Fire incidents and potential fire incidents on Norwegian oil and gas installations

(1)

Fire incidents and potential fire incidents on

Norwegian oil and gas installations

Karolina Storesund

SP F

ire

Rese

(2)

Fire incidents and potential fire

incidents on Norwegian oil and gas

installations

VERSION 1 DATE 2015-11-23 KEYWORDS: Fire incidents Oil & Gas

AUTHOR Karolina Storesund CLIENT Internal report CLIENT’S REF. Tommy Herzberg PROJECT NO. 20080 NUMBER OF PAGES/APPENDICES: 15 + 1 Appendix ABSTRACT

This report presents results from a review of fire incidents and potential fire incidents on installations under the responsibility of the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil). The review was an initiative of, and funded by SP Fire Research.

PREPARED BY

Karolina Storesund SIGNATURE

CHECKED BY

Ragnar Wighus SIGNATURE

APPROVED BY

Paul Halle Zahl Pedersen SIGNATURE

REPORT NO. A15 20080:1 ISBN CLASSIFICATION Unrestricted

CLASSIFICATION THIS PAGE

(3)

Document history

VERSION DATE VERSION DESCRIPTION

(4)

REPORT NO. A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 3 of 15

1 Introduction

4

1.1 Data 4 1.2 Limitations 5

2 Results

6

2.1 General 6 2.2 Severity level 8 2.3 Consequences 11

3 Discussion

15

(5)

1 Introduction

This report presents results from a review of fire incidents and potential fire incidents on installations under the responsibility of the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil). The review was an initiative of SP Fire Research, which requested the available dataset of incidents from Ptil. The purpose was primarily to gain a better knowledge internally about the type of incidents that have occurred on Norwegian petroleum installations.

1.1 Data

The dataset contained reported parameters about the incidents. Data identifying the operators or the installations has been excluded from the review, and only a limited number of project participants have had access to the complete dataset.

Data included in the study:

 Type of facility (fixed, moveable, onshore facility)  Year of incident

 Free text description of the incident  Drilling halt (stans boring)

 Production halt (stans produksjon)  Mustering of lifeboats

 Area/system, with categories:

o Drilling and well (bore og brønn) o Electrical installation (elektrisk anlegg) o Ancillary system (hjelpe og støttesystemer) o Subsea installation (havbunnsanlegg) o Main process (hovedprosess)

o Living quarters (innkvartering)

o Compressor installation (compression)

o Structures and maritime systems (konstruksjoner og maritime systemer) o Lifting operations (løfteoperasjoner)

o Pipeline system (rørledningsystemer) o Other (andre)

o Not recorded area/system (ikke registrert område/system)

For the purposes of this study this is not an optimal categorisation, because not all categories are of the same type. For example, an incident involving the electrical installation in the living quarters may be registered on either electrical installation or accommodation. This must be taken into consideration when studying the results of this review.

 Severity (alvorlighetsgrad)

The severity of the incidents are reported on a scale from 1 to 5 according to the following definition:

1. Not notifiable (Ikke meldingspliktig) 2. Simpler follow-up (Enklere oppfølging )

3. Potential under small changes (Potensial ved små endringer) 4. Severe (Alvorlig)

5. Large potential / serious accident / death (Stort potensial/stor ulykke/død)

(6)

REPORT NO.

A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 5 of 15

 Actual consequence (faktisk konsekvens)

The actual consequence of the incident is, in this data set, characterised according to one of the following:

o DFU02 Ignited hydrocarbon leakage (Antent hydrokarbonlekkasje) o DFU04A Fire / explosion in other areas, not HC-False alarm

(Brann/ekspl i andre omr ikke HC-FEIL ALARM)

o DFU04B Fire / explosion in other areas, not HC-Fire (Brann/ekspl i andre omr ikke HC- BRANN)

o DFU04C Fire / explosion in other areas, not HC-Explosion (Brann/ekspl i andre omr ikke HC-EKSPLOSJON)

In total the data contains 985 incidents spanning from 1997 to 2014.

1.2 Limitations

The report is based on the information in the database only. Many of the incidents have been more thoroughly investigated beyond what is reported in the database, and therefor new information may have been uncovered that is not included here. Ptil may have more detailed information about specific incidents.

(7)

2 Results

The findings from the dataset is presented below.

2.1 General

Figure 2-1 below shows that the number of reported incidents have increased during the period we have reviewed. The reason may be both an actual increase in accidents, but perhaps more likely better routines of reporting incidents.

Figure 2-1 Year of incident. n=985

Figure 2-2 shows the reported incidents distributed over the type of facility. Fixed facilities have the most reported incidents. It is not investigated if this distribution correlates with the distribution of the total number of different facilities.

Figure 2-2 Type of facility. n=985 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Fixed Moveable Onshore facility <Blank>

(8)

REPORT NO.

A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 7 of 15

Figure 2-3 shows the number of reported incidents distributed on area / system. The categories "Not recorded area/system" and "Other" is a relatively large category. It has not been further analysed to determine the correct categorisation with respect to the other categories. The majority of these (88 %) were reported between 1997 and 2002, so it seems that the reporting routines on this account has improved over the years.

"Ancillary system", "Main process" and "Electrical installation" are the three largest categories besides "Not recorded area/system" and "Other". The main part of the

incidents categorised as "Not recorded area/system" was reported before 2002. The main part of the incidents categorised as "Other" was reported after 2004. 66 of these 139 incidents were False alarms.

Figure 2-3 Number of reported incidents distributed on area / system. n=985 42 95 305 1 102 66 29 14 8 2 139 182

Drilling and well Electrical installation Ancillary system Subsea installation Main process Living quarters Compressor installation Structures and maritime systems Lifting operations Pipeline system Other Not recorded area/system

(9)

2.2 Severity level

Figure 2-4 shows that severity level 2 (simpler follow-up) is most common severity level reported.

Figure 2-4 Number of incidents distributed on severity level (1-5) and area / system. n=985

Figure 2-5 through Figure 2-9 shows how the different severity levels are distributed over the different areas / systems in more detail.

Figure 2-5 Number of incidents characterised with severity level 5. n=6

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4

(10)

REPORT NO.

A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 9 of 15

0 5 10 15 20

0 1 2

(11)

Table 2-1 Distribution of reported incidents on year and severity level.

Se ve ri ty le ve l 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 1 ₁ ₁ ₁ ₁ ₁ ₃ ₃ ₁ ₁ ₂ ₁₅ 2 13 15 43 44 31 25 28 38 40 68 61 71 69 61 79 81 70 61 898 3 ₁ ₂ ₃ 4 1 ₆ ₆ ₂ ₅ _{4 15} ₇ ₂ ₃ ₅ ₄ ₃ ₆₃ 5 ₂ ₂ ₁ ₁ ₆ 0 50 100 150 200 250 300

0 1 2 3 4 5

(12)

REPORT NO.

A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 11 of 15

2.3 Consequences

Figure 2-10 shows in what extent the incidents caused drilling downtime. Figure 2-11 shows the distribution of drilling downtime on area / system. The main part of the 76 incidents with drilling downtime occurred in the time period of 2006-2012. Subsea installation, lifting operation and pipeline system were not reported with any incidents that caused drilling downtime.

Figure 2-10 Distribution of whether the incident caused drilling downtime (of drilling) or not. n=985

Figure 2-11 Distribution of drilling downtime over area / system. n=76 76 909 Downtime No downtime 8 12 25 0 9 5 2 3 0 0 7 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30

(13)

Figure 2-12 shows in what extent the incidents caused production stoppage. Figure 2-13 shows the distribution of production stoppage on area / system. The main part of the 231 incidents with production stoppage occurred in the time period of 2006-2012. Pipeline system were not reported with any incidents that caused drilling downtime.

Figure 2-12 Distribution of whether the incident caused production stoppage or not. n=985

Figure 2-13 Distribution of production stoppage over area / system. n=231 231 754 Production stoppage No production stoppage 13 22 77 1 52 4 20 1 1 0 28 12 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

(14)

REPORT NO.

A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 13 of 15

Figure 2-14 shows what actual consequence that has been reported from the incident. The most common actual consequence reported is DFU04B Fire / explosion in other areas, not HC-Fire (Brann/ekspl i andre omr ikke HC- BRANN). The next most common category is DFU04A which are the incidents reported as false alarms.

Figure 2-14 The reported actual consequence of the incident. n=985

Out of 985 reported incidents 286 are reported as false alarms of various types. Going through the free text field, it can be seen that false alarms are set off for various reasons: detectors malfunctioning / technical error, misinterpretation (e.g. sandblasting dust detected as smoke, heat from a sauna detected as heat from a fire, heated leakage of lubricating oil detected as smoke, steam from cleaning detected as smoke), human error / manual alarm, deluge system or sprinkler system activated. Figure 2-15 shows the distribution of false alarms on area / system, and Figure 2-16 shows the distribution over the years.

Figure 2-15 False alarms reported as DFU04A. n=286 25 286 654 20 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 DFU02 DFU04A DFU04B DFU04C 12 12 98 1 60 16 10 2 66 9 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

(15)

Figure 2-16 False alarms per year. n=286

Of the 286 incidents which were false alarms

 20 (7 %) caused drilling downtime (stans drilling)

 109 (38 %) caused production stoppage (produksjonsstans)  129 (45 %) caused mustering to life boats (mønstring til livbåter) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

FALSE

(16)

REPORT NO.

A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 15 of 15

3 Discussion and conclusions

Ancillary systems

A third of the reported incidents belongs to the category Ancillary systems. There is also quite a large number of all the incidents that are reported under severity level 2. A question arises whether this is an indication of generally poor maintenance, which may eventually lead to more serious incidents. However most of the platform systems that is not the main process are ancillary systems, which could explain the large share of incidents.

Reporting

A large number incidents categorised as "Not recorded area/system" was reported before 2002.

Almost half of the incidents categorised as "Other" were false alarm and could, through the free text description, be derived to specific areas / systems.

This shows that in some ways the culture of reporting seems to have improved over the years. At the same time it appears that it may be difficult to categorise false alarms.

False alarms

The amount of false alarms are quite substantial (appr. 30 %), and most of them have occurred in recent years, from 2005 onwards. Further work should be undertaken to investigate the different types of false alarms, and what can be done to reduce the number.

The majority of installations on the Norwegian shelf is ageing, some having old or outdated detection systems. It should be investigated whether upgrading of the fire detection could reduce the number of false alarms and, consequently the number of false alarms resulting in production stoppage and mustering.

General conclusion

The numbers show that there is room for improvement, especially regarding false alarms. A more thorough investigation would be informative concerning what types of equipment are causing false alarms.

The numbers also show that severe incidents do not occur often, something that may be explained by good control of barriers. However, there are still some incidents that occur that have the potential of a severe incident. Hence, there must still be a focus on barriers preventing the consequences of an escalating incident.

(17)

A

Tabulated results

Drilling and well Electrical installation Ancillary system Subsea installation Main process Living quarters Compressor installation Structures and maritime systems Lifting operations Pipeline system Other Not recorded area/system Number 42 95 305 1 102 66 29 14 8 2 139 182 Severity level 1 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 3 2 35 82 282 1 92 64 23 14 8 2 130 165 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 10 19 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 5 13 5 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Drilling downtime Downtime 8 12 25 0 9 5 2 3 0 0 7 5 No downtime 34 83 280 1 93 61 27 11 8 2 132 177 Production stoppage Production stoppage 13 22 77 1 52 4 20 1 1 0 28 12 No production stoppage 29 73 228 0 50 62 9 13 7 2 111 170

(18)

A

Tabulated results

REPORT NO. A15 20080:1 VERSION 1 A2 of A2 Drilling and well Electrical installation Ancillary system Subsea installation Main process Living quarters Compressor installation Structures and maritime systems Lifting operations Pipeline system Other Not recorded area/system Facility type Fixed 28 64 231 1 76 48 28 9 6 0 90 135 Moveable 14 26 61 0 6 18 1 5 2 0 31 40 Onshore facility 0 5 13 0 20 0 0 0 0 2 18 4 <Blank> 3 Actual concequence DFU02 ₂ ₅ ₆ ₁ ₂ 9 DFU04A ₁₂ ₁₂ ₉₈ ₁ ₆₀ ₁₆ ₁₀ ₂ ₆₆ 9 DFU04B ₂₈ ₈₂ ₁₉₂ ₃₃ ₅₀ ₁₈ ₁₄ ₆ ₂ ₆₈ ₁₆₁ DFU04C ₁ ₁₀ ₃ ₃ ₃ False (DFU4A) leading to drilling downtime 1 0 6 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 False (DFU4A) leading to production stoppage 4 1 30 1 39 1 7 0 0 0 23 3 False (DFU4A) leading to mustering 5 5 43 0 36 11 5 0 0 0 23 1

(19)

SP Fire Research AS

Box 4767 Sluppen, N-7465 Trondheim, NORWAY Telephone: +47 464 18 000

E-mail: post@spfr.no, Internet: www.spfr.no

www.spfr.no

SPFR Report A15 20080:1 ISBN

SP Sveriges Tekniska Forskningsinstitut

Vi arbetar med innovation och värdeskapande teknikutveckling. Genom att vi har Sveriges bredaste och mest kvalificerade resurser för teknisk utvärdering, mätteknik, forskning och utveckling har vi stor betydelse för näringslivets konkurrenskraft och hållbara utveckling. Vår forskning sker i nära samarbete med universitet och högskolor och bland våra cirka 10000 kunder finns allt från nytänkande småföretag till internationella koncerner.

SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden

Our work is concentrated on innovation and the development of value-adding technology. Using Sweden's most extensive and advanced resources for technical evaluation, measurement technology, research and development, we make an important contribution to the competitiveness and sustainable development of industry. Research is carried out in close conjunction with universities and institutes of technology, to the benefit of a customer base of about 10000 organisations, ranging from start-up companies developing new technologies or new ideas to international groups.

Fire incidents and potential fire incidents on Norwegian oil and gas installations

Fire incidents and potential fire incidents on

Norwegian oil and gas installations

Karolina Storesund

SP F

ire

Rese

Fire incidents and potential fire

incidents on Norwegian oil and gas

installations

Document history

Contents

1

Introduction

4

2

Results

6

3

Discussion

15

1

Introduction

1.1

Data

1.2

Limitations

2

Results

2.1

General

2.2

Severity level

2.3

Consequences

FALSE

3

Discussion and conclusions

A

Tabulated results

A

Tabulated results