The EU as a Global Actor in the Korean Conflict : Rising Stature Under External Restraints

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Linköping University | Department of Management and Engineering Master’s thesis, 30 credits| International and European Relations Spring 2020| LIU-IEI-FIL-A--21/03512--SE

The EU as a Global Actor in

the Korean Conflict

– Rising Stature Under External Restraints

Johannes Nordin

Supervisor: Per Jansson Examiner: Khalid Khayati

Linköping University SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden +46 013 28 10 00, www.liu.se

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Abstract

Following the 2017-2018 North Korea nuclear crisis and a decade of disinterest, scholarly attention to the EU’s involvement in the Korean conflict has steadily increased. This thesis compares EU actorness in the Korean conflict, spanning the periods 2011-2012 and 2018-2019, using parts of Rhinard’s and Sjöstedt’s (2019) new actorness framework. Following recent developments in Actorness studies and heeding calls for a greater focus on external factors, it situates the analysis within the Korean conflict's broader context. It concludes that while the EU has deepened its overall engagement in the Northeast Asia region – shifting focus from North to South Korea – the EU has shown little interest in getting involved, despite other actors perceiving further EU involvement favorably. Brussels has continuously been unable to define what role it wants to play. Internal disunity concerning how the EU should balance its troubled relationship with the US with commitments to Seoul has led to the embrace of a traditional passive status quo approach, hindering proactive engagement. The EU’s stance on North Korea remains hardened, making all further cooperation and engagement entirely conditional on progress in the denuclearization talks with the US. The analytical variables borrowed from Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s actorness framework address key concerns in previous actorness studies, allowing for a detailed analysis even when no comprehensive EU-DPRK relations are found.

Key Words: EU-Korea relations, EU Actorness, Critical Engagement, Denuclearization,

Korean Conflict, EU Global Strategy.

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Acknowledgments

It is very atypical for me to insert myself in writing. I have always tended to draw a barrier between author and subject. Yet, this time it would be inconsiderate of me not to. I have been writing this thesis for well over a year during a once-in-a-lifetime global pandemic, mostly isolated in my humble student apartment or on my parents’ kitchen couch. I burned out entirely early on while writing this thesis, took a break for a couple of months, and thoroughly questioned what is meaningful in life before finding mindfulness and rediscovering my deep affinity for writing. I could have never done that without the support and inspiration of those around me. In no particular order, I want to sincerely thank: Mahika for supporting and seeing me through this arduous journey from beginning to end, making what could have been a very isolated miserable existence much more bearable; Rickard and Kamilla for blessing us with delicious dinners and delightful company; my large extended family for always being there when I needed them; Csanád, Zoran, Rickard M., Samuel, and others, unfortunately too many for all to be named here, for blessing me with their company, whether virtual or in real life; my supervisor Per Jansson for his seemingly boundless patience and considerate feedback; peer reviewer Ann Jansson and examinator Khalid Khayati for reminding me at the very end of why I am passionate about this topic; and, finally, my former internship supervisors and subsequent colleagues, Alec Forss, and Sangsoo Lee, for helping in the thesis’ very earliest stages and inspiring me as a Junior Research Fellow, now working with East Asian affairs.

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Abbreviations

• ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations • ASEM – Asia-Europe Meeting

• AU – African Union

• CSFP – Common Foreign and Security Policy • CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

• CVID – Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization • DPRK – Democratic People's Republic of Korea

• EC/EU – European Community/European Union • EEAS – European External Action Service • ESS – The European Security Strategy

• EUGS –The Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy • EUMS – EU Member States

• HR/VP – High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy • KEDO – the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

• ODA – Official Development Assistance • ROK – Republic of Korea

• SAARC – South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation • SPT – Six-Party-Talks

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1. Introduction – The EU Global Strategy in the Asian Century

We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity, and democracy, is being questioned. – The European Grand Strategy (EUGS)

In 2016, thirteen years after the publication of the first European Security Strategy of 2003, the European Union reenergized efforts to outline its vision once again for Europe’s role in the world. Unlike its predecessor, which proudly, and some would argue blinded by functionalist hubris (Lavenex, 2016), proclaimed that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free,” the European Global Strategy begins with a more sober acknowledgment of the turbulent times the EU finds itself navigating. Europe must act in unison not because it is time for the Union to “realize [its] full potential,” but because an increasingly fragile, “connected, contested and complex world” demands it (EU Council, 2003; EEAS, 2016c).

Despite continuously growing its capabilities over the preceding decade, Brussels would several times find itself falling short of the idealistic ambitions outlined in the early 2000s, 1 at that time still riding the fading wave of post-Cold War euphoria. Just as the Union had stood ineffectual in the face of the Yugoslav wars, it would be curtailed again. Armed conflicts and protracted civil wars broke out in Georgia, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Each of them posed critical and overwhelming test cases to the developing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), slowly but surely undermining its legitimacy and adding to the Union’s existential angst. When major conflicts broke out at Europe’s doorstep, there was once again a lack of unified collective action. Meanwhile, internally, the figurative European ship would be rocked by the tumultuous Eurozone crisis, Euroscepticism, jihadi terrorism, and Brexit.

These recurring shortcomings facilitated bringing about an emerging realization that just as the EU was growing its capabilities and prominence, the rest of the world did as well. The liberal post-Cold War international order was becoming increasingly multipolar and unmistakably non-European. “In a world in which the West would no longer be the unchallenged hegemon, the EU’s own approach had to be reassessed” (Tocci, 2016). It is in this context that the EUGS soberingly recognizes its limitations and pursues “principled pragmatism,” aiming to strike a balance between “realistic assessment of the current strategic

1_{The European Security Strategy states, “with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. […]}

This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early” (EU Council, 2003).

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environment [and] idealistic aspiration to advance a better world” (EEAS, 2016c).2 In developing European hard power projection and nurturing strategic autonomy, the strategy presents a vision for a more potent global EU that, in collaboration with strategic partners, although autonomously, if needed, can act to prevent conflicts outside of its borders. This vision applies not just to Europe’s near neighborhood but also, significantly, to Asia.

For every passing year, Asia’s stability and prosperity become more intertwined with Europe’s, and the implications have not been lost on Brussels. As the adage goes, “Whoever is Lord in Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice.” Simply put, Europe’s interests are best served by peace and stability in Asia and Brussels must act accordingly: “In light of the economic weight that Asia represents for the EU – and vice versa – peace and stability in Asia are a prerequisite for our prosperity. We will deepen economic diplomacy and scale up our security role in Asia” (Ibid).

This rekindled commitment to Asian security would soon be put to the test. In August 2017, just a bit over one year after the EUGS publication, war nearly broke out on the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia. In an unprecedented war of words, the leaders of the United States and North Korea publicly threatened each other with “fire and fury,” as an uneasy South Korea – the EU’s closest partner in East Asia – assertively called for de-escalation (Kim, C., 2017). Once tensions began to ease in 2018, EU-Korea scholars gradually took a renewed interest in the longstanding frozen conflict, which, just as the Cold War sometimes did, had nearly reached a boiling point. For many, one question immediately sprung to mind:

1.1. Was the EU ready to engage with the two Koreas as a Global Actor? No.

As the upcoming literature review will begin to illustrate, the answer was a resounding NO. EU Global Strategy or not, the EU was not fully prepared for the events of 2017-2020, which will be explored in later chapters. This answer is fascinating because it tells a story, not just about another botched EU foreign policy objective, but fundamentally about the EU’s place in the world and the creeping realization that the world is changing with or without Brussels. The Fukuyama-esque belief of the 2000s that the rest of the world will aspire to become progressively more liberal, democratic, and capitalist, as long as the EU continues to project its economic and normative power of attraction, has been deflated. While those ideals and norms certainly continue to hold significant sway globally, alternative models spring up as Europe’s clout is gradually fading. Moreover, as new regional powers duly stake their claims to global

2_{Tocci (2016) notes that “the correct interpretation of ‘principled pragmatism’ is not that the EU should}

compromise on its principles as a result of pragmatic interest-based considerations, [but] rather […] that the EU would remove its rose-tinted glasses and pragmatically look at the world as it is, and not as it would like to see it.”

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3 influence, those ideas and international norms are increasingly formed by others, some of which will not hesitate to call out hollow rhetoric.

In this identity crisis, scholars, politicians, and EU leaders have started to ask essential questions, like “Why?” and “How can the EU adapt?”. A strong and prosperous Union is no longer seen as something inevitable, but rather a long-term goal for a flawed project that must be fought for, improved, and justified, or else perish. With this newfound humility comes an emerging willingness to introspect and critique, observe the gaps between rhetoric and action, and discard unhelpful notions of the EU’s uniqueness. In that spirit, this thesis aims to explore a revised version of this section title’s question: “Why was the EU not ready to engage with the two Koreas a global actor?” What are the EU’s constraints in the Korean conflict? What has changed over the last decade, and in what direction is the EU moving? These are not the main research questions, but they serve to frame the narrative. Keep them in mind as we proceed.

1.2. Literature Review – the EU as a Global Actor in the Korean conflict

There is growing literature on the virtues and flaws of the EU’s engagement with the Korean conflict, especially post-2017, as recent developments have heightened scholarly interest.3 This comes in the aftermath of a decade-long period of essentially lukewarm interest. Yi and Millard (2017) write that the literature on the EU’s involvement in the Korean conflict has been relatively limited, finding little to no studies expressly encouraging the EU to involve itself more. Yet, since then, there has been a minor burst of papers and policy briefs on the topic.

For almost two decades, the EU has been pursuing a policy called critical engagement towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).4_{Using a mix of carrot and stick,} economic and diplomatic pressure, the EU seeks to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, uphold the international non-proliferation regime, and improve the DPRK's human rights situation (EEAS, 2016a). This approach has come under mounting scrutiny in the last few years.

Novotna and Ford (2019) charge the critical engagement policy for focusing too much on the critical aspect and all too little on engagement, thus, over time, consigning the EU to a passive role with waning influence. Ballbach (2018) criticizes the critical engagement strategy for failing to fulfill its goals and points to factors underlying the EU’s indecisiveness in approaching the Korean conflict, in the end, outlining possible solutions going forward.

3_{There are also a lot of writings on the broader state of EU involvement in the Korean conflict throughout the}

2000s and early 2010s. Some notable ones are: Frank (2002), Berkofsky (2003, 2009 and 2010), Lee (2005), Ko (2008), Seliger (2008), Lee (2016), and Alexandrova (2018).

4_{”DPRK” and ”North Korea” are used interchangeably in this paper. The same applies to “ROK” – the Republic}

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Similarly, Esteban (2018) gives a brief overview of EU-DPRK relations, comparing the current priorities of different actors, finally suggesting how the EU can potentially facilitate further negotiations. Less critical of the strategy itself, Pardo (2017, 2018a, 2019) and Bondaz (2020) suggest how the EU can take a more proactive stance, adapting its policies to the US and South Korea’s intensified negotiations with North Korea. These practical approaches stand in contrast to Millard and Yi (2017), who argue rather idealistically, though well aware of this, that the EU boldly should impose itself on the six-party talks (SPT).

Although certainly to varying degrees, several of these papers have in common an instinctive focus on what the EU should do, or at least can. Turning this perspective on its head, Park (2020) questions “how South Korea may be able to request the EU to take a more active role.” Thus, rather than diving into the EU's political ‘black box’ – such as internal structures, interests, capabilities, or cohesion – this perspective entails a greater focus on what other key actors may think of, want from, or allow the EU to do. It moves away a bit from agency towards structure, questioning what real opportunities there are for EU involvement.

Framing this perspective within the broader discussion of ‘EU global actorness,’5_it touches upon notions of EU legitimacy and its recognition as a global actor. In a rapidly growing world where Europe comprises an ever more shrinking part of the whole, what role is there for the EU? This focus on broader geopolitics aligns with recent developments in actorness studies. In the only study of EU actorness vis-á-vis the DPRK, Lax (2012, p.50f) observes that the lack of attention to the influence of external factors, such as political climate and relations with other key actors, limits the applicability, usefulness, and comparability of actorness theory. Lax concludes that while EU capabilities had improved throughout the 2000s, interest and engagement opportunities had ostensibly not.

Around the same time, in the early 2010s, other actorness scholars also picked up this increasingly discernable contradiction between the EU’s developing external policy capabilities and the broader changes in the surrounding world. In the words of Niemann and Bretherton (2013), “a less favorable external environment [had emerged], with the US shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region and emerging powers creating a more polycentric world order,” ultimately at the expense of the EU’s global influence. Bretherton and Vogler (2013) observe that while the Lisbon Treaty's ratification had reinforced the EU’s legal authority, increasing the EU’s internal capabilities, the changing global context had resulted in a loss of opportunity

5_{Actorness can be defined as the “capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the}

international system” (Sjöstedt, 1977). The concept has mostly been used to determine to what extent the EU, a quasi-sovereign polity, fulfills the criteria of being an international actor, such as a nation state.

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5 for EU action, and overall decreased EU influence. In a similar vein, Macaj (2014) contends that “[m]any of those who champion a more assertive global role for the Union fail to draw the implications of the profound changes taking place in the international system and the simple fact that the world is becoming decidedly non-European.” These quotations illustrate the shifting perceptions at play first discussed in the introduction. The figurative balloon of EU-centrism was getting ready to be popped in EU-studies.

While not in isolation, these developments have encouraged introspection and self-criticism in the field of actorness. Covering five decades of the conceptual history of actorness, Drieskens (2017, p.1542f) compiles the many complaints within the discipline and criticizes it for still lacking a clear conceptual framework that can be “generalized beyond both the specific case and beyond the EU.” Indeed, over the years, many different frameworks have been built up.6_{While this versatility has contributed to the popularity of the actorness concept, it has also} made comparisons of results much more challenging.

Building on Drieskens’ conclusions, one of the pioneers of the actorness discipline and the author of The External Role of the European Community (1977), Gunnar Sjöstedt, attempts to reconceptualize the actorness concept together with Mark Rhinard. Rhinard and Sjöstedt (2019) criticize different strands of actorness research for focusing too much on the EU’s internal developments, equating more EU capabilities with increased global influence, and using the EU’s stated ambitions as benchmarking for effectiveness evaluations. In essence, the results reveal little about actorness effects outside of their particular contexts. Embracing these criticisms, they reconceptualize the actorness model to incorporate the broader context in which the EU operates, “the kinds of political, economic and social transactions it undertakes, and the feedback processes engendered” – indeed both a comprehensive and ambitious undertaking. Adding these dimensions to the traditional actorness model will make studies more systematic and comparable between cases, and over time, they argue.

While some of these aspects appear to mirror what Lax (2012) finds lacking when examining EU-DPRK relations, the model retains some difficulties from Sjöstedt’s traditional actorness framework (Sjöstedt 1977). While “conceptually inspiring, [the] properties […] are mainly appropriate for general application to the case of the EU and hard to apply to a specific case (Huigens and Niemann, 2011, p.7).” Therefore, parts of the framework could prove to be

6_{Some notable ones are Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970), Galtung (1973); Sjöstedt (1977), Allen and Smith (1990),}

Hill (1993), Jupille and Caporaso (1998), and Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006). Sjöstedt’s contribution is one of the most frequently cited early texts and most subsequent analysts “either explicitly or implicitly relied or expanded upon this central work” (Koops 2011, p.107).

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insufficiently parsimonious, remaining challenging to apply to the unique Korean case. Indeed, the quote illustrates the concluding remarks of Lax (2012) rather perfectly: “[M]any of Sjöstedt’s theoretical concepts would probably be more suitable to apply to a case where more comprehensive relations are to be found.”7 This appraisal remains equally valid almost a decade later. As we will later see, EU-DPRK relations are anything but comprehensive.

Against this background and returning to Park’s (2020) perspective, a case can be made for focusing more exclusively on the geopolitical context in which the EU is deploying its critical engagement strategy, acknowledging the legitimate criticisms made by Rhinard and Sjöstedt (2019). First, post-2011, it would ostensibly be unrewarding to study in-depth the EU’s internal developments as a global actor vis-á-vis North Korea. There has been no major legal revision after the Lisbon Treaty went into effect in 2009. Moreover, the EU’s Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CSDP) innovations have primarily been confined to the European neighborhood, Africa, and Central Asia. Second, as long observed by Korea-experts, it is evident that the EU is significantly “constrained by the perceptions and needs of the other powers more directly involved in the crisis” (Bridges, 2003, p.103). Third, it would be somewhat problematic to evaluate EU engagement performance in isolation, especially when the EU is not even a party to the denuclearization talks.8 Until the Korean conflict is resolved, with so many actors involved simultaneously, it will by nature remain difficult to meaningfully assess the impact of EU relations with the DPRK (Berkofsky. 2003, p.20)

As the literature review has demonstrated, previous research has given limited attention to the EU's external conditions to be a global actor, particularly in the context of the EU’s evolving role in realizing North Korean denuclearization and inter-Korean peace. This thesis aims to fill that gap with an empirically comprehensive account of the factors and restraints at play, tracing changes chronologically and outlining future possibilities. How has the logic of EU engagement with the Korean conflict changed, and how has the peninsula's changing situation influenced the EU’s opportunities for further involvement? As we explore these questions, relevant components from Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s (2019) actorness model will help guide the analysis.

7_{This flaw is not exclusive to Sjöstedt’s actorness model, as “in both conceptual and empirical terms, the domain}

in which the actorness concept is supposedly relevant is unclear (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012, p.560).” In recent years, actorness has, for example, been applied to CSDP missions (Greiçevci, 2011), environmental negotiations (Delreux, 2014), EU anti-terrorism (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012), and European Neighourhood Policy (Börzel and van Hullen, 2013).

8_{Attempts have nonetheless been made. Portela (2015a) explores and compares EU performance in dealing with}

the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises through the use of sanctions. Lee (2016) explores EU impact on regional cooperation concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis.

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1.3. Research Problem and Research Questions

A detailed long-term perspective is needed to investigate the overarching why-question first posed in the introduction – Why was the EU not ready to engage with the two Koreas as a global actor? Inspired by Lax (2012), which covers actorness changes between the early and late 2000s, this thesis will compare and contrast the factors at play in the early and late 2010s. However, using Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s framework, this perspective is applied primarily to the external rather than internal conditions for actorness, thus following Lax’s concluding recommendation to focus more on the broader environment in which the EU is engaging.

In the process, the thesis heeds calls to adopt an “outside-in perspective” on EU foreign policy (Smeets, Adriaensen, and Ryekers, 2013; Smith, 2013). Instead of exploring the increasingly impractical concept of Sui Generis” (Wunderlich, 2012) or trying to assess what unique kind of power the EU provides (Borzel and Risse, 2007),9 it focuses more on what the EU does and how (Smith, 2008). To some extent, this approach might allow for a sidestepping of the ‘EU navel-gazing’ that critics have charged actorness studies with (Keuleers, Fonk, and Keukerleire, 2016).

Accordingly, the thesis will examine the following research questions:

− How has the EU’s engagement with the Korean conflict changed between 2011-2012 and 2018-2019?

− Using Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s (2019) actorness model, how can this change be accounted for?

1.4. Approach, Significance, and Delimitations

Answering the questions outlined above require a comparative longitudinal approach. Thus, this is an explanatory case study of the EU’s engagement with the Korean conflict over time, as a case of the broader phenomena of EU foreign policymaking in Asia (Yin, 2009): what has changed and why? The thesis, employing a qualitative research design, examines the EU’s engagement within a broader Korean geopolitical context and the EU’s relationship with other key actors, chiefly the two Koreas and the US. Tracing EU involvement over an extended period of history further introduces process tracing elements into the approach. With a ‘small-n’ research design coupled with a variety of different empirical sources, the goal is to explore complex causal processes in great detail (Hall, 2008).

9 _{Over the years, it has been proposed that the EU is a “civilian power” (Duchêne, 1972), a “postmodern state”}

(Cooper, 2000), a “normative power” (Manners, 2002), the “Venus’ next to the U.S.’ ‘Mars” (Kagan, 2003), an “ethical power” (Aggestam, 2008), a “Normal Power Europe” (Pardo, 2012), an “integrative power Europe” (Koops, 2011), and, more recently, a “Liberal power Europe” (Wagner, 2017).

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The choice to combine these distinct approaches has resulted from a continuously evolving understanding of the case throughout the writing process. At the onset, only one thing was evident beyond doubt – this would be a case study involving the EU and North Korea. I had just spent six months following Korean affairs at a research institute in Stockholm, gaining a decently good understanding of the fundamental dynamics at play. It all began with the observation that, once again, there was a gap between EU rhetoric and EU action, but this time around, a lot of things were in motion. Behind the scenes, diplomats in and outside of the EU murmured discontent. In the open, the Transatlantic relationship reached historic friction levels while the EU forged many new relationships in Asia. These observations had to be explored.

As more information accumulated, it became clear that only a narrative spanning decades would do the case justice. A recurring complaint in both actorness studies and EU scholarship seemed to be the all-too narrow perspectives, neglecting historical detail or context, and sometimes assuming EU involvement to be innately desirable. Uncovering the dynamics at play in the present would require an approach that began much earlier.

Upon this realization, internal alarm bells rang loudly. Beyond covering a long-period, the project necessitated keeping track of the EU and several other players simultaneously. Treading down this path would require copious amounts of reading from a scholar with an academic focus on European and International Relations, already feeling out of one’s depth. Yet, the project was well off the ground at that point, and there was no going back. This realization immediately disqualified any plans of including interviews with officials of the EEAS or Korean embassies, who likely, either way, would’ve been very difficult to reach due to the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. In-depth interviews would add little useful information compared to the added workload.

Moreover, any questions truly worth asking would only be identifiable very late in the research process. For this reason, the analysis relies extensively on official statements and documents from EU institutions, summits, and high-level dialogues with other key actors, as well as existing EU-Korean research. Though, to understand the broader conflict and avoid potential ‘EU-bias,’ it also accounts for US, Korean, and Chinese perspectives. It furthermore builds on some internal reports and personal observations from Track II Diplomacy conferences between Korean and European officials and scholars. In extensively triangulating information sources, efforts are made to cross-verify accounts and heighten the results' validity, especially important for a single-case, single-researcher study like this one.

The information-gathering process began by searching widely on research search engines for EU-North Korea relations and similar equivalents involving actorness. Upon reaching a

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9 critical mass of papers, it devolved into snowball sampling. In such a narrow field of academia, many cite each other. Tracing citations back through time gradually uncovered the big picture, reaching a point of saturation as fewer new papers emerged. Though gathering information has been continuous throughout the whole writing process. Additionally, a few well-chosen books on US-Korean history and the Trump administration's inner workings have been instrumental.

As a consequence of the comprehensive focus, the thesis adopts a structural macro-level perspective on the EU’s foreign policy and Korean conflict involvement. This perspective does not imply a denial of the value of the diplomatic efforts made by individual member states, EU institutions, or European NGOs' but it acknowledges that mapping out lower-level engagement would be another thesis on its own.10 At most, and in broader terms, the study would note the general ambiance among EU member states concerning the Korean question and how it may influence Brussels’ degree of involvement. Nonetheless, the overarching focus remains on changes in the outside world and how Brussels collectively responds to and navigates them.

Although primarily situated within the broader discipline of actorness, drawing several lessons from recent debates, the study involves by no means a conventional approach to EU actorness. More accurately, given the focus on the conflict's broader context, it straddles the disciplinary border region between actorness and foreign policy analysis. This point is worthwhile underscoring, as Drieskens’ (2017, p.1542) explicitly cautions scholars against using actorness for “conceptual convenience,” thus undermining its utility by changing its meaning to fit all cases. As Karl Popper famously once mused, “A theory that explains everything, explains nothing.”

Against this background, this thesis aspires only to test the new relevant theoretical tools introduced by Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s actorness framework. Given the previously discussed restricted nature of EU-DPRK relations, it would be unwarranted to test the framework as a whole. Thus, the end goal is partial theory testing and, more crucially, exploring and explaining the case itself (Yin, 2009, p.15), which, as shown in the literature review, is quite distinctive.

Case in point, the EU is seeking to project influence on an over half-century-long conflict that is far away – the very last remnant of the Cold War. Brussels is not a party to the ongoing negotiations, nor has it historically been considered a relevant stakeholder by the other parties to the conflict. Instead, other actors widely perceive the EU as a ‘third-tier power.’ It lacks the decision-making capacity of the two Koreas and the United States – the ‘first-tier powers’ – and it also lacks the capacity to be a significant supporter or a spoiler, like ‘second-tier powers’

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such as Russia, China, and Japan (Toloraya, 2019, p.241). Hence, as an outsider with limited direct interests at stake, the EU is primarily restricted to, at best, playing a facilitating role and creating conducive conditions for progress in negotiations, to the extent that other key actors allow it to. It follows that there are limited possibilities for generalizing the results to conflict mediation as a broader phenomenon. Nevertheless, tracing the EU’s changing opportunities and evolving roles in this central test-case will beyond doubt reveal clues about the direction the EU is heading as an actor in Northeast Asia.

The two time periods that will serve as points of comparison are 2011-2012 and 2018-2019. The former is appropriate for two primary reasons. 2011 was the year Chairman Kim Jong Un11 ascended to power following his father’s passing; it was also the year that the EEAS first became fully operational, henceforth coordinating the EU’s diplomatic efforts under the HR/VP’s guidance. Moreover, at the time, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first launched the notion of a US’ pivot to Asia, soon prompting the EU to follow suit. The second period, 2018-2019, is appropriate as it follows the wake of the foreign policy reorientations in South Korea and the United States and North Korea’s rise as a de facto nuclear power. Furthermore, it precedes the COVID-19 pandemic and the December 2019 installation of the new von der Leyen Commission and HR/VP Josep Borrell.

1.5. Actorness Theory

This study conceptualizes the EU as an international agent consisting of states pooling parts of their sovereignty into the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is not concerned with the general extent to which the EU is an actor and focuses instead primarily on EU actorness's external constraints in the Korean conflict. Wissenbach (2013) captures this superbly, describing the EU-DPRK relationship as a function of “regional security dynamics, inter-Korean relations and the DPRK’s challenges to the EU’s values and strategic interests.” In other words, there is a wealth of structural variables that matter. This understanding entails a focus on the EU’s position vis-á-vis the first-tier powers – North Korea, South Korea, and the United States – and the nature of ongoing negotiations – whether they are open and multilateral, opaque and bilateral, or even ongoing at all.

As a consequence of viewing EU foreign policy as an extension of the member states' will, Brussels’ priorities are understood as a balancing act between the shared values and

11_{The two Koreas have different spelling conventions for Romanized names. In North Korea, the two parts of the}

given name have the first letter capitalized, thus Chairman Kim Jong Un, whereas South Korea adds a hyphen, leaving the second part uncapitalized, thus President Moon Jae-in. This paper will follow these spelling conventions unless directly quoting sources which do not.

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11 interests of the Union and the member states’ (EUMS) national security interests. As illustrated by Ko (2008), the EUMS have been key drivers in early EU engagement policy, with EU institutions having comparatively limited interests at stake.

As previously discussed, parts of Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s new framework will be tested, notwithstanding the issues enumerated in the literature review. Charting new territory for actorness studies and focusing less on internal developments, the model will guide the upcoming analysis. Still, to account for the limited EU-DPRK relations and the questionable validity of the impact evaluation and feedback loop variables, some variables will be left out. Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s (2019, p.11) model for actor capacity consists of seven different variables, separated into five overarching categories. The first two categories, general and

specific conditions, contain the traditional actorness variables, which primarily focus on the EU

itself, its internal characteristics, and capabilities. In contrast, the latter categories, context,

performance, and impact, contain the new variables that aim to account for the external

environment. Finally, the two theorize a feedback loop variable, irrelevant for this project.

Figure 1: A recreated illustration of Actor Capacity (Rhinard and Sjöstedt, 2019, p.11).

General conditions reflect the long-term structural features of the EU’s foreign policy-making. They change slowly over more extended periods of time and guide policy-making omnipresently. The structural features can be divided into Autonomy and Value Coherence.

Autonomy stems from the EU’s internal legal authority, as outlined in EU-treaties and delegated

from the member states, and its recognition from other international actors. When the EU as an actor in its own right, in a given issue area, is perceived as capable and reliable or having experience, expertise, diplomatic skill, or political authority, it is more likely to be engaged

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with seriously. Value cohesion, meanwhile, describes the degree of agreement among EU member states over the pursued values in a given policy area, whether there is “community spirit” encouraging joint action and cooperation (Ibid, p.12).

Specific conditions reflect the EU’s relationship to the particular policy area in question. The two variables are Policy Preference Cohesion and Capabilities. Policy Preference

Cohesion reflects the degree to which EU actors (EUMS or institutions) have shared policy

goals for external action in a given area. Preferences for specific policies are ultimately linked to the broader values that underpin them but are more likely to be formable by the EU’s behavior abroad. Capabilities, meanwhile, signify the EU’s ability to translate intent and objectives into action and depends on (1) the resources available for mobilization, such as funding, human resources or expertise, and (2) the practical tools to act, that is, the policy instruments with which resources are deployed (Rhinard and Sjöstedt 2019, p.13f).

Context refers to the global contextual conditions in which the EU is acting. The two key

variables are Geopolitics and Forum Type, but Sjöstedt and Rhinard also highlight the amount

of issues on the agenda. Geopolitics refers to considerations such as the international balance

of power, the EU’s position vis-à-vis the US, or “the reassertion of military power in international diplomacy.” (Ibid, p.14). In other words, it describes precisely those external variables actorness scholars’ have found to be severely missing in many earlier writings. Forum

Type refers to the bargaining environment in which the EU is engaging, whether bilateral or

multilateral. In the two settings, different characteristics would be highlighted. Whereas in a bilateral setting, where the EU’s bargaining power and cohesion would be more directly compared to its counterpart, the EU’s position would be compared to a range of other actors or coalitions in a multilateral setting.12 Finally, the amount of issues under discussion determines the room available for negotiation. The fewer problems currently on the agenda, the harder it will be for negotiators to escape cemented positions through bargaining on various issues.

The last category, Performance, is defined as “the kinds and quality of transactions originating from the EU system carrying a potential to shape addressees in the external environment” (Ibid, p.15). In other words, it can be understood as an intervening variable, consisting of the combined output from the previous three categories, general and specific

conditions, and context, translating it all into impact upon an outside target. Performance

12_{Moreover, in a setting with many powerful counterparts, EU unity might be a prerequisite for gaining any}

bargaining power. Yet, in a setting with only weak or few counterparts, strong EU unity can instead seem intimidating, leading others to disengage (Delreux, 2014). Reviewing multilateral negotiations, da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) finds that “low internal cohesiveness can co-exist with high, medium or low effectiveness depending on the policy areas and the bargaining configuration.”

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13 examples can be transactions, economic exchanges, transfer of knowledge, agenda-setting, military assistance, or threats of sanctions. Finally, the variable impact asks to what extent the EU’s goals are achieved and whether anything has changed as a result. We will now proceed to translate these variables into the Korean context.

1.4.1. Operationalization

As previously noted, there have been no significant overhauls of the EU’s internal legal structures since the Lisbon Treaty. While South Korea is the first, and thus far only, Asian country to have signed a Framework Participation Agreement, regulating participation in EU overseas missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP innovations have primarily been confined to the Middle East and Africa. South Korea has joined EU operations far from home ports, and not the other way around. Accordingly, in the Korean conflict’s context, the variable Autonomy indicates the EU’s recognition from the other primary players, the two Koreas and the United States. Do they encourage or ask for EU involvement, or is Brussels kept at an armlengths distance? Meanwhile, Value Coherence reflects the degree of agreement over the EU’s pursued values in the conflict, covering human rights and sanctions.

Concerning Specific Conditions, Policy Preference Cohesion indicates the EU member states’ unity on engagement and how closely aligned with Seoul or Washington Brussels should be policy-wise. Capabilities, which, as a consequence of the absence of changes since the Lisbon Treaty, have stayed mainly the same, but reflects the EU’s available tools: the ‘Carrot and Stick’ of sanctions and aid, applying international pressure on human rights, and maintaining dialogues with the two Koreas.

Under Context, Geopolitics reflects the state of inter-Korean relations, the political climate and degree of cooperation between Seoul and Washington, and the EU’s position vis-á-vis the other players. Forum Type describes the format of negotiations with North Korea, whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or inactive. Without a place at the negotiation table, it plays a rather limited role in determining the EU’s direct influence. However, it does affect how transparent or opaque the negotiations are to outsiders. Finally, the Amount of issues on the

agenda focuses on the various deliberation areas, such as human rights, trust-building

mechanisms, denuclearization, and peace treaties.

As previously noted, assessing the impact of EU-DPRK relations remains difficult and unrewarding in light of the Korean conflict’s complexity. For this reason, there is little use in trying to ascertain the final variables impact or feedback on a more meaningful level.

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1.4.2. Descriptive Schematic

The descriptive comparative chapters, forming the foundation of the subsequent analysis, will in part be guided by four dimensions of involvement, deduced from the Engagement Strategy:

The European Union has a policy of Critical Engagement towards the DPRK, which combines pressure through sanctions and other measures while keeping communication and dialogue channels open. Its goals, aimed at the complete, verifiable and irreversible de-nuclearisation, are to support a lasting reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, the upholding of the global non-proliferation regime, and the improvement of human rights in the DPRK. – EEAS (2018a).

The first dimension, Conventional Diplomacy, refers to the more direct bilateral engagement with the DPRK through high-level dialogues or inter-parliamentary meetings. The second dimension, North Korean Wellbeing, has two subparts. EU humanitarianism consists of direct bilateral aid to improve wellbeing and earn good-will. Meanwhile, human rights are addressed alongside the direct dialogues by applying international pressure in multilateral organizations. The EU has long lacked direct involvement in the third category,

Denuclearization (Negotiations). In the latter parts of the descriptive chapters, the EU’s

opportunities for further participation in this dimension will be explored. Finally, the fourth

Economic dimension consists of both reward and punishment. In exchange for desired changes

on Pyongyang’s behalf, the EU offers to deepen trade and cooperation – a conditional incentive – and sanctions removal. These four dimensions are subsequently classified by Type (engaging or pressuring), Forum (bilateral or multilateral), and Policy Instrument.

1.6. Thesis Roadmap – From the Cold War to “Fire and Fury”

The subsequent background chapter will provide an overview of early EU involvement in the Korean conflict, chiefly covering the 1990s through the mid-2000s. Chapters three and four will descriptively explore the state of EU engagement leading up to the two time periods,

2011-Table 1: Dimensions of EU Engagement

Attributes

Type Forum Policy Instrument

1. Conventional Diplomacy - - -

2. North Korean Wellbeing - - -

- Humanitarianism - Human Rights - - - - - - 3. Denuclearization - - - 4. Economic - - -

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15 2012 and 2018-2019, respectively. They will focus first on developments within the areas of diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic engagement, and secondly on developments concerning denuclearization and peace talks. They will afterward situate these efforts within the conflict's broader context. In chapter five, the two periods will be analyzed and compared using Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s new actorness model. Finally, the concluding sixth chapter will discuss the results’ implications for EU foreign policy and actorness studies while attempting to outline some prospects on the horizon.

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2. Before Critical Engagement – An overview of early involvement

Following the end of the Korean War, in which several European countries had participated as part of the US-led United Nations Command, there was limited contact between the DPRK and Western Europe for a long time. North Korea, the world’s sole de facto communist monarchy, mainly engaged with its patron, the USSR, and the Eastern Bloc countries. However, with the fall of the Berlin wall and the Soviet Union's gradual dissolution, longstanding barriers to engagement began to break down.

Under the banner of the policy ‘Nordpolitik,’13 South Korean President Roh Tae-woo14 spearheaded efforts to expand economic and diplomatic ties with North Korea’s traditional allies in the communist bloc, with the ultimate goal of achieving international cross-recognition of both the Koreas (Sanford, 1993). Hungary was the first Eastern European country to extend recognition in early 1990. By the end of the year, almost all of Eastern Europe had followed suit, including, crucially, the Soviet Union. With Moscow having borne the brunt of Pyongyang’s initial resentment, Beijing established relations with Seoul in 1992, informing North Korean leadership that the developments were unavoidable (Kim, 1994; Oberdorfer, 2003, pp.227, 247f). This set the stage for a series of major events where North Korea was similarly left with little choice but to diversify its relations.

Although the two Koreas joined the UN at the same time in 1991, Pyongyang became increasingly isolated diplomatically. With the loss of subsidized trade and close relations with the eastern communist bloc, North Korea experienced a significant economic downturn and energy deficit. Under this duress, Pyongyang could no longer keep up with Seoul in a conventional arms race (Sigal, 1998). Meanwhile, due to Seoul’s diplomatic offensive, there was significant fallout with former allies (Kim, 2009). Several of these factors, in combination, energized the North Korean efforts to develop its already existing nuclear program, both for energy sufficiency reasons and as a bargaining chip in establishing diplomatic relations with the US and its allies. However, in response to the North Korean efforts at diplomatic rapprochement, Washington and Tokyo made it clear that closer relations would be entirely conditional on resolving all standing disagreements over the nuclear program (Sanford, 1993).

13_{The policy drew inspiration from West Germany’s ‘Ostpolitik‘ towards the GDR and gained momentum with}

the recent reunification of Germany.

14_{In 1988, President Roh Tae-Woo had been sworn in following South Korea’s first free and fair elections since}

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17 Although an aspiring nuclear state, North Korea was party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 198515 and had also ratified the 1992 safeguards agreement that required Pyongyang to allow routine inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recurring disagreements over the scope of the inspectors’ access culminated in the 1994 nuclear crisis that left Pyongyang and Washington at the brink of war. Nevertheless, a successful US mission to North Korea resulted in a return to negotiations and, ultimately, a bilateral agreement between the US and DPRK – an enormous achievement from a North Korean perspective, having forced concessions from the world’s sole superpower as a comparatively small and diplomatically isolated state. In return for denuclearization, the Geneva Agreed Framework offered the DPRK prospects for economic and political relations with the US. It was further meant to address North Korea's energy needs through the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). These significant developments put the Koreas on the international agenda, including for EU policymakers, who two years prior had singled out non-proliferation as a top priority for the recently established Common Foreign and Security Policy.16

The subsequent year, in 1995, the European Union received its first South Korean presidential delegation.17 In parallel, Brussels began sending humanitarian food aid to North Korea, which was currently undergoing massive flooding and widespread starvation – a period known as the Arduous March. This food aid evolved into more comprehensive assistance with elements of positive conditionality. As a part of the so-called ‘Sunshine Policy,’ which seeks to transform North Korea through positive reinforcement and generous ODA flows, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung directly encouraged the establishment of EU-DPRK ties (Bridges, 2003). Importantly, beyond the Korean War, the EU had neither historical baggage nor ongoing political issues weighing down relations with the Koreas.

As the EU deepened its engagement, it lobbied to enter KEDO with the US, South Korea, and Japan, formally joining the executive board in 1997 (KEDO, 1997). Though outwardly accepted by the other parties, behind the scenes, Seoul and Tokyo were reluctant to give equal influence to the late-arriving Europeans, who, in the end, paid for less than three percent of

15_{Pyongyang had assented to the NPT under pressure from the USSR, which six years prior, had aided efforts to}

build the first North Korean nuclear reactor at the Yongbyeon Nuclear Scientific Research Center (Panda, 2018).

16_{The EU’s direct interest in Asia was first established in a communication “Towards a New Asia Strategy” from}

the European Commission to the Council in 1994 (European Commission, 1994). The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), a major political dialogue forum, was inaugurated only two years later. For a detailed overview of early EU activities on non-proliferation, see Portela (2003).

17_{After nearly three decades of diplomatic relations, Seoul sent a permanent delegation to Brussels in 1989,}

simultaneously commencing annualized high-level dialogues and parliamentary exchanges. The EU reciprocated the subsequent year (Embassy of the Republic of Korea to the European Union in Belgium, n.d.)

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KEDO’s total expenditure (Bridges, 2003, p.90; EU Council, 2002). Concomitant with the progressing inter-Korean rapprochement, the EU likewise intensified its engagement with the North. Between 1998 and 2002, Brussels and Pyongyang held five political dialogues, and four EU parliament delegations visited Pyongyang. The Commission established standard guidelines for member states to follow when engaging with North Korea (EU Council, 2000). In the aftermath of the historic first inter-Korean summit on June 15, 2000, in which the two Koreas declared their shared commitment to promote deeper South-North relations and seek peaceful reunification, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity. The previously reclusive DPRK was joining several international organizations, and soon, formal diplomatic relations were established between the DPRK and the EU along with eight member states (Bridges, 2003, 93f).18 Under Swedish leadership, the EU sent a top-level delegation to Seoul and Pyongyang in May 2001, and the following year a DPRK delegation toured five European capitals (European Council, 2001). In parallel, the EU Council developed a four-year EU-DPRK country strategy, identifying critical areas for deeper cooperation, notably technical assistance, humanitarian aid, providing market access, and intensifying support for KEDO (European Commission, 2001). While encouraged by Seoul, the initiative caused some exasperation in Washington. The recently installed Bush administration, still without a DPRK policy fully formed, felt snubbed by the timing (Berkofsky, 2003).

While some have suggested alluring business prospects as a motivating factor for EU involvement, the DPRK accounted for less than 0.02 percent of the EU’s foreign trade in the year 2000.19 More concerning was the need to maintain momentum in ongoing negotiations over North Korea’s ballistic missile technology exports, an issue left unaddressed by the 94 Agreed Framework (Frank, 2002).20 The talks were under strain following the Clinton administration’s failure to normalize relations and fulfill its commitment to phase out certain sanctions due to opposition in the US Congress (Harrisson, 2001). Moreover, some policymakers and scholars were already identifying North Korea as a conceivable test case for the EU’s global CFSP aspirations (Bridges, 2003). Participating at the front row alongside the big four of East Asia – the US, China, Russia, and Japan – could undoubtedly add more clout to the Union’s presence in the region.

18_{Italy and the United Kingdom established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in the year 2000, and were}

subsequently followed by Spain, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, and Luxembourg in 2001. With Ireland joining them in 2003, France remained the only member state without official relations.

19_{Though, conversely, it was 13.7 percent of the DPRK’s total foreign Trade (Berkofsky, 2003).}

20_{Having reverse engineered Soviet missiles since the late 1970s, North Korea launched its first satellite launch}

vehicle in 1998, containing technology that can also be used for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching continental United States.

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19 Just as negotiations were gaining momentum, with North Korea committing to a five-year moratorium on missile testing, there was a transition of power in Washington. After a six-month-long policy review, the incoming Bush administration took a more aggressive approach towards Pyongyang. In contradiction of the Agreed Framework’s pledge not to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, Washington notoriously lumped the regime together with Iraq and Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” adding Pyongyang to a list of possible targets for preemptive nuclear strikes in the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (Federation of American Scientists, 2002). The unilateral announcement, alongside the subsequent invasion of Iraq, further convinced Pyongyang of the existential need to acquire nuclear weapons for regime survival.21

The US was perceived as rapidly backtracking from existing commitments22 and received backlash from both Pyongyang and some allies. The EU’s two top foreign policy chiefs, HR/VP Javier Solana and Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten, condemned the speech, calling it “megaphone diplomacy” and “a unilateralist overdrive” (Black, 2002). The policy reversal also caused considerable alliance friction with Seoul, which persisted with engagement and dialogue (Oberdorfer, 2013, p.417f). Only three years earlier, in 1999, former President Kim Dae-jung set up the Trilateral Oversight and Coordination Group (TOCG), with Japan and the US, precisely to avoid this type of policy miscoordination on Pyongyang (Koen, 2005).

On the other side of the conflict, Pyongyang was involved in a naval clash with South Korea in June 2002, prompting the US to cancel scheduled talks. With tensions mounting, North Korea de-facto ended the agreement when it in October 2002 told an American delegation that it had the right to maintain a nuclear weapons program, arguing that the US had already nullified the Agreed Framework with its hostile approach (KCNA, 2002). Following these revelations, the EU immediately put all technical assistance on hold, and KEDO suspended energy deliveries and construction projects, ultimately getting disbanded completely four years later (KEDO, n.d.). In response, Pyongyang left the Non-proliferation Treaty in January 2003 and began reprocessing nuclear fuel.

There was still support for continued engagement within the EU. However, as over the US-led invasion of Iraq, cracks began to appear between member states, with diverging preferences emerging. Some member states felt “donor fatigue,” voicing disapproval that North Korea had made far too few concessions on human rights (Lee, 2005, p.37) and disappointingly

21_{A North Korean editorial in the Rodong Sinmun argued at the time: “The Iraq War taught us that it is inevitable}

that we will possess strong material deterrence in order to prevent war and defend the country’s security and national sovereignty (Rodong Sinmun, 2003, as cited in Hwang, 2013).”

22_{On October 12}th_{, 2000, just three months before Bush took office, the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Communiqué had}

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rolled back some of its market reform initiatives. Moreover, there was frustration over Brussel’s minimal influence in the nuclear negotiations despite its financial contributions, however small. These differences hampered existing efforts to stay actively involved.

Several possible multilateral frameworks for renewed nuclear talks were under consideration in the aftermath. One of them, favored by the recently installed South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, included all the DPRK’s immediate neighbors, the US, and the EU. Perhaps a European presence at the negotiations table would help Seoul moderate Washington’s comparatively hawkish approach. However, from a North Korean perspective, the EU either lacked the political clout or willpower needed to counterbalance Washington in any meaningful way. Pyongyang had no incentive to include the EU in security talks if it toed the US line too closely (Berkofsky, 2003, p.12). Stemming from the EU’s predominantly reactive (as opposed to preventive) approach to proliferation crises at the time, Brussels would frequently end up endorsing or complementing US measures instead of proposing a policy of its own (Portela, 2003), and especially when internally divided. On the other hand, for the Bush administration, the EU’s step-by-step approach represented an unwanted relic from the failed Clinton years of “appeasement” (Baker, 1999).23_{Thus, in the end, the Europeans were neither invited to the} tripartite- or subsequent six-party talks (SPT), which would end up predominantly centered around the two Koreas and their respective patrons, Beijing and Washington.

While continuing the humanitarian aid program and lending official support to the SPT, the resulting policy review led the EU to adopt a more cautious approach, making all economic cooperation conditional on progress on the nuclear issue and the human rights dimension (EU Council, 2003, p.21). By the end of 2003, the EU had adopted a common anti-proliferation strategy and a European Security Strategy, which highlighted North Korean nuclearization as an explicit threat to European Security. “[P]roblems such as those in Kashmir [...] and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly [...] nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia . . . are all of concern to Europe’ (EU Council, 2003, p. 11). It further stated that those who place “themselves outside the bounds of international society […] should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union” (EU Council, 2003b, 2003c). Ko (2017) has called this moment the end of the ‘active engagement’ phase and the beginning of ‘critical engagement.’ With that, this dynamic backdrop sets the stage for our understanding of the comparative chapters ahead.

23_{The Bush administration’s early North Korea policy has been characterized as the “ABC (Anything But Clinton)}

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3. The EU and the state of Critical Engagement in 2011-2012

Figure 2: 25 out of 27 Member States have diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 2011.24

This chapter will provide an overview of the EU’s involvement in the Korean conflict in the years leading up to 2011-2012, first covering diplomatic and economic engagement, and subsequently, denuclearization- and peace talk-developments. In the end, it will situate the EU’s actions within the broader context of the conflict, focusing primarily on the first-tier powers, the DPRK, the ROK, and the US.

3.1. EU External Action in the Korean conflict

3.1.1. Diplomatic and Economic Engagement

In the early 2010s, the EU had a hardline tactic on weapons of mass destruction and human rights, making all technical assistance and cooperation projects conditional on non-proliferation, but was simultaneously moderate on providing continued humanitarian aid. Brussels employed a “two-track approach of a dualistic nature” (Lee, 2005, p.49).

The high-level political dialogues and EU-DPRK relations temporarily broke down for two years following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT regime in 2003. Excluded from the SPT format, a disgruntled EU first canceled large-scale technical aid under the North Korea

24_{The EU has no official delegation in Pyongyang and the member states turns representing the EU on a}

six-month basis. France does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea but has a diplomatic office in Pyongyang. For an overview of the history of DPRK Diplomatic Relations, see Wertz (2016).

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country strategy paper (Lee, 2009) and began to push harder on North Korea's human rights record. In unison, EU member states tabled three resolutions on the DPRK in the UN Human Rights Council (OHCHR) and pushed to establish a UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea in 2004. Finally, in 2005, after Pyongyang had acknowledged that it possessed nuclear weapons and ended its five-year self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile testing, the member states brought the resolutions to the UN General Assembly (Bridges, 2008, 227). They have ever since annually sponsored the ‘Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK’ (Esteban, 2018). This hardened stance prompted Pyongyang to expel aid workers from European NGOs and suspend all political dialogue with the EU until 2007 (Seliger, 2008, p.86f).

While all technical assistance beyond food development aid was made entirely conditional, the EU’s humanitarian aid levels were relatively stable throughout the 2000s compared to those of South Korea and the US. While US aid is officially de-linked from political concerns, aid flows have correlated with progress in security talks, with significant decreases following the two nuclear tests of 2006 and 2009. South Korean aid has been tied to government unification policy, with a no strings attached approach until 2008, when the progressive administrations’ decade-long Sunshine Policy came to a swift end. In contrast, EU food aid has been highly correlated with humanitarian crises, and there is a separation of humanitarian and political issues (Jang and Suh, 2017, p.740).

The sharp policy reorientation of the conservative Lee Myung-bak presidency in 2008 – including drastically reduced aid to North Korea and a much closer alignment with Washington – had the indirect effect of making Pyongyang more dependent on Chinese and European support. To put things in perspective, barring Beijing and Washington, Seoul provided almost as much food aid as the rest of the world combined between 1995 and 2011. As long as Seoul provided steady aid flows in the preceding years, the Kim regime could afford to be selective when accepting ODA, making access for foreign NGOs conditional on technical assistance. Yet, with the aid flows from other actors significantly reduced, accompanied by flooding that led to recurring food shortages, the continuity of EU assistance became much more appreciated (Seliger, 2008, p.86f). Pyongyang could no longer effectively substitute unsatisfactory European aid with unconditional aid from Seoul.

This dynamic became especially apparent in 2010 when a North Korean famine coincided with a low point in inter-Korean relations and a standstill in the SPTs. South Korean food aid had fallen over 90 percent compared to 2007 levels, while US aid was almost nonexistent (Jang

The EU as a Global Actor in the Korean Conflict : Rising Stature Under External Restraints