Species as individuals

In the previous sub-section we saw that one of the main problems with the idea of species as natural kinds is that species are spatiotemporally limited, which makes it difficult to conceive of them as kinds. Kinds are, as we noted, normally seen and treated as universals. Individuals, on the other hand, always exist in a particular spatiotemporal slot. An individual comes into existence at a particular place at a particular point in time, exists in a certain area for a certain period, and eventually ceases to exist. The same is the case with species, which means that at least in this particular respect, species seem to be more like individuals than like kinds. Some biologists and philosophers have therefore chosen to talk about species as individuals.⁷⁴⁰

To see species as individuals fits very well with how species are conceived of in evolutionary theory. Since species are the entities that evolve according to evolutionary theory, it is more natural to see them as individuals than as kinds or classes.⁷⁴¹ According to Hull, species in fact have to be conceived of as individuals bound in space and time because of the role they play in evolutionary theory.⁷⁴² It is even held that evolutionary theory shows species to be individuals.⁷⁴³ At least, the idea of species as individuals has several advantages from an evolutionary perspective. To see species as individuals and not as kinds fits better with the fact that organisms can change and still belong to the same species.⁷⁴⁴ This posed a big problem for the idea of species as kinds but it seems only natural if we see species as individuals. Individual organisms, after all, retain their identity even though their bodies change.

Talking about species as individuals also fits better with the belief held by many biologists and philosophers of biology that there can be no natural laws about species.⁷⁴⁵

Another advantage is that if we see species as individuals, we do not have to rely on common properties to bind the species together.⁷⁴⁶ The parts of an individual can be very different from each other. An arm, a heart and a nail are very different from each other even though they are parts of the same organism.⁷⁴⁷

This means that the idea of species as individuals does not fit with the phenetic species concept.⁷⁴⁸ On the other hand, this might not be a very big disadvantage as we saw that this concept has large problems of its own and is not very popular among the ecocentrists.

740 Dupré 1993 p.270 note 3, Ereshefsky 1991 pp.84, 96, Ghiselin 1974 p.536, Horvath 1997 pp.226f, Hull 1999 pp.31ff, Sober 1993 p.15, Sterelny 1999 p.123, Wilson, Bradley E. 1995 p.340, Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.191. Ghiselin and Hull are the most prominent advocates of the theory.

741 Hull 1999 p.32

742 Hull 1999 p.31

743 Sober 1993 p.145

744 Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.191

745 Buege 1997 p.16, Donoghue 1985 p.172, Lange 1995 pp.432, 436

746 Ghiselin 1974 p.537

747 Buege 1997 p.10

748 Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.191

The other two species concepts that we investigated (the biological and the phylogenetic) are very compatible with the idea of species as individuals.⁷⁴⁹ Christopher D. Horvath goes as far as equating the idea of species as individuals with the phylogenetic species concept,⁷⁵⁰ while Elliott Sober on the other hand equates it with the biological species concept (that he calls “the individuality thesis”).⁷⁵¹ It seems clear, however, that both the biological and the phylogenetic species concepts are compatible with the idea of species as individuals, which ought to speak in favour of this idea.

An interesting aspect of the idea that species are individuals is that it also affects the status of the organisms that make up the species. If we see species as kinds or classes, organisms become members or instances of the species. If we on the other hand see species as individuals, organisms instead become parts of the species just like limbs and cells are parts, not members or instances, of the organism they belong to.⁷⁵²

This has implications for ecocentrism in that it affects how they can fit individual organisms into their theory. If we reason from an ecocentric basis, it will look something like this:

The value of an entity according to ecocentrism is to a large degree determined by its role in the system. A part ought to be less autonomous and more integrated than a member in relation to the whole. Therefore, the value of a part is probably more closely connected to that of the whole than is the case with a member. This in turn means that, on the one hand, a part can more easily be sacrificed for the sake of the whole. On the other hand, a part that functions together with other parts might be a more substantial loss from the perspective of the whole than the loss of one of many members with the same essential properties.⁷⁵³ Even though parts of an individual can be sacrificed when called for, they are not exchangeable or expendable in the same way as members of a kind that are all identical when it comes to the properties that make them members of the whole.

The conclusion is therefore that the interest of a part means less than the interest of a member in relation to the interest of the whole, but for the whole it ought to be more of a value loss if it loses some of its parts than if it loses some of its members – even if the loss does not kill it. If organisms are parts and not members of their species, the interests of the organisms will in the same way matter less in relation to the interests of the species compared to if the organisms were members of the species. On the other hand, it is more of a value loss for the species to lose some of its organisms if the organisms are parts than if they are members, even if the loss does not lead to the extinction of the species.

749 Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 pp.191f

750 Horvath 1997 p.226

751 Sober 1993 pp.153ff

752 Buege 1997 p.10, Ghiselin 1974 p.536, Griffiths 1999 p.211, Reydon 2005 p.149

753 Remember that according to ecocentrism species have interests of their own that are not reducible to the interests of the organisms that make up the species.

This conclusion is very important for how individual organisms should be regarded from an ecocentric, and also, to some extent from an anthropocentric position. If the notion of organisms as parts rather than members of their species implies a higher instrumental value for the individual organisms in relation to the species, it will strengthen our preservation duties. The non-human organisms do not have any moral status of their own from an anthropocentric perspective, but a reduction of the number of organisms that make up a valuable species has effects on the function of the species even if the species does not go extinct. It means that if species are integrated enough to be individuals we have to be more careful not just to avoid extinction but also to avoid losing too many parts of the species in order to not disturb the function of the species and thereby diminish the value the species has for us.

From an ecocentric perspective, the most important aspect of the idea that species are individuals is probably that they get the same ontological status as organisms.⁷⁵⁴ This is important because individuals are traditionally seen as the paradigm cases of moral objects.⁷⁵⁵ If species have the same ontological status as organisms it will not be possible to dismiss ecocentrism on the account that species have the wrong ontological status unless one is also willing to deny that living organisms including human beings have moral status.

Not surprisingly, the idea of species as individuals has caught on among ecocentrists. Rolston, Callicott and Johnson use the idea to support their standpoints.⁷⁵⁶

We have seen that Rolston talks of species both as natural kinds and as individuals. This is a rather bold strategy considering that the two ideas are normally seen as contradicting each other.⁷⁵⁷ There are those who argue that they are compatible, however. Boyd, who advocates a rather unconventional version of natural kinds, is not a supporter of the idea that species are individuals. Even so, he claims that there is no real contradiction between seeing species as individuals and seeing them as kinds.⁷⁵⁸ On the contrary, those who claim that species are individuals must, according to him, also conclude that they are natural kinds (though apparently this does not go both ways).⁷⁵⁹

John Dupré who, as we saw, is a pluralist regarding species concepts, is also a pluralist regarding ontologies.⁷⁶⁰ As we noted in the beginning of this sub-section the idea that species are individuals fits very well with the role species play in evolutionary theory. Dupré argues, however, that for all other areas of biology, seeing species as individuals is not working very well. In ecology, for example, he believes that species have to be conceived of as kinds.⁷⁶¹ His conclusion is that species play different roles in different theories. If species have

754 de Queiroz 1999 p.61, Sober 1993 p.15

755 Buege 1997 p.2

756 Callicott 1980 pp.320ff, Johnson 1991 pp.153f, Rolston 1988 p.149

757 Boyd 1999 p.168, Griffiths 1999 p.211, Hull 1999 pp.32f, Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 pp.188,191

758 Boyd 1999 pp.141, 162f

759 Boyd 1999 p.141

760 Dupré 1993 p.43

761 Dupré 1993 p.20

to be conceived of as individuals in evolutionary theory, we must conclude that species are individuals in that context, but that they are other things in other contexts.⁷⁶² He argues that just like the cells in his body can be both members of a kind (the cell-kind) and parts of an individual (the organism), so organisms ought to be able to be both members of species that exist in the form of kinds, and parts of species that exist in the form of individuals.⁷⁶³

From an ecocentric perspective, ontological pluralism presents the same problems as pluralism regarding species concepts: If all species can be seen as existing in both ways depending on perspective, it is not obvious that it is possible to maintain the realism that is originally built into the two ontologies.

On the other hand, if different species exist in different ways, the ecocentrists will have to find more than one way of assigning moral status to species in order to cover all species. If finally, as Dupré seems to argue, all species actually exist in more than one sense simultaneously, ontological pluralism looks like a good option for Rolston.

There is one problem, however: It is very important for both Rolston and Johnson that species play the role of individuals not just in evolution but also in the ecosystem. This will not be possible if Dupré is right.

As we also saw before, Callicott seems to believe that the idea of species as classes is the predominant theory, and he was very cautious in his reference to Hull. Even so, when he argues for his own theory he clearly assumes that species are individuals.⁷⁶⁴ He uses this ontology, not only to argue for moral duties to species,⁷⁶⁵ but also as a basis for claiming that it is acceptable to sacrifice organisms for the good of species or ecosystems. ⁷⁶⁶ He reminds us that we sometimes sacrifice parts of a person for the good of the person as a whole, and he argues that we ought to do the same with parts of species even if these parts are sentient organisms.⁷⁶⁷ This seems to follow our conclusion above that the idea of species as individuals strengthens the instrumental value but weakens the moral standing of individuals in relation to species.

Also others, both supporters and opponents of ecocentrism, have concluded that the idea of species as individuals is essential for the idea of species as moral objects.⁷⁶⁸ Tom Regan, who is one of the fiercest opponents to ecocentrism, believes that the faith of ecocentrism is closely connected to the question of whether species are individuals. Contrary to both the ecocentrists and a number of other philosophers and biologists, he does not believe that species are individuals, however, and he sees this as an important argument against ecocentrism.⁷⁶⁹

According to Regan:

762 Dupré 1993 pp.42f

763 Dupré 1993 p.58

764 Callicott 1980 pp.321ff

765 Callicott 1980 p.322

766 Callicott 1980 pp.320, 322f

767 Callicott 1980 p.323

768 Buege 1997 passim, Regan, Tom 1983 pp.245f, 359, 362, Schönfeld 1992 p.360

769 Regan, Tom 1983 pp.245f, 359, 362

The rights view is a view about the moral rights of individuals. Species are not individuals, and the rights view does not recognize the moral rights of species to anything, including survival.⁷⁷⁰

Even though the idea of species as individuals has become quite popular, Regan is far from alone in being critical. There are a number of other critics,⁷⁷¹ and there are a number of problems of which some are quite severe.

The big question is whether there is not more to being an individual than spatiotemporal boundness. At least some authors argue that there is, though they do not agree on whether this is a problem for the idea that species are individuals.

Sober argues that a particular kind of causal connection between the parts is necessary for something to be properly called an individual.⁷⁷² Ereshefsky argues for both cohesiveness and a causal connection,⁷⁷³ and Horvath argues for cohesiveness and integration in relation to the evolutionary forces that work on them.⁷⁷⁴ Robert A. Wilson argues that the difference between individuals and kinds is that the former, contrary to the latter apart from spatiotemporal unity, also have internal coherence, discrete boundaries, and a historical continuity,⁷⁷⁵while Bradley E. Wilson talks about internal organization and cohesion.⁷⁷⁶

Cohesion, organization and integration seem to be popular criteria. The question is how these demands should be interpreted, and especially how they can be interpreted in such a way that they put species ontologically on par with organisms. The main point seems to be that the connection between the parts has to be both strong enough and of the right kind. We have seen that species might not be universal enough to be natural kinds, but are they bound enough to be individuals? It might just be that the spatiotemporal boundness of species makes them too cohesive to be kinds, but not cohesive enough to be individuals.

Ereshefsky suggests that actual interbreeding is both necessary and sufficient to fulfil his criteria, but he also points out that only populations that count as species according to the strongest version of the biological species concept would then qualify as individuals.⁷⁷⁷ For ecocentrism this would mean that their realm of moral objects would be severely restricted, and most of what they call species would not qualify as individuals.

Even if we weaken the criteria so that all populations that count as species according to the more conventional version of the biological species concept are seen as individuals, we would still have to exclude all non-sexually reproductive species. Besides, it is very doubtful that a potential to reproduce sexually can

770 Regan, Tom 1983 p.359

771 Boyd 1999 pp.168, 173, Dupré 1999 p.18, Ereshefsky 1991 p.96

772 Sober 1993 p.150

773 Ereshefsky 1991 pp.96f

774 Horvath 1997 p.227

775 Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.191

776 Wilson, Bradley E. 1995 p.340

777 Ereshefsky 1991 p.98

really be enough of a connection between organisms to conceive of the species as an individual.

If we instead decide that historical continuity is what it takes to be an individual we would include all species according to the phylogenetic species concept. This would also take us closer to how we tend to look at individual persons. Historical continuity is often seen as necessary for personal identity among persons, but is it enough to define someone or something as an individual? When we discussed the phylogenetic species concept we saw that one problem is to find cut-off points between lineages that is good enough to work as species boundaries, and we did not find any satisfying solution to that problem.

Seeing species as individuals will clearly not lessen the demands on what constitutes a good cut-off point. This is a problem considering that if we look at individual organisms (who are seen as the paradigm cases of individuals), it is in general very simple to distinguish between individual organisms even if they are historically connected. It is in general unproblematic to distinguish between an individual organism and its siblings, parents or offspring. A possible explanation for this is that individual organisms are internally physically united while physically clearly distinct from the surrounding world. Does this mean that internal physical unity and external physical isolation are necessary to be an individual?

There are two obvious exceptions to the rule that individual organisms are physically isolated. Before a mammal is born and the umbilical cord is cut, it is not totally physically separate from its mother. The other case is Siamese twins.

They count as different individuals although they are physically connected. In these cases we may be able to circumvent the problem by saying that not all parts of an individual must be separated from all parts of another organism. The important thing is that certain relevant parts are isolated from each other. In our case it ought to be the brain as the physical basis of our personality. For organisms that do not have a brain, maybe the reproductive organs would be used as the identifying physical part. The point is that even when we distinguish between individual organisms that are partly physically united, we still seem to use some form of physical isolation to decide whether we deal with one or two individuals, and it seems to be intuitively very clear which physical parts have to be isolated from each other.

However, to use relevant physical isolation as the cut-off point between individuals does not seem to make any sense if the entities in question are not to some degree internally physically connected. The fact that there is often (at least) as much physical isolation between organisms belonging to the same species as there is between organisms belonging to different species means that we will never be able to use physical isolation to distinguish between species. The lack of physical connectedness within species also seems to be a problem in itself.

Intuitively, close physical connection is probably the first thing that comes to mind when it comes to identifying something as an individual.

At least this is true for many forms of individuals like individual organisms, individual pens, individual books etc, but we also tend to talk about individual

universities, individual companies, individual countries, etc. and they are not always internally physically connected. Callicott makes an analogy between species and human societies,⁷⁷⁸ and Ghiselin has compared species to companies.⁷⁷⁹ Both Ghiselin and Sober have also pointed out that we conceive of USA as an individual country even though Alaska is not physically united with the other states.⁷⁸⁰

These are good points. We do tend to see countries as ontological individuals and they certainly play the role of individuals on the international arena. It is also clearly the case that at least some parts of countries sometimes are at least as physically disconnected as those of species. In the same way, companies play the role of individuals in the economic arena and many companies are spread all over the world. The same seems to be true (in their respective arenas) of universities and many other kinds of organisations.

What keeps countries together seems instead to be things like common laws, a common economy and a common government that has some kind of control over the entire territory. When we talk about organisations and companies, the answer seems to go along the same lines. Both organisations and companies have a board, they have statutes, and they have a common economy.

Individual organisms have a common system for collecting and digesting nutrients and some organisms have a brain connected to a nervous system that controls the entire organism. It might thus be that it is the way the parts are organised and the way they interact rather than simply their physical connectedness that are relevant for deciding whether something is an individual.

We can, for the sake of simplicity, say that what is relevant is the way the parts cooperate.⁷⁸¹

If we look at our examples above regarding mothers/foetuses (or newborns connected with the mothers by an umbilical cord) and Siamese twins respectively, we concluded that they are distinguishable because it is possible to identify some relevant parts of the individuals that were not physically connected. Maybe that conclusion was premature? Maybe the real explanation is that they are distinguishable because they do not cooperate in some relevant respects?

Apparently it is not always the same kind of organisation and interaction between the parts that keeps individuals together, and sometimes there might be more than one type of organisation and interaction within the same individual. In individuals, like organisms, it might even be that some parts cooperate for one function and other parts cooperate for something else, and the whole complex of co-operations bind all parts together even if not all parts cooperate with all other parts.

How about very simple things like individual tables or coins? In these cases, the cooperation is not very sophisticated but it seems intuitively reasonable

778 Callicott 1980 pp.321f

779 Ghiselin 1974 pp.536, 538f

780 Ghiselin 1974 p.536, Sober 1993 p.150. One might add that the same is true for Hawaii.

781 ‘Cooperate’ is here used in a sense that does not imply sentience, intentionality or goal direction.