GDP and post-GDP - A Spurious Divorce

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GDP and post-GDP: A Spurious

Divorce

Dominic Austin

International Relations

Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits thesis

VT2020

Supervisor: Dimosthenis Chatzoglakis Word count: 13,986

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Abstract

Where post-GDP, a socio-ecological substitute of GDP, has become increasingly salient within international relations, its practice at an institutional economic level remains largely marginalised. At a discursive level, however, both GDP and post-GDP appear to be both supplementary and antithetical to one another. This thesis investigates this relationship between GDP and post-GDP discourse, as well as the dependency of economic institutions to exercise such a discourse. Constructivist institutionalism initially frames these economic ideas as both constitutive and antagonistic towards institutional stability. This thesis, however, draws primarily upon institutional poststructuralism, articulating GDP/post-GDP discourse, not the agent, as a mechanism that produces economic knowledge and, by association, the institutions that are shaped by it. A two-part analysis takes place, consisting of an historical genealogy of GDP/post-GDP and a discourse logics analysis between the IMF development committee and the economic departments of India and surrounding countries. The findings show that the formative discourse of GDP and post-GDP had become divorced during the 20th_{century and} that while GDP logics often struggle to reconcile requisite development outcomes, economic institutions exercise the two as a unitary discourse; albeit one that maintains a GDP centre.

Key Words: GDP, post-GDP, poststructuralism, constructivist institutionalism, discourse, genealogy, logics, development committee, IMF, economics

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A special thank you to Microsoft spellchecker, without whom this work would not have been possibel.

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List of Abbreviations

BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Economic CI Constructivist Institutionalism

DC Development Committee

DoC United States Department of Commerce EME Emerging Market Economy

FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program GDP Gross Domestic Product

GPA Global Policy Agenda Reports GPI Genuine Progress Indicator HCI Human Capital Index

IBBS India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka IDA International Development Countries IMF International Monetary Fund

IPE International Political Economy LIC Low Income Country

LIDC Low Income Development Country MENA Middle East and North Africa MEW Measure of Economic Welfare

OPACS Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply SDG Sustainable Development Goals

SNA System of National Accounts SAP Swedish Social Democrats TNC Transnational Corporation U.S. United States of America WB(G) World Bank (Group)

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1. Introduction

1.1 GDP/post-GDP

A nation-state’s dependence upon gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator for status, development and power has become a global norm since the mid-twentieth century (Beckley, 2018; Lepenies, 2016:152; Philipsen, 2015:3; Fioramonti, 2017). The last two decades, however, have seen an intensified demand for post-GDP, with many seeking to dispose of GDP altogether (Fioramonti, 2016; 2017; Beyond GDP, 2007; Marsh, 2014; Thiry, 2014; Raworth, 2017; Smith, 2016).

Coined by Fioramonti (2016), post-GDP aims to articulate the development of indicators that aim to either displace or supplement GDP as an international economic and development standard. Although varied in method, post-GDP collectively refers to indicators that incorporate sociological and/or ecological factors into the calculus of economic development (see Thiry, 2014; Marsh, 2014; Fioramonti, 2016; Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973). By contrast, GDP exclusively calculates the gross sum of goods and services produced within a given territory, irrespective of its socio-ecological preservation (Beckley, 2018:16).

1.2 IR relevance and Research Problem

In addition to their methodological distinctions, this thesis recognises a discursive divergence between GDP and post-GDP, about which particular dichotomies are revealed within IR literature: sustainability/growth, north/south, wellbeing/inequality, science/political-philosophy1_{(see Beckley, 2018; Fioramonti, 2017; Smith, 2016; Goede, 2006). The} contestation between the two has also become increasingly salient within international forums, a notable example being ‘Beyond GDP’2_{(2007), which held critical discussions on the} potential of a European implementation of alternative indicators to GDP, concluding with a “political consensus on the need to go beyond GDP” (Beyond GDP, 2007:8). Shortly afterwards, UN secretary-general, Ban-Ki Moon also declared the need for “a new economic

1_{These dichotomies are not necessarily split cleanly between GDP and post-GDP, rather they are revealed as}

overlapping themes when the two are juxtaposed.

2_{This forum was attended by numerous institutions: OECD, Club of Rome, European Parliament, European}

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paradigm” (Ban, 2012). Post-GDP within this dichotomised discourse, however, fluctuates as both commensurable towards GDP, while at other times existing as seemingly antithetical to it (Thiry, 2014:314), thus framing the first research question of this thesis: ‘What is the relationship between GDP and post-GDP discourse?’

As they aim to mitigate the intensification of inequality and ecological degradation, post-GDP indicators have become increasingly relevant as an alternative towards GDP (Raworth, 2017:31). These indicators, however, remain largely unimplemented by nation-states and international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, who pursue GDP growth regardless, often relegating post-GDP to symbolically titled ‘satellite accounts’ (Vanoli, 2018:87-88; Bos, 1992:25; Philipsen, 2015:227). Consequently, there remains a hegemonic system of GDP-based policy and development practice (Speich, 2008:21-22; Mügge, 2016:412). There is a paradox, therefore, between a rise in post-GDP knowledge and the insubstantial practice of post-GDP at an institutional level, thus framing the second research question of this thesis: ‘In what way are economic institutions dependent upon GDP discourse?’

1.3 Thesis Road Map

This thesis, therefore, primarily asks:

—What is the relationship between GDP and post-GDP discourse? —In what way are economic institutions dependent upon GDP discourse?

To answer this, literature regarding GDP from the field of international political economy is first utilised —chapter 2. This defines economic institutions as both shaping and resisting the economic ideas of GDP/post-GDP within an institutional contestation —chapters 2.4-3.3. Poststructuralist theory details this further —chapters 3.3-3.8—, surfacing two further guiding questions:

—What agency do actors exercise within institutional mechanisms? —What are the systems within discourse in which these actors operate?

The result is an analysis of two-parts: an historical genealogy, whereby the ‘GDP discourse’ of both primary research questions is defined —chapter 4. Subsequently, this enables a logics analysis that describes how GDP/post-GDP discourse is exercised between the Development Committee and the IBBS3_{nation-states between the years of 2014-2018 —chapter 5.}

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1.4 Delimitations

Particular areas of this research encountered difficulties. Access to selected research that was limited within the English language was apparent, namely the topic of the material product system (MPS), a Soviet variation of GDP that dissipated in the 1990s that holds scarce English material4_{—chapter 4.3.1. Necessitating a two-part analysis also held further limitations,} insofar that these discourse-heavy methodologies could have extended significantly beyond the scope of this thesis —detailed further in chapters 5.2 and 6.2.

2. GDP in IPE

As a sub-field of international relations, the study of international political economy (IPE) seeks to understand how the two spheres of economy and politics interrelate. It achieves this via two predominant theoretical positions: the first concerns the national and the international, while the second concerns the social and the institutional (Frieden & Lake, 2000:17). The chapter to follow will demonstrate GDP via each of these positions, problematising it as a political phenomenon and in doing so demonstrate the reasoning behind post-GDP development.

2.1 Nation-State

GDP is most notably a comparable measure of a nation-state’s growth. The purpose of growth and how it is defined, however, is heavily debated (Benatar et al., 2018; Stiglitz & Squire, 2000; Raworth, 2017; Fioramonti, 2017; Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973). While it is commonly — although often implicitly— argued within IPE that growth “benefits most of the people most of the time” (Stiglitz & Squire, 2000:384), the critique of this position has become increasingly salient. Scholars who advocate post-GDP reflect this, arguing that we must account for the distribution of growth, otherwise we risk amplifying inequality further (Fioramonti, 2016:23). Conversely, Joseph Stiglitz & Lyn Squire (2000) describe a quality of growth, one that depends upon the economic policy of a nation-state (ibid.:384): Nation-states who strive for military prowess, often “contain the seeds of their own destruction”, while those who “clothe their

4_{MPS otherwise surfaced frequently, but was brief and undetailed (see Vanoli, 2018:87, Bos, 1992:22; Arvay,}

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children and improve their nutrition” reap the benefits (ibid.:384). Growth in this sense is simply an amplification of nation-state agency.

Michael Beckley (2018) extends this notion of GDP as a measure of capability, yet critiques its validity, stating that scholars often adopt it as a “rough but reliable” indicator, simply because it is the best data on hand given their available data constraints (ibid.:9). He points out that for nation-states to maximise their GDP growth, they can proceed simply by “dumping toxic waste into the streets and then spending billions of dollars to clean it up” (ibid.:16). The argument made here, is that GDP counts all goods and services, including that which demands a nation-state to exhaust its resources.

Measuring the power of a nation-state via its production demands a recalculation of ‘Gross’ of GDP, into ‘Net’. Countries that sustain large financial burdens, such as poverty, civil unrest and pollution, are less capable of generating military and financial power, therefore this should be accounted for (ibid.:9-14). Had deductions been made in this manner, the U.S. (United States) National Intelligence Council, for example, may have reconsidered issuing reports warning of a Chinese re-emergence and the subsequent return towards global multi-polarity (ibid.:11). Sean Starrs (2013:817), similarly argues that GDP fails to encapsulate true economic power. Due to a globalised network of transnational corporations (TNCs) that exist offshore, an extraterritorial and diffused wealth possessed by countries such as the U.S. remains outside of GDP’s focus. GDP, it has been argued, remains an inaccurate projection of material state-power, albeit in differing ways.

2.2 International

Fioramonti (2016; 2017) by contrast, frames GDP as an economic regime that has power and influence in and of itself; it is not just a number, he argues, but a “powerful ordering principle in international governance” (Fioramonti, 2016:15). GDP, he continues, determines those who gain access to elite international forums such as the G7 and G20 (Fioramonti, 2017:49), while granting the status of the ‘developed’, ‘emerging’, ‘regional leaders’ or indeed ‘superpowers’ (Fioramonti, 2016:15, 18). GDP has become normalised to the extent that political bodies worldwide, be they socialist or capitalist, rarely propose substantial alternatives (Fioramonti, 2017:209). Increasing one’s GDP, it seems, no longer exists as a means to an end, but as the end itself (Raworth, 2017:35-36).

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Fioramonti (2017) goes some way to illustrate how an alternative system would appear by inviting us to imagine the G7 world leaders as being measured by post-GDP. The Social Progress Index —prioritising the social and environmental— would see Norway as the global leader (ibid.:177). Alternatively, the Human Development Index —healthy and educated— would ascend Costa Rica to the top (ibid.). If one disregards a new world order of this calibre as either unthinkable or, perhaps, trivial, then it is testament to the central role that the economy, as opposed to the social and ecological metrics, plays in our normative assumptions of international relations.

The economy as measured by GDP, Firoamonti (2017:28) continues, also portrays harmful trade as profitable. By exposing the hidden costs of these transactions, however, post-GDP indicators would account for the external social and environmental costs, stimulating a global market reformation (Fioramonti, 2016:21). Renewable energies, too, are far costlier to transport than oil, resulting in regional exchanges as favourable (ibid.:22).

2.3 Social

In a similar vein, by concealing the exogenous shocks that global trade can have on smaller developing nations, John Smith (2016) critiques GDP as an instrument of neo-imperialism. For the global South in particular, he argues that GDP performs as a veil for the ‘developed’ nation-state, within which the TNCs house their head quarters (ibid.:257). It does this in two ways: The first is that GDP does not address the inequality of capital that is distributed amongst the global class divide (ibid.:255); the second is that it enables TNCs to produce an illusion of wealth by inflating the estimates of domestic output of the countries that produce primary goods —exemplified by his case study of the Dominican Republic (Smith, 2016:261-63). This last point is no passing detail as “[…] up to 40% of value added is created by foreign affiliates (Smith, 2016:263). In other words, a significant proportion of GDP calculated in the developing nation-states, is “what competing firms construct it to be” (ibid.:265). The global North, he continues, would rather remain ‘neutral’ to GDP as opposed to subtracting from it, thus preserving it as with an apolitical veneer (ibid.:257).

GDP’s scope, it has been argued thus far, extends far beyond the material capability of a nation-state. Whether it is granting status within international forums, or benefiting particular polities by disregarding particular socio-ecological factors, GDP is constitutive towards a system of international governance. The sub-chapter to follow seeks to conceptualise how an economic

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idea such as GDP can be exercised in such a system, while exploring the potential for its alternative, post-GDP, at an institutional level.

2.4 Institutions

To begin with a broad definition, institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990:3). Their function is to reduce —or ‘shape’— the uncertainty that occurs during human interaction, by doing so they seek to reduce the inefficient transaction costs that are present across cultural, spatial and temporal divides (North, 2000:49).

Douglass North (2000:50) describes institutions as constituted both by formal rules and informal norms. These take on a variety of processes, be it “routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies […] and technologies” (March & Olsen, 1989:21). When the formalities of contract and law are unable to ‘constrain’ the terms of exchange, institutions depend upon the aforementioned norms, the “codes of conduct, taboos [and the] standards of behavior” (North, 2000:51). To summarise, institutions are the

[…] architecture [within which] opportunities and incentives for behaviour, inclusion and exclusion of potential players, and structuring the relative ease or difficulty of inducing change, and the mechanisms through which change may be facilitated or denied. — Rhodes et al., 2006:xiii

This definition is echoed by Fioramonti (2017:28) who defines GDP “as a powerful institutional framework which has shaped incentives, policies, perceptions and behaviours”. GDP possesses a type of institutional agency, one that consists of rules —what one can measure— and norms —what one should measure (ibid.:29-30). To act within this institution one is predisposed towards a policy choice that results in GDP growth, often doing so at the expense of others (Pilling, 2018:66).

Fioramonti (2017:41) goes on to caution the development of post-GDP under GDP’s institutional domain, quoting March & Olsen, (1989:63): “By shaping a change to make it more consistent with existing procedures and practices, institutions maintain stability in the face of pressure to change.” Establishing post-GDP mechanisms is at risk, therefore, of being obfuscated by a type of institutional resilience. International financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, he continues, function upon these mechanisms (Fioramonti, 2017:175). While this is relevant to my second research question regarding institutional

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dependency upon GDP discourse, Fioramonti’s (2016; 2017) analysis does not go into further empirical detail as to how these institutions function upon GDP. Instead, an assumption is made that post-GDP alternatives can be cultivated with little to no resistance from GDP influence:

Alternative institutions based on the value of sharing, reciprocity and mutual benefits [will] allow communities of users to self-manage economic interactions, even in the absence of an external, top-down authority — Fioramonti, 2017:32

This portrays a vacuum into which rational actors can choose to operate outside of pre-existing rules and norms in favour of another. A theoretical assumption that is typical within the prescriptive literature of post-GDP (see Coscieme et al., 2019; Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973; Maturo et al., 2019; Thiry, 2014; Pilling, 2018; Raworth, 2017; Lepenies, 2016). These developments of alternative indicators often make empirically rigid arguments regarding the efficacy and necessity of their GDP substitutes, particularly regarding socio-ecological concerns. Yet, they collectively eschew the pre-existing institutional settings into which they hope to implement their new ideas.

2.4.1 Post-GDP as SDG

An exception to this could be argued to reside within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), for which alternative indicators such as the Sustainable Wellbeing Index (SWI) and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) have all been proposed (Coscieme et al., 2019; Fioramonti et al., 2019). As part of the United Nations (UN) resolution for 2030, the SDGs form a framework for collective action amongst nation-states to address an intensifying level of inequality and unsustainability. Mirroring this, its goals were seen to be in accordance with that of post-GDP (Fioramonti et al., 2019:208).

Recent developments, therefore, had hoped for the SDGs to form an institutional platform, via the UN, onto which these alternative indicators could be normalised (Coscieme et al., 2019; Fioramonti et al., 2019). While the normative power of the SDGs has been substantial, what it revealed, in fact, were the inherent paradoxes that are embedded between the economic and the social/environmental goals. This debate concerns Goal 8: “[T]o promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth” (UNSDG, 2020), the success of which is to be measured by GDP (Coscieme et al., 2019:6).

This conflation brings about “significant policy incoherence”; growth via an exhaustion of the biosphere is the primary enabler of wellbeing, yet wellbeing is unobtainable without a

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functioning biosphere (ibid.). GDP, as a result, will remain inadequate until it is supplemented with better suited indices (ibid.). SDG, at least in part then, is an ‘oxymoron’, as it is housed between the two ideologies of production and preservation (Spaiser et al., 2017), a contestation that is reflected by GDP/post-GDP, both in terms of methodology and doctrine.

In this chapter, GDP has been illustrated as an institutional mechanism that shapes and constrains behaviour, all the while exercising a type of resilience towards its post-GDP substitute. Thus far, however, this contestation has remained somewhat vague. To remedy this, the chapters to follow will position this institutional phenomenon into a theoretical field.

3. Theory

3.1 Constructivist Institutionalism

Constructivist institutionalism (CI) sees actors —institutions and their subjects— as rational, although only as far as these ideas enable them to be rational (Hay, 2006; Blyth, 2002). Ideas are seen in this regard as ‘cognitive filters’ (Hay, 2006:65), for when we look at the world through them they shape our preferences, judgments and motivations (ibid.:63). In other words, ideas dictate what is politically feasible. Institutions, therefore, are not reducible to the material circumstances in which they find themselves, but “are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, ethical, and political) orientation” (ibid.).

This produces three additional ontological assumptions towards institutions: The first, institutions are not optimal at reducing ‘uncertainty’ as they function through a messy prism of human ideas (Hay, 2006:64); secondly, institutions are subject to ‘instability’ (Schmidt, 2010:2; 2011:47) or ‘disequilibrium’ (Hay, 2006:60), as these ideas are seen as fluid and exist in a perpetual state of contestation (Hay, 2006; Jacobs, 2018; Blyth, 2002). Lastly, these ideas are formative towards institutions, for it is “the very ideas on which they are predicated and which inform their design and development, that exert constraints on political autonomy” (Hay, 2006:65).

CI, it can be argued, is epistemologically retrogressive. It articulates a specific and historical context between actors (ibid.:64), revealing “processes of normalization and institutional-embedding [whereby] established ideas become codified” (ibid.:65). CI assumes the institutionalisation of post-GDP, therefore, to be a relational process, one where actors are able to exert its ideas, subsequently altering a GDP-dominant institutional architecture.

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Mark Blyth’s (2002:6) Great Transformations, demonstrates this position of ideas as “vitally important components of institutional construction and change”. Recognising a pattern of struggle between the protection of labour and the protection of capital, namely the embedded liberalism (sic) of Keynesian economics and the re-ascension of neo-liberalism, Blyth proposes five hypotheses (ibid.:34-44): 1) Economic ideas reduce uncertainty; 2) These ideas can enable coalitions between interest groups; 3) or be utilised by actors to challenge pre-existing institutions; 4) they can additionally provide the blueprint for their replacements; 5) while economic ideas reassert themselves, producing institutional stability.

Blyth (2002) tests this institutional/ideational lifecycle through a comparative, process-tracing case study of the U.S. and Sweden5_{. Both similarly developed nation-states were subject to the} same external stimuli of the Great Depression and the subsequent stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s, yet both resulted in a remarkably different institutional make-up: Within the U.S. the embedded liberalism —increased economic institutionalism— of the 1940s and ‘50s failed to address the uncertainties of the turbulent decades that followed. The failure of an activist government (sic) to reduce said uncertainty and enable coalition building was supplanted by a successful mobilisation of neo-liberal economic theories. This was exercised by conservative think tanks and political action committees —who distribute political campaign contributions—, both of whom were “directly involved in the production and dissemination of alternative ideas” (ibid.:154).

Conversely, Swedish neoliberal ideas remained anchored to a strong democratic identity that demanded an economic system that could “‘restore’ the welfare state and to promise more money for healthcare and social services” (Blyth, 2002.:246). While neoliberalism had gained some footing, it had ultimately failed to unify a conservative national identity with the interests of economic elites (ibid.:245).

Where the U.S. had implemented “off the shelf” neo-liberal ideas, favouring the freedom of capital (Blyth, 2002:267), the Swedish institutional system became further entrenched within a national economic model, successful as it could “reduce uncertainty and recast seemingly contrary interests as common” (ibid.:253). Contrasting, yet equally favourable demonstrations of Blyth’s five hypotheses.

5_{This section is an abbreviated reflection of Blyth’s case within ‘Great Transformations’ (2002: 152-250), the}

function of which is not describe a synopsis per se, but rather to demonstrate his hypotheses which will resurface later in the methodology chapter of 5.1.

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This provides three key points towards this thesis: 1) Economics is a field that is both politically and socially constructed; 2) Economic ideas are contingent upon their historical context; 3) Ideas do not become institutionalised simply because they are effective, but rather their implementation is dependent upon whether they are believed to be so. Blyth’s (2002) case, therefore, has reframed both my research questions regarding the relationship between GDP/post-GDP discourse and the institutional dependency on GDP discourse; as these economic ideas seek to replace and/or unify the other, economic institutions also become dependent upon these ideas to form institutional stability.

Where Blyth’s two cases shared the same crisis, GDP exhibits an entirely different crisis to that of post-GDP: The GDP crisis of non-growth (Philipsen, 2015:136), sits axiologically opposed to that of post-GDP, which frames a crisis of ecology and inequality. These two opposing ideas, therefore, are discursively unique. One epistemological approach that Blyth (2002) largely ignores, however, is discourse, which is central to each of the research questions discussed in this thesis. How one understands a relationship of ‘discourse’ between GDP/post-GDP at an institutional level is the purpose of the chapters to follow.

3.2 From Constructivism to Poststructuralism

Vivian A. Schmidt (2008) has gone to lengths to accommodate discourse within an institutional constructivist framework: “Discourse serves not just to represent ideas but also to exchange them through interactive processes […]” (ibid.:321–2). Discourse, within CI then, is essentially a vessel that enables actors to transmit their ideas, a technique that reshapes the meaning and context of ideas through ‘discursive intervention’ (Schmidt, 2010:4). What has remained consistent thus far is one’s agency within CI theory: for one to act upon discourse at will, ultimately shaping the way in which institutions become shaped by discourse.

However, this proposed duality between discourse and the agent is problematic. Poststructuralist analyses of institutionalism would ask: How much agency is one empowered with? If institutions shape and constrain the individual, then one’s agency risks relegating institutions entirely; ontologically they would be reduced to pseudo-political structures (Bell, 2011:891; Larsson, 2015:194). The remainder of this thesis will argue, therefore, in favour of this poststructuralist position, while tying discourse —not the actor— back to Blyth’s (2002) hypotheses, reframing his constructivist ontology.

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3.3 Discourse

Reflecting Foucault’s (1972[1969]) understanding of discourse, Gillian Rose (2016) illustrates how discourse is not something to be possessed, but rather “human subjects are produced through [it]” (ibid.:189). Subsequently, this dilutes what agency one would have within an institution, as well as one’s ability to produce the ideas that recast them, for “it is discourse, not the subjects who speak it, which produces knowledge” (Hall & Jhally, 1997:55). This is echoed in Rose’s definition of discourse:

Discourse […] refers to groups of statements that structure the way a thing is thought,  and the way we act on the basis of that thinking. In other words, discourse is a particular knowledge about the world which shapes how the  world is understood and how things are done in it. — Rose, 2016:187

By enabling and restraining how we view the world, discourse is not simply a catalyst —as CI has previously argued—, but constitutes, rather, the very ideas that we can form: what can and cannot be said (Goede, 2006:5-6; Rose, 2016:137; Maiguashca, 2006:241). It is worth noting how this definition is commensurable towards North’s (1990:3) institutions as “humanly devised constraints” as well as ideas that function as “cognitive filters” (Hay, 2006:65). The crucial difference here is that poststructuralist theory collapses the institution, the actor and their contexts into discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:103; O’Farrel, 2005:81).

3.4 The Nexus of Power and Knowledge

To conceptualise this poststructuralist understanding of discourse and its relation to knowledge, power and the institution, this chapter draws upon a Foucauldian (1973[1963]; 1977) understanding.

Discourse seeks to “render our environment meaningful by differentiating it into elements, which we articulate together” (Jacobs, 2018:383). By organising these ‘elements’ of discourse we are “ordering the social and physical environment to make it manageable” (O’Farrel, 2005:66). In other words, an ‘ordering’ of things is how we come to represent an object, making it knowable, thus exhibiting a production of ‘knowledge’ (Hall, 2003:44).

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The actor, therefore, is produced within this nexus, one is ‘disciplined’ through it (Rose, 2016:189; O’Farrel, 2005:133), while existing as a node from which discourse is emitted within a discursive ‘relay’, one which is inherent with a knowledge:

The subject can become the bearer of the kind of knowledge that discourse produces. It can become the object through which power is relayed. But it cannot stand outside power/knowledge as its source and author. — Hall & Jhally, 1997:55

This discipline and relay is where we find the relation of power. Institutional settings in particular can be understood as mechanisms that produce and reproduce knowledge (Foucault, 1973[1963]; 1977). This is done by the examination of on an individual’s performance or ability to ‘reproduce’ a certain knowledge, thus normalising them —i.e. student, patient, soldier (O’Farrel, 2005:105). This knowledge is then ordered and compared, enabling its further production via other disciplines (ibid.). For one to become disciplined, standardised and normalised from this exercise is what constitutes power, yet power also rests upon the claim that the knowledge produced claims to be true; they reinforce one another (Foucault, 1977:27). Put simply, power is situated in knowing what we control and controlling what we know.

3.5 Technology of Truth

Institutions that produce these quantifications and comparisons require “[…] the production of effective instruments for the formation, and accumulation of knowledge” (Foucault, 1982:102). These instruments manifest as “[…] methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control” (ibid.). These processes are

central to poststructuralist IPE as they feature heavily within economics (Goede, 2006:6-7). Goede (2006:7) in particular, argues that this concept of institutional knowledge production enables one to expose “technical and depoliticized economic practice to political scrutiny”. To politicise the apolitical. Examples of these instruments within institutional economics include accounting, auditing, debt restructuring and financial modelling statistics (ibid.). All of which are understood as technologies of truth as they are quantifications that claim a professed truth (ibid.:6). As a result, one should aim to get “inside the particular construction of numbers and statistics by developing an understanding of their normative assumptions” (ibid.:7). It is at this juncture that we can begin to merge these Foucauldian concepts back to the case of GDP/post-GDP.

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(Goede, 2006:14; Smith, 2016:257). However, if one begins to frame GDP within the institutional setting that Foucault has described, it emerges as something quite different: Within chapter two, GDP was demonstrated as an economic technology; Used by defence ministries to provide new information on international security (Beckley, 2018:11); TNCs that project wealth on recipient countries by inflating their GDP (Smith, 2016:263); or indeed within international relations, whereby countries are classified as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ by indexing their GDP (Stiglitz & Squire, 2000). All of these are examples of institutions utilising GDP to examine and compare the nation-state, resulting in the production of a new knowledge through discourse. In turn this both empowers and constrains us to see the world in a particular way.

3.6 Continuities

To specify a knowledge is to indicate that our present understanding of subjects, and the new categories in which we place them, are contingent upon a matted history of accidents and struggles for power (Foucault, 1998[1971]:380-81). This position also sits opposed to the assumption that we are a product of one inevitable history, from which our present day was ‘destined’ to arrive (O’Farrel, 2005:76). This assumption is what Foucault refers to as ‘continuities’ (Foucault, 1972:3).

Continuity also eliminates the possibility of chance events […]. The rationality of progress, ideology, scientific truth or the working out of some political or religious destiny mean that history is determined in advance […] any changes made simply confirm the inevitable end result. — O’Farrel, 2005:76

What is being critiqued here, be it empirical or indeed spiritual, is the philosophical assumption that that there is an unchanging ‘essence’ of the human within a singular history (O’Farrel, 2005:75). Discontinuity, by contrast, marks the historical moments, or ‘events’ within which ideas and activities are interrupted, marking a discursive revolution of cultural forms (ibid.:74). At a later lecture Foucault (1983) uses the example of marriage: It is itself an institution by form as it shapes and constrains human behaviour through rules (law) and norms (love), yet both of these assumed constants that become attached to marriage are subjected to change through time, place and culture (ibid.). When historical ‘events’ alter the ethics of law and love, so too will marriage: be it faith/secularism or community/individual. Institutional mechanisms,

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therefore, function upon these continuities, which become increasingly embedded through discourse, gaining, over time, an inherent ‘stickiness’ (Jacobs, 2018:385).

Foucault understood these ‘events’, therefore, as windows into which we can interpret worldly phenomena —in this study the continuities of GDP/post-GDP are conceptually tied to the logics of chapter 3.8 and demonstrated in chapter 4. For this reason, our present is inherently contextual; rooted in historical contestations of discourse, where ideas are forced out, maintained or forgotten (Rose, 2016:189). There is a considerable overlap epistemologically, therefore, with the historical process-tracing of constructivist institutionalism and poststructuralism —see chapter 3.1.

3.7 Discursive Formation

The institutional sedimentation described above, produces a ‘style’ of discourse, or a ‘discursive formation’, found typically between different fields of knowledge —medical, legal, economic (Foucault, 1972:33-38). Yet the concept extends further as it aims to scrutinise the particular elements of a discourse, in particular how they relate to produce new meanings, logics and subject positions (Rose, 2016:188). ‘The doctor examines the patient’, as an example, as there is an assumed logic that one subject is positioned in a context to another. These rules between the subjects of a discursive formation are, more accurately, a “system of dispersion” (Foucault, 1972:37). To elaborate, where statements appear to be heterogeneous, there is in fact a:

[…] system that governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement, and replacement — Foucault, 1972:34 Again, this illustrates discourse within a constant state of contestation, within which there are ‘hegemonic’ themes that seek “[…] to dominate the field discursively, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:112). I argue that this theoretical view is paramount towards the analysis of this thesis, regarding, in particular the first research question: ‘What is the relationship between GDP and post-GDP discourse?’ Where CI had framed GDP/post-GDP as social constructs within a contestation between actors, poststructural theory describes a hegemonic centre of —GDP— discourse that ‘arrests’ an external —post-GDP— discourse. Daniel Mügge (2016), in reference to GDP, aligns this view:

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Institutionalizing a particular definition of a macroeconomic concept in an indicator gives that definition power, both because it becomes more consequential and because it elevates this definition to the universal one, obscuring that definitional choices had ever been made. — Mügge, 2016:412 italics added

This chapter has demonstrated GDP/post-GDP as a ‘technology of truth’, imbricated within an institutional knowledge/power nexus. The concept of (dis)continuities, in turn, argues that institutions function upon these knowledges, or truths, which sediment over time within the “hegemonic historical blocs” of discourse (Jacobs, 2018:384). The analyses of this thesis rests therefore, within the discursive formation of GDP/post-GDP; how its subjects, practices and truths are structured within a discursive contestation of the hegemonic and the disqualified.

3.8 Logics

Discourse-theoretical methods towards the study of institutions are, arguably, in their infancy (Jacobs, 2018:385). Poststructuralism, evidently, elevates institutional discourse to a high degree of abstraction which, in turn, risks impeding a constructive contribution towards the social sciences (Panizza & Miorelli, 2013:308). Building upon the discursive ‘logics’ of Laclau (2005), Glynos & Howarth (2007) seek to address this problem; “to bridge the gap” between the “hermeneutical and naturalist accounts of social phenomena” (ibid.:134, 213). They do so by establishing the analytical framework of social and political logics. Building upon the poststructural theory thus far, this chapter defines this system of discourse, as utilised within the second analysis —see chapter 5.

A logic establishes “functional relationships between subject positions, statements, practices, topics and other discursive elements” (Zienkowski, 2016:67), a type of discursive formation —see (Foucault, 1972) chapter 3.7— as it portrays “the way meanings are connected together in a particular discourse” (Rose, 2016:188). The logics of Glynos & Howarth (2007) dichotomise this ‘system of dispersion’ into two: the logics of the social and the logics of the political.

3.8.1 Social Logics

A social logic is a statement that casts a relation between subjects or objects as preordained or ‘natural’ (Jacobs, 2018:393): “When a person portrays a particular practice as normal, as the way things are, the discourse s/he articulates can be characterized with a social logic” (ibid.). As social logics state what a particular regime or social practice is, as opposed to what it should

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be, what they represent become gradually normalised and eventually objectified (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:137-40). This act constitutes a system of rules “within which some objects are representable while others are excluded” (Laclau, 2005:117), a reiteration of how discourse establishes what is sayable (sic) and what is not (Goede, 2006:5-6; Rose, 2016:137; Maiguashca, 2006:241).

For a discourse to consist exclusively of social logics, therefore, would exemplify total institutional hegemony; a total homogenisation of discourse. Discourse, however, can never fully capture a perfect representation of reality: instead, it is in constant oscillation as it aims to rebalance itself via political logics (Clarke, 2012:177-8).

3.8.2 Political Logics

Political logics “provide the means to explore how social practices are instituted, contested, and defended” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:133). Echoing Blyth’s (2002:34-44) aforementioned hypotheses, they endeavour to bring about, sustain and replace an established idea/discourse. Political logics only function in reference to social logics, as they challenge what has been established as ‘normal’ and govern the ways in which we contest them (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:105-6). Often this is achieved by narrating a threat, problem or obstacle (ibid.:174). What has been established thus far is a dichotomy that structures how phenomena are represented by discourse: On the one side social logics arrest discourse via synoptic statements, whereas political logics alter this via dynamic statements (Clarke, 2012:179).

To illustrate this briefly, political logics stimulate constant change, evolution and progress by simplifying the discursive field of subjects/objects into two opposing, antagonistic camps. This is known as the political logic of equivalence (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:144): e.g. ‘A united South African nation against an apartheid state’. Conversely, the opposite can be exercised by multiplying subject positions, constructing them as featuring elements that are clearly “distinct, separate, and autonomous” from one another, a logic of difference (ibid.): e.g. ‘We are a nation formed of many ethnicities, with their own cultures and traditions’. Although this last statement could be held in support of an institution, it remains a political logic as it seeks to defend a challenged institution; if it were truly hegemonic, there would be no need to articulate a political logic.

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One can identify a correlation here between institutionalisation and social/political logics: “The preponderance of social logics [their] repetitive practices, and sedimentation, entails a high degree of institutionalization” (Jacobs, 2018:394). Conversely, political logics, with their augmentation of subject positions, demonstrate institutional contingency, “making more far-reaching institutional transformations possible and institutional changes more likely to occur” (ibid.).

This distinction between the two is crucial in regards to the second research question of this thesis: ‘In what way are economic institutions dependent upon GDP discourse?’. Where GDP-related social logics within an institution’s discourse indicate GDP as embedded and resilient towards that of post-GDP, political logics indicate a discourse that seeks to displace and/or reaffirm a particular convention or norm back into institutional practice. Uncovering a relationship between these logics will enable an analysis of both the relationship between GDP/post-GDP discourse, as well as the way in which economic institutions utilise, or ‘depend’ upon, said discourse for institutional stability. The chapter to follow will first explain how one defines a GDP social logic.

4. Genealogy: Method and Analysis

To reiterate, the analysis of this thesis is structured into two parts. The previous theoretical discussion, predominantly between that of Foucault (1972; 1977) and Glynos & Howarth (2007), was grounded within the same discursive epistemology, yet there is a divergence between the fluidity of the former and the mechanistic qualities of the latter. This chapter fuses the two: Defining the method of a genealogy and explaining its necessity as a prerequisite to a logics analysis.

4.1 Determining Logics

In their methodological example of these aforementioned logics, Glynos & Howarth (2007:171-7) analyse the various discourse —political, professional and popular— of the UK tertiary education auditing system and its turbulent transition into neo-liberal governance. However, when categorising the social logics that are inherent within the university system they bypass an explanation of their origins: “For purposes of illustration, we start by positing the operation of four such logics – competition, atomisation, hierarchy, and instrumentalization” (ibid.:171). This is problematic as it proposes that a similar method

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towards categorising GDP/post-GDP can arbitrarily define its own logics.

Tomas Martilla (2015:120) reinforces this critique, arguing that Glynos and Howarth “proceed seemingly effortlessly to identify social logics”. The method to follow —the first of two— seeks to address this dilemma by first identifying the characteristics of GDP —its social logics— via a genealogy.

This Foucauldian method is concerned with the development and discursive contestation of concepts through historical ‘events’ or (dis)continuities (Foucault, 2003[1975]:9). Drawing upon the concepts of chapters 3.3-3-7, these (dis)continuities seek to unearth and juxtapose “disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them” (ibid.:9). Thus, a genealogy is concerned with how institutions discursively constrain and shape knowledge.

This method is particularly pertinent towards GDP/post-GDP as the former often distinguishes itself as a concept that belongs to economics and quantification, positioned as opposition towards the socio-political assertions of the latter (Thiry, 2014:314-15). A genealogy of one, therefore, naturally brings about a genealogy of the other, as GDP, marked by its historical continuities —evident in its global legitimacy today—, should disclose the discontinuities that constitute its alternative, post-GDP. This assumption is nested in the genealogical method as it scrutinises a “unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse” and in doing so enables the recognition of another otherwise illegitimate discourse (Foucault, 2003[1975]:10).

Connecting these two analyses rests upon the continuities of GDP defined within the genealogy. Based upon O’Farrel’s (2005:74-6) synoptic, this genealogy defines a GDP continuity as: A discursive event, whereby a practice or value is fixed to GDP, subsequently constituting, in part, our present knowledge of the concept.

As historical discourse produces what GDP is —see chapter 3.3—, what its norms and conventions are, this thesis equates the social logics of GDP as identical to the continuities of GDP. As a result, the first analysis, a genealogy, enables the latter, a logics analysis.

4.2 Genealogical Contributions

The operationalization of GDP social logics, however, does not constitute the entire purpose of this genealogy. It also serves to articulate GDP/post-GDP discourse within a historical and

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institutional context, thus providing its own empirical contributions towards both research questions —see chapter 1.2. Additionally, it will indicate the relevant actors/relations, data selection and time set of the logics analysis. The data chosen in this genealogy, however, predominantly concerns that of individuals and their academic discussions that were instrumental for the development of GDP/post-GDP. This genealogy thus concerns the “‘specific intellectual’ located within a particular discipline, institution or social setting as [a] way of providing parameters for the choice of research matter” (O’Farrel, 2005:77).

4.3 A Genealogy of GDP: Analysis 4.3.1 State

Although earlier attempts of national accounting, for which GDP was formed, were made in the 1600s, GDP’s ability as an instrument to make visible an aggregate of wealth within a given economic nation-state began in earnest in the early-mid 20th century (Bos, 1992:8). This century had emerged from an ‘Age of Economic Measurement’, that saw a quantifiable world; all that one required was the correct instrument (Morgan, 2003:276).

The Great Depression and the Keynesian (1936) publication ‘General Theory’, that aimed to rebalance this crisis via economic state intervention, stimulated the U.S. government, in particular, to successfully navigate its national accounts (Vanoli, 2018:9285; Bos, 1992:8). Simon Kuznets alongside Colin Clark at the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), had by this time published the creatively titled ‘National Income’ (1933), a seminal work that laid the foundation of what would soon become GDP. This essay held three distinct features: The first is that it enabled, for the first time, comparative investigations on the economic condition of a nation6_{(Kuznets & Clark, 1933:205); Second, it held national economies as culturally} contingent (ibid.:209); And lastly, it included variables that were subjective, the quality in which income was enjoyed: “[The] net total of desirable events enjoyed by individuals […]" (ibid.:1). This theme of wellbeing, Kuznets (1955) continued to argue, was one of many moral obligations that were inherent within national accountancy.

This last point, in particular, had implications that Kuznets was well aware of, stating that such efforts would venture “into fields beyond those recognized in recent decades as economics proper” (Kuznets, 1955:28). His work continued to subscribe, in this fashion, towards an

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‘economic civilisation’, a liberal ideal that awarded economic primacy to the individual, with the state7_{existing as a means to an end (Lepenies, 2016:75). This was further demonstrated as} the Second World War began to unravel, at which time his calculations deducted military spending, as he considered this to be an interim, yet necessary product of state expenditure (ibid.).

As early as the 1930s, the Keynesian ideas of aggregate economics had jumped the Atlantic and were quickly becoming rooted in the The Economic Section of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS), the organisation entrusted with mobilizing resources for the U.S. war supply (Lepenies, 2016:76). Much to the opposition of Kuznets’ work, in a neighbouring department of DoC, OPACS was re-tuning his methods to account for the ‘aggregate production’ of all sectors, including that of government. To do so would firmly position the state at the centre of national accounting, while government military spending was also to be reframed not as a loss, but as an investment (Lepenies, 2016:75-6).

As the war intensified so too did the ‘vested interest’ of an aggregate macro-economic system, as it favoured the intensification of military spending (Lepenies, 2016:76). By 1942 the ‘household income’, upon which national accounts were previously centred, had been supplanted by the war-favouring aggregates of OPACS (ibid.:75). A full conversion was made and the net calculations of Kuznets’ deductions of society’s evils (sic) were abandoned for gross (ibid.).

This marks a particular event in an ‘Age of Economic Measurement’, a discontinuity of the economic ability to measure all. The purpose of the aggregate had been intended for the capability of production, particularly for that of warfare (Lepenies, 2016:75). The success of Keynesian economics had meant that making deductions on national accounts, be it ethical or otherwise, had swiftly become remodelled as illegitimate. This exemplifies, at an institutional level, the knowledge/power nexus —see (Foucault, 1977) chapter 3.4—, whereby a Keynesian knowledge of national accounts had become both standardised and normalised. Power, in this sense has been exercised, as a standardised knowledge had begun to permeate throughout neighbouring economic institutions, disciplining their practice, in this case a military OPACS into an economic DoC.

7_{State, however, specifies a government, its institutional constituents and their ability to exercise the}

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This illegitimacy of welfare within national accounts is evident within an audit by George Jaszi (1986), who recounts the last 43 years spent staffing and directing for the Bureau of Economic Analysis —a program within the DoC:

I resisted the will-o'-the-wisp of forging national output into a measure of economic welfare. I was a minority of one in a company that included such mental giants as Simon Kuznets and John Hicks, and at one point I had to defy a forceful Secretary of Commerce who had instructed the BEA to prepare a measure of welfare. — Jaszi, 1986:411

GDP8_{, he continues, is an “unrivalled tool for macroeconomic analysis” (ibid.:412). Part of its} resilience belongs to the fact it makes no deductions, including those concerning welfare. He further argues that by not measuring the illegal underground economy —as GDP would advocate— one risks bastardising the national accounts (ibid.:414). He is not advocating illegal activity, one would think, but rather the scientific absolutism with which he endows economics. The calculations are made and the policy, he prescribes, should be left to politicians (ibid.:416). A clear distinction is also made in reverse: “I always was aware of the politicization risk and long ago concluded that the safe course was to keep away from policy advice” (ibid.). Again this reinforces the scientism of economics; what inhibits politicians and strategists of the state should not inhibit the economist, rather, it is only the calculus that should be of concern. This is an event that distinctly separates both GDP from welfare and the economist from the politician. An emergence of a discourse is apparent that establishes GDP as an economic process, yet also as a possession of the state: A tool which it can exercise at will, thus establishing the continuity of the state —see (Foucault, 1972; O’Farrel, 2005) chapter 3.6. Much like the natural sciences that had enabled the Manhattan Project, GDP was to become a powerful military tool, both of the state and about the state (Cobb et al., 1995:6). During the Cold War, GDP had enabled the U.S. to make policy interventions that were previously invisible. It became instrumental for predicting the military capabilities of not only the U.S., but of Soviet Russia too —a task assigned to the new department of ‘foreign economic intelligence’ (Philipsen, 2015:13; Noren, 2003:17). So successful was this act of espionage that Soviet counterintelligence incorporated U.S. GDP estimates of Russia into their own planning (Engerman, 2007:620-21). This reiterates knowledge/power —see (Foucault, 1977) chapter

8_{Gross national product (GNP), as opposed to GDP, had been the dominant measure prior to the 1990s,}

synonymous yet distinguished from gross domestic product in that it also included the product output of foreign nationals within its calculations. See Cobb et al., (1995:6).

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3.4—, for the production of GDP knowledge had been both controlled and replicated, this time into the Eastern Bloc, subsequently disciplining Soviet institutions into a standardised way of knowing themselves.

From as early as the 1950s, however, nation-states affiliated with the Soviets had already begun to adopt their own national accountancy measures (Arvay, 1994:457). The Material Product System (MPS) reflects a centralised communist economy, differentiated from GDP, it excludes ostensibly capitalist services from its calculations (ibid.). This sat opposed, in Cold War fashion, to the rapidly developing GDP-based national accounts of the West. What it shared in common, however, was an appetite for growth. At the onset of the Cold War these systems of national accounts and the economic theories to which they were attached, competed in a battle of their own; the greatest growth defined the victor (Raworth, 2017:37). Growth marks the second continuity of GDP. To posit this, however, an international perspective must first be made.

4.3.2 Growth

By 1948, the Marshall Plan, to which some credited as “saving Europe” from soviet takeover, began a wave of transatlantic U.S. investments (Philipsen, 2015:131). This vast exercise aimed to rebuild western Europe with America’s new wealth, but to do so required a standardisation amongst aid recipients (Speich, 2008:3; Philipsen, 2015:128). As a result, the UN published the System of National Accounts (SNA) and set into motion the replication of GDP-centred national accountancy methods (UN, 1953; 1968).

The pressure for Europe to adopt GDP was not necessarily coercive, as influence was diffused and reproduced amongst a number of institutions. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), for example, “explicitly requested submissions of national income and product accounts from all its member nations” (Philipsen, 2015:131), while the UN did the same of it member-states to calculate the financial obligations of their membership (Speich, 2008:28). The overwhelming image of success wielded by the U.S. following the war, combined with the knowledge that alternative systems of accounts were becoming increasingly “costly, time consuming and not easy to invent” meant that most countries became rapidly homogenised under this single system of GDP (Bos, 1992:17).9_{This further demonstrates the}

9_{Albeit with some developments and compromises on the way; the European System of 1970 for example (see}

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nexus knowledge/power —see (Foucault, 1977) chapter 3.4—, evident in that the international arena had become subjected to GDP as a technique of registration, investigation and control; the standardisation of the state-lead economic statistical agencies towards GDP had become a crucial component of their international recognition.

An alignment of national accounts had, in turn, also enabled the subsequent discourse of growth to unfurl, especially as the Marshall Plan had advocated GDP growth as one of its central tenets (Lepenies, 2016:152). By the 1960s GDP growth had become, and remained, an almost universal driving force behind state-lead policy formation (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973:509). Okun’s law, published U.S. 1962 embodied this new phenomenon: an annual growth of 2% GDP corresponded to a decrease of unemployment by 1%. Growth was not just a question of state security, it had also become an economic marvel that did away with the age-old class struggle, all “without facing the politically charged issue of redistribution” (Raworth, 2017:37). A decade later, however, and the jubilation over GDP’s fix-all approach began to show signs of wear. By the early 1970s a divergence had began to grow between GDP growth and social/ecological progress (Fioramonti, 2017:96). The most notable discourse of which being ‘Is Growth Obsolete?’, whereby Nordhaus & Tobin (1973) question the ‘value-laden’ word of growth, albeit in third person:

Disillusioned critics indict both economic science and economic policy for blind obeisance to aggregate material of ‘progress,’ and for neglect of its costly side effects. Growth, it is charged, distorts national priorities, worsens the distribution of income, and irreparably damages the environment. — Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973:509

This ‘obeisance’, they continue, has been intensified by neo-classical economic enthusiasts, who aim not just to close the gap between expenditure and income, but rather to continue accelerating growth exponentially (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973:511). This, they are among the first to argue —see also for this time Meadows el at., (1972)—, was an unsustainable feat. Instead, they had developed the Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW). Intended as a replacement for GDP, MEW went on to set a precedent for a number of replacement indicators thereafter. Its aim, to account for income distribution as well as the costs associated with environmental degradation (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973).

In an open letter to the Department of Commerce, Arthur Okun (1971) —the very same Okun after whom the 2% GDP law was christened— ripostes such an alternative:

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I urge you not to try to ‘fix’ it—to convert GNP into a purported measure of social welfare. You are doing your job so well that people are asking you to take on a different and bigger job. Resist at all costs, for you can’t do that job; indeed nobody can. Producing a summary measure of social welfare is a job for a philosopher-king […]. — Okun, 1971:4

A recurrence is seen here, whereby welfare is relegated to ‘philosophy’ and firmly separated from that of an economic science. Yet growth, Okun’s law argues, is also, and somewhat paradoxically, a prerequisite for welfare. Having previously been rejected as an inherent attribute of GDP logic, social welfare now resurfaces; a disqualified knowledge that had been proposed by Kuznets & Clark (1933) some four decades earlier. The same logic had also been applied to that of sustainability, —economic and environmental— as it remains outside the alleged remit of GDP. What is alarming in contrast to that of Nordhaus & Tobin (1973), is that the (un)sustainability of GDP had not been recognised as a problem. It had been left unsaid (Okun, 1971; Jaszi, 1986; Kuznets & Clark, 1933; Kuznets, 1955). Thus establishing the second discontinuity —after welfare— of sustainability —see (Foucault, 1972; O’Farrel, 2005) chapter 3.6.

In a time fuelled by metaphors of ‘looking up’ and ‘moving forward’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:14-16), GDP had become discursively congruous towards its second continuity, growth. The discourse of GDP had transitioned from the state knowing itself into the state doing itself. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, the act of growth by a nation’s state could now secure its stability while asserting itself globally. Conversely at this time, GDP’s discontinuities of sustainability and welfare had begun to emerge, too, as a gradually unifying yet subordinate counter discourse (see Meadows, 1972; Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973). Arguably, the discursive event upon which post-GDP made its conception.

4.3.3 Appraisal

The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 —a monetary order intended to balance and govern financial relations between the allied nation-states— had manifested as two financial organisations in particular: the IMF and the World Bank. Their financial practices hinged upon a standardisation of both data collection and the practice about which this data should be interpreted; for this reason, GDP —via SNA— became the axis, about which financial norms became both intelligible and transferable (Philipsen, 2015:128, 132; Fioramonti, 2016:17; Lepenies, 2016:137; Peet, 2009:67).

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These organisations —in tandem with the Marshall Plan— remained relatively insular within the post-war rehabilitation of the West (Vanoli, 2018:9289). That is until the collapse of the Soviet alliance and its MPS alternative in the early 1990s, subsequently opening up a vast new territory for a GDP-based SNA system (Bos, 1992:22). Previous decades had also seen to a sharp decline of war-torn ‘crises investments’ as the restoration of Europe was concluding, leaving the IMF and the World Bank to look elsewhere (Peet, 2009:73-4). Both organisations responded by reducing their ‘eligibility thresholds’, elevating their financial promise to a global level (Vanoli, 2018:9289).

The IMF in particular was highlighted for its structuring role of national accounts at this time, applying its “system of standards to guide countries in data dissemination” (Vanoli, 2018:9289). Not only would the IMF have a direct hand in conceiving national accounts, but they would continue to conduct “assessment missions in order to evaluate the quality of countries’ national accounts and data systems” (Vanoli, 2018:9289). It is in the joint committee of the Boards of Governors of both the World Bank and the IMF, titled the Development Committee (DC), that would report upon and “advise governments (through the central banks and the ministries of finance) on economic policy” (Peet, 2009:70). These DC assessments of predominantly developing nation-states would then go on to ‘signal’ investors that said country is on the ‘right track’ (Peet, 2009:70).

What had developed, then, was a ranking order, a ladder upon which nation-states looked to measure and compare their success and prestige via assessments based upon GDP knowledge (Fioramonti, 2016:17; Speich, 2008:13), thus establishing the third and final GDP logic, appraisal.

This metaphorical ladder of GDP had become something of an ‘epistemic place’ about which developmental discipline and norms were to become finely tuned (Speich, 2008:21): “Weakly developed African economies, for example, were carefully analyzed and framed in a way that suited their assumed future compliance with the industrialized model” (ibid.). This appraisal, however, was not exclusively imposed upon the industrialising nation-states of the world, for in tandem a more nuanced impetus was at hand.

The industrialising nation-states of the globe had homogenised under a single abstraction of GDP. Although this reduction of all economic cultures under one monolithic measurement had initially troubled Kuznets (1933:209), he had later succumbed to the post-war zeitgeist of

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based universalisms —evident in Kuznets’ (1955) resolve of international comparisons, where he argues that no group of human beings are without the ability to achieve a high level of economic success. Their success, rather, was contingent upon the historical and political power relations of social institutions (ibid.:10). As the remainder of the 20th century unfolded, this economic pluralism, fused with ideas of emancipation, had become increasingly popular amongst new political regimes, particularly in Africa (see Speich, 2008; Cooper, 1997). For many new African nation-states “estimating a Gross Domestic Product for their countries equalled an act of sovereignty” (Speich, 2008:32). Producing GDP had become tantamount towards international recognition, for its absence led one to question a state’s legitimacy over its nation. GDP had become a way for a state to declare itself as co-existing with a nation. The growth of a nation-state had become a thing that required facilitation, measurement and prediction. Assessments were to be made of “their assumed future compliance with [a proposed] model” (Speich, 2008:21). This act of assessing one’s compliance, appraisal, constitutes the third continuity of GDP —see (Foucault, 1972; O’Farrel, 2005) chapter 3.6. A discourse that gained noticeable salience in the second round SNA; where the first model had been primarily formative (see UN, 1953), the latter had focused upon reporting comparable data to external bodies: “The new SNA is also to serve as a basis for the reporting of comparable national accounting data to the United Nations and other international bodies […]” (UN, 1968: iii). Without appraisal, one’s position within the SNA would become incomparable qua illegitimate. The GDP continuity of appraisal, to conclude, unifies the former; the state knows itself with GDP, it practices growth as measured by GDP, a combination of which must be signalled, via a third party, by the act of appraisal.10

5. Logics: Method and Analysis

5.1 Logics Method

Having established the continuities of GDP, which have been operationally equated to Glynos & Howarth’s (2007) social logics —see chapter 4.1—, the prior genealogy has enabled the logics analysis to follow. A combination of state, growth and appraisal have defined a ‘style’ of discourse, or a discursive formation —see (Foucault, 1972) chapter 3.7.

10_{A full conclusion to this genealogy can be found in chapter 6.1, whereby the findings of both analyses are}

GDP and post-GDP - A Spurious Divorce