Human Rights in Foreign Policy : The role of the Human Rights discourse throughout the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis

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Human Rights in Foreign Policy

The role of the Human Rights discourse throughout the

Venezuelan Presidential Crisis

By Janne-Frederike Fenz

Human Rights Bachelor Thesis 15 credits

Spring semester 2021

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Abstract

The conception of Human Rights is relatively new to international relations and their analysis and, accordingly, their location within this field, theoretically as well as practically, has not yet been ultimately identified. Their role varies among differing theoretical approaches. The aim of this work is to contribute to this discussion through working towards a theoretical framework which allows to place the normative conception of Human Rights in a rather realist analysis of foreign policy. Visualizing this attempt through reviewing the foreign policy measures initiated by the United States and the European Union towards the Maduro government throughout the Venezuelan presidential crisis, the potential impact of the Human Rights discourse for the means of legitimizing such measures becomes apparent. Eventually, the power potential the discourse holds when instrumentalized as a tool of foreign policy contributes to the understanding of its role in contemporary international relations.

Key Words: Human Rights, International Relations, Foreign Policy, Realism, Venezuela, Maduro, Venezuelan Presidential Crisis

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1. Introduction

The Venezuelan presidential crisis and the related events leading there are issues not exclusively of national but of international concern, or at least have been taken place, since several years, on the international stage with the involvement of multiple state actors. When following the events in relation to the fight over the legitimacy of the presidency of Nicolás Maduro, one will eventually notice the repeated mentioning of Human Rights by opposing state actors as means of justifying their actions towards the Maduro government. From the measures initiated, most prominent could be considered the economic sanctions imposed on individuals as well as corporations and state (owned) institutions. It is striking that these sanctions use, to a considerable extent, the narrative of being responses to Human Rights violations by certain individuals and institutions related to the Maduro government and its officials. Accordingly, Human Rights appear to be of considerable importance in the border-crossing conflict developing around this issue and the study conducted will focus on identifying their role as an instrument of foreign policy, or the extent to which they are interconnected with them.

The research problem manifests itself in the specific context of the political conflict centred around the Venezuelan presidency and the employment of power political tools (such as sanctions), which will be illuminated in the particular light of the involvement of the Human Rights discourse as means of legitimizing the measures. While taking the case of Venezuela as topic of my study, the focus of the analysis will be primarily on how the foreign state actors act

towards Venezuela, especially how they justify their actions. To be investigated are mainly the

foreign policy actions of the US as well as the European Union as the key actors and their

communications to the public.

With answering the research question:

“What role does the Human Rights discourse play in terms of justifying the foreign policy measures taken by the United States and the European Union during the

Venezuelan Presidential Crisis?”

this study particularly aims at identifying the location as well the importance of the Human Rights discourse in this particular case in order to discover possible theoretical and practical implications for the analysis and understanding of contemporary international relations and foreign policy practices.

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5 The particular relevance to the field of Human Rights lays with the identification of the potential power they hold as rhetorical instrument within international politics as well the possibilities for mis- and abuse.

2. Structure

Structurally, the research question will be approached with firstly reviewing the field of research and locating this study within it. The literature this study mainly draws on, theoretically and analytically, will be introduced as well as the material representative for the discourse of the United States and the European Union. Secondly, the theory which will provide the analytical framework for the analysis conducted, will be introduced in detail and important concepts will be defined. For making the theoretical concepts applicable to the purpose of this paper, it will be internationalized in the process of definition. In the following a brief overview will be given over the method employed as well as the operationalization of the theory. After operationalizing the theory and explaining the way it will be used for the purpose of examining the case, the analytical part of the study will follow. The analysis will precisely examine the steps taken by the European Union towards Venezuela with a focus on their way of justifying it and compare it to the actions and justification process of the United States. Conclusively, the research question will be answered and a short indication for possible further research will be given.

3. Delimitations

3.1 Theory

The Theory employed throughout this analysis is built to enable one to determine whether a claim of authority by a state actor over subjects, paired with an exercise of coercive power, is legitimate. It does so with constructing a theoretical framework within which the justifications of the respective state actors can be analysed in the light of historical circumstances, the demands made by the subjects and the form of actions taken. In this study however, the theory is only made use of to identify the necessity of justifying foreign policy measures by states and to explore, followingly, the Human Rights discourse has with this justification. Accordingly, the question if the demands for basic legitimation, the theory puts forward, are actually met by the interventions of the United States and the European Union in the case of the Venezuelan presidential crisis, is not discussed.

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3.2 Statements concerning the Maduro Government

The material which is analysed does contain a row of allegations and statements about the situation in Venezuela and especially towards the governing Maduro administration. Since the purpose of this paper is a descriptive one which examines primarily the discourse and the rhetoric employed by the United States and the European Union, it does not investigate the validity of these allegations or the honesty in which they are claimed. The study works with the argumentation and reasoning provided for the purpose of legitimizing foreign policy actions and not with the factual trueness of the claims or to what extent the actual interests of the state actors might differ from the ones expressed within the discourse.

3.3 Modernity – Post Modernity

Throughout this paper, the entirety of the global socio-political structures will be referred to as modernity. The scope of this paper is not equipped for engaging with the

question if the current international society and their interrelations have already progressed to a condition of postmodernity or if it still covered by developments natured in modernity. The discussion on this matter is still debated extensively in political and sociological science and philosophy and too extensive to be presented, as detailed as would be necessary to grasp its comprehensiveness, within this study. Furthermore, the theory used is build on a conception of modernity which would require an adaption of the theory to fit a post-modern understanding. Examining the current status of international relations it becomes visible, however, that a great amount of the understanding and interpretation relies on modern structures and features of modernity, which makes it reasonable to conduct the study backed up with interpreting preset times as modernity.

4. Literature and Material

The previous research conducted at the point where the fields of the power politics of intervention and the role of Human Rights discourse intersect, presents a variety of approaches and differing emphases. The areas covered engage predominantly with the legitimacy of different forms of interventions on humanitarian grounds, their normative potential and factual effectiveness. It appears that one of the most striking controversies discussed in the field is the actual impact of Human Rights on the behaviour of international actors domestically (towards its people) and internationality (among each other) as well as the protection and creation of international peace and security, the designated goal of the UN. The dominant opinions within

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7 this controversy are on the one hand the arguments in favour of the Human Rights ideology and the conviction that they are able to shape behaviour of individuals and state actors, whereas on the other hand their normative influence is rendered nearly irrelevant or at least insufficient. The research on the topic of the intended instrumentalization of these rights however seems to be lacking in the common academic discourse. As well, the consideration of the actual negative impacts is less apparent on both fronts (even though not non-existent). One will have to draw on Marxist scholars and theories and on the critical engagement with the form of rights itself in order to address this topic properly. Accordingly, this cannot necessarily be labelled a gap in existing research, rather simply a different location of the answer in the field of critical theory. This thesis however does not aim at reproducing this criticism with the theoretical means of the political left, rather it will try to proof that classical realist and (neo)-realist conceptions, as well, are capable of leaving room for a demand for justifying the actions taken in foreign policy. As well as that these approaches are equally able to consider the possible impacts of normative concepts such as Human Rights and their potential for being instrumentalized. Accordingly, the material which builds the main foundation for this study will be selected to fit this purpose of representing realist, and partly liberal, understandings of international relations. It is to be divided in three categories according to the place it will take within this study.

4.1 Theoretical framework

The material presented in category one will lie down the theoretical framework for the analysis and define essential conceptions. The literature providing the necessary research will contain mainly (neo)-realist conceptions and merge them with Bernard Williams’ elaborations on political moralism. The conceptual developments by Williams, presented in “In the

Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument”, aim at finding a middle

way between realism and political moralism, which does not entail the primacy of moral over political action. Consequently, he developed the concept of legitimacy which basically requires a basic justification for the legitimate exercise of power. He extends these theoretical components with placing them in relation to international Human Rights and the questions of foreign intervention and toleration. The elaborations sketched by Williams will be supplemented by the views of Matt Sleat who critically engages with Williams’ work. In “Bernard Williams and the possibility of a realist political theory” he points out shortcomings and adapts the theoretical approach as a try to overcome or, at least, address them constructively.

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4.2 Academic secondary material

The theory will be used to analyse the events related to the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis through applying it to the other two categories of material. One which provides academic analyses of foreign policy and transnational engagement of the international actors concerned, namely the U.S. and the EU, and another group of material comprised out of first-hand material by official governmental bodies which will be engaged with through discourse analysis. The former analyses, with using differing approaches, the foreign policy measures the U.S. and the EU initiated specifically towards Venezuela and, furthermore, develops conceptualizations of Human Rights foreign policy in general while paying attention to the place Human Rights might and do already take within international relations. This category mainly groups secondary analytical material which reviews the foreign policy of both actors generally and specifically in regard to Venezuela. In addition, there is material dealing with the interplay between Human Rights and foreign policy and particularly with the question, if the normative power international Human Rights hold can or already is impacting policies of international relations. Jordan Luber, Ruby Gropas and Par Engstrom, commissioned by the Policy Department of the European Parliament, are all concerned with the analysis of how the Union shapes and motivates its actions addressing the alleged violations of Human Rights by the Maduro government. This link between the Human Rights discourse as normative, policy-shaping instrument and the actions taken accordingly is considered by all authors. Engstrom is focussed on describing the current relations and practices with the goal of developing "concrete recommendations to enhance the coherence, effectiveness and normative alignment of EU rule of law and human rights policies towards the two countries, as well as more generally"1, thus he takes a rather practical approach. Luber and Gropas, in comparison, work rather normatively, stating that the advocation of democracy became a key role and thus steadily integrated into the EU’s Foreign Policy. Luber, in addition, identifies the Venezuelan crisis as a potential start of new behaviour of the Union internationally and the ground of practice for a generally new Foreign Policy approach including Human Rights as guiding principles. Adrian Hyde-Pricy, as another author, supplements these evaluations with focussing more on the power potentials and capabilities the European Union could have if viewed as a political, instead of a predominantly economic, actor. His work holds a conceptual value helping to place state actors, according to their foreign policy, into the international system.

The United States of America are as well reviewed with a similar aim, but less specifically focussed on the actions particularly towards Venezuela. They take a more general and

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9 theoretical stance determining the role Human Rights discourse and principles play for how the state presents itself. David Forsythe, as scholar in the field often referenced and drawn on by others, critically engages with the image of the US as self-proclaimed leading Human Rights advocate, while the state at the same time presents itself as being very reluctant when it comes to ratification of the international legal instruments backing up the normative conceptions they propagate. Furthermore, he points out the selective engagement with Human Rights issues by the state internationally compared to its domestic protection and securitization of Human Rights.

Similar controversies regarding the relation between Human Rights and the United States are pointed out by Christopher Wall who, however, is more particularly concerned with the practice of applying Economic Sanctions as foreign policy tool for addressing violations. Wall also introduces the question of sovereignty and the right to self-determination by states within the international community to the academic discourse of Human Rights foreign policy. Despite the powerful economic potential and its political standing, which should naturally attribute them the task of advocating Human Rights and address their violations internationally, the author stresses the utmost importance of international cooperation and multilateral approaches as well as pursuing the same standards domestically, for the sake of the legitimacy and effectiveness of their sanctions.

The purely legal foundation, specific to U.S. interventions of Venezuela, which is essential for understanding the relation between and aims of the former towards the latter, is provided by Joseph Lutta and his “A critical analysis of Western Interventions in Foreign Nations: A Case

Study of Ukraine and Venezuela”. With a critical view he analyses the Venezuela – US

relations, sums up the legal situation and decides that the form and actions of the Maduro government do not serve as sufficient justification for "any form of foreign intervention under the guise of promoting democracy and regime change"2_{. And similar to Wall, he takes into} consideration the territorial integrity of states with calling for a reconsideration of the UN rules protecting smaller states' sovereignty from the more powerful ones in the international community and their actions. Thus, his research takes into account the possibility of instrumentalization of Human Rights.

To round up this foundational analytical material, the work by Kathryn Sikkink will contribute a country unspecific attempt to locate Human Rights within the area of shaping policies and implementing them. Her examination of the Human Rights politics’ impact on international and domestic changes and developments leads her to the argument that this normative concept can

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10 be helpful for developing and expanding the theoretical framework about international norms and their impact and influence in International Relations. With paying attention to the theoretical process of “norm emergence” she points out the power Human Rights hold for "fundamental(lly) shift(ing) the perception of long-term national interests"3. She joins the other authors introduced in concluding that Human Rights can potentially be very impactful in shaping Foreign Policy and International Relations practices and might even introduce a differing approach.

Finally, a row of journal articles and scholarly works engaging with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, and the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions and various other kinds of measures taken for the protection of Human Rights, might be referred to throughout the study to supplement the introduced academic material. Furthermore, some literature primarily on the effectiveness and practice of employing economic sanctions is used, since sanctions of different kinds may be the tool preferably used by the EU and the US to address the issues arising in the presidential crisis of Venezuela. Eventually however, the form the power political instruments are taking does not matter too much for the identification of the role of Human Rights, which is why this literature will only be minimally important for the analysis. As well, this study is not concerned in detail with either the normative power potential of international Human Rights foreign policy, the factual legality or legitimacy of the actions taken by the EU and the U.S. or the form these actions are supposed to take, which makes this additional material supplementary and will only be engaged with marginally.

The sum of this academic material provides an overview of the field of research this study will be located in and presents the topics already engaged with and which are already investigated. They will constitute the direct academic and analytical environment os this thesis. Accordingly, this paper will not deal with the topics represented here but only draw on parts or conclusions of them for supporting the independent analysis developed in this work.

4.3 First-hand material by U.S. and EU governments

In addition to the, previously introduced, academic analytical material, the paper will lean on first-hand material, such as different kinds of official government statements, for analysing them in respect to the usage of Human Rights rhetoric as means of justification. The discourse analysis will aim at locating the Human Rights narrative within these official statements made by respective government bodies, for evaluating its importance for the

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11 justification of their actions towards Venezuela. This justification will, theoretically, play a crucial part for the legitimacy of the power the states exercise with initiating such measures. Thus, identifying the potential role the Human Rights discourse holds, to provide this justification, is essential for answering the research question.

The European Unions’ communications which are analysed, consist out of a row of press releases published by the Council of the European Union (backed up by legal resolutions), on the one hand presenting the Unions’ evaluation of the presidential crisis in Venezuela and, on the other hand, introducing the intervening procedures addressing the alleged Human Rights violations which are part of the crisis. The U.S. discourse however is comprised of executive orders regarding sanctions issued by the Department of State, as well as Country Reports on Human Rights in Venezuela.

The creation of a proper conceptual framework for the discourse analysis will be supported by studies of Anne Karine Jahren and Sonja Dragović Sekulić, who examined the usage of the Human Rights narrative to justify power-political measures through framing and language. Jahren conducts her analysis in the context of the war on terror, indicating that "no language, including the language of human rights, is neutral"4. Sekulić, in comparison, presents this kind of human rights instrumentalization “as part of new security dilemma”5. Both articles provide introductions useful for conducting an analysis of discourse regarding this topic of interest. Conclusively has to be stated, that for the whole of the material reviewed the validity and reliability is given. Since it is constituted out of either first-hand official publications of respective governmental bodies or scientific discourse approved by academic institutions they can be counted as being nearly absolutely reliable. The issue of validity could only be questioned partly with the claim that parts of the academic work appear to be thematically only marginal. However, they provide necessary background knowledge crucial for the understanding for the field of research as well as providing an all-encompassing overview of the case at hand and thus the validity of the material is given as well.

5 Theory

The majority of research conducted in the field of concern can be said to either employ, at least to some extent, (neo)-realist theory and conceptions of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) for evaluating the topics at hand. Realist theory, broken down, views the state as homogenous

4_{Jahren, A. (2013): p. 16} 5_{Sekulic, S. (2016): p. 117}

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12 actor in an anarchical structure of the international community. The main concern of these actors is to survive in this kind of self-help system and to gain power for the purpose of national security.6_{These assumptions and structural understanding of the behaviour of state actors helps} calculating actions and reactions in international relations. What distinguishes neo-realism (or structural realism) from realism is the presumption that the way states act is not determined by the self-interest natural to human beings, like realists predict, but rather by the anarchic structure of the international system. In addition, it allows more varying approaches around the definition of the state as unitary actor with introducing different level of analysis which enable scholars to consider domestic processes as well.7 As Kathryn Sikkink concludes, in her writings about international norms and their impact on International Relations, the current international system cannot solely be analysed in the realist tradition with a focus on self-help but rather needs to be viewed as interactions among "members of an international society"8. Accordingly, only a few authors, like Hyde-Price, make use of a purely (neo-)realist theory, while the majority of researchers employs a variety of theoretical conceptions from within the realm of international relation theories in different combinations for supplementing the realist core of their analysis with relevant aspects, making their work more precis. Sekulić, for example, locates her studies in the field of realist security studies but attributes to it parts of speech act theory to evaluate the employment of discourse properly.

Since the Human Rights question is still relatively new to international relations theory, especially when considering (neo-)realist approaches, some kind of combination of mutually supplementary conceptions will be necessary to create a valid and comprehensive analysis. This leaves a lot of room for re-evaluating and reshaping these existing theories in order to locate the place Human Rights take in their frameworks but at the same time creates the necessity to do so.

A theoretical approach providing this possibility is, as mentioned above, Foreign Policy Analysis. FPA presents a rather “actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.”9 It enables one to take into account all aspects relevant for a decision taken by a specific actor, “including problem recognition, framing, perception, goal prioritization, option assessment, and so forth”10. Irrelevant aspects however can simply be neglected and left

6_{Gooding, R. (2010): pp. 132-133} 7_{Mearsheimer. J. (2014): pp. 3} 8_{Sikkink, K. (1998): p. 520} 9_{Hudson, V. M. (2005): p. 1} 10_{Hudson, V. M. (2005): p.2}

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13 unconsidered. A wide range of scholars rely on FPA when examining the Human Rights understanding and policy of a specific state actor and the influence it has on their foreign policy decisions and actions towards others. A total of five authors whose work is referred to in this paper, namely Gropas, Luber, Engstrom, Wall and Forsythe, rely on FPA to draw their conclusions. Realist and Neorealist conceptions however appear to always function as some kind of backbone to the majority of studies conducted in the present field of research, since the basic features of these theories still pose the foundation on which contemporary international actors make their decisions.

Following these visible patterns, this study will as well present a, in its ground lying framework, realist approach for properly being able to capture the structures of contemporary international decision-making, which can be said to still be driven by a self-help attempt and the aim of stabilizing national security through gaining power. Viewing the case of the Venezuelan presidential crisis, these realist factors play a decisive role, since the political instruments employed by the regarded states can potentially be identified as power political and thus part of the tradition of realism. In line with Sikkink’s argument however, more flexible conceptions will be needed to supplement this frame to grasp the comprehensiveness of these decisions and be able to consider other influences like historical or ideological ones. Especially in the connection to the Human Rights question, which’s normative function has, as already indicated above, not really a place in the realist considerations of power and its securitization, it is necessary to allow other considerations for locating its purpose and impact on international relations and foreign policy.

For providing a framework fitting this specific purpose this study will employ the attempted realist theory of Bernard Williams, which is sketched out in his, post-humanly published work

In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. His, in principle

realist critic of liberalism, examines the relation between morality and political action with the goal of designing a concept which gives more room to the autonomy of the political without any guiding function of morality. With identifying “much of contemporary liberal theory to be a version of what he called political moralism (emphasis added)”11 he emphasizes the need for viewing international relations and societies from a more realist point of view that does not “represent the priority of the moral over the political”12, like political moralism (PM) does. Explaining the starting point of his theorizing, Williams reviews two models of liberalism, namely the enactment and the structural model. Even though both differ, since the former uses

11_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 486} 12_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 2}

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14 the utilitarian understanding of political actions serving as instruments to enact moral ideals and the latter sees morality rather as a constraint which defines when “power can be justly exercised”13_{, they are both locating the moral as prior to the political. However, Williams does} not deny that morality has or can have a place in politics, as long as it is not a primary one, which makes this conception suitable for including Human Rights.

The basic argument, his theory presents, is that there is a need for every exercise of power to be justified in order to be regarded as legitimate and that this need for justification is inherent to the political and to the fundamental formation of a legitimate state and thus is not a moral principle. This idea of a need for legitimization makes the Williams theory perfectly suitable for the aim of this study, since it provides the possibility for analysing the usage of the Human Rights discourse for the means of justification and the place this particular practice takes within the process of legitimization of the exercise of power internationally. However, Williams is most and for all concerned with the state as such and the questions if it can be considered legitimate or illegitimate, which requires a justification towards its own people, or more precisely, the people the state presents as its “own” through a claim of authority. Since this study on the other hand is not concerned necessarily with the state – people relation, but rather with the application of power internationally by state actors, the theory at hand needs to be extended to the international level. It needs to be disconnected from Willams’s discussion on statehood and the claim of authority of the state over its people and transferred to an environment of international inter-state relations.

In the following, accordingly, will be firstly defined and explained the essential concepts of Williams’s theory. Secondly, these concepts will be supplemented and adapted theoretically for the, above mentioned, purpose of internationalization so they can be applied to the international scenario the events around the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis constitute.

5.1 The First Political Question

For a state to be regarded as legitimate, Williams’s theory requires it to engage with and pose a solution to what he refers to as the first political question. This question incorporates the Hobbesian understanding of “the securing of order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of cooperation”14 by the party who claims having power over other people, or in other words the state which claims power over its population needs to secure the conditions named above. Providing this solution, or rather answering the question what the solution is, is an ongoing

13_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 2} 14_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 3}

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15 process which needs to be revisited permanently and by each state individually to adapt to changing social, historical and political conditions. Only if there is an answer provided by a particular state, this state can engage with developing other rules, principles and structures to play a role within its society. Furthermore, simply solving of the first political question does not always count, according to Williams, as sufficient condition for being considered legitimate. This problem will be engaged with in more detail further below.

For determining what this first political question would be on the international level, there has to be taken, firstly, a situation in which one state actor either attempts to exercise power over another sovereign state or over individuals or groups of individuals which are not its own people. In the latter case, the variation would be that the state exercises power over subjects not part of its jurisdiction. Williams himself engages with this issue with stating that there is, or at least he cannot present, an appropriate answer to the question of the limits of a state and the scope of its governance. The internationalization of this subject-state relation would thus fall exactly in this gap of definition and suggests that even though the subjects are not formally part of the state’s scope, they can de facto be targeted by the power exercised by one.15 The contemporary foreign policy practices within the international system are so interconnected that they do present a variety of such situations. One could count all sorts of interventions in other states, the sanctioning of complete states with condemning all relations to them as inappropriate or the treatment of refugees and stateless persons (among others) as such external exercise of power. Given this obvious possibility, there needs to, in the second place, be determined an international equivalent to the first political question. Viewing one of the most essential documents regulating modern interactions between states, the Charter of the United Nations, it will be striking how it repeatedly identifies the purpose of the institution as “maintain(ing) international peace and security”16. More precisely, it calls for “take(ing) effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”17. Even though the document speaks of “collective measures”, it is each state’s goal as well individually to work towards this “peace and security”. Considering the situation of this principle as guideline of contemporary international behaviour, one can reasonably argue that it can serve as international version of the first political question. Thus, foreign policy actions of single or groups of states which involve the exercise of power over other states or individuals needs to happen under conditions respecting this principle to be regarded as legitimate. A state, accordingly, needs to present a solution to how it can maintain

15_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 4} 16_{U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1} 17_{U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1}

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16 and secure this “international peace and security” while exercising its power. Putting it differently, every exercise of power by a state internationally needs to always work towards the insurance of this basic principle.

5.2 Subject

Williams understands as subject within his theory “everyone who is in (the state’s) power”18. This simple definition works as well internationally, since the state, in modernity, is not only capable of but also tends to claim power over individuals as well as other entities and even over whole states and, furthermore, stating to have the right to do so. Ergo, being a subject to a state’s sphere of active influence, is not necessarily a domestic matter and can extent arbitrarily according to the state’s intentions. Especially when considering, as mentioned above, the unclear “boundaries of a state”19.

5.3 Basic Legitimation Demand

As previously mentioned, simply posing some kind of solution to the first political question however is not the only condition necessary for a state to be considered legitimate. The solution, furthermore, has to be accepted by the people which are subjects. In other words, securing “order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of cooperation”20 might not be enough, if the subjects regard the way in which it happens as unacceptable. For gaining this acceptance of the people, the state has to justify its exercise of power over them (for the purpose of solving the question) to them. Williams calls this basic justification the Basic Legitimation

Demand. Satisfying the Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD) means providing an “acceptable

solution for the first political question”, thus it is “what distinguished the legitimate from the illegitimate state” 21. A case in which the state justifies its exercise of power simply with its capability to employ it would not meet the BLD and accordingly mere ability to dominate would not be a solution.22_{Thus, if coercion wants to be seen as rightful and employed only to ensure} a solution to the first political question, the BLD must be met. Additionally, Williams states that there can certainly be moral ideals and virtues beyond the fulfilment of the BLD like the political orientation or conceptions the state employs to ensures this fulfilment. However, those ideals do have nothing to do with the purely political necessity of meeting the BLD.

Constructing an international equivalent of the BLD is, when considering the previous efforts of bringing this discussion to the international stage, relatively simple. Having determined before that, when using coercion internationally, it has to happen for the “maintain(ance of)

18_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 4} 19_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 4} 20_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 3} 21_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 4} 22_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 5}

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17 international peace and security”, it has to be equally justified to the subjects to generate acceptance by the majority. The targeted subjects in this case change as well as the form of exercised power, but the requirement to meet the BLD remains, since here as well the sole capability to use power over other states or individuals does not suffice as justification for actually doing so.

5.4 Demand for justification

The necessity of such a justification arises with a genuine demand for it. This principle gives explanation to the questions “when there is a demand for justification” and “what counts as one”23, rather than determining if there is an actual need for it according to some normative values. However, not every demand counts as sufficient as well as it is not, in all circumstances

necessary. Firstly, there is constantly an extensive number of various demands within a society

and not everyone requires a justification in the form of the state meeting the BLD. For being sufficient, there needs to be some level of severeness in the regarded situation, which involves the pushing through of a claim of authority by a state with severe means like, in example, warfare in order to stop or suppress the reaction of the subjects to this claim. Secondly, there is the possibility of a situation in which a state has to meet the BLD, thus to justify its exercise of power, without there being a demand for doing so. Such a demand is not necessary if the acceptance of the subjects is not given voluntarily but they are “drilled by coercive power itself into accepting the exercise”. According to Williams “acceptance of justification does not count, if the acceptance itself is produced by the coercive power”24.

The emergence of a genuine demand for justification follows, in this case as well, the same principles domestically and internationally. As soon as there can be said to exist a claim of authority by a state over subjects external to its official scope, such a genuine demand for justification can arise as well and must be addressed by the acting state.

However, Williams limits the possibility to employ this principle of demand with stating that the ones not subject to this claim of authority (as well as active enemies25_{of the state) do not} have a right to and thus cannot demand this justification or cannot expect treatment according to the BLD. Following this limitation, it has to be decided in the international situation if the individuals demanding justification are, firstly, subjects to the exercise of power and, secondly, can be classified enemies to the state. Such enemies can exist internationally as well as inside

25_{What exactly constitutes an enemy of the state is not defined by Williams, but it will end up being a decision}

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18 of the state borders and, if this is the case, the state cannot claim power over them in the first place, which leads them to not having the right to demand justification.26

5.5 Liberalism as answer to the first political question

It is interesting to witness how Williams argues for liberalism as being the only feasible solution to the first political question within modernity, ergo the only political approach which meets the BLD. The contrast lays in Williams’s theory being inherently realist and with that a theory which identifies conflict as being the core of international relations and accordingly emphasises the employment and potential of coercive power. Liberalism, in comparison, does approach the question of politics philosophically instead and presents “essentially a consensual view of the political”27.

For explaining this, it first of all needs to be addressed that the answer to the first political question has to be, as already stated previously, constantly engaged with. Accordingly, the solution as well changes depending on the context. Historically speaking the BLD was not always, and indeed seldomly met by liberal approaches. However, the historical context in these cases differed fundamentally from the one our contemporary societies are placed in. The consideration of these historical circumstances is essential for engaging with the normative question of how the contemporary solution to the first political question has to look like, but as well are the reasons why this normative view can never be applied to history. According to Williams, approaching the legitimacy question of past times normatively is not valid since the circumstances have been entirely different and they cannot be judged by the values of modernity. Following this line of argumentation, Williams does argue that, even if perhaps this was not the case throughout history, Liberalism does in fact pose the only right answer if one considers the circumstances of modernity. This can be explained by its demands. Williams defines liberalism as being more precise and having higher demands regarding the definition of “threat”. So, the amount of what threatens people becomes more and thus poses more requirements to the state exercising power.28 Furthermore, his judgement that in these times “hierarchical structures which generate disadvantage are not self-legitimizing”, puts emphasis on the importance of democracy, which is as well central to the liberal principles of socio-political relations. In addition to the valuing of democracy, the importance of the freedom of speech propagated by liberal societies, is another point in which Liberalism raises the bar. Williams goes along with emphasising the freedom of speech as central requirement since

26_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 6} 27_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 491} 28_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 7}

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19 “citizens should know whether the BLD is met”29_{which is only possible if freedom of} information and communication is given. Thus, even though he leaves open the possibility of discovering or developing other, new participatory concepts which could potentially fulfil the BLD, he argues that Legitimacy in modernity and in the contemporary context can only be provided by Liberalism.30

Transferring this idea of liberalism as an, if not even the only, answer to the first political question, ergo the only social structure which is capable of meeting the BLD, means viewing the international community and the differing state systems represented in it. Doing so it will be visible that Liberalism is by far not the only approach. Including dictatorships, monarchies and socialist attempts there exists a variety of ideas about how to structure a state in order to be considered legitimate. However, it is also obvious that the liberal tendencies and values are not only factually prevalent but as well setting the normative standards within this international community. International institutions as well as state collectives and unions which follow or at least aim at following the approach of liberalism setting the international bar through, in example, treaties and agreements regulating the conduct and behaviour of international actors among each other and towards individuals. And those regulations follow, mainly, the liberal ideas of democracy and as well Human Rights such as freedom of speech as already emphasized by Williams. The question if Liberalism poses the only viable solution to the first political question on the international level, namely the only option to ensure “international peace and security”, will not be answered in this study but it can confidently be said that it is the predominant one within the contemporary global setting. If this hegemonic position of liberalism internationally is derived from a collective agreement within the international community about these principles being the only feasible solution or from the western-centric origin of the most influential institutions and regulations is not to be of concern in this work either. However, the latter being the case would raise the question of a possible suppression of differing approaches and the coercion of certain states and groups of people to abide to and accept the idea of liberalism and would serve as a promising topic for further research.

5.6 Criticism and Problems arising with Williams’s Theory

Matt Sleat critically examines Williams’s theory not only in order to detect contradictions and gaps but to adapt and supplement it for making it usable as realist theory whatsoever. The two points of criticism which will be viewed more closely in the following are

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20 the ones most relevant to the purpose of this thesis. The aim is to determine whether it still will be possible to apply it to the case at hand and if so to explain how to best consider the criticism and take it into account when conducting the analysis.

Firstly, Sleat points out that “Williams does not attempt to demonstrate how the universal justificatory constituency necessary to fulfil the BLD is generated from within politics, though it is clear that he believed it was.”31 This criticism is an answer to Williams’s claim that the BLD would not present a moral principle but would be “implicit to the very idea of the legitimate state”32, thus being purely political in nature. The legitimization of a state would be a precondition to its emergence and actions and thus its justification through the BLD could be considered to not “represent morality prior to politics”33.

Sleat questions Williams’s conviction that the need for legitimizing the power of the state to all subjects comes from within politics. Williams explains his reasoning briefly, but it does not clearly describe how or, more importantly, why it is to be separated from the normative foundation of liberalism which presents the understanding that all subjects should be protected because they are all of “moral worth”34 . Sleat presents here a valid point of criticism which requires an extension of Williams’s arguing to be properly addressed, however, this discussion does not necessarily matter for the analysis attempted in this thesis. Even though deriving the need for legitimacy from politics was a foundational and crucial point for Williams, important for this study is primarily the need for justification to legitimize the exercise of power generally in our contemporary world order. If it results out of any moral conception similar to the liberal tradition or from the preconditions of the legitimate state and the political is not of concern for the purpose of merely locating the usage of the Human Rights narrative in terms of providing justification. Especially, since this analysis employs Williams’s theory to situate itself in the middle ground between the liberal ideas of political moralism and realism, it can be still considered as appropriately fitting the purpose. It does still present a proper framework for evaluating the process of legitimization in this case.

Another essential discussion which has to be considered when using this theory is that of the “plurality of different and conflicting ways of interpreting and understanding modernity”35. Williams’s interpretation of modernity arrives at the conclusion that what is legitimate in modernity has to take the form (or a variety of forms) of liberalism and that this constellation

31_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 496} 32_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 8} 33_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 7} 34_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 496} 35_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 499}

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21 would be the only one which “makes sense”36_{in modern societies. He expresses this in the} formula: LEG + Modernity = Liberalism. Sleat however argues against that with acknowledging the possibility of different interpretations of modernity. Among others, Marxism, Anarchism and Existentialism might make sense in their own line of interpretation, according to Sleat. Thus, the wide-spread consensus, Williams says to be in place, when it comes to liberalism being the only option making sense (or “even necessarily make most sense”37), does not appear to be a consensus after all.38

Consequences to this acknowledgement are, firstly, that the consensus which Williams puts prior to politics with his theory, is according to Sleat situated after it and thus rather a result from politics. In other words, the consensus is built upon the interpretation of modernity. And, secondly, that the affinity to liberalism, perhaps dominant in our contemporary society, might be produced by the “employment of political power in several varieties (for example, liberal education, the enforcement of the public/private distinction which makes it much easier to live a life according to liberal values than many others”. Accordingly, an actual, far reaching and overall consensus is only to be reached via “the use of political power” 39 which however would go against the theory Williams put forward in the first place.

This criticism goes in line with some remarks already made previously during the brief description of the location of liberalism within international system. Especially, since the different interpretations of modernity are not only to be found theoretically but as well in practice when viewing the differing approaches to structuring (state) systems of i.e. China, Cuba or the region of Rojava in northern Syria. However, as Sleat as well mentions, the liberal interpretation and thus the (neo)-liberal conception of organizing societies is still predominant within modernity and the most far-reaching propagated. Considering this hegemonic situation which is reproduced and spread through the conception of Human Rights central to this paper, and especially because the United States of America and the European Union are excellent representants of the liberal conception, this analysis can still lean on Williams’s approach. Even though his consensus might be non-existent and most certainly cannot be generalized, the actors regarded (U.S. and EU) can still appropriately be viewed by his theory. It needs to be mentioned, eventually, that the state of Venezuela and especially the Maduro government represents, at least partly, one of the political and social consequences following a differing, rather socialist, interpretation of modernity and thus could not necessarily be evaluated under

36_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 10} 37_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 500} 38_{Sleat, M. (2010): pp. 499-500} 39_{Sleat, M. (2010): p. 500}

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22 the umbrella of Williams’s concept. However, since the analysis presented in this work is concerned with the actions the U.S. and the EU as (neo)-liberal actors take according to their liberal principles, and Venezuela is “only2 the targeted state, the provision of justification is their responsibility and will, eventually, follow out of their liberal tradition.

5.7 Human Rights

Conclusively, something must be said about Williams’s perception of Human Rights and how he locates it within the political and societal framework created by his theory. He argues for a limited set of such rights consisting only of the most fundamental Human Rights which’s violations would come from and result in “unmediated coercion”, ergo fail to provide an acceptable answer to the first political question. He questions the feasibility of Human Rights as actually fulfilling their purpose as rights. Including rights which cannot always be guaranteed by governments and accordingly rather serve as an “aspiration”40 will lead to them being broadly violated. Accordingly, he argues that having an actual right to something cannot be the case if it is not possible to be secured in the first place by the ones supposed to provide it. Including those “aspirations”, the list of Human Rights would be too extensive, what makes him conclude that fundamental Human Rights should only centre around those cases in which rights are “really what is claimed”41.

He does not, however, argue completely against the notion of Human Rights since, first of all, they ensure the provision of freedom of speech, expression and communication, without which it would be impossible to evaluate the justifications given by a state and thus the process of legitimization could not be considered genuine. Furthermore, he sees the Human Rights discourse as essential to political theory since “our conceptions of Human Rights are connected with what we count as such a legitimation”42_{. Approaching this, usually viewed as normative,} conception from a rather political standpoint he attributes it a crucial political value, namely that “the charge that a practice violates fundamental Human Rights is ultimate, the most serious of political accusations”43. This assessment place the Human Rights discourse within the political realm not only marginally but as having, potentially, an impactful and even central function. Especially when considering the international character of these rights they can be seen as possibly being, based on Williams’s definition, a powerful political instrument. Williams himself, illustrates a possibility for such instrumentalization when mentioning the

40_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 64} 41_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 64} 42_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 63} 43_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 73}

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23 possibility of “exaggerat(ing) the extent to which a practice resembles the paradigm violations of human right”44_{for political purposes. He refers to this as a habit of directing and increasing} attention towards violations, it however will not be too far-fetched to imagine this kind of instrumentalization for other purposes beyond the Human Rights purpose in itself.

Considering Williams’s account of Human Rights, especially his partial description of the possibilities of instrumentalization, it will be feasible to move the discourse and the narrative of these rights and their violations into the position of a tool for justification. Even though he pleads for a limited list of Human Rights he is still open to their general concept and even more, sees their potential not only in the ideological but as well in the political realm. Identifying their political usage in the process of legitimization in the case of the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis will help to locate the Human Rights concept more detailed within the framework of realist theory and further define the relation between them as a normative concept and the political processes of international relations.

6 Method and Operationalization

6.1 Operationalization

For determining how the theory is best used on the topic of analysis, the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis, the roles of the concerned actors will have to be clarified first. Even though this Crisis constitutes the anchor point of the analysis, the subject of the study are the foreign policy measures by the United States and the European Union, which target the actors they consider as responsible, namely the Maduro government and associates.45 These measures by the state actors46 towards Venezuelan individuals, the state of Venezuela itself as well as associated individuals, governments and corporations can be classified as a claim of authority and, including the interventionist actions following this claim, as an exercise of power by the EU and the U.S. over them.

For achieving the analytical aim of this study, Williams’s theory will be used to firstly, establish the “subject status” of the targeted Venezuelan actors in order to identify either a demand for justification by the subjects or, alternatively, the necessity to provide it independently from such a demand. Secondly, if there is a genuine demand for justification, the argumentation by the EU and the U.S. employed to satisfy this demand, will have to be analysed

44_{Williams, B. (2005): p. 72}

45_{Council of the European Union, May 2018}

46_{For the purpose of this analysis, the EU will be considered as a sovereign state actor since the way it acts as a}

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24 in terms of how it attempts to provide it. The conception of the BLD and the obligations it establishes serve as an analytical framework to evaluate these justification attempts.

Considering the EU and the U.S. separately, the way each of them justifies their economic and political actions must be evaluated by the conceptions Williams’s theory provides. After establishing a claim of authority, the form the exercise of power takes has to meet the BLD in order to be regarded as appropriate by the subjects. Thus, the US and the EU have to provide a suitable solution for the first political question. This question, in the particular case at hand, requires the US and the EU to explain that their actions are aiming at re-establishing or, at least, stabilizing the “international peace and security” which is, according to them, endangered by this Presidential Crisis. Phrasing it differently, the answer to the question “How does this exercise of power by EU and US over the subjects secure international peace and security?”, given by the two state actors, needs to satisfy the BLD for being considered legitimate.

After setting this theoretical framework and placing the case of the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis within, it now has to be looked, in more detail, at the process of legitimization. This will be the primary concern of the analysis, which examines the role the Human Rights narrative plays, through employing discourse analysis.

6.2 Method

Even though, according to Williams, it is possible and, as well, common to employ his theory with a normatively to present cases situated in our contemporary society, which is a criterium the case at hand fulfils, this paper presents a rather descriptive intent. According to the aim of this study, the description of the place the Human Rights discourse takes in the EU’s and U.S.’s foreign policy towards Venezuela, is the primary consideration. The examination of how this place came into being and how it developed, as well as the final, normative evaluation of and judgement about the actual satisfaction of the BLD are only marginally referred to. However, even if the former is already engaged with in some previous research by, among others, Gropas, Sikkink and Forsythe, the latter could constitute a rewarding topic for further research.

Given this descriptive character, an empirical analysis of discourse will be conducted for answering the question if, and how, Human Rights are used as justification for satisfying the Basic Legitimation Demand. The discourse encompassing the justifications by the state actors, which is represented by the primary material published by the respective governmental bodies, will be analysed within the theoretical framework by Williams and interpreted with the supplementary knowledge gained from the secondary academic material. Engaging with the press releases by the European Union and the executive orders issued by the United States with

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25 employing a qualitative method will facilitate a detailed examination of single statements by the government officials, and thus allow to identify the line of reasoning used during the legitimization process. An equally qualitative approach will be used with the secondary academic material for including single ideas provided by the scholars for the purpose of interpreting the discourse and understanding its function in foreign policy more generally. Additionally, a quantitative method will, even though only briefly, be used on the discourse for visualizing the importance of the Human Rights narrative for justification. Giving an account of the number of times the terms “Human Rights”, “Democracy” and “Rule of Law” are used in the primary material under examination, a general picture of the weight the narrative carries can be created.

Concluding the findings of the analysis in a comparative way, with holding the process of legitimization of the EU against the justifications of the U.S., they will describe the relations between the Human Rights discourse and the foreign policy of the regarded state actors and, potentially, provide implications for the role the latter plays as instrument of international relations.

7 Analysis

7.1 Background

For giving a brief overview over the emergence and events of the crisis, the key facts will be presented briefly. The scope of this analysis, however, will be limited to the time frame from 2017 to the present time, covering the events leading up to and following the presidential elections in 2018.

Nicolás Maduro was elected President of Venezuela in 2013, following his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. After he assumed office, civil unrest in the country increased due to reasons which can be summarized under severely decreasing living standards and a critical economic situation. The crisis status in Venezuela was declared in 2017 by the High Representative of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, on the grounds of “severe shortages of food and medicines” which amount to a polarization of the country leading to immense political and social tensions in the form of “numerous reports of human rights violations, excessive use of force, massive detentions and trials of civilians by military courts”47. Already two years prior, the United States claimed to have identified an “erosion of human rights guarantees, persecution of political opponents, curtailment of press freedoms, use of violence and human rights violations and

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26 abuses in response to government protests, and arbitrary arrest and detention of anti-government protestors, as well as the exacerbating presence of significant public corruption”48_. During the next presidential elections in 2018, which are the object of this study, Maduro became re-elected. They as well present the central event of the crisis, which emerged as such after impactful international actors like the EU and the U.S. labelled them undemocratic and thus invalid. The situation became critical when parts of the international community (in this study represented by the European Union and the United States) began to publicly support the opponent of Maduro, namely the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaido. Being backed up by the U.S. and the EU, Guaido declared himself Interim President in 2019. The civil unrest in the country increased further and produced, together with the conflict regarding the position of president and the validity of the elections, a row of allegations and criticism by the U.S., the EU and supporting states. The Presidential crisis does not only constitute a simple claim of undemocratic elections and the following conflict regarding the official and acknowledged “leader” of the country. Furthermore, it does present a confrontation between the socialist systemic structure of Venezuela, embodied by Hugo Chávez, and continued by Maduro, and the attempted implementation of the (neo)-liberal ideas and values Guaido represents, supported by the majority of “western”, capitalist states.49

7.2 Analysis of discourse and actions of the European Union

Reviewing the press releases, issued in response to the crisis in Venezuela on the behalf of the Council of the European Union, their content and purpose can be summarized as communicating to the public the assessment of the situation in Venezuela as well as the introduction of specific policies decided to address this matter. While the first declarations concerning this situation were published in 2016, the first “targeted sanctions” were decided in November 2017 as reaction to the critical situation. This decision created the political and legal groundwork for the foreign policy instruments implemented in the future throughout the events of the crisis. Due to this initiate implementation of an “embargo on arms and on related material that might be used for internal repression “as well as “a legal framework for a travel ban and asset freeze”50 the foundation was built for following measures. This fundamental characteristic was clearly expressed with the claim that these measures can be adapted according to the development of the situation and be extended, if necessary, to include additional targets as well as being decreased and reversed if the situation develops as encouraged by the EU, with and

48_{Executive Order No. 13692 of March 8 (2015): p. 1} 49_{Lutta, J. (2019): pp. 60-61}

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27 increased respect of the rule of law and diplomacy and an effort to stop human rights violations51_{. On this basis, all future measures were decided and accordingly, can be described} as simple extensions of the four previous points. Throughout the engagement by the European Union with the Crisis in Venezuela, Arms and repression tools embargos, travel restrictions and the freezing of assets of individuals and entities from different scopes can be said to constitute the primary sanctions employed, which are renewed on a yearly basis. These measures are referred throughout the discourse as “restrictive measures”52 rather than sanctions and are located mainly in the economic sector and thus differ from Williams’s understanding of “coercive power”. Williams, in his theory, understood the exercise of power mainly in the literal sense of the active display of force by the dominating actor. However, considering the development of international relations and foreign policy in the recent years one will find that the employment of economic and purely political actions has increased rapidly and now makes up a significant tool of foreign policy53. This change simply makes up a change of form of the coercive measures which is in focus in Williams’s theory. Eventually, if they take a military or economic form does not change their capability of being coercive. So, the “restrictive measures” announced can be said to fall under this category of coercive power, since their aim is to alter the behaviour (domestically as well as in international relations) of the Venezuelan government54 according to the EU’s demands with the help of their economic capabilities. Thus, they intervene in the political structures of the state with a specific goal established by actors external to the crisis. These attempts to change social and political processes within the targeted state, presents a subtle claim of authority over these processes, or at least the political will to interfere with it. In this case the elected government, namely the Maduro administration, as well as the individuals and entities associated, are subjected to this interference.

A claim of authority, as the one identified in this case from the EU over the electoral and political processes of Venezuela and the ones involved, leads to two implications. Firstly, it places the ones targeted by the exercise of power, in the form of the “restrictive measures”, in a subject relation to the EU and accordingly, following Williams’s theory, they could raise a demand for justification. If this demand is raised by the subjects in this specific case or not is not essential for determining its necessity. Recalling Williams’s classification of this demand as probable but not necessary condition it is possible for the purpose of this study that the claim

51_{Council oft he European Union, November 2017}

52_{Council oft he European Union, November 2017, even though the use of actual force, in terms of warfare, has}

by no means vanished from the international stage.

53_{Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (2007): pp.}_904-904

54_{In this case the term „government“ is used as a simplified expression meaning the people and/or entities}

Human Rights in Foreign Policy : The role of the Human Rights discourse throughout the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis