The EU’s Constraints in Involvement of the Post- Soviet Frozen Conflicts : (A Comparative Case Study on the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia Conflicts)

(1)

Linköping University | Department of Management and Engineering Master’s thesis, 30 credits | Master’s programme August 2020 | ISRN: LIU-IEI-FIL-A--20/03496--SE

The EU’s Constraints in Involvement of the

Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts

(A Comparative Case Study on the Nagorno-Karabakh,

Abkhazia and South Ossetia Conflicts)

Author: Mahira Mukhtarova

Supervisor: Per Jansson Examiner: Lars Niklasson

(2)

Upphovsrätt

Detta dokument hålls tillgängligt på Internet – eller dess framtida ersättare – under 25 år från publiceringsdatum under förutsättning att inga extraordinära omständigheter uppstår.

Tillgång till dokumentet innebär tillstånd för var och en att läsa, ladda ner, skriva ut enstaka kopior för enskilt bruk och att använda det oförändrat för ickekommersiell forskning och för undervisning. Överföring av upphovsrätten vid en senare tidpunkt kan inte upphäva detta tillstånd. All annan användning av dokumentet kräver upphovsmannens medgivande. För att garantera äktheten, säkerheten och tillgängligheten finns lösningar av teknisk och administrativ art.

Upphovsmannens ideella rätt innefattar rätt att bli nämnd som upphovsman i den omfattning som god sed kräver vid användning av dokumentet på ovan beskrivna sätt samt skydd mot att dokumentet ändras eller presenteras i sådan form eller i sådant sammanhang som är kränkande för upphovsmannens litterära eller konstnärliga anseende eller egenart.

För ytterligare information om Linköping University Electronic Press se förlagets hemsida:

http://www.ep.liu.se/.

Copyright

The publishers will keep this document online on the Internet – or its possible replacement – for a period of 25 years starting from the date of publication barring exceptional circumstances.

The online availability of the document implies permanent permission for anyone to read, to download, or to print out single copies for his/her own use and to use it unchanged for non-commercial research and educational purpose. Subsequent transfers of copyright cannot revoke this permission. All other uses of the document are conditional upon the consent of the copyright owner. The publisher has taken technical and administrative measures to assure authenticity, security and accessibility.

According to intellectual property law, the author has the right to be mentioned when his/her work is accessed as described above and to be protected against infringement. For additional information about the Linköping University Electronic Press and its procedures for publication and for assurance of document integrity, please refer to its home page: http://www.ep.liu.se/.

(3)

(4)

Abstract

This thesis examines constraints of the EU’s engagement in the frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus, namely, the Abkhazia, the South Ossetia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The study begins with a puzzle in which the EU’s ambition for prioritizing the resolution of frozen conflicts mismatches with the reality related to the status quo of frozen conflicts. By using an abductive reasoning in an observed surprising fact, the research highlights that the complexity of the region can be the main contributor to the EU’s limitations.

With this purpose, the ENP as a normative power of the EU is analyzed to identify how the EU is attempting to be a major actor in the region in order to secure its borders. Subsequently, the limitations of the EU in engaging in frozen conflicts are examined from ‘security dilemma’, ‘balance of power’ and ‘bandwagoning’ neorealism perspectives together with a comparative study on the three conflicts. The results show that the complexity of the region is a principal constraint for the EU. In particular, geopolitical rivalries with Russia and small states with their alliances contribute to the complexity of the region. However, this study also explores the idea that the complexity of the region is not only the best explanation for the EU’s limitations, but also the EU’s structure per se creates a lack of credibility with relations to the respective Caucasian states.

For future studies, I suggest that the analysis of the social learning mechanism of the EU will be an asset for understanding the region and avoiding Eurocentric approaches towards Caucasian political systems and people. Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, policymakers can consider that it is possible to change the EU’s low profile either by having clear strategies concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or replacing one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group with the EU.

Keywords: Frozen Conflicts, the South Caucasus, EU constraints, Normative Power Europe and Neorealism.

(5)

(6)

Acknowledgement

This work would not have been possible without the people to whom I owe thanks and gratitude. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to all my professors, and faculty members and staff at Linköping University for providing me with amazing lectures and seminars at which I gained knowledge on building theoretical foundations, improving my critical thinking and obtaining scientific methods. This group includes, in particular, members of my dissertation committee, who have provided me professional guidance and taught me a great deal about scientific research.

I am deeply grateful for my thesis advisor, Professor Per Jansson, Head of the Department of International Relations. As my supervisor and professor, he has inspired, instructed and motivated me with his valuable guidance, timely suggestions and support during my study.

Nothing can replace the love and support of my family in my pursuit of this project. I would like to thank my parents, sisters and brother, whose compassion and encouragement are with me in whatever I pursue. Most significantly, I owe tremendous thanks to my loving and understanding husband, Dr. Parviz Alizada. Thank you for supporting me for everything, particularly encouraging me throughout this experience. I appreciate my wonderful and gorgeous daughter, Aylin, for her inspiration and unconditional love. I consider myself the luckiest in the world to have a lovely and caring family standing beside me.

I dedicate this thesis to IDPs and refugees as I know what it means to experience a war.

Gothenburg, in August 2020 Mahira Mukhtarova

(7)

(8)

List of Abbreviations

AA Association Agreement

AO Autonomous Oblast

AP Action Plan

ASSR Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic BMO Border Monitoring Mission

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CTO Collective Security Treaty Organization DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area EEAS European External Action Service

EAEU Eurasian Economic Union EaP Eastern Partnership

ENP European Neighborhood Policy

EPNK Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh ESS European Security Strategy

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

EUMM EU’s Monitoring Mission

EUSR European Union Special Representative

GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova)-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development

IDPs Internally displaced persons

INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe JPKF Joint Peacekeeping Forces

LINKS London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building MSSD Most Similar Systems Design

(9)

NPE Normative Power Europe

NREP Non-recognition and Engagement Policy

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PCAs Partnership and Cooperation Agreements SOCAR the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic

TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States

TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNSC UN Security Council

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VLAP Visa Liberation Action Plan

(10)

List of Figures, Tables and Maps

FIGURE 1.SCHEMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW. ... 6

FIGURE 2.THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF FROZEN CONFLICT DYNAMICS. ... 10

FIGURE 3.BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT,1995-2017 ... 16

FIGURE 4.DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN ABKHAZIA,1897-1989 ... 18

TABLE 1.CHARACTERIZATION OF ABDUCTIVE, INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING. ... 35

TABLE 2.SOME KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF A CASE STUDY METHOD. ... 39

TABLE 3.CASE STUDY TACTICS FOR FOUR DESIGN TESTS. ... 42

TABLE 4.NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE BASED ON THE EU’S ACTION PLANS IN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN. ... 49

MAP 1.FROZEN POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD. ... 12

MAP 2.THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND SURROUNDING OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN AZERBAIJAN. ... 15

(11)

1 Introduction

Conflicts within the EU neighborhoods have escalated several times which have resulted in many civilian and military casualties in the last two decades. Although the EU, international organizations, and other regional actors are involved in peacekeeping processes, the 2008 Georgia-Russia war changed the situation in the region. Consequently, the 2008 conflict became brutal and the issue was again on international agendas (Hille, 2010, p.235). Likewise, a new severe clash happened between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops on April 2016, which lead to significant death tolls on both sides. Despite the fact that conflicts in the South Caucasus have escalated several times, they ultimately have remained unresolved with the EU not being able to respond to the crisis directly. Therefore, the EU faces certain limitations regarding involvement in the stability of the South Caucasus region and regarding contribution to the solution of the conflicts.

1.1 Background of the EU’s Engagement in the South Caucasus

Following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the South Caucasus region became the major security concern due to rising conflicts in the region. The conflicts’ death tolls, fragile economy and unstable governments after the dissolution of the USSR were some of the major factors that contributed to the situation in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia by the mid-1990s. Therefore, international organizations started assisting these governments with initial humanitaran help in addition to contributing to the conflict resolution. Among these organizations were the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which were in charge of providing guidance for the particular conflicts. According to Lynch (2002, p.15), the UN was the main leader for the Abkhazian conflict and the OSCE led the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Ossetia conflicts. Thus, the EU was not participating in the conflict resolution process in the 1990s and the organization limited its assistance to only humanitarian involvement. According to Jafarova (2015, p.96), the EU’s initial projects in the region such as TACIS, TRACECA and INOGATE in the 1990s mostly concerned the support of ‘state building’ processes. These projects did not reflect the EU’s role in conflict resolution. Moreover, the EU’s lack of political and security engagement in the 1990s are explainable with exogenous and endogenous factors (Delcour, 2011, p.113).

External factors were mostly explained by limited historical participation of the EU in the region. On the one hand, the existence of international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE left little space for the EU. On the other hand, Russia had a major role in leading the process (Delcour, 2011). The region was a part of the USSR and the Russia had full control of the territory until the collapse

(14)

of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Western countries and companies did not have a direct access to the region until the early 1990s. However, endogenous factors for being inactive as a regional security actor were “the lack of security toolbox at the EU level and the lack of coherence among the policy goals of EU actors” (Delcour, 2011, p.118). Deficiency of a single policy or strategy led the EU member states failing to act together towards the conflicts in the neighbhood. Instead of representing the EU, the member states were already involved in the conflict resolution process as a part of other international organizations. For example, France co-chaired (together with the Russian Federation and the United States of America) the Minsk Group, which was created with the effort of the OSCE for contributing to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict.

Starting point of the EU and South Caucasus relations was the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which were one of the first official documents between Post-Soviet countries and the EU (the contracts entered into force in 1999). The aim of the agreements was to strengthen democracies and develop economies of the post-soviet countries. However, these exisisting contracts and the EU policies in the 1990s and until the early 2000s did not clearly explain which actions the EU should take towards conflict resolution.

Conversely, the major shift in the EU’s low profile in the South Caucasus happened with the appointment of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus in 2003. According to the press realease which was issued on July 7th_{, 2003 by the European Commission, the}

new representative would enhance the political role of the EU in the South Caucasus. It was the first time the EU officially declared its engagement in the conflict resolution process as the objectives of the EUSR. Hence, the objectives included but were not limited to preventing and assisting in the resolution process of the unresolved conflicts and the support for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, the EU’s conflict resolution mechanisms were not well-defined in the EUSR mission. The EU’s conflict resolution strategies were alternatively presented as support for the OSCE’s and the UN’s conflict resolution missions. Although the EU did not have a clear strategy and policy towards the South Caucasus countries by 2003, the situation has changed with the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), which included the South Caucasus countries in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).

Finally, The EU’s engagement with the South Caucasus countries is divided into three timelines (Jafarova, 215, p.96). The EU’s initial involvement in the South Caucasus is in the 1990s, which is described as a low profile. This timeline has already been covered in this section as background information. The second period starts with the appointment of the EUSR for the South Caucasus in the early 2000s. The active engagement of the EU is observed from this point. Finally, the third period

(15)

starts after the 2008 Russian- Georgian war. The South Caucasus region became an important security issue in EU agendas. However, this research focused on the last two periods of the EU’s engagement in the region since the significance of the region has drastically increased during these timelines.

1.2 The Significance of the Region for the EU

Despite the fact that European countries and the South Caucasus region had historical trade ties with the ancient Silk Road,1_{the EU as a regional actor began to realize the significance of the region in}

the last two decades. In the European Security Strategy Paper on December 12th_{, 2003, it was}

mentioned:

We [the EU] should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighboring region (Council of European Union, 2003, p.10).

By accepting Romania and Bulgaria into the union in 2007, the EU borders became closer to the South Caucasus than before. As Romano Prodi, the former president of the European Commission, mentioned in his speech, “I want to see a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbors, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea” (Prodi, 2002). It is crucial for the EU to protect its own territory, have ‘a ring of friends’ and secure the borders for its citizens. Therefore, EU perspectives for the frozen conflicts within its closer borders were not only unresolved conflicts in the neighborhood, but also security challenges. The EU’s security concerns are correspondingly reflected in the European Security Strategy, which Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia joined in 2003.

Moreover, the EU’s interests for the region enhanced when the war-torn states gradually improved ‘the state building processes’ and reconstructed their economies. The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia increased debates about the South Caucasus states; consequently, they became a focal point for the EU.

This [Rose Revolution] brought the states of the South Caucasus publicity but also what it had lacked until then – a constituency of EU members with an interest and understanding for the region (Cornell & Starr 2006, pp.13-14).

The new Georgian government after the revolution reformed the government with its own anti-corruption programs and rebuilt its economy. Thus, Georgia became a more democratic state, which was open to Western democracy and collaborations. Accordingly, Georgia’s pro-Western foreign

(16)

policy during Saakashvili’s administration boosted EU interests. The transformation of the state-building process was successful and became a green light for the EU to have better relations and cooperation with its own neighbors.

Last but not least, the region is notably important for European energy security. The 2006-2009 Gazprom pipeline crisis which disrupted the gas supplies of Europe from Russia through Ukraine affected the EU’s energy security strategies. The EU already considered the oil-rich Azerbaijan in the shore of the Caspian Sea an alternative solution for the energy supplies for European Security. The European Union’s communication on the development of the energy policy states:

Secure and safe export routes for Caspian oil and gas will be important for EU's security of energy supply as well as crucial for the development (economic, but also social and political) of the Caspian region (European Commission, 2003).

The oil agreement in 1994 which is referred to as ‘the Contract of the Century’ in Azerbaijan was signed between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and major Western energy companies such as BP, Statoil, Unocal and others. The Supsa pipeline in 1999 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines in 2006 linked the region to Europe through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Thus, the South Caucasus states Azerbaijan and Georgia became a strategic transit corridor for connecting the Caspian energy resources to Europe.

1.3 The Research Puzzle

Since the South Caucasus region became significant for energy and European security, the EU’s active engagement in the settlement of the conflicts was expected. The solution of the frozen conflicts would not only contribute to the development of these countries, but also maintain regional stability and security:

These conflicts undermine regional stability, not just because of the treat of renewal of fighting, but because they have created security vacuums that are outside of government control, providing ideal conditions for transnational security challenges such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal trafficking to flourish (German, 2007, p.358).

The EU emphasized repeatedly the significance of the solution of frozen conflicts through the ENP and the objectives of the EUSR mission. Considerably, some scholars likewise argue that the EU used the ENP as a normative power to influence the region. This argument is discussed more in the next chapters.

The missing piece of the puzzle is why the EU has not been considered the main contributor to the settlement of the conflicts, as the status quo of the conflicts are remaining. Although the EU has

(17)

reasons and a normative power to change the situation, instability still exists in the neighborhood without any resolution. Furthermore, severe escalations of the ‘frozen conflicts’ had happened, and the EU failed to react to the crises directly. For instance, during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, involvement of the EU as a security actor was limited, which likewise jeopardized the EU’s reputation as the security actor in the region.

1.4 Study Aim and Research Questions

This study aims to explore limitations of the EU’s engagement in the post-Soviet frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus. Since Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the ENP in 2003, the EU’s involvement in the settlement of the conflicts has progressed tremendously. The ENP was an essential tool for the EU to prioritize the peaceful resolution of frozen conflicts in the region and strengthen relations with the states in the South Caucasus. Despite the EU’s initial progressive steps, the status quo of the frozen conflicts has not changed. The conflicts escalated several times and created a security threat for the region and Europe. Furthermore, the extensive research on this topic mostly focused on identifying the EU’s role in the region after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, but some research has been conducted to explain the limitations of the EU’s direct involvement in the post-Soviet frozen conflicts.

In order to understand the EU’s strategies and tools for impacting the settlement of the conflicts, the EU’s normative power towards the region is first identified. Thus, the study addresses the following theoretical question to examine EU’s normative power from the Normative Power Europe (NPE) perspectives:

How does the EU use the ENP as a normative power in the frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus? By applying action plans of the ENP to the region, the EU can impact the current situation of the conflicts. The significance of the region for the EU similarly emphasizes the EU’s willingness for solution of the frozen conflicts. However, the remaining status quo of the conflicts indicate that there are some restrictions for the EU as a security actor. Thus, this problem leads to the main question of this study:

Why does the EU have constraints towards changing the status quo of post-Soviet frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus?

A part of the second question is analyzed from neorealism theoretical perspectives while explaining the Russian approach towards the EU’s presence in the region. In this case, the key components of neorealism: ‘security dilemma’, ‘balance of power’ and ‘bandwagoning’ are examined. Empirically,

(18)

a comparative case study has been conducted to clarify the EU’s involvement in each conflict. By comparing the EU’s action plans in each conflict, conclusions have been drawn from the empirical work of the EU in order to explore the EU’s limitations. Nevertheless, the research contributes to the EU neighborhood policy and security studies in order to have a better understanding of the EU’s limited involvement in the region and its use of conflict resolution mechanisms for the Eastern neighborhood frozen conflicts.

1.5 Thesis Outline

The thesis constitutes of seven chapters with the main emphasis on the chapter three and six.

Chapter one, which has already been presented, includes information and introduction to the thesis.

Background of the EU engagement in the South Caucasus portrays the events from the early 1990s until the early 2000s. Afterwards, the significance of the region for the EU and EU studies is discussed. Furthermore, study aim, and research questions are presented.

Chapter two, describes and assesses the conceptual literature related to the study including frozen

conflicts and the EU mechanism of conflict resolution. First, the concept of a frozen conflict is defined and then the overviews about the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia conflicts are presented. Second, the EU’s conflict resolution tools and experiences in its Eastern neighborhood are discussed. Moreover, the ENP as a part of EU’s strategy in South Caucasus are defined through the previous literature. The gap of the research is underlined as the outcome of the literature review. The schematic illustration of this chapter is show in Figure 1.

Chapter three analyzes the Normative theory of Europe (NPE) and Neorealism theory. The NPE

perspectives address the first part of theoretical question of this research, which focuses on the Literature Review The Concept and Overview of Frozen Conflicts Conflict in Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh The EU’s Conflict Resolution Mechanism Research Gap Conflicts in Georgia:

Abkhazia and South Ossetia The ENP

(19)

normative approach of the EU. The EU and Russian approaches towards the conflicts are analyzed from ‘security dilemma’, ‘balance of power’ and ‘bandwagoning’ assumptions of neorealism perspectives.

Chapter four highlights the methodology used in the research study, research design and method,

collection of the data and delimitations of the study.

Chapter six, analyzes the main research question empirically. The comparative case studies on the

EU’s involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts through the ENP and APs are conducted. Russia’s involvement in all three conflicts is correspondingly examined in this section in order to explore other factors for the EU’s limitations.

Chapter six analyzes and discusses the main results of whole research and tries to find the best

explanations for the research problem.

Chapter seven concludes the key findings drawn from results and proposes suggestions for further

(20)

(21)

2 Literature Review

The literature review serves three purposes: “1) to survey the current state of knowledge in the area of inquiry, 2) to identify key authors, articles, theories and findings in that area, and 3) to identify gaps in knowledge in that research area" (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 21). Thus, this section begins with the conceptualization of a frozen conflict and continues to present the similarities of the post-Soviet frozen conflicts. The conflicts belong to the same area and share mostly common political and historical events. This study does not try to have a historical framework for the frozen conflicts; therefore, the main events and incidents are chosen to give as background information about the conflicts. Since the region has a complex history with empires and historical events, it is impossible to cover all historical events and significant political changes in this research. Only main historical events that have the connection to the frozen conflicts according to the existing literature are chosen. Further on, the study connects the EU’s conflict resolution mechanism and its foreign policy instrument (the ENP) to the South Caucasus region. The EU’s ambition to engage in the settlement of the conflicts is defined according to foreign policy mechanism. This study also clarifies the used instruments and its effectives. Finally, a research gap is explained according to the literature review.

2.1 The Concept of a Frozen Conflict

Although there is not a single concept for explaining frozen conflicts, the term is frequently used in international relations or conflict studies after the collapse of the USSR. Accordingly, the phenomenon ‘frozen conflict’ became the label for unresolved conflicts in post-Soviet countries. Researchers who used the term ‘frozen conflicts’ share a common belief that the ‘frozen’ metaphor in the definition of the conflicts is misleading (Fregoso & Zikovic, 2012, p.40; MacFarlane, 2009, p.25; Lynch, 2005, p.192). ‘Frozen’ does not mean the conflict is passive and thereby never escalates. The conflicts are defined as frozen due to long-lasting nature (Fregoso & Zikovic 2012, p.40). Even though the ‘frozen’ label is a misleading adjective for understanding the conflicts, MacFarlane (2009, p.25) adds that “social processes are dynamic” in the frozen conflicts. The power of the parties in the conflicts are shifting, which means the parties can change their position over years. Additionally, Lynch (2005, p.192) emphasizes that the situation has changed since the conflicts started to escalate. For instance, new treaties, policies and strategies between the EU and the South Caucasus countries did not exist in the early 1990s, therefore, a new actor or actors gained a significant position of involvement in the negotiation processes.

The main dilemma in a frozen conflict is that there is a ‘no peace no war’ situation. Conflicts can escalate and change their phase easily. Smetana and Ludvik (2019, p.11) explain the peaceful or

(22)

violent thawing which can transform a conflict in the negotiation stage. Peaceful thawing represents a diplomatic and peaceful solution, but violent thawing is a military victory over another conflicted party that chooses the negotiation as a mean of survival. However, frozen conflicts are not resolved, as they have never completely transformed to one of the aforementioned stages (see Figure 2). Figure 2 clarifies the cyclical nature of frozen conflict dynamics and shows that the conflict thawing stage does not transfer a frozen conflict to a stable peace; rather, it moves towards the direction of refreezing. According to Smetana and Ludvik (2019, p.12), conflicts return to freezing stage instead of reaching the peak of the thawing:

Figure 2.The Cyclical Nature of Frozen Conflict Dynamics.

Contrary to dynamic social processes, in the frozen conflicts, the status quo maintains. Lynch (2002) examines the role of the ‘de facto states’ for obstructing a conflict resolution process. The author discusses internal and external drivers as the main forces of maintaining the status quo. While internal forces that are related to ‘de facto states’ ambitions such as having an absolute sovereignty at the expense of the metropolitan2_{states’ territory, they have also fear, insecurity and subsistence}

syndrome3_{(Lynch, 2002, pp.836-842). Moreover, the features of the ‘de facto states’ are explained}

as “a de facto regime that is recognized by neither the internal community nor the rump state from which the secession occurred” (Clancy & Nagle, 2009, p.14). Since ‘de facto’ states are self-declared, military based and have a lack of substance, they make another knot in the resolution of the conflicts.

2_{In the case of frozen conflicts in South Caucasus, the metropolitan states are Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh}

conflict and Georgia in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts.

3_{Lynch (2002, p.841) explains subsistence syndrome as “the de facto states are failing. They have the institutional fixtures}

of statehood, but they are not able to provide for its substance”.

(23)

However, Lynch (2002) explains that the external drivers for keeping the status quo in post-Soviet frozen conflicts are metropolitan states, Russia, humanitarian organizations and other actors.

Since Lynch (2002) focuses on the separatist ‘de facto regimes’, this research was limited by disregarding the role of the EU and other main actors in the conflict settlement. Still, there are other factors that can change the phase of a conflict from stalemate to settlement. One of the distinctions of the frozen conflicts from other conflicts is explained as “the interplay between endogenous and exogenous factors obviates a conflict’s transformation and/or resolution, and this is what separates ‘frozen conflicts’ from other minority disputes” (Clancy & Nagle, 2009, p.14). Thus, the combination of different factors can alter the situation from ‘frozen’ peace talks to a settlement or vice versa.

2.2 Overview of the Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts

As the outcome of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the conflicts escalated in the Eastern Neighborhood of the EU: the Transnistria conflict in Moldova, the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan, and most recently, the Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk conflicts in Ukraine (see Map 1). However, this study focuses on three frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus: the Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and the South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia, because the EU involvement in the South Caucasus conflicts has been a puzzling case due to the EU’s passive presence in the region. Although the frozen conflicts in South Caucasus have some differences in the terms of location and actors involved, these conflicts have several similarities. First, these conflicts have common root in the ethnofederalist institutional approach of the USSR. This approach started in the 1920s in which ethnically divided societies increased the cleavages among ethnic groups. According to Zürcher (2007, p.24), Bolshevik state founders achieved the solution of three problems by choosing the ethnofederalist approach: 1) they achieved a central authority by dividing ethnic groups to administrative units, 2) they united ethnic groups that experienced wars and revolutions under administrative units, 3) they used the force of nationalism against the Tsar regime by granting de jure rights to the nations. In this system, some ethnic groups could gain more power than others depending on the position with the central authority which was ruled from Moscow. Moreover, the ethnofederalist approach also combined with ‘divide and rule’ policy of the USSR (Zürcher, 2007, p26). As the outcome of the ethnofederalist approach, nationalism and ‘divide and rule’ policy, Moscow created autonomous administrative units in the South Caucasus: the Abkhaz ASSR and the South Ossetian ASSR in Georgia, and “Nagorno-Karabakh” AO in Azerbaijan.

(24)

Second, all these three conflicts share the starting point in the 1980s when new reforms took place in the political system of the Soviet Union. Mikhael Gorbachev’s new reforms, i.e., ‘Perestroika’ (restructuring) and ‘Glasnost’ (openness) influenced nationalism and re-ignited new nationalist movements, resulting in the escalation of conflicts in the post-Soviet countries. According to Kellas (1998), Gorbachev’s decentralization did not aim to power the nationalist parties, but the leaders of nationalistic parties held posts in the government. He could not limit the nationalist claims and ethnic

disorders, because glasnost gave more opportunity for independence to the nations (Kellas, 1998, p.133). Besides, the collapse of the Soviet Union which means that the lack of the central authority, also created anarchy where new independent fragile states and autonomous entities were in conflict with the rise of nationalism.

Third, the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus create security challenges in the Black Sea region and in the EU neighborhood. Klimenko (2018, p.1) emphasizes that frozen conflicts are security challenges for the territorial integrity of the states which was violated. The frozen conflicts resulted militarization of the region and are the cause of the lack of cooperation and engagement in economic, political and military integration with their neighbors.

Source: Warsaw Institute webpage.

(25)

Lastly, all three conflicts share the same characteristics of frozen conflicts. Unlike the ceasefires, the conflicts escalated several times and created security dilemmas in the region. The separatists took control over some parts of the regions, thus the situation was ‘no war no peace.’ However, these conflicts have their own uniqueness in terms of history, actors, and dynamics that are examined according to the existing literatures.

2.2.1 Conflict in Azerbaijan: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.

The word of “Nagorno-Karabakh” is the combination of several words in different languages: “Nagorno” means mountainous in Russian and the definition of “Karabakh” is “Black Garden” in Turkish/Persian (De Wall, 2003, p.8; Coene, 2010, p.145). As the name represents different languages, the region is multicultural and has been influenced by different empires including Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires.

Background of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

A legitimate historical title of the region is disputable from Armenian and Azerbaijanian perspectives. According to the claim of Armenian historians, the region has been a part of “Greater Armenia” more than 2,500 years; however, Azerbaijanis claim that the region belonged to the Caucasian Albania4

and Turkic-speaking people that were dominant there until the nineteenth century (Krüger, 2010, p.4; Coene, 2010, p.145). Krüger (2010, p.4) adds to both claims that the territories do not have ethnological relevance since both areas represent geographical titles and there is no information about the ethnic origin of people living in “Great Armenia” and “Caucasian Albania” which can be equal to the current ethnic group of population.

Moreover, the demography of the territory has changed as the results of wars between empires. For instance, the Armenian immigration occurred during the Russo-Ottoman wars in 1853-1856 (Crimean war), in 1876-1878 (Serbo-Turkish and Russo-Turkish war) after the 1828 Turkmenchay Treaty between Iran and Russia (Krüger 2010, p.10; Coene 2010, p.146). Thus, between 500,000 and 700,000 Armenians have moved to the areas of Erivan and Nagorno-Karabakh, which increased the population of Armenians to 900, 000 (Krüger 2010, p.10).

According to Russian census reports, the Armenian population in Karabakh represented 9% of the total in 1823 (the remaining 91 % being registered as ‘Muslims’), 35 % in 1832, and a majority of 53 % in 1880. This shows the relative rapidity of the population exchange (Cornell, 1999, p.5).

(26)

The Tsar’s preference for Armenian population instead of Azerbaijanis is not only related to their Christian religious backgrounds, but also Azerbaijanis cultural and linguistic connections to the Ottoman Empire. While the Russians considered the Azerbaijanis as untrustworthy and allies to the Turks due to the cultural and linguistic backgrounds, Armenians were Russia’s trustful supporters. Therefore, they gained a better position and support as they were loyal to the Tsar (Cornell 1999, p.5; Zurcher, 2007, p.18).

Historically, there are many events that contributed to the ignition of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. One of the incidents between Armenians and Azerbaijanis happened in 1905 in different cities of the majority Azerbaijani populations in Shusha, Baku, Ganja, Nakhichevan and also in Yerevan which resulted the death of 10,000 Azerbaijanis (Cornell, 1999, p.5). Although ethnic tensions were stirred several times, the Bolshekviks’ ‘divide and rule’5_{policy towards South Caucasus and other}

post-Soviet countries deepened the case. Moreover, the Dashnaksutun nationalistic party in Armenia claimed territories both in Georgia (the Akhalkalaki and Gosharli regions) and Azerbaijan (Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhjivan) (Cornell, 1999, p.8). The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was established by the Soviet Union in 1923. The capital moved from Shusha to Khankandi and was renamed as Stepanakert after Armenian Bolshevik Stepan Schaumian with the region remaining within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Coene, 2010, p.146).

Dynamics

The conflict escalated in 1980s with severe ethnic clashes in Stepanakert, Askeran and Sumgait (Coene, 2010, p.146). The rise of nationalism as the result of clashes and the ethnic Armenians’ demand to transfer the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian authority intensified the boiling point of the conflict. The situation was so tense that thirteen high-ranking Azerbaijani government officials, two Russians and one Kazakhstani Ministry of Internal Affairs official, and three journalists traveling in an Azerbaijani helicopter for a peacekeeping mission were killed when the Armenian military shot down the helicopter on November 20, 1991 (Coyle, 2018, p.219). The tragedy remained a Karakend tragedy in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and many believed that this mission would alter the outcome of the future war if the incident had not happened. Nevertheless, it was not long after the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia from the Soviet Union in 1991 that the Nagorno-Karabakh war began to encompass the region.

(27)

The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1992 to 1994 resulted in thousands of deaths of civilians including women, children and elderly individuals. According to Coyle (2018, p.224), 5000 people from Armenia and 25 000 from Azerbaijan were killed. By 1992, Armenian forces occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh and the other seven mostly Azerbaijanis-populated adjacent districts, which corresponds to approximately 20% of the Republic of Azerbaijan total territory (see Map 2).

The UN Security Council (UNSC) condemned the occupation in four UNSC resolutions: 822, 853, 874 and 884. The UNSC demanded “the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal” of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan territory (UNSC, 1993a; UNSC, 1993b; UNSC, 1993c; UNSC, 1993d). The number of refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) reached between 1.000.000 and 1.200.000 (Cornell, 1997, p.9). In 1994, the Bishkek ceasefire agreement was eventually signed, which prohibited military operations.

From the time of the 1994 ceasefire, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has been known as ‘no peace no war’. Tensions remained and many soldiers were killed on the frontlines of various military skirmishes. Although there have been many clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijanian military forces since ‘the ceasefire’, the most serious ones took place in the 2000s. One of the clashes was on

March, 2008 in Ter-ter, which intensified the conflict. Both sides blamed each other for the escalation by insisting that the governments wanted to distract population with the war in order to cover their

Source: The London Post, thelondonpost.net

(28)

internal problems (Cornell, 2017, pp.195-196). Afterwards, the fighting erupted in 2010 and 2011, (in June and September) and more recently in 2012 the death toll reached 30. The increasing number of clashes and fatalities made the situation worse in 2014 when the casualty of the servicemen reached approximately sixty (Cornell, 2017, p.196).

The escalations of the conflict between 2014-2016 resulted in the height of the fatalities after the ceasefire (see Figure 3). Figure 3 explains battle-related causalities in the Nagorno-Karabakh war between 1995 and 2017 (the highest death rate was in 2016). This was due to the April 2016 fighting, which was called a “four-day war” that ended with around 200 causalities and some territorial control of the Azerbaijani military. ‘Heavy weaponry and attack drones’ were used during the fight (Cornell, 2017, p.196). According to Klimenko (2018, p.4), one of the reasons for the 2016 escalation was the increasing number of militaries from both sides, which makes the area ‘the most militarized area of Europe’. It is a fact that both countries import weapons from Russia. While Azerbaijan has a military cooperation agreement with Turkey, Armenia’s military partnership with Russia and their membership in the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) military alliance allows Armenia to buy weapons at reduced prices or with loans (Klimenko, 2018, p.4). Hence, the de-militarization of the conflicting parties can create a security challenge not only for the region, but also for the EU’s Eastern neighborhood.

Figure 3. Battle-related deaths in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 1995-2017

(29)

2.2.2 Conflicts in Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Similar to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the collapse of the Soviet Union created territorial conflicts in Georgia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see Map 3) are regions which claimed their territorial independence from Georgia. Since both Abkhazia and South Ossetia de jure belong to Georgia, they can be discussed concurrently. Another reason for discussing them concurrently is that Russia

supports both de facto states directly in military, political and economic ways (Racz, 2016, p.20). Despite the fact that these conflicts have many similarities they encompass diverse backgrounds.

Background of the Abkhazian Conflict

Historically, Abkhazia was either an independent entity or an integral part of the Georgian administration. In the ninth century the Kingdom of Abkhazia covered not only the current Abkhazia, but also its territory extended until western Georgia. The Kingdom of Abkhazia and Georgia became a joined kingdom in 978 (Potier, 2001, p.8). Between 1810-1864, Abkhazia was under the control of the Tsarist Russian Empire as a separate unit from Georgia until the region transformed into the Sukhumi Military District. Moreover, the Abkhazian people (primarily ones of the Muslim origin) deported to the Ottoman Empire between 1877-1878, which influenced the ethnic population of the region (Cornell, 2017).

Source: Deutche Welle, dw.com

(30)

By 1886, the population of Abkhazia was as follows (despite deportation): Abkhazian 58,961; Mingrelians 3,474; Greeks 2,056; Armenians 1,337; Russians 972; Estonians 637; Georgians 515 and others 1,460 (Cornell, 2017, p.196).

Additional demographic change occurred in Abkhazia after 1897 (see Figure 4). In 1989, the ethnic Georgian population reached 45.7% in the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Republic, while the ethnic

Abkhazian was only 17.8%. The remaining groups were Armenians, Greeks and Russians (Petersen, 2008, p.189).

Regarding the political situation in Abkhazia in the early 1920s, Sukhumi (current Abkhazia) included Georgian territory once Russia recognized Georgia as an independent country. The situation in the area altered when the Bolsheviks gained power in Tbilisi in 1921, and March of the same year saw the declaration of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia as a separate entity from Georgia. However, it united with Georgia as a union the following year (Cornell, 2001, pp.135-6; Petersen 2008, p.190). The Abkhazia SSR lost its title as ‘a socialist republic’ and became as ‘an autonomous republic’ of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1931 (Cornell, 2001, p.137). Abkhazian leaders in 1957, 1967 and 1977 requested the joining of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

Figure 4. Demographic change in Abkhazia, 1897-1989

(31)

(RSFSR) territory, but Moscow rejected their demand, deciding instead to reward the leaders with regional investment packages. Thus, the Abkhazians had more control over the local economy than the Georgian government (Zürcher, 2007, p.120).

Background of the South Ossetian Conflict

Since the creation of the Soviet Union, the Ossetian people living in Caucasus were divided into two autonomous regions: The North Ossetian ASSR and the South Ossetian AO. According to Cornell (2000), Ossetians inhabited Georgia after the Mongol invasions in the 13th_{century (Cornell, 2001,}

p.138). Although both Georgians and Ossetians fought on the same side during the battles against external invaders and empirers, they have different perspectives about their historical lands. From the Georgian position, they are newcomers to the region and their homeland is North Ossetia which means they do not have any rights regarding territorial autonomy. In contrast, the Ossetian view is that they are ‘southern branch of Ossetian nation and the decendant of the Alans’. Unlike the Georgian position on the South Ossetian settlements, Georgians support the claim that Abkhazia is the Abhazians’ historical homeland (Sammut & Cvetkovski, 1996, p.7).

Regarding ethnicities living in South Ossetia in 1989, Ossetians were around two-thirds (66.61 %), Georgians, the other third (29.44 %) and the rest of the groups were Russians, Armenians and Jews (4%). The administrative center of the South Ossetia - Tskhinvali was mostly populated by Ossetians in 1989. The ethnic composition has changed due to economic reasons and wars, with some Ossetians having moved to North Ossetia (Sammut & Cvetkovski, 1996, p.5).

The end of the Tsarist Empire in 1918 changed the political situation in the South Caucasus. Georgia became an independent country and Western states recognized the independence. While in 1920 South Ossetia attempted to declare independence as a Soviet republic, the 1920’s treaty of friendship between Russia and Georgia had already confirmed the Russian recognition of South Ossetia as an integral part of Georgia.A year after the Red Army’s 1921 invasion of Georgia, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in Georgia was established (Sammut & Cvetkovski, 1996, pp.8-9). Although ethnic groups were living side by side for years, there have not been any serious clashes until the end of 1988 (Zürcher, 2007, p.124).

Dynamics

Similar to the case of minorities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the results of Gorbachaev’s ‘perestroika and glasnost’ policies influenced the minority groups in Georgia which led to a reduction of the integration process into the Soviet Union in the latter 1980s (Petersen, 2008, p.192). The new

(32)

policies did not only affect the rise of nationalism among minority groups, but also the Soviet republics began to strengthen their national identities via the new procedures. According to Jones (1993, p.288), the liberty that perestroika brought altered the Georgian nationalism “from a force for liberation and democratization to one of ethnic hegemonism and anti-pluralism”. The 1989 language law decreeing the Georgian language a mandatory language in all Georgian territory occurred in conjunction with the accelerated nationalistic movements (Zürcher, 2007, p.123). The language law, mass demonstrations and the political situation in the 1980s correspondingly worsened the Ossetian and Georgian relations. South Ossetians demanded to have an autonomous republic (ASSR) instead of an autonomous oblast (AO), which was not confirmed by the Georgian government and it was interpreted as a threat towards Georgian independence (Zürcher, 2007, p.124). South Ossetia declared itself a separate republic from Georgia and wanted to join North Ossetia in 1990. As the result of the South Ossetian secession act, the Georgian government abolished the South Ossetian AO (Zürcher, 2007, p125). The war between the Georgian government and Ossetian groups lasted two years (between 1990-1992) which resulted a de facto secession in South Ossetia.

Following the South Ossetia conflict, new clashes happened between Georgian and Abkhazian groups. Petersen (2008) highlights the indication of parallel national liberation movements during the 1992-93 Georgian-Abkhazian War. While Georgians were trying to obtain their independence from Russia, the Abkhazians chose to retain under Russian power in order to obtain freedom from Georgia (Petersen, 2008, p.198). This contradiction between Abkhazian people and Georgians after the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the 1992-93 war which resulted thousands of casualties and displacement of about 250,000 people (Petersen 2008, p.187). Unlike Abkhazia where the majority of Georgians were displaced, some smaller ethnic Georgians still remained in South Ossetia (German, 2006, p.8). Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared their de facto independence from Georgia, which was not recognized by any UN member states until the 2008 War.

Conflicts deescalated when Mikheil Saakashvili became the president of Georgia after the Rose Revolution in 2003. Saakashvili’s administration prioritized rebuilding the Georgian territorial integrity and enriching relations with the West in order to balance Russia’s power in the region (Klimenko, 2018, p.7). De facto states for the central government of Georgia did not only mean the loss of the 20% of the Georgian territory but also a lack of the central control of these areas which also provided a ground for the smuggling of weapons, narcotics and people. German (2006) explains that it also meant the security threat for the multi-ethnic country where the separatist groups were backed by Russia. Both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian governments chose to enact political and economic integration towards Russia and as a result of the majority of people living there received

(33)

and Russia in 2008 resulting 850 deaths and more than 100,000 civilian IDPs. As the consequence of the 2008 war, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Klimenko, 2018, p.8).

2.3 The EU’s Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

In the previous chapter, it was discussed that the South Caucasus region and resolution of the existing frozen conflicts are significant for the EU. Thus, this research strives to define the tools and mechanisms the EU applies in engagement of these conflicts in the neighborhood. Accordingly, two approaches are distinguished to define the conflict resolution mechanisms of the EU to influence the conflicts: traditional foreign policy mechanisms and ‘offering prospect of membership and association’ mechanisms (Cooley, 2019).

Foreign policy mechanisms

The 1991 Maastricht treaty entered into force in 1993, determined common foreign and security policy of the European Union and one of the main objectives was conflict resolution (Tocci, 2007, p.7). The three-pillars treaty formed the current EU and the second pillar concerned with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The 2009 Lisbon treaty efficiently finalized the foreign policy tools by ending the pillar system and creating a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy. Moreover, there are different foreign policy instruments that can be used for a conflict resolution matter, such as one that includes “identifying, formulating and implementing interventions for crisis response, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness” (the European Commission, 2003a). Particularly, the instrument contributing to the Stability and Peace mission which regulated this instrument was signed in 2014 (Tocci, 2007, p.7).

Conflict resolution through integration and association

As a complement to foreign policy mechanisms, the EU uses the ‘prospect of association with or full integration” as a neighborhood conflict resolution mechanism (Cooley, 2019). Regarding the EU influences on the ethno-political conflicts beyond its borders, Tocci (2007) defines using three following instruments in contractual relations:

1) Conditionality or ‘carrot and stick.’ Conditionality also can be a positive and negative one. Positive conditionality applies when a party fulfils the required circumstances and as a result receives benefits. (e.g. economic assistance or the EU accession). The negative conditionality is when the party violates the obligations and receives punishments (e.g. diplomatic or

(34)

economic sanctions) (Tocchi, 2007, p.10). Conditionality is also defined as a ‘compulsory’ pathway in which the EU sets the certain conditions for the EU membership or to be qualified for association with the EU (Cooley, 2019).

2) Social Learning is a long-term mechanism in which local actors voluntarily choose to adopt institutional, political, economic and social reforms which, in turn, transform into EU values. This can occur in both top-down and bottom-up ways. Regarding the top-down method, the local policy makers try to adjust their policies according to the EU international framework and the bottom-up method can be non-state actors that urge the decision makers to change their policies (Tocci, 2007, p.15).

3) Passive enforcement or ‘rule application’ is the third mechanism. “Obligations constitute the necessary rules which make mutually beneficial cooperation with the EU possible” (Tocci, 2007, p.15). In order for the mechanism to work, the rules should be legal and clear.

Furthermore, Tocci (2007) indicates that three factors can enable effectiveness for these mechanisms:

value, credibility of obligations and political management. First, the objective nature of the contract

reflects the value. “When full membership is an option, the EU’s potential leverage on a conflict is higher than in cases where relations are based on association, partnership or financial assistance”. Excepting the object value, the subject value becomes essential if the conflict party is more dependent upon Europe and, there is more potentiality that the EU can influence conflicts. Timing is also important for the value. If long-term benefits, such as an EU membership are not on the table, it is more likely the third party will change rules and policies accordingly (Tocci, 2007, p.15).

Second, the credibility of the obligations is considered the way in which the party is accepting the capabilities of the EU in conflict resolution. It is possible that one party fulfills all obligations, but the promises of the EU are not delivered. Another issue affecting credibility is related to favoring one party in the conflicts, with an example being when the EU limits its relations with de facto states (Tocci, 2007, p.15).

Third, political management defines the EU’s effectiveness in conflict resolution. While parties in contracts are supposed to be automatically granted or their rights are automatically withdrawn based on their fulfillment of obligations, this is not true in practice. Thus, when consensus of all EU member states is needed to grant or withdraw benefits, it jeopardizes the value and credibility of the EU (Tocci, 2007, p.15). Additionally, Wojna and Arcipowska (2011, p.2) criticize that intergovernmental structure of the CFSP involves member states interests, which makes “the EU react late, and slowly and limit its ability to pursue a more ambitious foreign policy”.

(35)

2.3.1 The ENP as a EU’s Foreign Policy Instrument

Despite the fact that the EU was not engaged directly in the 1990s conflicts in South Caucasus, the outcome of certain events in the EU brought the union closer to the Southern Caucasus. The amendments of the CFSP and ESDP policies in the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties altered the global engagement of the EU. The 2004 Eastern enlargement redrew the borders of the EU and its neighborhood (Gogolashvili, 2017, p.6). Most importantly, all three countries in the South Caucasus became a part of the 2003 EU’s Security Strategy with which the EU aimed “to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” (European Commission 2003a, p.4). Hence, a new policy tool was required to define the EU’s role in the Eastern neighborhood.

Consequently, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 in the Southern Caucasus states: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the line with Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. The EU’s external relations commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006, p.139), pointed that the ENP is the EU’s newest foreign policy tool which aims to increase the “zone of prosperity, stability and security” in the neighborhood. Moreover, in 2015 the revised version of the ENP strengthened the stability of the neighborhood in the terms of political and socio-economic and security issues (European External Action Service, 2016).

Furthermore, the ENP is based on a positive conditionality. Whenever the obligations (e.g. democracy, respect for human rights) of the conditionality are fulfilled, the EU is going to offer ‘a deeper relationship’ (Ferrero-Walder, 2006, p.139). This means that the ENP does not promise any membership prospects in the future, but it deepens the integration process of the EU values and norms. By means of the ENP’s action plans in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the EU’s goal is to increase security (Ferrero-Walder, 2006, p.141). The assistance of the ENP in the settlement of the neighboring conflicts is reflected in the 2004 ENP’s strategy paper. According to Ferrero-Walder (2006), “The ENP should reinforce the EU’s contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts”. Additionally, his study underlines that the EU should increase efforts in the solutions of the conflicts (Ferrero-Walder, 2006, p.6). Moreover, the ENP as a bilateral policy is completed with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy in the Southern Caucasus (European External Action Service, 2016).

2.4 The Research Gap

A review of the literature implies many studies have been conducted to study the EU’s engagement in the Eastern neighborhood countries in order to identify the increasing interests of the EU in the Southern Caucasus. Likewise, the official documents, the EU treaties (the Maastricht, Amsterdam

(36)

and Lisbon treaties) and, the foreign policy instruments (the Stability and ENP instruments) support the claim that the EU prioritizes stability and the settlement of conflicts not only in the member states, but also in its neighbors. Tocci (2007) additionally conceptualizes the EU’s conflict resolution mechanisms and their effectiveness beyond EU’s borders.

However, a few research fill a gap in the literature regarding the EU’s constraints in transforming its conflict resolution ambitions with neighborhoods into effective action through its foreign policy instruments (the ENP). Therefore, there has been a mismatch for decades between its ambitions and reality due to the status quo of frozen conflicts. This research develops new understanding to the limited existing literature considering the constraints of the EU in engaging in the frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus.

(37)

3 Theoretical Framework

In this section, the theories of Normative Power of Europe (NPE) and Neorealism are explained. Initially, key features of Normative Power of Europe (NPE) are presented; furthermore, the EU’s use of normative power for resolving conflicts is examined. Then, some restrictions of the EU in post-Soviet conflicts are clarified by pointing the EU and Russian perspectives to security dilemma. Moreover, the way of small states’ (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) survival in an international system is also explained via alliance formation. In addition, it is assumed that allies that the South Caucasus states have, entangle the situation in the frozen conflicts, resulting in a more complex region.

3.1 Normative Power Europe (NPE)

From the time that the EU appointed a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the South Caucasus, the EU began its involvement in the frozen conflicts. Therefore, the EU’s international role in the regional frozen conflicts will be defined according to the Normative Power Europe (NPE) framework. This theoretical framework is an explicit respond to the first research question of this study: how does the EU use the ENP as normative power in the frozen conflicts of

the South Caucasus?

3.1.1 The Concept of NPE

The notion of Normative Power of Europe (NPE) was first mentioned by Ian Manners who published his formative article on this topic in the 2002 Journal of Common Market studies (Whitman, 2011, p.1). The EU’s relations in the world are framed within the NPE concept as ‘ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations’ (Manners, 2002, p.239). First and foremost, selecting a normative power instead of ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ power as a theoretical framework for explaining the EU’s role in frozen conflicts relies on recent research which confirms the EU’s normative characteristics:

The scholarly interest in the normative and value-driven features of the EU can be surely predicated upon the developments in the area of foreign policy cooperation and the accompanying emphasis on the importance of values and norms for conduct of external relations by EU policy circles (Whitman, 2011, p.2).

Secondly, defining the EU’s role in the rest of the world after the Cold War as a military and civilian power, is not as relevant as a normative one. Manners (2002, p.238) emphasizes that “both [civilian and military power] value direct physical power in the forms of actual empirical [economic or military] capabilities”. Therefore, the NPE theory, unlike military and civilian power, it does not

The EU’s Constraints in Involvement of the Post- Soviet Frozen Conflicts : (A Comparative Case Study on the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia Conflicts)