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The veil of ignorance

4. FUTURE GENERATIONS

4.1. T HE ASYMMETRY PROBLEM

4.1.3. The veil of ignorance

Christian Munthe and Anders Melin are of the same mind as Parfit and Barry when it comes to contractualism in general, but they believe that John Rawls’s version is more successful and can actually account for moral duties to future persons.383

The persons behind the veil of ignorance do not know to which generation they belong.384 “They must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever generation they turn out to belong to.”385 The idea is that they will therefore prefer an equitable distribution of resources between generations as well as within generations.386

Initially, this seems plausible given the idea of a veil of ignorance. There are, however, problems that we need to look into. I will start with a problem that

381 See also Ihse 2005 p.70

382 Almond 1995 p.18

383 Melin 2001 p.124, Munthe 1997

384 Rawls 1973 p.137

385 Rawls 1973 p.137

386 Rawls 1973 pp.137, 287f. Commented by e.g. Luper-Foy 1995 pp.95f, 100, Melin 2001 p.124, Munthe 1997. (The “veil of ignorance”-model is described in Rawls 1973 pp.136ff).

I believe is of crucial importance if we are to establish a just distribution of resources between generations. The people in the original position do not know to what generation they will belong, but do they know how many generations the resources are supposed to be distributed among and how large each generation will be? Rawls does not mention anything about this, and to assume such knowledge would be utterly unrealistic. We do not even have this knowledge in the real world. If the people in the original position do not know these things, how can they decide what will be a just distribution? Robin Attfield believes that the impossibility to know is a serious problem for Rawls’ theory – especially since the number of generations will partly depend on the decisions of earlier generations.387

Luper-Foy believes that the people behind the veil will adopt a policy regarding, for example, consumption and pollution that can be indefinitely sustainable.388 Such a policy would take care of this problem even though it would be suboptimal for the people behind the veil. It is not optimal since it puts harder restrictions on people than would be necessary if they knew how many generations there would be, but given that they do not know and given that no one would like to be born in generation X+1 after having agreed to base the calculations on X generations, this principle still seems rational given the original position.389

Luper-Foy’s suggestion would not take care of the problem regarding the number of people per generation. We could, of course, quite simply transform the idea of infinite sustainability into a policy that assumes an infinite number of people. The problem is that such a policy would not allow for any consumption at all. A better solution would be to approach the question of population size from a prescriptive rather than a descriptive angle; that is, the problem could be solved by having the people behind the veil of ignorance adopting a policy for how large a generation is allowed to be.

An alternative way to solve both problems would be to assume that everyone that will ever live takes part in the decision behind the veil. This, however, is forbidden by Rawls in his restrictions for the veil of ignorance. He presents different reasons for this restriction. One is that it would stretch our imagination too far. Another (which Rawls himself apparently sees as the strongest) is that the question about who takes the perspective of the original position and when, should not be able to influence the conclusion. Any randomly selected person should be able to go behind the veil and reach the same conclusion.390 Robin Attfield also points out that the number of future people will depend on the decisions behind the veil. This in turn means that if everyone who

387 Attfield 1998 p.211

388 Luper-Foy 1995 pp.95f, 100

389 It still assumes a rather high aversion towards risk, just like many other decisions Rawls assumes that the people in the original position would take. In Rawls’ description of the veil of ignorance he specifies that the people behind it do not know their aversion to risk (Rawls 1973 p.137), but they obviously have such an aversion and it has to be quite strong – much stronger, in fact, than would be granted by the precautionary principle.

390 Rawls 1973 p.139

will ever live were to take part in the decision behind the veil the number of people behind the veil of ignorance will depend on the decisions behind the veil and we would end up in a paradox.391

A possible solution to the problem concerning the number of generations would be to let all generations have their own representatives behind the veil.

This alternative is also ruled out by Rawls for the same reasons: It would to demand too much of our imagination to imagine people from different generation conferring behind the veil of ignorance, and it would break the rule that it should not matter for the conclusion who meets behind the veil.392 It is also excluded by the rule that everyone behind the veil belongs to the same generation. This rule is in fact very problematic. It does not just exclude a simple solution to the problem presented above. In fact, it also threatens to decrease the motivation for the parties behind the veil to consider the interests of future generations at all. The parties in the original position cannot affect the policy of previous generations (who’s decisions they cannot change), and they do not have to care about future generations. If they agreed on a principle of inter-generational justice, they would have to start saving for future generations but they would not get anything from previous generations, so their generation would have the worst deal.

Rawls is aware of this.393 In order to deal with the problem, he initially suggests that the parties in the original position have duties to their immediate descendants, but this solution is dismissed because it does not follow from the conditions in the original position.394 Instead, he suggests that we see the parties in the original position as representing a continuous time line stretching over at least two generations. This means, according to Rawls, that we have an overlap where everyone will be cared for by someone in the previous generation. Since generations overlap, everyone will be accounted for.395

This method of overlapping does not always work, however. Many problems related to extinctions take a longer time than two generations. One generation might cause the extinction but it does not always become a serious problem until two generations later – or more. Maybe it takes that a certain (unknown) number of species disappear for an ecosystem service to stop working. Then the process can be started by generation G but neither generation G nor generation G+1 experience the consequences, and generation G+2 or maybe G+5 is not covered by Rawls method. Even if we assume that the members of generation G+1 represent the future members of generation G+2 in the same way as the members of generation G represent all members of generation G+1, it will not help us since in the case described above, the effects skip one generation and the overlapping is therefore broken. Everyone behind the veil of ignorance belongs to generation G and everyone in generation G+1 is represented by someone in generation G but Generation G+1 will not be affected

391Attfield 1998 p.211

392 Rawls 1973 pp.140, 291f

393 Rawls 1973 pp.140, 291f, Rawls 1993 pp.273f

394 Rawls 1973 p.128

395 Rawls 1973 pp.128f

by the decision. That the people in generation G+1 represent the members of generation G+2 does not help since the no one in generation G+1 will themselves have any say in the original position. It is therefore necessary that the timeline goes on for a longer time than two generations. This in turn obviously presents its own problems. It is a stretch of the imagination already when we talk about two generations and the imagination becomes even more stretched when we talk about a larger number of generations.

There is also a general problem with the solution of one generation representing one or more future generations. It does not tell us anything about how the representative should handle conflicts between her (yet unknown)396 interests and the interests of those she represents. The situation differs essentially from the intragenerational setting where the reasoning behind the veil takes place. In that setting, the parties are indifferent to each other’s interests. In the inter-generational situation the parties are representing the interests of everyone along the same lineage. Rawls does not explain how this representation should be done and thus does not really present any solution to the problem of intergenerational justice.

Another problem is that the solution is not genuinely reciprocal. It is an exception from, rather than a result of, Rawls reciprocal basis, which means that it does not really help us find a reciprocal solution to the asymmetry problem.

Even though Rawls’ theory as a whole is contractual by building on an agreement in an original position, our relation to our descendants will not be contractual if we choose the suggested solution. This means that Rawls’ theory is only a contractual solution to the asymmetry problem in a very weak sense – if at all.

It is also a very strong concession by Rawls and means that care for future generations does not follow from the circumstances in the original position but is added in order to save the theory. In his later writings, he therefore chose another solution. Instead of allowing the people behind the veil of ignorance to have emotional bonds towards their descendants, he infers a rule that their agreements must be such that they would want everyone to follow it independently of what generation they belong to.397 This means that instead of making an exception to the restriction against knowing their interests, Rawls chose to make an exception to the restriction against having any moral inclinations.

I do not know if this is a smaller concession for Rawls. This solution too means that instead of deriving a duty to care for future generations from his theory, he introduces this principle in an ad hoc manner explicitly in order to save the theory. To say that the agreement made by the parties behind the veil must be acceptable also to others that are not present, is in fact a way of saying that we have a moral duty to consider the interest of these people even though we know that we will never turn out to be in their shoes. That is, we have a duty that is assumed and not agreed upon by all those concerned by the agreement. We are

396 The persons behind the veil are not allowed to know more about their descendants’ interests than about their own. Rawls 1973 p.209

397 Melin 2001 p.125, Rawls 1993 p.274

therefore facing the same objection as before – the solution to the problem of future generations is not genuinely reciprocal and only contractual in the very weak sense of being added to an otherwise contractual theory. The solution itself is not contractual at all.

One could object that Rawls’s aim is to find a theory of justice between contemporaries such that everyone would accept it if they take an impartial view.

His aim is not to find a reciprocal solution to the asymmetry problem. However, Rawls states explicitly that he considers intergenerational relations a question of justice.398 In fact, he has to if he wants to be true to his view that questions of justice are something that emerge where there are conflicting interests,399 as it is quite clear that there are conflicting interests between generations.

It is clearly stated by Rawls that he wants his theory to be genuinely contractual.400 He also states that reciprocity is the basis for the theory. For example, he says that the idea of reciprocity is implicit in his notion of a well-ordered society,401 and that the parties in the original position try to advance their good the best they can without being bound by any moral ties to each other.402

True, Rawls claims as well that his theory is not an egoistic theory or a theory about what rational egoists would agree upon:403

One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial situation as rational and mutually disinterested. This does not mean that the parties are egoists, that is, individuals with only certain kinds of interests, say in wealth, prestige, and domination. But they are conceived as not taking an interest in one another’s interests.404

Rawls’ definition of egoism seems unconventional. Only to have certain kinds of interests like those mentioned above seems more like shallowness or single-mindedness than egoism. In fact “…not taking an interest in one another’s interests” if anything, looks like a very accurate definition of egoism.

There is another way in which Rawls’ theory can be said to be non-egoistic.

405 One basic condition for people in the original position is that it should be possible to formulate their principles without reference to proper names or to rigid definite descriptions.406 This means that it is not possible to agree on principles that are restricted for instance to the generation to which the parties in the original position belong. The point of this principle is obviously to achieve the impartiality that is the very point of the veil of ignorance, and so it can be said to be non-egoistic. But this goes for the system – not for the individuals. In

398 Rawls 1973 p.137

399 Rawls 1973 p.129

400 Rawls 1973 passim. See in particular p.148

401 Rawls 1973 p.14

402 Rawls 1973 pp.4, 11, 102f, 128, 142

403 Rawls 1973 pp.127, 129, 147f

404 Rawls 1973 p.13

405 Rawls 1973 pp.132ff

406 Rawls 1973 p.131

fact, the entire point of Rawls’ manoeuvre is to show that it is possible to achieve a non-egoistic system that is acceptable to everyone without assuming that people care about anyone but themselves. Rawls thus makes it absolutely clear that the concept of justice as fairness is supposed to be contractarian in the traditional meaning.

Rawls also stresses that even the most basic principles of justice have to be the result of the choice situation presented by the original position.407 This includes the so-called “natural duties” such as the duty not to be cruel. These are special in that they do not have to be voluntarily agreed on in the actual world – we are bound by them anyway.408

It thus seems quite clear that Rawls’ solution to the problem of intergenerational justice is a break with his intentions and his basic demands on principles of justice.

The general conclusion is that in spite of Rawls’ efforts to find a genuinely contractual theory of justice as fairness that includes intergenerational justice, he has failed to do so since his way of dealing with intergenerational relations is not derived from his original position.

Other contractarians not discussed here have offered different solutions to the asymmetry problem, but none have been able to produce any working solution.409 I believe that the approaches I have discussed explicitly in this and the previous sub-section are the most promising ones, and since they have failed, I believe we have to conclude that contractualism does not supply us with any rational reason to preserve species for the benefit of future generations.