The Zazas in Crisis
A qualitative study on the influence of the Turkish political
discourse on the Zaza Identity
Johanna Aslan
International Migration and Ethnic Relations Bachelor Thesis 15 credits
Spring 2020: IM245L
Supervisor: Anders Hellström
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Abstract
The author of this essay has during a field trip to Turkey done a research about the Zazas, an inbetweener group of people who often fall into the ethnic category of Kurds or Turks, gathering essential academic content and individual views from locals who were interviewed. The reasons behind the neglection of Zazas and the oppression against them caused by the nationalist
discourse of Turkey are explored and it is taught that when the Zazas were neglected their language, they officially became excluded of all the nation’s societal structures. Their language is now highly endangered, on a path to be forgotten. This research presents the Zazas and their endangered position due to a great identity loss caused by a nationalist state ruling, which has mainly affected the Zazas by the language restrictions forced upon them.
Keywords: Zaza, Turkey, Kurdish, identity, nationalism, ethnicity, minorities, exclusion.
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CONTENT
ABSTRACT & KEYWORDS 2
1.INTRODUCTION 4
1.1 AIM 5
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 5
1.3 DELIMITATION__________________________________________________________5
1.4 METHOD AND MATERIAL 5
1.5 DISPOSITION 8
1.6 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 9
2.NATIONALISM 13
2.1KEMALISM AND THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF TURKEY_________________________14
2.2TURKISH NATIONALISM 15
2.3 KURDISH NATIONALISM 17
2.4 ZAZA NATIONALISM 19
3.INTERVIEWS 21
4.ANALYSIS 27
5.SUMMARYANDCONCLUDINGREMARKS 31
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1. Introduction
In the book “The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern minority in a globalised society” (2018) by Mehmed S. Kaya, the author writes about the Zazas as a group of people in Eastern Turkey, referred to as Kurdish people speaking the dialect Zazaki, stating that there is very little known about them. (Kaya, 2018:1-3). He also describes that Zazas perceive the Turkish laws as unjust because “they do not regulate the citizens relation to the state by individual rights such as
freedom of expression, religious freedom, political freedom, cultural belonging etc (Kaya,
2018:79)”. The political discourse of Turkey has been criticized for being a contributor to the Zaza identity loss. Because of Turkey’s nationalistic political system, and what some refer to as repressive policies of the Turkish state and Kurdish organizations, the Zaza identity has been reflected as a political tool which, as divided and separated, becomes weakened culturally over time. Researchers in the field of IMER realize that understanding cultures, reviewing patterns of movement, relations between state and structures, but most of all the relationship between individuals all the way from a micro to a macro level is crucial to develop further expertise within the field of interest.
Kaya stresses the need for understanding nationalism in Turkey in order to understand the Zazas and their circumstances any further. He defines nationalism “… as an ideology is used by
the authorities and military apparatus as a tool to prevent minorities from developing their own independent organizations (Kaya, 2018:112)”. It is necessary to understand the past and the
movement of people involved in the particular field of interest, to comprehend how the structures around them were built and how they affect them today. These are i.eg. social, institutional- and political structures, which all of them in Turkey are based upon nationalism. Due to the
Language Ban Act of 1985 in Turkey, that banned any use of the Zazaki language in the Turkish territories, the Zazas were struck very hard since the Zazaki language was now forced to be taught solely within the Zazas private spheres, often in their own homes. This led to a generation almost completely left out of knowledge of the Zazaki language.
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1.1 Aim
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how the nationalist political discourse of Turkey acts as a contributor to the Zaza identity loss, with a main focus on the state’s neglection of their
language, which for the Zazas functions as a leading barrier of their identity. To do so, this thesis shall present a variety of theories of nationalism, connect them to the political foundation and current political system in Turkey, and explain how these may have affected the Zazas identity loss over time. Interviews with locals in Turkey are also held in order to get an insight to perspectives based on their individual thoughts on the subject of both the nationalism in their country and the prejudice against the Zazas.
1.2 Research Question
The following is the research question for this thesis:
- How has the nationalist political discourse in Turkey affected the Zaza and their identity loss?
1.3 Delimitation
The research within this thesis is geographically delimited to Turkey solely due to the higher number of Zazas available there. It also delimits to theories of nationalism, identity and language with nationalism being the largest area of focus. This is to emphasize that the three mentioned above are the core to how the political discourse affects the Zazas and their identity loss.
1.4 Method and Material
The chosen method for this thesis is mainly the qualitative method which includes
semi-structured interviews and a set of pre-written questions accompanied by questions that naturally may arise during the interviews. The material in this thesis contain several relevant sources such as academic journals, literature, and newspaper articles. Since there are more researches done about Kurds, the material consists a lot of information about them and is beneficial to emphasize the Zazas circumstances as well since they can identify with the Kurds on many levels such as
6 the neglection of them being a part of the Turkish nationhood by restricting their claimed
language as well.
One of the books to be used as material of this thesis is the book “The Zaza Kurds of
Turkey: A Middle Eastern minority in a globalised society” (2018) written by Mehmed S. Kaya.
This book is an ethnographic study about the Zaza people in Turkey where the author reveals a background of the Zaza culture with a larger focus on the Zazas in Bingöl and its surrounding areas; Solhan, Dare Yeni, Palu, Piran, Dersim and also the adjacent areas which are considered to be the “core areas” of the Zaza speaking population. The use of this book provides a greater insight in the Zaza culture and identity construction within Turkey, such as how they are bound to the Turkish and the Kurdish identity and their way of living.
In addition to that, another article used in this thesis is “Kurdish Nationalism and Competing
Ethnic Loyalties” (1994) written by Professor. Dr. Martin Van Bruinessen, where the author
writes about Kurdish nationalism and the foundation of the Kurdish nation. He also writes a lot about the Kurds and their relationship to the Zazas, the Kurdish identity and the existing identities such as the Sorani Kurds, Gorani-speaking Kurds, Kurmanji Kurds, mostly
differentiated because of divisions in language or dialect which he refers to as ‘intra-Kurdish
divisions’ (Bruinessen, 1994:11-12). Bruinessen is in this article shining light upon Kurdish
nation-building and knowledge in separating the different Kurdish identities from each other and in addition, he explains why they are different. This article is important for this thesis because it brings up some of the reasons to why the Zaza identity is affected by the overall Kurdish
identity. Cuma Çiçek is another author who in his book “The Kurds of Turkey” (2017) examines the Kurds in Turkey by creating an extensive analysis which includes the actions and behaviors of Kurdish political actors that gives light to the formation of what some might call an
autonomous Kurdish ‘space’ in Turkey.
In the book “Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods
Approaches” (2018), written by John W. Creswell, the author writes that using the qualitative
method is appropriate when one wants to understand people by observing them in their natural environment with a number of different materials gathered through i.e. interviews and
7 “Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder” (2011) aiming critique towards the use of the qualitative method and mentions that it may become too subjective due to the fact that qualitative researchers, who often start their investigations relatively open, may become influenced or inspired by their subjects and can therefore create a lack in transparency (Bryman, 2011:269). The interviews in this thesis have helped in understanding its topic widely through personal insights on the issue and does not lack transparency due to it all having been carefully transcribed.
As previously mentioned, the design of the interviews is semi-structural since the purpose of them is to answer a set of questions about their ideas and knowledge regarding the Zazas. In the book “Social research: issues, methods and process” (2001) by Tim May, the author
explains that semi-structured interviews are of good use in studies focusing on specific topics in comparison to i.e. structured interviews, that might weaken the quality of the result because of being a more controlled type of interview which leaves little or no space in order to create a deeper conversation in order to answer the questions (May, 2001:135-136).
The interviews are recorded by using a tape recorder rather than simple writing since the
interviewees might speak too fast to comprehend. (May, 2011:151). By the use of a tape recorder while conducting the interviews, one will be able to record the interview without interrupting the interviewee all too much and can instead let the conversation flow.
The interview questions will be exploring the background of the interviewee, the current role in the profession and their knowledge and attitudes towards the political portrayal of the Zazas in the academic field and within Turkey. After completing the interviews, the material is
transcribed and compared each other to then analyze and interpret them. According to May, a comparison of the interviews can create a bigger picture of the situation and intensify the search of validity (May, 2011:135-136).
Furthermore, the reason for emphasizing this thesis by conducting interviews are explained by David Silverman in his book “Interpreting qualitative data“ where he writes that “..of the
strengths of qualitative research is its ability to access directly what happens in the world, that is to examine what people actually do in real life rather than asking them to comment upon it
(Silverman, 2011:166)”. The interpretation of the data leads the thesis closer to a more realistic perspective based on the interviews with people both affected and engaged in the topic of the
8 Zaza. The thesis conducts four interviews with three different people who each identify
themselves as Kurdish, Zaza and Turkish. These three persons are selected randomly during a trip to Turkey where the author searched for people engaged in the topic of Zazas and who could either identify or relate to them, as well as freely want to give their input to this study. They were found through the author’s friends and relatives in Turkey, however, the interviewees themselves are neither friends or relatives of the author. The fourth person interviewed is Murat Bukan, the President of the Zaza Association Federation in Ankara. A set of nine questions are asked to understand the local’s political perspective and attitudes towards the Zazas. Obviously, these four individuals cannot represent the perspectives of a whole nation, but they do give their personal insights on the topic which helps in building new perspectives regarding it. The nine questions asked are chosen randomly in accordance to the author’s own interest to develop competence within the field of study, believing the answers to these questions will help fulfilling the aim of this thesis by providing answers to its research question. Because of security reasons and ethics, the three non-public interviewees are given the initials B.R, Z.E, and G.G. The
questions are formulated by in accordance to Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s view on nationalism and quotations regarding the Zazas from authors who have written about them. The nine questions asked are the following:
● Where do you think the Zaza people come from originally?
● Do you recognize the Zazas as different from the Kurds and the Turks, and if so - why? ● Do you think that the Zaza people can be recognized as an own nation?
● Can there be any differences in the consequences for Zazas who identify themselves as Turkish and the Zazas who identify themselves as Kurdish in Turkey?
● Do you think the politics in Turkey has affected the Zaza identity? ● Why is it that the Zazaki language is so important for the Zaza people? ● Do you believe that Zazaki is a Kurdish dialect?
● Do you think it’s important to acknowledge Zaza as an own minority? ● What role do you think the laws in Turkey has played for the Zaza people?
1.5 Disposition
Chapter one consists of an introduction to the subject of this thesis, its aim, research question, delimitations and a presentation of the methods and materials used in this thesis follows. In this
9 chapter, it is explained why the specific methods and materials have chosen and applied to fulfill the aim of this thesis. The chapter continues with a presentation of previous researches done within the field regarding the Zazas and their language. Chapter two introduces definitions and theories of nationalism, contributed by multiple authors, writers, and politically engaged individuals. This enables an understanding to what nationalism is and how it has affected governments and people over time by providing an historic overview to then leave room for interpretations and comprehension of the fact that most of these nationalistic features are still influencing governments and affecting people worldwide. Then, different theories of
nationalisms within Turkey are presented. First introduced is Kemalism upon which the latter is founded – Turkish nationalism. Then there is a Kurdish interpretation of nationalism – Kurdish nationalism. Likewise, the Zazas claim their rights based on their theory of nationalism and how their national rights have been neglected mainly because of the language restrictions forced upon them due to the Turkish nationalism and partly because of the Kurdish nationalism. Why
language is of such an importance to the Zazas is also mentioned in this chapter. Chapter three consists of the transcriptions from the interviews in this research. All the questions are listed above their answers. The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the locals in Turkey view the political situation in their country regarding the circumstances within which the Zazas are situated, and vice versa. Their prejudices both against and for the Zazas are also expressed. Their contributions give a personal insight to the topic which differs from the academic researches previously done regarding Zazas and their situation. Chapter four analyses this thesis, its theories of nationalism and the interview transcriptions to then put it all in context. Lastly, chapter five summarizes the thesis and ends it with concluding remarks.
1.6 Previous research
In the academic journal article “The Zaza People as a New Ethno-Political Factor in the Region” (1999) written by Victoria Arakelova, the author writes of the Zazas as a new ethno-political group of people in the region of Caucasus. She also writes that “the Zazas has never claimed
their separate existence, as they have for centuries been surrounded by the Kurds, the people with a homogenous language and close culture. Therefore, in the ‘outer world’ they have always been under the shadow of the Kurdish ethnic and national prevalence, and during the last century and a half, it has been totally suppressed by the Kurd’s political strivings manifested in
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numerous movements (Arakelova, 1999:397)”. Arakelova also criticize the lack of political
consideration to the background and purely academic works about the Zazas topic, even though findings of often rare and contradictory materials inhabited by the Zazas (Arakelova,1999:397), which failed to fulfill any proper knowledge about this group of people.
Zazas have more frequently been mentioned in linguistic articles where many of the results have been inconsistent and disagreeing on the similarities of the relation between Zazaki and other Kurdish dialects such as Kurmanji (the dominantly spoken Kurdish dialect). However, in the article “Zazaki ile Kurmanci Lehçelerinin Fonetik Yönünden Karşılaştırılması”, is a phonetic comparison between what Karacan and Kaya refer to as two Kurdish dialects: Zazaki and
Kurmanji. In this study, they investigate differences and similarities between the dialects based on the alphabet, sound, and phonetic characteristics. Karacan and Kaya conclude their study by stating that there is nothing to be questioned further, the two dialects are simply closer to each other than the differences dividing them. (Karacan & Kaya, 2015:114). They here agree on Zazaki being a Kurdish dialect, not a separate language.
On the contrary, an author who denies the resemblance between Kurdish and Zazaki is Ludwig Paul, in his article “Zazaki” (2010), where he tackles the subject with an historic-linguistic approach. He writes that Kurmanci has been the most important single language to influence Zazaki over time. The Turkish influence on Zazaki has, on the other hand, been rapidly increasing for the past decades (Paul, 2010:546). Paul provides the reader with an extensive work that covers most part of the linguistic functions as he states that Zazaki “[linguistically] is a
North-West Iranian language, more closely related to Gôrani and the (Iranian) Âzari dialects than to Kurdish (Paul, 2010:545)”. In comparison to Karacan and Kaya, Paul refers to Zazaki as
a language rather than a dialect.
Although some linguists have proven the differences between the Kurdish language and the Zaza language and their belonging to the same language-family, it is still viewed as a Kurdish dialect. Perhaps this is due to the fact that there are so many positioning arguments which constantly are changing, and mistakes are being made in their studies surrounding Zazaki, not making the studies around the Zaza language complete. The importance of the great
11 factor that could decide the case: language. Varol and Elaltuntaş discuss the building blocks and importance of the Zazaki language, in the linguistic book “Uluslararası Zaza Dili Sempozyumu” referred to as Zazaki or dimili. (Varol & Elatuntaş, 2011). From an extract in the book it is notably worthy to understand how the lack of knowledge about Zazaki is restricting the linguistic studies about it:
In spite of the small grammatical knowledge of Zazaki, Persian and Kurmanc, there were minor differences between these languages. Therefore, Lerch does not realize the
grammatical gender of the eleven other words recorded in the oral e and ending with –e, -i, –a: for example, aşme ‘ay’[me], kerge ‘tavuk’ [chicken], kardi ‘bıçak’ [knife], keina ‘kız’[girl], manga ‘inek’ [cow]. The Austrian linguist Friedrich Müller (1864) did not realize that Zazaki distinguishes grammatical gender. He also thought that Zazaki and Kurmanji were dialects of Persian, but it turned out to be a mistake. On the other hand, F. Müller made two important determinations in his study: the first was that Zazaki was older than Kurmanic and Persian, and the second had a different historical language development, for example the old Iranian baw and is kept in Zazaki against Kurmancca. This was later supported by other examples by scientists such as F. Spiegel (1871), W. Tomaschek (1887), W. Geiger (1891-1901), [and] A. Socin (1901).
(Varol & Elantuntaş, 2011:116)
The challenges with separating views contesting each other can be a motivator to why the discussion about language is so important to raise among the Zazas.
The study made by Varol and Elantuntaş first shows on how incomplete linguistic analyses can affect the conclusions heavily. The discovery of Zazaki being older than Kurmanji has in this study been confirmed. The Minority Rights Group in Turkey mentions Zaza in the category of the Kurds by stating that “Kurds speak Kurdish, which is divided into Kurmanci, Zaza and other
dialects (Minority Rights Group International, 2018)”, and portrays their stance of Zaza as a
dialect as well. Bruinessen heavily argues against this argument of Zazaki as a Kurdish dialect and instead views the attempts for Kurdish nation-building as the oppressing factor that discourages Zaza from owning their language rather than branching out as a dialect. He states that the Kurds tried to motivate their nationhood with the help of the Stalinist definition of a nation but were for many left-winged parties seen as a national minority that “does not have the
right of self- determination and cannot establish its separate communist party (Bruinessen,
1994:10)”. In order to fulfill the criteria of language, the Kurds had to declare the language difference of the Zaza-speakers as a Kurdish dialect instead rather than proper Kurdish.
12 Bruinessen mentions that the separation and denial of Zazaki as an own language and referring to it as a dialect is also how the authorities in Turkey had motivated for the Kurdish language as a Turkish dialect (Bruinessen, 1994:10). Finally, using the words of Bruinessen “referring the
language as a dialect is also how the authorities in Turkey had motivated for the Kurdish language as a Turkish dialect (Bruinessen, 1994:10)”. Perhaps this is one of the reasons to why
the largest discussion concerning Zazas involve language, which has become a symbol of either separation or unity since it seemed to be the biggest motivator for both inclusion and exclusion.
Therefore, the Zaza population is an ethnic group in crisis and a victim of previously oppressed oppressors. Conceptualizing identity can be different among researchers depending on their chosen theories and methodologies. The result of this has been several different terms that explores identity as a socio-cultural construction. However, this thesis will define an individual’s feeling of belonging to an ethnic group, people, race, or tribe as ethnic identity. In addition to ethnic identity, also national identity will be discussed as it is a sense of belonging to a state or a nation and can perhaps explain the process of new nations occurring from within current nations. Both identities can also help the Zazas themselves to encourage a stronger identity positioning, especially when it comes to passing on the Zazaki language, which itself can be seen as the most important factor tied to the Zaza identity.
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2. Nationalism
Theorists of nationalism have largely been discussing both how and why nationalism came forward as a phenomenon where some claim that nationalism has always been a factor within groups and nations formed because of common features such as language and feelings of belonging within specific groups (Özkirimli, 2000:49). Others, such as the modernists Gellner and Hobsbawn, instead suggests that nationalism and nations are simply created by elitists (Özkirimli, 2000:94). The theory of nationalism is criticized for its inability to clarify the
uncertain boundaries that a nation has as well as the definition of what a nation is, which Eriksen also recognizes as nationalism is neither positioned any more left than right on a political scale. Nationalism highlights equality, but also shuts out non-inclusive groups. (Eriksen, 1993:135). According to Anthony D. Smith, nationalism is defined as “an ideological movement to attain
and maintain autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members believe it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ (Smith, 2009:61)”. Smith continues his
definition of nationalism by explaining that “Nationalism is a doctrine about the nation, not the
state (Smith, 2009:61)”.
However, the approach and positioning for understanding nationalism will in this thesis be through Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s model of the imaginary community and political power construction. He describes nationalism as a politically constructed feeling of community within a state or nation as he exemplifies how Norway had to find something that linked different classes together into one single identity that became the Norwegian identity (Eriksen, 1993:131). The most important factor was to create a scenario that all people could relate to and the construction was established by elitists since it was essential for nationalism to derive from common beliefs within the nation. Eriksen’s also writes that “Contrasting is not, moreover, merely a political
instrument intended to create loyalty and internal homogeneity; it is equally important as a means to achieve recognition (Eriksen, 2004:57-58)”. Whereas recognition of a group of people
can be in the form of a nation. He also mentions that nationhood grounds upon the national ideology’s transformation, sentiments and commitments of citizens from their personal experiences to that abstract and imagined community called the nation. He then describes that “When national leaders use kinship terminology (‘brothers and sisters’, ‘fatherland’,
‘homeland’, ‘mother tongue’ and so on) to designate features of the abstract community which is the nation, they are busy carrying out this work (Eriksen, 2004:58-59)”. Eriksen concludes a
14 nation as a ‘metaphoric kin group’, their place or their nation as a ‘metaphoric nation’ where they live in an imaginary community without the need for kin. He does not neglect the existence of nations, instead he states that “their reality hinges on the efficacy of social constructions
relating citizens to one another through fictive kinship, and creating a fatherland through geographical abstractions (Eriksen, 2004:59)”.
Furthermore, the complexity of nationalism is how to clarify or define identity while maintaining limits. Eriksen notes that the socio-cultural boundaries should clearly fit with the political boundaries but are at the same time very difficult to maintain. It can be seen as if nations are political and territorial with the need to categorize people into groups of us and them based on citizenship from a perspective of ethnic and nationalistic ideology. The cultural
similarity amongst the citizens becomes political, and in this way the us-group or i.e. the ones belonging to the national identity can demand more than ethnic identities in a multiethnic society (Eriksen, 1993:145). Nationalism itself manifests through contrasting and is a way to give sense of “relational uniqueness (Eriksen, 2004:57)”. The imagined community of the Zaza nation can only be real if there is a metaphorical community that identifies with being Zaza. Although Eriksen’s focus upon nationalism is heavily emphasizing the ethnic perspective within
nationalism, he acknowledges that there are forms of nationalism that are not constructed by it. He speaks about a general type of nationalism that doesn’t emphasize the importance of
ethnicity, it rather highlights the citizenship, with its official language, flags, symbols and the national anthem whereas the own national identity is not highlighted as much as the country of residence (Eriksen, 1993:146-147). As shown above, the critical way that Eriksen analyzes nationalism makes it possible to examine norms, power-structures and oppression. Nationalism as a power construction will be reflected in this paper in order to frame the possible impact that it has on the Zaza identity with the alignment of the nationalist discourse in Turkey.
2.1 Kemalism and the political discourse in Turkey
The nationalist discourse in Turkey is based upon the thoughts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, today often spoken of as an ideology on its own referred to as Kemalism. His ideas were still are the foundation of what is referred to as the new Turkish Republic, founded in 1923. (Kaya,
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society” by Mehmed S. Kaya, the author writes that “Turkey has denied the existence of the Zaza Kurds since the foundation of the republic in 1923 (Kaya, 2018:111)”. His view on the Turkish
state is based on Kemalism, and he explains that to understand the identity of the Zazas, it is necessary to “explain the official ideology of Kemalism (Kaya, 2018:114)”. Kemalism was “inspired by the Pan-Turkic ideas of the Young Turks of the late Ottoman Empire (Kaya, 2018:115)”. It meant that Ataturk’s attempt with his ideology in modernizing Turkey left no room for minorities outside the Turkish identity since these new beliefs came with the urge of wanting to create a more westernized nation. (Kaya, 2018:114-115).
Kaya’s interpretation of the Kemalist core is that:
The Turkish state is perceived as a holy entity. It is the state that is to be protected against individuals and not the opposite, as is the case with modern western democracies… [W]hen the Kurds demand fundamental democratic rights such as the right to use their own language and that their culture is respected within the Turkish state structure, it is perceived as a threat to the social order, that is to the Turkish state, or as activity hostile to the state. (Kaya, 2018:112)
This denial of rights also applies to the Zazas, even though Kaya is explaining the situation for the Kurds here, since they fall outside the frame of the national identity and are not considered as Turkish. Instead, they are rather Kurdish, in Kaya’s perspective. He moves on in his explanation of the relationship between the state and those living within it as he writes that “[t]he state is the
fellowship of those who define themselves as Turks and it represents their common spirit and mentality” … “other cultural minorities who do not deny their ethnic backgrounds are excluded and despised” … “considered sub-human[s]” … “[and] often referred to as animals (Kaya,
2018:112-113)”. The non-inclusive politics of Atatürk’s Kemalist ideology excluded the Kurds from the political field, important positions within the public sector and even academic
institutions. The state was in direct control over some of its meso structures such as the Universities (Kaya, 2018:113).
2.2 Turkish nationalism
The strong nationalist assimilation politics in Turkey calls for Turkish identification among their citizens. A direct opponent within the discourse is the Kurdish population who have a history of
16 oppression and injustice brought by the Turkish state. In the article “Kurder och
identitetsbildning” (2013) written by Aziz Aksungur, the author views the Turkish nationalism as
religiously grounded Kemalism. This view upon is shared by Kaya who previously contrasted Kemalism as a religion. In addition to that, Aksungur emphasizes that Turkey was supposed to be a state for Turks and that Kemalism was to serve the state’s purpose even if this was to be on the cost of individuals free will. This means that the nationalistic Turkish identity was to be applied on every individual in society, regardless, including the Kurdish part of Turkey which “accounts for 20% (approximately 15-19 million) of the population in Turkey.” Aksungurs also emphasizes the catastrophic consequences for all Kurds in Turkey as their existence was completely denied. This denial led to them being referred to as “mountain Turks.” During the Kemalist era, the ruling of Atatürk, minorities were nothing to even discuss (Aksungur, 2013:10-11).Aksungur is critical towards the idea of Kemalism since it affects the Kurdish people
negatively, and if one views Zazas as a part of the Kurdish community, then it also affects them negatively.
Moreover, in the book “Un(intended) Language Planning in a Globalising World Multiple
Levels of Players at Work” (2018) written by Catherine CHUA Siew Kheng, the author writes
about the ban of using other language than the official language in Turkey. The ban itself became criminal and was punishable according to Turkish law. “Initially, the lack of recognition of
Kurdish was framed within a discourse of national identity and state building. Within this discourse, internal ethnic divisions were denied as creating divisions within Turkish identity and Kurds were considered as linguistically and culturally primitive Turks (Kheng, 2018:32)”.
Forced assimilation and homogenization, as Kaya explains the actions of Atatürk’s nationalism, became one of the markers for recognizing Kemalism. One example can be made with referral to the Language ban act of 1985 in Turkey, which Kheng argues against because she sees language one “marker of difference” between ethnic groups while, emphasizing specifically on Turks and Kurds. In addition to that, she mentions that language was one of the strongest points on the checklist for assimilation and explains that the planning of the Turkish language itself didn’t ban Kurdish. However, it surely favored language policies emphasizing Turkish to be the only language in Turkey (Kheng, 2018:32-33).
17 The declaration of the language ban within the Turkish constitution was defined and prohibited the use of all languages within the public sphere except from the official language in Turkey, which is Turkish (Kheng, 2018:33). According to the Minority Rights Group, Turkey is missing a framework that can address minority rights in Turkey. They state that there isn’t any no comprehensive legislative framework for minorities in Turkey that directly grant them minority rights. There are, however, laws that aim to limit the political, participatory, religious,
educational and linguistic rights of minorities (Minority Rights Group International, 2018). This is despite that minority protection were imposed on Turkey in alignment with the Treaty of Sèvres, which required Turkey to “guarantee the rights of ‘racial, religious or linguistic’
minorities, without distinction (Minority Rights Group International, 2018)”. The political stand
of the nationalistic message that Atatürk sent out with the constitution as a basis for groups of other ethnic belonging is met with forced assimilation or restricted fellowship by the state. The dedication to the nationalistic ideology of Atatürk is determined and stressed in article 2 within the Turkish constitution as quoted:
“The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble”.
Despite the wish for a republic consisting of democratic rights, it has many gaps open for interpretation, in other words, everything that goes beyond these written words can be left out. As seen above in article 2, the Turkish constitution is instituted by Atatürk and leaves no room for otherness within the Turkish Republic. In the words of Eriksen, he states that from a
nationalist perspective, ethnic ideologies could justify social hierarchies. Clarification regarding the relationship between ethnicity and other criteria for hierarchization is therefore essential. (Eriksen, 2010:59)”. Following the nationalism of Atatürk would mean giving up on the other minorities such as the Zaza, and instead agree on belonging solely to the Turkish identity, which indicates forced assimilation. If one would decide not to surrender, the constituted rights of public peace, national solidarity, justice, and human rights can be taken away.
2.3 Kurdish nationalism
Critically viewing the relations according to the framework of Eriksen’s nationalism that sees nationalism as a power-construction makes it plausible to apply the idea of the need for other
18 minorities and ethnic groups to strengthen the Kurdish nation, with a sense of becoming a more influential group of people. It is logical that a dominant ethnic group have greater impact than a small minority since it affects a larger group of people. Kurdish nationalism has a long history of failing to achieve unity between its people due to the challenges in defining a Kurd. In his article “Kurdish Nationalism and Competing Ethnic Loyalties”, Bruinessen presents the Kurdish nation-building as a somewhat non-constructed case that initially demanded unity and a creation of a common identity (Bruinessen, 1994:1). He writes that “[a]lmost everyone in Turkey may find a
distant Kurdish ancestor if he goes far enough back. Those with at least one Kurdish
grandparent is a vast reservoir of potential Kurds (Bruinessen, 1994:3)”. Bruinessen means that
the intra-ethnic relationships among Kurds and their surrounding neighbors makes it harder to simply define Kurds, in this case even Turkish or Zaza.
Although intra-ethnic relationships are very common across most countries and cultures, it is not the only reason for the complexity in identifying the Kurds. Bruinessen provides us with several reasons to why Turkey failed to identify Kurds during the 1965 census, although the real world witnessed otherwise. One of the reasons he writes about regards the national integration where the governmental policy doesn’t enumerate the country’s religious and linguistic groups within the nation’s borders. In the few cases where they do, results are reluctant to be published. A second reason that he presents is its dependency on the political and social context whereas a person identifies himself as a Kurd or not. (Bruinessen, 1994:2)”. What Bruinessen forgets to mention here is the question of whether the participants in the census were able to simply identify themselves as another group or not. A clear standing point here seems to be that Kurds exist, and leaves out the prospects of other ethnic belongings such as Zazas. This neglects the possibility to answer any differently.
Furthermore, what became a very popular association in the political discourse that developed during the 20th century was Joseph Stalin's influential writings on the national
question and the Charter of the United Nations as they both emphasize the right to nations’ self-determination. Bruinessen writes that Stalin’s definition of a nation consisted of five
characteristics, and these were commonness in history, language, territory, economic life and culture and expressing a national character. (Bruinessen, 1994:9-10)”. The attempts to prove the existence of a Kurdish nation were too weak among Kurdish nationalists and the definition of
19 Stalin became a working frame for the rise of Kurdish nationalism.
A previous way to name someone Kurd was determined during the rule of the Ottoman Empire which was also applied the same way by the “Persian administrators” up until the 1930s when Turkey started denying the Kurds, and speaking about Kurds became forbidden (Bruinessen, 1994:4). These empires included tribesmen who weren’t Turkish and speakers of both Kurdish and Zazaki. (Bruinessen, 1994:4)”. Bruinessen marks that as a result of the wide-stretched inclusion of groups that could differentiate linguistically, religiously and socially they could also exclude, i.e. non-tribal groups that also “spoke Kurdish (or Gurani or Zaza) dialects as their first
language (Bruinessen, 1994:4)”. Although there were clear differences between these people,
especially linguistically, Kurdish nationalists claimed that their language was born from the language spoken by the Medes people (Bruinessen, 1994:5). A nationalist thought was not enough to define Kurds, instead, linguists emphasized on the differences of Zaza and Gurani compared to many of the other Kurdish dialects such as Kurmanci or Sorani (Bruinessen,
1994:5). Bruinessen states that speakers of Zazaki have by the Zazas themselves been considered as Kurds for as long as one can remember, which has been a shared opinion amongst both Kurds and Turks as well. This although native Kurdish speakers couldn’t even understand Zazaki, unless they actively tried to learn it. (Bruinessen, 1994:6)”. Bruinessen aims a lot of critique towards the way Kurdish nationalists have tried to bind Zazas to a Kurdish identity, and it is important to question if there can be a connection to why many Zazas refer themselves as Kurdish.
2.4 Zaza nationalism
In the book “The Kurds of Turkey: National, Religious and Economic Identities” (2016) written by Çiçek, the author defines the Zaza identity as: “a resource for political mobilization (Çiçek, 2016:99)”. Ciçek motivates this by mentioning that:
The mobili[z]ation of the Zaza identity by different Sunni Muslims and Alevi Kurds is a response to the Kurdish national groups, in particular the BDP DTK/PKK KCK [short for Peace and Democracy party, a political party active in Turkey / the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, a political party active in Northern Iraq”, which he defines as “[Kurdistan], which mostly mobili[z]es the Kurmanci speaking Kurds but does not exclude Zazaki speaking Kurds. Moreover, both pro Islamists and Alevis see the Zaza identity as an operative resource for distinguishing themselves from the leading Kurdish movement in the
20 political scene.
(Çiçek, 2017:99)
He writes that the Kurdish movement rather has been “mobilizing remarkable resources to
revitalize the Kurmanci dialect (Çiçek, 2017:99)”. He goes on by arguing that the Kurdish
movement makes less of an effort for those who speaks the Zazaki dialect despite viewing them as a part of the Kurdish society in comparison to Kurmanci speakers. Ciçek is referring to the Zaza identity as a construction forged by the Turkish state intervention. He writes that the Turkish state intervention into the foundation of the Zaza identity as an alternative identity must be highlighted in order to understand that it is relational to political constructs with fluid
boundaries (Çiçek, 2017:101).
Çiçek interprets this intervention from the Turkish state as a “political response directed
towards the Kurdish opposition in order to create a disadvantage in their political growth
(Çiçek, 2017:101)”. He argues that the method governed by the Turkish state is separation and confusion. At the same time, he explains how the state first tried to differentiate between Alevi Kurds and Kurds by stating that these are separated since Alevis cannot be Kurd when they in reality are Turks. Then the state tried to differentiate between Kurds who spoke Zazaki and the ones who spoke Kurmanci, arguing that the Zazas are not Kurds, instead, they are a distinct nation. In addition to this, they could also at some points argue for the Zazas not being Turkish either. Since the Zazas didn’t react to this, the state went ahead with ruling out even Zazaki as a distinct language which should belong in the Zazas distinct nation (Çiçek, 2017:102). Cicek concludes that the foundation of Kurdish and Zaza identities are pretty much impossible to understand unless their interaction with political entrepreneurs is reviewed, whereas these are the leading Kurdish movement and the Turkish state (Çiçek, 2017:102). The way that Çiçek argues for Zaza as a political tool is also how Eriksen defines the function of nationalism. It is important to note in this case that Zazas have had their identity blurred out through several efforts made by the Turkish state such as implementing the language ban.
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3. Interviews
Where do you think the Zaza people come from originally?
“In the opinion of scientists, a significant part of the people of Zaza (Dimili); They migrated from the Deylemistan region on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea to today's Anatolia of Iran and settled mostly in Eastern Anatolia. In 542 BC, the inscription of the king of Pars Dara (Darius) is called the Fır Zazana Yukarı of the Upper Euphrates and the Tigris Basin. It reveals the fact that Zazas' country is Deylem-Gilan-Khorasan. Action of Zazas. Deylem-Gilan-Horasan is the main house of the Zazas (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
“They belong to us Kurds (B.R, Kurd)”.
“From the beginning they are connected to the Persians (Z.E, Zaza)”.
“I have no knowledge of that. I have always believed that they come from the Kurds (G.G, Turk)”.
Do you recognize the Zazas as different from the Kurds and the Turks, and if so - why?
“Zaza are different from the Turks, but they do not differ from the Kurds because they are basically Kurds. The Turks and Zaza have nothing in common except that they live in the same country (B.R, Kurd)”.
“The Zazas have their own lifestyle which is more closer Kurds than Turks, they came closer to Turks during the 1930s, but came close to the Kurds way more back than that, I don’t know the exact date now but...Because after World War 1 when the Turkish Republic was founded, they tried to go around, sending teachers to everywhere where Zaza lives in Turkey and the villages and tried to teach them to speak and write in Turkish, and tried to make them Turkish… (Z.E, Zaza)”.
“I think Zaza is different from the Turks because language, ethnicity and history differ. When it comes to the Kurds, I think there is not as clear a dividing line. The reason for this is that many
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Kurds claim that Zaza is Kurdish with a different dialect. Zaza can also claim to be Kurdish. That is exactly why I am a little uncertain about this issue (G.G, Turk)”
Do you think that the Zaza people can be recognized as an own nation?
“Yeah. Because our people are going back to history by applying psychological pressure and relying on them for years, using the technology they have prepared, and there is the possibility to discover and explain the true history and language. In this sense, the Zazas recognized
themselves and had the opportunity to learn their true history and language. With significant contributions from Bingöl and Munzur universities, the Zazas are now struggling to learn, teach and survive. We sincerely believe that all the facts that will mature in this regard will be
accepted by the political authorities of our country and will have a constitutional definition. I would like to emphasize that the Zazas, who do not belong to political or marginal
organizations, do not feel that they belong to a different ethnic origin, nor do they go to a different definition (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
“They don’t have any problems, we are same, Zaza is Kurdish but they don’t fight for their rights, when the Kurds were oppressed by the government the Zazas made no resistance, we fought for our rights, they didn’t, I don’t like Zazas (B.R, Kurd)”.
Can there be any differences in the consequences for Zazas who identify themselves as Turkish and the Zazas who identify themselves as Kurdish in Turkey?
“Of course, he can. However, as I said before, the basis for this is the lack of real history and political order. Due to the banned system and the repressive policies of the state and Kurdish organizations in the region, some Zaza people considered themselves Turkish and others considered Kurdish as Zaza. Because of political and ideological considerations, some Zazas took part in Turkish nationalist parties and Kurdish parties, and as they pursued this policy, they made them feel Turkish and Kurdish according to their aims and definitions. This led to the formation of concepts such as Turkish Zaza and Kurdish Zaza (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
23
traitors. Earlier, when Turkey oppressed Kurds, Zaza did not resist, so I would not have been shocked if they would rather be identified as Turks (B.R, Kurd)”.
“That is actually really mixed, i think those who say that they are Turkish believes that a country is a whole. That believes in the Turkish doctrine of nationhood. And those who say that they are Kurds believes in the opposite, Kurdish politics (Z.E, Zaza)”.
“Yes of course! In the long run, this will help Zaza identity and language disappear more and more. They may identify themselves as Turks or Kurds because these two have a stronger position in Turkey than Zaza, BUT this is wrong when they erase their own Zaza identity on the way (G.G, Turk)”.
Do you think the politics in Turkey has affected the Zaza identity?
“Of course...! Since the foundation of the Republic, Zazas have been trying to protect their language and identity despite their prohibitions. Unfortunately, in the last 40 years, the Kurdish political movement and its organizations have been tried to be kept away from them through their repressive and discriminatory policies. In recent years, the attitude of the development of the system to the prohibitions in our country has been positively reflected in the identity, language and culture of the Zazas, but this cannot be said to be sufficient. In this context, we expect political parties to take steps to remove these pressures and prohibitions against the Zaza people under universal law. As the Federation, we will also meet with political interlocutors and continue our efforts to fulfill this expectation (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
“Turkish politics has affected us Kurds very much, Zaza Kurds have not gone through a crap. Turkey has started to allow us to speak Kurdish, but it is still something that I avoid in public contexts, since the Kurdish identity and culture have been invisible for a long time and considered the ‘enemy’ (B.R, Kurd)”.
“It is the main cause for it, politics is affecting it because the politics doesn’t allow it [the Zaza identity], as said, they tried to make people Turkish (Z.E, Zaza)”.
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“As I mentioned earlier, I am critical of politics in Turkey because of their strong nationalism. So yes, politics plays a big role in how Zaza identity and culture are affected. In my opinion, they are affected in a negative way as they cannot learn their own language in schools and where they are not classified as a minority. All this undermines Zaza identity and culture (G.G, Turk).
Why is it that the Zazaki language is so important for the Zaza people?
“Language; Besides being a means of communication, it is also an alphabet of thought, identity, history and culture. In other words, his memory, his genetic background and the treasure of all vital accumulation. Language is the pride and honor of a people. The name of the peoples who forgot their language or whose language was assimilated was deleted in history. There are many tribes in Anatolia whose language and identity have been lost. Years later, excavations left nothing but ceramic tribes. Through this window, it is essential that the Zaza language survive and survive. We said that language is the honor of the people and we will protect the honor of all Zazas (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
“Don't know. It is their Kurdish dialect. I myself think they should see Kurmanji as important as Kurmanji is larger and more usable than Zazaki (B.R, Kurd)”.
“It is your own identity, your soul. If you don’t have your own language, then you go back to the stone age speaking with sign language. They are all born with it, grown up with it, if you don’t speak your own language then you aren’t you (Z.E, Zaza)”.
“Language is important for all groups, not just Zaza. Language is primarily a means of communication between one another but also to convey their history, culture and oppression. Languages similar to flags show how to differ from the "other" flags and languages. It becomes an identity symbol in a way (G.G, Turk)”.
Do you believe that Zazaki is a Kurdish dialect?
“The academic view on Zaza is also very clear, Zaza is a separate language. Today, the standard distinction between language and dialect is at a certain point in linguistic studies around the world. If the two communities can understand each other without special education,
25
and if there is no problem in communication between them, it is accepted that these two communities speak the dialects of the same language. If these two communities cannot accept and if there is a very serious distinction in terms of communication, these two communities are considered to speak different languages. Zaza and Kurdish are not languages that understand each other. Therefore, technically, these are two separate languages (Murat Bukan, 2019)”. “I don’t think so. Zazaki is so different. It is a different dialect. They can understand us, but some I know also know Kurmanji because they have grown up with it. It is more common here that they also learn Kurmanji because they are Kurdish, but also, they often have someone married to someone who is Kurmanc in their family. Not many people know Zazaki, instead they go and learn Kurmanji because it is better (B.R, Kurd)”.
“It is two completely different languages, culturally, sure they belong together but it is two completely different languages. It is like Finnish and Swedish. If someone doesn’t know Zazaki that speaks Kurdish they can’t understand Zazaki. If the Zaza don’t know Kurdish they cannot understand Kurdish. But since they were living in the same areas, automatically they mixed together a lot through marriage between Kurds and Zazas. So automatically one will learn both languages because they live so close to each other, but it doesn’t make it the same (Z.E, Zaza)”. “As I mentioned before, I don't have that much knowledge about this much. But if I assume that Zaza is a separate ethnic minority group in Turkey, should Zazaki be their language? Otherwise you should call Zazas as Kurds and not as Zaza (G.G, Turk)”.
Do you think it is important to acknowledge Zaza as an own minority?
“Of course it's important. Zazas have been living on this land for thousands of years and the cornerstone of the nation mosaic in our country. Zaza cannot be considered a group or tribe. It is our basic approach to ensure that all people live together in the framework of brotherhood law with laws in which they have equal rights (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
“No, they are Kurds and they already belong to the Kurdish minority so there is no point in seeing them as their own minority? (B.R, Kurd)”.
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“It is, we are an own minority, because we are a group of people who have been living longer here than Turks and Kurds (Z.E, Zaza)”.
“Yes, but not just politically. Other Zaza should also do so and raise themselves rather than identify themselves as Turks/Kurds. Everything is not to blame for Turkey, although there are many shortcomings. Somewhere you also have to fight for your own and inform others about themselves as a group (G.G, Turk)”.
What role do you think the laws in Turkey has played for the Zaza people?
“Unfortunately, Turkey represents our identity, is to comply with international standards on religious freedom issues. We expect that the more libertarian laws that everyone can find themselves will be implemented within the framework of universal law. As the Federation of Zaza Associations, we will continue our struggle with the following demands for our language and culture. These demands are as follows;
• The language of ZAZA should be guaranteed by the Constitution.
• Although Zaza Language is accepted as a separate language in the scientific world, political decisions should impose the imposition of our language as a dialect.
• It is important for primary schools to be taught as elective courses, but more teachers should be appointed by exceeding the limited number of teachers assigned, and primary education should be the language of instruction.
• While there are channels in TRT, which broadcasts in Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic in our country, the lack of a television channel and a radio broadcasting in Zaza is a major deficiency. We want this deficiency to be solved immediately.
• Positive discrimination should be ensured for the protection, development and survival of the Zaza language and culture which is in danger of disappearance.
• Zaza language should be able to find place in official correspondence in all institutions and organizations, especially municipalities, especially in provinces where Zazas live intensively (Murat Bukan, 2019)”.
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4. Analysis
This research has found that not only the Turkish nationalism was a contributing factor to the Zaza identity loss, but also the Kurdish nationalism implicated the Zaza identity through their own methods of nation-building. The results of the interviews mostly encourage Zazas placing as an own ethnic identity group, whereas the suspicion of bias can be placed due to nationalist thinking among the participants.
The interviewees provide us with the insight of where the Zazas originally comes from, this is one of the larger points for the Kurdish nation-building that has been referring to the same heritage between the Zazas and the Kurds as ancestors of the Medes people. As previously mentioned in the chapter about Kurdish nationalism, the difficulties in creating unity among Kurds and their inability to fulfill the ‘requirements’ for becoming a nation, can be problematic if a group within the group says otherwise. Since one of the definitions described by Stalin relies on expressing a common history, this question is essential to figure out the groups view on history and identity, which itself is important for the sharing of this common history. Dr. Martin Van Bruinessen speaks about Zaza nationalism as a relatively new but growing phenomena in his journal “Kurdish nationalism and Competing Ethnic Loyalties”. Dr. Bruinessen also mentions that many Zazas self-identify as either Turkish or Kurdish. To understand how largely the constituted laws affects the Zaza population, the interviewee Murat Bukan is asked about his view on what some of the academics have written about the Zazas and what role he believes the laws in Turkey has played for the Zaza people. What is important to notice here in Bukan’s response is how he acknowledges the fact that Turkey ‘unfortunately’ represents the Zaza identity and provides a sense of refusal to the Turkish identification. At the same time, there are contesting views from the other interviewees on the Zazas as being different from the Turks. Political impact on the identity seemed to be present for the Zazas, which is portrayed in the notion of how the Zazas are different from the Turks, since those in Turkey are Turkish according to Kemalism. This, however, does not implicate on the attitudes for ethnic
identification. The interviewees were asked about the known self-definitions of Zazas as Turkish or Kurdish. Overall, the interviewees commonly agree that there are consequences that comes with identifications of other identities than just the Zazas. Bukan speaks about new formations of what he calls “concepts for Zazas”, and what some would say is an identity such as being
28 Turkish Zaza and Kurdish Zaza. What is interesting in these answers is the clear bias among the Turks, Kurds and the Zazas depending on what one might assume is the discourse they have been educated within. G.G uses the sentence ‘help Zaza identity and language disappear’, where one might question the choice of the word help by asking to whom is it beneficial.
This question seems to divide attitudes among the interviewees where Bukan focuses on how the Kurdish political movement acts as a repressor towards Zaza identity and culture, while Z.E focuses on the forced assimilation opposed on the Zazas by the Turkish government. Both are equally important factors since they both comprehend to the political discourse in Turkey. B.R rejects the focus of the Zazas but emphasizes on an ongoing fear of showing his Kurdishness in public due to the political climate. Despite the focus on assimilation and strong political nature in Turkey, G.G responds with critique towards Turkey for their treatment of the Zazas and says that the Turkish nationalism undermines both the identity and culture of the Zazas.
The challenges that come with the inter-cultural groupings that Zaza can be identified within and Zaza nationalism as a rising factor urges to ask the interviewees the following question: “Is it important to acknowledge Zazas as an own minority?” To which all the interviewees, except B.R, believe it is important to view Zaza as an own minority, one of the reasons that is argued for their long existence. Z.E even differentiates further from the Kurds and Turks by claiming that the Zazas came first. The interviewees answer the question of why the Zazaki language is so important for the Zaza people. The importance of language within culture and identity is that it becomes a carrier of thought and information, which all interviewees could agree on. Undermining the culture and building blocks for Zaza culture may deprive the Zazas from their force of nationhood. As previously mentioned, nationhood depends on the national ideology’s transformation, sentiments, and citizens’ commitments from their personal
experiences to that abstract and imagined community called the nation (Eriksen, 2004:58-59). In what seems to align with the functions of nationalism that Eriksen describes, it also seems to be fulfilled by Bukan in the sense of how he emphasizes in the shared sentiments of the Zaza people while building up this imagined community.
Even though Bukan stresses the Zazaki language as one of the most important pillars carrying the Zaza identity, it is on its way of being forgotten. Murat Varol and Ömer F.
29 They state that it is in the similar way that Zazaki speakers grow interest into learning Turkish because of the wide area of job opportunities this will introduce them to. Perhaps they even get enrolled into the military or find success in their own business. However, it does not function the same way around whereas the Turkish speakers rarely want to learn Zazaki since they believe it lacks prestige, class and power. They prefer to learn Kurmanji instead. Even the Zazas can prefer to learn Kurmanji at times because it is seen as a high prestige language. (Varol & Elantuntaş, 2011:93)”. B.R. confirms the aspect of prestige and power for using Kurmanji over Zazaki. All the interviewees were asked about knowledge and attitudes towards Zazaki or Kurmanji. Considering that they belong to the spectrum of the different ethnicities being discussed (e.g. Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza) makes it a more of a general consensus. Z.E, one of the interviewees which identifies himself as being Zaza, emphasizes more on the differences between Zazaki and Kurmanji. He has in his life noted that Kurds and Zazas cannot understand each other's language. When the interviewees were asked whether they agree to Zazaki being a Kurdish dialect what also the Minority Rights group defines Zazaki as, B.R agreed on this view and as shown previously, Kurds see Zazas as a part of the Kurdish community. The answers of the
interviewees appear to be bound to their ethnic background, the two Zaza subjects Bukan and Z.E agrees on that Zazaki is a separate language, which partially can be supported by the view of G.G that states that if Zaza is an ethnic minority group, Zazaki should also be a language. B.R’s view on Zazas, and even so, the dislike of Zazas are motivated by their low political
involvement. Bukan, on the contrary, has another attitude towards the Zazas and their nation-building as he believes that they can be recognized as a nation of their own. Viewing this according to Eriksens idea of place, kinship and nationhood in his article “Nations and
Nationalism”, it is applicable to view the different attitudes of B.R. in comparison to Bukan’s
nationalistic view upon the Zazas as instigated based on their adherent aspect of “Kurdishness”. To emphasize, Eriksen writes that kinship and territoriality shapes the human group identification and that the nature of human communities simply lack appreciation. (Eriksen, 2004:58). The imagined community of the Kurds and Zazas is only valid as long as there is a group of people who identifies with it. By analyzing the words of Bukan about the Zazas that emphasizes on shared origin and territory, it appears that he still believes that the Zazas can be
30 recognized as an own nation. In the same way, Zazas do not need the territory in order to
establish their claimed place.
Although Eriksen’s theory of nationalism acknowledges that the socio-cultural boundaries should fit with the political boundaries, they are difficult to maintain. While the Turkish attempts of assimilating the Zazas, for instance through the imposed language ban, to fit in within
Turkey’s national identity, the failure led them to acknowledge Zazas as Kurds, not initially but eventually. As Çicek previously argued, the methods governed by the Turkish state were reparation and confusion as they first tried to separate Kurds from Alevis, then the dialects between Zazas and Kurds Çiçek, 2017:102). Bruinessen and Bukans arguments that Kurdish nation-building is one of the many oppressing factors that discourages Zaza from owning their language rather than branching out as a dialect, are confirmed by the interviewees as they agree on that Zazas are widely viewed to belong ethnically to the Kurds. What can be deeply criticized is the position which many Turks and Kurds, and for instance researchers like Karacan and Kaya take as they refer to Zazaki as a Kurdish dialect. The danger in doing so is to neglect the
possibility to view it as an own language and identity. They are revoking what most Zazas agree on concerning their ancestry. Forcing the Zazas to be a carrier of an ethnic identity which they reject in many cases, leaves them under dual pressure. Analyzing the fact that the Kurds are an official minority in Turkey provides them with a bigger playing ground for political influence, however, one can argue that they wouldn’t have been able to do so without gathering their numbers in total e.g. claiming that Zazas are Kurds.
However, one of the most important factors that has been widely discussed and strengthened by acknowledging support within this thesis for Zaza and Zazaki as an own ethnicity and language, which shouldn’t be bound to other identities or languages, has been identified with othering within the Turkish political discourse. As Bukan and Z.E pointed out in their interviews, Zazaki cannot be understood by Kurds. Connecting the dots to Kurdish nation-building and their ability to take in other minorities within their ethnic identification, for political gain, makes it even more probable to be true that the case here is the same.
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5. Summary and concluding remarks
Analyzing the material provided by Thomas Hylland Eriksen's theory of nationalism makes it possible to put the Zazas in another perspective due to his description of nationalism as a politically constructed feeling of community within a state or nation, which makes the Zaza an ethnic identity, and Zazaki their language rather than a dialect. Moreover, Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s nationalist theory is applied to analyze the material. The thesis highlights the
importance of recognizing the Zazas as an ethnic identity, independent from the Turks and the Kurds. On one hand, the nationalistic politics driven by the Turkish state imposes forced
assimilation on the Zaza population by using methods such as the language ban, and on the other hand the Kurds are misleading the Zazas for their own political gain, which Eriksen explains as a power-constructed function of nationalism and can be seen when the Zazas are being used as a political chess-piece. In reference to the analysis, it can hereby be concluded that its aim and research question has been fulfilled by presenting various theories of nationalism to understand the political discourse of Turkey and how particularly nationalism, over time, has been a clear tool to exclude various people from their nationhood. The importance of language and identity has also been presented and discussed to explain the bond between them, and how they are affected by the country’s nationalism. Individual interviews with locals in Turkey have provided some personal perspectives on the situation, differing from the previous researches done on the topic. The material has been analyzed according to Eriksen’s view on nationalism, as a political tool.
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