Shared identity as a cause for rivalry between rebel groups : A comparative case study of the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 and the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017

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Shared identity as a cause for rivalry between rebel groups

A comparative case study of the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014

and the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017

Karl Modig

Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp) War Studies

Master’s Programme in Politics and War Autumn 2020

Supervisor: Sophia Hatz Word count: 17 815

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to answer the question of why rebel groups engage in conflict with each other despite sharing an identity. Previous research suggests that a shared identity should promote cooperation, but recent conflicts between rebel groups in Syria seem to suggest that shared identity can instead be a cause for rivalry. This thesis investigates this puzzle by using Pischedda’s theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability and Hafez theory on proxidistant ideologies. The cases of the thesis are the conflicts between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 and between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017. The results indicate that shared identity does cause rivalry, and both theories receive support for their explanation of inter-rebel conflict. All three rebel groups are labeled as extremists, which supports Hafez theory that extremist groups are more likely to engage in conflict with rivals. The military strength and the possible costs of attack of the rebel groups seem to support Pischedda’s theory that rebel groups use specific windows in time to attack their rivals. There are however some problems that neither theory can explain, such as Ahrar Al-Shams friendly relationship to Al Nusra between 2014 and 2017. This thesis provide insight into the understudied field of inter-rebel conflict of War Studies by highlighting the importance of identity.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background and research problem

Despite having cooperated for five years, the two rebel groups Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front engaged in open combat in 2017. This was despite the two groups sharing both an identity as Salafi Jihadists and having similar goals (Hassan, 2017). The groups, who had been allied in their fight against the Assad regime in Syria, had occasionally had violent confrontations before 2017 but nothing of this scale. Viewing this from Christias influential perspective on rebel alliances, this makes little sense. Christia (2012:32) would argue that rebel organize themselves into coalitions where they seek to win the war with minimum marginals, yet this case seems to illustrate a case where rebels chose to do otherwise. Furthermore, previous literature has indicated that a shared identity can be an indicator of increased cooperation between rebel groups. While studying the alliances of rebel groups active in the Syrian civil war, Gade, Gabbay, Hafez and Kelly findings implicate that groups that are ideologically similar are more likely to cooperate than groups who are ideologically dissimilar (2019:2091). This puzzle, that rebels fight each other despite their similar identity, is what this thesis will study.

In civil wars, rebel groups are often in a conflict with the government. The very intent of the creation of the rebel group is often in response to actions conducted by the government. The goals of the rebel groups may vary, they can include territorial sovereignty, overthrowing the current regime or creating a new state (Buhaug, 2006:695). Despite this, rebel groups often engage in warfare with other rebel groups. The obvious, but sometimes simplistic, solution would be for the rebels to band together in an alliance and unite to fight the government. Yet, Ahrar Al-Sham fought its former allies. What can explain this phenomenon? Using theories on identity, ideological extremism and rationalistic power-grabbing, this thesis tries to explore this topic further using a comparative case study on the Ahrar Al-Sham, IS and the Al Nusra Front rebel groups. The motivation for analyzing these three rebel groups is because of their shared identity as jihadist groups and because of the change in their relationship from cooperative to hostile.

Ahrar Al-Sham was founded in 2011 by jihadists who were released from a Syrian prison after having served sentences for their involvement in the Iraqi insurgency. These former prisoners banded together and created the first incarnation of Sham (Yasir, 2016). Ahrar Al-Sham cooperated with IS from 2012 to 2014. Initially following the same pattern as the first case, the relationship between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS was cooperative during the first years,

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exemplified when they cooperated in taking the Latakia region in 2013. The relationship turned hostile in late 2013 when IS killed Abu Rayyan, a leader of Ahrar Al-Sham. In January the following year, the conflict escalated into open conflict when Ahrar Al-Sham, together with other rebel groups, drove IS out of strongholds in northeastern Syria (Steinberg, 2016:3; Nassief, 2013; Lund, 2014c). IS has been known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS, ISIL and Daesh but for this thesis, they will be called IS.

Just a year after its inception, Ahrar Al-Sham had formed an alliance with the rebel group the Al Nusra Front. The two groups cooperated closely during the following years on numerous offensives against military objectives and capturing strategic areas. They often used different strategies, where Ahrar Al-Sham would be relying on traditional tactics with soldiers and firearms whereas Al Nusra Front was more eager to use suicide bombers. This alliance seems to have been stable up until January 2017, when the two groups suddenly engaged in combat with each other (Haid, 2016; al-Tamimi, 2017:17-18; Bassem, 2017). The Al Nusra Front has had several names including Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, Jabhat Al Nusra and Al Qaeda in Syria but for the sake of this thesis, they will be called the Al Nusra Front or simply Al Nusra.

Due to the scope of this thesis, the case study of Ahrar Al-Sham and IS will be the primary case, which should yield the main insights to the thesis. The case study of Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front is to be considered a secondary case, which should provide insights and support to the primary case.

This thesis defines rebel groups as non-state actors that seek to accomplish political goals by using violence. Based on Hafez (2020) and Pischedda (2018), two rebel groups sharing an identity is defined as either the groups hailing from either the same intellectual ideology, or if the goals of the rebel groups are associated with the same ethnic group or if the majority of their membership is made up of the same ethnic group. Rebel in-fighting is to be distinguished from a few attacks on the sub-level, which can happen from time to time in civil wars. For this thesis, rebel in-fighting is defined as “purposeful, large-scale combat between distinct rebel organizations” following Pischedda (2018:139).

1.2. Aim and research question

The aim of this thesis is to investigate why Ahrar Al-Sham engaged in conflict with IS in 2014 and the Al Nusra Front in 2017, despite sharing identity with these two groups. Using Pischedda’s (2018) theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability as well as Hafez (2020) theory on proxidistant ideologies, this thesis will investigate these cases. The reason for choosing these two theories is their common understanding that rebel groups who share an

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identity are also likely to become rivals. This is due to the scarcity of resources in civil wars, where rebel groups who share an ethnicity or ideology also compete for the resources from the same community group (Pischedda, 2018:147; Hafez, 2020:605). The theories do however differ in their explanation of what turns a rivalry into an open conflict. Pischedda argues that co-ethnic rebel groups will come into conflict depending on the strength of the groups and the cost of the potential conflict (2018:145-6). Hafez on the other hand argues that it is only ideologically extremist groups who will actually engage in violence with other rebel groups, whereas more centrist group will opt for more peaceful solutions (2020:605-7). The aim is that the theories will be applied complementary on the cases in order to answer the research question:

Why do rebel groups engage in conflict with each other, despite sharing the same identity?

2. Previous Literature

This thesis situates itself within the broader literature of civil wars while focusing specifically on rebel groups and on their identities as well as conflicts. The previous literature of this thesis begins with a short discussion on the term rebel groups and their definition. The section then continues with a focus on the relationship between civil war and rebel groups. It then narrows down to the interactions between actors in wars. Starting off with traditional state alliance literature, followed by those theories applied to rebel groups and then focusing on inter-rebel fighting. The previous research is finally narrowed down to the role of identity for rebel groups in civil wars.

2.1. Rebel group alliances, infighting and identity

The literature on rebel groups can sometimes offer a confusing number of terms such as terrorists, insurgents or sub-state armed actor to categorize the phenomenon. For the sake of this thesis, the term rebel groups will be used. Rebel groups are often defined by their ability and readiness to achieve political objectives such as territorial control or change of regime by using violence (San-Akca, 2016:7-8). The importance of territory is also brought up by Byman, who sees the ability to govern and control territory as a defining aspect of rebel groups (2005:24). Therefore, this thesis defines rebel groups as non-state actors that seek to accomplish political goals, especially territorial control, by using violence.

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The previous research on civil wars has typically focused on the state-level of violence, where civil war conflicts have been tried to be explained by using a dyadic analysis between the government and the rebels. While discussing the results of their dyadic analysis of civil wars Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) suggest that there is a strong state-centrism in the study of civil wars. They furthermore suggest that future research should study how specific, local characteristics of rebel groups may impact conflicts (Cunningham et al, 2009:592). In line with this, Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) argue that previous research on civil wars has a tendency to group together rebel groups in a conflict and treat them as one entity (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012:606). These simplification of civil war conflicts often miss a crucial part of these conflicts. Rebels are seldom unitary actors, in reality they are most often made up of several different groups whom each represent different ethnicities and ideologies. Sometimes they cooperate against the government and sometimes they fight each other. Therefor it is important to study these groups and the relationships between them.

Theories on rebel alliances and inter-fighting have drawn inspiration from research done within international relations. The neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979) proposed that states form alliances due to their wish to at least secure their place in the international system. This causes them to form alliances where they can balance against the stronger enemy, which in turn should secure their own place in the system (Waltz, 1979:118-119). Walt continues this thought and proposes that states will join alliances based on perceived threat rather than just considerations based on material power. Walt further distinguishes the alliance choices of states by discussing the situations where states ally against or bandwagon with an enemy state (Walt, 1985:8-9). Inspired by these theories, Christia (2012) proposed an influential theory in the field of inter-rebel alliances by combining the alliance theories of Waltz and Walt with a theory on civil war influence. By studying the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s as well as the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christia argues that the alliances of rebel groups in civil wars is mostly based on an attempt to form an alliance which is strong enough to win the war while at the same time trying to maximize the influence of the rebel group post-war. These so called minimum winning coalitions cause rebel groups to switch sides frequently for fear of losing influence when the war is over (Christia, 2012:32). The cause for inter-rebel fighting, Christia argues, is therefore the need to maximize influence. In this view, the alliances and conflicts of rebel groups are based on power considerations and not on identity. Christia writes that rebel groups may be formed based on ethnicity or religion, but the alliances between groups are not based on these identity traits. Rather, Christia (2012:32) argues that alliances are based on power optimization and afterwards justified by identity arguments.

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Similarly, other research on rebel groups have tried to explain inter-rebel fighting as an expression of rationalistic considerations based on material power. Using a quantitative analysis of conflicts from 1989 – 2007, Fjelde & Nilsson try to find a relationship between why violence occurs between rebel groups in some civil wars but not in others. Their main argument is that rebel groups engage in conflict with each other in order to gain an upper hand in their fight against the government. Specifically, rebel groups seek “material resources and political leverage” (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012:605). They develop this into a framework where they argue that inter-rebel violence is more frequent 1) in geographical areas with access to resources such as oil, diamonds or drugs 2) if rebel groups control their own zones 3) if a rebel group is comparatively weaker or stronger than other groups 4) if the government is weak (ibid: 609-611). This line of reasoning suggests that rebel groups come into conflict with each other as a result of trying to compete with one another in the anarchical nature of a civil war. Both Christia as well as Fjelde and Nilsson do however disregard any attempt at explaining the role of rebel groups identity in their theories. This may be a faulty line of thinking, especially as rebel groups are often organized around ethnic minorities, ideologies, or religions.

Another branch of the previous literature has instead sought to bring focus to identity as a causal mechanism in rebel cooperation and conflict. The literature has mainly focused on shared ethnicity as a source of cooperation. While studying ethnic conflicts such as Rwanda in 1994, Kaufmann argues that ethnicity can be a source of unity and unification. Kaufmann argues that once the state is no longer able to protect its civilians, people will have to mobilize their ethnic community in order to secure their own situation (Kaufmann, 1996:147). The article argues that separated enclaves of the same ethnicity, i.e. rebel groups, will fight to ensure each other’s survival in the face of an enemy from another ethnicity (Kaufmann, 1996: 149). While studying the alliances of rebel groups active in the Syrian civil war, Gade, Gabbay, Hafez and Kelly (2019) findings implicate that groups that are ideologically similar are more likely to cooperate than groups who are ideologically dissimilar (2019:2091). Ideology is defined along three dimension, conflict framing, conception of the ideal polity, and territorial aspiration (ibid: 2072). By using these three dimensions, the researchers are able to bypass the typical categorizations of ideology, i.e. socialist, nationalist etc. and instead focus on what makes up an ideology (ibid:2072). Their findings implicated that groups active in the Syrian civil war who were categorized as centrist were the most willing to cooperate with other groups whereas extremist groups were les swilling to cooperate (ibid:2091). They did not find any support for power or sponsors being the fundamental factor that encouraged cooperation (ibid:2091). By using a network analysis of rebel groups in Syria, they conclude that “ideological homophily”

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seems to be the driving factor behind rebel group cooperation. Another view is that shared identity does not impact the conflict of the rebel groups within a civil war. For example, Christia (2012) argues that rebel groups only form alliances based on material and power considerations and will try to justify these minimum winning coalitions by using identity rhetoric.

In opposite to this is the idea that a shared identity could breed competition. While studying the governance arrangements of the Al Nusra Front in Aleppo and Idlib, Berti (2020) studies the relations between rebel groups. Berti finds that while the groups started out sharing responsibilities for local courts, they eventually started their own institutions in competition with each other. The research suggests that this was, at least in part, due to ideological competition (Berti, 2020:11). Even though the idea of ideological competition is not particularly developed in Bertis article, it is similar to the theories used in this thesis.

The theories used in this thesis, the window of opportunity-theory developed by Pischedda (2019) and proxidistant ideologies by Hafez (2020) combine the previous research by using the idea presented by Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) that rebels engage in violence with each other in a competition over resources. Furthermore, Pischedda as well as Hafez also believe that identity is an important factor when explaining inter-rebel violence. However, unlike Kaufmann (1996) and Gade, Gabbay, Hafez and Kelly (2019), Pischedda (2018) and Hafez (2020) theorize that identity can be a cause of conflict rather than cooperation for rebel groups. Rebel groups mostly compete with other rebel groups that share the same identity. This is further developed in the next section.

3. Theory

This thesis will use two theories, both joined by the common assumption that rebel groups who share an identity will also become rivals due to this identity. The theories differ however in their explanation of why a rivalry between two rebel groups sharing an identity becomes violent. Pischedda (2018) explains inter-rebel fighting with a theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability. These windows represent times in the civil war where the conditions are favorable for a rebel group to attack another rebel group with the same ethnicity to capture the resources of the opponent. Hafez (2020) views the conflicts between rebel groups who share an identity as an ideological conflict between centrist and extremist groups. The ideological differences between two groups can cause fighters and community groups to splinter their loyalties, which can cause defections to the opposing group and marginalization. This causes

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rivalry between ideologically proximate groups, where extremists are more prone to use violence to end the rivalry.

These two theories will be further developed in the following sections. Finally, a theoretical framework is presented which combines the two theories.

3.1. Window of opportunity and vulnerability

Pischedda (2018) presents the theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability, which is primarily concerned with the mechanisms that causes an inter-rebel war to begin. He argues that inter-rebel war is not solely based on rationalist power assumptions or on factors concerning co-ethnicity, but rather a combination of the two (Pischedda, 2018:140). Co-ethnicity between two rebel groups is defined as two groups having similar political goals related to an ethnic group or if the majority of the membership comes from the same ethnic group. In this theory, co-ethnicity is not seen as a factor that can support allyship but rather as a source of conflict for the rebel groups. This is because sharing the same ethnicity causes the rebel groups to vie for the same community base, as they want to control the same communities. If one rebel group would defeat the other, they can assume that they will be able to absorb the resources of their rival with ease (Pischedda, 2018:147). This conflict over resources is what causes the rivalry between co-ethnic rebel groups. But this does not automatically mean that the rivalry should escalate into violent conflict. For a rivalry to escalate into inter-rebel war, a window of opportunity or vulnerability is needed.

The basic requirement of the window of opportunity states that rebel group A should be stronger than rebel group B, both sharing the same ethnicity, and that the local government should not pose an urgent threat. If those requirements are true, then the costs of initiating an inter-rebel war should be low for rebel group A. Rebel group A may choose to attack the weaker group in order to quickly defeat group B and become the hegemon and absorb the resources of its rival. On the other hand, the window of vulnerability is based on a situation where a weaker rebel group is facing a near imminent loss of power. Due to this possible loss, the weaker group will be tempted to launch an attack against its co-ethnic rival in order to try to prevent the loss of power. In this situation, the costs of an attack are high, as a failure could cause the destruction of the rebel group (Pischedda, 2018:139-40 & 145). Both windows can provide great benefits for the attacking group, the difference is that the window of opportunity rises when the costs are low and whereas the costs of a window of vulnerability are high (Pischedda, 2018:146). Pischedda also proposes the possibility that there could also exist a combination of the two windows. This combined window would happen if a stronger group is afraid that it might lose

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its “superiority” compared to a rival. This could cause the stronger group to attack the other group even though the costs would be higher than in the usual window of opportunity (ibid:146).

To sum up, the window of opportunity-theory entails that a stronger rebel groups should attack a weaker coethnic rival if the government does not pose an urgent threat. This high reward, low cost action creates a high incentive for the attacking group to strengthen. On the other hand, the window of vulnerability posits that a failing rebel group may launch an attack even though the costs are high in a last bid to prolong its eventual downfall. The combined window is based on a stronger group accepting high costs for fear of losing its stronger position. This is exemplified in table 1.

Table 1

Military strength Cost of attack

Window of opportunity Strong Low

Window of vulnerability Weak High

Combined window Strong High

Developed by author based on Pischedda (2018)

3.2. Proxidistant ideologies

Hafez (2020) presents a theory on inter-rebel conflicts which primarily focuses on identity and ideology. Like Pischedda, Hafez argues that rebel groups who are closely aligned in their identity may come into conflict as they compete for the same community base. However, Hafez research focuses on ideology rather than ethnicity. He argues that a rebel group needs ideological cohesion to be able to perform its tasks (Hafez, 2020:611). Groups are closely related in their ideology if they share an “intellectual heritage”, such as communism, conservativism, or nationalism. This relatedness makes them appealing to the same community groups. However, because of the distance between their ideological stance, “disagreements can divide their fighters, followers, and sponsors between two viable alternatives.” (Hafez, 2020: 605). In short, there is an ever-present threat that fighters and supporters are going to defect to the rival group. In this zero-sum game, Hafez argues that rebel groups either take a centrist or extremist standpoint on ideological issues, which causes rebel groups to come into conflict as they are competing for the same supporters (Hafez, 2020:605). This “proxidistance” (Hafez, 2020: 605) between the groups may cause their fighters to defect and the community to

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fractionalize to the other group. There are a few different options available to a rebel group to prevent this from happening. Centrists will opt for more peaceful and non-violent options such as joining an alliance or gaining support of the public. Extremists are however more likely to use deadly violence against an ideological competitor. The violence employed by the extremist group doesn’t have to be directed directly at the competitor, but could also be aimed at community supporters of the rival (Hafez, 2020:605-7).

Using the same three dimensions as in Gade, Gabbay, Hafez and Kelly (2019), Hafez (2020) divides between extremists and centrists. The first dimension considers conflict framing, where the group defines their own place in the ongoing conflict. This entails answering three questions: “who are we, why are we fighting, and whom are we fighting against?” (Hafez, 2020:610). Typically, groups characterized by centrism usually frame the conflict as a complex situation with competing political actors, whereas groups on the extreme spectrum prefer to frame the conflict in a black and white, us vs. them, narrative. The second dimension revolves around conflict objectives, where the rebel groups define what they are fighting for. Extremists tend to engage in all-consuming total war in order to achieve system transformation whereas centrists usually aim to use a limited war in order to achieve system integration. The third dimension considers target portfolios, which defines which targets that are legitimate to attack by the rebel group. Hafez argues that centrist groups will focus on using “controlled and selective” violence against mostly military targets whereas extremists are more likely to use expansive and “indiscriminate violence” including civilian targets (ibid:611).

To conclude, rebel groups compete with ideologically proximate groups. Centrist group should be more likely to join an alliance to balance against an ideological competitor and an extremist group should be more likely to use deadly violence against an ideological competitor. This thesis operationalizes the theory as if a group is categorized as extremist, using the three dimensions, it should attack a rival rebel group of the same identity.

3.3. Theoretical framework

This thesis will attempt to combine Hafez (2020) theory on ideology in rebel fratricide and the theory of Pischedda (2018). Hafez seeks to explain rebel infighting by studying the schism between ideological centrists and extremists whereas Pischedda focuses on ethnicity. The two theories will be used in theoretical framework where instead of using “proximate ideology” and “co-ethnicity” as two different typologies, both will be combined under the umbrella term “proximate identity”. Proximate identity is defined as either two groups hailing from either the

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same intellectual ideology, or if the goals of the rebel groups are associated with the same group or if the majority of their membership is made up of the same ethnic group.

The three dimensions presented by Hafez, conflict framing, conflict objectives and target portfolios, are not exclusive to rebel groups based on ideology. Both ethnic and ideological groups must answer these questions and situate themselves within the larger conflict. An ethnic rebel group are also concerned with questions such as who they are, if they want systemic integration or transformation and to what degree they will use violence. As such, in this thesis, Hafez theory on extremists and centrists will be adapted to include the broader term identity rather than only ideology.

The theoretical framework is presented in Table 2. Both theories state that two rebel groups should become rivals if they share the same identity. A shared identity can be based on ethnicity, ideology, or religion. The cause of the rivalry can be either because of a competition over resources, potential fighters or fear of defection to the other group (A). If at least one of the groups is extremist according to the three dimensions, there is a risk of inter-rebel war. If both groups are extremist, this should heighten the risk (B). Another risk for inter-rebel war, is if a window of opportunity or vulnerability is presented. This should entail that there is a power imbalance between the two groups (D). This is however not enough for inter-rebel war, as the costs of a potential need to be included as well. The costs can be either high for a window of vulnerability or low for a window of opportunity (E). If those conditions are true, it should result in an inter-rebel war (F).

Table 2. Theoretical framework

Developed by author based on Hafez (2020) and Pischedda (2018).

Two rebel groups with proximate identity

(A)

At least one group classified is as extremist (B)

Power imbalance (D)

Inter-rebel war (F)

The potential costs (E)

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4. Research design

4.1. Comparative case study

This thesis will use a comparative case study design. According to Yin (2018) one of the reasons for choosing a comparative case study is that the results can be considered more compelling than from that of a single case study. If the results from the two case studies are analyzed and presented individually, the combined result will be stronger. Yin disregards Mill’s methods of similarity and difference and instead argues that a comparative case study should be based on replication, not sampling (Yin, 2018:110).

For this thesis, the two case studies are based on the logic of literal replication. Literal replications should be used as a research design when the chosen cases are few and when the predicted outcomes are similar. Furthermore, literal replications should also be used depending on the how straightforward the theory is. The aim of the replication logic is not to simply view the case studies as samples of a larger population, but rather to conduct two independent case studies and see if the results replicate each other. If so, the results can be considered more robust (Yin, 2018:101-2). The result by each individual case study is to be considered as independent and in need to be confirmed by the result of the other case study (ibid: 104).

The two cases, Ahrar Al-Shams relationship to IS and Ahrar Al-Shams relationship to the Al Nusra Front fulfill the requirements of the literal replication design mainly because the outcomes were similar. Both of the relationships started with cooperation but ended in conflict. The conflicts erupted in different years but since the cases involve the same group, Ahrar Al-Sham, variables should be held constant across the cases. These variables include same environment, same state opponent as well as the identity of Ahrar Al-Sham being the same in both cases. Furthermore, the leaders of Ahrar Al-Sham changed between the two time periods, which should account for variations in leadership characteristics.

Even though a comparative case study can be considered as more robust than a single case study, the results will be difficult to generalize. This is not considered a problem as the aim of this study is to find results that can be further tested by future research. By following the replication logic, the results from the comparative case study should be primarily viewed as contributions to theory and not the broader empirical population (Yin, 2018: 58).

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4.2. Case selection

For this thesis the case is the relationships between rebel groups in the Syrian civil war and the case study is comprised of the relationship between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS as well as the relationship between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front. Due to the scope of this thesis, the study of Ahrar Al-Sham and IS is to be considered the primary case, which should provide the main insights. While Ahrar Al-Sham and Al Nusra is the secondary case, which should provide support and insights to the results. The intention of using Ahrar Al-Sham in both case studies is to be have more variables constant between the two case studies. This makes the unit of analysis rebel groups engaged in civil war. Specifically, rebel groups who have been active in the Syrian Civil War. The motivation for analyzing these three rebel groups is because of their shared identity as jihadist groups and because of the change in their relationship from cooperative to hostile.

The first case will be the relationship between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front (later joined, merged and renamed into Tahrir Al-Sham) from 2012 to 2017. This relationship was characterized by cooperation between the groups during the first years but later turned into an open conflict during 2017 (Hassan, 2017). The second case also revolves around Ahrar Al-Sham and IS (also known as IS, ISIL and Daesh) from 2012 to 2017. Initially following the same pattern as the first case, the relationship between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS was cooperative during the first years but then escalated into a conflict in 2014 (Lund, 2014c).

These two cases are interesting from a few theoretical standpoints. First of all, the fact that they turned from cooperative to hostile could mean that that a window of opportunity or vulnerability could have been the cause of conflict. If there was a structural change in the Syrian Civil War, say that the government withdrew its forces, which would enable the groups to be able to focus on fighting each other. However, this logic should entail that the groups in the two case studies would engage in conflict during the same time. But the change from cooperation to conflict in the two case studies occurred during different years. Following the logic of the window-theory, Ahrar Al-Sham should have engaged in conflict with both groups during the same time as this would be the window that was represented to them. This makes this comparative study a least likely scenario for the window-theory. Regarding the theory presented by Hafez (2020) this case presents a most likely scenario, as all three groups should fall into the extremist category on at least one of the three dimensions presented by the theory.

It should be noted that in both cases, these were not the only rebel groups active in the conflict. In fact, several rebel groups were active on both sides in both cases. However, for theoretical and due to the size of the paper, the focus is on the primary rebel groups of each

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case. In the first case, between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS, the third rebel group the Al Nusra Front also took part. But this thesis argues that the conflict in the first case was primarily between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS, and that the Al Nusra Front acted primarily as an ally to Ahrar Al-Sham. This is supported by Lister who writes that Al Nusra attempted to mediate between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS but was eventually drawn into the fighting (Lister, 2016:14).

4.3. Data analysis & operationalizations

The method of structured, focused comparison revolves around the idea of focusing on specific parts of an historic case. This is done by asking general questions to the material that make the results generalizable. These questions help standardize the data collection, thereby enabling comparison across the cases. The aim of using this method is to be able to use the results from a case in “a broader, more complex theory” (Bennet & George, 2005: 58). In order to use the method, the “universe” must be defined, i.e. the type of event. For this thesis, this is inter-rebel fighting, specifically among rebel groups who share an identity.

The questions asked must be constructed as such that they are grounded in the theoretical approach as well as the research objective of the thesis. This is because a case study is not able to fully dissect every aspect of a case, and therefore needs to pick and choose the aspects that are relevant for the study. These aspects are the ones that are relevant for the theory that is chosen. If this is not done properly, “the format of structured, focused comparison will not yield good results” (Bennet & George, 20015:59). In this thesis, this refers to the factors listed in Table 2: military power, cost of rebel in-fighting, conflict framing, conflict objectives and target portfolios. This is because these factors operationalize the theories presented by Pischedda (2018) and Hafez (2020) and this thesis will be able to investigate the measures. The questions asked to the material will be:

- What was the military power of the rebel groups? - What were the costs of potential rebel in-fighting? - How did the rebel groups frame the conflict? - What were the objectives of the rebel groups? - Who were the targets of the rebel groups?

In order to properly answer the questions, the relevant factors must be operationalized. Coding of military power will be used to identify the potential strength of the rebel groups. Using measures by Pischedda (2018:152), the operationalization of military power will be used in four

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categories. 1) the number of soldiers available to a rebel group in a given year. 2) the weaponry the rebel group has access to. 3) if the group has had any recent splits, or if there has been any feuds between leaders or groups within the rebel group. 4) previous experience from battles. As there may not be data on all four categories, a rebel group will be categorized as stronger if there are data on two categories and the rebel group exceeds in one category and is equivalent in another. Finally, the theory is also based around the potential cost of rebel infighting. The cost is operationalized as low if there have been few, smaller confrontations between the rebel group and the government. This would suggest a low-intensity war, where the government does not pose an immediate threat to the group. The cost is coded as high if the rebel group has recently acquired new territory, which suggests a favorable battle trend which they would have to defend, or if the government has recently launched an offensive (Pischedda, 2018:152-3).

Hafez (2020) theory posits that an extremist rebel group has a higher risk of engaging in inter-rebel fighting with a rival than a centrist rebel group would. The coding of extremist and centrist ideology is done over three dimensions which all have two opposites. The first dimension, conflict framing, codes a group as centrist if they have a “nuanced and multiplex” perspective of the conflict. This is contrasted with the extremist view where the conflict framing revolves around a black and white world view of an us vs them (Hafez, 2020: 610). The second dimension, conflict objectives, juxtaposes the centrist view of engaging in a “limited war for system integration” against the extremists view of a “total war for system transformation” (ibid: 610). System integration can be operationalized as one group seeking to reform the political system of a country but still maintain the basic structure whereas system transformation can be operationalized as a group seeking to radically change the political system of a state. The third dimension, targeting portfolios suggests that centrists usually engage in “selective” violence and extremists often use “indiscriminate” violence. Selective violence can be operationalized as only targeting military objectives and indiscriminate violence can be operationalized as also targeting civilian and political objectives. For a summary on operationalizations, see Table 2.

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Developed by author based on Hafez (2020) and Pischedda (2018)

4.4. Reliability and validity

Construct validity concerns the subject of subjectivity. Case studies are often criticized for being too subjective and to counter this, construct validity is needed (Yin, 2018:89). This is achieved primarily by defining the concepts presented in the theories of Pischedda and Hafez and by operationalizing those concepts in distinct measures. Internal validity is of a concern for this thesis as it tries to find a causal pattern between rebel groups with proximate identity and their in-fighting. The problem is that it may be difficult to infer if x actually leads to y (Yin, 2018:91). External validity details the ability of this thesis to generalize beyond its case. As mentioned earlier, this thesis follows the logic of replication, with the results from the comparative case study should be viewed as contributions to theory. This entails that the goal is not to generalize to a broader population but to aim for analytic generalizations (Yin, 2018:58). Reliability is to make to explicit enough to make sure that future researcher can complete the research done in a precise manner (Yin, 2018:93). This is primarily done by being thorough in documenting the steps done while completing this thesis.

Theory Factor Measure

Window-theory Military power The number of fighters

available to a rebel group Recent splits

Previous battle experience Cost of rebel in-fighting Recent confrontations with

government

Recent territorial gains Extremist / centrist ideology Conflict framing Us vs Them-rethoric

Conflict objectives Limited or total war System integration or transformation

Target portfolios Targets civilian and/or military objectives

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4.5. Material

In order to be able to analyze the case studies, secondary sources such as newspaper articles, research done by experts and documents such as memos published by the Swedish Defence Research Agency will be used. Further, a few statements made by leaders of the rebel groups will also be used, they were however in Arabic and have been translated into English by journalists. This could be a problem, as it is not always certain how the translation has been made and what the original intent was. However, this is circumvented by having these statements as support to other data, rather than standing on its own. Primary sources such as interviews with the leaders of the rebel groups would have been preferred. This would have enabled the thesis to further understand the intentions of the rebel groups in the conflicts, but the author does however not have access to these persons. It is the intent that secondary sources will be able to fill this gap by triangulating the information that is sought after. This is a strength of the case study in general and this thesis in specific, that multiple sources are used. This enables a deeper understanding of the studied phenomenon. The goal is to find “converging lines of inquiry”, that is data that confirm or reject the same information (Yin, 2018:196). In this thesis, this is done by searching for newspaper articles about Ahrar Al-Sham and IS published in late 2013 and early 2014 as well as articles about Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in late 2016 and early 2017. A snowball technique was used, where one source often guided the thesis to the next one. There was some difficulty in finding reliable data on measures such as the number of fighters available to a rebel group, but this was circumvented by applying a holistic approach to the factor military strength. This means that several measures were included to give a bigger picture than just simply the size of the troops. The aim was to find information on the same event or timeframe from different newspapers and sources that can be corroborated or denied by other sources.

5. Empirical background

A short background is presented for the two cases in order to provide some context.

5.1. Ahrar Al-Sham and IS

Ahrar Al-Sham was created in 2011 by Hassan Aboud alongside other Islamist prisoners who were released by the Assad regime. The group is based in the northwestern part of Syria but has spread its influence by being parts of alliances and umbrella organizations with other rebel

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groups (Jonsson, 2016:1-2). Originally called Al Qaeda in Iraq, IS was created in 2004. It was not until 2013 that this group expanded into Syria, then under the name of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The term the Levant can refer to an area including and surrounding Syria. Finally, the group changed name to simply the Islamic State, to signify its global rather than regional goals (Irshaid, 2015). The two groups cooperated initially, evident by them joining forces in taking the Latakia region, even though they were later pushed back (Nassief, 2013). During late 2013, IS attacked and grabbed control of territory from other rebel groups but Ahrar Al-Sham was hesitant to join the fight. Eventually, skirmishes began in December 2013 but it was first when IS killed Abu Rayyan, leader of Ahrar Al-Sham, that the conflict escalated. Ahrar Al-Sham, together with the Islamic Front and the Al Nusra Front, drove IS out of “Idlib, Latakia, the city of Aleppo and the areas extending north of Aleppo to the Turkish border” and also attacked them in the city of Raqqa (Steinberg, 2016:3).

5.2. Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front

In contrast to IS, who eventually split from Al Qaeda, the Al Nusra Front remained a part of the Al Qaeda organization for a much longer time. Al though Al Nusra started as a branch of IS, back in 2011, it split from IS and has been considered an official branch of Al Qaeda (Lister, 2016:5). The Al Nusra Front and Ahrar Al-Sham cooperated closely from 2012. In the conflict between Ahrar Al Sham and IS in the beginning of 2014, Al Nusra initially tried to mediate but eventually joined the fighting on Ahrar Shams side (Lister, 2016: 14). In 2015, Ahrar Al-Sham and Al Nusra joined the Jaish al-Fateh alliance (Holmquist, 2016: 3) and a merger was suggested between the two groups in 2016, but the negotiation failed. The failed negotiations can be attributed to Ahrar Al-Sham being accused of being a pawn for Turkey and Al Nusras close ties to Al Qaeda. The two sides clashed but a ceasefire was quickly established (Karouny, 2016). Later in 2016, Al Nusra cut its official ties to Al Qaeda and renamed themselves Jabhat Fateh Sham. During late 2016, another round of merger talks were initiated but Ahrar Al-Sham still hesitated. In December 2016, fighting broke out between Ahrar AL-Al-Sham and a sub-faction from the group over ideological issues as well as over the relationship to Al Nusra. In late January of 2017, it was evident that there would be no merger between Ahrar Al-Sham and Al Nusra. Ahrar Al-Sham announced an expansion and were joined by five smaller rebel groups and Al Nusra joined a few other rebel groups to create the Tahrir Al-Sham alliance. During this time, the conflict between the two former allies ensued and continued on and off throughout 2017 (Haid, 2016; al-Tamimi, 2017: 17-18; Bassem, 2017).

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6. Analysis

6.1. The proximate identity of Ahrar Al-Sham, IS and the Al Nusra Front

In order to determine if the rebel groups are rivals, it must first be investigated if the rebel groups actually share an identity. In line with the theories used, identity is viewed as endogenous. This means that identity is viewed as something that does not change and is not relational to the identity of another group. Because of this, the identities of the three rebel groups can be analyzed under the same headline despite belonging to different cases. In this section, it will first be determined if the Ahrar Al-Sham and IS as well as if Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front share ideological heritage. Proximate identity is defined as either two groups hailing from either the same intellectual ideology, or if the goals of the rebel groups are associated with the same group or if the majority of their membership is made up of the same ethnic group.

The intellectual ideology that all three groups hail from is Salafi Jihadist. While they have different interpretations, which will be developed in the next section, they all claim to be inspired by Salafi Jihadism (Bunzel, 2015:7; Ahmed, 2015; Lister, 2016:3). Similarly, the goals of the group are also related to the same group, Sunni Muslims. In one way or the other, all three groups seek to create an Islamic state, either in Syria or globally (Economist, 2013; BBC, 2015; Lister, 2016:25). The membership of the groups seem to also be similar, with the members of Al Nusra, Ahrar Al-Sham and IS primarily being Syrian nationals (Jonsson, 2016: 3; Lister, 2016: 48; Schmid, 2015:13). A note can be made that it seems like the demography of IS changed the years after the conflict, as they welcomed more foreign fighters.

This all point towards all three groups having proximate identities, which makes Ahrar Al-Sham and IS as well as Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front rivals.

6.1.1. The three dimensions of ideology

In this part, the rebel groups will be analyzed using the three dimensions of ideology proposed by Hafez (2010:610) in order to assess whether they can be categorized as centrists or extremists. The three dimensions are conflict framing, conflict objective and target portfolio. All three groups are found to be extremist in all three dimensions, with the result summarized in the end of the section.

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The first part in trying to understand the ideology of a rebel group is by measuring how they frame the conflict. One important part in order to measure a groups conflict framing is its rhetoric regarding the conflict. Centrists would try to view the conflict in complex terms whereas extremists are more prone towards us vs them-views of the conflict (Hafez, 2020:610).

Ahrar Al-Sham has aimed at developing a rhetoric which positions it as a moderate alternative to other jihadist groups active in Syria. They have at least appeared to promote the religious freedoms of minorities such as Christians and other Muslim orientations. While other groups have sought to condemn those who do not follow their own teachings, Ahrar Al-Sham has not done this (Soliman, 2017:2). The Islamic Front, an organization that Ahrar Al-Sham created and led has been described as “ideologically and politically positioned itself halfway between the disparate Western- and Gulf-backed armed opposition” and “the radical jihadi factions” (Lund, 2014a). To add to this, Ahrar Al-Sham has said that they will secure the rights of minorities in post-conflict Syria. What this means is unclear though, as this will be in accordance to Sharia laws, which could entail a second-class system for minorities (Zelin, 2013) Despite this, Ahrar Al-Sham has several extremist tendencies. The group condemn and view the Alawite minority as well as the Shia population as “heretics” (Nealen, 2013; Steinberg, 2016: 2 & Ahmed, 2015) and they view the Syrian war as a conflict between Sunni and Shias (Economist, 2013; Ahmed, 2015). In one, perhaps cynical way, Ahrar Al-Sham view the conflict in complex terms, highlighted by the fact that they were open to securing the rights of minorities. But, since the group view minorities such as Alawites as heretics and frame the conflict as between Sunni and Shia, Ahrar Al-Sham should be considered as extremist.

In a similar fashion, Al Nusra Front also frame the conflict as one against their “Alawite and Shia enemies” (Lister, 2016:10). Furthermore, the leaders of the Al Nusra Front have during public speeches even promoted the idea of genocide of the Alawites. Al Nusras religious leader stated in 2016 that the Alawites should be treated as “apostates” and that Syria should be “purged of them” (Heller, 2016). This view is akin to the us versus them categorization that illustrates an extremist worldview.

Central to how IS frames the conflict is the idea of takfir. This idea, or concept, illustrates quite clearly the black and white view that IS holds. Simplified, it is the act of one Islamist calling another Muslim a non-believer, which legitimizes violence against the victim (Oxford, 2020). IS frequently uses this act in order to brand who is and who is not a legitimate target. By using takfir, IS is able to claim that they are the only true believers and that everyone who does not follow their specific set of ideology are non-believers. For IS, this entails not only non- and

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Shia Muslims but also even Sunni Muslims can be considered a legitimate target (Kadivar, 2020: 279; Ahmed, 2015). This is a strong example of the us vs them framing that IS us when framing the conflict. This causes them to be classified as extremist in the conflict framing dimension.

Conflict objectives

Conflict objectives is the dimension where the rebel groups define what they are fighting for. Extremists tend to engage in all-consuming total war in order to achieve system transformation whereas centrists usually aim to use a limited war in order to achieve system integration. System transformation could be the goal of radically changing the political system of the state whereas system integration would mean the attempt to reform the political system but keeping its core intact (Hafez, 2020:610).

Ahrar Al-Sham has made efforts to try and be seen as a more moderate group than their adversaries. For example, in 2013, they claimed that their aim was to replace the Assad regime with a secular one, although based on Islamist principles (Nealen, 2013). This is illustrated by this quote form the groups former leader, Hassan Abboud “Democracy is a government by the people for the people, who create rules as they please. We say that we have a god-appointed system” (Dockery, 2013). Similar reports have stated that Ahrar Al-Sham seeks to create a Sunni-led Islamic state (Economist, 2013). On its official website, Ahrar Al-Sham stated that “It (Ahrar Al-Sham) aims to completely overthrow the Assad regime in Syria and build an Islamic state” (translated from Arabic by Chabkoun, 2014). Democracy is thus rejected, but Ahrar Al-Sham seems to want a establish a theocracy similar to the system in Iran (Lund, 2014b). Ahrar Al-Sham has also repeatedly stated that its aims only regard Syria. The rebel group considers its jihad strictly within the country (Economist, 2013; Nealen, 2013).

In some regards, the goals of IS are not that far from that of Ahrar Al-Sham. While Ahrar Al-Sham mainly focuses on Syria, IS wants to create a caliphate, meaning a state which is ruled by a religious leader in accordance with Sharia laws. IS is therefore not constrained to only Syria. IS goals are global (BBC, 2015). Furthermore, IS believes that there is a conspiracy where the leaders of the Shia countries Iran, Lebanon as well as Assad are in secret alliances with the west. This causes IS to wish to establish an Islamic State for true believers (Bunzel, 2015:10).

The goals of the Al Nusra Front are characterized by their ability to work towards longtime achievements. In this aspect, the Al Nusra Front places its objectives somewhere between that of Ahrar Al-Sham and IS. Though Al Nusra seeks to focus on Syria, they also have an

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international goal. Their fight in Syria is “temporary” as their ultimate goal is to establish a Caliphate for Al Qaeda. This is a link to its Al Qaedan origin, as the group is primarily fighting in Syria while Al Nusra sometimes tries to establish first attempts at creating a Caliphate (Lister, 2016:23). This does not mean that Al Nusra is strictly loyal to Al Qaeda, just that it follows ideas laid out by them. The Al Nusra Front is trying to implement Sharia laws under a longer timeframe. They aim to make the people gradually accept “their existence in a pure Islamic society ruled by Sharia” (Lister, 2016:25).

While it may be difficult to measure whether a group uses a total or limited war, it is possible to judge to the objectives of that war. As all three groups seek to fundamentally change the governing system of Syria, they are assessed as system transformational. The goals of the groups may seem familiar, but while Ahrar Al-Sham seeks to create an Islamic state in Syria, IS seems to be more focused on carving out a piece of the land on their own and create a caliphate. Al Nusra ultimately seeks to create something alike to the Caliphate of IS, but is working on a longer timescale. The current regime is ruled by Assad, who hails from the Alawite minority but describes his regime as secular (Meuse, 2015). This secularism is however disputed, as the personal cult of the president is sometimes dubbed Assadism (Harkin, 2018). Thus, as the groups seek to transform the political system of Syria, they are both assessed as extremist on the dimension of conflict objectives. In this regard, the only great difference between the groups is that their ultimate goals differ, Ahrar Al-Sham only focusing on Syria whereas IS has a global goal and Al Nusra focusing on both.

Target portfolios

The third dimension, target portfolios, is focused on which targets that are legitimate to attack by the rebel group. Hafez argues that centrist groups will focus on using “controlled and selective” violence against mostly military targets whereas extremists are more likely to use expansive and “indiscriminate violence” including civilian targets (Hafez, 2020:611).

While Ahrar Al-Sham primarily targeted the Assaad regime, it has been known to attack civilians. There have been reports of Ahrar Al-Sham, together with other rebel groups, attacking, killing and kidnapping members of the Alawite minority (Human rights watch, 2016). This means that Ahrar Al-Sham can be viewed as extremist on the dimension of target portfolios. IS has been in conflict with the regime in Syria as well as other rebel groups, but it is perhaps most infamous for its attacks toward civilians. The nature of the violence has been indiscriminate, as it has used cruel penalties towards militaries and civilians (Saul, 2015). Al Nusra has also primarily been in conflict with the Syrian government and its allies but it is also

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known to have targeted civilians (Lister, 2016:33). Furthermore, it was reported that all three groups took part in an organized attack in 2013 on an Alawite village where 190 civilians were killed and over 200 were kidnapped (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Al Nusra has also, frequently used suicide bombings as a weapon (see for example Karouny & Perry, 2012). As such, all three groups are designated as extremist in the target portfolio dimension. They target civilians systematically and with extreme violence.

6.1.2. Summary

In all of the three dimensions on ideology, Ahrar Al-Sham, IS and the Al Nusra Front can be identified as extremist. They are quite similar in these three regards, even though there are some differences. They frame the conflict of the Syrian war in a black and white manner. Ahrar Al-Sham frame the conflict as a nationalist struggle primarily between Sunni and Shia. Al Nusra also frames the conflict as versus Shia Muslims, specifically against the Alawite minority. IS on the other hand frame the conflict as between them and everyone else, viewing themselves as the only true believers. The objective of the Syrian war is transformational for the rebel groups, as they seek to overthrow the Assad regime and replace it with a state based on Sharia laws. The groups do however differ as Ahrar Al-Sham is only focused on Syria whereas IS have global goals. The goals of Al Nusra are ultimately global, but unlike IS they are trying to achieve this in the long term. The targets of the groups are similar as well, with the groups attacking both military and civilian targets. The nature of the violence towards civilians may not be exactly the same, but this may not be relevant for the theory presented by Hafez (2020). To summarize the results, all three groups were deemed as extremists on the three dimensions provided by Hafez (2020); conflict framing, conflict objectives and target portfolio.

6.2. The windows of opportunity and vulnerability

The theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability posits that rebel groups who share an identity may come into conflict depending on the costs and on the possible gains. A window of opportunity is presented if one group is stronger than the other while the government does not pose an urgent threat. If those requirements are true, then the costs of initiating an inter-rebel war should be low for the stronger rebel group. A window of vulnerability is presented if a weaker rebel group is facing a near imminent loss of power. The weaker rebel group may try to prevent this by launching an attack against the other group. In this situation, the costs of an attack are high, as a failure could cause the destruction of the rebel group (Pischedda, 2018:139-40 & 145). Firstly, the strength of each group and the possible costs of an attack must be

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assessed. The strength of the rebel groups is measured by the number of fighters available to the group, if the group has had any recent splits and previous experience from battles. As there may not be data on all four categories, a rebel group will be categorized as stronger if there is data on two categories and the rebel group exceeds in one category and is equivalent in another. The cost of attack are measured by recent geographical gains and if there has been any recent conflict with the government.

6.3. Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014

Ahrar Al-Sham and IS engaged in violent conflict with each other in the beginning of 2014. As such, the military strength of the two groups as well as the potential cost of an attach during this time will be assessed. Because this occurred in the beginning of 2014, an assessment of the groups assets will be made for both 2013 and 2014.

Number of fighters

The quantitative numbers are poor in this case, but this thesis is able to circumvent that problem by using qualitative assessments. As it is difficult to find reliable data and numbers, especially in a civil war, it is not enough to only study the beginning of 2014. In order to estimate a more reliable number of fighters, size estimates of the number of fighters in 2013 and 2015 will also be investigated. This is done to see if the number of fighters from 2014 seem to be in proportion to the number of fighters in the other years.

IS was reported to have 5 000 fighters in August 2013, according to US Intelligence (UCDP, 2020a). In May 2014, it was reported by the Washington Post that IS had between 5 and 10 000 fighters (Ignatius, 2014). The reports fade out during the rest of the year until around the beginning of the fall, just after the caliphate had been officially announced. The CIA reported in September that they estimated that IS could have between 20 000 and 31 500 fighters (Yahoo, 2014). This may seem like a large jump from the previous number in May. But previous research has indicated that around 6 000 foreign fighters joined IS in mid 2014, with around 1 000 joining each month after that (Schmid, 2015:2-3). The highest number reported was 50 000 fighters, which was reported by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in August 2014. These numbers were however not verified. The Observatory also added that there had been an increasing recruitment of the group during the last several months. With the recruitment number of the month before being around 6 000 fighters (Al Jazeera, 2014a).

The numbers from August and September are greater than those reported in May and even though the exact numbers aren’t exact, they suggest a dramatic rise in recruitment. Research

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and reports has indicated that IS also grew in great numbers during this time period (Schmid, 2015 & Al Jazeera, 2014). This suggest that the lower number, 5 – 10 000, presented in May 2014 could be reasonable to assume to also be true for January.

Similarly, there are no exact numbers accounting for the size of Ahrar Al-Shams fighters in January 2014. In July 2013, it was reported that Ahrar Al-Sham may have 10 – 20 000 fighters available (Economist, 2013; BBC, 2013a). It was estimated in May 2014 that the group had around 10 – 15 000 fighters (Ignatius, 2014). Later that year, in September, Al Jazeera estimated that Ahrar Al-Sham had around 20 000 fighters (Al Jazeera, 2014B). This number is supported by conflict research which also puts the total number of fighters available to Ahrar Al-Sham at 10 – 20 000 (UCDP, 2020b; Jonsson, 2016). All of the reports suggest the lower number of 10 000 fighters available to Ahrar Al-Sham, making it reasonable to assume that they had at minimum access to that many fighters.

Recent splits or feuds within the group

If the groups had any recent feuds or splits, this could be an indication of a lessened military power (Pischedda, 2018:152). As the conflict erupted in January 2014, splits during 2013 are of the most interest.

IS was originally part of Al Qaeda, signified by IS earlier name Al Qaeda in Iraq. They however later changed their name to The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to signify their independence (Irshaid, 2015). In 2013 the dispute between IS and Al Qaeda became even greater. In April, IS announced a merger with Al Nusra Front, but this was rejected by both Al Nusra and Al Qaeda. This caused hardline followers to split from Al Nusra to join IS and vice versa. Following this, Al Qaeda announced officially that it had split from IS (UCDP, 2020a; Abouzeid, 2014).

Ahrar Al Sham joined, and was a front figure in, an alliance of rebel groups called the Syrian Islamic Front in late 2012. The organization was however reported to be dysfunctional and was dissolved in November 2013 and that a new organization, titled the Islamic Front, would replace it (Lund, 2014b). While the group is described as rather an umbrella organization than a strict alliance. It was however reported that the organization had 40 – 70 000 fighters. The leader of the organization is also the same person leading Ahrar Al-Sham (Lister & Zelin, 2013).

Previous battle experience

Both groups are deemed to have experience of violent conflict prior to January 2014. As IS was active in Iraq during previous years, under the name Al Qaeda in Iraq, where the group led

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several campaigns and attacks against the Iraqi government (Stanford, 2019). Furthermore, IS had at the time a strict and developed organization surrounding their military activities which indicated advanced tactics (Bilger, 2014:10). Ahrar Al-Sham had, since its inception in 2011, actively fought the Syrian regime. Apparently, Ahrar Al-Sham has been called “one of the most effective insurgent groups in Syria” (Jonsson, 2016:2) and their fighters were “renowned for their discipline and ability” (BBC, 2013a).

Territorial gains

IS had taken control of multiple new territories from the middle of 2013. They had concentrated on areas in the north and east parts of Syria, which they took control of from other rebels (Hubbard, 2013a). Likewise, Ahrar Al-Sham also expanded in the northeastern parts of Syria during 2013, especially in the Idlib province. During the year, Ahrar Al-Sham was able to take control of cities such as Raqqa and Aleppo (Economist, 2013; Hubbard, 2013b).

Recent conflict with government

Both groups had engaged in battles with the government as well as with other rebel groups. This is perhaps best illustrated by the offensive initiated by the Assad regime during late 2013 and early 2014 where the government re-captured parts of Aleppo and fought against both IS and Ahrar Al-Sham. Aleppo, the once most populous city of Syria, had fallen into rebel control during 2012. Among the rebels controlling parts of the city was IS and Ahrar Al-Sham. The western part of city was controlled by government forces but the rebel groups were able to cut off supply lines. During late 2013, the government initiated an offensive which re-took parts of city and strengthened its position, as well as aiming to cut supply lines for the rebel groups (BBC, 2013b; Reuters, 2016)

6.3.3. Summary of the results for Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014

Regarding the military strength of the two groups. it may be difficult to compare the measures that have been presented. The empirical analysis finds that it is likely that IS had around 5 – 10 000 fighters while Ahrar Al-Sham could have controlled 10 – 15 000 fighters, excluding fighters in the Islamic Front alliance. This means that IS could have had 5 000 fighters and Ahrar Al-Sham could have had 15 000, making Ahrar Al-Sham much stronger. This could also mean that both IS and Ahrar Al-Sham had 10 000, suggesting that they had equal or similar military strength. To only use quantitative numbers would have made the comparison difficult, if not impossible. The previous battle experience of the two groups seems to be equal. There is

Shared identity as a cause for rivalry between rebel groups : A comparative case study of the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 and the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017