Linköping University – Master of International and European Relations Master thesis – 733A27 (30 ECTS) 23/05/2011
Evolving EU climate
policy discourses and
self‐representation –
A study of press‐releases from Kyoto to
Copenhagen.
Author: Benjamin Otterbach, benot991@student.liu.se Supervisor: Eva Lövbrand Word count: 24.347 ISRN‐number: LIU‐IEI‐FIL‐A‐‐11/01006‐‐SE
Abstract
This thesis analyzes EU international climate policy discourses around the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, its entry‐into‐force and the COP15‐negotiations in Copenhagen. Using EU‐press releases and employing Hajer’s argumentative approach, the main focus lies on discursive shifts and self‐ representation. The thesis finds considerable discursive shifts, including a changing role of science, global responsibility and the economy. Findings also include the self‐representation of the EU changing from an emerging to an established and powerful actor but with a sharp rupture after COP15.
Keywords: climate change, EU, discourse analysis, constructivism, Hajer, UNFCCC, self‐representation, Kyoto, Copenhagen
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Eva Lövbrand for assisting me both in broad strategic and detailed questions as well as for investing much time and effort in the revision of this work over the whole process. I would also like to thank Pressbyrån for providing the coffee and Kanelbullar that made this work possible.
Contents
Abstract ... 2 Acknowledgements ... 2 Contents ... 3 1 Introduction ... 5 1.1 | Thesis aim and research questions ... 5 1.2 | Methodology, method and material ... 6 1.2.1 | A constructivist methodology ... 6 1.2.2 | Discourse analysis ... 7 1.2.3 | EU press releases ... 8 1.3 | Limitations ... 10 1.4 | Thesis outline ... 11 2 The theoretical basis ... 12 2.1 | A theoretical framework of the EU ... 12 2.1.1 | EU international identity and actorness ... 12 2.1.2 | EU institutions in foreign policy and their interplay ... 14 2.1.3 | The EU as an actor in international climate politics ... 16 2.2 | The concept of discourse ... 18 2.2.1 | Distinguishing general approaches towards discourse ... 18 2.2.2 | Hajer’s argumentative approach ... 20 3 EU climate policy discourses over time ... 22 3.1 | Background ... 22 3.2 | 1997/1998 – Before and after COP3 in Kyoto ... 24 3.2.1 | Emancipation through internal and external ambition ... 25 3.2.2 | Legitimizing ambitions through science and sustainable development ... 27 3.2.3 | The moral responsibility for the developed world ... 29 3.3 | 2004/2005 – Before and after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol ... 30
3.3.1 | “Grown‐up rhetoric” –The EU as an established actor in the world of climate politics ... 31 3.3.2 | Legitimacy through economic and moral story‐lines ... 33 3.4 | 2009/2010 – Before and after COP15 in Copenhagen ... 36 3.4.1 | A skyrocketing coverage ... 37 3.4.2 | From self‐confidence to pragmatism ... 38 3.4.3 | Legitimizing through an economic vision ... 41 3.4.4 | Balancing the responsibilities of the developed and the developing world ... 42 4 Concluding discussion: Story‐lines and self‐image in flux ... 44 4.1 | Revisiting the theory ... 44 4.2 | Summarizing the major findings ... 46 Bibliography ... 49 Annex I: list of press releases ... 53 First period: 11 June 1997 – 11 June 1998 ... 53 Second period: 16 August 2004 – 16 August 2005 ... 54 Third period: 18 June 2009 – 18 June 2010 ... 56
1
Introduction
When it comes to international climate politics, the EU is at a crossroads today. Ever since the negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the EU has taken a leading, at times the leading role, in the negotiations over an international climate regime. While it has evolved as a partner of the USA in the initial Kyoto negotiations, steady US‐withdrawal under the Bush‐administration beginning in 2001 has left the EU as the only major leading force for several years, mostly drawing upon directional and idea‐based leadership. Accordingly, a 2008‐study undertaken among the participants of the 14th Conference of the Parties (COP14) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC shows that, while other actors such as China had been evolving, the EU position as a perceived leader at COP14 was stable and that delegates from all parts of the world except Africa perceive the EU as an important leader (Karlsson et al 2001, p.99).
One year later, in the aftermath of the Copenhagen negotiations which the EU highlighted so much as the crucial conference for finding a post‐Kyoto regime, perceived EU leadership looked very different, as the following quotation from Kilian/Elgström (2010) shows:
“In 2010, the outcome of COP15 in Copenhagen was seen as a signal of definite loss of leadership for the Union. Environmental NGOs blamed Europe for being ‘unable to (…) take a leading role in the run up and during Copenhagen’ (Greenpeace, 2010). By the same token, large parts of the European media found that ‘the truth about Copenhagen is that (…) the EU completely failed to show leadership on environmental matters’ (Aftonbladet, 2010).” (Kilian/Elgström 2010, p.258)
The quotation summarizes a frequently heard criticism of EU international climate change‐policy in a post‐Copenhagen world. In the 2009 UN‐negotiations in Copenhagen, it is often argued, the EU was confronted with a new reality. Unlike in previous negotiations, its goals did not find their way into the final accord and its voice did not seem to matter very much in the negotiations: Neither did Copenhagen turn out to be the beginning of a binding, comprehensive and ambitious post‐Kyoto regime as the EU had wished for, nor was the EU decisively involved in the final negotiations over it. No matter if a marginalization of the EU stems from a changed international power‐landscape, internal ambiguities or too low (or even too high) ambitions, it is clear that, after Copenhagen, the EU is at a crossroads, where it must find its position in the world community again.
1.1 | Thesis aim and research questions
This lack of clarity about how to conceptualize the EU as an actor in international climate politics today represents the motivation for this thesis. More precisely, the aim of this study is to better understand the way the EU (re)presents international climate change policy, and the way the EU represents itself within the area of climate politics. In order to shed light on this, this thesis analyses how EU climate discourses have been articulated before and after the Copenhagen conference. Following Maarten Hajer’s (1995) “argumentative approach” to discourse analysis, this thesis ultimately seeks to understand whether the EU‐representation of international climate change policy has changed along with the changed perceptions of the EU position in the UN climate negotiations.
The aim of this study is translated into the following two research questions: How has the EU represented international climate policy between 1997 and 2010? What does this tell us about the EU’s self‐image in climate politics?
1.2 | Methodology, method and material
1.2.1 | A constructivist methodology In order to answer these questions, discourse analysis will be advanced as the main method in this thesis. However, the usage of discourse as relevant material depends on and entails certain ontological and epistemic assumptions, which is why this work endorses a constructivist as well as interpretive approach. The two are briefly outlined before the method of discourse analysis is presented both as a general method and in the context of the material used in this thesis.Questions of ontology and epistemology address the questions: “What is there to be known?” and “How can we know it?” (della Porta/Keating 2008) When discourse is advanced as a concept influencing a subject’s reality, it is automatically implied that reality is not a phenomenon that is given a priori but that reality is constructed over time and always subject to change. The label of this ontological approach that underlies and supports the argumentative approach is Constructivism (sometimes also “Constructionism”). Constructivism, in general, holds that, aside from the physical reality, the world acquires meaning in social interaction only. This contradicts natural‐science approaches (such as objectivism) that see reality as something independent from our interpretation about it. Reality in constructivism is interpreted and reinterpreted (constructed) among social actors. A constructivist approach “implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman 2007, p.23). Discourse in turn serves as the enabler of the production of social phenomena or facts and the categorization of them – it serves as the tool that turns things into objects with meaning: “This idea that physical things and actions exist, but they only take on meaning and become objects of knowledge within discourse, is at the heart of constructionist theory of meaning and representation” (Hall 2001, p.73). Similar to the construction of meaning in social interaction, actors and their identities are also constituted by meaning structures and “shaped by the cultural, social, and political – as well as material – circumstances in which they are embedded” (Fierke 2007, p.171).
Since the “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” (Wendt 1999, p.1) , actors are seen as social beings, empowered and constrained by the social structure of shared understandings rather than as utility‐maximizers or interest‐based rationalists. They behave based on a “logic of appropriateness” (Fierke 2007, p.170) following shared and changing values and norms rather than their pure interests. Social context and cognition are therefore more important than the rational logic of rationalist theories such as neo‐liberalism (ibid). This entails that the opportunities of agency are bridged with the coercive nature of structure, reconciling the two as mutually dependent sides of the same coin.
There are different kinds of “Constructivisms” that can differ much. While all constructivists will agree on the ontological assumption of the world as socially constructed, there are different opinions on which epistemic consequences this has, particularly with regard to the role of language. Constructivism as a middle‐ground theory on the one hand acknowledges a positivist epistemology separating the researcher from the researched phenomenon and drawing on positivist methods of
hypothesis testing. It is therefore treating language “as a set of labels for the objective reality or for the mental processes of individuals” (ibid, p.175). Consistent constructivism does not accept the contradiction between a socially constructed world and the treatment of language as an “impartial” reflection of reality. For consistent constructivists, language is as such socially constructed and its use subject to constant change. They are therefore not seeking underlying rules in language that can be used for testing hypothesis but they are seeking a Weberian understanding (“Verstehen”) of language and its rules. Language, thereby, becomes embedded in action (ibid, p.175/176).
This thesis does not treat language as a mere reflection of reality but rather as a part of reality as such. It is therefore closer to the consistent version of constructivism by endorsing an interpretive epistemology. Interpretivism is the epistemic approach that underpins the notion of subjective, constructed reality. Reality, according to interpretivism, is knowable to a certain extent, but it is always linked to human subjectivity. Unlike positivism, that demands a consequent separation of the researcher and the researched, it calls for a change of perspective in order to gain contextual knowledge and “requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman 2001, p.13). In turn, it does not allow for natural science‐like generalizations but rather for case‐specific understanding. 1.2.2 | Discourse analysis Within this ontological framework, discourse analysis will be used as method in this thesis, drawing upon press releases issued by the EU‐Commission around three different milestones of international climate politics. These milestones are located in the years 1997, 2005 and 2009. The first milestone is the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto on 11 December 1997. This event marked the beginning of a binding multilateral regime addressing climate change, which required the EU to establish a coherent climate policy and bargaining position. The second milestone is the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005. This event marks the end of a global diplomatic effort by the EU to “save the Kyoto Protocol” after the Bush administration in spring 2001 decided not to offer its ratification to the American Congress. Finally, the third event chosen for this study is the 15th Conference to the Parties in Copenhagen in December 2009. This conference had raised high hopes for the agreement of a follow‐up regime to the Kyoto Protocol with an “expiration date” in 2012. The EU in particular had hoped for a strong binding agreement and came to the conference with an internally agreed 20%‐reduction of greenhouse gases by 2020 and a conditional 30%‐reduction if other industrialized countries were to follow. Even though Copenhagen put the issue of climate change high up on international agendas in a time of economic recession, it did not bring the envisaged break‐through and the EU had to face strong criticism for its performance.
To ensure a broad contextual basis around the three events a period of 12 months is considered around each milestone. Taking this into account, the following exact dates result as the demarcation lines of each period: First period: 11 June 1997 – 11 June 1998 Second period: 16 August 2004 – 16 August 2005 Third period: 18 June 2009 – 18 June 2010 Discourse analysis has become a popular research method among social scientists, yet the term can mean very different things. The way in which discourse analysis is used in this thesis follows a post‐
positivist, constructivist tradition, looking for context‐related and researcher‐dependent knowledge rather than for objective, generalizable truths. As such, it defines discourse not as mere text but as “shared meaning of phenomena” (Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2006, p.51)1. Here, the French philosopher Foucault has paved the way, understanding discourse as a body of knowledge that is detached from the text and the way something is expressed. While Foucault’s body of knowledge helps to shed light on what can and cannot be said in a given context and therefore brings in the power of knowledge, the way things are expressed can still help to understand how a preferred meaning of phenomena is promoted and another one is dismissed by an actor. A connection of the two is done by Hajer in his “argumentative approach” (Hajer 1995, p.42), the approach chosen for this thesis. Hajer does not only reconcile linguistic with institutional approaches to discourse analysis but also brings back in a notion of agency, otherwise neglected to a certain extent by Foucault2. In this way, discourse analysis allows to look at the EU as an actor taking part in the struggle over the definition of the problem of climate change, dismissing or advancing certain preferred meanings, and in turn solutions, over time. “Accordingly, policy discourses favor certain descriptions of reality, empower certain actors while marginalizing others” (Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2006, p.52) . Besides the careful identification of policy discourses in Hajer’s argumentative approach and the respect of actors, the concept of discourse institutionalization is another reason why the argumentative approach is helpful in this thesis, tracing how certain prevalent policy discourses become mirrored in the setup of political institutions.
1.2.3 | EU press releases
In order to trace the EU’s climate policy discourses following Hajer’s argumentative approach, this thesis uses press releases by the EU‐Commission as working material. Why press releases?
Firstly, there is a need to reduce the sheer number of documents. This is because, even when limiting oneself to the field of climate change policy, the amount of documents provided by the EU is overwhelming. Through the years and across different institutions, the EU has produced a seemingly never‐ending repertoire of documents concerning climate change – including everything from websites, children’s books, speeches, green papers, white papers, Communications by the EU‐ Commission, memos, citizens’ summaries to directives, regulations or treaties. It is obvious that such an abundance of material needs to be delimited in a way that suits the research questions best and that matches the limited extent of these studies. Press releases are thereby a viable choice regarding both their number and length.
Secondly and more importantly, press releases are directed to the public and therefore follow
a simplified language: In contrast to internal communications, directives or green papers, press releases are made to be understood by the general public, which is especially decisive in the often very scientific field of climate change. Here, scientific facts as occurring in other sorts of documents can easily distract both the writer and the reader from the promoted policies and the standpoints of the communicator. At the same time, they are not overly simplifying as brochures or citizens’ summaries. EU climate change discourses are therefore believed to be best represented in press releases. a more argumentative strategy rather than a purely informative one. By arguing, positioning and trying to convince, press releases have the potential to say more about the position and 1 see chapter 2.2.1 for a more comprehensive discussion over the term “discourse”. 2 see chapter 2.2.2 for a more comprehensive outline of Hajer’s argumentative approach.
the situation of the communicator than a technical communication paper or a legal document. The implications on the self‐identity that shall be drawn from a general discourse about climate politics are therefore expected to be best drawn from press releases.
Thirdly, press releases are mostly linked to a specific event or a specific question. Unlike brochures or other argumentative publications they do not present the big picture but rather new puzzle pieces within the picture. Hence, they can account better for changes.
As in any other EU‐related issue, the main potential communicators in the field of EU climate‐change‐ policy are the institutions of the European Union, i.e. the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Being the most “European” institution (i.e. the institution whose members are least accountable to the member states), the EU‐Commission will provide the material for this study. The Commission is the European institution least accountable to the citizens, which allows for more streamlined communication. Furthermore, as the proposer of (climate) legislation, its safeguard and a collector of information, the EU Commission has a central role in the definition of a problem.
The EU‐Commission’s press service “Rapid” represents a viable source of information. This website (http://europa.eu/rapid/), run by the “Directorate General Communication”, collects press releases by the EU Commission and some other European institutions (notably the Council of the EU) since 1985 (Europa.eu (2)) and makes them easily accessible to a general public.
When retrieving the press releases of the three mentioned timeframes, the documents have been delimited according to their relevance in two steps. In order to limit the overall search result to the European Commission’s press releases3 relevant to climate politics, documents have, in the first step, been searched using the keywords “climate change”. All relevant documents must include the exact match of the term “climate change” (search function: “exact match”). In order not to miss out on any relevant press releases, the search is extended to the whole text and not to the title only. This may entail however that some irrelevant press releases turn up in the result list in the first place. Such documents clearly are not concerned with climate change as such but rather use the term “climate change” in a different context, a side‐phrase, a list, etc. Therefore, as a second step, each document has been examined manually according to its relevance. In this process, documents that are clearly “off‐topic” have been sorted out. This “negative exclusion process” has been preferred to a “positive inclusion process” to ensure that even somewhat relevant documents stay within the relevant set, thereby ensuring highest cautiousness4.
This proceeding gives an overall number of press releases of 245 originating from all three timeframes, whereas 130 have been examined as relevant and 115 have been disregarded as irrelevant. In more detail, over the first period between 11 June 1997 and 11 June 1998, 20 press releases met the search criteria in the Rapid‐database, out of which 4 were identified as dealing with different topics and therefore clearly irrelevant. This leaves a repertoire of 16 press releases around the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on COP3. In the second period between 16 August 2004 and 16 August 2005, 53 press releases met the search criteria in the Rapid‐database. Out of these 53 documents, 25 were identified as clearly irrelevant. This leaves a number of 28 relevant press releases around the time of the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, in the time between 18 June 3 Press releases by the Commission are chosen by marking the “IP”‐field under the heading “Type”. 4 see Annex I for an overview of the documents within and outside the relevant set.
2009 and 18 June 2010, 172 press releases met the search criteria in the Rapid‐database. Out of these 172 documents, 86 were identified as clearly irrelevant leaving a number of again 86 relevant press releases around the COP15‐negotiations in Copenhagen. Compared to 16 (20 in total) press releases in the 1997/98‐period and 28 (53 in total) in the 2004/05‐period this represents a steep increase in the number of documents.
1.3 | Limitations
Before moving to the outline, presenting how the thesis will go about to answer the research questions, it is important to consider the inherent limitations to this thesis first, laying out the questions which this work cannot, and does not aim to, answer.
Since the research problem points towards a lack of understanding of the EU’s role, the aim of the studies is not to impartially investigate any shortcomings of EU climate change policy over time. Studying EU‐climate policy discourses tells us more about the EU than about climate politics. Similarly, it is not of any interest here to what extent the EU really has been a “climate leader” or has ceased to be so, for example by examining the effectiveness of its domestic climate policies or its international diplomatic efforts.
Even though this thesis uses the term “the EU”, this should not be understood as an ultimate claim to investigate and understand the EU in all its complexity. Rather, for pragmatic reasons, the EU‐ Commission’s press releases will be equaled with the voice of “the EU” in the course of this study, simplifying who is speaking for “the EU”. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the EU is not the homogeneous actor as which it might appear when only looking at documents issued by the supranational EU‐Commission. It is believed, however, that approximations about “the EU” are allowed to be made and that the EU‐Commission’s documents allow better for such approximation than other EU‐institutions that are much more subjects to internal debate and incoherencies. Therefore, approximations must be allowed when drawing conclusions on the self‐identity of the EU in climate politics.
There is another important note to be made in this context: Understanding self‐identity or self‐image of the EU does not mean that “European identity” is studied. It is important to note that this work seeks to derive implications on the EU’s self‐identity as a political organization; it does not seek to add to the understanding of “European identity” as such, i.e. the identity of European citizens. As a particularly controversial example of national – or better: supranational – identity, adding up to the understanding of European identity would be a too big of a task and deriving meaning from official “top‐down” EU‐publications on the identity of millions of Europeans too much a matter of speculation.
Finally, there is a remark to be made about the degree to which results from this study can be generalized. Even though the material of this thesis is plain text as well as “hard” background information regarding the EU’s climate policies, the interpretation is, while based on this material, researcher‐related and therefore reflects subjective understanding. Thus, another researcher might interpret certain things differently, stress different ideas or “hear” different things when listening to the documents while still going about in the exact same way. This subjective insight is a goal of this study and its interpretative epistemology of “Verstehen”. It should therefore be underlined that no simple generalizations can be drawn from the results. They enrich the understanding of the EU climate policy discourse and its role in international climate politics and cannot represent a blueprint
for the understanding of another time, another organization or another policy field. Yet, they can and should give inspiration for further studies in similar fields.
1.4 | Thesis outline
How will this thesis go about when attempting to answer the research questions? Following will be a brief overview of what awaits the reader:
The following second chapter will present important theoretical concepts and models which are to underpin the later analysis. Namely, it focuses first on the difficulty of EU‐literature to conceptualize the EU as an actor in its own right rather than as a sum of the member states’ actions. It then lays out the concept of discourse, by giving a rough introduction to the theoretical heritage, namely to the work of French philosopher Foucault, and presenting in more detail the concept used in this thesis, Maarten Hajer’s “argumentative approach”. The third chapter is, in general, devoted to the discourse analysis of the chosen EU‐documents, presenting the periods in chronological order. It also gives a brief historical account of European and global climate policies of the years prior to and between the given events. Combining historical account and theory with the major story‐lines, it interprets them with regard to the EU’s self‐representation. The fourth chapter, the conclusion, speaks back in a first step to the presented theoretical concepts and assesses their viability. It then summarizes the evolution of the major story‐lines and points to important consistencies and disruptions in the EU’s discourse. It also sums up the findings about the EU’s changing self‐representation over time and gives food for further studies.
2
The theoretical basis
2.1 | A theoretical framework of the EU
This work seeks to analyze EU climate policy discourses and what they imply with regard to the EU’s self‐identity. While the process of construction will be left to the discussion over the term “discourse” in the next chapter, this chapter seeks to conceptualize the EU as an actor with an identity. Knowing the way existing literature is making sense of the uniqueness of the EU represents important background information when trying to understand the way the EU represents climate policy and itself. 2.1.1 | EU international identity and actorness The area of identity is a large one and the concept has been used in many different fields of studies independent of the EU. Identity in psychology means something else than what it means in sociology and the two differ from the conceptualization of identity in the field of identity politics. The concept of corporate identity in economics is about the tools to deliberately shape an image of a corporation in the public, whereas social identity theory looks at the interdependencies of personal identity and group identity (such as, e.g., national identity). In short, concepts of identity differ greatly in the way they stress the individualistic or collectivistic side and the way they stress them as stable or floating (Karolewski/Kaina 2006, p.62). Drawing upon social psychology, we can (in line with Smith) conceive of identity here as “the images of individuality and distinctiveness (“self‐hood”) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’” (Jepperson/Wendt/Katzenstein, quoted in Smith 2008, p.14). Even though social‐psychological definitions of identities as this one are originally conceived for individuals, Smith states that they are equally viable for “states – and organizations composed of states” (ibid, p.15), while being open to (re‐)construction and interaction.
When aiming to add to the understanding of the EU’s self‐identity, the question arises of how to understand the EU as an actor, i.e. a subject with an identity, particularly on the global scene. Therefore, different notions of the EU as an actor from the EU‐literature are first conceptualized and special regard given to its institutional landscape. It is then linked to the topic of how EU‐identity is framed in the respective literature. However, before proceeding, one needs to consider a point made by Andreatta, stating that it is “important to distinguish between those theories which analyse Europe’s role as an actor in its own right and those which conceptualize the Union as an institution whose influence is mainly felt through the foreign policies of member states” (Andreatta 2005, p.33). The focus here shall be on the former.
As the EU has become more and more engaged in international politics, it has also been studied increasingly as a foreign policy actor in its own right. Most scholars agree that “the EU is both a key part of the multilateral structures of world politics, and a player of growing resource and influence in its own right” (Hill/Smith 2005 (1), p.400). However, to date there is no one satisfying concept “on the market” for the EU and what it represents on the international scene. There are attempts to conceptualize the EU’s international role according to classical concepts of nation‐states, but most scholars acknowledge today that the EU is a unique actor, internationally and domestically, which
does not fit the concept of a federation or a confederation to a satisfying degree (ibid). However, it is accepted that it does borrow certain features from these concepts as can be seen in the examples of trade (where it roughly follows the federal model and has the sole responsibility for external action) or the Common Foreign and Security Policy (where the intergovernmental decision‐making process points to a more confederal mechanism).
Theoretical assumptions determine to a large extent how an actor is perceived, because actorness depends on the theoretical assumptions one endorses (such as realism, liberalism, critical theory…) and what “counts” as power according to these assumptions. Yet, when asking about the EU’s international actorness, varying decision‐making processes and complex international representation mandates stemming from an often shared responsibility with the member states, add up to the question of theoretical perspectives. In very broad terms, one can however point towards certain characteristics of EU actorness as represented in the literature.
Firstly, traditional realist power concepts are not at the core of most EU studies. An overwhelming number of scholars agree that the EU is not a straightforward “pole” (ibid, p.394) even if substantial “diplomatic, economic, and now some limited military tools are all available to the EU” (ibid, p.451). Instead, an institutional perspective is used for analyzing the EU’s hard power, identifying “structural power” (ibid, p.404) in international institutions. This notion of power refers to the ability of the EU identified by scholars to influence the international structure, thereby affecting other actors’ choices.
Secondly, a generally more liberal or constructivist perspective used across a large part of the literature seems to capture the EU‐actorness the best. Liberal literature focuses on the EU’s interests in the world, while constructivist literature stresses the image of the EU as an actor taking part in the interactive shaping of global norms and rules.
Sedelmeier (2005) for example, when looking at the “EU’s specific role‐identity in its relationship with the CEECs” (p.23), argues that the EU in foreign policy represents a normative structure which affects European policy makers’ preference formation and makes certain policies impossible. Following a neofunctionalist/constructivist stance, he perceives the EU as an environment that shapes policy makers’ identities through constructed and institutionalized norms. In this model, the EU institutions shape the identities of the “real” European foreign actors and in turn their policy preferences but do not act much themselves. In this “world”, the EU Commission gets big responsibilities to “help to articulate common European interests, suggest policy options, and encourage agreement among the member states on policies that represent more than the lowest common denominator” (Smith 2008, p.8). Neofunctionalists such as Sedelmeier draw on the notion of “spill‐over”, which describes the gradual need for integration across various sectors, each integration step being a necessity created by one of the previous ones (ibid).
Greater EU‐agency is incorporated in the influential concept of “normative power” by Ian Manners: “According to this view, the power of the EU lies in its ability to project its core values beyond its borders.” (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007, p.435) Terms such as “gentle power”, “post‐modern power” and “civilian power” are also often quoted in the context (Smith 2008, p.15). Building upon an earlier concept of “civilian power” by Duchêne, Manners finds that the international power of the EU is to define what counts as “normal” rather than to use military or economic pressure. He thereby meets criticism by authors such as Hedley Bull who question the actorness of the EU by stating that they engage too much in a debate over the “state‐like features” of the EU (Manners 2002, p.239). Instead,
he argues, one should focus more on the international identity of the EU and how it can shape the world.
There is an abundance of studies employing the normative power concept. Often, this is linked to a study of EU‐identity and European identity as normative power and identity are closely interlinked: “As Manners and Whitman argue (2003), the international identity of the EU is constructed around specific interpretations of internationally shared norms” (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007, p.451). Smith (2008) argues that these norms include the “preference for diplomacy over coercion” (p.15), the respect for the rule of law and long‐term economic solutions, an emphasis on multilateralism and a promotion of human rights (ibid). For instance, Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) study the EU’s role in setting up both the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol and find that EU‐identity as a normative power has evolved in both cases “against” the image of the US as the major obstructor of these norms, and that, despite little reflexivity, the EU can play a credible role in the respective regime‐making.
According to the normative power concept, norms are globally promoted and, eventually, shared. Therefore, it becomes difficult to say who exports norms to whom. That is why Hill and Smith stress the interdependence between the international level and European actorness: “Thus, ‘International Relations and the European Union’ is about both the place of Europe in the world and the way the world contributes to the shaping of Europe.” (Hill/Smith 2005 (2), p.5) What’s more, they state that already the EU’s internal policy‐making process resembles a process of international relations in the traditional sense (Hill/Smith 2005 (1), p.398), which makes a clear distinction between the domestic and the international a particularly difficult endeavor in the case of the EU. While the concept of normative power puts the focus more on other actors being influenced by ideas (push‐factors), the similar (and also popular) concept of a “directional leader” focuses more on domestic policies, i.e. the attractiveness of a good example (pull‐factors). Parker/Karlsson (2010) summarize it as following: “By engaging in directional leadership, an actor works towards solving a collective problem by making the first move and providing a model others will want to emulate.” (p.927).
To conclude, most scholars do not draw on consequent realist notions of power when they conceptualize the EU as an international actor, even if in economic terms the EU is sometimes called a “superpower” and the EU’s military capability is without any doubt constantly rising5. Therefore, many conceive of the EU in liberal and constructivist terms as an actor embedded in multilateral diplomacy and with an identity based on norms – often coined a “normative power”. This identity is summarized to include post‐modern objectives such as the rule of law or the respect of human rights as well as “soft” instruments such as commercial diplomacy and economic development or humanitarian aid. 2.1.2 | EU institutions in foreign policy and their interplay Before looking at the roles of EU‐institutions in foreign policy – what is meant by the term “foreign policy” in this context? Foreign policy here is not seen as dealing with traditional security‐issues only. In fact, it is not limited to security issues in general. Rather, when studying the EU’s multilateral and “soft” foreign policy, a broader definition of foreign policy makes sense. Hazel Smith’s constructivist definition seems viable here: “The foreign policy of the European Union is the capacity to make and 5 However, deployments remain, in essence, a decision left to the member states (see next chapter).
implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the European Union” (Smith 2002, p.8). This definition stresses the importance of the external dimension of “low politics” such as commercial diplomacy rather than the “high politics” of traditional security issues (Giegerich/Wallace 2010, p.432).
Turning now to the roles of the three major European institutions in foreign policy and international relations, it gets obvious that the respective institutional framework is “complex, reflecting a variety of histories, trajectories, and innovations” (Vanhoonacker 2005, p.88). The European Commission’s role within this complex texture is most significant in the former “Community pillar”, i.e. foreign issues related to the common market, trade and the related four freedoms (Edwards 2005, p.52/53). It has the major role for initiative and implementation. In the context of Common Commercial Policy (such as trade policy), it has the task to draft the EU’s position based on the Council’s guidelines and for instance to negotiate within the WTO on behalf of the EU, while the Council adopts the outcomes and the Parliament is only informed. Yet, the Commission’s role doesn’t stop here. It is also portrayed as the actor collecting information and converting differing viewpoints into common EU‐positions in policy areas that are not clearly accountable to one decision‐making procedure. However, with the rise of the former “third pillar” for common foreign, security and defense policy (CFSP), the importance of the Council in foreign policy has risen steadily (ibid, p.57). The intergovernmental nature of the decision‐making process in this issue‐area, still predominating to date, makes the Council with the representatives of the member states the main decision‐making body in “traditional” security and defense policy. The heads of states (European Council) thereby lay out the broad guidelines; the Council of Foreign Ministers implements them (Smith 2008, p.38). This entails that “the CFSP pillar remains largely in the hands of the member governments”, making it an example for “intensive transgovernmentalism” (Giegerich/Wallace 2010, p.441). Moreover an increasing need for “trans‐pillar coordination”, i.e. coordination between different decision‐making processes, has enhanced the role of the European Council, tasking it with outlining the broad, strategic frameworks and thereby giving cross‐sectoral policies the legitimacy of the member states (Edwards 2005, p.57).
The European Parliament has, since the Treaty of Lisbon, gained important decision‐making power, as most Community‐policies now pass the plenum (as well as the Council) for affirmation – the so‐called “co‐decision‐procedure”. Yet, important foreign policy issues such as security and defense do not need the Parliament’s consent. Nevertheless, the Parliament is often said to have evolved as a “grand forum” for debate (ibid) in international relations, thereby indirectly influencing decision‐makers, for example through a constant emphasis on human rights.
In conclusion, with respect to formal involvement of the EU institutions in the EU’s foreign policy making, it can be stated that, “the game is primarily played by the Council and the Commission” (Vanhoonacker 2005, p.87) with the Commission being stronger in Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and the Council in Security and Defense Policy. Overarching policies touching upon different decision‐ making processes are mostly dealt with in a ping‐pong mode between the two, giving the Council the role to lay out strategic goals and the Commission the role to break them down into policy propositions by collecting information and moderating the discussion.
The EU institutions, most scholars agree, do play an important role independent of member states’ actions (ibid, p.86), while limitations to their actorness are also discussed, particularly with regard to consistency and coherence (Nuttall 2005, Smith 2008), a limitation that the Lisbon Treaty has tried to
tackle by creating more cross‐sectional links (Giegerich/Wallace 2010, p.453). With respect to the above described EU‐integration theories, the institutional framework sustains both an intergovernmental stance (through the setup of the Council) and a neofunctionalist stance (through the evolving and coordinating role of the Commission). 2.1.3 | The EU as an actor in international climate politics We now turn to the way the EU’s international climate policy is presented by the literature, asking the questions how EU climate policy is actually done and how effective the institutional setup is. Climate policy represents a good example of an area in which issues are crossing over the tradition demarcation lines of domestic and international policy. This is, because domestic interests and ideas become internationalized in international regimes, for instance by trying to define domestic standards as international ones or through the mere fact that pollution does not stop at any border. At the same time, international agreements strongly influence domestic policies of environmental standard. This is well coined in Harris’ concept of “environmental foreign policy”, defined as following:
“Environmental foreign policy (EFP) can be conceived of as the interplay between (1) domestic forces, institutions and actors involved in environmental decision making and the implementation of environmental policies, and (2) international forces, institutions and actors […].” (Harris 2007, p.16)
EU literature presents climate policy as a truly cross‐sectional and multi‐stakeholder issue, giving responsibility not only to the European Commission and the national governments but also to NGOs and industry groups. Within the European Commission, initiatives naturally do not only address issues within Directorate General Environment (DG Environment) but within most other DGs as well. Together with the more general goal of sustainable development introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and endorsed by the Lisbon strategy as well as the “Europe 2020‐Strategy”, climate change has become present in most DGs, from DG Agriculture and Rural Development over DG Trade to DG Enterprise and Industry. This cross‐sectional character entails a wide variety of policy modes, leaving the old‐fashioned regulatory mode used in traditional environmental policy as only one amongst many. Climate change policy in the EU is therefore best perceived as a web of directives, regulations, voluntary agreements, coordination mechanisms and binding national targets – or as Berkhout puts it: “Climate policies in the EU have accumulated as a complex texture of national‐level policies and EU‐wide emission reduction” (Berkhout et al 2010, p.143).
In internal climate change policy, this gives the EU Commission different roles depending on the policy area an initiative (for example as stated in the ECEP) belongs to. The regulatory mode, which has been more and more used since the 1980s, has become the dominant policy mode. It is used in single‐market issues, traditional environment‐issues and increasingly in agricultural issues, provisions co‐decision between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and involves the Commission as an agenda‐setter and a safeguard of the legislation. At the same time, the traditional Community Method has been used less and less, with trade as the most important, yet external, example.
Some important areas in climate change policy still lie predominantly at the national level. Notable examples are energy policy and taxation. Agreements in these areas have a bigger intergovernmental dimension with the European Council as the most important decision‐maker. The role of an EU‐wide energy‐policy has however constantly risen (for the last time with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty),
although the Commission here has only limited powers and cannot affect the national energy‐mixes directly. However, the 2008 Climate and Energy Package includes differentiated targets for renewable energy sources as well as a right for the Commission to allocate a part of the ETS certificates (Lenschow 2010, p.377).
Buchan (2010, p.377) summarizes internal EU climate policy as following: “with regard to climate change, the EU is acting in what might be called a ‘revolutionary regulatory mode’”.
In international climate politics, i.e. negotiations at the global level, the EU is mostly represented by the member states, i.e. the Council and here especially the presidency. The Commission as the representative of the European Community is, however, also present. Vogler (2005) explains that “under mixed competence – and especially in areas such as climate change, where Community competence is limited – the presidency, often assisted by other ‘lead’ states, has a key coordinating role.” (p.839). This has been the case in all negotiations within the UNFCCC and the negotiations of the parties to the Kyoto‐protocol. The website of the UNFCCC is explaining the special case of the EU as a party to the climate change negotiations as following: “The 27 members of the European Union meet in private to agree on common negotiating positions. The country that holds the EU Presidency ‐ a position that rotates every six months ‐ then speaks for the European Union and its 27 member states. As a regional economic integration organization, the European Union itself can be, and is, a Party to the Convention. However, it does not have a separate vote from its members.” (emphasis in the original, UNFCCC (1))
This multi‐layered and shared setup of competences between Commission, Council and the Presidency within the EU is both presented as an obstacle to and a reason for EU performance in climate change policy and implementation in the literature.
Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) stress the performing side and argue that, while supported by public opinion and normative commitment, the high number of actors has triggered EU‐action, creating an “upward‐cycle of reinforcing leadership”: “Institutionally, environmental policy is an issue where the Commission and Member States have joint competence and one where decisions in the EU Council are taken by qualified majority voting. Under these circumstances, a positive cycle of competing leadership among different poles can take place.” (ibid, p.24/25) They portray the European Commission, the European Parliament and lead states within the European Council as proactive actors, each of them striving for greater environmental profile and competing for the most “progressive” position. Thus, they highlight the importance of this institutional setup for the firm European position that eventually saved the Kyoto‐Protocol. Vogler and Bretherton (2006) argue that, despite sometimes open disagreements, there is relatively good coherence across member states and therefore within the Council. According to them, despite necessary “Herculean’ tasks of coordination” and a therefore often “primarily reactive” role, the EU had shown consistency in international negotiations (p.13). Yet, they see the consistency rather as an outcome of public support, occuring despite the institutional setup.
Similarly, Haug and Berkhout (2010) stress the shortcomings of the difficult EU‐representation in international negotiations concerning climate change. They see a “lack of flexibility in negotiations” with a lot of time “wasted on coordination among European delegations and little time and resources
left for outreach and negotiations with partners.” (p.23/24) To exemplify this, they cite Connie Hedegaard, at that time Danish minister for Climate and Energy, and host of the 2009 Copenhagen summit: “Sometimes, we’re almost unable to negotiate because we spend so much time talking to each other.…’” (ibid, p.25) Internal division and unclear competences are therefore seen as major restraints to European agency on the international stage. On the domestic stage, they are addressing divisions within the European Council, especially since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, as the biggest obstacles of effective EU‐action (ibid, p.26).
To conclude, EU‐scholars often question EU‐actorness in climate policy, both internationally and domestically. Compared to other policy areas however, internal effectiveness and external consistency and coherence and external effectiveness of the EU are still seen as relatively high. According to Vogler/Bretherton for instance, the EU has long been present internationally as an actor in climate change, it has used key opportunities to boost an international climate regime and it has shown considerable diplomatic capabilities6 (Vogler/Bretherton 2006). Yet, whether or not this is still
the case to a similar extent after Copenhagen and Cancun is an open question.
2.2 | The concept of discourse
We have learnt that constructivist literature often portrays the EU as a “normative power” (e.g. Manners 2002). While this image is most probably not always realistic to the full extent, it can be stated nevertheless that the EU is stressing, probably more than other actors, the power of the idea and the good example – particularly in the field of climate change. The concept of normative power is thereby particularly interesting in relation to discourse as the two are interconnected. In line with Scheipers/Sicurelli (2007, p.453), we can understand normative power also “in terms of being an ideological power, that is, the power to shape the patterns of discourse when it comes to basic principles and values”, which puts discourse in the focus of interest.
In order to study discourse, this thesis draws upon Maarten Hajer’s argumentative approach for an analysis of the chosen EU‐documents. This entails the adoption of a certain notion of discourse, which is to be presented in this section. Such a notion of discourse must be able to capture the spirit of the normative power concept and incorporate the process of the discursive subject trying to advance certain norms as well as the process of the discursive structure influencing the subject’s identity and favored norms. However, instead of rushing to the identification of the definition of the term discourse for this work, it makes sense to give a short overview of the different usages of the term “discourse” and to present the theoretical heritage of Hajer’s approach first. Here, it is mostly the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault that represents a useful theoretical foundation.
2.2.1 | Distinguishing general approaches towards discourse
A delimitation of the term discourse is important for any study relying on discourse analysis as a method. Wodak illustrates this by stating that “discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic‐related conversations, to language per se.” (Wodak 2008, p.1)
Most of the times however, discourse is not understood as text only. Discourse and text differ on the level of analysis. While text is the media carrying information, discourse can be seen as text in
6
Vogler and Bretherton (2006) conceptualize the actorness of a protagonist as a mixture of presence, opportunity and capability.
context, assigning meaning to what is written, uttered or done. The way researchers employ discourse as a “meaning‐maker” thereby includes a variety of approaches and methods, including everything from working with the text only over considering a big range of contextual information up to the point of taking text as a mere collection of statements, regardless of the way they are uttered (McHoul/Grace 1995, p.37).
Even if very different in their methods, all approaches share a focus not only on what is said, but how it is said, why it is said and what can/cannot be said. There is a broad theoretical basis to build a discourse analysis upon. No matter what is the goal of a discourse analysis, researchers can choose at least from the following discourse tradition, enlisted by Wetherell et al (2001): “conversation analysis and ethnomethodology; interactional sociolinguistics and the ethnography of communication; discursive psychology; critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics; Bakhtinian research; Foucauldian research” (p.6) As a post‐Marxist theory, critical discourse theory represents a special post‐positivist approach with an interest in underlying power structures. Even if not identical with Foucault’s account of discourse as a repertoire of knowledge, it suits well to introduce a notion of discourse as representing and constituting reality rather than just reflecting it. Critical discourse theory is the general title for approaches that are critical towards the understanding of discourse as a mere matter of language. They stress the importance of sociological, political and power‐related characteristics over the importance of the words as represented in classic semiotic and linguistic theory. Thus, the relationship between discourse and society and the power‐relations reflected in the discourse are in focus. As critical discourse theory incorporates a wide variety of other scientific schools into the understanding of discourse, it does not have a specific research‐paradigm with a given methodological framework. It is therefore an approach rather than a school (van Dijk 1995, p.17). As the understanding of the term discourse is much larger in a critical understanding, it includes not only linguistic features such as grammar, style, rhetoric, speech acts, interactive elements but also other dimensions such as film, music or gestures (ibid). Frequent areas of interest in critical discourse analysis are the discursive constructions of power, dominance and inequality as a result of determinants such as gender, race, religion and nationality, because here “discourse is not seen as neutral but as producing power relations as people are positioned to talk” (Wetherell 2001, p.194). Preferential access to a certain discourse as well as the ability to shape the style of it can therefore be seen as a resource of power. Being concerned with these manipulative acts, critical discourse analysis digs deeper in text and talk and tries to uncover the hidden and implicit, sometimes with an ethical and normative background. To summarize: “CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis] is essentially dealing with an oppositional study of the structures and strategies of elite discourses and their cognitive and social conditions and consequences, as well as with the discourses of resistance against such domination.” (van Dijk 1995, p.19)
Michel Foucault also partly looked at discourse as a constituting power, yet with a different notion of
power. His understanding of the term “discourse” rejects most formalist and empirical approaches, which somewhat mechanistically conceive discourse as mere speech acts or human conversation. Instead, Foucault saw discourses as bodies of knowledge, consisting of an accumulation of statements
