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Nuclear Security, Safety and

Non-Proliferation: Sweden’s

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Foreword

This report summarizes the results of the work carried out by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) in 2015, together with partners in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Moldova. These efforts relate to Sweden’s international commitments as established in various international fora, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the EU Action Plan on Weapons of Mass Destruction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the G-7 Global Partnership, the MNEPR Agreement, as well as other undertakings in Nordic settings.

Important issues on the agendas of these institutions address the cooperation in the fields of nuclear security, safety and non-proliferation, and the links between these areas.

Before the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, 31 March–1 April, we devote particular attention to the objectives of the Summit and the ambitions of ensuring continued international cooperation and strengthening nuclear security. In the years

to come, we will implement activities to ensure that our work continues in the spirit of the Summit legacy.

We strive to have a holistic approach to security, safety and non-proliferation, which is reflected in the results presented in this report. This is a fruitful way of simultaneously promoting peaceful developments, security and a safe environment.

We welcome comments and suggestions from cooperation partners and other readers, as feedback is an important tool for our ongoing improvement work.

Fredrik Hassel

Deputy Director General

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

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Frameworks and

partnerships

Since the collapse of the USSR, Sweden has

been engaged in international cooperation to

ensure that radioactive and nuclear materials

and facilities are kept safe and secure.

Sweden has for nearly 25 years been active in the nuclear and radiological areas of international cooperation. Several hundred projects have been implemented in states that once were republics of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union between 1991 and 1992 initiated this international cooperation.

When 15 new states replaced the USSR, it became a strenuous task to ensure that nuclear weapons and former Soviet military and civilian activities in the nuclear field were channelled into new structures of ownership and responsibility in the successor states. Today, much work still needs to be completed in order to ensure a transition from the old to the new.

Swedish commitments

Sweden’s project work has been carried out and implemented with reference to the political objectives stated in the Nuclear Security Summits held since 2010, in addition to the objectives of the G-7 and its Declarations from Kananaskis in 2002 and Deauville in 2011.

Moreover, the legal framework established through UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) sets a legal basis for requirements on all states as concerns measures to secure materials and facilities that could be used for the

manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, as well as for defining international interaction and assistance among UN Member States.

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s (SSM) projects are run in accordance with what is increasingly a recognized standard for responsible international behaviour: 29 states are members of the G-7, 56 states and international organizations are parties and partners in the Nuclear Security Summit process, and all member states of the UN are required to comply with obligations set out in UNSCR 1540.

Sweden also works on the basis of goals and procedures established in the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR Agreement), a framework for enabling external partners to implement projects in the nuclear and environmental fields in Russia. Last but not least, many activities are defined and specified by Sweden and its cooperation partners, primarily in Norway, Finland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Poland.

New challenges

As far as concerns the G-7, a major change occurred in 2014. Following the Russian occupation of Crimea as of February that year,

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the Russian Federation was ousted from the G-8, which then continued as the G-7. This has also affected the groups working under the G-7, of which the Global Partnership has the largest membership and broadest global representation. With this development, the Global Partnership no longer has a G-7 or G-8 member as the prime object of attention and investment in security improvement. Instead, the focus for the “new Global Partnership” has been moved to Ukraine, a country that is not in the G-7.

At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Sweden and Norway pledged to cooperate with Ukraine in the fields of nuclear security and safety. This framework acts as an intersection between commitments to the NSS process and the G-7

Global Partnership. It has been important for SSM over the past two years, and will remain so over the years to come.

Today’s partners

SSM implements international cooperation efforts on the behalf of Sweden in the nuclear and radiological fields. Sweden’s cooperation partners today are the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Moldova. Earlier, projects were also implemented together with Kazakhstan, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. SSM implements projects and activities based on the Swedish Government’s instructions and budget allocation.

Locations

The map shows the main locations in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus where SSM and its cooperation partners implemented projects in 2015.

Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Belarus gr aph ic s: b o ss e a le n iu s

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Results 1: Safety and security improvements

at Ukrainian nuclear power plants

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has increased the challenges for the Ukrainian nuclear power sector. Uncertainty over the supply of gas and oil from Russia is increasing national dependence on nuclear energy in Ukraine. The conflict poses additional challenges for physical protection of Ukrainian nuclear installations, so security measures must be strengthened. It must be ensured that the safety situation and systems are stable and resilient against external events.

One project co-sponsored by Norway aims to amend Ukrainian regulations to allow import of nuclear fuel from any international supplier. In addition, Swedish and Norwegian

experts launched a project to upgrade the physical protection system of the Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant. The project is part of the coordination efforts of the G-7.

SSM implemented projects for adaptation of regulatory guidelines for ageing surveillance programmes. Other efforts concern provision of expertise for development of systems for safety qualification of staff as well as equipment relating to testing of materials and welds.

Various tools for assessment of real-time safety situations were delivered to the operators and the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU).

The results and outcomes of the projects are summarized under individual headings depending on the overall effort and the objectives set for each project. Many projects are continuations of earlier efforts. In many cases, the projects contribute to objectives in several areas. However, the projects are only described under the heading showing their main significance.

The following pages present results in various areas of cooperation. For additional information, see the Appendix on page 14.

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Ukrainian, Norwegian and Swedish experts at the Rivne nuclear power plant in Ukraine.

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Results 2: Safety improvements at Russian

nuclear power plants

For more than ten years, SSM and its Norwegian (NRPA) and Finnish (STUK) counterparts have cooperated with the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants. These Russian nuclear power plants (NPPs) are located the closest to the Nordic countries.

Safety experts from both plants received training in Sweden on methodologies for assessing nuclear safety. Further cooperation concerns completion of projects started in previous years.

The projects cover installation of equipment at the Leningrad NPP, both for measuring gas composition in the reactor cavity and for

surveillance of vibrations of rotating components. At the Kola NPP, installation of batteries for backup supply of electricity was completed.

For both the nuclear power plants, SSM and its Nordic counterparts are transitioning towards a greater focus on issues relating to treatment and management of radioactive waste. This work relates to equipment for separating radioactive waste into different categories at the Kola NPP. Cooperation has started with the Leningrad NPP on waste issues regarding graphite from RBMK reactors. Another factor is that four reactors of this type will be decommissioned over the years to come.

ph o to : t o r s te n be rg A remote-controlled excavator for sorting of radioactive waste at the Kola nuclear power plant.

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Results 3: Nuclear security and

non-proliferation education and training

Since 2004, SSM has worked with universities in Russia on training and education matters in the areas of nuclear security, non-proliferation and disarmament. This cooperation began in Tomsk and continues to develop at Tomsk Polytechnic University and Tomsk State University.

Scholars from these universities participated in international conferences and held training for staff from the regulatory body in Belarus.

Similarly, support was provided to universities in the Urals region, with a special focus on training activities organized by the universities.

SSM involved the scholars from the above-mentioned universities in a joint workshop on academic writing. Here, the focus was on applying scientific methods to research on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security issues. Overarching education programmes In Georgia, a training course for government officials and university scholars was held in order to deepen skills in nuclear security, disarmament and non-proliferation. In Ukraine and Moldova, further steps were taken towards building

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institutions. The nuclear security training centre at the Technical University of Moldova was provided with additional equipment and training sessions. In Odessa, Ukraine, SSM sponsored establishment of the Odessa Center for Non-Proliferation. The Center will conduct important research on nuclear issues in the region. The first task commissioned to the Center is a report on Ukraine’s nuclear history.

An underlying premise and achievement of the education and training programmes is that scholars and experts are able to meet across borders and institutional affiliations. This benefits research and teaching.

The educational activities mentioned above contribute to knowledge in their own right. They also contribute to Moldova, Georgia, Russia,

Sweden and Ukraine’s fulfilment of UN General Assembly Resolutions on implementation of education and training in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament.

Participants of a seminar on nuclear non-proliferation arranged by SSM in November 2015 at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). Countries participating included Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. The seminar was hosted by the VCDNP and its director, Laura Rockwood. She is seated fourth from the left.

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Results 4: Protecting radioactive sources

and combatting illicit trafficking

The Black Sea region is troubled by illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. In most cases, the materials originate from the territory of states that once were part of the Soviet Union. Smuggling is carried out by various actors seeking to deliver to markets in areas of unrest and conflict, for instance in the Middle East.

There are recent indications of increased illegal trade in radioactive and nuclear materials due to demand from terrorist groups. Alongside the threat of terrorism, illegal transports of these materials pose hazards to the public. The environment is also at risk, as smuggled materials are often abandoned if no buyers are found.

For the above-mentioned reasons, it remains a priority for SSM to focus on activities that combat illicit trafficking. In 2015, SSM, the US State Department and the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) held a major conference in Tbilisi, Georgia for a regional audience. The conference was convened by the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for the Interior, and had over one hundred participants from twenty countries. The conference created a shared perception of

threats to the Black Sea region and approaches to establish joint protective measures. A second conference was decided for 2016 with the aim of implementing the agenda from the NSS’s communiqués and action plans.

Exercise in Giurgiulesti

An exercise was carried out in the Giurgiulesti International Free Port in Moldova with a view to enhancing national authorities’ capability to prevent, detect and deter smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. The exercise, co-sponsored by the DECC, focused on

identification, seizure and analysis of radioactive sources in cargo shipments.

This exercise happened to coincide with Moldovan authorities having discovered radioactive materials in private dwellings in Chisinau. This also coincided with joint seizure of radioactive materials by other Moldovan authorities together with international intelligence services. These materials were destined for recipients with links to terrorist activities in the Middle East. Against this background, the exercise in Giurgiulesti was not

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only timely, but also instrumental in mass media coverage, as this demonstrated that Moldova has partners and allies in the field of nuclear security.

SSM supports the Georgian Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resource Protection, and authorities under its mandate, to establish a national strategy and five-year action plans for management and disposal of radioactive waste. In the long term, these plans will enable the establishment of processes and infrastructure through which all kinds of radioactive sources– including materials seized from illicit trafficking and retrieved orphan sources–will be managed and stored. SSM has completed upgrading of guards’ facilities at the Mtskheta repository, where radioactive materials are currently stored.

Radioactive sources in Ukraine

Hundreds of thousands of radioactive sources in Ukraine are estimated to be under the control of their owners and registered by state authorities. Together with the United States, and partners from Germany and the United Kingdom, SSM provides support to the SNRIU for strengthening its functions for regulatory control in the area.

Due to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, there is an added urgency since 2014 to ensure that as many radioactive materials as possible are safeguarded and put under proper control by government and operators.

In 2015, international partners completed construction of the VEKTOR facility near the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. With this facility in place in Ukraine, large quantities of radioactive materials can be collected and stored securely. SSM’s mission in Ukraine

SSM’s activities mainly focus on establishment of the infrastructure necessary for regulatory control by the SNRIU. Assistance was delivered for replacement of servers and computers, in addition to an upgrade of software used for the SNRIU’s radioactive source registry.

SSM has also contributed to the establishment of a national campaign for tracing and collecting radioactive sources. The campaign was

implemented via a dedicated web page linked to the SNRIU and Ukrainian Government. A special part of the project concerned passing of new legislation in Ukraine. The legislation was deliberated by the Ukrainian parliament in 2015.

A separate project involved SSM and Ukrainian specialized agencies continuing a study on handling of radioactive materials, which during the Soviet era were placed in drilled wells.

Cooperation in the above-mentioned areas will continue with Ukrainian stakeholders, as well as the United States and United Kingdom, and within the G-7 Global Partnership.

The 2015 exercise in Giurgiulesti focused on seizure, identification and analysis of radioactive sources in a cargo shipment.

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Project 5: Emergency preparedness and

radiation protection

SSM and Rosatom initiated a series of fora in order to exchange experiences on their respective capacities and procedures as part of emergency preparedness and response. Further steps concern establishment of a bilateral agreement and implementation of joint exercises relating to nuclear events. Finland and Norway also joined this cooperation. Another forum is SSM’s support of the Institute for Radiation Hygiene (IRH) in St. Petersburg, Russia. The IRH has a crucial role for long-term surveillance of radiation effects from Chernobyl on regions in western Russia, and

provides emergency preparedness infrastructure in Russia with data in the event of a nuclear emergency.

SSM also assisted the NARNRA, the Moldovan regulator, with establishment of a system of gamma measurement stations for continuous environmental surveillance of radiation levels. The stations belong to the State Hydrometeorological Service’s mandate. Moldovan infrastructure is of utmost importance to the country, which is surrounded by

neighbours which all have nuclear power plants.

Project 6: Legacy nuclear and radioactive

waste in northwest Russia

For more than two decades, Russia and its international partners have cooperated on management of nuclear and radioactive waste products in northwest Russia. Since the Soviet era, these waste products have posed needless hazards.

The cooperation efforts are still ongoing, although several institutions involved have demised (the G-8 Global Partnership and the IAEA Contact Expert Group), or are withdrawing their involvement in pace with project

completion. SSM has retained its presence and its cooperation with Russian authorities in the field, and intends to continue doing so as far as the funding will allow.

At the Andreeva Bay site, where large quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials await treatment and transport to safer sites, SSM contributed to establishment of the electrical power infrastructure. These activities are

coordinated with Italian and Russian partners. The power infrastructure will be established in stages before the spent fuel management operations can begin.

For the purpose of managing particularly radioactive waste and transporting it from Andreeva Bay, SSM provided a lorry and containers. These will be used to transport the waste to a specially prepared storage site at Saida Bay, northwest of Murmansk.

The Lepse, a ship used for storage of spent nuclear fuel, used to be moored in the port of Murmansk for decades. It is now subject to international dismantling efforts. For this work, SSM provides assistance to the Nerpa Shipyard in the area of physical protection.

The project, run by the EBRD, involves the vessel’s dismantling by the shipyard. SSM’s efforts relate to physical protection of areas in the shipyard used for the dismantling operations.

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Reconstruction of the Nerpa Shipyard checkpoint is a general security improvement. ph o to : c o u rt es y o f n er pa s h ip ya rd

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Russian Federation

Cooperation on emergency preparedness with Russian authorities, SSM2015-1099; payments in 2015: 253 kSEK

At SSM’s initiative, an action plan was established for cooperation on emergency preparedness and response between Russian, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish authorities. The action plan covers five years and has the objective of enhancing mutual understanding, knowledge and trust on how emergency preparedness and response are organized and managed in the Russian Federation and Nordic countries.

The possibility of bilateral assistance will be explored in order to improve reciprocal capability to counteract and mitigate effects of nuclear incidents and accidents. Cooperation will be conducted within the framework of bilateral agreements. In 2015, a joint Working Group (WG) was set up and two WG meetings were held.

Waste extractor at the Kola NPP, SSM2010-3123; payments in 2015: 554 kSEK

The project comprises delivery of a remotely operated electro-hydraulic machine for cutting and retrieving old unidentified solid radioactive waste, including operator training. Cutting and retrieval are crucial for enabling identification and categorization of the waste for further treatment and disposal. The machine and attachment tools were procured under two separate contracts. The main machinery has been delivered, whereas the attachment tools will be delivered in 2016. This project was co-financed by Finland (STUK).

Decommissioning and waste treatment in

cooperation with Rosenergoatom, SSM2014-2990; payments in 2015: 338 kSEK

Cooperation between the LNPP and SSM on waste management and decommissioning was resumed. A previous project that comprised knowledge transfer and procurement of related hardware ended in 2010. The previous experiences were considered valuable by the LNPP, and it was agreed to resume the cooperation, focusing on Nordic and Western experiences. Handling

and treatment of irradiated graphite from RBMK reactors are of special interest. STUK showed interest in participating and is now part of the cooperation. A waste group was formed and is now elaborating an action plan.

A decommissioning seminar was arranged in Sweden with 15 participants from the Russian nuclear industry and from SSM. A visit to Studsvik Nuclear AB and AB SVAFO was arranged in conjunction with this to share experiences from decommissioning of the R2 reactors. Inspection of dissimilar welds at the KNPP, SSM2014-2667; payments in 2015: 87 kSEK The objective of the project was to develop and deliver methodology and equipment for ultrasonic inspection of weldings of different materials. A tender process was announced but cancelled since all financiers decided not to proceed due to disagreements with the recipient. Training in seismic PSAs for LNPP specialists, SSM2014-5861; payments in 2015: 7 kSEK

The project involved facilitating LNPP specialists’ formal training on computerized models for PSAs of seismic events at nuclear power plants.

PSA training for KNPP specialists, SSM2015-3964; payments in 2015: 99 kSEK

The project focused on facilitating knowledge sharing in the area of PSAs for nuclear power plants, as well as giving KNPP specialists the opportunity to undergo training on computer-based PSA tools. PSA specialists attended training on use of PSA tools and participated in the 2015 meeting of the Nordic PSA Group.

Equipment for radiation monitoring at the KNPP, SSM2015-3056; payments in 2015: 388 kSEK The project comprised delivery of three gamma detector stations for outdoor use. A similar detector was delivered in 2012 and has been tested successfully at the KNPP. The project is part of a modernization of the environmental monitoring system used at the KNPP. The system is crucial for surveillance of radiation levels.

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Vibration monitoring system at the LNPP,

SSM2015-3057 and SSM2015-3891; payments in 2015: 1,154 kSEK

The project concerned upgrading of components and software for the online vibration monitoring system for rotating machines and the installations at the LNPP. Replacement of components is financed by SSM and the LNPP, and installation is performed by LNPP staff. The system is used by all four units at the LNPP and alerts operators in the event of imbalances and vibrations which could have a negative impact on reactor safety.

PSA training for LNPP specialists, SSM2015-3965; payments in 2015: 95 kSEK

The project focused on facilitating knowledge sharing in the area of PSAs for nuclear power plants, as well as giving LNPP specialists formal training on computer-based PSA tools. Two LNPP PSA specialists attended a course on use of PSA tools. They also participated in the 2015 meeting of the Nordic PSA Group.

Batteries for emergency power supply at the KNPP, SSM2012-450; payments in 2015: 80 kSEK A supply of safety grade batteries to the KNPP was initially planned for delivery and installation in 2014. Upon delivery, some documentation was incomplete due to administrative difficulties between the KNPP and the battery supplier. Extensive communication between the KNPP, SSM, the Russian regulator Rostechnadzor and the supplier solved these problems in 2015. The batteries will be installed in 2016.

Gas circuit online monitoring system at the LNPP, SSM2009-2668; payments in 2015: 118 kSEK The purpose of the monitoring system is to obtain data on the chemical composition in the gas circuit of a reactor. The data provided is used for assessing the processes and condition of the graphite stack. The system can also detect leakages and measure the efficiency of the gas purification system. Commissioning of the system is delayed due to the procurement process for installation at the LNPP. The software is undergoing an upgrade by the supplier, with commissioning planned for May 2016.

Measurement equipment, Obninsk, SSM2014-2154; payments in 2015: 3 kSEK.

This project concerns improvement of the control and national accountancy of nuclear materials accumulated in various technological processes in the nuclear fuel cycle industry. Spectrometer-based measurement equipment will be delivered to the IPPE in 2016.

Non-proliferation education at Russian

universities, SSM2015-2601; payments in 2015: 1,226 kSEK

The purpose of the project is to continue promoting non-proliferation education in Russian academia. Some joint arrangements include participation by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. An academic writing workshop was held in Stockholm with participants from Russian universities in the Urals region, in Novouralsk and Tomsk, also from Ukrainian universities in Kiev and Odessa. A few research papers are ready to be submitted for publication in internationally recognized journals.

SSM arranged a symposium for young scholars at a non-proliferation conference held in Astana, Kazakhstan.

In cooperation with the VCDNP, SSM held a seminar on nuclear non-proliferation that was attended by international experts and representatives from Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.

Non-proliferation education at Russian universities: Tomsk region, SSM2015-951; payments in 2015: 96 kSEK

Cooperation with universities in the Tomsk region was initiated in 2004. SSM’s main partners, TSU and TPU, established nuclear non-proliferation as an area for instruction and research. TSU professors and scholars took part in SSM’s academic writing workshop in Stockholm, as described above. SSM provided support to two students from TPU for their participation at the ESARDA 37th

annual meeting in Manchester, England, where they presented their research papers.

SSM also supported TPU in holding an introductory non-proliferation course in Tomsk for Belarusian officials. Non-proliferation education at Russian

universities: Urals region, SSM2015-1039; payments in 2015: 202 kSEK

Cooperation with universities in the Urals region was initiated in 2006. SSM’s activities in the region are

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managed by the two main partners, URFU and the NTI. Professors from these universities attended the VCDNP seminar on academic writing, as described above.

SSM continued its cooperation with the NTI to improve knowledge in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, with a special focus on nuclear security culture. The target group consists of faculty members and students from universities in the Urals region and from the region’s nuclear industry. Swedish cooperation with the Institute for

Radiation Hygiene (IRH), St. Petersburg, SSM2011-2047; payments in 2015: 385 kSEK

The project supports joint research activities conducted by the IRH and SUS. IRH contributes to the Russian emergency preparedness system by providing scientific information and measurement data to Russian

authorities. The activities planned were campaigns on continuous measurement of the effects from the 1986 Chernobyl accident. The data collected has led to a better understanding of the long-term environmental consequences of radiation exposure. In addition, the IRH and SUS run a fruitful research exchange programme on medical radiation physics.

5010003-24 – Reconstruction of security checkpoint 11 at the Nerpa Shipyard, SSM2014-2901; payments in 2015: 3,207 kSEK

This project supplements the decommissioning programme for the nuclear service vessel, the Lepse, implemented in the framework of the EBRD/NDEP programme. Reconstruction of the checkpoint is an integral part of the site’s general security improvement. This will improve security monitoring of all movements to and from the Lepse decommissioning site. The system will prevent intruders from accessing the shipyard area, where highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel is stored.

Power supply infrastructure at Andreeva Bay, Murmansk, SSM2012-4525; payments in 2015: 22 kSEK.

International efforts are continuing in order to remediate the Andreeva Bay site and remove its enormous quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials. A joint project was initiated to ensure an adequate power supply for the spent nuclear fuel handling at the site, and facilitate further transport to Mayak, in the Urals region.

Project participants included Rosatom, SevRAO, SOGIN, the EBRD and SSM. The Swedish contribution concerned design and infrastructure for the diesel generators needed for the power supply. Final Rosatom approval of the work and documentation was granted in 2015. The project was completed in May 2015.

Transports of solid radioactive waste to long-term storage site at Saida Bay, Murmansk, SSM2015-2795; payments in 2015: 1,817 kSEK. Existing radioactive legacy waste and spent nuclear fuel at the former military nuclear submarine base at Andreeva Bay will be transported to the newly built long-term storage site for radioactive waste at Saida Bay. Due to the harsh climate, sea transports cannot be carried out all year round.

In order to meet the deadlines of the removal and remediation programme, additional road transport is necessary. SSM signed a contract for delivery of vehicles and containers for these transports.

Ukraine

Strategies and meetings with Ukrainian

authorities and organizations, SSM2013-1350; payments in 2015: 169 kSEK

SSM participated in one steering committee meeting in Oslo and one in Kiev. The meetings were linked to the Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian cooperation initiated at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Systems and procedures for management of ageing reactors, SSM2012-619; payments in 2015: 907 kSEK

SSM and the SNRIU have for a number of years now cooperated on a new regulation to govern ageing management and long-term operation of NPPs. Two working meetings were held that resulted in a final draft for the SNRIU to consider.

In 2016, the SNRIU plans to have the new regulation reviewed and approved by the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice and other authorities. The SNRIU has requested further assistance from SSM during this process.

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Development of systems for safety qualification of staff and equipment of the SNRIU, SSM2009-4200; payments in 2015: 361 kSEK

The objective is to assist Energoatom and the Ukrainian accreditation body in developing a system regarding procedures, staff and equipment. The system will be used for in-service inspection of reactor vessels at Ukrainian nuclear power plants. The internationally recognized European Methodology for Qualification of Non-Destructive Testing is being followed. Two project meetings were held. However, the project was halted by SSM due to problems with acquiring essential test materials and with work scheduling. The work at Energoatom continued without SSM’s assistance. Implementation of risk monitoring at the South Ukraine NPP, SSM2013-1351; payments in 2015: 705 kSEK

Risk Spectrum is a tool for estimation of various risk factors at nuclear power plants. Risk Watcher is an additional program for risk monitoring. At an early stage, SSM and its Ukrainian counterparts decided to implement these tools in Ukraine with the objective of enhancing the quality of continuous safety analysis of Ukrainian NPPs. In the framework of this long-term project, these software tools were implemented at the South Ukraine NPP in the form of a pilot project involving other NPPs as observers.

Requirements for qualification and licensing of reactor fuel, SSM2014-3726; payments in 2015: 440 kSEK

The project was suggested by the SNRIU immediately after the Nuclear Security Summit held in March 2014. Previously, Ukraine mainly imported fuel from Russia, but Ukraine is striving to diversify its nuclear trade. The project brings together experts from Swedish, Norwegian and Ukrainian regulatory bodies and experts from the Czech Republic. The object is to review Ukrainian drafts of new regulatory guides that will make it possible for Ukraine to import nuclear fuel from any company internationally. The project is co-financed by Norway. Licences for the software programs Risk Spectrum and Risk Watcher to the SNRIU, SSM2014-3725; payments in 2015: 399 kSEK

The objective of this project is to provide the SNRIU with surveillance software programs for reviewing safety

analyses from the NPPs. Delivery of the software packages to the SNRIU, as well as training of personnel, have been carried out. The project is co-financed by the Norwegian regulator, the NRPA.

Feasibility study for management of well-type storages in Ukraine – Participation in Global Partnership Programme in Ukraine, SSM2014-1654; payments in 2015: 333 kSEK

There are around half a million disused radioactive sources throughout Ukraine. Under the long-term programme of the G7 Global Partnership donors, all these sources are to be moved to the newly built central repository, VEKTOR, located in the Chernobyl exclusion zone.

SSM has signed a contract with the Radon company on a feasibility study for solving well-type storage problems at Radon’s facilities, with assistance by Swedish expertise. The feasibility study is to result in recommendations for optimal solutions for the well-type storages.

Outreach campaign on recovering orphan radio-active sources under institutional supervision, SSM2015-883; payments in 2015: 394 kSEK SSM and the SNRIU have cooperated for several years now to set up a public Ukrainian website to promote nuclear and radiological safety, as well as nuclear security and non-proliferation.

A draft amnesty law with the purpose of encouraging enterprises, organizations and the general public to turn in orphan radioactive sources to Ukrainian authorities was submitted to the Ukrainian parliament in August. Since then, the object of the website has broadened to include follow-ups of the approval process and the impact of the law on recovering control over orphan sources.

Further technical improvements to the website were achieved, as well as continuous updating.

Upgrade of the Ukrainian state registry of ionizing radiation sources, SSM2013-4711; payments in 2015: 104 kSEK

In 2014, SSM supported the SNRIU in improving the technical infrastructure of the national registry of radioactive sources by replacing old computers and servers with up-to-date hardware and operating systems, thereby ensuring the registry’s functionality. Ukraine has

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about 25,000 radioactive sources in operation. Further improvements were achieved by transferring and adapting the registry’s database to new hardware in compliance with new regulations. The project is co-financed by Norway. Development of Ukrainian national dose registry, SSM2015-3537; payments in 2015: 219 kSEK The project was initiated by the SNRIU to facilitate establishment of a national dose registry. It will be set up by the National Research Center for Radiation Medicine and the National Academy of Medical Sciences.

The registry encompasses intercomparison of national radiological laboratories. This will result in improvements to occupational dose monitoring and control, together with development of the national dose registry. Part of the project includes collection of comprehensive data on the current status of occupational dosimetry monitoring. Improvement of the physical protection system at the Khmelnitsky NPP, SSM2015-5133; payments in 2015: 28 kSEK

SSM helped launch trilateral cooperation on nuclear safety and security between Ukraine, Norway and Sweden to support the Khmelnitsky NPP regarding modernization and improvement of its physical protection system in order to meet international standards.

Training course on physical protection of radioactive sources and radioactive waste, SSM2014-1332; payments in 2015: 142 kSEK A training course for inspectors of the SNRIU, on design basis threats to sources of ionizing radiation and facilities for radioactive waste handling, was carried out at the George Kuzmycz Training Center in Kiev. This training contributed to increased national competence and knowledge for supervision of the security of radioactive sources and radioactive waste.

Technical support for the SNRIU database for IAEA safeguards inspections, SSM2015-1892; payments in 2015: 199 kSEK

Sweden assists the SNRIU by providing technical support for a special-purpose database for keeping records on IAEA safeguards inspections in Ukraine. The objective is to ensure that the safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA is properly applied, and that the

SNRIU’s nuclear material accountancy reporting to the IAEA functions well. The database was updated as agreed between SSM and the SNRIU.

Export control system in Ukraine, SSM2015-305; payments in 2015: 322 kSEK

The project focuses on facilitating Ukraine’s adjustment process to the EU’s export control principles and procedures. The main partners in Ukraine are the State Service of Export Control of Ukraine and the scientific centre of export and import. Main support was directed to the national implementation process of the Ukrainian single control list of dual-use goods and technologies.

SSM funded a workshop on export control for

government officials in Kiev. SSM also sponsored printing of a manual on recent amendments to the export control law of Ukraine. Further development of an export control handbook for the industry is being supported by SSM. Support for establishment of the

Non-proliferation Research Center at Odessa National University, SSM2015-526; payments in 2015: 192 kSEK

A new research centre was inaugurated at ONU with SSM’s support. The role of the new Odessa Center for Non-proliferation is to strengthen Ukraine’s work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the main focus on supporting analysis within the field. Research will focus on political, technological, legal and societal processes and factors impacting on non-proliferation work in the Black Sea region.

Ukraine’s nuclear history survey, SSM2015-304; payments in 2015: 448 kSEK

SSM and the Odessa Center for Non-proliferation launched a joint research project to survey the history of the Ukrainian nuclear sector. The main objective is to increase transparency and broaden insight into key historical issues related to nuclear activities in Ukraine. The research outcome is planned to be summarized in a monograph.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT 20 years, SSM2014-3546; payments in 2015: 91 kSEK

In 1994, Ukraine signed the NPT, which was the beginning of the disarmament of nuclear weapons located in the

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former Soviet Union’s territories. In order to study the outcomes, problems and lessons from this unique period in recent history, SSM had planned a conference on this topic, but it had to be cancelled.

Odessa summer school, SSM2015-592; payments in 2015: 389 kSEK

This summer school cooperation between SSM and ONU began in 2009. The objective of the courses is to disseminate knowledge on nuclear non-proliferation issues to university students, scholars and young professionals. Around 25 students participated.

Moldova

Gamma monitoring system, SSM2014-4076; payments in 2015: 1,041 kSEK

The project comprised procurement and installation of five gamma monitoring stations throughout Moldova. The stations form a network with a central server in Chisinau. The objective of the system is to detect and register gamma radiation as part of Moldovan emergency preparedness in the event of radioactive releases in Moldova or from neighbouring countries with nuclear power plants. The system is operated by the SHMS. The system was installed and commissioned.

Development of emergency preparedness capacity, SSM 2012-3427; payments in 2015: 74 kSEK

As part of the project SSM2014-4076 described above, a delegation of experts from the Ministry of Environment of Moldova, the NARNRA and SHMS visited Sweden in order to study the Swedish system for radiation monitoring, including its infrastructure, and sampling and investigation procedures at the national meteorology laboratory.

International response exercise on combatting nuclear smuggling, SSM2015-953; payments in 2015: 265 kSEK

At the request of the NARNRA, SSM has supported organization of an international response exercise on combatting illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive

materials in Moldova. The exercise was conducted at the Giurgiulesti International Free Port, which lies on the border between Moldova and Romania. Participants included regulators, customs officials, border guards, police officers and intelligence organizations, as well as observers from international organizations.

The aim of the exercise was to test the effectiveness of existing response procedures to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear smuggling, and to test interaction between relevant authorities in Moldova and with neighbouring states. This cross-border exercise improved practical capabilities and skills, and contributed to strengthening national strategies, laws, regulations and procedures to combat illicit trafficking in the Black Sea region. The exercise was co-funded by the DECC. Identifying and securing radioactive orphan sources outside regulatory control, SSM2012-3427; payments in 2015: 18 kSEK

Moldova continues to encounter problems involving large quantities of radioactive orphan sources outside regulatory control that pose hazards to people and the environment. SSM supports the NARNRA in its technical efforts to regain control over nuclear and radiological materials.

The NARNRA collected an astonishingly high number of radioactive sources (329). This included five cases involving nuclear materials. The materials were transported to the State Radioactive Waste Repository for safe storage.

Support to the NSSC at the Technical University of Moldova, SSM2015-306; payments in 2015:

165 kSEK

SSM has provided support to improve nuclear security capacity measures in Moldova since 2012. The opening of the NSSC at the Technical University of Moldova in 2014 provided new opportunities to improve nuclear security education and training capacity.

SSM supported the NSSC with radiation detection and measurement equipment for a training laboratory. Support was also provided to improve the knowledge base and exchange with international experts.

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Georgia

Study of non-proliferation education needs, SSM2015-527; payments in 2015: 195 kSEK SSM and its Georgian counterpart, the Civil Council on Defense and Security, conducted a survey to assess the need for capacity building of non-proliferation education in Georgia. Improvement of education capacity for this subject is in line with Georgia’s overall security policy and general efforts to address CBRN threats.

The study analyzed the present status of curricula and instruction in non-proliferation at six Georgian state universities. The outcome shows that non-proliferation education elements are mostly part of international relations and security studies curricula, while engineering and physics curricula emphasise general radiation protection and safety issues.

System for physical protection at the storage site of the Institute of Physics at Mtskheta, SSM2013-6036; payments in 2015: 136 kSEK

SSM undertook the first steps to modernize the physical protection system of the Mtskheta radioactive waste repository in 2013. Furniture and supplies for the renovated guardhouse were delivered in 2015. Development of national competence in nuclear non-proliferation issues, SSM2014-844; payments in 2015: 526 kSEK

An international conference entitled “Challenges and Responses to Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation” was held in Tbilisi. The conference was arranged by the CCDS, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior of Georgia in cooperation with SSM, the US Department of State and the DECC. The conference was held in the framework of the Tbilisi International Forum for Regional Stability.

The forum attracted nearly one hundred participants from twenty countries. The level of participation reflected the importance of the topics addressed, and provided a platform for discussion of a common nuclear security and non-proliferation agenda prior to the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

Regulatory authority capacity building, SSM2015-2073; payments in 2015: 325 kSEK

Georgia recently established a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for management of radioactive waste, including revision of nuclear and radiation safety acts, and creation of an independent regulatory body and an organization responsible for all radioactive waste management in Georgia. SSM supports the Georgian government in developing long-term plans for radioactive waste management.

Together with SSM, the Georgian Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection held a workshop with participants from state authorities, academia and NGOs. The aim was to form a national strategy and draw up five-year action plans for managing all types of radioactive waste in Georgia. An official report from the workshop was approved by the Georgian government and distributed to Georgian stakeholders.

Belarus

Cooperation initiated with Gozatomnazor, the nuclear regulatory body of Belarus, SSM 2015-951; payments in 2015: 45 kSEK

In cooperation with the Finnish and Norwegian regulatory bodies, SSM attended meetings with the Belarusian regulatory body relating to the licensing process for construction of two reactors in Belarus, as well as concerning emergency preparedness. Moreover, training in the field of nuclear non-proliferation was held at TPU for experts from the Belarusian regulator.

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CBRN Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear

CCDS Civil Council on Defense and Security of

Georgia

CEG Contact Expert Group (IAEA)

DECC Department of Energy and Climate

Change (UK)

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development

Energoatom Ukrainian state company that owns all nuclear power plants in Ukraine

ESARDA European Safeguards Research and

Development Association

G-7 The Group of Seven (Canada, France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States)

G-8 The Group of Eight (same as above, including

Russia)

GP Global Partnership

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IFE Institute for Energy Technology (Norway)

IPPE Rosatom’s Institute for Physics and Power

Engineering (Russia)

IRH Institute for Radiation Hygiene (Russia)

KNPP Kola Nuclear Power Plant (Russia)

LNPP Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (Russia)

MEPHI Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

(Russia)

NARNRA National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear

and Radiological Activities (Moldova)

NDEP Northern Dimension Environmental

Partnership

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRPA Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority

(Norway)

NSSC Nuclear Security Support Centre (in

Moldova)

NTI Novouralsk Technological Institute (Russia)

ONU Odessa National University (Ukraine)

Radon Ukrainian state-owned company for

management of radioactive waste

RBMK Soviet reactor type, graphite moderated

REA Rosenergoatom (Russia)

Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Russia)

PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment

SAT Site Acceptance Test

SevRAO Federal Enterprise for Radioactive Waste

Management (Russia)

SHMS State Hydrometeorological Service

SNRIU State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of

Ukraine

SOGIN Italian state-owned company for

management of radioactive waste

SSM Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (Sweden)

STUK Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety

Authority (Finland)

SUS Skåne University Hospital (Sweden)

TPU Tomsk Polytechnic University (Russia)

TSU Tomsk State University (Russia)

URFU Ural Federal University (Russia)

VCDNP Vienna Center for Disarmament and

Non-Proliferation

List of abbreviations

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Staff from SSM’s Office for International Relations involved in international project implementation.

Back row, from left to right: Leif Pettil, Tor Stenberg, Zlatan Delalic, Cecilia Somell, Håkan Klasén, Tage Eriksson.

Seated, from left to right: Viviana Sandberg, Lars van Dassen, Sarmite Andersson. For more information on the projects described in this report, email Lars van Dassen, Head of the Office for International Relations, at lars.van.dassen@ssm.se, or call +46 8 799 40 00. ph o to : k je ll n yh o lm

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S tr å ls ä ker h e ts m yn d ig h e ten 2 0 16 . P ri n te d b y A rk it ek tk o pia .

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Solna strandväg 96 SE-171 16 Stockholm Sweden +46 8 799 40 00 registrator@ssm.se www.ssm.se

Send an e-mail to registrator@ssm.se if you would like to have the report in a different format, such as Braille or DAISY.

References

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