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Political discontent in Oromia regional state

7.1 Oromia regional state, Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa

7.1.1 Political discontent in Oromia regional state

[...] the Amhara of killing more than 200 people in a territorial dispute” (France 24, 10 June 2019). According to France 24 “dozens of people were killed in clashes between residents of northern Benishangul Gumuz and Amhara states” in May 2019 (France 24, 10 June 2019).

The EIP and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies organised a workshop on ethnic extremism in Addis Abeba in January 2019. Regarding some of the results the EIP report of July 2019 notes the following:

“In fact, when asked, during a workshop on ethnic extremism, a large majority of participants (82%) saw the risk of ethnic extremism as considerable, with 44% rating the risk as ‘high’ and 38% as ‘very high’. This is consistent with media reports, some of which observed: ‘Ethnic tensions are the biggest problem for Ethiopia right now’ or that ‘You’ve got millions of people displaced – it’s a humanitarian crisis, and it could get out of control.’

Reports further stated that even though Dr. Abiy's aggressive reform agenda has won praise, the impact of inter-communal tensions and ethnic violence presents a serious challenge for the new leadership across the country.” (EIP, July 2019, pp. 12-13)

In September 2019 Africanews cites the Ethiopian attorney general’s office as reporting that

“violence has claimed the lives of at least 1,200 people and displaced 1.2 million people from their homes” over the past 12 months (Africanews, 25 September 2019).

Please see the following link for an administrative map of Ethiopia:

UNOCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Ethiopia – Administrative Map, 15 August 2017

https://reliefweb.int/map/ethiopia/ethiopia-administrative-map-15-aug-2017

93 ICG further mentions a “fault line” between the TPLF and the federal government of prime minister Abiy, who is also the head of the ODP. The report notes grievances by the TPLF over the loss of federal power and alleged “selective prosecutions of Tigrayan top officials” as well as “a federal commission that is tasked with assessing interregional boundary disputes”

regarding Amhara claims on Wolkait and Raya areas (ICG, 19 July 2019).

Regarding the planned 2020 elections and the return of leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in September 2018 the ICG report mentions the following:

“Three years of anti-government protests since 2015, which largely took place in that state [Oromia], forced the internal shifts that brought Abiy to power. Violence has continued since. The September 2018 return of leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a formerly banned armed group campaigning for Oromo rights and autonomy, sparked ethnic skirmishes, as Oromo youth replaced national flags in the capital and surrounding areas with the OLF banner, provoking the anger of, and clashes with, other groups. If the electoral board registers the OLF, which is seen as the standard bearer of the Oromo liberation struggle, as a political party, it could sap votes in 2020 from Abiy’s Oromo Democratic Party: while leaders like Abiy are popular with youthful protesters, many Oromo regard the ruling Oromo party as ineffective and for years subservient to the TPLF.

Moreover, OLF-linked factions are still fighting the military in western Oromia, with each side accusing the other of being the aggressor.” (ICG, 19 July 2019)

A November 2019 article by The Conversation provides an overview regarding Oromo support of Abiy Ahmed:

“Abiy seems to be the prisoner of Ethiopia’s federal government, the very system that propped him up. This federal system draws its legitimacy from citizens maintaining a strong ethnic identity at the regional level. In light of this the new premier has two options. One is to actively pursue the unifying agenda that made him popular, which would alienate his ethnic Oromo constituency. The other is to align with the interests of the Oromo ethno-nationalist movement. This would secure the electoral support of his political base in Oromia. But choosing the latter could deprive him of the non-Oromo support he has been enjoying. Indeed, since Abiy was elected the nation has gone down a renewed path of violence. It is not only the Ethiopian people who are divided, it is also the political elites who had previously shown support for Abiy’s leadership. Ethiopia’s two majority groups – the Amharas and the Oromos - have been particularly critical of the prime minister’s perceived inability to address the country’s political tumult.” (The Conversation, 9 November 2019)

In February 2019 ICG notes that ethnic nationalism is intensifying. Regarding the Oromo the article notes:

“Within the Oromo, forces outside the ruling party, notably the OLF and the Qeerroos, as well as other, less visible, groups seem increasingly emboldened and have begun to question Abiy’s commitment to their objectives – either Oromo dominance in the current dispensation or a forcible takeover of power.” (ICG, 21 February 2019, p. 25)

After protests in front of the residence of media entrepreneur Jawar Mohammed in October 2019, a report by DW describes the relationship between the prime minister and the Oromo:

“While some Ethiopians have criticised [Jawar] Mohammed for inciting ethnic hatred and aiming to destabilize the country, many young Oromo men consider him a hero. ‘The Queerroos [...] are responsible for the prime minister being in office, and today they could make the reform project much more difficult to implement,’ Ludger Schadomsky, head of DW's Amharic Service said. ‘Some say that one day they [Queerroos] could be the reason for the end of Ahmed's term.’ […] Young Oromos are disappointed by how Ahmed has been running the country so far, according to Davison [William Davison, Senior Analyst from the International Crisis Group]. Several Oromia residents reported that non-Oromos had been attacked, their properties looted and burned. ‘This reflects lingering discontent in Oromia among the Oromo,’ Davison said. ‘Some of the demands dating back to 2018 of the protest movements have not been met, like the language demand. The general concern is that the prime minister is not governing in the interest of the Oromo people.’” (DW, 25 October 2019)

The Africa Report writes in October 2019 with regard to demands of the protesters:

“Among the Oromo, long-marginalised although the largest ethnic group, some activists want an independent Oromia to break away from Ethiopia. […] Youths chanted against Abiy, an Oromo himself, and whose rise to power last April was helped by Mohammed’s campaigning. More than 400 people were arrested, the government said last week.” (The Africa Report, 11 October 2019)

An analysis regarding the October 2019 events published by Foreign Policy (FP) provides details regarding expectations by Oromo:

“Some activists worry that Abiy’s acquiescence toward Jawar presages a future of Oromo dominance. They fear that Abiy and his party have no commitment to genuine democratization but are only interested in replacing the old hegemony of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF, with a new form of Oromo dominance. Despite being the largest ethnic group with more than a third of the country’s population, the Oromo have historically been marginalized from central roles in national politics and, many say, borne the brunt of historical injustices. Abiy carries the full burden of satisfying the expectations of Oromos who expect national emancipation as a result of his rise while also remaining credible enough among other ethnic groups who fear increasing Oromo dominance. Abiy indeed bends over backward to accede to Jawar’s demands. But this is most likely out of a fear of alienating the passionate Oromo youths who rally behind him than out of the desire to cement Oromo dominance. Having come to the premiership by riding the waves of Oromo protests that were spearheaded by the Qeerroo movement, he needs Jawar’s tacit approval to legitimize the claim that he represents the forces of change that brought him to power. But while Jawar’s only challenge is appealing to the Oromos through radical populist demands, Abiy is torn between two competing challenges:

appealing to the Oromos and appealing to the rest of Ethiopia. His current approach is unsustainable, not least because Jawar’s demands are far-reaching. In a media interview,

95 Jawar had said that there are two governments in Ethiopia, the second being the Qeerroo

youth movement that seems to follow his bidding.” (FP, 8 November 2019)

According to a November 2019 article by the New York Times, Jawhar Mohammed announced

“he would run for a parliamentary seat in Oromia” and that he aims “to create a political party there with the goal of winning enough seats to name him prime minister” (NYT, 18 November 2019).