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Securing the Welfare

Analysing the change in the Social Democrats’ discourse for

Third Country Nationals in Denmark and Sweden

Luís Vilachá Fernández

International Migration and Ethnic Relations Two-year Master’s program

30 credits

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Abstract

The Social Democrats in Denmark and Sweden have dominated the socio-political spectrum for decades with a discourse based on the principles of solidarity, equality and

freedom. Since the migrant crisis hit the European Union in 2015, these parties have

strengthened their discourse towards migration and migrant incorporation concerning their access to the welfare system. The use of identity for theory, together with the variables of national identity, the rise of far-right parties, the troublesome fitting of national identity and the EU and the economic revision will be analysed in this thesis. By using an ideal type analysis for a method, this thesis will explore the shift in the discourse from the Social Democrats by looking at their political programs before and after the migrant crisis to find out the changes Third Country Nationals have these days when accessing the system and try to obtain social benefits.

Keywords: Social Democracy, identity, Third Country National, social rights, ideal type

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Table of contents

Abstract ... 2 Table of contents ... 3 Acknowledgements ... 5 Abbreviations ... 6 1. Introduction ... 7

1.1. Aim and research question ... 8

1.2. Case studies ... 9

1.3. Languages used in this thesis ... 9

2. Social Democracy and Welfare State ... 10

2.1. Welfare State Regime in Denmark and Sweden ... 10

2.1.1. Residence permit ... 11

2.1.1. Citizenship ... 12

2.2. Social Democracy as an ideology ... 13

2.3. Social Democracy v Social Democrats ... 15

2.4. Migration and the Social Democrats ... 16

2.5. Social rights for TCN in Denmark and Sweden ... 17

3. Method and Material ... 18

3.1. Ideas and Ideological content ... 18

3.1.1. Ideology critique ... 19

3.2. Material ... 20

4. National identity and the Social Democrats ... 21

4.1. The question of identity... 21

4.1.1. Sweden and the People’s home ... 22

4.1.2. Denmark, from ‘fatherland’ to ‘Folket’ ... 23

4.2. Criticism and economic revision ... 25

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4.2.2. The Third Way... 27

4.3. Fitting the EU in Denmark and Sweden... 27

4.3.1. Denmark chooses to opt-out ... 30

4.3.2. The EU and the end of the Swedish consensus ... 30

4.4. The rise of far-right nationalist parties ... 32

4.4.1. Sweden Democrats ... 33

4.4.1. Danish People’s Party ... 33

5. The migrant crisis and the political discourse of the Social Democrats ... 34

5.1. Structure of the analysis ... 34

5.2. Accessing the system before the migrant crisis ... 35

5.2.1. Vi tror på Danmark ... 36

5.2.2. En Del af Europa ... 38

5.2.3. Värderingar och Samhälle ... 39

5.2.4. Världen Av Idag ... 41

5.2.5. Vår Politik ... 42

5.3. Accessing the system after the migrant crisis ... 44

5.3.1. Fælles om Danmark ... 44

5.3.1.1. Udfordringen og muligheder ... 45

5.3.2. The Congress of Aalborg ... 48

5.3.3. The Congress of Göteborg ... 50

6. The shift in the Social Democrats’ discourse towards TCN ... 55

6.1. Accessing Social rights after the shift in the discourse ... 58

7. Conclusions ... 60

Annexes ... 61

Annexe 1: Tables ... 61

Annexe 2: Original texts ... 63

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Acknowledgements

I want to express my gratitude to all my friends from Copenhagen who helped me get through the process of writing this thesis. I could not have completed this project without your support, patience and attention, especially when difficulties arose in my life and my mind and my heart were far from focusing on this thesis. I also want to express my gratitude to my family; I would not have been able to do it without your great support, not only during the process of writing this thesis but throughout my life. I cannot thank you enough for all your support. Today I can happily say that it has become a long, intense and fruitful adventure writing this thesis.

Studying this master program and writing this master thesis has been an exciting experience of self-discovery at many levels. It is not only writing about topics I feel passionate about it but also to have finally found something I feel passionate after many years of searching for it.

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Abbreviations

Dansk Folkeparti / Danish People’s Party DPP

European Economic Community ECC

European Union EU

New Public Management NPM

Second Country Nationals SCN

Sverigesdemokraterna / Sweden Democrats

SD

Third Country Nationals TCN

United Nations UN

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR

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1. Introduction

The humanitarian crisis as a consequence of the Civil War in Syria serves a context in the thesis. The conflict in Syria, together with the political and economic instability in the region led into vast flows of people running away from their conflicts back in their countries of origin. The consequences from this vast humanitarian crisis are directly related to the aim and research question of this thesis.

The UNHCR (2016) distinguishes in between two different groups often confused by media and public opinion in general, migrants and refugees. Hence, I believe it is essential to explain the reason I have chosen migrant crisis and not refugee crisis as the misconception among these two terms may bring confusion and also a negative impact to the economic migrants this thesis is using as a target group.

According to the UNHCR, refugees ‘are persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution’,

while migrants ‘choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons’ (ibid.). The Council on Foreign Relations states (CFR 2015)

that the word migrant can also work as an umbrella for refugees, as refugees are moving seeking an improvement in their lives, but the word refugee does not apply to migrants as they are explicitly moving due to persecution and any risk posed in their lives (UNHCR 2016; CFR 2015).

Nevertheless, it is not the scope of this thesis to discuss whether economic migrants move voluntarily or forced by socio-economic and political circumstances nor to analyse how many applicants per country were economic migrants or asylum-seekers. I will use TCN

as the umbrella term to unite both groups applying for residence permit and citizenship

to access social rights. The reason behind using this terminology is that the concept of TCN refers to people without a passport from an EU member state and therefore, it applies to both groups as in both cases they are not citizens of the EU.

The thesis will be divided into two core chapters and one chapter, chapter three, for the method and the material. In chapter two, the literature regarding Social Democracy and the view on the WSR by the Social Democrats will be presented. Chapter four will present identity as a theoretical framework in relation with the ideology behind Social Democrats in Denmark and Sweden by using national identity, the economic revision, the

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relationship with the EU and the rise of far-rights parties as variables. Chapter five will

focus on the analysis of the material, both from the political programs and the political Congresses as I will present in chapter three. Finally, chapter six will explore the shift occurred in these two parties by focusing on four variables to analyse the change in the discourse on the access to social rights for TCN in the WSR of Denmark and Sweden.

1.1.

Aim and research question

Social Democracy has played a significant role in creating and developing the Social Democratic welfare regime. The Social Democrats have traditionally been at the forefront in the expansion of the social welfare in both in Denmark and Sweden. (socialdemokratiet 2018a; socialdemokraterna 2018a). However, since the migrant crisis of 2015, their discourse has changed towards those migrants trying to access the WSR. This master thesis aims to compare the current discourse of the two largest political parties in Denmark and Sweden regarding the access to social rights of TCN based on their WSR, national identity, the rise of the far-right parties, the economic revision made since the 1980s and their relationship with the EU. The reason behind choosing these two parties is due to its historical dominance over Danish and Swedish politics and more specifically regarding the expansion of their WSR.

To analyse their political discourse, I will use my material to answer the following research question, what changes have occurred in the discourse from the social

democratic parties regarding the access to social rights for TCN before and after the migrant crisis of 2015?

When I refer to social rights, I mean that TCN when legally registered in an EU Member State they are entitled to access certain rights, like any other national or SCN residing in the state. I will analyse the political discourse of these two parties regarding the access to social rights benefits for TCN in Denmark and Sweden.

Social rights are generally entitled to national citizens, but also legal residences of the state, I will specifically focus on (1) the right to receive pension benefits and (2) unemployment benefits.

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1.2.

Case studies

The Social Democrats of Denmark and Sweden are the two case studies in this thesis. Both parties have a long history as the ruling party, and both have been key actors in the development of their WSR. Nevertheless, Denmark and Sweden have followed different approaches on how to integrate TCN with the status of long-term residents.

Denmark has several opt-outs regarding its participation in EU legislation since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Denmark’s position in the EU and its provisions regarding the status of TCN with the status of long-term residents makes this country suitable for this research study. Denmark is the first case study as it is an example of a Member State that does not entirely follow EU legislation, and more importantly, their national legislation for citizenship acquisition is based on ius sanguinis. At the same time, the Danish Social Democratic party has a long history in power (socialdemokratiet 2018).

The Swedish Social Democrats are the second case for this thesis. Sweden shares cultural and historical similarities with Denmark due to its historical alliances and disagreements but more importantly, has a different policy towards immigration. Sweden follows as Denmark, the principle of ius sanguinis and is an example of a Nordic country that follows EU Directive 2003/109/EC. This means that Sweden differentiates in between TCN coming from another EU member state and TCN without residence permit from a non-EU member state. At the same time, the Swedish Social Democratic party has as in Denmark, a long history as the main ruling party (Socialdemokraterna 2018a; Schall, 2016:35).

1.3.

Languages used in this thesis

The primary language for this thesis would be English, which I master but it is not my mother tongue, and therefore I will use The Free dictionary when looking for synonyms, clarification and so on. At the same time, I will use Danish and Swedish as secondary languages as the political programs, and Congress information is only sometimes in English. I do speak Danish as I currently live in Denmark and have some limited understanding of written Swedish. In both cases, I will use Den Danske Ordbog and the Svenska Akademiens Ordböcker when reading and analysing information in these languages.

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2. Social Democracy and Welfare State

This chapter will present the background and previous literature on the ideology behind Social Democracy.

2.1.

Welfare State Regime in Denmark and Sweden

In the cases of Denmark and Sweden, both countries have a Social Democratic WSR; this means that the government aims for a welfare state that promotes high levels of equality and solidarity where costs have been pre-emptively socialised by its citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1989:50).

Many authors have widely discussed the concept of WSR, one the most influential authors, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, divided in his book ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1989), the WSR in three typologies, the liberal (anglophone countries), the conservative (continental Europe and Japan) and the Social democratic (Scandinavia) (Ebbinghaus, 2012:4). According to Sainsbury, all three regimes have the goal to contribute with social provisions. However, the liberal regime is based on need, the conservative is based on work, while in the social democratic regime, universal access is based on citizenship or residence (2012:11). It is important to mention as Ebbinghaus argues, that the three typologies received extensive criticism for lacking analysis in the hybrids systems of some countries. (2012:3). However, the three-regime model is still used as a basis to study different WSR and therefore I will use it when analysing the discourse of the Social Democratic parties in Denmark and Sweden.

The impact on immigration vary in all three cases, in the liberal regime, access is based on need, which implies that newly arrived immigrants will be in a vulnerable, if not poverty and exclusion as they lack resources during their first years in the country. Sainsbury explains that this principle of exclusion can also be considered inclusive as this is the factual manner for immigrants to access the benefits of the system (ibid. 11). In the second case, in the conservative regime, access is based on work, this means that immigrants can immediately access the same conditions as citizens of the state. However, for this to happen different provisions can take place such strict tests, lifetime earnings and precarious employment (ibid.12).

Finally, in the social democratic regime, access to social benefits is based on citizenship, and therefore migrants can be denied the rights to receive rights based on its status of

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non-11 citizens. In this case, residence permit acquisition is the first step to receive rights as any other citizen of the state (ibid.12).

Esping-Andersen argues that access to social benefits is tight to access the social market, meaning that the right to work equals the right to receive and income protection (1989:28). As they both have a social democratic WSR based on citizenship, the right to work in Denmark and Sweden is fundamental. Therefore, migrants need to overcome the entry requirement to be able to access the benefits of the market in the first place, and only then they will receive social protection.

The next two subsections will further explain how to access into a Social Democratic WSR as in the cases of Denmark and Sweden.

2.1.1. Residence permit

To be granted with a residence permit is the first step in Denmark and Sweden to access social rights. However, both countries have different incorporation regimes and different relation towards the EU. Denmark has several opts-out regarding EU legislation and more specifically regarding TCN possibility to transfer their residence permit from one EU member state to another one, while Sweden follows EU regulations.

According to Sainsbury, an incorporation regime ‘consists of rules and norms that govern immigrants’ possibilities to become a citizen, to acquire permanent residence, and to participate in economic, cultural and political life (2006) (in Sainsbury, 2012:16). In the case of Denmark and Sweden, even though they have the same WSR, the incorporation regimes vary, from an inclusive regime in Sweden to a restrictive regime in Denmark. In Sweden, the incorporation regime is based on residence or domicile as a precondition to access rights even though ius sanguinis was still the citizenship principle (SOU 1975:15) (in Sainsbury, 2012:84), meaning that residence permit is granted not long after arrival. However, since 1980s restrictions such language courses, complementary education, etc., have been incorporated in Sweden to mitigate the growing differences of citizens and non-citizens (ibid.91).

Denmark has a more arduous incorporation regime where criminal records, language requirements and knowledge of Danish society and culture among others is needed to become a citizen. The principle of ius sanguinis is the citizenship principle that applies

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12 to the Danish case. In Denmark, all non-citizens, whether they are SCN or TCN, they need to naturalise to become citizens, except Nordic citizens (ibid. 97). Residency has also been strengthened for both SCN and TCN where economic and employment requirements needed to be met to receive legal residency in Denmark (id. 98). Already in the 1960-70s’, Denmark considered migrants as temporary workers or future citizens and not as members of the community. In other words, immigration was labelled as foreign workers policy rather than settlements policy (Sainsbury, 2012:229), while in Sweden, immigration was labelled as permanent rather than temporary one, as rights were derived from residence (Geddes 2003b:118) (in Sainsbury, 2012: 215).

2.1.1. Citizenship

As seen in this section, Denmark and Sweden’s citizenship acquisition is based on the principle of ius sanguinis; this means based on descendants, blood rights (Joppke, 2011:2). The fact that citizenship is blood-based determines who is a member and who is not. Bryan S. Turner defines citizenship as a collection of rights and obligations (1997:5), meaning that it is not just to hold citizenship from a country, but to effectively use the social and political benefits attached to it. Rogers Brubaker argues that citizenship is ‘internally inclusive [and] externally exclusive’ (1994:21), meaning that citizenship differentiates members and non-members of a particular state.

Thus, citizenship appears as a category to differentiate people that share a specific set of values, culture, language and territory behave and relate to each other from the rest. Brubaker argues (ibid.:22) that the state and the territory of the state are closely related, and therefore the state is the only actor entitled to grant membership for its territory, as we can see with TCN with long-term residence permit inside the EU borders.

In the cases of Denmark and Sweden, as these countries have a WSR based on citizenship, to acquire citizenship is crucial to benefit from the full provisions of the Danish and Swedish WSR, meaning that citizenship is crucial for changing a group category from an administrative perspective and thus accessing social rights. However, as Jenkins (2014:111) argue, group categorisation such citizenship can have consequences for those in and out. This author differentiates nominal categories based in discourse that identify them, for example national identity and national values, and virtual category to refer to the way people actually behave and are treated. In other words, the discourse (nominal category) used by members of the group or by the Social Democrats can define what TCN

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13 can access or not once they pass through the process of citizenship acquisition. However, the perception among the group members (virtual category) from the newcomers can be different even they have fully achieved the right to be permanent residents or citizens of the State.

Both Denmark and Sweden had similar citizenship laws until the 1970s when they started to follow different paths until these days. As Midtbøen explains (2015:2), Denmark and Sweden signed the European Council Convention of 1997 which regulates all aspects of nationality internationally from dual citizenship, citizenship acquisition but also to prevent statelessness in case of state secession (Council of Europe 1997; Midtbøen, 2015: 2-3).

Sweden adopted its current citizenship law in 2001 removing its previous legislation from the 1950s. The new Swedish legislation was based on the liberalisation of individual rights thanks to the prerogatives of the state. This means that by allowing migrants to have dual citizenship and therefore become Swedish citizens, Sweden linked the access to citizenship with social integration as holding citizenship could contribute to a faster and better integration for the migrant into the Swedish society (Midtbøen, 2015:3). Denmark adopted its current citizenship law also in 2001 with a more restrictive turn as in the Swedish case. Dual citizenship is possible since 2002. However citizenship is seen as a culmination of a correct integration into the system by passing different language, cultural and society test to become Danish citizen, which makes Denmark one of the most restrictive countries for citizenship acquisition in Europe (ibid. 5-7). As Brubaker explains, citizenship is a ‘prerequisite for the enjoyment of certain rights’ (1994:31). In this case, those that have an ancestor from Denmark or Sweden will have access to the status and rights that holding Danish and Swedish nationality entitles.

As seen in section 2.1 in both Denmark and Sweden citizenship is a prerequisite to access the Social Democratic WSR. Next section will go further into the ideology behind Social Democracy and thus, the two Social Democratic parties used as case studies in this thesis.

2.2.

Social Democracy as an ideology

Social Democracy as a political ideology has had an exceptional position as a basis of the current WSR in Denmark and Sweden. As seen in section 2.1, a WSR takes

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14 place when the state promotes high levels of equality and solidarity while costs have been pre-emptively socialised by its citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1989:50; 1992:36). At the same time, the State has a central and decisive influence in society with the goal of transforming the economy (Keman, 2017:54). Flora & Heidenheimer (1986) argues that the main goal of a WSR is that the State should provide basic rights such as security and equality to increase their life chances (in Keman, 2017:56). In other words, a Social Democratic State intervenes to redistribute wealth among its citizens following the principles of universalism, egalitarianism, and decommodification. To do so, the State needs to impose heavy burdens on taxpayers to collect and redistribute wealth among the entitled citizens. However, as Esping-Andersen argues, these goals cannot be achieved without the full participation of the working class in society and the economic and political life (1992:36-7).

At the same time, a WSR with a Social Democratic base aims to implement equality by providing with collective benefits together with equity by empowering individuals. The idea behind is to mitigate and undermine the effects of the market in society to bring social justice for all (Keman, 2017:56). Esping-Andersen argues that to do so, a WSR should be a ‘productivistic’ system as in the Swedish case (1992:36). This means that the WSR uses a large amount of resources to optimise the correct use of the wealth that is meant to be redistributed. Swedish sociologist Gustav Steffen explained in his 1920 essay to the ‘Nationalization Committee’1 that participation of the working class in society was fundamental for the proper construction of the WSR (in Tim Tilton 1992:410-1). This means that according to Steffen, through the nationalisation of private enterprises the workers would be integrated and have access to economic and political power in society and thus be able not to be caught ‘just’ as proletarians. He emphasised that Social Democracy as an ideology should represent not only the traditional working-class struggle and rule, we find in the traditional Marxist thinking, but the rule for all by adding the benefits of liberal democracy. (Keman 2017:57; Tilton 1987:412).

Keman argues that a Social Democratic WSR cannot prevail if the ‘Dual Welfare State’ is not enhanced, meaning that the virtues of a social welfare state need to be combined with the benefits of welfare capitalism (Keman, 2017:57).

1 The Nationalization Committee of 1920 took place after the Social Democrats reached office by a large

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15 In Sweden, Social Democracy as an ideology has had a strong position as the Social Democrats were the larger party in Swedish politics until the 1990’ when its hegemony ended. (Schall, 2016:162-3). According to Therborn, the historical hegemony of the Social Democrats was the result of a balanced combination of ‘government leadership, majority rule, and a number of votes’ (1992:2-3). For Tim Tilton (1992:409-10), five themes deserve attention in the implementation of Social Democracy in Sweden: ‘integrative democracy, society as the ‘People’s Home,’ the compatibility of equality and economic efficiency, social control of the market economy, and the ‘strong society.’ According to this author, the feeling of the ‘People’s Home’ is based on the recognition that there was no place for disfavoured or privileged citizens, but a ‘togetherness’ society based on principles of equality, cooperation, and consideration. The concept of ‘togetherness’ is crucial as I will further develop in this chapter to show the high degree of participation in the society argued by Steffen. In other words, all citizens of the State should have access not only to a high degree of participation but to social and economic benefits from the State (id. 411-12).

In Denmark, Social Democracy and the Social Democrats have also been crucial in the development of the Danish WSR. Gundelach (1988) argues the Social Democratic party triumphed in the post-era of the Bolshevist Revolution with a non-revolutionary program. This means that, as in the Swedish case expressed by Steffen, they aimed for a significant State control with the objective of grating social and political rights to the working class, but without the aim of creating a centralised communist State, as welfare capitalism was also part of the equation (in Hansen 2002:60). As Hansen further explains, Social Democracy became very successful in Denmark after the 1920’ and received no questioning from the Liberal and the Conservatives which accepted social democratic principles as the basis of the State, as they were not able to offer ideologic resistance during the implementation of the principles of Social Democracy in Denmark (ibid. 60).

2.3.

Social Democracy v Social Democrats

The concepts of Social Democracy and the Social Democratic parties in Denmark and Sweden are two concepts that are easily mixed and confused. Social Democracy stands for an ideology where the State occupies the most important role. As Keman argues,

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16 ideologies represent different ways to allocate power. (2017:52). This means that Social Democracy as an ideology has a common set of policies and goals in order to distribute wealth among citizens, as I will further develop in Chapter 4, section 4.1. Still, Social Democrats might follow different value related-goals to organise and distribute wealth among citizens of the State. In other words, Social Democrats are not another part of the State but a political party that participated in the foundation of the Social Democratic WSR of both Denmark and Sweden. Still, Chapter 4, sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 will explore the narrow line that differentiate both terms as both Social Democratic parties have tried to bring together both concepts and identify themselves as the party of the State.

2.4.

Migration and the Social Democrats

Carvalho & Ruedin argues that left-wing parties are traditionally bounded with principles such as solidarity, egalitarianism and thus having a positive impact into migration (2018:7-8). These authors argue that historically Social Democrats see migrants as potential voters as most likely, migrants, will end up into the working-class economic part of society and therefore, they are considered new voters for the Social Democrats. Carvalho & Ruedin also argue that this has recently become a threat for these parties as right-wing nationalist parties use the anti-immigration rhetoric within the working class to debilitate the Social Democrats as Chapter four will further explain. Chapter four will also address the EU as a factor for national identity and how their different relation with the EU influence the way the Social Democrats tackle and perceive migrants.

Chapter 3, section 3.2, will further exaplain, ‘Fælles om Danmark’ (Together about Denmark) is the current political program use by the Social Democrats in Denmark since 2017. In this document, the party unveils its vision regarding immigration and integration in a political program that aims to bring the party back to the office after losing the elections in 2015 in favour of the current liberal-conservative coalition (Folketinget 2018). They advocate for a more efficient migration policy that prioritises a positive and better integration of migrants rather than a faster an incomplete integration. At the same time, they defend a vision on the EU that favours Denmark and Danish interests. According to their political program, this means that the Danish welfare cannot be for everyone but those register and contributing into the Danish society (Socialdemokratiet 2018c).

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17 In the Swedish case, Ett Program för Förändring (A Program for Change), is the current political program of the Swedish Social Democrats since 2013. In this document, the Social Democrats advocate as its Danish counterpart for a better and more efficient policy towards migration and asylum seekers. They are keen to promote solidarity among other EU member states and globally, to tackle the current migration crisis as this party believes that the Swedish municipalities cannot solve the problem alone. For this party, Sweden should take fewer migrants if the system is unable to integrate migrants and asylum seekers (Socialdemokraterna 2018c).

2.5.

Social rights for TCN in Denmark and Sweden

Once TCN can access the system, no matter if they are entitled to access to certain benefits, considering the scope of this thesis, I am only going to focus in the social benefits mentioned in chapter 1, unemployment support and pension benefits.

As Table 3 shows (see Annexe 1), membership to an A-Kasse in Denmark or the A-Kassa in Sweden is mandatory for all legal residents to receive unemployment benefits in these countries. Besides, TCN are entitled to unemployment benefits once they are legal residents in the country following the residence permit requirements as seen in section 2.1.1., and also in Table 2 & 3 (see Annexe 1). Sainsbury argues (2012: 83) that in the case of a Social Democratic WSR such as Denmark and Sweden, characterised by universal social schemes together with entitlement based on citizenship or residency as seen in the previous sections, meaning that ‘the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection’ (Esping-Andersen 1990:28) (in Sainsbury, 2012:83).

Therefore, we see how in the case of Sweden, TCN are as well entitled to unemployment benefits as any other Swedish national or SCN. In Denmark, any TCN legally living and working in Denmark, will have the same benefits and restrictions as any other Danish citizen or SCN. However, since the 1st of January 2019, all legal residents in Denmark will see tighten the condition for unemployment support if they have not lived 7 out of the last 12 years inside an EU/EEA country (A-Kasse 2018; A-Kassa 2018).

Regarding the access to pension benefits, as Table 3 (see Annexe 1) also shows, both countries fractionate the State pension depending on the working years in the country. On top of that, legal residents, no matter if they are nationals, SCN or TCN are entitled to receive labour scheme pensions and private pensions. In the case of Denmark, a total

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18 amount of 40 years living in the country is required to receive the full State pension. In Sweden, the pension schemes do not include a minimum amount of years to receive the full pension as the pyramidal pension scheme base on a mixture of different pension providers (Working in Denmark, 2018; pension myndigheten 2018).

3. Method and Material

The last chapter introduced the literature and beginning of the theory regarding the access to the Social Democratic WSR of Denmark and Sweden. In this chapter, I will present the method that will be used to analyse the discourse Social Democratic parties have had before and after the migrant crisis of 2015 as the traditional representatives of the WSR in these countries. The method to be used is ideas and ideological content or

ideal type analysis. I will rely on Kristina Boréus and Göran Bergström book, Analyzing

text and Discourse, to dig into the political discourses of both Social Democratic parties regarding the access to pension and unemployment benefits for TCN in Denmark and Sweden. Boréus & Bergström define ideal type analysis as the analysis of single ideas. This refers to the ‘ideas which guide the actions and interactions that make up society with its institutions, social relations and power relations’ (2017:7). Social Democratic parties have as a major goal to expand social benefits and social welfare among citizens of the country to promote social justice (socialdemokratiet 2018b; socialdemokraterna 2018b). A Social democratic WSR is characterised by a strong social provision with citizenship or residence as the entitlement, which in the cases of Denmark and Sweden, both countries have a long history of social benefits and provisions with social equality as the final goal (Sainsbury, 2012:82).

3.1.

Ideas and Ideological content

Ideas, such as social equality, do not appear on their one, different actors spread them following different purposes aiming to create, modify or produce a certain change (Lindberg, 2017:87-8, 92). In the case of the Social Democrats, the two parties have as the primary strategy to promote social equality and access to social resources provided by the State to increase the economic efficiency and reduce social divisions (Esping-Andersen, 1989:25).

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19 As Lindberg argues (2017:90), the aim of a qualitative analysis of ideas and ideological content is to ‘interpret, describe and analyse the specific ideological content inherent [..] in the communication and discourse around us.’ To do so, I will follow a three-dimensions scale of values, descriptions, and prescriptions, that will help me to find the

action-guiding motives of these two parties to justify their current policies towards TCN’ access

to social rights.

The first one is the value dimension which refers to ideas, goals, interests (V); In this case, it will be analysed the values behind both Social Democratic parties regarding TCN’ access and use of the welfare state benefits but also integration and challenges within the WSR. Second, a descriptive dimension which stands for narrative accounts, evaluative assessments, explanations or judgements (D); This second dimension explain the current situation and discourse from the Social Democrats when referring and TCN integration into both WSR. Finally, the prescriptive dimension refers to normative or practical conclusions, policies, rules, recommendations (P), etc. This third dimension serves as the policies and recommendations these parties might desire to implement for TCN in Denmark and Sweden to access to social rights.

These three dimensions create a system of ideas based on an motivating, action-orienting and action-directing. However, Lindberg (ibid. 92-3) argues that the combination of these three V-P-D dimensions is not enough to guide action as it just the core of the basic reasoning of the concrete issue to be analysed. In this thesis, the action-guiding or ideological content that serves as the core for the V-P-D dimensions is the current shift in discourse from the Social Democratic parties regarding the right for TCN to access to social rights in Denmark and Sweden.

3.1.1. Ideology critique

I have chosen a qualitative analysis of ideas based on an ideology critique study of ideas as I aim to identify the V-P-D ideological content behind the discourses of these two parties in relation with their current WSR concerning and TCN’ access to social rights. An ideology critique study is suitable for my investigation as it tries to unmask the ‘hidden social function’ and ‘real causes’ behind a social reality (Lindberg, 2017:97). In this thesis, the goal is to unmask the reasons for the shift for TCN’ access to social rights from the discourse of both Social Democratic parties both in office and in the opposition.

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3.2.

Material

The political programs of both Social Democratic parties before and after the migrant crisis of 2015 will be used to compare their suggestions and vision on social benefits TCN are entitled in both Denmark and Sweden considering their status of residents in the country. It is important to mention that in the Danish case; the Social Democrats are the main opposition party while the current Danish government is a liberal-conservative coalition supported by the DPP which provides the government with the necessary votes to be in Office (Folketing 2018). Then, the analysis will focus on their policy suggestions to overcome this government in the upcoming elections (mid-2019). On the contrary, in Sweden, the Social Democrats are in power since 2014. In this case, they have been adapting their policies regarding migration due to the raising of SD. In September 2018 the Social Democrats felt short to keep the Prime Minister Office and are currently trying to form government. Due to the length and timing of this thesis, the future new program of the Social Democrats and the policies that the future Swedish government may enhance will not be considered, the changes they will both made will be open for a future investigation in this same area.

In the Danish case, I will use before 2015 the political program from 2011 under the name

Hånden på hjertet (The hand on the heart), used by the Danish Social Democrats in opposition with the goal to overcome the Liberal Party and made Helle Thorning-Schmidt became the first female Prime Minister of Denmark. In 2017 the Social Democrats released a new political program, as they are now in opposition after losing the 2015 elections. Mette Frederiksen is the new leader, and the current political program has for name Fælles om Danmark (Together about Denmark) (Socialdemokraterne 2017; Altinget 2017). In the Swedish case, I will use the political program from 2013 under the name Ett Program för Förändring (A Program for Change), when the Swedish Social Democrats were in opposition during the Moderate-Christian-Conservative government coalition of Frederik Reinfeldt (See Table 1, Annexe 1). Currently, they are using the same political program since the Swedish Social Democrats regained office in 2014 with Stefan Löfven as Prime Minister (Socialdemokraterna 2013). In addition to the political programs before and after the migrant crisis of 2015, I will also use, as secondary material, the speeches from the party leaders, Mette Frederiksen, and Stefan Löfven from the last political congresses in Göteborg in 2017 and Aalborg in 2018.

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21

4. National identity and the Social Democrats

This chapter will present the theory of identity that lies behind the Social Democrats policies before and after the migrant crisis in both Denmark and Sweden. At the same time, it will unveil the four variables that will be used when analysing the material for this thesis.

4.1.

The question of identity

Identity and self-identification play a pivotal role to understand the formation and evolution of the WSR in Denmark and Sweden. According to Jenkins (2014:6), identities can mark ‘who’s who (and hence what’s what).’ As this author explains, the capacity to know who we are or better to say, what makes us what we are, allows us at the same time to set the boundaries of what the others are not. Halls (1996:4-5) argues that identities are a product ‘of difference and exclusion [..]’ (in Jenkins, 2014:21). When a certain number of individuals share similar identification patterns of ‘us,’ ‘we,’ ‘community,’ ‘solidarity’ can be recognised as a group identity (Jenkins, 2014:24,107). In other words, members of a certain group define themselves to the extent of what they perceive they are and the differences with those who are not like them. Different requisites can apply when categorising a whole group even if their members are unknown. Jenkins (2014:114) argues that group categorisation can be certainly meaningful for individuals as it provides with a social identity of those patterns and behaviours attached to a certain group. He defines a category as ‘a collectively defined classification of identity, part of [the] local common knowledge.’ This means that the fact that one group can identify itself throughout different categorisations makes them different and unique in front of other groups, thus, creating their social identity as a group.

In the cases of nation-states such Denmark and Sweden, several categories may apply such ethnicity, culture, language, the territory, a shared history, together with some accepted political myths or even social and economic factors, may be used as categories as part of the Danish and Swedish social identity as a national group. In other words, the discourse around the construction of the self, better to say their identity as a demos and

ethnos, represents the way on how, in the case of this thesis, Danes and Swedes are, live

and see themselves in relation with those that share a specific set of social, cultural or political values (Wæver, 2001:24-5).

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22 As seen in Chapter 2, section 2.1.1, both countries follow the principle of ius sanguinis for citizenship acquisition. As seen in this chapter, both WSR are social democratic, which means that entry is granted through membership to the State, thus citizenship or the preliminary status of permanent residency. In both cases, attachment to the community is crucial to become a member and be granted access. Access to permanent residency and citizenship becomes crucial for Denmark and Sweden as it allows these countries to allow and reject future members. The fact that citizenship is strictly a matter of these two States its related with Danish and Swedish national self-identification, meaning that the way these two countries approach the access to their WSR has a direct relation with their national identity.

Subsections 4.1.1, and 4.1.2. will deep into the self-identification Danes and Swedes have regarding their WSR to unveil their national myths, values, and approaches towards how they perceive themselves in opposition to the ‘other.’

4.1.1. Sweden and the People’s home

The first glances of romantic nationalism in Sweden came from Swedish poet and historian Erik Gustav Geijer. As Trägårdh argues, Geijers poems and sagas emphasised the struggle for freedom and liberty from the Swedish peasants against foreign invaders such as the Danes or the Germans. Even though, Geijer’s poems and sagas were based on quasi-mythological time lapses, Geijer introduced many political concepts of his time such ‘the people’ from the French Revolution, the ideals of ‘nation’ and ‘democracy’ and the so-called, ‘soul of the people’ that needed to overcome different political oppressions in order to become free (2011:134-5). Swedish historian Erik Lönnroth (1943:1) argues that even though its influence was based on myths and historical modifications, Geijer’s romantic view on Sweden mixed with political concepts from his lifetime has been very influential in conforming Swedish national identity as it created a romantic vision of what being Swedish stands for (in Trägårdh, 2001:136).

This romantic or even ‘essentialist view’ (ibid. 136) explained by Trägårdh, shifted some decades after when Social Democracy emerged in Sweden. As seen previously in this chapter, the struggles and fight from the working class dominated the discourse in the socialist approach to society and socio-economic relations. In the Swedish case, a merge into the two concepts took place when already in the 1920’ the Social Democrats started using the concept of the ‘small people’ (småfolket) embedded in a class struggle. Trägårdh

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23 argues (ibid.137) that during the time in Office of the first Social Democrat Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, the Social Democrats advocated for the idea of ‘the people’ (folket), as a whole country. The concept of the ‘People’s home’ (folkhem) as the metaphoric house to implement democracy, social rights, and freedom was first coined in this period. Trägårdh (2002:80) argues that the Social Democrats ‘used’ this national narrative to merge two key concepts, democracy, and the nation into their party discourse (in Hellström, 2016:85). In other words, the people and the State should be embedded in the same historical and political chronological path, and only if the people were together, Sweden and the Swedes will end the class struggle and succeed as a nation. As imagined, the Social Democrats played the fundamental role within this discourse as they presented themselves as those that could unite both the State and the people to spread democracy and enhance the ideal of the above mentioned ‘soul of the people’ (Hellström, 2016:86-87; Trägårdh, 2001:138-9).

Trägårdh argues that the process of reshaping Swedish myths into the social democratic imaginary had its peak in the 1930’ when the party started associating itself as the party of the people where lords and aristocrats became industrialists and peasants became workers. At the same time, the correlation in between People and class (Folk och klass) was again not opposed to each other as seen in traditional Marxist thinking as seen in section 4.1 (2001:140). However, as Hellström argues, the effective discourse used by the Social Democrats brought an ethnic distinction based on the demos and the ethnos, as the representation of Sweden being an exclusive community made for Swedes (Hellström, 2016:86-7; Trägårdh 2001:141). The concept of the exclusive community will be further explained in section 4.2.3., with the appropriation of this term from the right-wing nationalist parties.

4.1.2. Denmark, from ‘fatherland’ to ‘Folket’

The concept of the ‘fatherland’(fædreland) and the emotional ties with the King and the Kingdom can be traced in Denmark since the end of the eighteenth century (Hansen, 2002:53). However, this self-identification was based on the representation of the King as father held by the aristocracy, meaning that the rest of the population was set outside of the construction of this self-identification. In this particular view, those under the rule of the King would directly be members of Denmark, thus Danes (ibid. 54-5). The fact that this conception of nationality included different nationalities such the

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24 Norwegians and the Germans provoked a dichotomy in the way on how the nation and citizenship should be portrait.

The construction of the modern Danish identity was built opposed to the concept mentioned above of the fatherland. The end of the 19th century brought to Denmark territories loses in Norway and Schleswig-Holstein in modern German while becoming a Parliamentary monarchy as it is these days. According to Jespersen (2004:188-191), Denmark has two central national myths, the first one is related with the ‘historical trauma’ after the Second Schleswig War in 1864 and the second one is the ‘farmers approach’ (in Hellström, 2016:89). The 19th century is the period were nationalism as a political ideology raised and in the case of Denmark had a compelling cultural shift. The Grundtvigian view on the nation based on Grundtvig’s Dansk Identitetshistorie (History of Danish Identity) is central to understand this process.

Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig is probably the most crucial figure in Danish national politics, and it can be compared with Geijer in Sweden. The writings of this author, poet, pastor and historian were based on the elementary concept of ‘Folket’ (The People), opposed to the original conception of the fatherland linked to the King and its traditional supporters, the aristocracy (Hansen, 2002:57-8). As Hansen explains, the Grundtvigian ideal of the nation had the people as the main focus, as they were the ones having direct contact on the nation in itself. The Grundtvigian concept of ‘Folket’ grew embedded within the education, and the creation of the Højskole (Danish Folk High School) for the powerless and illiterate countryside people represented in the image of ‘the farmers’ as explained above (ibid. 58).

We then see how the self-identification in Denmark grew from being originally attached to the figure of the King and the aristocracy into a more grounded version of the nation represented by those who were powerless and became dominant. After the 1920’ and the raised of Social Democracy in Denmark, Danish Social Democrats had the way paved by the existence of the concept of ‘the People’ as their vision of Denmark envisage the empowerment of the working class and thus, the redistribution of wealth into the members of the nation. Nevertheless, as Feldbæk argues (1996:130), the Social Democratic conception of the nation was not, as in the Swedish case, able to reshape the Danish self-identification myths based in the struggle of the working class to build ‘the new Danish society [..] with their own hands’, nor in the fatherland concept showed before. Instead,

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25 the Social Democrats used the concept of ‘Folket.’ However, the term ‘the People’ is defended by left-wing and right-wing political parties, as it is central in Danish self-identification as a nation (in Hansen, 2002:60-1; Hellström, 2016:90).

4.2.

Criticism and economic revision

Aside from the historic and political origin of Social Democracy and the WSR in Denmark and Sweden. The economic discourse of the Social Democrats in both Denmark and Sweden in the last decades have shifted from a traditional left-wing position regarding an active intervention of the State into a more left-centre position where the market is more determinant than the State as it was in the past (Keman, 2017:175). The next subsections will deep into the New Public Management and the Third Way as two prominent approaches that has redefined the role played by the State, and thus, has profoundly influenced the way Social Democrats identify themselves as a party.

4.2.1. The New Public Management

Green-Pedersen explains how during the 1970-1990’ both WSR suffered from the economic contraction that led to a new political strategy known as NPM to optimise the WSR in both countries (Green-Pedersen, 2001:4-5; Keman, 2017:171). This means that the NPM reforms were introduced to increase the economic performance of the economy by implementing decentralisations, privatisation and a new focus on service and client orientation (Green-Pedersen, 2001:4).

In both cases the Social Democrats while enjoying a historical and political hegemonic position in the political spectrum, faced several years in opposition after the 1970-1980’. Still, as Green-Pedersen argues, the basis of the WSR in these countries is largely understood as own by the Social Democrats. This fact, have caused troubles for the right-wing parties when approaching public reforms for the system, as they can be seen as ‘a neo-liberal attempt to dismantle the welfare system’ as I will further explain in section 4.3.2., with the end of the Swedish exceptionalism (Green-Pedersen, 2001:7,9; Schall, 2016:125).

In the case of Denmark, the economic slowdown in the 1970’ which was followed by the end of an almost 30 years rule from the Social Democrats (Folketing 2018). The new party in office, the Conservatives implemented a privatisation policy which was severely resisted by the Social Democrats and the trade unions as an attack on the welfare state

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26 (Green-Pedersen, 2001:20). Nevertheless, since the Social Democrats went back to power in 1993, they continued with market-type reforms to optimise the welfare services they strongly opposed while they were in the opposition. As Green-Pedersen explains, the Social Democrats were suddenly caught in between the historical discourse used by the party leaders until the 1980’ as the founders and keepers of the WSR, and the new political and economic discourse to implement NPM reforms (2001:21).

In Sweden, the Social Democrats were accused by the opposition of creating a ‘bureaucratic nanny state’ (ibid. 22). The oil-crisis hit Sweden a decade later than Denmark and had the Social Democrats in power instead of being at the opposition like in Denmark. As Antman (1994, 42-44) explains, the Social Democrats were accused of not doing enough reforms to bring competition into the welfare state (in Green-Pedersen 2001:23). As the Swedish Social Democrats assumed the necessity of reforming the WSR, the opposition took a stronger position regarding the reforms that were needed. As Antman (1994, 20) argues, in Sweden, the debate turned into how to reform an ineffective WSR rather like protecting the system from neo-liberalist policies. According to this author in Sweden, the Social Democrats lost the ‘discourse battle’ as they accepted that the reforms were needed to make the system efficient for all (in Green-Pedersen, 2001:23-4; Keman, 2017:171).

Contemporaneously with the political fatigue represented by decades of the same political type governments, Hans Keman argues that the 1980-1990’ also represented the political triumphs of the neoliberalism as a political option together with the end of the Soviet Union as the representative of those favouring a significant presence on the State in the public sphere (2017:171-2). This means that the NPM reforms were taking place following the socio-economic changes happening during the second half of the 20th century.

In the cases of Denmark and Sweden and as this section shows, these effects provoked a dramatic change in the configuration, but also perception, of the WSR as it used to be amongst Danes and Swedes. The introduction of market-type reforms as explained by Green-Pedersen introduced as well a new ‘words’ such as efficiency or productivity in to the WSR ‘nomenclature’, which are more prone to be found in a Capitalist market economy rather than in a Dual Welfare system as Keman have argued (Green-Pedersen, 2001:7-8; Keman, 2017:170-1).

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4.2.2. The Third Way

Besides the economic revision seen in the 1980’ regarding the efficiency of the WSR, there is a modern wave of economic revision in the late 1990’ and the beginning of the 2000’ with the concept of the ‘Third Way’ (Keman, 2017:173). The idea behind the Third Way refers to a liberalist market economy together with the claim of fighting for social justice. The main goal of this economic revision is to promote Social Democracy as an ideology but with the final goal of expanding it as a system that can be attractive to other parties, as an agent of change for the centre-left parties (ibid. 173; Giddens, 1999:8). As Hans Keman argues, the traditional Dual Welfare System is meant to be replaced by a ‘Social Investment State’ where according to Giddens (1998), inequality will not be reduced by fighting for social justice but by providing equal access to opportunities (in Keman, 2017:173).

In other words, the Third Way supporters advocated for a state that acted more as guardian than as a regulator. The idea behind is that throughout externalisations and privatisations the system shall provide citizens of the State with better services, which according to Keman, has a primary goal to shift the traditional universal welfare state benefits to turn it into work and market-oriented system (2017:174).

4.3.

Fitting the EU in Denmark and Sweden

Denmark and Sweden are both members of the EU. Denmark became an EU member state in 1973, while Sweden accessed the EU in 1995 (European Union 2018). In the case of Denmark, the polarisation regarding the membership and degree of participation in the EU has been a matter of discussion among both the right and the left-wing parties. The Liberal Party, the Conservatives, the Radical Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party supported the yes campaign to join the EU in 1973. Still, the political debates split these parties in between those expecting economic benefits after joining the EU and the sceptics from the minority parties and especially the Socialist People’s Party which believed that joining the EU will end up for Denmark losing political sovereignty (Hansen, 2002:62).

As Hansen explains, even though Social Democrats and the Radical Liberal Party were in favour of accessing the EU, they were not so keen as the Liberal Party in supporting a

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28 united defence alliance among EU member states (ibid. 66). In the case of the Social Democrats, as Hansen explains, they have been concerned with the ‘pace of the integration process’ as they are worried that EU integration might damage the social welfare their party and ideology helped shaping during the 20th century (ibid. 67).

The negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, represented a big step forward towards European integration, as it included the so-called three-pillar system with the creation of the European communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters. The treaty of Maastricht ended up in a referendum with a No-vote as a result, while even if short2, was seen as if Denmark had said no to a federal EU while favoured Danish traditions (ibid.72; Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2018c). For this thesis, the most relevant aspects included in this treaty were located in the first pillar, the creation of the concept of an EU citizenship and the common policies regarding immigration and asylum for TCN as I will explain more in detail in the next subsection.

While the Maastricht Treaty posed problems to be accepted, the Amsterdam Treaty from 1999 was supported by 55,1% of the Danish electorate with a less intense debate as the previous Maastricht Treaty. This treaty brought the immigration issue on the debate as it discussed the enlargement of the EU in the East (ibid. 77). At the same time, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) achieved outstanding results in the national elections as the policies towards the EU were targeting more and more their conception and image of the Danish nation (ibid. 76).

In the case of Sweden, Sweden joined the EU in 1995, 23 years later than Denmark and therefore this country had to accept the Maastricht Treaty before its accession but could negotiate the conditions of the Amsterdam Treaty as full EU member state. As seen in section 4.1.1., Sweden’s folkstat or the people’s home have dominated the discourse around Sweden’s national identification as an intrinsic linked between the state and its citizens. At the same time and as seen in the case of Denmark, the creation of complementary citizenship to the Swedish one after the Maastricht Treaty, which in the case of Sweden cannot be renegotiated as Denmark did with the Edinburgh agreement, posed as well a threat to the values of what Sweden represents for Swedes (Trägårdh,

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29 2002:131; Lindahl, 2000:109). Swedish self-identification has had a direct impact on the relations with the EU, and it also helps to explain the late accession of Sweden to the EU in 1995.

The small victory in a polarised society showed the division in between the supporters for participating in the project of constructing a common Europe, and those defending national sovereignty and the welfare state (Trägårdh, 2002: 130, 160). Although national identity played an important role, the historical image of Sweden as a neutral and military non-aligned country also reinforced the No-vote position in the referendum to access the EU (Lindahl, 2000:114).

In Sweden, the ‘Yes’ to the EU has been historically supported by the Liberal Party, the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party, while the Centre Party has been critical of the centralism of the EU project (ibid. 164). Even though these parties supported Sweden’s accession to the EU, they were profoundly divided during, before and after the EU referendum. The ‘No’ side has the support of the left side of the Social Democrats, the Leftist parties, the Green Party and recently from the Sweden Democrats (SD) (ibid.165; Widfeldt, 2000:67). The perception in the Swedish public opinion about the EU has oscillated from high levels of Euroscepticism to full acceptance in the benefits of being a member of the EU since Sweden’s accession to the EU until the beginning of the 2000’ (Jungar, 2002:403-4). Regarding the question of immigration, for those aligned with the No-vote defended that the EU project was about constructing a ‘’Fortress Europe’’ out of ex-colonial powers to exclude TCN (Gahrton 1994 in Trägårdh, 2002:169).

At the same time, discourse towards a more restrictive immigration policies came from SD as they advocate for a ‘responsible immigration policy’ (Hellström, 2016:40-1) as they believe Sweden has an extreme immigration policy, regarding the relation in between immigration and the EU and that TCN with non-European background whatsoever have caused a ‘moral decay’ since the 1970’ (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2017:355-6). Still, SD has not directly influenced Sweden’s position at the EU as they have not been in office or supporting any other political party in office. It is still vital and relevant to be mentioned here, as this party does influence public opinion in their view towards TCN access to social rights, and also in the political decay of the Social Democrats in Sweden.

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4.3.1. Denmark chooses to opt-out

As seen in the previous section, Denmark chose to opt-out to accept the Maastricht Treaty. As mentioned above, this No-vote to Maastricht ended-up with Denmark re-negotiating its own relation with the EU and presenting at the Edinburgh summit a new draft under the name ‘Denmark in Europe’ with four exceptions or opt-outs for Denmark to fit inside the European project (union citizenship, EU currency, justice and police affairs and defence policy). These four exceptions were granted for Denmark to accept the Maastricht Treaty (European Union 2018b). As seen in chapter 2, section 2.1, Denmark has a strict incorporation regime and access to citizenship. Hansen (2002:73) explains how the solely fact EU citizenship included the word ‘citizenship’ posed a threat to the self-conception of the Danish nation in itself as citizenship was tightly linked to Denmark and becoming citizen of Denmark implies I high degree of integration into Danish society. Nevertheless, Denmark accepted in the Edinburgh summit access for EU citizens to vote in Danish local and EU elections but strongly disagreed in the name given to this complementary citizenship, which is seen by Hansen as a proof that the name was more important than the content of this so-called ‘union citizenship’ (ibid. 73).

As seen in section 4.1.2., the formation of the national identity in Denmark has played an essential role in the conception of their current citizenship regulations. Manners (2013:71) argues that instead of considering the Danish position as an opt-out, it is more precise to call it self-exclusion. This means, that even though Denmark is not fully participating in the decision-making of some EU related policies, it is affected as EU member state. The different relationship between ‘the People’ and the State makes the EU a distrustful external agent.

4.3.2. The EU and the end of the Swedish consensus

As seen in chapter 4, section 4.1.1, the social democrats have reigned over the rest of the political parties for many decades. Regarding their views on the EU, the Swedish Social Democrats have these days a positive view on the EU and the possibilities for trade, freedom of movements and good that membership to the EU may be entitled Swedish citizens and corporations but also regarding the fight against climate change

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31 (Socialdemokraterna 2018c). Regarding the issue of immigration, the Social Democrats in Sweden advocates for a new asylum system and security cooperation in between all the EU member states (ibid.; Regeringen.se 2018). However, as Trägårdh explains (2002:154), the Social Democrats approach to the EU has not always been the same.

During the 1960’ a huge debate was fostered in Swedish society when the United Kingdom decided to apply for membership to the former ECC. Back in those days, the Social Democrats saw the former EEC as an opposing concept of what Sweden represented. They coined the ‘four Ks’ (Conservatism, Capitalism, Catholicism, and Colonialism)3 to exemplify what membership to the EEC might bring to Sweden. Protestant Europe was seen more advance that Catholic Europe and this argumentation was used by authors like Gunnar Myrdal (Ekström et al. 1962:33 in Trägårdh, 2002:154). Nevertheless, the bid to join the EU grew in the 1970’ with the support of the Conservatives after Denmark and Norway applied for membership. They claimed that Swedish companies would be left out if Sweden did not follow to join the EEC. For the Social Democrats, it was still not the right moment for Sweden to join the EEC. Former Prime Minister, Olof Palme (Palme 1971) argued in a speech at the Swedish Parliament that being outside the EEC was the best way to promote solidarity, democracy and to protect the Welfare State (in Trägårdh, 2002:159). In other words, the close relationship between the values behind the Swedish WSR and Sweden’s national identity was emphasised by the Social Democrats when discussing any membership to the EEC.

The attacks from the pro-union side, mainly supported by the Conservatives and the business industry grew during the 1980’ while the Social Democrats were radicalising its discourse towards the left. As Trägårdh (ibid. 159) explains, the attacks on the Social Democrats were targeting the excessive interventionism of the State. Pressure on the Social Democrats increased, when Swedish conservative sociologist Hans Zetterberg launched in 1978 the Timbro think tank to foster the ideals of the free market, free enterprise, individual liberty and a free society (Timbro 2018).

In the 1990’, prior Sweden’s bid to join the EU the discourse led by this think tank was targeting in the empowerment of the ‘civil society’ and the demonisation of the State and the Social Democrats as they have historically linked their image to the Swedish WSR.

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32 In other words, the discourse launched by Timbro focused on separating the concept of Welfare society (välfardssamhället) into Welfare state (välfardsstaten) and the Social State (Socialstaten) to pointed out the negativity attached to the State interventionism regarding the lack of freedom, massive bureaucracy and liberty of choice (Trägårdh, 2002:159).

The 1990’ ‘catastrophic defeat’ (Schall, 2016:123) in national elections ended the consensus regarding the exceptionalism of the Swedish WSR as seen in chapter 4, section 4.2., as for the first-time criticism towards the inefficiency of the Swedish model raised. The economic crisis in the 1980’ and the issues to integrate refugees running away from the Balkan wars deteriorated the image of the Swedish WSR among some of its traditional supporters as it was shown as too bureaucratic and inefficient (ibid.125). At the same time, the views on the EU started to change led by the pro-EU sector inside the Social Democrats in favour of the EU which claim that the welfare state was not only about equality but also prosperity (Trägårdh, 2002:170). As Trägårdh explains, these multiple events represented a profound change in the Social Democrats as it shaped its own identity as a party confronting traditional aspects such the bid for national sovereignty and political neutrality in favour of the EU project. The new image of the Social Democrats came together with the vision of balancing the free market that the EU represented with the idea of balancing politics with the market (ibid. 171).

4.4.

The rise of far-right nationalist parties

Nationalists parties have strongly burst into Danish and Swedish societies. Both the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party have as a primary goal to influence their societies and to reduce the migration numbers as they believe multiculturalism is posing a threat to the existence of Danish and Swedish nation-state (DF 2009; SD 2018). For these parties, the strength of the current regulation to apply for citizenship acquisition is a must within their political programs, as they believe is the adequate way to protect their social identity as a nation-state. Abou-Chadi & Krause argues that the goal of these parties is not always to seek and gain office but to influence the politics and policies of its rivals to achieve their own political goals (2018:3-4). As I will develop in the following subsections both DPP and SD use rhetoric that tries to copy and improve the Social Democrats historical hegemony as a political party in Denmark and Sweden.

Figure

Table 2. Residence permit for TCN coming from a first member state
Table 3: Access to Social rights for TCN

References

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