Examining Discourses of Women in Ground Close
Combat:
How the potential for gender equality in the British
Armed Forces has been limited by the construction of
gender differences.
Amelia Pulvertaft
Supervisor: Alma Persson, Gender Studies, LiU
Master’s Programme:
Gender Studies – Intersectionality and Change
Master’s thesis 15 ECTS credits
CONTENTS
Abstract ---
3
Key Words ---
3
Acknowledgements ---
4
Introduction ---
5
Contextualising the British Armed Forces ---
6
Gender in Organisation ---
7
Examining Gender in the British Armed Forces ---
10
Rationale ---
12
Source Material and Method ---
13
Findings ---
16
The Report on the Review of the Exclusion of Women from Ground Close Combat Roles (2010) --
16
Women in Ground Close Combat Findings Paper (2016) ---
22
Analysis ---
25
Cohesion ---25
Physical Capacity ---34
Discussion ---42
Conclusion ---45
Bibliography ---47
Appendix 1 ---59
ABSTRACT
In 1997, 70% of British Armed Forces roles were opened to women. Women were still excluded from ground close combat (GCC) roles, where the primary purpose is to close in on and kill the enemy at short range, usually under 30 metres, using weaponry or hand to hand combat. Excluding women from GCC roles in the military was covered under Section 85(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. In order to legally retain the exclusion, the European Community Equal Treatment Directive stipulated that a review of the role of women in certain ground close combat environments should be undertaken every eight years. In this study I will be using post-structural policy analysis to examine the ways the 2010 and 2016 reviews on women in ground close combat have constructed gender difference. The findings have shown that cohesion and physical capacity have been deemed essential to combat effectiveness, therefore in this study I argue that the subtexts of these “essential” factors of combat are actively limiting the potential for gender equality in the British Armed Forces.
KEY WORDS
Military masculinities , male dominated organisations , British Armed Forces ,
gender equality , female inclusion , homosociality.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I’d firstly like to thank Alma for her endless support, wisdom and invaluable contributions. I have really valued having your expertise to guide me. Secondly, I owe a lot to my co-tutor group; I have loved our time spent together online, and your contributions and complications which always make me think differently. Finally, as always, a big thank you to my loved ones for always encouraging me to pursue the things I want to do. I really appreciate your time spent listening to me ramble on about the British Armed Forces, and of course your time spent proofreading. As cliché as it sounds, I couldn’t do it without you all.
Writing this thesis has been a surreal experience. At the beginning of this writing process the whole world went into pandemic mode, and the UK went into lockdown. Sitting and writing this thesis has been an unexpected relief from the current chaos of life, and I have found great comfort in studying.
INTRODUCTION
The British Army is one of the largest public sector employers in the UK, beaten to the top by the increasingly invaluable National Health Services in England and Scotland, and the Police Force (ONS, 2019). In October 2019 The British Army employed 109,090 people (Regulars and Reserves), making up 60.1% of the combined British Armed Forces1 (see Appendix 1). The British Army prides itself on being an inclusive employer that attracts the best of the talent in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and is a “true representation of the society it aims to defend” (Army Website, 2020e; 2020c). Despite these claims, only 10.8% of current personnel are female and 12.1% are from the BAME community (MoD, 2019b; 1), contradicting their statement of representation.
On the 25th October 2018, all roles in the British Armed Forces (BAF) were opened to
women, including the closely contended ground close combat (GCC) roles (Army Website, 2018). This removed the final physical boundary limiting women in the BAF and validated the BAF as an inclusive employer. Lifting this exclusion saw the end of a four-year review process that began in 2014 (MoD, 2014c; 2016b; 2016c). The exclusion of women from GCC military roles was covered under Section 85(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (GOV, 1975; 57), however the European Community Equal Treatment Directive stipulated that the BAF had to review the exclusion of women from GCC every eight years to ensure that derogation from the act was still justifiable (Cawkill et al, 2009; 1). In this study I will be exploring the problematic representations of women in ground close combat (WGCC) roles, and how the 2010 and 2016 reviews of WGCC have constructed and re-articulated gender differences over time.
It is important that I state how I use the terms “male” or “men” and “female” or “women” early in this study. I use them the same way as the British Armed Forces do, in the binary definitions. Whilst there are conflicts of doing so, invalidating the experiences of those who do not identify in this way (non-binary) and conflicting my own opinions of the terms, I wanted to be consistent with both my uses, and the way the BAF use them. This should not be taken to assume that I hold essentialist notions of these definitions. Similarly, I also refer to “sex” and “gender” differently throughout. In this study I align theoretically with West and
1 The British Armed Forces is the combined name for The Royal Navy / Royal Marines, The Army and The Royal Air Force.
Zimmerman who distinguish the terms well: “Sex, [...] was what was ascribed by biology: anatomy, hormones, and physiology. Gender, [...] was and which is constructed through psychological, cultural, and social means.” (West and Zimmerman, 1987; 125). This draws on an established theoretical framework that understands gender as socially and politically constructed; a performance which evolves and is maintained and challenged in social interactions (West and Zimmerman, 1987; 125; Woodward and Winter, 2006; 47; Persson, 2012; 137). Whilst I acknowledge that these understandings of sex and gender have been widely debated (see Einstein, 2007; Jagger, 2015), these debates are beyond the limits of this study and the empirical material used. Therefore, when referring to ‘differences’ throughout this study, I will be referring to ‘gender differences’ in terms of constructed differences based upon stereotypes, and ‘sex differences’ as biological or anatomical differences.
CONTEXTUALISING THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES
The contributions of women in the British Armed Forces (BAF) was formally recognised after World War II (Cawkill et al, 2009; 7), specifically with celebration of the effortstowards voluntary, medical and air force services and the permanent creation of the Women’s Forces2 in 1949 (RAF, 2018). Further changes took place in the 1990s, and in 1997 70% of roles were opened to females (Brooke-Holland, 2014; 3). This increase from 47% saw women able to take more active military roles in combat support onboard ships, as pilots and in the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers (Cawkill et al, 2009; 7). However, until 2018, women were still excluded from participating in Ground Close Combat (GCC) roles in the Royal Marines General Service, the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps, the Infantry, and the Royal Air Force Regiment. The primary function of GCC is to close in on and kill the enemy in close proximity, with the potential of fighting hand to hand (Woodward and Winter, 2006; 46; Dunn, 2007; 469; Cawkill et al, 2009; 7). Excluding women from GCC roles in the military was covered under Section 85(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (GOV, 1975; 57; in order to legally retain the exclusion, the European Community Equal Treatment Directive stipulated that a review of the role of women in certain ground close combat environments should be undertaken every eight years (Cawkill et al, 2009; 7). The first review was conducted in 2002, then again in 2010. The next review was not due until 2 “The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) was formed in 1939 to support the RAF in WWII. Whilst the WAAF did not recruit aircrew, a large selection of ground trades were open to them” (RAF, 2018). In 1949, this strength possessed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) was renamed “Women’s Royal Air Force” and remained a subsection of the RAF until they merged in 1994 (RAF, 2018).
2018 and this was not going to be reconsidered until the UK withdrew its forces from conflict in Afghanistan in late 2014 (Brooke-Holland, 2014; 2). Therefore in 2014, Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond brought the review forward because he “was concerned of the message it sends to women” (ibid; 3). As of October 2019, there were 15,650 women serving in the BAF, 10.8% of the total 144,650 personnel. These statistics vary across the three main services: women constitute 9.7% of the Royal Navy/Royal Marines (3,170 in total, 11.5% of Officers and 9.2% of Other Ranks3), 9.7% of the Army (7,670 in total, 12% of Officers and 9.2% of Other Ranks) and 14.7% of The Royal Air Force (4,820 in total, 17.6% of Officers and 9.7% of Other Ranks) (MoD, 2019b; see Appendix 1). Since January 2002, the overall number of personnel employed by the BAF has decreased, and the percentage of women employed has increased. However, in this 17-year period, the percentage of women in the BAF has only increased by 2.5%, despite drives for a more diverse and inclusive workforce (Woodward and Winter, 2004; 281; MoD, 2019b). Examining gender equality in
organisations has become increasingly apparent in today’s changing social climate, with interrogation of organisations with evidence of low female representation. The BAF, as a male dominated organisation, has essentially defined the “soldier” in opposition to femininity and therefore we must begin to examine the ways the standards and values of the organisation have been defined by gender.
GENDER IN ORGANISATIONS
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, feminist scholars began to theorise gender in organisations (Acker, 2012; 214). They criticised conventional organisational research (e.g. Crozier, 1964 and Landsberger, 1958) for ignoring the importance that gender played on organisational structure and working life (Acker, 2012). Theories of gender in organisation often begin with Acker and Van Houten (1974), who reexamined two studies that had a significant impact in the field of complex organisations: the Hawthorne studies and Crozier’s study of two French bureaucracies (ibid; 153). Their findings suggested that within organisations there is a sex structuring where differentiation is made between male and female jobs, with a hierarchal ordering of these roles that often places male jobs in a higher position of power (ibid; 152). They noted that there was preferential recruitment of women into production-based roles that were subservient or dependent on the male dominated leadership or managerial roles (ibid;
158). Acker and Van Houten concluded that identifying gendered processes was essential in analysing organisational structure and processes (ibid; 161). Acker explored this further in 2012 and noted that despite powerful women’s movements, laws mandating equality and the promotion of gender equality, there were still invisible gendered processes in which
organisations functioned (Acker, 2012; 215). They suggested that these processes were part of a gendered substructure where inequality was built into the job design with gendered roles, divisions in wage determination, unequal distribution of decision making and supervisory power, physical design of the workplace and rules for behaviour (ibid; 215). These processes in the gendered substructure can both contribute to, or be constructed by, the organisational culture. Organisational culture in relation to gender defines the ways that an organisation approaches gender differences and equality, and how this may shape the potential for women in that organisation (ibid; 216). It is commonly assumed by employers, and employees, that gender equality can exist in measures of equal pay, female representation in managerial roles or policy change (ibid; 216). But often, these logistical factors appear to promote gender equality by finding women that fit the existing culture, rather than changing the culture to fit women (Wittenberg-Cox, 2015). This suggests that gender equality can be combatted by logistical, organisational factors such as changing a policy, rather than acknowledging and transforming the organisational culture that remains.
A more specific explanation of sex segregation in organisations was suggested in 1976, Lipman-Blumen suggested that “occupational segregation of women is a major reflection of the generalized segregation that characterizes all aspects of western social life” (Lipman-Blumen, 1976; 15). Lipman-Blumen introduced a theory called “homosociality”, which began to theorise how the sex segregation of occupational roles was developed. Combining knowledge from child development, sociology, politics and economics, Lipman-Blumen theorised where this domination stemmed from. Male dominance in society was noted as a product of the historical male roles of hunter and warrior, that placed men in a prioritised position of protecting and acquiring essential resources to society – such as territory and food; these roles were inaccessible to women because of their childbearing and child nursing roles (ibid; 17). Lipman-Blumen suggested that the stratification system ranks individuals based on their value to society, and with women being defined by their biological functions, men have systematically been established in more highly valued roles (ibid; 16). Recognising that males “controlled economic, political, educational, occupational, legal, and social
preference and need for same-sex interaction within these organisations was defined as “homosociality” - the platonic attraction, stimulation and interest in members of the same-sex (ibid; 16). In male-dominated organisations such as the military, homosociality is evident in the “band of brothers” narrative where male-bonding has been associated with team
effectiveness (Woodward and Winter, 2004; 192; Cawkill et al, 2009; 31). Male
homosociality plays a large role in perpetuating gender inequalities and the dominance of particular hegemonic masculinities (Bird, 1996; cited in Flood, 2008; 342). When applying this to organisations, the preference of same-sex interaction has excluded women from
certain, male dominated roles. Therefore, homosociality provides an exciting theoretical point of departure to begin the understanding of gender relations in male dominated organisations, such as the military.
Whilst Lipman-Blumen and Acker and Van Houten provide an excellent foundation for understanding gender in organisations, it is important to note that they provide a structuralist framework for analysis. Structuralism builds on the concept that all aspects of human culture, society and life are dictated by structures that build binary opposites and where hierarchies are established (Sturrock, 2003). Structuralism also builds upon theories of governmentality where activities, discourses and practices aim to shape, guide or affect the conduct of people (Foucault, 1979; Foucault et al, 1991). Foucault suggested that governmentality is productive, and desirable citizens are produced through policies, whilst rejecting those that are
undesirable. Structuralism defines gender and sex, and the categorical distinction between men and women, to produce an image of them as essential and fixed categories (see Butler, 2007). The structuralist approach to gender in military organisations suggests that militaries function off of assumptions about gender and their relative femininities and masculinities (Sløk-Andersen, 2018; 56).
Using this knowledge, in this study I take a post-structuralist position. Post-structuralism critiques structural binaries, suggesting that to understand a subject we must examine the subject itself and the systems of knowledge that have produced it. As a multidisciplinary approach, poststructuralism criticises traditional scientific belief that there is an objective truth; it ultimately examines the constructed nature of society, how knowledge constitutes it, but also how it is also subject to change (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016; 13). Post-structuralist gender theory and research have questioned the discourses underpinning gender roles (see Paechter, 2001), and examined how these have contributed to organisational structure and the
sex segregation of roles (see Alvesson and Du Billing, 2009). More specific research into male dominated organisations has examined the construction of compulsory heterosexuality (Flood, 2008), and the ways masculinity has been developed as the ‘norm’ (Guerardi and Poggio, 2007). In this, these studies into gender theory and organisational structure have debated the simplistic binaries of society, organisations or institutions. As Raewyn Connell (2020) suggested, “to speak of masculinities is to speak about gender relations”, in this Connell suggested that discussing masculinities is wholly about discussing the “position of men in a gender order”. In this, these studies into gender theory and organisational structure have debated the simplistic binaries of society, organisations or institutions. In this study, taking a post-structural position, and building on Foucault’s problematisation of
governmentality, I examine discourses that shape the conduct of people and control the ways in which they can use their bodies (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016; 107; Paechter, 2001; 3). In this, I debate the binary oppositions of gender that have been constructed in the British Armed Forces, and how these have negatively impacted gender equality.
EXAMINING GENDER IN THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES
The subject of gender in the British Armed Forces (BAF) is one that has been studied greatly, and broadly. There have been multiple texts regarding gender differences in terms of the physical and psychological impact of the military on performance. For example, Varley-Campbell et al systematically reviewed the literature evaluating changes in the physical performance of men and women following military training (Varley-Campbell et al, 2018). Their aim was to question whether sex specific training would provide better outcomes and optimise training, but they ultimately found no evidence to suggest that sex differences were present (Varley-Campbell et al, 2018; 2636-2367). O’Leary et al (2017; 2018) found that women experienced a greater level of physiological strain during load carrying and training (ibid; 595) and had to work harder than their male colleagues. However, women consistently performed to the same standard, and avoided fatigue better (Varley-Campbell et al, 2018; 2573). Studies into the health and mental wellbeing of women on deployment found that women were at a greater risk of experiencing negative implications, such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression (Haskell et al, 2010; Kline et al, 2013). However, whilst collectively examining the impact of the military on women they criticised the current physical training, and the mental health and wellbeing provisions in the military.There has also been more specific research on the negotiations of gender identity in the BAF and policies aimed at women’s military participation. In 2004, Woodward and Winter looked at three specific features of policies on female participation: “The Expansion of Posts” (Woodward and Winter, 2004; 284), “Gender-Free Physical Selection” (ibid; 286) and “Combat Effectiveness and Gender” (ibid; 289). Overall, they found that the policies
represented the BAF to be positive and enthusiastic about gender equality (ibid; 294). Where sex differences were noted in regard to physical and cognitive performance, equality of opportunity was promoted; specifically, “the skills and attributes that the Army identifies as belonging to women as a group have been viewed as positive assets for today's diverse Army” (ibid; 295). In this, the Ministry of Defence suggested that previously unsuitable female attributes were now an “asset”, finally suggesting a benefit of women in the BAF. In 2006, Woodward and Winter completed a similar study on equal opportunities and diversity management policies in the British Army. They explored the ways that the policies indicated a construction of ideas about gender and gender difference and included the 2002 review of women in ground close combat in their study. They examined the linguistic shift from “equality of opportunity” where minorities have equal rights to education, training and jobs, to “diversity management”, where people have different needs and abilities (Woodward and Winter, 2006; 52). They essentially noted the ways that diversity management suggested that the BAF were not giving in to political pressure for equality, whilst avoiding criticism for their “equality of opportunity” rhetoric in an organisation that is stereotypically white, heterosexual and male (can be seen in MoD, 2016c).
Changes in the approach to female military participation have also been examined in
reference to the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF). The context of the SAF is different to that of the BAF. The staffing of the SAF was based on mandatory conscription for most of the 20th
Century until 2010. Between 2010 and 2018, mandatory conscription was abolished, and when reinstated in 2018, men and women could be conscripted on equal terms. Persson and Sundevall (2019) found that prior to the inclusion of women into the military profession, women were constructed as problematic and not suitable for military roles. However, with growing recruitment difficulties, women were then positioned as the solution or an untapped resource, and their female qualities such as peacekeeping were promoted (Persson and Sundevall, 2019; 1050).
Researching gender has become a lot more complex as a result of intersectionality. Gendered processes do not stand alone but intersect with and are shaped by race and class processes (Acker, 2012; 214). Concerns about the level of racism in the BAF were raised by the Commission for Racial equality in 1997; as a result, an equal opportunities action plan was developed to combat harassment and discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and sex to ensure the equality of opportunity for all (Woodward and Winter, 2006; 49). Whilst I acknowledge the importance of other minorities in the BAF that experience oppression, discrimination and harassment, I agree with Dandeker and Mason who suggest that diversity policies regarding ethnicity and sex are different (2001; 224; 2003; 486), with goals for representation for ethnic minorities, as opposed to issues of opportunity and institutional boundaries for women. Dandeker and Mason importantly explore ethnic diversity in the British Armed Forces thoroughly (1999; 2001; 2003).
RATIONALE
The study of women’s participation in the labour market and within organisations are not new to social or cultural studies, nor are they new in the field of military participation.
However, this wealth of knowledge should not suggest that there are no new conversations to be had. Despite the British Armed Forces organisational structure and policy being changed to open all roles to women, as well as the “gender-less” standardisation of physical
employment standards, statistics show that the percentage of women in the British Army isn’t increasing as greatly as this perceived push for “gender equality” would aspire to. It is
important not to disguise gender equality with the equality of opportunity in the military, as Woodward and Winter suggested, “whilst diversity and equality of opportunity seem a laudable goal, we should not be under the illusion that changing organisational culture is easy; especially not one that that is defined, essentially, in opposition to femininity” (2004; 296). Therefore, in this study I will be exploring the ways the discourse from the 2010 and 2016 reviews into women in ground close combat examine the suitability of women in these military roles. In this, I will explore how the narrative of difference in relation to gender and sex have evolved over time, and how they have limited the potential of women in the BAF, as well as the potential for diversity in the BAF.
SOURCE MATERIAL AND METHOD
The review process of women in ground close combat (WGCC) began in 2002, and the review from 2002 was largely examined by Woodward and Winter (2004 and 2006) for its representation of gender differences. Therefore, my empirical point of departure is in 2010, when the second review of WGCC was conducted and ends with the publication of the 2016 review of WGCC.
The 2010 review process comprised of three main workstrands (MoD, 2010; 2): 1. A review of the recent research literature (published since 2002) on the
effectiveness of mixed-gender teams in a combat environment.
2. An assessment of women’s roles and experience of cohesion in recent operations. 3. Consideration of the experiences of other nations that have employed women in
ground close-combat roles.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) commissioned two authorities to conduct the reviews and The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) conducted workstrand (1) and (3), and Berkshire Consultancy Limited (BCL) was appointed “as an independent research organisation” to complete workstrand (2) (MoD, 2010; 3).
The 2016 Women In Ground Close Combat Findings Paper (MoD, 2016c), saw the end of a two year review process beginning in 2014 with Women In Ground Close Combat (GCC)
Review Paper (MoD, 2014c). The 2014c review found a “positive approach” towards lifting
the exclusion, but in order to maintain safety and combat effectiveness, they recommended a further review into physiological uncertainties (MoD, 2014c; 7). Therefore, in 2016, the Ministry of Defence published an Interim Report on the Health Risks to Women in Ground
Close Combat Roles (2016b). Whilst the primary reports (MOD, 2010; 2016c) provide a
summary and the conclusions of the review documents, I felt that it was important to examine this information as well. As Bacchi said, the non-obvious documents can often find the most problematic representations (2012; 22), and this was evident when choosing the empirical material. The value of examining these specific discourses regarding female military participation is that they directly contribute to the discussion of retaining or removing the policy that excluded women from GCC. Therefore, referencing back to Foucault (1979, 1991), they govern the ways real people are allowed to behave (Bacchi, 2012; 22). In this
material, we can begin to understand why the policy was retained, and how their constructions of gender difference contributed towards it.
My methodological point of departure begins with post-structural policy analysis, as defined by Carol Lee Bacchi (1999, 2009, 2013; Bacchi and Eveline, 2010). Bacchi’s WPR approach stems from the question “What is the Problem Represented to be?” (1999, 2009, 2013: Bacchi and Eveline, 2010) and is used as a critical tool for engaging with public policies (Bacchi, 2003; 21). The method begins with something problematic; in the example of this study the problem is female inclusion in the British Armed Forces (BAF). Traditional policy analysis relies on the concept that policies are designed to solve a problem, placing trust in defined problems and measurable facts (Diem et al., 2014; 1070-1071). The WPR approach challenges these dominant views, and explores the ways that problems are created or produced, rather than solved (Bacchi and Eveline, 2010; 111 - 112). This form of critical policy analysis is a multi-disciplinary approach which acknowledges context, group values, and the contestable nature of problem definition, as well as research findings, and the arguments for solutions (Diem et al, 2014; 1069). The WPR approach has a built-in
emancipatory function (Eveline et al, 2009), which is embedded in the political assumption that the policy benefits some and harms others, whilst always taking the position of those that are harmed.
The method asks a set of six questions whilst reading the policy (Bacchi, 1999, 2009; 2; Bacchi and Eveline, 2010; 110):
1. What is problematised in the policy?
2. What assumptions underlie this representation of the problem? 3. How has this representation been established?
4. What is left unproblematic and how can the problem be thought about differently? 5. What are the effects and consequences of this representation of the policy?
6. How and where has the representation of the problem been produced, disseminated and defended and how could it be questioned, disrupted and debated?
In the next section of this study, I will explore the findings of the 2010 and 2016 reviews of WGCC and the problem representations that are evident, particularly the gender differences constructed around cohesion and physical capacity; this will address question 1 of the WPR
approach. In the analysis I will expand on these problem representations and discuss the assumptions and presuppositions that underlie them, addressing question 2. In reference to question 3, I will then examine the ways the organisational culture and gendered subtexts of the BAF have contributed to these understandings of gender difference. Finally, I will suggest how these problem representations have been left unproblematic and how they have been reinforced in other areas of the BAF, whilst acknowledging the consequences of this; this will address the final three questions of the WPR approach (4, 5 and 6).
Using this post-structuralist approach to policy analysis, the aim of this study is to examine problem representations in the 2010 and 2016 reviews on WGCC. My research question begins with how the policies construct women in opposition to the military image of the soldier and proceeds to suggest how this has limited the potential for gender equality in the BAF.
FINDINGS
In this section I will present the findings chronologically; I will systematically work through the empirical material by the date of publication and summarise at the end of the review process the problem representation, in relation to the WPR approach to policy analysis as stated above.
The Report on the Review of the Exclusion of Women from Ground
Close-Combat Roles, November 2010.
Workstrands (1) and (3) of the 2010 Report on the Review of the Exclusion of Women from
Ground Close-Combat Roles were conducted by The DSTL Group and were conducted by
authors Cawkill, Rogers, Knight and Spear (cited as Cawkill et al, 2009). Their paper on
Women In Ground Close Combat Roles: The Experiences Of Other Nations And A Review Of The Academic Literature assessed the combat experiences of other nations, identifying their
also contacted appropriate representatives within the chosen 18 nations4 in which to direct the following questions (ibid; 15):
1. What are the main changes in your academic literature since 2002 regarding the effectiveness of mixed gender teams in combat environments?
2. Is your nation employing women in combat roles/environments? 3. Has your nation reported difficulties with employing women in combat
roles/environments?
4. Has there been an effect on operational performance? 5. Has team cohesion been assessed – if so how?
6. How has operational performance of mixed gender teams been assessed?
Cawkill et al firstly explored the responses from other nations (ibid; 16-33). They found that “many countries had made significant progress towards increasing gender integration in their militaries by removing limitations on the roles of women” (ibid; 34). At the time of the review Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Israel and Germany allowed women to serve in combat roles, whereas Australia and the US retained their exclusion. The Nordic countries were identified as the most progressive, with specific policies regarding gender neutral inclusion (ibid; 34). In the nations that gave in to external political pressure5, such as Canada and Israel, they noted conflicts regarding female integration in a typically “male culture” where women were stereotyped and discriminated against (ibid; 17). These negative implications were noted to be combatted by good leadership (ibid; 34). The nations with exclusion policies similar to the UK, such as Australia and the US, noted that women “lacked the physical strength” (ibid; 34, 16), were not “emotionally tough or aggressive enough” (ibid; 31), and that “mixed gender units will undermine the ‘male bonding’ that is needed for combat units” (ibid; 31). The UK aligns culturally and socially with these nations and these nations provided a large amount of literature in which the Cawkill et al study found
significant. It was evident that the nations that had successfully integrated women in GCC roles did not note gender differences, and similarly, gender identity was not noted to have an impact of team cohesion. Their militaries were not deemed any less effective for providing
4 The MOD specifically requested that the following nations be questioned: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Ukraine and the United States. Cawkill et al also questioned additional nations: Finland, Norway, Romania, Spain and Sweden.
5 Cawkill et al (2009) explained that Canada (ibid; 17) and Israel (ibid; 24) allowed women into GCC because of legal disputes and political pressure.
women with equal opportunities (ibid; 19). In opposition, the nations that retained their exclusion, did so on the ground of differences between male and females; where female disadvantage was noted in terms of the physical, emotional and aggression required of military performance (ibid; 16, 31). These disadvantages were also used to suggest that women posed a threat to team cohesion (ibid; 34).
The second part of the Cawkill et al (ibid; 35) review was a review of the academic literature regarding the effect of mixed gender groups on cohesion and performance. They highlighted three key focuses: The “relationship between cohesion and performance”, “mixed gender group composition, cohesion and performance” and “leadership and gender” (ibid; 4). In the first section, Cawkill et al found “a small but significant positive relationship between team cohesion and performance” (Mullen and Cooper, 1994; cited in Cawkill et al, 2009; 35). Whilst cohesion did have a positive impact on performance and combat effectiveness, it was not the only factor that contributed towards it. Cohesion was deemed to enable good
performance with team members liking each other, group pride and task commitment enabling performance, rather than enhancing it (Cawkill et al, 2009; 35). Some researchers found that gender didn’t negatively impact team cohesion, but that male bonding was central to team cohesion (Harrell and Miller, 1997; Rosen et al, 2003). This suggested that the male only GCC teams understood cohesion to be dependent of male bonding. However, the identification of masculinity as essential to team bonding was also noted to have negative implications, where excessive cohesion could lead to defective decisions and judgements, with negative consequences6, where groups can deviate (Dion, 2004 and Whyte et al, 2004; cited in Cawkill et al, 2009; 36). This danger of deviation was understood to be combatted by team diversity, exemplified with the integration of women (Cawkill et al, 2009; 36). This reinforced the findings of Leon (2005) and Leon, Nist and Magor (2004) who suggested women had a peacekeeper function, where other team members could confide in them (cited in Cawkill et al, 2009; 38). One researcher proposed that women would negatively affect cohesion for the following factors:
“a) the reduced physical abilities (stamina and endurance) […]; b) forced intimacy and lack of privacy issues; c) the ‘natural’ responses of men to protect women; d)
dysfunctional relationships (sexual misconduct); and e) pregnancy” (Simons, 2001, cited in Cawkill et al, 2009; 38).
Despite claiming that women would have a negative impact on team cohesion and that their biological functions could negatively impact their military performance, neither Cawkill et al or Simons (2001) provided no evidence to suggest that this was true. On the whole, the literature suggested a “potential” impact of women on cohesion, or what “could” happen if women were permitted into GCC teams, rather than explicit empirical evidence to confirm these suggestions.
Berkshire Consultancy Ltd (BCL) were commissioned by DCDS Personnel to undertake
workstrand (2) of the 2010 review (BCL, 2010). They conducted a quantitative assessment on the cohesion of mixed gender teams in recent operations titled Study of Women in Combat –
Investigation of Quantitative Data. Questionnaires were sent to 8718 women and 6000 men,
across all three services7, who had been deployed to Afghanistan and/or Iraq in the period of 2002 – 2009 (ibid; 1). A random sample of 6000 men was selected of the 46,838 eligible personnel as a control group, for comparison to female responses8. Of this sample, 800 men responded, and 1728 women responded and of the total responses, 76% of men had
experienced a GCC situation, compared to 25% of women (BCL, 2010; 17). The questionnaire had two key components; they firstly identified the background demographics of respondents, such as their role in the team, size of the team,
presence/number of attachments, number of women present, how well respondents knew their section, how long they had operated with the team. Then secondly, they established a measure of cohesion (ibid; 11) which was based on the Armed Forces Cohesion
Questionnaire (AFCQ) developed by Siebold and Kelly (1988) for the assessment of the US Army. The AFCQ separates cohesion into three key factors: horizontal bonding, vertical bonding and organisational bonding. It then divides these factors to establish whether they are affective or instrumental. The ways in which these factors were understood can be seen in the table below (ibid; 11):
7 The Royal Navy and The Royal Marines, The Royal Air Force and the Army.
8 The 46,838 eligible personnel were a) of a rank lower than a Lieutenant Colonel and b) were in the following trades: Royal Navy: Royal Marines including reserves. Army: Infantry, Royal Engineers, Signals, Royal
Armoured Corps, Artillery, Cavalry. Royal Air force: Security, Mechanical transport, Medical, Operations Support, Photography, Operations Support, Medical Support, Ops Support. (BCL, 2010; 9)
Affective (A) Instrumental (I) Horizontal Bonding (HB) Peer bonding (HB-A) and
amongst leaders (HB-AL)
Teamwork (HB-I)
Vertical Bonding (VB) Leader Caring (VB-A) Leader Competence (VB-I)
Organisational Bonding (OB)
Values and Pride (OB-A) Rules and Norms (OB-I)
The AFCQ was based on a questionnaire, where questions were grouped in relation to the above cohesion factors (HB-A, HB-AL, HB-I, VB-A, VB-I, OB-A and OB-I). Each question was answered on a seven point scale (1 = low and 7 = high). The questions were designed to imply that 1 = low cohesion and 7 = high cohesion, allowing for an average cohesion rating to be taken. The AFCQ used by BCL suggested that the presence of women in GCC teams lowered the cohesion rating for both male and female respondents in mixed-gender teams. The table below shows the average cohesion scores from all-male teams (All-Male) and from mixed gender teams from male (Mixed(M)) respondents and female (Mixed (F)) respondents. These findings only show the cohesion scores from respondents who reported being present in GCC incidents, responses from non-GCC incidents can be found in (BCL, 2010; 32).
Findings
(BCL, 2010; 28): Cohesion Factor Average All-male Vs Mixed (M) Mixed (M) Vs Mixed (F) All-Male Mixed (M) Mixed (F)HB-A (peer Bonding) 6.24 6.09 5.93 0.15 0.16
HB-AL (peer bonding among leaders) 6.29 6.22 5.95 0.08 0.26
HB-1 (teamwork) 6.34 6.28 6.18 0.06 0.10
HB OVERALL 6.29 6.19 6.04 0.09 0.16
VB-A (leader caring) 6.19 6.05 5.88 0.14 0.17
VB-I (leader competence) 6.25 6.17 5.86 0.08 0.32
VB OVERALL 6.22 6.11 5.87 0.11 0.24
OB-I (rules and norms) 6.25 6.21 5.98 0.04 0.22
OB OVERALL 6.25 6.19 6.06 0.05 0.13
OVERALL COHESION 6.25 6.17 5.98 0.08 0.19
The findings suggested that the presence of women in GCC teams lowered the overall cohesion rating for both male and female respondents. This was made evident by using the “male” team as a control. Men ranked cohesion in mixed teams 0.08 lower than in all-male teams, this was an insignificant difference; whereas overall women ranked mixed team cohesion 0.19 lower than men did. The factors where we see the largest differences, that significantly lower the average cohesion rating by women, are leader competence (VB-I), peer bonding among leaders (HB-AL) and rules and norms (OB-I). These factors collectively suggest that the reason women rated cohesion lower than their male counterparts based on factors that are associated with good leadership. This suggested that a key component to bettering the cohesion rating in this study, would be to examine the leadership in these GCC environments. Despite this, the review concluded that because men rated cohesion lower in mixed gender teams, and women rated cohesion in GCC lower than men, gender was negatively impacting cohesion. The review explicitly acknowledged this problem representation by claiming:
“The critical question is whether this is fundamentally due to the fact of them being female, or a reflection of other impediments to cohesion that happen to be generally true for females – they tend to have shorter lengths of service, know other team members less well, have operated less often and over a shorter time period with their small team/section and to be less likely to be a leader (IC or 2IC). Additionally, the small teams/sections reported on by women tended to have more women and attachments in them.” (BCL, 2010; 40)
This conclusion by BCL suggested that there was no clear evidence to suggest whether the lower cohesion rating was because of gender alone, or the above mentioned organisational factors that generally disadvantaged women in this study. This allowed for gender to be viewed as a threat to cohesion, and women to be problematised.
The Minister for Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans (DPWV) met with service chiefs of the British Armed Forces to consider the results of the findings from Cawkill et al (2009) and BCL (2010) reviews, and decided that there was no clear recommendation for or against lifting the exclusion of women from GCC (MoD, 2010; 4). This decision was based on a “precautionary approach” where maintaining combat effectiveness in the BAF was to be their top priority (ibid). In this decision for a “precautionary approach” it is important to note how women were represented to reduce combat effectiveness. Both Cawkill et al (2009) and BCL (2010) problematised women, suggesting that they proposed a “potential” threat to cohesion. This was based on “perceived” inability, lower physical capacity and an innate unsuitability to combat roles (Cawkill et al, 2009) and the evidence of a lower cohesion rating in mixed-gender teams where women were present (BCL, 2010).
Women in Ground Close Combat (WGCC) Findings Paper - 2016
This 2016 Women in Ground Close Combat (WGCC) Findings Paper saw the end of a two year review process (MoD, 2016c). In 2014, the Ministry of Defence began the review process for lifting the exclusion of women in GCC roles (MoD, 2014c). This review was brought forward from 2018, as the Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond was concerned about the message the exclusion sent to women within and external to the BAF (Brooke-Holland, 2014; 3). This review process was based on the premise that all roles in the BAF should be opened to women unless it would negatively impact combat effectiveness (CE) with an emphasis on an open and evidence-based conclusion (MoD, 2014c; 1).
The 2014 Women in Ground Close Combat (GCC) Review Paper identified the benefits and risks of lifting the exclusion, and integrating women into GCC roles (MoD, 2014c; 3). It identified two key workstrands critical for assessment; cohesion (the basis for maintaining the exclusion in 2002 and 2010), and physiology (how physical training could have a disproportionate impact on women) (ibid; 3). Additional workstrands including the
experience of “recent combat operations, internal and external engagement, other nations and implementation” were also noted to provide context and ramifications of lifting the exclusion (ibid; 3). The review found that in comparison to men, women are typically shorter, lighter, have less muscle, more fat, smaller bones, smaller hearts, lower aerobic fitness, lower oxygen carrying capacity and different muscle composition (ibid; Annex B1). This contributes to a lower upper body strength, lower standard on load carrying marches, higher risk of
musculoskeletal (MSK) injury, pelvic trauma and stress fractures (ibid; Annex B1-2). Where these sex differences have been recognised by inclusive, or more progressive militaries, policies have been developed to include and manage risks to women, such as a lower stride length9 (ibid; Annex B1), and post-partum policies to ensure that the greater risk of MSK post-partum is managed correctly for returning personnel (ibid; Annex B2). The review also noted that only 4.1% of women pass current fitness standards in the British Army, compared to 90% of men (ibid; Annex B2). The review noted its limitations on the different
physiological impacts for men and women in British Armed Forces training and suggested a mid-2016 review should take place to explore this thoroughly. The research ensured that the physiological impacts in GCC for men and women was correctly investigated to ensure accurate mitigation would be in place for the introduction of women to GCC (Annex B4; seen in Ministry of Defence, 2016b).
In assessment of combat effectiveness, the review was careful to not use misleading, ‘modal’ language (‘can’, ‘could’, ‘might’, and ‘may’) that could present information in more than one way and allow for interpretation, and instead used words that clearly stated the findings (‘will’, ‘likely’ or ‘unlikely’). The review identified key factors that contribute towards combat effectiveness and the factors were reviewed using previous literature and by psychological, physiological and military experts (ibid; Annex C1-C9). They found that of the factors negatively impacted by gender integration, only three would pose difficult for mitigation: morbidity, survivability and deployability. All of which are in part impacted by physiology, thus would require further investigation into physical standards and military policies (ibid; Annex C6). Finally, the review found that the current literature on cohesion does not suggest that cohesion is impacted in mixed-gender teams. Where there are negative impacts, they can be overcome by collective training, shared experience and strong
leadership (MoD, 2014c; 5). The review concluded with an implementation planning proposal where they detailed the process in which successful gender integration could be achieved. Overall, the culture of the UK Armed Forces required an upheaval, where structure and procedures promoted inclusion, rather than reinforcing gender differences (ibid; Annex E1). The review also noted that the physical employment standards should be gender-free, standardised and relevant for the role being done, whilst maintaining an emphasis on not lowering standards (ibid; Annex E1). This would ensure that combat teams were always held 9 Australia lowered the stride length for females from 30” to 28”, this has reduced medical discharge rates by 47% (Annex B1).
to the same standard and trained together, aiding cohesion and thus operational effectiveness. The review noted its limitations on the different physiological impacts for men and women in British Armed Forces training and suggested an additional review should take place to
explore this thoroughly. The research ensured that the physiological impacts in GCC for men and women was correctly investigated to ensure accurate mitigation would be in place for the introduction of women to GCC (MoD, 2014c; Annex B4; Ministry of Defence, 2016b). The 2016 Interim Report on the Health Risks to Women in Ground Close Combat Roles developed on the preliminary findings of the 2014 review and conducted an in-depth analysis on the physiological differences between men and women; it then suggested risk mitigations to ensure women were not negatively impacted by integration into GCC roles (MoD, 2016b). Ultimately, it found that the risks to women include disproportionate Musculoskeletal (MSK) injury in women, increased medical downgrading for women, susceptibility of mental ill-health is greater for women than men, and the potential risk to fertility after military training (ibid; 39). All of which could be mitigated by updated physical employment standards (PES) to physically develop personnel correctly, and avoid overtraining; similarly, occupational physicians are required to monitor personnel for early signs of injury and mental ill-health throughout career; all leaders are educated on injury risk, ill-health and prevention strategies; provision of, and access to, mental health first aid for all; education on appropriate training, and post-partum requirements, and dietary needs for women (ibid; 40). Whilst some of these mitigation strategies were directed at the female reproductive organs, other strategies would benefit all personnel.
Summary
Whilst both the 2014 (MoD, 2014c) and 2016 interim report (MoD, 2016b) highlighted the physiological differences between men and women, and how women could be negatively impacted by integration into GCC roles, it is interesting to note the differences from the 2010 review. The 2014-2016 review process suggested that cohesion was no longer a valid
argument (MoD, 2016c; 1), and in doing so the reviews were able to take a positive approach to lifting the exclusion. It is evident that there are two key factors for lifting the exclusion: maximising and accessing talent, and to improve the reputation, and increasing the legitimacy of the BAF (MoD, 2014c; 2016c). These could be understood to suggest that the BAF has a problem with recruitment and is having an image crisis. This suggests why women are now being positioned as the solution to a problem, rather than as the problem themselves.
ANALYSIS
In the research conducted on the 2010 and 2016 reviews on women in ground close combat (WGCC), it was evident that the British Armed Forces (BAF) placed an importance on two key aspects: team cohesion, and the physical capacity of personnel in ground close combat (GCC) roles. These two factors were deemed as essential to combat effectiveness, but by using cohesion and physical ability as key arguments for retaining or removing the exclusion of women in GCC, and constructing women as problematic in both elements, the BAF had gendered their understanding of the two concepts. Therefore, in this analysis, I will be exploring the ways the BAF has constructed gender difference in its conceptualisation of cohesion and in its creation of physical standards and show how this has had a negative impact on the potential for gender equality. As Woodward and Winter suggested, it is not only the policies themselves that are important for analysis, but the wider institutional frameworks that have contributed to this understanding of gender difference (2006; 47). Therefore, I will also be exploring the ways the organisational structure, discourses and subtext of the BAF have contributed to these attitudes towards gender difference.
COHESION
Team cohesion and its importance in combat effectiveness have been central to the debate on female military participation in the BAF, and the impact of women on team cohesion was the specific rationale for retaining the exclusion of women in both 2002 and 2010 (MoD, 2014b; E-4). Cohesion is defined by the UK Defence Doctrine as
“A source of moral fortitude to fight and keep on fighting. Cohesion occurs when individuals want, or are encouraged, to work together, normally to share tasks, provide eachother with support and achieve a common enterprise. Moral cohesion depends on cultural solidarity, shared experiences, a common sense of worth, appropriate discipline and an expressed collective identity, which is sustained by shared common values and standards, it endures genuine and deep comradeship that endures, notwithstanding violence and fear of death and injury.” (Cawkill et al, 2009; 8; MoD, 2014b).
What is significant in this definition is that there is no reference to gender as a contributing factor for good cohesion. However, considering cohesion is a site for debate on WGCC, we
must analyse why cohesion has been understood as significant and why women have been problematised as a threat to cohesion. This definition suggests that value or task based measures of cohesion are dependent on “encouragement” to “work together”, supporting colleagues and sharing tasks to “achieve a common enterprise” (Cawkill et al, 2009; 8; MoD, 2014b). Whereas moral cohesion is dependent on factors such as shared culture, experiences, sense of worth and discipline. However, the “shared collective identity” is the most
questionable factor for cohesion; especially considering it is “sustained by common values and standards” and “endures genuine and deep comradeship”. The “shared collective identity” suggests that moral cohesion is dependent on unit homogeny, where “collective identity” suggests that all members have a unifying identity. As the 2014 review on WGCC suggested, “gender is an obvious self-identity attribute”, and in a male dominated role, “the group prototype of [the] combat unit [embodies] ‘male’, [therefore] the introduction of
females may reduce the level of cohesion” (MoD, 2014c; D-2). This proposes that women are problematic to cohesion because they do not present the “shared collective identity” of the unit, when this identity is based on gender. This was also suggested by Woodward and
Winter when analysing the 2002 review on WGCC, who found that women are not a threat to cohesion because of physical or emotional ability but based alone on their gender and their difference to the majority of the team (Woodward and Winter, 2006; 12). In order to analyse how cohesion has become central to the debate of female military participation, I will be exploring how the gendered subtexts of the BAF are presented in discourse on WGCC. In this I will suggest how the construction of gender difference in male only units and their homosocial relationships have led to cohesion being a viable argument for the exclusion of women from GCC.
The history of cohesion and its importance in combat effectiveness has been conflicting. The BAF has been historically viewed as an unrivalled builder of cohesion, with many personnel serving in the same regiment10 for their entire military career (Major McBreen, 2002; 15). In both periods of peace and in extreme conflict, the British Infantry11 have been viewed as a family unit that maximises the shared spirit of sacrifice and teamwork, whilst minimising “stragglers and deserters” (ibid; 15). But like any concept, the meaning making processes and 10 “The Regiment or Corps is the key administrative component of the BAF. Each has its own long history, traditions and insignia. To its soldier’s, the regiment is a military family that provide comradeship and a unique identity.” (NAM, 2020). The full list of British Army Regiments can be found at (ARMY, 2020)
11 The British Infantry regiment is the largest branch of the BAF and they are at the core of the GCC capability (Army Website, 2020d).
definitions of the term have changed over time. Specifically, the changing definition of what cohesion means for military units and how cohesion can be enforced. Immediately after World War II, several scholars suggested that unit cohesion was essential to military effectiveness (as seen in Hix and MacCoun, 2010; 137). After WWII, Stouffer et al (1949) reported that when soldiers were asked what kept them motivated and performing at a high standard, 14% of them responded with “solidarity with the group” (cited in Hix and
MacCoun, 2010; 144). However, Stouffer et al also suggested that 39% of soldiers responded that “ending the task” was a key driver for maintaining combat effectiveness (cited in Hix and MacCoun, 2010; 144). This suggested that cohesion not only applied to the bonding of the team, but also the group ambition to complete the task. Military scholars furthered this and suggested that cohesion could be understood to be both social and task related (Beal et al, 2003; Dion, 2000; Siebold and Kelly, 1988). Social cohesion was relevant to the nature and quality of relationships and the degree to which members of a unit or team liked, cared for and were close to each other (Cawkill et al, 2009; 11). Task cohesion referred to the shared commitment among members to achieve a common goal, that requires the collective and motivated efforts of the team (Cawkill et al, 2009; 10). The wording of these different factors for cohesion changes between academics and theorists, but the main agreement remains: “success in direct combat rests not only on the fighting abilities of the unit under conditions of extreme hardship, but crucially on the cohesion of that unit” (Woodward and Winter, 2006; 12).
To measure the cohesion of military units, Siebold and Kelly devised the Armed Forces Cohesion Questionnaire (AFCQ) (1988). Created for the US military, the AFCQ was an empirical way of measuring peer bonding and teamwork, leader caring and competence and the teams understanding of values, pride, rules and norms (Siebold and Kelly, 1988; BCL, 2010; 11). Deemed as a “well-established measure of cohesion” (BCL, 2010; 11), this was also the method used by Berkshire Consultancy Ltd (BCL, 2010) in the Study Of Women In
Combat - Investigation Of Quantitative Data to investigate how mixed-gender teams in the
BAF impacted cohesion. The concept of cohesion, and the methods used to measure it, have been criticised for their efficacy. Cawkill et al (2009; 41) suggested that this may be “in part be due to the rather nebulous and multidimensional nature of cohesion as a concept and the fact that it is difficult to define and measure, particularly in terms of team effectiveness”. Here, Cawkill et al refers to the inconsistencies in defining and applying to combat
effectiveness. Similarly, when used in the argument against the inclusion of women in GCC, there was no way of testing whether women could impact cohesion in GCC. This may be in
part because of the “multidimensional nature of cohesion” or because women do not occupy GCC spaces, and there is no way of replicating “highly dangerous” GCC situations (MoD, 2010; 4). Considering that there is “no way of knowing whether mixed gender teams can develop the bonds of unconditional trust, loyalty and mutual support that must be strong enough to survive the test of close combat” (Woodward and Winter, 2006; 12), we must consider how the impact of women on cohesion has been produced. In this, I suggest that cohesion has been defined in masculine terms, with male bonding deemed essential to cohesion, and thus when used against WGCC, women will always be seen as disruptive. As part of the 2010 review of WGCC, BCL (2010) deployed the AFCQ questionnaire to BAF personnel involved in either the Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts to explore the impact women had on mixed gender team cohesion. The findings suggested that female respondents rated mixed-team cohesion lower than male respondents (BCL, 2010; 39) in a combat incident. A “combat incident” was defined by BCL as “an incident where you have come under enemy fire (with small arms over short range on the ground) and a response was required” (BCL, 2010; 49, 55). Comparisons between the respondents who rated cohesion high and those who rated it low found several “non-gender-related” factors that contributed the rating of cohesion (BCL, 2010; 39). Respondents were more likely to rate cohesion high when they knew the other team/section members well and for longer and had operated with them in the past (BCL, 2010; 39). Similarly, the rating was higher when the respondent was more senior, in a leadership role and had a longer length of service (BCL, 2010; 39). Despite defining these factors as “non-gender-related”, BCL later suggested the context behind these findings and why they impacted the cohesion rating. BCL declared the following conclusion:
“A straightforward interpretation of this result is that the presence of women does not reduce cohesion in small teams/sections in combat situations, as perceived by men – but that when women are present they will tend to experience lower cohesion than the men, particularly in terms of the team leadership and the application and
understanding of rules. The critical question is whether this is fundamentally due to the fact of them being female, or a reflection of other impediments to cohesion that happen to be generally true for females – they tend to have shorter lengths of service, know other team members less well, have operated less often and over a shorter time period with their small team/section and to be less likely to be a leader (IC or 2IC).”
In this conclusion, BCL directly reference the differences in employment of the male and female respondents (BCL, 2010; 28). Initially noting these factors as “non-gender-related” (ibid; 39) suggests that BCL have ignored the importance of the gendered subtexts of the organisation that in this example have impacted the respondents’ cohesion rating. BCL highlighted that women were more likely to be “attachments”12 in the combat incident reported, suggesting that they had not operated with their team before, or did not know their team well (ibid; 39). Similarly, male respondents were more likely to be IC or 2IC13 (ibid; 17) meaning that when they are the leader, it could be assumed that they are more likely to rate leadership as good. BCL here explicitly references the findings of their quantitative research, suggesting a potential cause and effect where womens’ roles in the GCC incident could reflect their cohesion rating. However, BCL fails women in their analysis by ignoring the gendered subtext of the organisation. I found that BCL did not reference the boundaries of women in GCC, such as the exclusion of women from GCC roles entirely. In this I suggest that BCL did not acknowledge that they sent questionnaires to women, when they were aware that women were less likely to be involved in GCC incidents and less likely to be in cohesive units that had performed together frequently in combat environments. This allowed for the problematisation of women and gender negatively impacting team cohesion.
In the other section of the 2010 review of women in GCC, Cawkill et al (2009) conducted
Women In Ground Close Combat Roles: The Experiences Of Other Nations And A Review Of The Academic Literature. Cawkill et al (2009) found that the nations that employed women
in GCC roles saw no notable effects on cohesion (2010; 2). This was in part because in the countries that did employ women in GCC, cohesion was not used an argument against their participation; where cohesion was noted as important, it was suggested that leadership could promote cohesion (ibid; 18), with team bonding and “special cohesion days” to ensure team members had time to get to know one another (ibid; 26). This suggested that cohesion was rarely viewed as important for combat effectiveness, but when it was, it could be enforced or promoted through leadership, collective training and team bonding. This suggested that in nations that do not exclude women based on gender differences, cohesion is no longer a viable argument for combat effectiveness, further suggesting that the argument for cohesion
12 BCL suggested that attachments are teams that are attached to the section/company at the start of an operation. Attachments rarely train alongside sections/companies in pre-deployment training (BCL, 2010; 43). 13 IC/2IC = In command / second in command.
in the BAF is rooted in the construction of gender differences. Similarly, the Cakwill et al (2009) review of the academic literature found that women did not have a negative impact on cohesion, and that task commitment was the most important factor for cohesion (Cawkill et al, 2009; 41). Where cohesion was noted to be important, it was referred to in terms of “male-bonding” or “hypermasculinity” (ibid; 31, 37), directly defining cohesion as male-only. It was generally noted that when the social aspect of cohesion was deemed important to combat effectiveness, the argument focused on the “collective identity” of the unit, which as we have discussed previously, is male (ibid; 25). Despite finding that cohesion was not negatively impacted by women in mixed gender teams, the “potential” threat of women to team
cohesion was still prioritised (ibid; 7, 8, 10). Therefore, the Ministry of Defence used this to take a “precautionary approach” and proposed that the exclusion of WGCC should be retained to avoid any “potential risks associated with maintaining cohesion in small mixed-gender tactical teams engaged in highly-dangerous close-combat operations” (MoD, 2010; 4). The 2010 review of WGCC suggested that despite the reviews by Cawkill et al (2009) and BCL (2010) proving the effectiveness of women in GCC (in a one off event), they did not directly prove the effectiveness of women in GCC roles (where they perform in these roles on a daily basis) (MoD, 2010; 3). By suggesting that effective cohesion and its impact combat effectiveness can only be measured in specific GCC environments, which historically in the context of the BAF have been exclusively male environments – as we have previously discussed, women are inherently excluded. Therefore, I will begin to analyse the ways the term cohesion has been gendered by the BAF, and how whilst using cohesion as a valid argument for combat effectiveness, women will continue to be excluded from true representation in the BAF. In a traditionally masculine organisation, with the majority of personnel identifying as male, the prototype of the “soldier” in the BAF has always been male. Where women have not been present in GCC teams, cohesion has only ever been applied and understood in relation to male teams. Gender was not noted to adversely affect cohesion, but academics such as Major McBreen (2002) only referred to the personnel in these units as “men”. Where the understanding of social cohesion has been built on the male example, women have been positioned as problematic. As Woodward and Winter (2006; 57) suggested, this rests on essentialist arguments that highlights the differences between men and women. In this, women are understood as disruptive, by being “non-men”. In the 2016 review of WGCC, the report stated that when group members share the image of the group, they have a positive feeling towards them and are more cohesive (MoD, 2014c; D-2).
Gender, as an obvious self-identity attribute, means that in male only groups being “male” becomes the group image. Expanding on this, I suggest that the problematisation of women as a threat to cohesion is based on the preference of same-sex interactions in the highly intense atmosphere in GCC. Cawkill et al suggested that “mixed-gender teams undermine the male bonding that is essential to team cohesion” (2009; 31). The preference of same-sex, platonic not sexual, relationships has been theorised in academia examining homosociality in male dominated organisations.
Homosociality defines a preference that humans have over same-sex interactions (Lipman-Blumen, 1976; 16). It suggests that men construct groups differently to females, bonding over gendered similarities where “men are attracted to, stimulated by, and interested in other men” in a non- sexual way (Lipman-Blumen, 1976; 25). In male dominated organisations these practices of group bonding can be seen as part of the job, where homosociality is vital to the occupation of the soldier (Persson, 2012; 137). The theory of homosociality can be used to understand why social cohesion has a preference of maintaining male-only GCC teams. Flood (2008; 342) suggested that “male homosociality plays a crucial role […] in
perpetuating gender inequalities and the dominance of particular hegemonic masculinities”. This resonates with discourses of military masculinity that promote the “band of brothers” where “trust loyalty, and mutual heterosexual behaviour” are identified as part of the bonding process (Woodward and Winter, 2004; 192). However, “this behavior necessarily relies on the construction of the figure of woman as a sexualized other” (ibid; 192) and “markers of manhood as occupational achievement, wealth, power and status, physical prowess, and sexual achievement” (Kimmel, 1994; 63). In this, I suggest that male bonding has been deemed as essential to cohesion in male dominated organisations, and thus has problematised women for being different to men. Contrasting research done on male homosociality in the military found that male-only teams exhibit hypermasculinity (Rosen, Knudson and Fancher, 2003). This could be seen to have a negative impact, where “in an attempt to emphasize heterosexuality, fear or hatred of homosexuals and misogynist language are developed” (Hammerén and Johansson, 2014; 2). Similarly, it was noted that overcompetitive
hypermasculine groups could have negative effects on combat effectiveness (Rosen et al, 2003; cited in Cawkill et al, 2009; 37). It has been noted that excessive cohesion can result in “groupthink” and “polarised attitudes and actions”, which in turn can lead to “defective decisions and judgments” (Dion, 2004; cited in Cawkill et al, 2009; 36). This suggested that
