Theories of Warfare : French Operations in Indo-China

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Theories of Warfare

French Operations in Indo-China

Author Programme

Alexander Hagelkvist Officers Programme, OP 12-15

Tutor Number of pages

Stéphane Taillat 71

Unclassified Subject: War Science

Level: Bachelor Thesis Scholarship provider: Swedish National Defence

University

Hosting unit: Écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan (FRANCE) Institution: CREC (le Centre de Recherche des Écoles de Coëtquidan) Report date: 2015-06-02

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost I offer my sincerest gratitude to the Swedish Defence University for the scholarship that made my exchange possible. Furthermore to Écoles de Saint-Cyr

Coëtquidan for their hospitality, as well as le Centre de Recherche des Écoles de Coëtquidan.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to Director Doare, Principal of the Faculty, for providing me with all the necessary facilities for the research. I also want to thank Colonel Renoux for constant support and availability with all the surroundings that concerned my work at the C.R.E.C.

And to my supervisor, Stéphane Taillat, who has supported me throughout my thesis with his patience and knowledge whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I attribute the completion of my Bachelor thesis to his encouragement and effort and without him this thesis, would not have been completed.

I am also grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Marco Smedberg, who has provided me with the interest and motivation for my subject. I am thankful and grateful to him for sharing expertise and valuable guidance.

I take this opportunity to express gratitude to Guy Skingsley at the Foreign Languages Section, War Studies at the Swedish Defence University for his help and support on the linguistic parts of the thesis. I am also grateful to my partner who supported me through this venture.

Finally to Captain Masquelier at the International Department for the support they provided me with during my stay. I also thank Gérard de Boisboissel for making my exchange memorable and filled with experiences from Bretagne.

I also place on record my sense of gratitude to one and all who, directly or indirectly, have lent their hand in this venture.

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Abstract

Human nature would usually organize and sort events to help bring order and clarity to your life. This also applies to analysis and studies of war, therefore the aim of this thesis is to determine to what extent the French use maneuver warfare or attritional warfare during operations in Indo-China (today known as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos). The author’s intent is also to contribute to existing research on the subject of analyzing military operations through maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. The research has been conducted with qualitative literature studies of the war in French Indo-China (1946-1954).

The thesis begins with a concept analysis of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare, which renders into an analytical tool. Through the lens of the analytical tool an analysis of four operations during the Indo-China war is conducted. The conclusions of each operation are presented using three levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical).

The analysis shows that both theories of warfare are present during each operation but on different levels and sometimes both are present at the same level. Therefore the author found that it is not possible to classify French operations in Indo-China as operations based solely upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare.

Key words

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

One of the main problems in studies of war and warfare is how we should analyze and

classify these phenomenon. Could it be that attritional warfare, maneuver warfare or total war “exist” in the empiricism world or are they analytical tools, that support our understanding of a complicated reality? How can war or warfare be categorized? According to Clausewitz war is a continuation of politics by other means and war should be understood as an instrument for achieving political goals:1

“[W]e maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war itself does not suspend political intercourse or

change it into something entirely different.”2

Widén and Ångström explain the need for measurable concepts of war; only when you succeeded in making something measurable could you begin your analysis. Human reason would usually organize and sort events to help bring order and clarity to your life. This also applies to analysis and studies of war, we sort war into different compartments to get some order on the complex phenomenon that war represents.3_{Therefore this thesis will not analyze}

war as a continuation of politics by other means; instead the focus will be on warfare, which is the exercise of military power and military force.4_{It covers everything from indirectly}

influencing an opponent to behave in a way that promotes your own interests, to persuasion or attraction and how to crush an opponent by brute force, i.e. warfare is the conduct of war. It ranges from military strategy to military tactics, armaments and organizations.5

1_{Karlsson, Ingemar (red.). Res publica: Östlings bokförlag Symposions teoretiska och litterära tidskrift. 54,} Krig, Brutus Östlings bokförlag Symposion, Eslöv, 2002. pp. 31-41

2_{Ångström, Jan & Widén, Jerker. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war, Routedge. Milton Park,}

Abingdon, Oxon, 2015. p. 19

3_{Widén, Jerker & Ångström, Jan. Militärteorins grunder. Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2005. pp. 34-35} 4_{Rekkedal, Nils Marius. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring, 3., rev. uppl. Krigsvetenskapliga}

institutionen, försvarshögsk, Stockholm, 2004. p. 19-20

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It is often argued today that the nature of warfare has changed significantly over the 200 years since the Napoleonic wars. A common standpoint for this approach is that during the classic era of warfare, the prerequisite for success was to defeat the enemy’s main force. Nowadays it is considered that an attack against the enemy’s central parts or rear units, like logistics or command and control units, could be sufficient to break the enemy’s will to continue. 6

At least that is the case in debates surrounding maneuver warfare in the US military between the end of the 70s and the 80s. For example, the US developed the Air-Land battle7_between

the 80s and 90s: Air-Land Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces, i.e. using air forces in order to stop reinforcement to the front or taking out essential command and control units. The concept could be used to implement both perspectives depending on the estimated center of gravity.

This can be divided into two different statements:

• Destroy the enemy’s military strength/ capacity.

• Destroy the enemy’s continued fighting spirit/ will to fight.

To connect these two statements to military theories that have been developed in order to understand the phenomenon’s of warfare, we need to look at two distinctly different military principals that were identified in Western countries in the 1980s. These military principals can be divided into the following main groups:8

• War of Attrition – also known as attritional culture or attritional warfare. • Maneuver Warfare – also known as mobile culture or manoeuver culture.

6

Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 20

7_{Leonhard, Robert R. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle, Presidio Press, CA, 1991. pp.}

157-186

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In most countries doctrines are maneuver thinking and maneuver warfare key concepts, even so in the Swedish military strategic doctrine that came in 2011.9_{The Swedish military}

strategic doctrine determines that mission-type tactics is the foundation of the Swedish Armed Forces’ actions. The standpoint is based on studies conducted on historical wars; for instance, the Second World War with the German blitzkrieg concept as a basis; other examples are the wars of Napoleon and his revolutionary thoughts. It is also tied to the greater strategic picture, namely the standardization of armies in the western world toward waging expeditionary wars.

In my thesis I intend to analyze a war that entailed relatively low stakes for France in

comparison to the opponent, who may be considered to have fought a total war. I will analyze the war in French Indo-China that lasted for eight years, from 1946 to 1954. I want to

determine whether, and if so how, this war can be classified into those two main types,

attritional warfare or maneuver warfare. The reason for choosing this war is that it takes place right after the Second World War and I would like to study whether France adapted to the new maneuver tactics and if they used them after the Second World War.

1.2 Purpose

The aim of my thesis is to contribute to the existing research on the subject of analyzing military operations through maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. Most of the research that compares maneuver warfare and attritional warfare dates back to the First- and Second World War. The comparisons made to other wars is limited, hence my motivation for devoting this thesis to comparing maneuver warfare and attritional warfare on the French operations in Indo-China.

The aim of the thesis is not to find any general method to classify warfare in general, but the purpose is to study operations during the Indo-China war and analyze the basis of their unique conditions. The aim is furthermore only to study the French use of military force in the war.

Both the French and the Swedish Armed Forces will almost certainly conduct joint and multinational military operations in the future, hence my choice to focus on France as the country to analyze. Furthermore, the author’s goal is that this thesis will be inspirational for

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more research on military operations, so that the academic world will benefit from different points of view, and this is how we make sure that we contribute to the combined knowledge of warfare.

1.3 Aim and research questions

The aim of my research is to determine to what extent the French use maneuver warfare or attritional warfare during operations in Indo-China (today known as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos). My intent is to focus on the military operations conducted by the French during the war between 1946-1954.

My research questions are:

• Could we classify French operations in Indo-China 1946-1954 as operations based upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare?

• How could we classify the individual operations, were they based upon different theories of warfare?

1.4 Disposition

This thesis proceeds as follows:

Chapter 1 presents why the chosen subject is of interest, it further contains the stated research questions for the thesis. The chapter also consists of background, purpose, demarcations and validity.

Chapter 2 the material and methods of the thesis are presented.

Chapter 3 the theoretical concepts of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare are discussed and, as a result of the discussion indicators for the analysis are generated.

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Chapter 4 contains the analysis of four separate operations during the Indo-China war and they are analyzed at three levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical). The chapter also contains a summary of the different operations and indicators.

Chapter 5 presents the answers to the research questions and thereafter a discussion follows on the research and the results that have been found.

Chapter 6 contains suggestions for future studies and a reflection on the subject. Chapter 7 contains a list of all references used in the thesis.

1.5 Demarcations

The thesis will only focus on the period between 1946-1954, and not analyze how previous wars have affected the use of one theory of warfare or the other. The main focus is to determine if the operations could be classified as operations with maneuver warfare or attritional warfare.

The thesis will only analyze the war through the French perspective, because the foundation of my analysis is based upon theories invented by the western society and thus internalized by French military, that is why I want to apply them to the French way of conducting warfare during this period.

I will use four different operations during the war in order to determine if there were any operations that could be classified differently. This will also allow me to get a general understanding of progression during the war. Since I will analyze four battles I will have to choose them carefully so that they represent a fair picture of the entire war.

A distinction between war and warfare is of importance in this thesis since only the latter will be analyzed. According to Clausewitz the nature of war consists of two elements: the “duel”, the basic antagonism which ultimately implied that war is violent, dynamic and changing; as

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well as the so-called “triad”, which ultimately meant that war is politically instrumental.10_If

we choose to see war as politics by other means, it implies that war is not fought in a vacuum but in a political context that sets the scene and makes war understandable. What

distinguishes war from other policies, however, are the means and methods employed; armed forces and violence. Thus, according to Clausewitz, we can understand war in terms of the political objectives that are pursued, thereby characterizing war as rational and instrumental.11

This means that war is so much more than just battles between two parties and therefore very complex, hence why I choose to only focus on warfare in the thesis.

Warfare in this thesis can be explained as the “duel”; as Clausewitz explains it, the basic antagonism which ultimately implies that war is violent. Warfare is the exercise of military power and military force. 12_{It covers everything from indirectly influencing an opponent to}

behave in a way that promotes your own interests, to persuasion or attraction and how to crush an opponent by brute force, i.e. warfare is the conduct of war. It ranges from military strategy to military tactics, armaments and organizations, this means that the thesis will not analyze the political or the “peoples” effect on the outcome of the war, it will focus on battles and analyze warfare.13

With the demarcation to only analyze the case according to theories of warfare rather than the complex phenomenon of war, it will allow me to limit the view of strategy. The analysis of strategy in the case study will then focus on military strategic goals and not political ones.

1.6 Terminology

By war of attrition (attritional culture or attritional warfare) I refer to that method of fighting wars, campaigns and battles in which the friendly force attempts to defeat an enemy through the destruction of the enemy’s mass. In addition, attritional warfare also focuses on

exhausting enemy forces by either disturbing their deployment or eliminating them at a higher rate than they can be replaced. The problem with those conceptions of attrition is that

Abingdon, Oxon, 2015. p. 19

11_{Ibid. p. 19}

12_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 19-20}

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one cannot really say if it is a matter of tactics or a matter of strategy (articulating ways, means and ends).

By maneuver warfare (mobile culture or manoeuver culture) I refer to that method of fighting wars, campaigns and battles in which the friendly force attempts to defeat an enemy through breaking the enemy’s spirit and will to continue. In addition, maneuver warfare also focuses on moving fast, probe defences, and exploit success, carrying battle deep into the enemy’s rear, and in this way forcing the enemy to react rather than taking the initiative.

There are different levels of warfare;14_{in order to analyze warfare a division into levels is}

often used as an instrument of clarification. The level of warfare as an analytical instrument is, to great extent dependent on the nature of war, and among military theorists the

interpretations of the concept vary, and in some cases the divisions of levels per se.15_{That is}

why I will determine each level so the reader knows how the author interprets each level of warfare.

Strategic level:

The rational process that tries to create a connection between, and coherence of, military means and political ends.1617

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”18

Operational level:

The planning level of war that constructs campaigns and major operations in order to accomplish the theatre goals articulated at the strategic planning level; the intermediate planning level that integrates tactical efforts and events into a campaign.19

14_{Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: a history. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. p. 206} 15_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 7}

16

Ibid. p. 54

17_{Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 7} 18_{Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 193}

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In other words:

The art of translating tactical actions in order to gain strategic effects.20

Tactical level:

The planning level of war that deals with battles and engagements.21

Center of gravity:

Determining ends and means in strategy is closely associated with a concept called Center of gravity (CoG). In military planning and the execution of a military operation, designed to quickly and effectively defeat the enemy, it is crucial to determine the strengths and

weaknesses of both the opponents and one’s own forces. But throughout history there have been different opinions of the meaning of CoG.22

In this thesis the author has chosen to use the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrines

interpretation of CoG. In Sweden it is named “tyngdpunkt”, meaning that CoG specifies the conditions in which one side of the conflict will gain their goals, while his opponents is prevented from reaching theirs.23

CoG is present at all levels of warfare and may be of moral, conceptual and physical nature. Examples of strategic priorities are a charismatic leader, an ideology, the people’s will and main combat forces.24

1.7 Previous research

When regarding maneuver warfare and war of attrition several researchers and military theorists have contributed analyses and data in order to gain a general perspective on these two concepts of warfare. As previously mentioned the author has compared several works in order to gain a high validity in the concept analysis of each theory.

20_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 73} 21

Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 9

22

Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 395-404

23

Militärstrategisk doktrin. p. 127

24

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The author has used a previous thesis as motivation for his own and in general that thesis laid the foundation for this one. It is a thesis produced by Major Håkan Josefsson and it analyzes the Falklands war though maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. His results showed that it was not possible to determine if the Falklands war was conducted with attritional style

warfare or maneuver warfare; but he described the conflict as a war fought mainly as a war of attrition but with influences of maneuver warfare, thus as the war progressed the more it became a war of attrition.

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2. Method

2.1 Systematizing

The research is based upon two different theories of warfare; initially I will start with a concept analysis25_{of maneuver warfare theory and then the attritional warfare theory. The}

purpose is to analyze the different theories to generate indicators, which allows me to create an analytical tool26_{. In previous research to determine the occurrence of maneuver warfare or}

attritional warfare Håkan Josefsson27_{created an analytical tool to analyze the data.}

The analytical tool will allow me to determine the presence of one or the other during the analysis. The data from the analysis is read through the lens of the analytical tool, I screen the texts for similarities to the different theories.

This is followed by a qualitative literature analysis28_{of events (operations) from the war in}

Indo-China in form of case studies29_{. The analysis of the war will be divided into different}

operations in order to answer my second question, how could we classify the individual operations, were they based upon different theories of warfare? Since the war will be divided into different periods they will be selected so that they represent the whole war in general, so that it creates a general picture of theories during the whole period.

Thereafter the results from the analysis will be presented and discussed at the end of the thesis in order to get as accurate results as possible, so that the research question can be answered. Using case studies as a model could be affected by the author’s own perceptions, as it is the author that has chosen the specific data from which to make general assumptions;30_therefore

the demarcations and the reliability of this thesis have been thoroughly discussed.

25

Friberg, Febe (red.), Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten, 2., [rev.] uppl., Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2012. pp. 98-109

26

Ibid. pp. 101-108

27

Josefsson, Håkan. Falklandskriget 1982: Manöver eller utnötning?. Bachelor thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm, 2004

28

Denscombe, M. (Translated by Larson. P.), Forskningshandboken: för småskaliga forskningsprojekt inom samhällsvetenskaperna. 2nd ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011. pp. 367-388

29

Ibid. pp. 59-73

30

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Figure 1: Research design.

2.2 Concept analysis

By clarifying what characterizes a certain concept, the meaning of it becomes clear, as well as what it does not mean. Most concepts have both a general and a particular meaning if one studies the concept related to a specific context.31

There are several reasons to use a concept analysis, in this thesis that reason is to analyze the concepts of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. The analysis then leads to the

development of an analytical tool and through this determine the occurrence of one or the other.32

31

Friberg. Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten. pp. 101-102

32

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By implementing a concept analysis the understanding of a concept increases by analyzing a broad foundation of previous interpretations. The idea is to collect as many sources as possible and analyze the data collected to determine the conditions for each concept. Many concepts exist only if certain conditions are met; and so the conditions are therefore important in the process of understanding.33

2.3 Qualitative literature analysis

Qualitative studies have increased understanding as an ultimate goal; with qualitative studies as a foundation one can gain a deeper understanding of the data that is being processed.34

Through this statement I will use this method to analyze my raw data. The data will be analyzed several times and against multiple sources to achieve a high reliability.35

The qualitative literature analysis will be used as a method both to implement the concept analysis of the theories and also to interpret the data available about the war in Indo-China. The analysis of the data will be repetitive in order to get solid conclusions from the data.36

Throughout the thesis I will take an objective approach to the data that is being analyzed in order to eliminate personal opinions. 37 The analysis will also be repetitive to demonstrate that several sources have been taken into account.38

The use of qualitative literature analysis is a method in which you analyze and validate the data through an inductive process: in other words, the use of repetition of data from multiple sources to validate the results. Throughout this thesis the use of multiple sources will be used to validate the conclusions. 39

33

Friberg. Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten. pp. 105-107

34

Ibid. p. 121

35_{Denscombe. Forskningshandboken: för småskaliga forskningsprojekt inom samhällsvetenskaperna. p. 367} 36 Ibid. p. 367 37 Ibid. p. 368 38 Ibid. p. 368 39 Ibid. 368-369

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2.4 Validity and reliability of research material and method

Through my work I have used secondary data. The magnitude of my subject has meant that the topics could only be studied cursorily. It has not been possible to conduct any study of

sources; I have tried to compensate for this by crosschecking my sources against each other.40

My intention has been to analyze the same theories but from different perspectives in order to validate my theoretical framework.

The method for the thesis is interpretative and hence open for critique regarding reliability; since it is likely that two analysts may find different answers to a given question, not only depending on what data they find but also depending on their respective foreknowledge.

In this respect I declare that I have a military background, which means that it is likely that I interpret descriptions of military activities differently than analysts without such experience would do. However, I presuppose that the reader will have some foreknowledge about war and warfare, since the extent of my thesis does not allow me to elaborate every keyword. But perhaps my foreknowledge may also prove to be useful if I can capture and interpret certain nuances in order to determine the difference between strategic, operational and tactical level of warfare.

However, this circumstance might also mean that I fail to interpret data objectively. Naturally, this potential problem is hard to surmount since I cannot disregard my military foreknowledge during analysis. What I can do, however, is to present this circumstance here for the sake of transparency. Reliability could be increased by further development of the indicators of the analytical tool. However, since this is a first attempt I will attempt to keep them general enough to determine which theory of warfare I have at hand.

Another restriction to this thesis has been the literature available in English on operations during the Indo- China war. Therefore I have used three different sources and

cross-referenced them in order to gain a high validity, and one of the authors had been in the war himself and was a French citizen. I have also chosen operations that have been mentioned in all three sources so that a cross-reference is possible.

40

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3. Theoretical framework

Maneuver warfare and attritional warfare is nothing new. Maneuver warfare probably occurred the first time a caveman surprised an enemy from behind, instead of meeting him face to face. There are several clear examples of maneuver warfare through history: at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC, they won the battle by a surprise attack on the enemy’s flank.

But what is maneuver warfare, sometimes the expression “maneuver” is used as a synonym to movement, for example, in discussions of “move and strike”41 when it comes to tactics for smaller units. When maneuver is used to express maneuver warfare it involves so much more; and the same thing applies for war of attrition, there is so much more to the concepts. In order to carry out an analysis of the concepts of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare, a deeper understanding is required of what they really mean.42

Boyd explained the distinction between the two concepts: attritional warfare focused on the physical domain and using firepower as a destructive force, whilst maneuver warfare focused on the mental domain where the aim was to generate “surprise and shock” by using

uncertainty, mobility and deception.43

41_{Leonhard, Robert R. Fighting by minutes: time and the art of war. Praeger Published, Westport, 1994. pp.}

14-16

42_{Lind, William S. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, Försvarshögsk, Stockholm,}

2002. p. 13

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3.1 Maneuver warfare

In contrast to attrition, which has the objective of killing enemy troops or destroying enemy equipment, maneuver warfare has as a “primary objective” to break the spirit and the will of opposing forces’ high command by creating unexpected and unfavourable operational or strategic situations.44

The aim is to move fast, probe defences, and exploit success, carrying the battle deep into the enemy’s rear. The spirit of maneuver warfare is offensive and in line with Boyd’s

determination to get inside the enemy’s OODA loop:

“The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to

disorganize his forces and to keep him off balance” 45 Original idea

Liddell Hart describes that an attack would be like water running down a hillside passing over the enemy, where the highest parts of the surface (where the enemy is at his strongest) would be by-passed while the lowest parts of the surface (where the enemy is at his weakest) would be immersed and small islands formed. After this it was then thought that the attacking force would knock out vital enemy resistance nests and facilities, and that the oncoming second wave of troops would eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance. This description of maneuver warfare is very graphic in order to begin to understand the concept.46

William S. Lind has another description of the concept at hand, it could be seen as a kind of “military judo,” i.e. a method to fight smart and to defeat an enemy through cunning rather than by brute force. For him, the term maneuver warfare is more than just movement. It is a way to gain an advantage over the enemy by always being faster in order to undermine the enemy’s ability to remain organized in battle.47 But faster how? One way of being faster than your opponent is to make decisions and to execute them faster than your enemy.

44_{Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 200} 45_{Ibid. p. 201}

46_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 116} 47_{Ibid. pp. 116-117}

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Tempo

Colonel John Boyd, an American fighter pilot with experience going back to the Korean War, developed a theory on how to be faster than your enemy. He began with analyzing dogfights during the early stages of the air war over Vietnam. After an intensive analysis of the

competing aircraft, Boyd concluded that the key quality was not absolute speed, but agility.

Boyd summed all this up as the “OODA loop.” OODA stands for observation, orientation, decision and action. The sequence starts with observation, as data concerning the environment is collected, then analyzed in the

orientation stage, leading to a decision and then to the execution of an action.48

The individual or organization that could undergo such a decision cycle faster than the opponent would have a decisive advantage. This had also been the case in air combat

conducted during the Korean war, in which the pilots of US fighters had better visibility from the cockpit and were able to switch from one maneuver to another faster than their opponents, despite facing fighters that could maintain a higher speed, climb faster and had superior turning radius. But by repeating the OODA loop, the pilot who could react faster would eventually force the opponent into even more difficult situations in which his behaviour became gradually obsolete.49

Figure 3: The principle of OODA loop50

48_{Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 196}

49_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 117} 50_{Militärstrategisk doktrin. p. 101}

Orient

Decide Act

Observe

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The analysis was based on dogfights but Boyd felt that the OODA loop could be applied to any situation in which it was necessary to keep or gain the initiative. The aim was always to disorient the opponent, who would be unable to grasp a situation developing more quickly than anticipated and in unexpected ways, and thus paralyzed into indecision.51

William S. Lind suggested that the aim of maneuver warfare is to get through Boyd’s decision cycle faster than the opponent. The suggestion implies three fundamental requirements for a military organization wishing to conduct maneuver warfare:

First, only a decentralized52 led military force could go through such a decision cycle fast enough. Second, anyone who practices maneuver warfare must accept the confusion and disorder which prevails on the battlefield and use those frictions53 to their advantage. Third and last, all patterns, recipes and formulas must be avoided to prevent the enemy from predicting what we will do next.54

According to Lind, mission-type tactics is a central part of the concept of maneuver warfare and that only through mission-type tactics is it possible to uphold a higher tempo then the opponent;55_{which leads into an analysis of the term “mission-type tactics”.}

Mission-type tactics

One possible definition is that the commander with mission-type tactics gives the subordinate a mission, i.e. specifies what is to be achieved. Within this framework the subordinates have the ability to choose a way to achieve the mission at hand. The commander also has to designate what kind of resources will be available in order for the subordinated to succeed: most commonly which attached units or/and which terrain to use.56

51_{Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 196}

52_{Smedberg, Marco. Militär ledning: från Napoleonkrigen till fredsbevarande insatser. Historiska media, Lund,}

2010. pp. 247-251

53_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 3} 54_{Ibid. pp. 116-117}

55_{Zetterling, Niklas. Manus till artikel för puplikation i KKrVAHT. Uppdragstaktik och tidsfaktorn. FHS/Opl,}

2000-02-01. p. 2

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An important element of mission-type tactics is that subordinates are expected to act in accordance with the overall situation. To achieve this the focus is not only on the command structures, rather mission-type tactics it should be seen as a collective term for methods to achieve the following objectives:57

• Empowerment of staff

• Involve more people in the planning-, decision-making- and implementation process. • Creating a better position to focus on overachieving issues

• Place commanders closer to implementation in the field • Creating greater flexibility and adaptively

• Allow for greater initiative

• Create better improvisational skills (e.g. a question of organization and leadership)

To conduct the “command and control” in maneuver warfare, it is very important that you seek a clear decentralized command structure. As previously stated, the importance of having a higher tempo than your opponent has been explained and in order to do so you cannot get stuck with a centralized organization. A command using mission-type tactics is a prerequisite for having and maintaining a high tempo when carrying out operations. Mission-type tactics requires that subordinates may and can take initiatives, responsibility, that there is

autonomous decision-making and a mutual trust between superiors and subordinates.58

It is important that the superior clearly defines the commander’s intent so that everyone in the organization has the overall objective. This is of the utmost importance so that the subordinate has the opportunity to act in the commander’s nature. Another critical factor is the need for both commander and subordinate to share similar meanings on the context, their mission and how to fulfill it. This leads back to the importance of a doctrine to create a common ground within the military organization.

57_{Zetterling. Uppdragstaktik och tidsfaktorn. p. 1}

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For the mission-type tactics to work, it is desirable that every subordinate knows the

superior’s intent at least two levels above their own. That way he can act even if the superior has not yet given the order, as long as it is in line with the purpose and goal of the operation.59

A decentralized command structure may be described as a system that uses “directive control” (mission-type tactics), and is based on the assumption that the man on the spot is the best judge of his immediate surroundings. German officers, most notably von Moltke, recognized that it was impossible to maintain communications between the front line and senior

commanders to the rear and still achieve tempo.60

The solution adopted was to provide commanders on the spot with all the information as to the general situation that they could find out for themselves and to guide them with directives in the form of their superior’s intent. Senior commanders then allowed their subordinates considerable room for action, trusting that in this way they would be able to make best use of each and every opportunity to further that intent.61

The key elements of this system are that free rein is given to the individual creativity of subordinate commanders, while superiors seek to identify the decisive point, direct their subordinates towards it and to reinforce success, even if other than at the chosen point, if it offeres to bring about a decision.62

Center of gravity

“[T]hat point where enemy is most vulnerable

and where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive.”63

The quote above is Clausewitz view on how to see the center of gravity and how it is

identified as the source of the opponent’s power and strength; it could also refer to an alliance or national will. Another explanation of the concept is that it is that point or set of points

59_{Lind. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. pp. 20-21}

60_{Samuels, Martin. Command or control?: command, training, and tactics in the British and German armies,}

1888-1918. Frank Cass, London, 1995. p. 283

61_{Ibid. p. 283} 62_{Ibid. pp. 283-285}

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where the application of military force would be most likely to result in the enemy’s surrender.64

But the hard part is to determine the enemy’s center of gravity since it could be basically anything; it could refer to a target or number of targets. The center might be identified because it constituted a source of enemy strength and/or a critical vulnerability. It could be found in the physical, psychological, or political spheres. If all went well, once the center is defeated the result would be decisive or else have consequences with potentially decisive effects, though this might depend on being combined with other significant events. So basically it is very hard to determine the center of gravity of the enemy in order to break his will to fight, and since there are so many ways of determining the center of gravity there is a lot of confusion as to what it really is.65_{Those who deal with the subject are in agreement that}

centers of gravity cannot be reduced to something materially tangible such as a building, a combat unit, or a person, but the concept is rather understood as a non-material force, a being, or an element that relies on such material things.66

An assessment of different centers of gravity is of great importance to all military planning and operational activity. Such analyses determine the priorities, sort out primary and secondary objectives, and decide how limited resources should be allocated to be used as efficiently as possible.67

Indirect approach

“[C]ircumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. The goal is the application of strength against selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver relies on speed and surprise, for without either we cannot concentrate

strength against enemy weakness.”68

The concept was not invented by B. H. Liddell Hart, which he does not claim. Generals associated with battles, campaigns and major wars had long exploited indirect methods.

64_{Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 205} 65_{Ibid. p. 209}

66_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 63-64} 67_{Ibid. p. 63}

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According to Liddell Hart, he studied 240 battles and campaigns with the aim of finding what characterized the key features of those who won.69

He summarized his studies with the idea that the great majority of the victors of these battles and campaigns used some form of indirect method; bypass, containment/ encirclement or infiltration possibly combined with misdirection.70

However, his theory is to be regarded as a philosophy or an attitude and not a ready-made recipe on how to win wars. One could explain the keystone of Liddell Hart’s theory with a quote:

”The perfection of strategy would… be to produce a decision – the destruction of the enemy’s armed forced through their unarming and surrender – without any fighting.”71

He developed a concept called the indirect approach and it involves finesse, deception, and the avoidance of enemy strength. Robert Leonhard discusses the integration of the indirect approach in theory of maneuver and he lists three goals in order to use the theory:

• To avoid enemy strength. Specifically, to disallow the enemy’s use of his strength in its proper medium.

• To deceive the enemy. Although this idea is somewhat different from the first, it is ultimately aimed at the same end: to refuse the enemy the opportunity to bring his strength to bear.

• To create and attack enemy vulnerabilities.72

With regards to the last of these, he discusses three types of vulnerabilities: geographical, functional and psychological. Geographical vulnerabilities could be exemplified by a hill overlooking the enemy camp, or a bridge cutting off enemy retreat. Functional vulnerabilities relate either to attacking an enemy through a medium against which he has no defense or

69_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 352} 70_{Ibid. p. 352}

71_{Ibid. p. 354}

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forcing the enemy into a medium in which his strength becomes weakness. Attacks on psychological vulnerabilities are aimed at convincing the enemy commander and troops that they are defeated. The outcome at Goose Green in the Falkland conflict is one example of when the British managed to effect the enemy’s psychological vulnerabilities. Often, maneuvers against the enemy’s rear have such an effect.73

Sometimes people think that the indirect approach is the same as maneuver warfare, but one should see the indirect approach as a tool in the maneuver warfare concept. For example, one can use the direct approach in maneuver warfare if it is appropriate. It depends on the phase of the operation at hand.74

This is consistent with how Liddell Hart explains the indirect approach. He believes that one should concentrate efforts against enemy weaknesses and at the least expected place. In order for this to work, it is necessary to have spread your forces and then muster them at the right time and place. This way one can achieve a shift in the balance of power and create a favourable situation for your own forces. This shift in balance is fundamental in the indirect approach.75

The shift can be both physical and psychological. Physically, it can be achieved through a maneuver such as limiting the opponent’s freedom of action. Psychological displacement is mainly an effect of logical confusion and feeling of incapability.76

One can also talk about implementing interventions along an operation line, a line that is not a natural line but rather a course of action against the opponent’s center of gravity. On the operation line there are a number of crucial points that lead to the center of gravity. Of course there is also a direct method that involves directly attacking the opponents center of gravity or crucial points, but the main effort in maneuver warfare is to use the indirect approach where possible.77

73_{Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 47} 74_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 351-353} 75_{Militärstrategisk doktrin. p. 125}

76_{Ibid. p. 125}

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Liddell Hart also offered a theory of modern maneuver, which he called the man-in-the-dark theory. The concept could be described as two people fighting in a dark room. As each one tries to locate the other, he advances with one arm outstretched, both for security and in order to contact his foe. Once one touches the enemy, he grasps him with the forward hand, in order to hold him at bay and to keep him stationary for the main blow. Meanwhile, he first cocks his other arm and then launches his fist at the enemy’s head for the knockout punch.78

Liddell Hart’s analogy is useful, because it is a modern application of Sun Tzu’s ideas on force dichotomy which is very similar to the man-in-the-dark theory.79_{In order to succeed}

with the indirect approach it is important or at least easier when you have the element of surprise.

Surprise and deception

Appearing in an unexpected time, place and manner contributes to the element of surprise. An accelerating pace of the battle, movements and actions that often change direction or intent are also elements of surprise. Even misdirection is of great significance and in some cases you could use a small part of your own force in order bind the enemy in a credible way with the direct method, in order to create an element of surprise with the main force.80

Surprise requires secrecy and deception, which are of importance to outmaneuver your opponent and gain an upper hand. To temporarily suspend the paradox of logic by implementing the element of surprise, however, implies certain risks. A high degree of secrecy tends to inhibit the planning of own operations and confidentiality about the operations is rarely or never upheld, some information always tends to leak out. In order to counter such leaks you mix up false information with correct information in order to mislead your enemy, in that way the enemy do not know what to think.81

Effective misdirection requires that parts of your resources are used in a context that differs from the actual objective of the operational activities and, thus, those resources cannot be

78_{Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 47} 79_{Ibid. pp. 47-48}

80_{Militärstrategisk doktrin. pp. 125-126}

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used to aid the actual operation. However, there is a risk when implementing “the

unexpected” after which such an operation usually becomes more demanding and complex than a regular operation. In the strict logical sense a repeated use of the “unexpected” becomes the “expected”. Terms like “surprise”, “conventional” and “expectation” are dependent on how the other party interprets one’s own actions. 82

Trying to repeal the paradox of logic is a timeless problem in strategy and has been

considered by political and military thinkers since the beginning of time. Sun Tzu found that all warfare is based upon cunning and deception; it is necessary to find out the enemy’s intention while concealing one’s own;83

When you are strong, give the impression that you are weak, when you are weak, give the appearance of strength.

Even Mao Tse-tung addressed the importance of surprise and deception in warfare, both at tactical, operational and strategic level.84_{We can assume that an adversary intends to protect}

his own center of gravity with all available means, therefore, the intention is to make him believe that we are in one place to execute one thing while in fact we are somewhere else and doing something completely different.85

The element of surprise, however, is no guarantee for success even through it undoubtedly increases the prospects for successful results. A successful surprise can create effective output that exceeds the value of the work and equipment used in the operation. An enemy who is shocked, distracted or out of balance, also loses the initiative, which is one of the goals of using the element of surprise.86

82_{Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 77}

83_{Van Creveld, Martin. Air power and maneuver warfare. Reprinted from the 1994 edition, University Press of}

the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002. p. 5

84_{Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 78} 85_{Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. pp. 3-5} 86_{Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 134}

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In maneuver theory, there are several descriptions of what is important for maneuver warfare: I will present what defines maneuver warfare according to some of the most representative theorists of maneuver theory. These are as follows, William S. Lind, Martin van Creveld and Sir Basil Liddell Hart.

William S Lind

According to Lind the central parts of maneuver warfare theory are the following:8788

• Mission-type tactics • Recon pull

• Center of gravity • Surface and gaps • OODA loop

Martin van Creveld

Van Creveld describes six principles that are to be used in order to use maneuver warfare.89

• The first principle that van Creveld mentions is tempo and it is connected to Boyd’s OODA-loop.

• The second principle is center of gravity. • Third principle is surprise.

• Fourth principle is the use of combined arms, the principle of using different kinds of weapon systems at the same time when effecting the enemy.

• Fifth principle is to be flexible and master the fictions of war.

• Sixth and last principle is to have a strongly decentralized organization that uses mission-type tactics.

87_{Lind. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. pp. 13-26}

88_{Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 117-119} 89_{Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. pp. 3-7}

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Liddell Hart

When studying Liddell’s indirect approach Leonhard listed three kinds efforts that could be integrated into maneuver warfare:90

1. To avoid enemy strength. Specifically, to disallow the enemy’s use of his strength in its proper medium.

2. To deceive the enemy. Although this idea is somewhat different from the first, it is ultimately aimed at the same end: to refuse the enemy the opportunity to bring his strength to bear.

3. To create and attack enemy vulnerabilities.

3.2 Indicators, maneuver warfare

Within maneuver theory, there are several concepts that are central and which could be indicators of maneuver warfare. You can use maneuver warfare regardless of what level of warfare you are conducting: strategic, operational or tactical. At the same time, it may be that you use attritional warfare on the tactical level and on the other hand you use maneuver warfare on the strategic level.

When determining the indicators in order to analyze the theory of maneuver warfare there were some indicators which could coincide within both theories; but in this case it is mainly these indicators that prove the occurrence of maneuver warfare:

• Tempo

• Mission-type tactics • Indirect approach • Center of gravity

• Surprise and/or deception

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3.3 Attritional warfare

While maneuver warfare is a positive idealtype, attrition warfare is a negative one; it is a concept which derives its very existence from its dissimilarities with the former, i.e. it can only be defined by comparison to maneuver warfare and not in itself. In contrast to maneuver warfare, which has the objective to break the spirit and the will of opposing forces’ high command by creating unexpected and unfavourable operational or strategic situations. Attritional warfare has the objective to destroy the enemy’s military force/ capacity.91

Attritional warfare seeks to smash the enemy’s assets one by one until few or none are left, it takes aim at the enemy’s strengths. Regardless of the size of the engagement, attritional warfare focuses on the immediate battle or on a decisive one. That means that attrition warfare could either rely on exhaustion or on annihilation.92

During the 1980s followers of maneuver warfare created an opposite theory, war of attrition, also known as “industrial warfare”, so that they could define their own theory. Because attritional warfare dose not have any self-proclaimed followers and is mainly a caricature. Despite that, the theory of attritional warfare is of value in order to understand and analyze warfare.

Original idea

Edward N. Luttwak is one of those who contributed with important thoughts about war of attrition. He implies that attritional warfare is “war waged by industrial methods”. The opponent is regarded primarily as a series of targets and you succeed through:

“[T]he cumulative effect of superior firepower and material strength”93

When you have affected the opponent with firepower and material strength it ultimately leads to the elimination of your opponent’s overall capacity, or, it leads to his retreat/ surrender. This is the aim of a war of attrition, to defeat the opponent’s military strength in order to win the war.94

91_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 20} 92_{Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. p. 9}

93_{Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 182} 94_{Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. p. 9}

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The larger the attritional element is in war, Luttwak implies, the more machine-like the techniques for identifying movement, targets and logistics become. Furthermore, tactical actions tend to become more mechanical and the need for operational thinking fades.95

A victory can be assured if the use of overwhelming firepower could be placed within reach of stationary targets like defensive positions or cities, if the firepower possesses sufficient qualitative and quantitative properties, if the enemy is forced to concentrate his forces or if your own forces can maintain material superiority. Implied with this type of warfare is that the enemy’s firepower will be absorbed by your own military force.96

John F. Antal, explains “war of attrition” as follows:

“(…) The attrition style of warfare focuses on the destruction of the enemy’s forces. Attrition deals with destruction of personnel and equipment over time. Attrition warfare reduces the

enemy through the application of superior firepower or superior numbers (…)”97

So attrition warfare is distinct from maneuver warfare in that it seeks to aim at another target, namely enemy material forces (especially military ones, but it could also be infrastructure, command and control, and so on). John Warden thus defines a third approach in addition to annihilation versus exhaustion, namely paralysis. He assumed that it is possible to

characterize the opponent as a system and that it is possible to induce system paralysis by decapitation of the systems’s core, i.e. applying firepower in order to affect the enemy’s core.98

Firepower

The purpose of firepower in war of attrition is to inflict damage on the enemy in order to reduce his military force. This means that firepower is one of the most important tools one can have as a follower of attritional warfare. In contrast to maneuver warfare, attritional

95_{Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 183} 96_{Ibid. p. 183}

97_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 383-384} 98_{Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. pp. 265-267}

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warfare uses movement only to get to a better firing position and not to outmaneuver in order to inflict a system collapse. The use of movement has one purpose and that is to inflict more damage with the use of superior firepower.99

This implies the fact that firepower can be substituted for maneuver. It recognizes that movement in warfare is inherently dangerous and should be avoided. Therefore, rather than move the follower of attritional culture will remain in a protected posture and simply fire at the enemy. Movement is accomplished implicitly though the range and lethality of strike operations.100

While firepower is important, the means to protect is also highly valued within war of attrition. Protection against firepower is of importance in order to absorb an enemy attack with as few losses as possible. Protection can be achieved by dug-in formations or

fortifications from which one may deliver fire.101

The use of firepower to influence the opponent means that one tries to defeat the enemy’s forces in the form of his tactical units. This is normally achieved by ensuring that you have an enhanced killing potential, namely the creation of a favourable balance of power. It means mobilizing a stronger fighting force than the enemy in order to succeed.102

As attritional warfare is characterized by systematic and mathematical calculations which try to determine how much input is needed in order to get the best output to win the war, the need for battle plans becomes mandatory.

Battle plan

Within attritional warfare one values security and certainty during operations, which leads to a time-consuming planning process. As a result the planning process becomes almost

mathematic in correlation to available resources. Furthermore, there exists a strong desire to

99_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring, 3. p. 414, 454} 100_{Leonhard. Fighting by minutes: time and the art of war. p. 25} 101_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 454} 102_{Ibid. p. 454}

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create and ensure some kind of “order” in the nature of war, hence the creation of an ultimate battle plane is supposed to ensure “order” in all the chaos.103

Consequently one prioritizes characteristics like administrative talent and an eye for detail. It is normally considered important to collect data and create solutions to events that might be of importance to the operation. The purpose of this is the desire to achieve success, i.e. through quantity of solutions prove that the operation is going according to plan.104

Lawrence Freedman explained the complexity of using the method of measuring input in order to predict the output, especially if one side uses non-linearly methods like maneuver warfare:

“Those looking for stability and regularity could find themselves having to cope with the opposite. If effects were uncertain, especially in more complex settings and longer conflicts, how could a responsible strategist think through the consequences of actions. Along with the sociological “laws” of unanticipated consequences and self-fulfilling expectations came the

cybernetic concepts of feedback loops and non-linearity. If inputs and outputs were proportional then variables could be plotted along a straight line, as in a linear equation, but with non-linear equations there could be no such plot because the relationships were complex

and outcomes would be disproportionate to effects.

The first thought that might be drawn from this was that all strategy was doomed to failure. The second might be that the process could only truly be managed during its early stages, so

the best option was to concentrate on getting the initial advantage.”105

The conclusion of this statement by Freedman could be that this is why attritional warfare puts so much effort into the planning process.

103_{Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 455} 104_{Ibid. p. 455}

Theories of Warfare : French Operations in Indo-China