Passive radicalisation without mobilisation
A narrative analysis of collective identities and emotions as
driving forces of online radicalisation
Ida Lewenhaupt
Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp)Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security Master’s Programme in Politics and War
Autumn 2020
Supervisor: Maria Hellman Word count: 20 000
Abstract
Scholars often consider ideology a crucial factor for radicalisation, but some groups appear radical even though they have been described as lacking clear ideologies. This thesis will explore why members of the incel community appear radical despite the community’s lack of a rigid ideology. I explore this through a narrative analysis focusing on collective identities and emotions as narrated and potential driving forces of radicalisation. My study has identified two narratives, the incel as inferior and the incel as superior. The analysis shows that radicalisation is more prominent in the second narrative. In the first narrative, the victimhood and hopelessness serve as a foundation for the expressions of violence found in the second one based on perceived injustices. My findings suggest that the narration of collective identities and emotional dimensions is crucial for the radicalisation of members of the incel community since collective identities create a sense of belonging to the community and guide actions based on “emotional batteries”.
Keywords: radicalisation, identity construction, narratives, emotions, collective identities,
Content
Glossary ... 1
1. Introduction ... 2
Research problem ... 2
Aim and research question ... 5
2. Previous research and theory ... 6
The concept of radicalisation ... 6
The internet’s role in radicalisation ... 7
Understanding the world through narratives ... 10
2.3.1. Collective identities role in radicalisation ... 11
2.3.2. Emotions role in radicalisation ... 12
3. Methodology ... 14
Narrative analysis ... 14
Material ... 16
Narrative framework ... 17
4. Analysis ... 21
The incel as inferior ... 21
4.1.1. Overview of the main narrative ... 21
4.1.2. Narrative parts of the incel as inferior ... 22
The incel as superior ... 29
4.2.1. Overview of the main narrative ... 29
4.2.2. Narrative parts of the incel as superior ... 29
Results ... 35
5. Discussion ... 39
Conclusions ... 39
Limitations ... 41
Suggestions for further research ... 41
Bibliography ... 43
Literature ... 43
Empirical material ... 48
1
Glossary
Term Definition
-pill Refers to embracing a type of philosophy.
ascend When an incel moves on to get laid [have sex] or gain a relationship.
Beta male an average male
Chad A physically attractive male, typically white.
cuck A man with an unfaithful girlfriend/wife.
ER Elliot Rodger, the Isla Vista Killer.
foid A derogatory term for female. Stemmed from female and -oid (as in android
or humanoid). Used to suggest that females are not fully human.
IT inceltears, a virgin-shaming terrorist group on Reddit
JBW Just be white. [Being white is enough if the woman has another ethnicity]
juggernaut law even girls that are AVERAGE and BELOW still have guys hitting on them.
You can't stop a woman's dating potential. She is like The Juggernaut.
Landwhale An obese human female, often morbidly so.
normie An average everyday boring person.
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1. Introduction
Research problem
This thesis will explore how a friendly space for lonely people wondering why they struggled to find a partner turned into a foundation for violent extremist beliefs.
Since 2009, perpetrators identifying themselves as incels have killed at least 53 people1 (Tomkinson et al., 2020). Incel is short for involuntary celibacy and is often described as an online community consisting of lonely and angry men who blame women and society’s genetic determinism for their inability to find partners (Fernquist et al., 2020). The members celebrate those who have conducted violent attacks (Rosenblatt & Zadrozny, 2018) in an echo-chamber dynamic in different online spaces occupied with hate speech towards women primarily. Further, the group is considered a part of the manosphere, a “loose confederacy of interest groups” in the West who advocate men’s rights (Ging, 2019:638). Incels share features and differ from others within this “bringing the man back-in"-community.
There is no offline equivalent to the community (Blommaert, 2017). Thus, the internet has been vital in developing the community and has played a crucial role in both the formation and the radicalisation of it. Without it, the incels would be unable to “learn the culture and particular idiom that cements the Incel worldview” since they would not have a way to discuss it with other like-minded people (Baele et al., 2019:20). However, the community was first started by a woman in her mid-20s who considered herself a late bloomer in dating and wanted to find others who were like-minded (Taylor, 2018). Today, members of the incel community share a nihilistic world view, and most of the community are probably more prone to self-harm than committing violent actions (Baele et al., 2019). Thus, to what extent incels should be seen as a threat to society has been debated.
Some scholars have argued that “the extreme fringes of the incel community … should be considered terrorism” (Hoffman et al., 2020:568) and that securitisation is “a necessary first step in unlocking the resources and political will” that is required for tackling the issue (Tomkinson et al., 2020:152). However, others argue that the incel community should not be considered a movement or terrorist organisation. This argument is mainly founded on the idea of only a small fringe of the community being radicalised, statistically few attacks and the lack
1 It is probable that there has been attacks that have not been recognised as influenced by incel philosophy
3 of a clear-cut ideology (Cottee, 2020; Fernquist et al.2020). To this date, Canada is the only country to pursue terrorism charges against a perpetrator adherent to the incel community (Ling, 2020).
Feminist scholars have long argued that misogynist violence tends to be over-looked as terrorism since mainstream Terrorism Studies has excluded it (Gentry, 2020). This follows from what is considered political and not. Misogyny is often regarded as personal, a trait of the individual, and accordingly merely as a psychological phenomenon (Manne, 2017). As such, patriarchal or misogynist violence is excluded from the definition of terrorism, and consequently, the debate often stops at whether the attacks committed by incels should be categorised as terrorism or not. The preoccupation with focusing the terrorism debate on what is regarded political or not is mirrored onto understandings of radicalisation. Although the process of radicalisation is acknowledged to be individual, it focuses on the political by assuming “political awakening” and “political extremism” (Hoffman, 2017:307). Thus, it is tightly coupled with an ideology and clear interests, which the incel community as a whole is argued to lack (Fernquist et al., 2020). Accordingly, the incel community’s radicalisation process has received little scholarly attention.
Further, assuming that few attacks equal only a small fringe of the community being radicalised (Cottee, 2020) may mislead us. Research on women’s radicalisation process shows that those in supportive roles may be just as radicalised as individuals in more active operational roles (Davis, 2017). Thus, it is surprising that this has not received more scholarly attention.
If we adopt a mainstream view of terrorism and radicalisation as concerned primarily with ideology and a clear end goal, incels do not seem radical. The same is true if we focus on actions as symptoms of radicalisation, rather than ideas. Nevertheless, at least 53 lives have been taken by members of this misogynist community, and as such, they appear radical. By adopting a feminist perspective and an understanding of misogyny as a political phenomenon, and “as the system that operates within a patriarchal social order to police and enforce women’s subordination and to uphold male dominance” (Manne, 2017:33), our understanding of radicalisation is opened up to include the incel community as well. Thus, the incel community offers a unique opportunity to explore other driving forces of online radicalisation than interests and ideology.
Even though exposure to extremist online content does not automatically lead to the adaption of radical beliefs (Archetti, 2017), research has found that “exposure to radical online content is associated with extremist online and offline attitudes, as well as higher risk of
4 committing violent political acts” (Hassan et al., 2018). The trend in attacks committed by incels has increased (Tomkinson et al., 2020), and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2020) has identified gender-driven violence and incels as one of four violent extremism to watch. Therefore, to counter this threat, we must understand this community since previous research shows that the wrong response can negatively affect and increase radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). To do so, it is necessary to understand radicalisation not only as action but as expressions of ideas and derogatory language.
In this thesis, radicalisation is, therefore, understood as “a process leading to the adoption of an extremist value system accompanied by approval, support for, or the use of violence and fear tactics as methods to affect change in society” (Gasztold, 2020:85). Hence, a member of the incel community does not have to resort to violence to be identified as radicalised.
Radicalism takes place “in the realm of communication, perceptions, and persuasion” (Archetti, 2017:218). To capture these concepts, we need to understand the narratives behind them. By understanding the world as stories on an ontological level, we can understand how individuals come to know who they are, and what to do (Somers, 1994). Accordingly, we can increase our understanding of their radicalisation process. A narrative approach “offers an insight into how social ties shape the way individuals will interpret external information and events” that they come across online (Archetti, 2017:239). On social media, there can be several contributors to the same narratives (Page, 2018), which constructs social identities (Somers, 1994). Hence, the shared beliefs held between the different narrators construct collective identities, and imagined communities can thus emerge (Archetti, 2017; Page, 2018). Collective identities not only apply to the identities shared among those identifying themselves as incels. They can also provide insight into the identities subscribed to others by the community. The identities depicted to those outside the community serve as the group’s external boundaries. Through imagined collective identities, feelings of solidarity are aroused for those in the community. This guides actions and defines morals boundaries against those outside the community (Jasper & McGarry, 2015).
Accordingly, it seems like collective identities constructed through narratives are central in the radicalisation of the members of the incel community and specific narratives are what could lead and might have led to violent actions. Further, there is reason to argue that emotions are central to this, especially the sense of belonging. Individuals identifying as incels often share an intense experience of loneliness and exclusion (Witt, 2020). They have also been found to experience crises of masculinity since they believe that they lack attributes valued as masculine
5 traits (Vito et al., 2018). These alternative factors for radicalisation can only be captured if identity is acknowledged as constructed through shared stories online. Studying the incel community, therefore, not only provides us with valuable information about the community itself but also about the greater process of online radicalisation and the driving forces behind it.
Aim and research question
This thesis aims to question the common notion of ideology as necessary for radicalisation by exploring the role of identity construction in the radicalisation process of the incel community. It will do so by understanding collective identities as narrated and a potential driving force of radicalisation online together with emotions. By adopting a feminist perspective, I argue that incels’ violence against women should be understood as radicalisation and, thus, a threat to society. Accordingly, the question that this thesis will be dedicated to exploring is:
Why do members of the incel community appear radical despite the community’s lack of a rigid ideology?
In order to explore my research question; I will focus my study around the following analytical questions:
• How is the sense of belonging narrated?
• How do emotions play into the narrative (in regard to belonging)?
• What underlying values and attitudes in regard to practices and actions play into the narrative?
I will discuss the research ideas behind each question and what they may say about the role and function of collective identities and emotions for radicalisation in section 3.3.
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2. Previous research and theory
This chapter will focus on developing the relationship between this study and the field of previous research to which this study speaks. First, I will briefly discuss the ubiquitous use of the term radicalisation. Second, I will present and discuss the internet’s role in radicalisation. Third, I will move on to my understanding of the world as narrated. I will then introduce collective identities and emotional aspects as narrated potential driving forces for radicalisation. These will serve as the theoretical point of departure in this thesis. Throughout this chapter, I will discuss how these factors relate to the incel community.
The concept of radicalisation
The term radicalisation is used ubiquitously, and hence it might appear as if there is a consensus about its meaning. However, this is not the case. Rather, the definition varies depending on context and agenda. Accordingly, it is a source of confusion (Sedgwick, 2010). As noted by Mark Sedgwick (2010:483), “most researchers using the terms ‘radical’ and ‘radicalization’ do not define these terms, either relying on their relative meaning or assuming that their absolute meaning is understood”.
Although acknowledging that individuals become radicalised in different ways, several definitions of radicalisation as a concept include references to ideology as a critical component (Hoffman, 2017). Further, research often regards Islam or Muslim radicalisation and combatting terrorism (Gentry, 2020; Sedgwick, 2010). This follows from a focus on radicalisation “as a precursor to terrorism” (Borum, 2011:1). Hence, what has been engaged with and considered radical follows from what has been considered terrorism. Terrorism is subjective (Hoffman, 2017) and feminist scholars have argued that the neglect and hesitancy of recognising violence against women as terrorism have to do partly with whom we identify as a terrorist and not. Accordingly, “to see violence against women as a form of terrorism within the West means seeing those who are typically aligned with counter-terrorists as suddenly aligned with the terrorists themselves” (Gentry, 2020:104).
The definition of radicalisation adopted in this thesis follows: “a process leading to the adoption of an extremist value system accompanied by approval, support for, or the use of violence and fear tactics as methods to affect change in society” (Gasztold, 2020:85). Hence, it encompasses both radical ideas and radical action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) since it
7 acknowledges not only violent actions as radicalisation but also approval and support of violence.
The internet’s role in radicalisation
The internet as a platform for radicalisation has received attention from scholars interested in cases stretching from jihadism to lone-wolf terrorism and right-wing extremists (Conway, 2017; Pantucci et al., 2016). In regard to lone actors, Raffaello Pantucci et al. (2016) argue that social media creates a sense of belonging. Online forums facilitate the breeding and spread of extremist ideas and the normalisation of them. Therefore, online radicalisation has received a growing amount of attention over the last few years (Brynielsson et al., 2013; Gill, 2015). However, the amount of research looking into the specific factors contributing to the radicalisation process online is somewhat limited. The focus has instead tended to be on whether one can or cannot be radicalised online. While there is research suggesting that radicalisation do appear online (Bastug et al., 2020; Conway, 2017), there is also another strand arguing that the cases of “pure online radicalization” (Schlegel, 2018:2) are slight to none due to a lack of empirical evidence. However, this strand still agrees on the importance of understanding it (von Behr et al., 2013; Schlegel, 2018). Thus, there is no surprise that there is also research arguing that the dichotomy between online and offline radicalisation may be false (Gill et al., 2017). In this section, I will present and discuss some fundamental driving forces of radicalisation in online communities.
Anonymity
The first driving force to consider in terms of online radicalisation is anonymity. Anonymity is an essential aspect since it has “provided those who would ‘never normally engage in criminal or risky behaviour in the physical world’ the ability to ‘confide in the safety of their surrounding online environment’” (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2017:1238). Since those who are active in extremist online forums do not have to leave their homes, they tend to write more radical things, and they can also get a sense of acting in an extrajudicial space since what they say does not have the same consequences as it would offline (Koehler, 2014).
Ideology and interests
A second driving force of online radicalisation is ideology and interests. Ideology is regarded as an essential aspect of radicalisation in general and in online radicalisation in particular. There is no single definition of the term ideology and what it should entail. Some of the most common
8 definitions are: “A political belief system”, a “political doctrine”, and “ideas used to legitimize a political system or regime” (Bergström & Svärd, 2018:135, my translation). Among those who are radicalised online, it is common to spread propaganda. This is done either to signal the level of commitment one has for a cause or to convince others. Some create their own propaganda, while others simply spread the words of others. In this way, their beliefs are strengthened (Gill, 2015).
Many violent extremist groups have an emancipatory agenda. Hence, they seek to change society by establishing a new state or disrupting the world order (Hoffman, 2017; Neumann & Smith, 2008). The agenda is communicated online, and it has been found that some have been unaware of the causes of a group before becoming members of it. Instead, they have stumbled upon the online community by chance, and after consuming much material, they start to share the beliefs of the ideology in question (Pearson, 2016). In online forums, participants become isolated in echo-chambers reinforcing their own beliefs, and as such, the extremist ideology becomes self-reinforcing (von Behr et al., 2013). A large amount of material on ideology available online means that members can educate themselves while also contributing to “the theoretical reflection and advancement of the ideology” (Koehler, 2014:120). This, in turn, can intensify radicalisation (Schlegel, 2018).
Scholars who have studied the incel community disagree on whether they have an ideology or not. Bruce Hoffman et al. (2020:567) argue that the two core beliefs shared by incels constitute an ideology. Others understand the continuous debates about different theories and philosophies within the community as a lack of a clear ideology (Fernquist et al., 2020). Even if we agree with Hoffman et al., the incel community's ideology is very thin compared to the ideology held by groups that are usually subject to research within terrorism studies such as Islamist or national socialist groups. Hence, if we assume that some members of the incel community are indeed radicalised, ideology does not seem to be the reason behind their radicalisation.
Leaders
Previous research suggests that a leader to be inspired by is an essential driving force of online radicalisation. This was evident in British university student Roshonara Choudhry, who was radicalised and stabbed her local Member of Parliament after watching videos on YouTube featuring Anwar al-Awlaki and Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, whom both had ties to al-Qaeda. In the beginning, Choudhry only watched videos of al-Awlaki, who argued that women have no active role in Jihad. However, after watching Azzam’s videos, Choudhry understood that
9 women should take an active part in Jihad. She told the police that she believed that she had a duty to fight after watching these videos. Accordingly, Choudhry became radicalised due to her interpretation of radical leaders' messages online (Pearson, 2016). This statement of Choudhry’s is similar to a finding by Paul Gill (2015), who argues that leaders can legitimise attacks.
There are no leaders within the anonymous incel community (Fernquist et al., 2020). Members may be inspired by others' attacks, such as Rodger’s, but there is no one who guides the community in general or dictates the ideas or direction. Again, if we assume that some members of the incel community are indeed radicalised, leaders do not seem to be the reason behind their radicalisation.
Preparatory activities and recruitment
Several studies on online radicalisation engage with those involved in radical action, either by committing or planning attacks. Thus, there has been a focus on their preparatory activities. Studies have concluded that many have found information on making bombs, suicide vests, surveillance advice, and other topics online (Gill et al., 2015; Gill et al., 2017). The internet has also played a significant role in the recruitment process for several violent extremist groups. These groups can recruit from a wider audience through social media than through traditional methods, and online recruitment is also cheaper and faster. The tools within social media to target specific groups are also adopted by these groups, making the recruitment process even more efficient (Hunter et al., 2017). When turning to lone actors, it has been identified that lone actors often try to recruit others. Thus, they become lone actors after failing to do so (Gill, 2015).
How can we understand incels in relation to the previous research on radicalisation online? According to the literature, this group is not dictated by a common ideology. They do not strive for a new world order, and they do not have an emancipatory agenda. They have no leaders who can steer the group and dictate its premises. Factors that all are important for online radicalisation. This group is diverse, and the community is founded on the body, on biology rather than ideology. Further, the community's individuals are loners, yet they are part of some group despite never meeting each other and never knowing each other’s real names. This begs the question of why members of the incel community appear radical.
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Understanding the world through narratives
One way to explore why the members appear radical is by understanding the world as narrated. This thesis will use narratives, particularly the narration of collective identities and emotions as potential driving forces of radicalisation.
Narratives “are constellations of relationships […] embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment.” (Somers, 1994:616). As such, narratives are a way of understanding and making sense of the social world that we live in, and “it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities” (Somers, 1994:606). According to Helen Haste et al. (2018:314), narratives “refers to the many ways in which we collect the disparate facts in our own worlds and then arrange them cognitively into a design that helps us find order, and perhaps even meaning, in our reality.” Thus, a narrative approach offers an insight into how social ties shape the way individuals will interpret external information and events” that they come across (Archetti, 2017:239). Narratives on social media are often shared stories. A shared story is “a retelling, produced by many tellers, across iterative textual segments, which promotes shared attitudes between its tellers” (Page, 2018:18). Thus, multiple narrators make contributions to a topic and, as such, different stories are woven together into narratives. Due to this, the shared stories on social media often “lack a single end point”, rather, they are “open-ended” (Page, 2018:20).
Our individual narratives are not created in a vacuum; rather, they are influenced by others' narratives. These other narratives “will never be absorbed”; instead, they are “filtered and appropriated through the prism of the individual narrative”. Over time, this could “lead to a change in the vision of the world of the individual” (Archetti, 2017:224). Thus, our identity evolves continuously (Archetti, 2017). However, as they evolve, the individual and the collective's narrative may also come to diverge. In that case, “the dissonance between them will lead the individual not to identify any longer with the group” (Archetti, 2017:225).
The internet and social media facilitate the spread of radical ideas, but “reach is not impact” (Archetti, 2017:239). According to Cristina Archetti (2017:228), an individual does not join a terrorist group based on “an external narrative being received and internalized by the individual, as if the collective narrative of the group substituted for the individual one”. Rather, “becoming part of an extremist group means having developed, as a result of shifting patterns of relationships, an individual narrative that is compatible with the collective narrative of the group”. Thus, the key is that individuals appropriate messages online through their own
11 narratives. Accordingly, not everyone who consumes extremist online content will become radicalised (Archetti, 2017). There is also a relative aspect of the process of radicalisation. What might seem radical to you or me might not be for someone else. Through their narrative, and the social setting that they function in, it might instead appear as legitimate and acceptable (Archetti, 2017).
The incel community’s members share a specific nihilistic world view that has come to life through their particular culture (Baele et al., 2019). The members have all started as loners who have then found like-minded individuals online, with whom they start discussing the world (Fernquist et al., 2020). Thus, it seems that Archetti’s understanding of narratives as being appropriated differently by different individuals could be relevant in understanding the incel community.
2.3.1. Collective identities role in radicalisation
Based on the shared beliefs held between the different narrators who contribute to shared stories, collective identities, and imagined communities could emerge (Archetti, 2017; Page, 2018). Benedict Anderson (2006:6) argues that communities are imagined since the members “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”. Hence, communities are formed through a mediated image which is shared.
According to this understanding, “radicalization is fundamentally a group socialization process through which people develop identification with a set of norms – that may be violent or nonviolent – through situated social interactions that leverage their shared perceptions and experiences” (Smith et al., 2020:327). Thus, collective identities are understood as crucial to radicalisation since they allow individuals to identify with others and share ideas. James M. Jasper and Aidan McGarry (2015:1) defines a collective identity as “an act of the imagination, a trope that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with their fellows and by defining moral boundaries against other categories”. Similarly, Cristina Archetti (2017) argues that collective identities can provide a sense of belonging. However, Archetti (2017:227) emphasises that “the specific motivation of each individual is shaped by one’s unique narrative”.
Individuals who are uncertain about their identities are prone to radicalisation. It has been found that “when collective identity becomes too central in personal identity this may accentuate othering processes and legitimize violence toward the out-group” (Rousseau et al.,
12 2019:2). Thus the othering process can be understood as stressing the compatibility between individual and collective narratives. Further, the narration of collective identities creates relations between different actors: the narrator, the actors in the narrative and the readers. This narration then causes a sense of belonging or exclusion from the community.
The incel community consists of people who, by definition, are lonely and who are missing out on an aspect of life that is central to most human beings, namely intimate relations. Thus, I expect that the community's collective identity is critical to several members since it can provide them with the attachment to others that we, as human beings, need.
2.3.2. Emotions role in radicalisation
Emotional aspects have also been given attention as driving forces of radicalisation, both concerning collective identities and on their own. Collective identities are not created neutrally with regards to our emotions. Instead, our basic human need for a sense of belonging and attachment to others is essential to the process, and accordingly, collective identities involve “both cognition and emotion” (Jasper & McGarry, 2015:1). Further, the boundary between the in- and the out-group has emotional dimensions too, and when they are drawn, members can express fear or manage anxiety and seek pride or feel shame. This combination of positive and negative feelings can “energize collective action” by being “directed toward one’s own group and toward one’s opponents, respectively” (Jasper et al., 2015:29). As such, it constitutes an emotional battery, and for groups suffering stigmas, it can “transform shame into pride in the identity” (Jasper & McGarry, 2015:8).
Moral superiority and the perception of the out-group as morally inferior has also been identified as a critical factor for radicalisation (van Stekelenburg, 2017), together with a strong sense of acting towards perceived injustices (Barlett & Miller, 2012; Sageman, 2008). The perceived injustices can be feelings of relative deprivation, which can be experienced when a group compares “their material conditions to that of other groups, and viewing their group’s disadvantage as an injustice” (King & Taylor, 2011:609).
Other scholars have focused on the role of hate and contempt in radicalisation processes. Michal Bilewicz and Wiktor Soral (2020) argue that social media has removed the protection from hate speech offered by traditional media. Therefore, people today are exposed to derogatory language to a higher degree than previously. Accordingly, “default emotional responses to other people, such as empathy, are replaced by intergroup contempt—an emotion fundamental to derogatory behaviors”, which can lead to political radicalisation (Bilewicz &
13 Soral, 2020:27). Hence, exposure to the kind of derogatory language that hate speech constitutes changes norms and pushes boundaries regarding what one considers acceptable. Thus, it lowers the ability to recognise hate speech (Bilewicz & Soral, 2020).
Several scholars argue that incels are under immense emotional pressure due to their deviation from hegemonic masculinity (Scaptura & Boyle, 2020; Vito et al., 2018; Witt, 2020). Hegemonic masculinity is on top of the socially constructed hierarchy of masculinities described by R. W. Connell (2005). Since incels believe that they fail to live up to these norms, they experience suffering and hate (Witt, 2020). However, Debbie Ging (2019) argues that the incels actually perform a so-called hybrid masculinity where they perceive themselves as victims, while at the same time expressing “a desire to establish male hegemony in the online spaces they inhabit, even if they may lack such claims to power in offline contexts” (Ging, 2019:651). According to Maria N. Scaptura and Kaitlin M. Boyle (2020:278), the “endorsement of ‘incel’ traits are associated with violent fantasies about rape and using powerful weapons against enemies”. Thus, emotions seem to be crucial for the radicalisation process within the incel community. Perceived injustices are likely to be experienced when incels compare themselves to men who have access to women.
Taken together, I expect these notions of the narration of collective identity and emotions as potential driving forces of online radicalisation to contribute to an understanding of why members of the incel community appear radical.
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3. Methodology
This chapter focuses on the course of action. The chosen method will be presented and discussed, as well as the empirical material that will be used in the analysis. Lastly, I will introduce the narrative framework that will guide my analysis.
Narrative analysis
This study will use a narrative analysis to explore collective identities and emotions as potential driving forces of radicalisation. Narrative analysis is suitable since it allows the researcher to in-depth dissect and analyse a phenomenon when it occurs. By taking on the voice of the narrator, a narrative analysis “moves beyond mere reporting; it suggests how the speakers make sense of the commonplace” (Haste et al., 2018:315). As such, a narrative analysis allows the researcher to step into the narrator's shoes to considerate the context and setting that the narrator functions in.
I am concerned here with the stories being told by incels and with how they are being told. A narrative analysis is not merely about identifying a narrative. Instead, when using narrative analysis, the researcher seeks to deconstruct stories. Arthur Asa Berger (1997) refers to Vladimir Propp, who argued “that there must be a way to separate tales into their components – to develop a morphology of the folktale that will enable readers to isolate the essential components of a tale and see how they relate to each other” (in Berger, 1997:23-24). Thus, a narrative analysis “reveals the structure of narratives – how they are put together” (Berger, 1997:24). Narratives on social media are a distinct type of narrative. Rather than being told by one narrator, social media often revolves around shared narratives told by several narrators (Page, 2018). Hence, these narratives are not projected on an audience; instead, they grow and evolve through contributions from different people. For the radicalisation process, this can be important since contributing to stories and engaging with like-minded individuals could strengthen the sense of belonging, and potentially increase radicalisation. Another crucial part of the narrative is the language used by incels. Within linguistics research, it is well known that slang is used to “establish or reinforce social identity or cohesiveness within a group” (Eble, 1996:11). This is supported by Stephane J. Baele et al. (2019), who argue that the particular language used within the community is crucial in creating the specific worldview expressed by incels. The language they use helps create their experienced reality and enables them to relate to each other. Thus, the specific words and concepts used by incels are vital in creating a sense
15 of belonging and critical for the construction of identities. As such, they have meaning beyond the mere translation. Therefore, these words and concepts play a crucial role in my study and frequently appear in my analysis.
To deconstruct the shared narratives of the incel community, I will use Charlotte Wagnsson and Costan Barzanje’s (2019:4) “investigative tools”. These tools have been derived from four key features of the narrative approach suggested by Margaret R. Somers (1994:616): “1) relationality of parts, 2) causal emplotment, 3) selective appropriation, and 4) temporality, sequence, and place”.
First, the relationality of parts “is about making events intelligible by sorting out their relation to other events” (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2019:4). Thus, “narrativity turns ‘events’ into episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experienced in anything resembling chronological order” (Somers, 1994:616).
Second, causal emplotment “is about how the sequences and episodes are ordered and how they connect selected, specific developments so as to impose a desired order on them. It is thus about the inner logic of the text” (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2019:4). Hence, emplotment “gives significance to independent instances” and accounts for “why a narrative has the story it does”. Without it, “events or experiences could be categorized only according to a taxonomical scheme” (Somers, 1994:616). We would then lose the specific context of the story.
Third, temporality and place are about “how events are placed in temporal and spatial relation to one another”. Thus, it concerns the story’s once upon a time (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2019:4). It is important to note that the events do not need to be true, “it is the process of organization, the sequences of the sentences, the way events are recounted … that is revealing”. Hence, it is how “the speaker organizes events to give meaning to them” that is important for the researcher (Haste et al., 2018:315).
Fourth, selective and temporal appropriation “is about what events are selectively and/or temporally appropriated, and what events are omitted” (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2019:4). Thus, silences and what is not being said is just as important as what is said since it informs the researcher about “the speaker’s view of what is canonical. What is ordinary and right is discussed as the matter of fact. The unusual and the exceptional are what is remarked upon” (Haste et al., 2018:314).
To conduct my analysis, I will follow Wagnsson and Barzanje’s analytical steps. They suggest that the researcher first identifies and provides “an overview of the main story and the general narrative techniques used to establish a strong narrative”. Second, the researcher
16 discerns the “narrative strategies by analysing the narrative parts of the main story” (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2019:4-5). I will present this process in detail under section 3.3. Further, I will use what Johnny Saldaña (2013) refers to as coding as a heuristic to approach my material. This entails that the data is coded both during and after the collection and as such, coding becomes more than labelling since it leads the researcher “from the data to the idea, and from the idea to all the data pertaining to that idea” (Richards & Morse, 2007:137). Thus, as I will use it, coding becomes a cyclical act of linking ideas to data and data to ideas.
Material
When researching online milieus, several types of material are possible to use. Apart from conversations, the researcher can use pictures, videos, memes, shares, or likes (Käihkö, 2018:10), to understand how narratives are constructed biographically within the community. I will use material from the largest incel forum today, incels.co. Incels.co is open to read for anyone, but only members can make comments or posts. It is exclusively for men (Incels.co, 2017). Apart from being the largest incel forum, it has been found to contain higher hate levels than other platforms for incels (Fernquist et al., 2020). Incels.co encourages members to follow the black-pill philosophy (Incels.wiki, 2020b), which entails that incels are doomed to stay incels forever (Fernquist et al., 2020). Thus, the posts on incels.co are likely to contain more extreme content than posts in the other forums since they encourage their members to be hopeful about their future, compared to the nihilistic worldview found on incels.co.
Shared narratives tend to be told over a long period (Page, 2018), and therefore, my material ranges from November 2017, when Incels.co was created, to November 2020. It is difficult to determine precisely when the incel community turned into the misogynist environment that it is today. In 2014, Elliot Rodger and Alek Minassian started communicating and sharing violent fantasies on the subreddit Forever Alone. Elliot Rodger killed six people later that same year, and in 2018, Alek Minassian drove a van into pedestrians in Toronto, killing ten people and injuring 16 (Fernquist et al., 2020). In 2017, Reddit shut down the subreddit /r/incels due to their new policy banning incitement of violence (Hauser, 2017). By then, the community consisted almost exclusively of heterosexual men, and today women are often banned from the forums (Fernquist et al., 2020).
I would argue that there have not been any dramatic changes in how the community discusses hate and violence after Rodger’s attack in 2014. The appropriation of the friendly space by misogynist men had already happened. It may have intensified after Rodger’s attack
17 since the attack created a potential endpoint and as such inspiration for others, but nevertheless, the shift had already taken place. Hence, choosing material from different years will not matter for the results. Further, I do not seek to determine when a shift took place or study changes over time.
On Incels.co there are different sub-forums. I will use material from the sub-forum Must-Read Content. Several of the posts in this sub have been subject to discussion, and potential differences in opinion should, therefore, appear in these. Even the ones with few replies have more than 1000 views, and, consequently, these threads are deemed representative of the community while also being subject to less spam than posts in other subforums.
The subforum contains 121 threads and more than 11 000 comments (Incels.co, n.d.). I have selected the 91 threads that have been contributed to between January 1st and November 30th, 2020. The selected 91 posts have received a total of 9583 comments. Taken together, I see
these posts and comments as making up the broad patterns of stories shared by the incel community today. Most of the threads start with a more extended post sharing scientific proof for a theory that the members have. The replies often consist of an emotional reaction to the scientific validation of the theory varying from a few words to several sentences.
Since I consider narratives in these forums to be shared stories, my material will consist of several narrators. The posts, comments, and pictures analysed are authored by several narrators and considered representative of the community as a whole, in which I am interested in finding patterns. Different members may occur several times in the analysis, while others may only occur once. This should not be assumed a reflection of the material in general. The quotes presented in my analysis have been selected since they are deemed particularly illustrative. There may be several similar comments to the ones that appear in my analysis that I do not present. Therefore, one cannot conclude who might have more or less influence on the forum based on my analysis since members are not considered individual participants. Again, that is not my intention either.
In the analysis, I treat all members as equal contributors to a shared narrative while keeping my eyes open to potential subplots. References to all 91 threads can be found in the appendix.
Narrative framework
The key in understanding why incels appear radical despite the lack of a rigid ideology seems to be how, or under what conditions individual narratives are being nurtured by the collectivity
18 and a sense of belonging to it, and under what conditions the individual identity come to diverge. To summarise the theoretical assumptions underpinning this study, I will briefly present each analytical question's underlying research ideas.
• How is the sense of belonging narrated?
This question is central since it regards the sense of self and who you are. According to Archetti (2017:225): “Being a member of a group means sharing a common collective narrative while simultaneously having an individual narrative that is compatible with it”. Collective identities are assumed to be an important factor for radicalisation (Smith et al., 2020). For collective identities to emerge, members need a way to identify with the group. How they come to identify with the group can be identified through narratives. Hence, the narration of the sense of belonging is important for the radicalisation process since, at its core, it is how an involuntary celibate becomes an incel.
• How do emotions play into the narrative (in regard to belonging)?
This question is important since the emotional aspect of radicalisation works in several ways. First, emotions are assumed to function as a battery for constructing collective identities through the combination of positive and negative emotions concerning the in- and the out-group (Jasper et al., 2015). Second, specific emotions, such as perceived injustices (Barlett & Miller, 2012) may drive radicalisation. Third, exposure to derogatory language online may shift how one feels about others and limit the ability to recognise the same (Bilewicz & Soral, 2020). Hence, exploring emotional aspects can inform us how this dimension of the narrative can function as an amplifier in the process of radicalisation.
• What underlying values and attitudes in regard to practices and actions play into the narrative?
This question relates to the lack of a rigid ideology. Traditionally, values and attitudes regarding politics, class, and ethnicity would be aspects that underlie practices and actions through ideologies (Bergström & Svärd, 2018). The incels lack a rigid ideology (Fernquist et al., 2020). Thus, the values and attitudes underlying practices and actions in their case do not seem to concern these aspects. Through a narrative approach, it is possible to identify what these values and attitudes may be instead. Narratives provide us with meaning and help us make sense of our reality (Haste et al., 2018). Thus, it can be argued that it is through an understanding of the world as narrated that underlying values and attitudes can be derived.
19 Based on these questions, the four key features of narratives presented by Somers (1994), and the analytical steps developed from Somers by Wagnsson and Barzanje (2019), I have set up the following analytical framework to guide my analysis. Some questions have been adapted or added to suit this particular analysis, while others are the same as Wagnsson and Barzanje’s (2019) framework since they serve my purposes equally well. The narrative framework aims to start out identifying the main narrative(s), after which follows analytical steps designed to discern the narrative parts of the main narrative(s). Part of this is different subplots that aggregate the main narrative(s). I will not operationalise radicalisation. What is considered radical and signs of radicalisation will instead be explored in my analysis.
21
4. Analysis
In this chapter, I will present my analysis. I have identified two main narratives through a brief reading of my material: the incel as inferior and the incel as superior. Through my analysis, I intend to show how these two might relate to radicalisation using the narrative framework described in section 3.3. Before presenting the narrative analysis, I will briefly introduce the community to set the stage. After that, I will start with the narrative about the incel as inferior and begin by presenting an overview of the narrative. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the story's narrative parts about the incel as inferior where actors, events, substories and alternative stories are accounted for. Since emotionality is key to narratives in this context, special attention has been given to this feature, and it is included in all aspects of the narrative analysis. I will then do the same for the narrative about the incel as superior. Finally, I will present the results taking both narratives into consideration.
A foundational aspect of the incel community is establishing a strong sense of who the incels are and who the “others” are. The community is misogynistic and believes that society is gynocentric. Accordingly, the main other is women and incels are thus primarily concerned with gender, since they identify who they are, in contrast with who women are. Women are usually referred to as foids. Foid is a term combining female and -oid, to imply that women are not fully human. However, women are not the only other to the incel community, and gender is not the only identity used to stress the hierarchy between different groups. Apart from women, the “others” to the incel community are primarily men who have access to women and sex. They are commonly referred to as Chad or Cuck. Incels have a scale to which they rate looks, and Chad is the most attractive according to this scale. Cuck is a man who is not as attractive as Chad, but who has a wife. The term cuck is used to imply that a man is being cheated on by his wife, and this is due to him not being attractive enough to keep her faithful to him (Incels.wiki, 2020a). These groups of “others” will all be presented more in detail with regards to the two main narratives in the following sections.
The incel as inferior
4.1.1. Overview of the main narrative
In the narrative of the incel as inferior, the idea of society as gynocentric is strong. It is argued that a social contract used to play out between men and women, where men would provide women with safety and security, while women would provide men with sex. However, due to
22 feminism, this is no longer the case. Men are no longer entitled to sex, but women still believe that they are entitled to security. According to the incels, society accepts this idea, and as a result, women have too much power and dictate society. Incels believe that physical appearances are the determinator in finding a partner. Nothing else matters, and this is unfair to incels since women only choose the most handsome men and leave unattractive incels without partners. The incel in this narrative has a strong sense of injustice and hopelessness about the future. This is evident since several members discuss suicide. The incel in this narrative does not discuss committing violent attacks but does not condemn previous attacks either. This can be interpreted as approval of violence and thus as a sign of radicalisation according to the definition used in this thesis. Further, the sense of injustice can function as a springboard for further radicalisation if combined with a will to act (Barlett & Miller, 2012).
4.1.2. Narrative parts of the incel as inferior
Actors
In the narrative of the incel as inferior, women are key actors, and they are repeatedly depicted as villains and scapegoats. According to incels, women have access to everything, yet they complain (epillepsy, 2020, #48). In this narrative, women are described as white supremacists and racists for always selecting white men over other ethnicities (Incellio, 2020, #12). According to incels, women select their partners based on looks only, since they no longer need men to provide for them. This has given rise to hypergamy and promiscuity, and since incels were born ugly, they will always miss out. The comment below is a typical example of comments about this issue:
Kind of funny what women push us into though huh? ‘Well you can be alone forever or you can saw apart your legs, have metal rods implanted, stretch them apart over a few months, and hope the bones fuse back together okay and not in a bad alignment. You might get horrible arthritis later and you might be crippled for life, but at least then I might fuck you! LOL XD’ Every story I've read from a guy who's done it in the 5'4" to 5'7" starting range reports a dramatic improvement in their success with women after. Women are fucked. This world is fucked. As men, we are fucked. (RageAgainstTDL, 2018, #139)
According to this comment, women are the ones who make the rules, and they force men to bend over backwards in order to attain a relationship. Members often share research articles and observations from their surroundings to prove their theories. This particular observation is perceived as evidence against the statement made about personality being important for finding
23 a partner and comments from others saying that they just need to try a little bit harder and then they will find someone. The comment expresses anger and frustration about the situation, something that is common overall.
In this narrative, women are also blamed for all historical conflicts since their hypergamous nature cause men to fight. “If women were inherently loyal and not hypergamous, many of the major wars of history would not have happened and men of all races and creeds could live together in peace” (Ethnic Natsoc, 2019, #1). Thus, women are narrated as scapegoats and blamed for wars even though men are doing the fighting.
However, women's role in this narrative is not as simple as being that of a villain only. According to incels, finding a partner or having sex is still what is most desired; hence women are not only villains in this narrative but also desired. In this narrative, virginity is central. This is evident in a post by Clarity1 (2020, #1), who argues that incels must marry virgins:
Female psyche was not made for having multiple sexual partners without getting her short circuits fried. The more sexual partners she has the lesser the ability to pair bond and be affectionate (in its truest sense) becomes ... In this researched and science based thread we established that if she’s not
a virgin she will never love you.
Similarly, BlkPillPres (2018, #55) shares the following thoughts about marriage: For me to even consider marriage she has to be very young, I'm talking 16 (maybe even lower), a virgin, at least 5/10, living in a rural community away from modern influences. That's the only way i'd even consider it, anything else is a waste of time and has too much risk involved with not enough reward.
Thus, women are narrated in a double role, yet they are not narrated as actors. Rather, they are narrated as objects and always excluded.
All comments presented here have an intense sense of hopelessness present in them, a total resignation. On the forum, data is shared on the number of female virgins in America and the UK (Edmund_Kemper, 2020, #1). Several members respond to these numbers with comments saying that the information is suicide fuel (see, for example, King_of_morons, 2020, #12). Taken together, this tells the incel that the chances of him finding love or having sex are slight to none. The number of women whose ability to love has not been ruined by another man or society is very few. Those who do exist will not choose incels regardless since they lack the physical attributes that are considered attractive. Thus, women are narrated as those who can give incels what they desire the most, yet they will not. The fact that this decision is believed
24 to be based only on the body creates a strong sense of injustice among the incels which, according to Barlett and Miller (2012) is a driving force of radicalisation. This is made even more evident when we turn to the way in which other men are narrated.
When the “other” of the narrative of the incel as inferior is a man, he is referred to as Chad. Chad can be identified as inhabiting and occupying what incels desire the most. They are good looking and can have any woman they want since women only care about looks. It is common to create fake Tinder accounts to test attraction theories. These tests usually confirm the theories, as evident in the comment below:
We have seen so many experiments now where the blackpill is confirmed. Chad can be HIV positive, toddler rapist, impregnate own mother and foids still don't care. Whereas if an incel works as a lawyer, owns his own firm, gives donations to charity, and talks to the girls even as R dating strategy wants, he will not get any matches. 'Attraction doesn't care about your personality’. (TheJoker, 2020, #88)
Thus, regardless if incels do everything right and Chad does everything wrong, incels still will not be selected since they are not physically attractive. This positions the incel as inferior to Chad, and at the same time, it strengthens the narrative about women as villains. Hence, the sense of us versus them is firmly established together with a strong sense of injustice.
Events
The narrative of the incel as a victim is historically oriented since it focuses on events in the incels past that have led to their inferior position in today’s society. As such, the narrative is passive and lacks a way forward. The narrative begins with a strong sense of injustice regarding the broken social contract between men and women, through which incels dismiss the argument that they would feel entitled to sex:
In these modern times the social contract is no longer functioning, expecting men not to regress and go back to the days of rape and violence when the contract is no longer being enforced and/or adhered to, is what is truly outrageous, and not the acts themselves. Men aren't entitled to sex?, true I agree, but women aren't entitled to safety either, they never were entitled to it and they never will be, it was a ‘provision’ offered by men to women for co-operating with men to facilitate the social contract … Women's actions have thrown the entire system out of order, and the violent responses of men today are retaliatory. (BlkPillPres, 2018b, #1)
Although the comment does not encourage violence, it supports violent acts since they are narrated as a logical response and retaliatory actions. Other members agree that they do not feel entitled to it; rather, they simply want it but are denied due to their physical attributes.
25 Therefore, according to the member mikepence (2018, #8), there is no surprise that some of them feel the need to resort to violence and misogyny. Comparing being entitled to sex with being entitled to safety are, however, two very different things. Based on the comment referring to violence and rape as the past where the social contract was in place, it is evident that physical safety is implied. This can be interpreted as a sign of radicalisation since it supports violent actions aimed at changing society and restoring justice. This member might not act, but someone else might interpret it as a call to arms depending on their narrative. Thus, we should not interpret these comments as harmless.
Further, the narrative continues with incels being the victims of bullying and sometimes abuse too. However, bullying is not limited to the past. This is evident in the comment below regarding a study that suggests that bullies are healthier both mentally and physically when compared to their victims:
this is the blackpill which makes me saddest. I had a FUCKING SHIT time in school and the only thing that pulled me through it was the idea that I'd get a better life at the end. I didn't. This is why I FUCKING HATE Inceltears because ultimately I am here … with all my problems due to bullying. And those pieces of shit still bully even though they're adults. Punching down on people with mental illnesses. Trying to hurt people who they should have helped. They are fucking scumbags and the adult equivalent of the people that ruined my life. (Barry, 2018, #57)
Barry states that Inceltears, a group making fun of incels, bully incels, and he bursts with anger and sadness when he thinks about this and his past. This sense of injustice is evident in other aspects too. Incels state that their teachers have neglected them in school since they focused on good-looking students (Bad Personality, 2020, #150). Incels have further missed experiencing teen love, which they, based on scientific proof, argue is crucial. One member argues that losing one’s virginity is something that everyone should experience at an early stage in life, otherwise, your life is over and “you should be considered legally disabled” (JosefMengelecel, 2020, #6). The comment further compares losing one’s virginity to learning how to walk or talk. This is striking since it informs how fundamental losing one’s virginity is perceived to be. Further, the argument that one’s life is ruined if they fail to lose their virginity at a young age indicates that this is the case for almost all group members since most of them are virgins.
The present in the narrative has a clear focus on distrust in society. This is evident in several comments. One comment states that the law is not on the incels side. Instead, it is on Chad's side (lifeisbullshit95, 2020, #30). Several comments claim that academia is biased and
26 fraudulent. One example of this is a post by FrailPaleStaleMale (2020, #1) who argues that researchers who expect “to find evidence of discrimination against women” instead have found “evidence of discrimination against men”. The post further argues that these studies often do not get published and that assumptions about women facing discrimination persist regarding areas where it is, in fact, men who are facing discrimination.
These statements indicate that incels believe that society is rigged against men in general and incels in particular. Incels are victims since they are the only ones who have to play by the rules, yet they are not rewarded. They have no way to gain attention and state that they feel excluded from society. The following comment by Irishcel (2020, #35) is an example of this:
It’s quite sad that no one gives a shit about the plight of lonely and disaffected young men until we start killing people, and even then only as a problem to be dealt with, not as people to be helped.
Irishcel’s comment indicates that mass killings committed by incels should be perceived as a cry for help from lonely men. However, it is not treated as such by society; rather, incels are seen as a problem. This is evident in comments about therapy as well. One member compares therapists to KGB spies and argues that they “will not hesitate to call the police on you if you say too much, and betray your trust” (Atavistic Autist, 2020, #1). Several members responded that the post was high IQ. This indicates that incels do not receive real help from society. Instead, they feel cheated. They cannot trust that they will receive support. Rather, it can be interpreted that they feel like society is out to get them, and thus they have only each other to turn to. This can strengthen the sense of belonging while at the same time, intensify the experience of exclusion.
Stories within stories
The subplots in the narrative of the incel as inferior concern different theories about what attributes are essential for the ability to find a partner. Together, the stories about these theories help create a strong narrative of the incel as inferior and, accordingly, as a victim with no hope for the future. Hopelessness might not be what we usually interpret as a sign of radicalisation since it does not entail committing violent attacks. However, feelings of exclusion, combined with hopelessness, might serve as a foundation for radicalisation since they do not believe that they can positively or negatively affect their future. Thus, the consequences of their actions do not matter; they have already resigned. Although this could lead to passivity and a lack of ambition, it could also lead to violence.
27 Most of the subplots concern different pills, a word that refers to adopting certain philosophies, and they are supported with scientific research. Most of the community agrees on these pills; however, there are discussions about their mutual order of importance. The height pill suggests that short men will have difficulties finding a partner (RageAgainstTDL, 2019, #1). The voice pill states that men with low deep voices have higher testosterone levels and are therefore found more attractive by women (Diocel, 2020, #1). The hair pill concerns balding and the idea that hair is essential (Gymcelled, 2020, #1). The race pill concerns what race is the most attractive (13k, 2018a, #1). It differs slightly from the other pills; whereas members agree on what is considered attractive and not within the other pills, there are debates about the hierarchy of different races. Most members agree that white men have it the easiest, hence the JBW-theory [just be white]. However, several members disagree regarding other ethnicities (see, for example, NotQuiteChadLite, 2018, #11). It is important to note that the incels do not believe that they themselves are a racist community; on the contrary, they describe “inceldom as the first movement/group to unite men of all races, religions and political ideologies” (Ethnic Natsoc, 2019, #1). Instead, it is women who are racists since they are “biologically wired to seek out men of most powerful race” (13k, 2018a, #1).
Another subplot concerns the so-called Juggernaut law. According to it, women with flaws do not become unattractive in the eyes of men. Men will instead believe that they have a chance with them. Several members argue that this is why women who are overweight can still find partners (see for example Kurdish_Incel, 2018, #23), which adds to the injustice felt by incels since they believe that the same does not go for men.
Other stories
Some members try to bring hope about the future. One example is Fearofeight (2020, #1), who argues that incels should not call themselves subhuman since that reinforces female superiority. Instead, they should question women and their standards since their physical appearances do not matter for doing their jobs. As such, Fearofeight tries to urge the community to shift the balance of power and the community's mindset. However, several members disagree and argue that looks are indeed the most important thing and that violence is the only solution to the problem (see, for example, Appetite4Destruction, 2020, #8). Other members argue that it is bluepilled to think this way: “so basically remain ignorant in the face of objective reality . Yeah no ” (D3X, 2020, #29). This substory does destabilise the narrative of the incel as inferior since it challenges the incels status as a victim without agency. However, the overall
28 response is not supportive of changing their status. Instead, it seems other members want to hold on to the victim mentality and hopelessness about the future.
Another example is the story of a former member called itsOVER, who travelled to Thailand to ascend and has since had three children with three different women. ItsOVER was banned from the forum due to bragging about his experience, but other members have stayed in touch with him and continue to share his stories on the forum (see, for example, 13k, 2018b, #1). 13k (2018b, #1) calls this “a success story and a life and hope fuel for incels”, while the rest of the comment section is divided in terms of their view of itsOVER. Several comments imply that what itsOVER has done is wrong and should not be perceived as anything to strive for since these children will be ugly too (see, for example, Gremlincel, 2018, #3). Due to their belief in the previously mentioned race pill, several members believe that itsOVER is cruel, who has given birth to children who will be half white/half Asian. These kids most likely will not find partners if they are male, and thus, they will become incels. This indicates that the community does not aspire to grow since they do not want others to share their destiny. This is also indicated by the fact that itsOVER has been banned for sharing stories about his ascension. This is not acceptable within the community and that you are excluded from the group if you tell others about your ascension. Thus, it seems that members do not want to leave their victim mentality and do not wish to read about other peoples’ success stories. As such, members who pursue their personal narratives and deviate from the group are excluded, indicating that the community does not seek to mobilise. Rather, it is crucial that everyone shares the experience of inceldom.
There are other comments that seem to think differently or do not express whether they believe it is right or wrong. The member _incelinside (2018, #14) commented that “many childERen shall be born”, the capital ER refers to Elliot Rodger’s mass murder, but without any sign of condemning what itsOVER has done. WarriorSkull (2018, #9) commented, “IT’S BEGUN”, which most likely is a reference to Alek Minassian’s Facebook post stating that “The Incel Rebellion has already begun!” (Feldman, 2018). Hence these comments can be interpreted as radicalisation since not condemning violence can be perceived as approval. The story about itsOVER does destabilise the main narrative of the incel as inferior since it challenges the incels' position as victims and indicates that they can change their future. Even though many members did not agree with these two stories, the idea of agency and a violent solution can be found in other stories on the forum. I argue that they make up an alternative narrative of the incel as superior, and I will present this in detail in the following section.
