlocutor [British Embassy] expects that the Government ‘definitely’ is monitoring the activity of the diaspora, especially their social media activity, from Minnesota in the US to the UK. However, only activity, which was really into hatred and violence is likely be flagged in Ethiopia whereas political rhetoric such as ‘the Government needs to change’ or
‘the opposition should be heard’ would be monitored but not likely to lead to repercussions.” (DIS, 5 November 2018, p. 24)
“[US Embassy:] The situation of members of the diaspora is ruled by its own internal dynamic, which are not obvious to external observers. The Government conducts internet surveillance, monitors the activities of diaspora members who are active on YouTube canals or otherwise engaged in internet based communication. This surveillance also includes those diaspora members who are of a low profile and who are less vocal in their anti-government agitation. It is well know that the Ethiopian government periodically closes down the internet – also known as ‘internet blackouts’ – blocks certain websites, which are critical towards the Government and actively seeks to restrict freedom of expression domestically: to illustrate this practice examples were given of how the authorities had contacted foreign governments, hosting large diaspora communities, and requested a foreign government to take action in order to close down TV programs or YouTube channels which were run by the diaspora communities.” (DIS, 5 November 2018, p. 27-28)
The November 2018 DIS report also cites information obtained from an international NGO and from a legal source in July 2018 and May 2018 regarding the diaspora:
“The level of surveillance inside Ethiopia is high and, according to the interlocutor [international NGO], there is ‘no doubt’ that this surveillance extends to people who belong to the diaspora. The activities and utterances of those members of the diaspora who are active on social media such as YouTube are most possibly being followed closely by the secret service.
The internet and telecommunication sector in Ethiopia is highly controlled by the state.
There are numerous examples of how the federal government has decided to shut down the internet to restrict citizens’ communication. The Government also blocks certain websites, in particular those of diaspora groups. In Ethiopia it is against the law to access the internet via a VPN [Virtual Private Network] connection. In practice the law does not, however, prevent ordinary people from using VPN connections. For individuals who are not on the radar of the security service it is possible to use VPN connections to access the internet.” (DIS, 5 November 2018, pp. 34-35)
“When asked whether the Ethiopian authorities were monitoring the diaspora, the source [Legal source] advised that the diaspora leaders would be watched. If members of the diaspora have not been very vocal and critical of the ruling party, they could return to Ethiopia. Actually some diaspora members were asked to return and would be offered land if they accepted.” (DIS, 5 November 2018, p. 55)
No further current information (since January 2018) regarding monitoring of the Ethiopian diaspora could be found. The following reports cover monitoring of the Ethiopian diaspora before Abiy Ahmed took office:
A February 2017 query response by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada contains information regarding the diaspora:
IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Ethiopia: Information on the ability of the Ethiopian government to monitor and censor Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, including scope and type of surveillance, and technology used; treatment of returning dissidents from Canada, including whether particular profiles face greater risks upon return (2014-January 2017) [ETH105729.E], 2 February 2017
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1423401.html
In December 2017 HRW notes that Ethiopian authorities carried out digital attacks and monitoring of government critics abroad (HRW, 6 December 2017).
HRW – Human Rights Watch: Ethiopia: New Spate of Abusive Surveillance, 6 December 2017 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/06/ethiopia-new-spate-abusive-surveillance
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