Nuclear Security, Safety and
Non-Proliferation: Sweden’s
Foreword
This report summarizes the results of the work carried out by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) in 2016, together with partners in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Moldova. These efforts relate to Sweden’s international commitments as established in various international fora, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the EU Action Plan on Weapons of Mass Destruction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the G-7 Global Partnership, the MNEPR Agreement, as well as other undertakings in Nordic settings.
Important issues on the agendas of these institutions address the cooperation in the fields of nuclear security, safety and non-proliferation, and the links between these areas.
We devote particular attention to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit and the ambitions of ensuring continued international cooperation and strengthening nuclear security. In the years to come, we will
implement activities to ensure that our work continues in the spirit of the Summit legacy.
My colleagues and I strive to have a holistic approach to security, safety and non-proliferation, which is reflected in the results presented in this report. This is a fruitful way of simultaneously promoting peaceful developments, security and a safe environment.
We welcome comments and suggestions from cooperation partners and other readers, as feedback is an important tool for our ongoing improvement work.
Fredrik Hassel
Deputy Director General
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
ph o to : k je ll n yh o lm
Frameworks and
partnerships
Since the collapse of the USSR, Sweden has
been engaged in international cooperation to
ensure that radioactive and nuclear materials
and facilities are kept safe and secure.
Sweden has for 25 years been active in the nuclear and radiological areas of international cooperation. Several hundred projects have been implemented in states that once were republics of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union between 1991 and 1992 initiated this international cooperation.
When 15 new states replaced the USSR, it became a strenuous task to ensure that nuclear weapons and former Soviet military and civilian activities in the nuclear field were channelled into new structures of ownership and responsibility in the successor states. Today, much work still needs to be completed in order to ensure a transition from the old to the new.
Swedish commitments
Sweden’s project work has been carried out and implemented with reference to the political objectives stated in the Nuclear Security Summits held since 2010, in addition to the objectives of the G-7 and its Declarations from Kananaskis in 2002 and Deauville in 2011.
Moreover, the legal framework established through UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) sets a legal basis for requirements on all states as concerns measures to secure materials and facilities that could be used for the
manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, as well as for defining international interaction and assistance among UN Member States.
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s (SSM) projects are run in accordance with what is increasingly a recognized standard for responsible international behaviour: 29 states are members of the G-7, 56 states and international organizations participated in the Nuclear Security Summit process, and all member states of the UN are required to comply with obligations set out in UNSCR 1540.
Sweden also works on the basis of goals and procedures established in the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR Agreement), a framework for enabling external partners to implement projects in the nuclear and environmental fields in Russia. Last but not least, many activities are defined and specified by Sweden and its cooperation partners, primarily in Norway, Finland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Poland.
New challenges
As far as concerns the G-7, a major change occurred in 2014. Following the Russian occupation of Crimea as of February that year,
the Russian Federation was ousted from the G-8, which then continued as the G-7. This has also affected the groups working under the G-7, of which the Global Partnership has the largest membership and broadest global representation. With this development, the Global Partnership no longer has a G-7 or G-8 member as the prime object of attention and investment in security improvement. Instead, the focus for the “new Global Partnership” has been moved to Ukraine, a country that is not in the G-7.
At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Sweden and Norway pledged to cooperate with Ukraine in the fields of nuclear security and safety. This framework acts as an intersection between commitments to the Summit process and the G-7
Global Partnership. It has been important for SSM over the past three years, and will remain so over the years to come.
Today’s partners
SSM implements international cooperation efforts on the behalf of Sweden in the nuclear and radiological fields. Sweden’s cooperation partners today are the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Moldova. Earlier, projects were also implemented together with Kazakhstan, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. SSM implements projects and activities based on the Swedish Government’s instructions and budget allocation. .
Locations
The map shows the main locations in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus where SSM and its cooperation partners implemented projects in 2016.
Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Belarus gr aph ic s: b o ss e a le n iu s
Key result 1: Combatting illicit trafficking in the
Black Sea region
SSM is continuing its work to reduce illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in the Black Sea region. This is done by contributing to the capacity of authorities and institutions at national and regional levels in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.
SSM cooperates with international partners such as agencies from the US, EU and Norway. Here, the purpose is to provide capacity for strengthening border controls and detection work. SSM’s additional contribution towards this objective concerns broader national exercises to test and develop national preparedness systems. After having sponsored a large exercise
in Moldova in 2015, SSM sponsored a major exercise in 2016 held by authorities in Georgia. It took place in the city of Batumi on the coast of the Black Sea. The exercise was on detection of radioactive sources in three different contexts: airport, seaport and open fields. Participants included observers from a dozen national and international agencies.
The support from SSM also encompasses establishment of national waste storage sites and repositories for radioactive and nuclear materials under government control. During the period 2015–16, SSM provided assistance to Georgia for development of a national strategy for waste management. The strategy was adopted by the government of Georgia in late 2016. As an extension of this work, the European Commission has requested that SSM, over the course of the next few years, be in charge of designing a repository for radioactive materials in Georgia. In Moldova, SSM and NARNRA, the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities, have launched a project for strengthening the Agency’s control and management of a large number of radioactive sources located on the premises of closed factories and industrial sites. In 2016, 350 radioactive sources – originating from the Soviet era – were collected.
Together with counterparts from the UK, US and Poland, SSM arranged a conference in Tbilisi, Georgia in autumn 2016 for representatives from the states of the Black Sea region. The aim was to support dialogue between governments and civil society organisations on nuclear security and non-proliferation issues, and to discuss conclusions drawn from Nuclear Security Summit documents.
The results and outcomes of the projects are summarized under individual headings depending on the overall effort and the objectives set for each project. Many projects are continuations of earlier efforts. In many cases, the projects contribute to objectives in several areas. However, the projects are only described under the heading showing their main significance.
The following pages present results in various areas of cooperation. For additional information, see the Appendix on page 12.
ph o to : c o u rt es y o f t h e m in is tr y o f i n te ri o r, g eo rg ia . A 2016 exercise in Batumi, Georgia, involving detection of radioactive materials.
Key result 2: Non-proliferation and nuclear
security education at universities
Swedish education and training efforts in Russia are mainly directed at universities formerly belonging to the old nuclear weapons complex of the Soviet era. This cooperation has led to an established group of instructors and postgraduate and graduate students in Russia who not only specialize in non-proliferation and disarmament, but also teach in these areas and develop shared research projects. Other achievements have been made at universities in Ukraine and Moldova. In Moldova, SSM has established a training centre with nuclear security programmes. The centre is used by the national authorities and IAEA for
various courses. In Ukraine, work is continuing on building capacity for nuclear non-proliferation, security and disarmament programmes at the Odessa National University (ONU). At ONU, SSM sponsored the establishment of a centre for non-proliferation studies in 2014. Since 2015, the centre has run a large project involving several scholars documenting Ukraine’s nuclear history. In 2016, SSM arranged a study programme for postgraduate students in Ukraine. At universities in Batumi, Georgia, a summer school programme was held, attended by researchers, students and civil servants.
Key result 3: Management of nuclear legacy
waste in the Russian Federation
The Russian Federation is still struggling to ensure that nuclear and radioactive waste from the Soviet era is taken care of, stored and disposed of in a safe and secure manner. Ever since the early 1990s, international partners have contributed to these efforts. On an overall level, cooperation with the Russian Federation has become more difficult since 2014 due to the abolishment of the IAEA Contact Expert Group (CEG), a working group within the IAEA where issues regarding Russian nuclear and radioactive waste were coordinated. Nevertheless, in operative terms, the cooperation between SSM and Russian partners is continuing seamlessly. In 2016, SSM delivered a truck and containers to the Russian authorities working on
transportation of radioactive materials from Andreeva Bay. The outcome of Swedish initiatives in 2016 is that the Russian authorities now
have improved possibilities for transporting radioactive materials from Andreeva Bay to Sayda Bay, the location of a newly constructed storage site for radioactive waste. Similarly, SSM has helped set up an infrastructure for supplying power at Andreeva Bay in order to ensure safe management of the waste. In the near future, this will facilitate shipments of spent nuclear fuel from Andreeva Bay to a treatment facility in Mayak. SSM also contributes to projects run by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. To some extent, planning meetings of the EBRD now carry out the functions
previously run by the CEG, for which reason taking part in meetings of the EBRD has become increasingly essential for the work of SSM.
Key result 4: Safety
improvements at
Russian nuclear power
plants
Since 2004, SSM has cooperated with personnel of the nuclear power plants in Russia that are closest to Sweden, i.e. the Kola NPP located south of Murmansk, and the Leningrad NPP west of St. Petersburg. This cooperation is carried out together with SSM’s sister authorities in Norway (NRPA) and Finland (STUK), which run corresponding programmes. The aim is to manage specific technical safety issues.
The projects that SSM has carried out and co-financed with STUK and the NRPA at the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants have resulted in a better capacity at the NPPs for identifying anomalies and safety risks at an early stage. Russian experts were invited to study the improved systems for dealing with radioactive waste at the Ringhals nuclear power plant in Sweden. Furthermore, other Russian experts attended a seminar on radioactive waste management held at the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania. SSM continues to run activities that will contribute to and highlight various possibilities and principles for decommissioning old reactors, above all the reactors at the Leningrad NPP. The practical and technical cooperation between the Russian licensee, Rosenergoatom, the Leningrad and Kola nuclear power plants under its supervision, and the Nordic regulatory authorities, provides a mutual understanding of contemporary safety issues and challenges. ph o to : c o u rt es y o f t h e k n pp .
Inspection and commissioning of the remote-controlled excavator for sorting of radioactive waste at the Kola nuclear power plant.
Key result 6: Radiation protection and
emergency preparedness
SSM’s work in the areas of radiation protection and emergency preparedness is mainly directed at actions in the Russian Federation and Moldova. The result of the efforts in Moldova is that the country now has an improved national structure for emergency preparedness and response, including measuring stations and
increased analytical capacity. Initiatives in the Russian Federation establish a broader network of contacts and shared standpoints between emergency response organisations in Sweden, the other Nordic countries and the Russian Federation in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection.
Key result 5: Reactor safety and security at
Ukrainian nuclear power plants
At the Nuclear Security Summit in The Haag in 2014, Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister of Norway offered to jointly cooperate with Ukraine to strengthen nuclear safety and security in the country. Since then, SSM and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) have worked together with the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) and the licensee Energoatom to launch several projects to develop forms of collaboration between those responsible for matters of safety, security and physical protection. The results of these projects are increased competence achieved within the areas contributing to increased safety and security when operating nuclear power plants. At the ensuing Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington DC in 2016, Ukraine, Norway and Sweden reported on the progress made. In 2016, SSM contributed to SNRIU’s development of its official regulations so that ageing of nuclear power plants can be assessed in accordance with international guidelines.
SNRIU previously received support to develop the regulatory framework so that Ukraine can diversify its nuclear fuel import while at the same time strengthening nuclear safety. As an extension of this project, SSM established cooperation in 2016 with Odessa National Polytechnic University on related aspects such as optimization of nuclear fuel performance. Through support from Sweden, Ukrainian nuclear power plants and the regulator alike have pre-existing software, RiskSpectrum, for assessing risks. This has strengthened safety work. In 2014, Ukraine requested support from the Global Partnership for the physical protection system of the Khmelnitsky NPP. In 2016, a contract was signed for the first delivery and installation of equipment at the plant. In addition, SSM and the NRPA jointly contributed to funding an annual conference on nuclear materials accountancy and security. It was arranged in Ukraine for experts from all national licensees and authorities.
Key result 7: Management of radiation sources
and radioactive waste in Ukraine
International and Ukrainian experts estimate that there are many thousands of radiation sources in Ukraine present at research institutions, industrial sites, closed down military bases and other locations that are outside the Ukrainian national system for registration and control of radiation sources. The result of the activities that Sweden (SSM) carries out in Ukraine together with other countries, such as the US, Germany and the UK, is that national control over radiation sources is being strengthened, and has thus reduced the risks posed to people and the environment by nuclear radiation.
SSM’s efforts in this area are part of a larger plan. The basis is that the US and UK are establishing a central store, VEKTOR, for radioactive waste, which is located near Chernobyl. Once the infrastructure is fully in place, this will enable transfers to VEKTOR of discarded radiation sources and radioactive waste from various old and insufficiently secure storage sites. SSM has also contributed to an information campaign and a website with the theme of a national amnesty programme on locating and handing in radioactive and nuclear sources. The
purpose of the programme is to establish control over these sources by Ukrainian authorities. SSM is contributing to an upgrade of Ukraine’s register for nuclear sources, and has arranged courses and a national conference for authority personnel working in the physical protection field.
From SSM’s perspective, the main risk posed to Sweden is either an accident or a large-scale event in the nuclear power sector in the vicinity of Sweden. This creates a need for well-established and extensive points of contact between the emergency preparedness systems of the Nordic countries and Russian Federation. SSM has worked with the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) to establish cooperation with ROSATOM and Rosenergoatom.
Working meetings and mutual participation in national exercises have been used to achieve an increase in information exchange. SSM and ROSATOM are negotiating a bilateral agreement on emergency preparedness and response with the ambition of signing it in 2017. In 2016, SSM participated in a Russian emergency preparedness exercise in Beloyarsk. Within the next three years, a joint emergency preparedness exercise is planned to be held between the Nordic countries and Russian Federation.
Russian Federation
Planning of strategies and cooperation with Rosenergoatom (REA), SSM2014-828; payments in 2016: 460 kSEK
Planning meetings are generally arranged twice a year between SSM and its Russian, Finnish and Norwegian partners. The meetings are arranged in order to get a general overview of safety work within the Russian nuclear power sector and to present the frameworks and priorities of the Nordic and Russian partners. The meetings involve reviews of all ongoing projects at the Kola NPP and Leningrad NPP and discussions of future projects. In May 2016, REA held the first meeting in Moscow, and in November, SSM held the second meeting in Sweden. At the meeting in May, the 2016 project programme was reviewed. The November meeting focused on proposed projects for 2017 and the division of work and financing between the parties.
Upgrading of system for steam generator tube inspection at the Kola NPP, SSM2015-5809; payments in 2016: 1,196 kSEK
The project started in 2016 when a contract was
established between the Kola NPP and a Croatian supplier comprising delivery of hardware, software and training for upgrading of the inspection system for steam generator tubes. The conditions in the steam generator tubes are crucial for preventing radioactive contamination outside the primary system of the reactors, as the tubes form the barrier between radioactive and “clean” media. The supply was approved at the factory in December. Final testing, training and commissioning at the Kola NPP will be performed in 2017. The project is co-financed by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), SSM and KNPP.
Emergency preparedness cooperation with Russian authorities, SSM2015-1099; payments in 2016: 233 kSEK
A number of activities were executed in 2016 under the umbrella of the five-year action plan agreed in 2015 for cooperation on emergency preparedness and response
(EP&R) between Russian, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish authorities. The first activity was a workshop, organized by SSM in May, on the subject of national management systems for accidents with cross-border implications.
Later, SSM participated in a workshop in September, organized by the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), on decision support systems,
measurement tools and countermeasure strategies. Also in September, SSM participated as an observer in an emergency preparedness and response exercise at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant in Russia. In December, SSM attended the annual Russian-Nordic EP&R working group meeting organized by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, where the EP&R activities performed during 2016 were reported on and further activities planned for 2017 were agreed.
Apart from the EP&R cooperation activities, SSM and the Russian authority, ROSATOM, have worked on development of a bilateral protocol for the purpose of enhancing the possibilities for direct communications in the event of a radiological or nuclear accident with possible cross-border implications. This bilateral protocol is expected to be signed by the end of 2017.
Waste extractor at the Kola NPP, SSM2010-3123; payments in 2016: 23 kSEK
The project comprises the delivery of a remotely operated electro-hydraulic machine for cutting and retrieving old and unidentified solid radioactive wastes. Cutting and retrieval are crucial for enabling identification and categorization of the radioactive waste for further treatment and disposal. The machine and attachment tools were procured under two separate contracts. The main machinery was delivered in 2015 and the attachment tools were delivered in 2016. The SAT and completion of the project were performed in August. The project has been co-financed by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and SSM.
Decommissioning and waste treatment in
cooperation with Rosenergoatom, SSM2014-2990; payments in 2016: 307 kSEK
Cooperation between the Leningrad NPP, STUK and SSM on waste management and decommissioning issues continued in 2016 based on an action plan agreed between the parties. Within the cooperation, a two-day seminar was held in May at the Ignalina NPP. Its focus was on decommissioning and waste handling issues relating to Russian RBMK reactors.
A two-day waste seminar was held at the Ringhals NPP in Sweden in November. Its focus was management and handling of low and intermediate level waste, and handling and final disposal of very low-level waste, i.e. landfill repositories. A study for the Leningrad NPP, comprising an overview of international experiences on characterisation, treatment and final disposal of irradiated graphite, was prepared by Studsvik Nuclear AB.
Training and knowledge exchange in the areas of PSA, operation and maintenance for the Leningrad NPP, SSM2016-761; payments in 2016: 191 kSEK
The project covers three activities relating to enhancement of nuclear safety performance. In April, experts from the Leningrad NPP visited the Forsmark NPP in Sweden in order to learn about the implementation of good-practice acknowledgements given to the Forsmark NPP by an IAEA operational safety review team (OSART).
The second activity involved the formal training of specialists from the Leningrad NPP on use of computerized models for probabilistic safety assessment analyses of internal fires at nuclear power plants.
Lastly, in October, electrical systems specialists from the Leningrad NPP visited the Ringhals NPP in Sweden for sharing of experiences in the use of specialized cable analysis equipment based on line resonance analysis.
Training and knowledge exchange in the areas of PSA, operation and maintenance for the Kola NPP, SSM2016-762; payments in 2016: 86 kSEK
The project focused on facilitating knowledge sharing in the area of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for the Kola NPP, as well as giving specialists the opportunity to undergo training on computer-based PSA tools. One course focused on fault tree analysis, and the second
training opportunity comprised identification of the sequences of events that can lead to core damage, and estimations of core damage frequency.
Equipment for environmental radiation monitoring at KNPP, SSM2015-3056; payments in 2016: 486 kSEK
In addition to previously delivered gamma detector stations for environmental monitoring, three more units were delivered in 2016. The project is part of the modernization programme for the environmental monitoring system used at the Kola NPP. The system is crucial for surveillance of radiation levels inside and outside the nuclear power plant.
Vibration monitoring system at LNPP, SSM2015-3057 and SSM2015-3891; payments in 2016: 232 kSEK
The project comprises upgrading of components and software for the vibration monitoring system for rotating machines at the Leningrad NPP. Replacement of components is financed by SSM. Installation is performed by Leningrad NPP staff. The system, used at all four units of the plant, alerts operators in the event of imbalances and vibrations that might have a negative impact on reactor safety.
Batteries for emergency power supply at KNPP, SSM2012-450; payments in 2016: 22 kSEK
A supply of safety grade batteries to the Kola NPP was initially planned for delivery and installation in 2014. Upon delivery, parts of the documentation were incomplete due to administrative difficulties between the Kola NPP and the battery supplier. Communication between the Kola NPP, SSM, the Russian regulator Rostechnadzor and the supplier solved these problems in 2015 and the batteries were installed in 2016. The SAT and completion of the project were performed in August 2016.
Online gas circuit monitoring system at LNPP, SSM2009-2668; payments in 2016: 15 kSEK
The purpose of the monitoring system is to obtain data on the chemical composition in the gas circuit of a reactor.
The data provided is used for assessing the processes and condition of the graphite stack. The system can also detect leakages and measure the efficiency of the gas purification system. Commissioning of the system has been delayed due to the procurement process for installation at the Leningrad NPP. The software was upgraded by the supplier in August; however, some remaining issues are still pending, with necessary action and planned commissioning expected in 2017.
Cooperation with State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM), SSM2013-4821; payments in 2016: 57 kSEK
In 2016, SSM continued to maintain dialogue with ROSATOM on areas dealing with elimination of Soviet nuclear legacy issues, with the aim of protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. This culminated in establishment of a joint SSM-ROSATOM interdepartmental working group for project scheduling, coordination and review. Experts of the working group will meet twice per year to broaden the cooperation between Sweden and Russia in the areas of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation, as well as to share information and exchange best practices.
Reconstruction of Security Checkpoint 11 at the Nerpa Shipyard, SSM2014-2901; payments in 2016: 1,917 kSEK
This project supplements the decommissioning programme for the nuclear service vessel, the Lepse, implemented in the framework of the EBRD/NDEP programme at the Nerpa Shipyard, west of Murmansk. The reconstruction of the checkpoint is an integral part of the site’s general security improvement. This improves security monitoring of all movements to and from the Lepse decommissioning site. The system prevents intruders from accessing the shipyard area, where highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel is stored. The SAT and completion of the project were performed in May 2016.
Measurement equipment, Obninsk, SSM2014-2154; payments in 2016: 554 kSEK
This project concerns improvement of the control and national accountancy of nuclear materials accumulated in various technological processes in the nuclear fuel cycle
industry. Spectrometer-based measurement equipment for the radioactive waste tagging system was delivered to the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, IPPE, in Obninsk, and installed after a successful SAT in August 2016.
Power supply infrastructure at Andreeva Bay, Murmansk, SSM2016-3480; payments in 2016: 1,074 kSEK
International efforts are continuing in order to remediate the Andreeva Bay site and remove its enormous quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials. A joint project was initiated to ensure an adequate power supply for the spent nuclear fuel handling at the site, and to facilitate further transport to Mayak, in the Urals region. This project was implemented in coordination with Italian partners and several Russian authorities, as well as with the EBRD. The Swedish contribution concerned design and infrastructure for the diesel generators needed for the power supply. Final ROSATOM approval of the detailed design documentation was granted in 2015. Construction works for the diesel generator station were completed in October 2016. The diesel generators are expected to be delivered and installed by the Italian partner, SOGIN, in 2017. The first transports of spent nuclear fuel from Andreeva Bay are expected in autumn 2017.
Transports of solid radioactive waste to long-term storage site at Saida Bay, Murmansk, SSM2015-2795; payments in 2016: 212 kSEK
In accordance with plans developed by Russian
authorities, radioactive legacy waste and spent nuclear fuel present at the former military nuclear submarine base at Andreeva Bay will be transported to the newly built long-term storage site for radioactive waste at Saida Bay. Due to the harsh climate, sea transports cannot be carried out all year round. In order to realise timely removal and an uninterrupted remediation programme, additional road transports are necessary. For these transports, SSM signed a contract for delivery of a specially equipped vehicle and containers. These were tested, approved and put into operation in September 2016.
Non-proliferation education programmes at Russian universities, SSM2016-270; payments in 2016: 1,370 kSEK
This project promotes non-proliferation and nuclear security education programmes in Russian academia. The main efforts focused on strengthening capacity building for academic writing on the part of faculty members of universities in the Urals, Tomsk and St. Petersburg. International experts provide advice and feedback to the professors in order to promote their research publications in Russian and international journals. In cooperation with the Ural Federal University (URFU), a specialized scientific session on current developments in the non-proliferation regime was included as part of the URFU international conference. This resulted in 20 scientific papers from 23 Russian authors.
Under the leadership of Tomsk State University, a group of Russian professors are updating a university textbook on teaching the area of non-proliferation. For their participation in Russian and international conferences and educational events in the fields of non-proliferation and nuclear security, support was provided to professors, postgraduates and students from several Russian universities and technological institutes.
SSM promoted sharing of experience between Russian and international experts by facilitating visits to universities by guest lecturers.
Batteries for emergency power supply at KNPP, SSM2012-450; payments in 2016: 80 kSEK
In 2016, installation and SAT were carried out on the part of safety classified batteries which, as part of SSM’s project SSM2012-450, were previously supplied to KNPP 1 and 2. By means of these new batteries, a long-term, robust and reliable power supply is ensured to the units’ safety system functions.
Belarus
Initiation of cooperation with Gozatomnazor, the nuclear regulatory body of Belarus, SSM 2015-951; payments in 2016: 17 kSEK
In cooperation with the Finnish and Norwegian regulatory bodies, SSM visited the site for construction of two reactors in Ostrovets, Belarus, and attended meetings with the Belarusian regulatory body relating to the licensing process for construction of the reactors. The regulatory authorities of Belarus, Sweden, Finland and Norway signed a memorandum of understanding in September 2016 that forms the basis for the design of future cooperation projects.
Moldova
Upgrading of software for gamma monitoring system, SSM2016-2349; payments in 2016: 187 kSEK
The objective of the project was to improve evaluation and assessment procedures for the gamma station monitoring network in Moldova in order to ensure reliable national surveillance of radiation levels. The project comprised upgrading of the software for evaluation and registration, and the data from the gamma monitoring system. The upgrading was complemented by theoretical and practical training of the Moldovan system operator.
Identifying and securing radioactive orphan sources outside regulatory control, SSM2012-3427; payments in 2016: 629 kSEK
Moldova continues to encounter problems involving large quantities of abandoned radioactive sources out of regulatory control. Since 2014, SSM has supported NARNRA in its technical efforts to regain control over nuclear and radioactive materials. In recent years, NARNRA has regained control over more than 3,500 radioactive sources from abandoned industrial sites. These materials are now securely stored at the national radioactive storage facility.
A complementary pilot project on tracking of radioactive sources by means of social media has
been implemented by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (USA). Moreover, NARNRA has collected more than 1,500 radioactive sources from enterprises and institutions located in the separatist-controlled region of Transnistria. These materials have been transported to storage sites in Moldova. This activity is highly appreciated by the government of Moldova. Activities within this project have been co-financed by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change.
Non-proliferation competence development in Moldova, SSM2016-601; payments in 2016: 294 kSEK
SSM has since 2012 provided support for improvement of nuclear security capacity in Moldova. The opening of the Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) at the Technical University of Moldova in 2014 provided new opportunities to improve nuclear security education and training capacity. In 2016, SSM supported organization of two intensive non-proliferation training courses in Chisinau for government officials and journalists. The NSSC training laboratory was upgraded in the form of radiation detection and measurement equipment. Support was provided to NARNRA staff to improve their knowledge of safeguards and nuclear security.
Gamma monitoring system, SSM2014-4076; payments in 2016: 79 kSEK
In recent years, SSM has delivered equipment to Moldovan authorities for establishment of a national environmental surveillance system of gamma detectors. In 2016, a delegation of experts from the Ministry of Environment of Moldova and NARNRA visited Sweden in order to study the Swedish system for radiation monitoring, including its infrastructure, plus sampling and investigation procedures and cooperation among the agencies involved.
Georgia
Response exercises on seizure of radiological materials, SSM 2015-953; payments in 2016: 370 kSEK
The cooperation in place between Sweden and Georgia has focused on preventing smuggling of nuclear and radioactive substances to countries that could use such material for terrorism purposes. In September 2016, three exercises were carried out in order to test and improve Georgian authorities’ procedures and collaboration in connection with seizure of radiological materials. The exercises were carried out at the Sarpi checkpoint on the Georgian-Turkish border, Batumi Airport, and the Batumi Cargo Port. More than 40 members of Georgian emergency teams and experts from Sweden, USA, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania participated in the exercises. The exercises were co-financed by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change.
Support for organization of the 2nd Tbilisi
International Forum for Regional Stability, Georgia; payments in 2016: 434 kSEK
The 2nd Tbilisi International Forum for Regional Stability, with the theme “Nuclear and Radiological Challenges in the Black Sea Region: Causes, Consequences and Countermeasures”, was held 5–6 October 2016 together with the Civil Council of Defence and Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, State Security Service, and Ministry for Internal Affairs of Georgia. The Forum, co-financed by the US Department of State and UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, had as its aim to underline the importance of the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit and to seek their implementation in the Black Sea region. Special emphasis was given to problems relating to territories in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine that are outside government control. The Forum attracted nearly 80 participants from Georgia and abroad.
Regulatory authority capacity building, SSM2015-2073; payments in 2016: 490 kSEK
Through support from Sweden, Georgia has recently established a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for management of radioactive waste. The Law
on Radioactive Waste has been adopted by the Parliament of Georgia, and the new, independent Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ANRS) has been established under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection of Georgia.
A new operator (Department of Radioactive Waste Management, DRWM), responsible for management of all radioactive waste in Georgia, has been established. Collaboration with the Swedish regulatory authority facilitated elaboration of a national waste management strategy and action plan, which were adopted by the Georgian government in December 2016.
The elaboration and adoption of the national waste management strategy subsequently opened up constructive dialogue between the Georgian government and European Union on construction of a central facility for interim storage and final disposal of radioactive waste at the Saakadze site.
Improvement of non-proliferation education programmes, SSM2016-629; payments in 2016: 475 kSEK
During 2015, SSM and the Civil Council on Defense and Security (CCDS) carried out the first steps of improving the quality of non-proliferation education programmes at Georgian universities. In 2016, a summer university class was held in Batumi aimed at increasing Georgian university teachers’ level of knowledge and understanding in the area of nuclear non-proliferation issues. Around 50 participants represented various educational institutions in Georgia. In November, CCDS, King’s College in London and SSM agreed on development of a concept for a cross-regional research project relating to the nuclear security regime and challenges in Georgia and the Black Sea region. Further actions will follow in 2017.
Ukraine
Strategies and meetings with Ukrainian
authorities and organizations, SSM2013-1350; payments in 2016: 335 kSEK
During the year, SSM and its Norwegian counterpart attended two steering committee meetings with the Ukrainian regulatory authority, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU). Based on the Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian cooperation initiated at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the meetings’ objectives included allocating tasks regarding project implementation and ensuring exchange of information on issues relating to the cooperation between the three countries in the fields of nuclear safety and security.
Technical support for SNRIU’s database for IAEA safeguards inspections, SSM2015-1892; payments in 2016: 129 kSEK
Sweden assists the SNRIU by providing technical support for a special-purpose database for record keeping of IAEA safeguards inspections in Ukraine. The objectives include ensuring that the safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA is properly applied and correct functioning of the SNRIU’s nuclear material accountancy reporting to the IAEA. The database was updated as agreed between SSM and the SNRIU.
Improvement of the state system of export control in Ukraine, SSM2016-1669; payments in 2016: 353 kSEK
The project focuses on facilitating Ukraine’s adjustment process to the EU’s export control principles and
procedures. The project’s main partner is the State Service of Export Control of Ukraine (SSECU). In 2016, SSM’s support mainly focused on the national implementation process of the Ukrainian single control list of dual-use goods and technologies. SSM provided funding for a workshop in Kiev for government officials and the export industry on updating national export control legislation in accordance with EU standards. SSM supported SSECU professional development and staff attendance at the conference Defence Exports 2016 in Amsterdam.
Support for the Odessa Center for
Nonproliferation at Odessa National University, SSM2016-585; payments in 2016: 523 kSEK
In 2015, a research centre was inaugurated at Odessa National University through SSM’s support. The main role of the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation (OdCNP) is to strengthen Ukraine’s work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the main focus of supporting analysis on political, technological, legal and societal processes and factors impacting on non-proliferation work in the Black Sea region.
OdCNP is implementing a research project to survey the history of the Ukrainian nuclear sector and nuclear disarmament. The main objective is to increase transparency and broaden insight into key historical issues related to nuclear activities in Ukraine from the 1940s up until today.
In 2016, Ukrainian participants gathered materials, visited archives in Ukraine and the USA, interviewed national and international experts, and produced the first draft account.
SSM also provided support for development of students’ academic writing skills. This took place in the form of a tailored research methodology workshop for 12 students, held in Odessa.
Pilot project for removal of disused radioactive sources from well-type storage, SSM2016-3948; payments in 2016: 608 kSEK
There are around half a million disused radioactive sources throughout Ukraine. Under the long-term programme of the G7 Global Partnership donors, “Participation in the Global Partnership Programme in Ukraine on Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources Management (GP DSRS)”, all these sources are to be collected and moved to the newly built central repository, VEKTOR. The repository is located in the Chernobyl exclusion zone.
SSM completed a project in 2016 with the Ukrainian national waste management operator, the company Radon, on a feasibility study for solving well-type storage problems at Radon’s facilities. This took place with assistance by Swedish expertise. The feasibility study presented recommendations for optimal solutions for the well-type storages.
In 2016, SSM also initiated negotiations with US part-ners and other international and Ukrainian stakeholders on purchasing the complete set of transport and storage containers needed for the overall GP DSRS management programme.
Outreach campaign on institutionally supervised recovery of orphan radioactive sources,
SSM2015-883; payments in 2016: 129 kSEK
SSM and the SNRIU have cooperated for several years now on setting up a Ukrainian public website to promote nuclear and radiological safety as well as nuclear security and non-proliferation. This “amnesty legislation” on recovery of orphan radioactive sources by Ukrainian authorities was passed by the Ukrainian parliament in October 2016 and has entered into force. The website promotes the amnesty legislation and has received international recognition for information activities relating to the safety and security risks connected with orphan radioactive sources.
Upgrade of the Ukrainian state registry of ionising radiation sources, SSM2013-4711; payments in 2016: 171 kSEK
In 2014, SSM supported the SNRIU in improving the technical infrastructure of the national registry of radioactive sources by replacing old computers and servers with up-to-date hardware and operating systems, thereby ensuring the registry’s functionality. Further improvements were achieved by transferring and adapting the registry’s database to new hardware in compliance with new regulations. The project is co-financed by Norway.
In 2016, SSM provided support to ensure reliable operation of the registry. SSM also held a workshop in May 2016 with representatives from all regional offices of the registry to draw conclusions and identify lessons learned following the improvement of the registry, as well as to establish plans for further development.
Development of the Ukrainian national dose registry, SSM2015-3537; payments in 2015:
296 kSEK
The project was initiated by the SNRIU to facilitate establishment of a national dose registry. For this purpose, a feasibility study was performed by the National Research Center for Radiation Medicine and the National Academy of Medical Sciences. The study defined deficiencies and suggested improvements to occupational dose monitoring and control, together with recommendations for
establishing and developing the national dose registry. A study visit to the Swedish organizations involved in occupational dose monitoring, SSM, SWEDAC (Swedish accreditation body) and Landauer Radiological Laboratory, was arranged in May 2016 for the Ukrainian stakeholders.
13th Ukrainian Conference on Nuclear and
Radiological Security, SSM2016-1236; payments in 2016: 258 kSEK
The Conference, which took place 3–7 October 2016 at the Khmelnitsky NPP, is the biggest and most significant event in Ukraine for the national nuclear and radiological security community. It gathers all stakeholders from nuclear facilities, authorities, the ministries concerned, research institutions and other organizations dealing with radioactive sources to exchange experiences and discuss new challenges in nuclear and radiological security.
Support to Odessa National Polytechnic University (ONPU), SSM2016-3188; payments in 2016:
80 kSEK
In June 2016, SSM visited ONPU to establish a new cooperation programme aiming at strengthening and improving ONPU’s curriculum for safety-related issues. A protocol and an action plan for future activities have been agreed and signed. In December 2016, study visits with representatives from ONPU took place at the Royal Institute of Technology and Uppsala University in Sweden, and at the Institute for Energy Technology in Norway. The aim was to establish contacts and networking between instructors, researchers and students of the institutions concerned.
Improvement of the physical protection system at the Khmelnitsky NPP, SSM2015-5133; payments in 2016: 1,010 kSEK
In 2014, Ukraine requested that its international partners in the G-7 Global Partnership contribute to the physical protection at the nuclear power plants in operation in Ukraine. SSM and Energoatom agreed on cooperation at the Khmelnitsky NPP on modernization and improvement of its physical protection system in order to meet international standards. USA and Germany are implementing improvements at two other NPPs.
CBRN Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear
CCDS Civil Council on Defense and Security of Georgia
CEG Contact Expert Group (IAEA) DECC Department of Energy and Climate
Change (UK)
CNS James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (USA)
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Energoatom Ukrainian state company that owns all nuclear power plants in Ukraine ESARDA European Safeguards Research and
Development Association
G-7 The Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States)
G-8 The Group of Eight (same as above, including Russia)
GP Global Partnership
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IFE Institute for Energy Technology (Norway) IPPE ROSATOM’s Institute for Physics and Power
Engineering (Russia)
IRH Institute for Radiation Hygiene (Russia) KNPP Kola Nuclear Power Plant (Russia) LNPP Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (Russia) MEPHI Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (Russia)
NARNRA National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (Moldova) NDEP Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership
NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRPA Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (Norway)
NSSC Nuclear Security Support Centre (Moldova) NTI Novouralsk Technological Institute (Russia) ONU Odessa National University (Ukraine) Radon Ukrainian state-owned company for
management of radioactive waste RBMK Soviet reactor type, graphite moderated REA Rosenergoatom (Russia)
ROSATOM State Atomic Energy Corporation (Russia) PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
SAT Site Acceptance Test
SevRAO Federal Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (Russia)
SHMS State Hydrometeorological Service SNRIU State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine
SOGIN Italian state-owned company for management of radioactive waste
SSM Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (Sweden) STUK Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority (Finland)
SUS Skåne University Hospital (Sweden) TPU Tomsk Polytechnic University (Russia) TSU Tomsk State University (Russia) URFU Ural Federal University (Russia) VCDNP Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
List of abbreviations
Staff of the Office for International Relations involved in international project implementation.
Back row, from left to right: Leif Pettil, Tor Stenberg, Zlatan Delalic, Cecilia Somell, Håkan Klasén, Tage Eriksson.
Seated, from left to right: Viviana Sandberg, Lars van Dassen, Sarmite Andersson. For more information on the projects described in this report, email Lars van Dassen, Director of the Office for International Relations, at lars.van.dassen@ssm.se, or call +46 8 799 40 00. ph o to : k je ll n yh o lm
S tr å ls ä ker h e ts m yn d ig h e ten 2 0 17 . P ri n te d b y A rk it ek tk o pia .
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Solna strandväg 96 SE-171 16 Stockholm Sweden +46 8 799 40 00 registrator@ssm.se www.ssm.se
Send an email to registrator@ssm.se if you would like to have the report in a
