The Possible Prospects of the Weak Veto reform proposal for the United Nations Security Council : A discourse analysis of United Nations Security Council meeting documents

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The Possible Prospects of the Weak

Veto reform proposal for the United

Nations Security Council

A discourse analysis of United Nations Security Council

meeting documents

Teodóra Nádasi

International Relations

Department of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits

Thesis submitted: Spring/2021 Supervisor: Scott McIver

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Abstract

Throughout the years many have called for a reform of the United Nations and more specifically its most influential body the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council has the authority to pass resolutions with the sole purpose to preserve the peace around the globe, in theory at least. As there are conflicts that have been going on for a decade without any kind of solution from the Security Council and with huge humanitarian toll, just like Syria and Yemen, the need for a reform is clearly needed for the Security Council to be able to act better in conflict solving. In the Council five members have veto rights which are also permanent members and are not elected. As this has been considered unfair, both the notion of a permanent member and also the notion of a veto, some reform proposals have been brought up by organizations or countries to change the Security Council. This work is concerned with the Weak Veto reform proposal as analysing possible reforms using discourse analysis can predict possible future behaviour of states and can introduce a different view on the future of international organizations.

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List of Abbreviations

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

EU European Union

IR International Relations

IO International Organization

P5 Permanent members of the UNSC (Russia, China, US, UK, France)

P2 Permanent two (Russia, China)

P3 Permanent three (US, UK, France)

UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNSC/SC United Nations Security Council

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As our world is becoming more and more intertwined international organizations (IOs) have become an important part of global and domestic politics alike in the last several decades. One of the most prominent IO is the United Nations (UN), as it has been the defining place for diplomacy and conflict resolution since the end of the Second World War (United Nations, 2021a). Yet, in many cases the UNSC has not been able to fulfil this promise as prolonged conflicts are still unresolved even though there is an organization in place to solve these problems (Erskine, 2014:121). An overarching reform could solve this problem, but there has not been a reform of the UN’s main organs like the General Assembly (UNGA) since its foundation (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2021) or the Security Council (UNSC) since 1963 (United Nations Security Council, 2021a). There have been several attempts and proposals to reform both the General Assembly and the Security Council, but none of them were realised.

The role of the United Nations is influential on both the global and national levels since virtually every nation-state is a member of it, its many sub-organizations are working with every area of modern life all around the globe (United Nations, 2021c). When an organization is this influential, it is natural that people want to see it as accountable and effective as possible and. There have been some proposals made, which analyse how to make the overall organization more democratically accountable using a bottom-up approach (Frey and Stutzer, 2006) which are all important but this paper argues for a top-down approach. As the United Nations Security Council is the executive branch of the UN and has a lot more power than the General Assembly, the change needs to start there and this is why this paper focuses on reform in the UNSC. The Security Council (SC) always has 15 members. Five of them are permanent (P5) and have veto powers and 10 are elected every two years based on regional distribution. The elected members do not have the right to veto (United Nations Security Council, 2021b). In order for a draft resolution to become a resolution at least nine affirmative votes are needed and none of the P5 can use their veto otherwise the draft will fail.

Several scholars (e.g. Gifkins, 2021; Gould and Rablen, 2017; Habegger, 2010; Imber, 2006) have argued for a reform due to the five nations’ right to veto power, as it is considered to be unfair, and thus undemocratic. Furthermore, the constitution of the UNSC no longer represents the stance and power relations of world politics. The permanent members (P5) – the United States, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, the People’s Republic of China and the

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2 Russian Federation – would all need to vote in favour or abstain from a reform regarding the UNSC, which it is safe to assume to be quite unlikely. Nonetheless, there are some proposals that are “watered-down” because of this reason and thus might have a bigger chance of passing. The most prominent of these is the Weak Veto or Veto- proposal which is the focus of this thesis. The Weak Veto would require two P5 members to use their vote against simultaneously in order for a draft to fail. Which means that the right to veto in a traditional sense would disappear, since if only one P5 member votes against a draft it would not count as a veto. This thesis examines if this would cause a drastic change in the outcome of votes in numerical and in political terms. The research question supports this puzzle as it asks: What impact would the

Weak Veto proposal have on the United Nations Security Council? The puzzle exists because

even though the initial thought would be that this proposal would lessen the relative power of the P5, this paper assumes that it would either not change too much or would make the power relations worse as it could revive Cold War era differences within the UNSC. To understand this change the thesis is built up in a manner that supports the research.

1.2. Structure of the Thesis

The first chapter of the thesis consists of the critical study of previous research which can help to find out the answer to this thesis’ inquiry. It starts with the detailed description of the

Weak Veto proposal and the analysis on it, which claims that this proposal would be fair. Then

the different alliances within the SC will be discussed as they have been highlighted in previous works since if double veto is needed at every instance some alliances are inevitably going to form, if they have not been formed already.

This chapter continues with the relevant International Relations (IR) literature as this is needed to analyse the political consequences of this proposal. Three main schools of IR in this work are realism, liberalism and constructivism. These provide the theoretical framework, but in order to use a holistic approach game theory within IR is introduced as well. The importance of this is that it can help with predicting the behaviour of states. This framework is revisited at the end of this paper to showcase the patterns of behaviour.

After the literature review section the method chapter is introduced. It begins with the detailed version of the two hypotheses, which assume that this reform proposal would not change much in numerical terms but can create a big divide within the SC. This will be continued with the explanation behind data selection and the accessibility of that said data, which are verbatim transcription of UNSC meetings. After these sections are finished the detailing of the methodology comes. First, the quantitative part is introduced with the research

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3 period, which is the 21 years from 2000 to 2020. This thesis assumes that in order to understand the consequences of a reform proposal, one needs to look at the latest period and how that would change in light of this proposal.

After the quantitative methodology, the qualitative follows. Discourse analysis is utilised in regard to speeches made during meetings intending to find reasons for exercising veto. The discussion provided as well focuses on, why it is better, in this case to use discourse analysis in than content analysis. The findings of the discourse analysis are utilised in the later chapter of the thesis when it is applied to the abstaining states to see if they would have changed their abstention to a veto with that achieving the double veto needed by this proposal. The results of this can suggest the likely outcome of this reform in numerical terms. Finally, the biases and shortcomings of the methodology will be outlined.

Then the analysis is conducted according to the methodology and its findings presented in the last chapter of this thesis. As the methodology is built up as a two-step research, the analysis is divided into two main sections. The first part is the numerical study of the vetoes and abstentions, further helped by explaining tendencies and some findings which can already suggest an answer to the research question. The latter section is the application of discourse analysis to the meetings in the given research period. Every meeting is detailed in order to provide a clear analysis thus reducing bias. The paper is finished with a discussion of the findings utilising the literature review section and a final conclusion of the whole of the paper. As mentioned above the thesis begins with the literature review chapter.

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4 2. Literature Review

The purpose of this literature review or theory section is to introduce the background of this work and the framework on which it will be based on. Firstly, a previous analysis from Gould and Rablen (2017) is outlined. It is important to note that they are analysing several reform proposals regarding the UNSC, and these were all submitted by different entities and as such none of them were proposed by the authors (Gould and Rablen, 2017:146). The authors analysed the possible outcomes of every single proposal, their methodology is described below as well as how it is connected to this paper’s aim. The main focus is on the Weak Veto or Veto- proposal, which they concluded to be the best solution according to their criteria of effectiveness and fairness (Gould and Rablen, 2017:160).

As the Weak Veto proposal requires two permanent members to use their vote against in order for that to become a veto, alliances will inevitably form. As previous research of Odeyemi (2016), and Curran and Holtom (2015) shows, these alliances already exist known as the P2 and P3. These are detailed in the second section of this chapter. The importance of this section can be explained with the RQ of this work. What impact would the Weak Veto proposal have

on the United Nations Security Council? As the hunch outlined it in the introduction section of

this thesis, a real possible effect of this proposal could be the formation of alliances. The second section of this chapter explains that these alliances already exist and are possibly growing stronger.

The previous paragraph can suggest that the alliances are inherently working against each other and a hard battle would form, almost like a Cold War era divide but within the Security Council. In order to avoid this very realist view, the third section of this chapter is dedicated to Game Theory. These types of simple game models have been used in IR and in foreign policy analysis among others through the years (Beach, 2012:54). It showcases how cooperation can be and lots of times is the best way forward for all participants. It becomes even more relevant when combining it with the institutional liberalist view, which assumes that international organizations can be a place of conduct for game theory (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986).

Furthering the description of the background for this work, the final section of this chapter introduces different IR theories from three main schools of thought. Realism, liberalism and constructivism are outlined briefly using the works of leading scholars. All of these ideas are revisited at the end of this thesis during the discussion as all theories or theorists can be used to try to explain or predict the answer for the research question: What impact would the Weak Veto

proposal have on the United Nations Security Council? The reason for the IR debate being

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5 have been directly influencing the present situation. The first two sections are more practical meanwhile the latter two sections provide a more theoretical background.

2.1. Gould and Rablen’s Analysis

In a 2017 article Gould and Rablen analysed several proposals regarding the UNSC. The fact that some states have a veto, and some do not can easily seem unfair. The writers focus on equality in the sense of the English School’s world society (Buzan, 2001:475). They claim that every eligible citizen – regardless of their country of origin should be able to influence the UNSC the same way (Gould and Rablen, 2017:149). This is a nice way to base the research and their research formulas, but since the representatives who are sitting in the UN both in the General Assembly and the Security Council are not elected directly this idea might be admirable, but it is untestable and not accurate. Different voting systems in different democratic countries are used, none of them are perfect yet we accept these as a workable tool in a representative democracy.

This is not to say that their research is invalid, but merely to showcase their premise of what they have considered fair and/or equal. Even if one considers this premise as a false or unreal claim it is still clear that for France and China to have one veto seems and is unequal. It becomes even more evident through the example of India, which does not have a veto, yet its population is twenty times that of France’s (The World Bank, 2019a and 2019b). On the other hand, if the focus is only on population size, then smaller states could not have a real voice as populous countries would be able to decide everything.

Naturally, many see that the only way to abolish the veto is if the permanent members (P5) vote for it which is highly unlikely (Imber, 2006:329). The proposals that this paper highlights are the Veto+ and the Veto- or Weak Veto (Gould and Rablen, 2017:153). Veto+ was brought forward by the African Union, it advises that 11 members of the UNSC should have the right to veto (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). This means that several non-permanent members would have the right to veto as well. This clearly means that the functionality of the UNSC would decrease and meeting the needed nine affirmative votes without a veto would be even harder (United Nations Security Council, 2021b). It could also mean that more behind the scenes negotiations could occur. It is clear that this proposal would make the UNSC more equal, but is it worth being equal if that means that the SC can no longer fulfil its objectives?

The other proposal mentioned here would weaken the veto, by demanding two permanent members to veto a draft resolution in order for that to fail (Gould and Raben, 2017:153). This idea might lessen the relative power of the permanent members but it does not give a clear

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6 solution to the problem of equity. Especially if one looks at the vetoed resolutions, in several cases Russia and China have vetoed together (Ren, 2014:114). One can make the assumption that since the US, the UK and France are close allies, they would help each other on the UNSC if one were to need an extra veto.

However, this division is not always clear cut, as there have been cases when France was threatening a veto (The Guardian, 2003) and China and Russia have not been close allies, but their interests were similar in several cases (BBC, 2020). These two groups can be categorized in several ways. Firstly, it resembles the Cold War era divide between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, and secondly Russia and China can be seen as autocratic systems unlike the US, the UK and France which are considered democratic states. Thirdly, the P3 are all NATO members (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2021) and the P2 are members of the BRICS (Odeyemi, 2016). This also brings up an important question regarding if it is possible to build a democratic system out of non-democratic states. Looking at the five permanent members through these categorizations, one can assume that the Veto- proposal would not change a lot from the current state in numerical terms.

The article comes to a similar conclusion in regard to draft resolutions as they claim that the possibility to pass a draft resolution rises by a small amount. They also claim that both efficacy and equity of the UNSC would rise, which this paper does not agree with (Gould and Rablen, 2017:159). In their research this was the only proposal that could achieve positive results, but the analysis of this paper will be concerned with the possible negative repercussions of this reform.

The writers of the article have used complex mathematical formulas to analyse the change of equity and function from the already existing status quo (Gould and Rablen, 2017). This method can be seen as a way of taking the personal bias of the researchers out of the equation by making everything numerical. Unfortunately, this can lead to the problem of assuming that every state acts independently. The above-mentioned divisions combined with the double veto could backfire, and instead of making the UNSC more equal, it could cause a wider divide, because Rablen and Gould (2017) do not take into account that alliances are forming, and the vote is not necessarily the three way vote they described it as. The three-way model is referring to the three options a state can choose when voting: in favour, against or abstention (United Nations Security Council, 2021b). In case the Veto- proposal passes, states might change their behaviour when deciding what to vote for, but this will be further discussed in the next section below, when the already existing alliances within the UNSC will be showcased.

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7 Their methodology is valid, and their research has been peer reviewed but the exact steps of their analysis can be questioned in a thorough investigation, beginning with the above-mentioned assumption that every single person eligible to vote should have the same influence on the Security Council (Gould and Rablen, 2017:149). Also, the eligibility for voting changes in every country so that can showcase inequalities too. They discuss the election of the non-permanent members and every states’ likelihood of being elected, since this thesis specifically focuses on the permanent five members and their right to veto, this part of Gould and Rablen’s (2017:150-152) research will not be used in detail.

2.2. Alliances within the UNSC

Odeyemi (2016) wrote research about the alliances within the UNSC using a case study of Syria. His research is important in relation to this paper because his timeframe fits into the timeframe of this paper and clearly discusses the two big parties of the P5. He calls them the P2 and the P3. P2 being China and Russia, while P3 represents the US, the UK and France (Odeyemi, 2016:122). The further analysis will find out if this paper’s findings align with his. He uses the timeframe of 2011-2014 and analyses the UNSC resolutions or failed resolutions regarding Syria, but sometimes uses information from the situation in Libya. His focus is on the BRICS members within the UNSC. He discusses permanent and non-permanent members alike, but this paper only focuses on the P5 therefore my focus is on China and Russia (Odeyemi, 2016:123).

He makes use of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which he discusses in light of previous philosophers such as Grotius and Pufendorf (Odeyemi, 2016:124). The debate centres around the same problem that other researchers have discussed as well, which is the importance of sovereignty and non-intervention versus the importance of human rights (Bellamy, 2009:16). Odeyemi (2016) put his findings in a table where he listed what different BRICS members have said about their reasoning for voting against a draft resolution. He found that during his time period, Russia and China have put an emphasis on the fact that “military intervention is non-acceptable” (Odeyemi, 2016:138). I expect that this reasoning will be found from the Russia-Sino side beyond Odeyemi’s timeframe.

Other research has been focused on the P3 rather than the BRICS members. Curran and Holtom (2015:2) have analysed the discourse of the P3 focusing on the term stabilization. Their research is explanatory and aims to see the diffusion of norms within the UNSC. Their time period aligns with this work’s since they analyse the official document between 2000 and 2014 (ibid). They are using content analysis, which does have advantages and disadvantages to it as

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8 described by Lamont (2015:89-91). Their data selection is interesting since they do not analyse every single meeting document in their time frame but have several criteria to approve a certain meeting document as a valid resource for their research (Curran and Holton, 2015:7). The first and probably most important criteria is the use of stabilization by a representative. The content of their analysis does not hold importance to this paper’s analysis, but some aspects of their research do.

They acknowledge that researchers can only access open meeting documents (Curran and Holton, 2015:11). This is a concern that will be addressed in this piece of work as well, since one can never be sure what has been discussed or agreed upon behind closed doors. Because of this lack of information many research papers can fall into the pitfall of not holding enough depth. Unfortunately, there is nothing to fill in this blank information therefore one’s best defence is to acknowledge the problems, just like Curran and Holton (2015:11) did. This does not mean that their research or any research based on public documents is not valid as it can even be turned into an advantage. In cases like this Curran and Holton’s research (2015) and this thesis’ further on, where discourse is being analysed then public discourse can actually show the intentions of states on what they want to present to the world.

2.3. Game theory within IR

Game theory has been used by IR scholars frequently as it can predict the outcome of policy decisions and the form of alliances (Beach, 2012; Lamont, 2015). These games are also called strategic games as the outcome of one’s own decision depends on the decision of the other player(s). The model also assumes that actors are rational (Lamont, 2015:102), which has been contested based on how rational human beings can be (Beach, 2012).

The basic idea is that with mutual cooperation, both actors can achieve the best outcome, but with mutual defection they both get the worst outcome. The problem is that the players do not know how the other one will decide, because if one of them wants to cooperate but the other does not then the second one will come out of the deal better but not as good as in the case of mutual cooperation. This thought can occur for the first one as well and if they decide against cooperation and this distrust may mean they both lose. This type of game is often referred to as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Beach, 2012:54).

Luckily, international institutions can offer a place where cooperation can take place and with that the distrust can be eliminated as the sides can discuss how to make and decide on a mutually beneficial agreement (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). Furthermore, international organizations usually have several actors or in this case “players” who need to be kept

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9 accountable but can keep each other accountable as well. Therefore, when a deal is done, the sides can be sure that the other(s) are acting according to the agreement. Another advantage of international organizations, like the United Nations is that information obtained by the organization and by its members can be and should be shared and with that helping all the members to make decisions that are beneficial to all. According to Keohane (1984:245) this actually helps to achieve greater cooperation.

This has been the aim of the United Nations, more specifically its acting body the United Nations Security Council (United Nations, 2021a), especially considering that for a solution to pass cooperation is needed. A draft resolution will not pass if a member with veto power votes against it or if the needed nine affirmative votes are not met (United Nations Security Council, 2021b). As the previous section outlined, there are alliances in the UNSC, but they are not always set in stone. Nonetheless, these two groups can be fit into a two player game if P3 is one of the players and P2 is the other, this will be further considered in chapter 4. Besides using game theory, IR has been concerned with the issue of international governance since its foundation. A couple of these notions are described below.

2.4. International Relations Debate

Morgenthau (1948:29) said that every kind of politics is “a struggle for power”. He also argues that nations are not always involved to the same extent at the same time (Morgenthau, 1948:30), which could be drawn in comparison to how active or inactive certain states are within the UN, be it the UNGA or UNSC. Importantly, political power has to be differentiated from physical violence, therefore the real political power can be the threat of using force. Naturally, there has to be a great amount of force at the disposal of the threatening side, otherwise it would not be able to exert that power but nonetheless, these two are not the same as there is a small but important distinction (Morgenthau, 1948:31).

He specifically addresses the United Nations as well. He clearly states that only the superpowers are able to make decisions, who are sitting in the Security Council (Morgenthau, 1948:319-320). It needs to be mentioned that when Morgenthau wrote this in 1948 the situation of global politics and power relations were vastly different. In the beginning, Taiwan was a member and China was not, as well as France became a member, which basically lost the war but the other superpowers could save it. Nonetheless, at the time these power relations were clearer than they are today, hence calls for a reform. He focuses a lot on the fact that the General Assembly has very limited rights and the Security Council can easily influence the debates that are happening (Morgenthau, 1948:320). He claims that even though the Charter would suggest

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10 a democratic organization, it still resembles an autocratic functioning because of the Security Council (Morgenthau, 1948:321). Because of his argument that the structure of the organization is autocratic he does not discuss the meaning of democracy.

Institutional liberalism sees that institutions are needed to hold a place for the interactions among states to ensure cooperation (Keohane, 2012:126). This school of thought can be seen as the basis of the United Nations. As institutional liberalists believe that there should be international institutions - with restraints naturally – which can facilitate the betterment of human lives and can be the field of sustained cooperation (Keohane, 2012:127). These ideas are written in the United Nations Charter as well (United Nations, 2021b). But in order to achieve some form of authority, there needs to be a collective acceptance of the ruler (Lake, 2009:18). Even if we assume that the United Nations has been accepted by every member state the existence of the Security Council can be questionable. Since this paper does not see a real possibility of abolishing the Security Council nor does it think it would help the United Nations, this thesis is going to focus on sole reform proposals to make the UNSC as equal as realistically possible while keeping in mind the importance of effectiveness.

Keohane (2012:135) agrees with the realist notion that international institutions are built on power and they change with power. This might not be as true as it seems since critique has been brought up against the UN in regards to Responsibility to Protect, that even if they manage to use it institutionally, the power is still unequal within the United Nations Security Council (Ralph and Gifkins, 2017:642). Especially when considering the rise of the BRICS (Gray and Murphy, 2013:184). Even though it seems like global politics is changing, the structure of the United Nations has hardly changed since its foundation (United Nations Security Council, 2021).

In constructivist IR anarchy in the international system is viewed as a socially constructed reality (Wendt, 1992). Wendt (1992:399) explains the anarchy connected to power politics in different ways, one being that self-help can be considered an institution. Also that the basis of interests are identities (Wendt, 1992:398) when discussing the SC, these identities can play a part, for example how the US poses itself as the democratic ideal. Wendt (2003:491-492) goes even further, claiming that eventually a world state is going to be needed, but it will not happen for 100-200 years.

There are two different processes that are happening and/or going to happen, which are pointing to or will help the establishment of the world state. These two processes are the micro- and the macro-level. The first one refers to the bottom-up approach, in this case self-organization and the latter one refers to a top-down approach from structural constitution

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11 (Wendt, 2003:498). The account presented by Wendt is mostly theoretical and philosophical so when discussing it with real life examples these two categories could be exemplified by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations. The EU is the bottom-up organization, which is the closest we have to a supranational state at the moment. The UN represents the structural top-down method, with the Security Council led by the supposed superpowers. According to him then, both of these processes are needed and the UN could lead this progress. This can show why a reform is needed, so when the process is far along the system is already more democratic. In light of the aforementioned debate within IR this proposal is particularly puzzling, therefore this attempt to conceptualize this proposal with a reform of the UN could add to the field. These are far from all the debates and ideas that have been part of the debates in the field, nonetheless these include some major ideas that can be useful for the analysis.

2.5. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the context in which the puzzle is analysed further on. The first two sections of this chapter gave the hands on background information for this study. A thorough description was provided about the Weak Veto proposal and the previous analysis that has been conducted in regards to it. Later the alliances have been described, the choice for these specific studies can be explained by their timeframe as it matches the scope of this paper’s.

The theoretical sections detailed game theory and different IR schools of thought. These are the ideas that are necessary to build up the discussion at the end of this work. Different theories are needed in order to explain the world around us and to predict the possible outcomes of different situations. All of the sections in this chapter are revisited at a later occasion as all of these provide important information for this thesis.

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12 3. Methodology

In this section the methodology is outlined. It is built up to conduct a several step analysis, which is divided into two main parts with the overarching aim to answer the research question which reads as: What impact would the Weak Veto proposal have on the United Nations

Security Council? The above mentioned two parts are correspondent to the two hypotheses

outlined below. Hypotheses are regarded mostly as a tool for positivist research and have been criticized when used for interpretive analysis like discourse analysis (Halperin and Heath, 2017:119). Nonetheless, having premises can be a useful guide when conducting a research when possible outcomes are considered and several options can be tested, as the aim of this study.

The first section outlines the two hypotheses in detail and the reasons of having those specific hypotheses. These will guide the analysis chapter of this paper. Continuing with the chapter the instruction for data selection. This is an important part of the research, because the validity of the data can suggest the probable validity of the research as a whole. In this case official meeting records are used from UNSC meetings. These are collected from the official UN website. After outlining the data the sections discuss how that said data is used.

Firstly, the quantitative analysis sheds light on the voting habits of the P5 in the last decades. This part is strictly numerical and aims to find tendencies in the last two decades. It considers all the times a state has used its veto, if two states used their vetoes simultaneously and what were these in relation to. The data from abstaining states is considered as well and are put in a table. Secondly, the discourse analysis aims to find out how states would have or could have changed their positions had this proposal been already in effect. In order to be able to determine the outcome the exact details of the discourse analysis is written and a supporting table for the analysis is provided.

The final section of this chapter addresses the concern of biases. As with every research made by humans, especially within social sciences, this paper has inevitable biases. As it is impossible to completely surpass having biases in a research, addressing them and working around them is the best defence.

3.1. Hypotheses

The methodology aims to find the answer to two major hypotheses regarding the proposal. The first one being if it would change a lot in simple numerical terms. Would similar amounts of

draft resolutions fail as before or the number of them would drastically decrease? The

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13 of vetoes and abstentions suggests that there are already two main blocks existing who are abstaining/vetoing together.

The next hypothesis regards the outcome of this reform politically. Opposite to what the Rablen and Gould (2017) research found, this hypothesis tests the realist view of IR, especially the discussion during the Cold War. Nonetheless, Rablen and Gould (2017) conducted their research on a mathematical baseline, meaning that they did not differentiate between the different members or their alliances. Their model is closer to a traditional game theory model, probably that is the reason that game theorists have reacted to their paper (put in those articles).

This thesis assumes that by making the rule that two vetoes are needed for a resolution to pass, alliances are going to form, which are going to be stronger than what we can already assume. When veto is working the way it normally does, which means that one veto stops a draft resolution to become a resolution, then every state acts in a way that they only veto something if it is really bad for them for any reason. But if two vetoes were needed then it is safe to say that a lot more hidden negotiations would happen, and countries would use their veto as a currency. Furthermore, the alliances would become stronger and with that a greater almost Cold War-era competition would be created which would make the UNSC to be in a worse deadlock than it already is. This study assumes that the divide is going to be Cold War-era as well, assuming that there will be a Sino-Russian block and a Western block consisting of the US, the UK and France, just as it has been discussed in the literature review.

3.2. Data Selection

This paper uses the verbatim transcriptions of the UNSC meetings when they vetoed draft resolutions, this means that draft resolutions that failed because of the veto are taken into consideration. The ones that failed because they did not reach the needed nine affirmative votes are not taken into consideration even if veto powers have voted against it. These documents are downloaded from the official UN website, which is publically available (undocs.org). The time period analysed is the last twenty-one years, from 2000 January 1th until 2020 December 31th.

Studies have been conducted about the UNSC and the behaviour of its members, some of these were outlined previously (see chapter 2). For the purpose of this study, it is important to use primary sources. It is safe to assume on the other hand that representatives do not always tell the whole truth during these meetings, but since it is impossible to know what was happening behind closed doors, this is still the most reliable data to be found. All documents are in English, many times the representatives have been speaking in English but when they were not the document clearly states which language that representative was speaking.

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14 However, the speech is only written in English on these documents, but the original version is available as well on the official website. This research continuously uses the English version.

3.3. Quantitative Part of the Methodology

As mentioned, the main focus is on the Veto- or Weak Veto proposal. In order to grasp if requiring two permanent members to veto resolutions simultaneously for it to fail will make a significant change in regards to power relations and the amount of failed draft resolutions, one needs to analyse the problem from different angles. The two main ways this work is looking at this problem are the quantitative and the qualitative side. A disclaimer needs to be presented before diving into the details of the methodology. This reform has never been implemented, therefore the P5 did not act accordingly to it, it is safe to assume that they might have acted in a different manner had the reform been in effect and that is what this research tries to find out, but in order to make a safe prediction of how they will act, one needs to analyse the recent past. The quantitative part is the more straight-forward method. All the vetoes from the past twenty-one years are looked at. This information is important in two different ways. Firstly, it provides clear data on the percentage of double vetoes out of all the vetoes. If this number is relatively high, then a hypothesis can be drawn, which would assume that even if the Veto- proposal passes, it still would not make a big change. The other type of data that is collected based on this is concerning the states who vetoed, especially when it comes to double vetoes. Which are the states that have been vetoing together? Maybe more than on one occasion? Can this be a proof of another hypothesis regarding the alliances within the SC? Expanding on this, the abstentions are analysed numerically and qualitatively. How many abstentions happened and who were the ones to abstain?

3.4. Discourse Analysis

The analysis continues with a discourse analysis, which is very similar to content analysis. These two are not exactly the same and the differences are outlined now. Content analysis codifies a type of communication. It can be used to analyse texts like in this paper case, but photographs, films and other types of media can be analysed as well. When conducting content analysis the researcher codifies a text for example on how often or how many times certain words can be found. Therefore the researcher will get numerical data, but the basis of this analysis is still qualitative, since the researcher will decide what kind of words he/she is looking for (Lamont, 2016:77). Naturally, this method is not perfect, since it cannot see the context as

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15 clearly as the method outlined below. On the other hand it can provide you with data that can be handled a lot easier because it is numerical.

Discourse analysis can be viewed as a similar method, but this method is purely qualitative and therefore interpretive. It puts a big emphasis on language and tries to understand the communication behind it. The reason this method is considered as well, is because in this case speeches will be analysed. Unfortunately, there are downsides of using this method as well. As mentioned before it is subjective, which leads to bias (Lamont, 2016:91). Another problem that this paper would face is further discussed below, that this method puts a huge emphasis on language but data in question is always translated to English but the original speech might have been held in a different language. Nonetheless, this method is more fitting in this paper than content analysis, the main reason being that content analysis is not well used to see the context of certain words or phrases. The next paragraph will outline how this method will be used.

First one needs to find the general trend of reasons why nations have vetoed draft resolutions. Firstly, the 39 meetings where someone vetoed are considered and the speech made by the vetoing country is analysed. The aim is to find words or phrases that keep reappearing when that said state vetoed. The type of words or phrases that this paper is looking for are the ones criticizing the draft or the states who submitted it. Preliminarily, this paper assumes that these words are going to be similar to unfair, unbalanced, bad and worse. The further analysis determines exactly which words are going to be used. As this paper aims to create a general framework, the part when a representative is speaking about the particular country does not bear huge importance, rather the focus is about the draft resolution discussing that said country or situation. It is not a huge difference but it is important to make this distinction in order to create a precise analysis.

The findings are put in a table in a similar fashion as Odeyemi (2016) has used it in his research and that table is searched through to find the recurring instances. The first hope is that there are some themes that all vetoing states have mentioned one time or another. If that is not the case then this paper is to group the discourses according to the two blocs of the UNSC. The P3 and the P2 as described in the literature review section above. After this has been established these words and phrases are searched in the speeches of abstaining states to see if they had a similar discourse. If so then the analysis concludes that the abstaining state would vote against the draft if two vetoes were needed. This means that even if the state representative has only mentioned it once, the conclusion is drawn that they could have changed their minds and voted against that said draft.

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16 3.5. Addressing Biases and Shortcomings

When using discourse analysis several biases can arise. Firstly, that the biases of the writer of this work will inevitably be present. The above mentioned framework should be a good tool to eliminate unnecessary bias. Unfortunately, there are some other built in problems with discourse analysis, namely that when looking at cultural differences, it might provide false data. Especially in this case when several representatives are using their own language which is in many cases not English to make a statement.

This paper does not have the ability to look at all the languages being used which are mostly Chinese, Russian, French, Arabic and Spanish, therefore it relies on the transcription from the UN bearing in mind that translations are always different than original texts or speeches in this case. On the other hand, this paper believes that the UN has a thorough and professional process regarding the handling of translations and transcriptions, but unavoidably there could be some slight personal biases included but the paper assumes that they cannot be big enough to change the meaning of the text.

Furthermore, this paper only uses publicly available documents from the United Nations, but as they several times refer to in meetings as well, there are negotiations happening behind the scenes before voting and during the process of writing up a draft resolution. As outlined above, there is no way of knowing what happened during those discussions, nonetheless it is important to acknowledge that unfortunately the whole picture will never be available.

3.6. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the practical basis on which the research is carried on. As mentioned, a two-step analysis follows which combines quantitative and qualitative research. This is important in order to have valid research as a combination of different research methods can provide a holistic view about the research problem. Just as important is the acknowledgment of shortcoming and biases which affects every research across the field, in regards to both the researcher personally and the data that said researcher is using. As this research is interpretive, some of these issues are more prominent than in positivist research. The next chapter presents the analysis.

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17 4. Analysis

So far the paper has outlined how the analysis was conducted, but now the actual analysis is taking place. The first chapter described the important background about the Weak Veto proposal as well as the functioning of the UNSC both administratively and politically. Gould and Rablen’s (2017) research is the foundation of this study as that study has provided a thorough investigation of the problem of reforming the UNSC. This research is taking a different turn than what Gould and Rablen (2017) have outlined therefore this can be viewed as a continuation of their research. Especially, since other research about the UNSC has been taken into consideration which is important both theoretically and methodologically. Odeyemi’s (2016) work on the BRICS members is utilised in this section as well.

The discussion has later turned into a theoretical discussion from game theory and major schools of IR, which is utilised in the last chapter of this thesis, when the discussion is provided. After these, the methodology chapter clearly indicated how the analysis is conducted in order for the paper to be able to answer the research question: What impact would the Weak Veto

proposal have on the United Nations Security Council? The two step methodology provides a

holistic research. The order of the analysis is the same as it has been outlined in the previous chapter. It starts with the quantitative analysis and continues with the qualitative one.

4.1. Quantitative Analysis

In the above mentioned time period, 39 resolutions have been vetoed by a permanent member (see 8. Appendix 1). The United States have vetoed 14 times, the Russian Federation 25 times, and China 13 times, France and the UK did not use their vetoes. This also means that in the last two decades Russia has been the most active vetoer in the SC. In 6 cases only one state used its veto and no one abstained. Out of the total 39 vetoes 13 were double vetoes. Without exception all of these were vetoed by Russia and China, which also means that China did not veto anything individually. This also means that whenever the US used its veto, it always used it individually. Which suggests that if none of the abstaining states change their minds to a veto then the US is more affected by this proposal than Russia or China. As a matter of fact, the reform proposal would not change a thing for China since it did not veto anything on its own.

Firstly, the amount of double vetoes means that the third of the vetoes were double vetoes in the last two decades, indicating that in these cases the new proposal would not change a thing. However in 26 cases the draft resolutions would have passed since only one state has used its veto. As mentioned above this thesis assumes that the behaviour of states would have changed

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18 if this reform would have been in effect. Therefore now the cases where a state has abstained is considered, which can lead to the assumption that they could have changed their decision.

Country Veto Abstention

China 13 11

France 0 1

Russia 25 0

UK 0 9

US 14 0

Table 1: Vetoes and abstentions

Secondly, in 20 cases someone abstained – none of these 20 cases happened during a double veto – which is slightly more than half of the vetoes. If the analysis comes to the point that in all of these 20 cases the swinger would have swung then this new proposal would only change the outcome of 6 votes, which is 15% of all the cases. This has been calculated by taking the 39 existing vetoes, then deducting the 13 double vetoes. Which ends up being 26, then further deducting the 20 cases when there has been an abstention, which then becomes 6. Which of course means that the reform would not have a huge impact on the outcome but could maybe cause a bigger divide, which the analysis tries to find out. Before stating that all the 20 cases when there has been an abstention will in fact become a double veto the content analysis takes place.

Out of the 11 double vetoes in the last decade, 10 were concerning the situation in Syria (see Appendix, Table 3). This does not prove that Russia and China are close allies only that there are some cases when their interests are aligned with each other. In the past decade that was Syria, which has been picked up by other scholars as well (Odeyemi, 2016). The only other case in which Russia and China were in understanding was in regards to Venezuela. Going back to the previous decade from 2000-2009, these two countries have vetoed two resolutions, one regarding Myanmar and the other regarding Zimbabwe. Russia on its own has vetoed resolutions regarding Cyprus, Georgia (during the Russo-Georgian war), Ukraine, Bosnia, Syria and Yemen. The analysis regarding their reasons is provided later on.

Finally, in the majority of the cases when the US used its veto, it was concerning Palestine, the only exceptions when their veto has not been cast on the question of Palestine was the case of Bosnia in 2002 and the latest veto from August 2020, when they vetoed a resolution regarding “the threat to international peace by terrorist attacks” (UNSC, 01/09/2020:1). Also, interestingly the US has only used their veto once during Obama’s eight years long presidency

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19 but used it three times during Trump’s one term and ten times during Bush’s two terms in the beginning of the 2000s.

The UK has only abstained when the US used its veto, but it was always concerning Palestine. Same with France even though they only abstained once during the research period. As the previous findings would suggest as well (Odeyemi, 2016), China has only abstained when Russia used its veto. Most interestingly, the US and Russia have not abstained at all during this time period. This could showcase them as the two leaders of the two alliances within the UNSC, the US as the leader of the P3 and Russia as the leader of P2.

4.2. Discourse Analysis

This section utilizes discourse analysis during the UNSC meetings. The focus is purely on the meetings when a state has used its veto and only on the state or states which have vetoed. In the first part of this section, just the findings of Table 4 are analysed and during the second part of this section, the findings are applied to the abstaining states to see if they could have vetoed as well.

Writing up the discourse of states in the table has showcased that regarding what the topic was states have been using different discourse. Therefore now the analysis consists of sections where the different situations are categorized. There are two main topics that have been recurring in the last two decades. During the 2000s it was the case of Palestine, and during the 2010s it was Syria, as mentioned in the previous section. Besides these two topics, the two sides were showing clearly as well. Since –again- as mentioned above every single failed draft resolution was vetoed either by Russia or the US, since China only vetoed together with Russia. First, the US’ discourse is considered and then it continues with Russia and China.

As mentioned above out of the 14 times the US has used its veto, only two of them were not concerning Palestine. Whenever the UK has abstained it was always concerning Palestine (see Table 3). The recurring theme in the US discourse has been terrorism, mostly talking about Hamas connected with some form of mentioning of the draft resolutions being unbalanced or unjust therefore would only make the situation worse. Many times claiming that the draft has been biased against Israel. Interestingly, the last vetoed draft resolution has been concerning the threat of international terrorism and the US claimed that “the draft is worse than no resolution at all” (UNSC, 01/09/2020).

Again, as previously expressed, Russia vetoed the most in the research period, total 25 times (see Table 3). Similarly to the US and UK, China only abstained when Russia used its veto. Russia mentioned in several cases that the issue discussed in the draft resolution was not a threat

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20 to international peace or security. Furthermore, several times the Russian representative has claimed that the vote was rushed or that there has not been a consensus among the members therefore it is pointless to vote. Also, the mentioning of the fact that the draft would just make things worse has happened on more than one occasion. This kind of discourse could be seen from the US when they were discussing how the draft is unjust and would alienate one party of the conflict. A further important point that they have made several times has been the mentioning of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This in light of the previous research is not at all surprising, but it does give a good explanation to the actions of Russia. A last interesting point which has not been expected was a phrase specific to the late Russian representative Churkin. He has talked about the Western or the humanitarian troika (troika is a Russian carriage pulled by three horses, therefore this word is used to describe an alliance between three entities too (Merriam-Webster, 2021)) several times in his speeches (put in source). This has not much to do with vetoing drafts but showcases the divide between the P5. Churkin himself thought of the P3 as an alliance.

Finally, China’s discourse is scrutinized. One can begin with the obvious, which the previous research showed that for China sovereignty was an important reason for using its veto (Odeyemi, 2016 and Mu, 2014). Most of the time the Chinese representatives have been using sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity together. They have also mentioned when vetoing that the draft would make the situation in mind worse. Similarly to previous points, China has talked about consensus several times as well, claiming the SC should be united in questions that come in front of it, therefore when they feel the draft is one-sided they use their veto to give a chance for another draft that would be acceptable to all the members.

After describing the different types of discourses used by the above-mentioned three permanent members, some tendencies can be seen as there have been some reasoning that have been used by all three countries. Such as an unbalanced draft connected with the lack of consensus within the members and the overarching theme of it would only make things worse. Therefore this is the first step of the analysis, checking if the abstaining state has used any or all of these terms. If not then the alliance specific discourse follows.

4.3. Speech Analysis of Abstaining States

Hereby, the twenty meeting documents are analysed in which abstaining states have explained why they did not vote against a draft resolution. It is possible that in several of these cases non-permanent members have voted against or abstained on the draft. As the analysis is only focusing on vetoed events, the decision taken by non-permanent members is not taken into

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21 account. The order of these documents are from the earliest date to the latest. The findings of this analysis are in a table below.

The first meeting on the agenda is the 4305th_{meeting from 27}th_{of March 2001 (U.N Doc.}

S/PV.4305). In this meeting two states have abstained: France and the UK. The French representative has talked about another draft that they have been writing with European states including the UK. He describes that since they do not have the support on their draft they will not put it for a vote, but still agree with the cause. And since they have their own draft these European states will abstain from the vote on the agenda (UNSC, 27/03/2001:6-7). The French representative does not talk about the key words and phrases that have been found in the previous section, therefore the conclusion is that France would not have changed its mind even if the reform would have been in effect.

In the same meeting the UK representative explains that the lack of consensus caused this draft resolution to fail. They repeat the same as the French representative, that they think the issue is important but they have another resolution which they think is better to solve the problem therefore they have abstained. As with France, the UK has not used the discourse this paper was looking for therefore, this work discloses that the UK would have not changed its mind and would have continued to abstain.

The next meeting under scrutiny is the 4438th_{meeting which occurred on the 14}th_of

December, 2001 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.4438). In this meeting the situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian question was on the agenda. The US vetoed and the UK abstained (UNSC, 14/12/2001). The UK has expressed how much they condemn terrorism and has mentioned Hamas as well. They have clarified that the reason for abstention is that they think that the draft is not good enough to present a ground for meaningful negotiations and does not present responsibilities equally, which can be interpreted as the draft being unbalanced and/or unfair (UNSC, 14/12/2001:9-10). Based on the fact that the UK has mentioned the draft’s problems of inequality and the terrorism, more specifically the Hamas, which has been their ally’s the US’ discourse, the finding in this case is that the UK would have changed its mind and would have voted against the draft if two vetoes were needed.

The following meeting with an abstention happened on the 16th_{of September, 2003 (U.N.}

Doc. S/PV.4828). The issue and the actors were the same as the previous one. The agenda had the Palestinian question on, the draft has been vetoed by the US and the UK has abstained. The meeting was led by the representative of the UK, who expressed the need for a unified front but also exclaimed that the draft is “insufficiently balanced” therefore unhelpful (UNSC, 16/09/2003:5). This is the type of discourse that has been seen by the vetoing powers therefore,

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22 this paper concludes that the UK would have voted against this resolution if two vetoes were needed.

The next meeting on the same issue, resulted with the US vetoing and the UK abstaining. This meeting was the 4842nd_{on the 14}th_{of October, 2003 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.4842). This meeting}

lasted for only 10 minutes and the representative of the UK did not speak (UNSC, 14/10/2003). As the criteria for this analysis is to evaluate the speeches made by the representative of a country and in this case this did not happen, the paper needs to disclose that it is undecidable how the UK would have acted in a Weak Veto scenario.

Continuing with the next meeting on the 25th_{of March, 2004 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.4943). The}

agenda of the 4934th_{meeting was the same as the ones previously and the outcome was the}

same as well. The US used its veto and the UK abstained. The representative of the UK explained that the reason they have abstained is because the draft was unbalanced and condemns only one side of committing terrorism (UNSC, 25/03/2004:4). As the usage of these words and phrases correlates with what the criteria has framed, it is concluded that the UK would have voted against this draft.

Continuing with the decade of the 2000s, the theme has stayed the same. On the 5th_of

October, 2004, the SC had a meeting on the question of Palestine named the 5051st_meeting

(U.N. Doc. S/PV.5051). The US voted against and the UK abstained. In the statement of Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the UK has called on both sides to end the violence. The UK did not use the word unbalanced or unfair when referring to the text but it did say that the text puts the fault on only one side of the conflict (UNSC, 05/10/2004:6). This paper thinks that this wording can be equivalent to the word unbalanced therefore concludes that in a different scenario, the UK would have voted against this draft.

The question of Palestine was on the agenda at the 5488th_{meeting as well which was held}

on the 13th_{of July, 2006 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.5488). The outcome has stayed the same as in}

previous cases, the US voted against and the UK abstained. The UK has used the same wording as before when explaining their abstention. They have claimed that the draft was not sufficiently balanced and it did not recognize the gravity of the situation. They think that more time could have allowed the members of the Council to come up with a draft that is balanced (UNSC, 13/07/2006:5). Sir Emyr Jones Parry’s speech fulfils the criteria of a change in decision, therefore the conclusion is that the UK would have changed its abstention to a vote against.

In the 5565th_{meeting of the SC, the same issue was discussed (U.N. Doc. S/PV.5565). On}

the 11th_{of November, 2006 the members voted on the question of Palestine. The draft was}

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23 rhetoric as it did before claiming that the draft is not sufficiently balanced reiterating that any kind of solution needs to be balanced and “serve the interest of both parties” (UNSC, 11/11/2006:3). As the UK’s rhetoric follows the cases before, in this case too the UK would have changed its vote to against.

In the next eleven cases, Russia has vetoed and China has abstained. During all these meetings the Chinese representative has spoken Chinese and this paper analyses the official translation to English provided by the UN. In the latter part of the cases the meetings were concerning Syria. But before that, one can begin with the meeting held on the 15th_{of June, 2009}

(U.N. Doc. S/PV.6143). The 6143rd_{meeting has discussed the issue of Georgia (UNSC,}

15/06/2009). The Chinese representative did not mention an unbalanced draft or that it would only make the situation worse. He did however express the need for a consensus within the SC, which is a common theme from China when vetoing. China has also talked about the importance of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, which has been used as a reason to veto by both Russia and China. Therefore this paper concludes that it would have been in China’s interest for this resolution to fail, therefore they would have changed their minds.

On the 15th_{of March, 2014 the SC discussed the issue in Ukraine (U.N. Doc. S/PV.7138).}

In the 7138th_{meeting, Russia has vetoed and China has abstained. China has spoken about the}

importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and also about the need of consensus, since the draft in its current stage would escalate the situation (UNSC, 15/03/2015:page number). These notions have been described above as discourse used by the permanent members when exercising their right to veto.

During the 7481st_{meeting, on the 8}th_{of July, 2015 the members of the SC were discussing}

the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia voted against and China abstained (U.N. Doc. S/PV.7481). The Chinese representative has expressed his sorrow over a forced a vote, when there is no consensus among the members (UNSC, 08/07/2015:7). China made a further statement expressing the importance of Bosnia’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Furthermore, said that voting on a “contentious draft” is unwise and causes a divide within the Council members (UNSC, 08/07/2015:17-18). As this discourse is similar to the criteria of a changed decision, the conclusion draws that China would change its mind.

The next meeting under scrutiny is the 7498th_{meeting, which took place on the 29}th_{of July,}

2015 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.7498). The meeting concerned Ukraine, and the draft was vetoed by Russia and China abstained. China explains that the reason for their abstention is that there is no consensus within the SC and the vote has been pushed forward even with the known concerns of several members (UNSC, 29/07/2015). Since the lack of consensus has been a

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24 common theme of speeches when justifying a veto, and now it is present in the Chinese representative’s speech as well, the conclusion is drawn that China would have changed its abstention to a vote against.

In the following meetings the focus was on the Middle East and in all but one case about Syria. The first meeting on this list is from the 8th_{of October, 2016 numbered as the 7785}th

meeting (U.N. Doc. S/PV.7785). At this meeting two different drafts were voted on. The first one failed because of the Russian veto (China abstained) and the second one did not meet the required 9 affirmative votes. When the Chinese representative spoke, he discussed both of these drafts simultaneously. About the first draft, China expressed that it did not respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Syria. They further expressed that there was no consensus among the Council members. China thinks that the second draft which they voted in favour of respected Syria and was a better way to deal with the situation in the Middle East (UNSC, 08/10/2016:14-15). These notions fit the requirements especially when putting it together with the fact that another draft has been provided as well, which according to China worked better. So it is reasonable to assume that China would have voted against the first draft to stop it from passing.

The same issue has been discussed in the next meeting that this paper looks at. It was the 7922nd_{meeting, which took place on the 12}th_{of April, 2017 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.7922). The}

outcome was the same as well, China has abstained while Russia exercised its right to veto. China once again has mentioned the lack of consensus among its members, which China thinks is a problem and a draft should be created in which there is an agreement between members. The Chinese representative has also talked about the “Syrian-owned and Syrian-led principle”, which can be drawn parallel to the respect of sovereignty, which is really important to the BRICS members (UNSC, 12/04/2017:6, previous research). Based on this discourse, it seems to be in the interest of China for this draft to not pass, therefore this paper concludes that China would have changed its mind.

The agenda of the next meeting was similar to the ones before. At the 8073rd_{meeting of the}

SC, which took place on the 24th_{of October, 2017 the members were discussing the situation}

in the Middle East (U.N. Doc. S/PV.8073). Russia started this meeting by proposing to adjourn this meeting to allow more time for negotiations. The vote has failed but China voted in favour of postponing the vote (UNSC, 24/10/2017:2-3). China repeats the same issue of lack of consensus and uses this to reason why they voted in favour of adjourning this meeting and why they abstained (UNSC, 24/10/2017:12). As this was the same reasoning they used before, the conclusion is the same as before as well, that China could have voted against this draft.

The Possible Prospects of the Weak Veto reform proposal for the United Nations Security Council : A discourse analysis of United Nations Security Council meeting documents