Norms in Foreign Policy : Institutionalization and the road to a feminist foreign policy in Sweden

Linköping University | Department of Management and Engineering Master’s thesis, 30 credits| Master’s in International and European Relations Spring/ autumn 2020| LIU-IEI-FIL-A--20/03504—SE

Norms in Foreign Policy

– Institutionalization and the road to a feminist foreign

policy in Sweden

Kamilla Petersen

Supervisor: Per Jansson Examiner: Mikael Blomdahl

Linköping University SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden +46 013 28 10 00, www.liu.se

Abstract

In 2015 the Swedish Foreign Minister announced that the foreign policy would be feminist. This thesis aims to advance an understanding of the process of institutionalizing feminism in the Swedish foreign policy statements and the effects this has had on Swedish foreign policy priorities. Through a combined approach of constructivist and feminist theory, it is argued that while areas related to feminism, such as women, gender, and equality, have been institutionalizing over the last two decades, the introduction of overt feminism has increased resistance. By drawing on institutionalization theory, gender mainstreaming, and hegemonic masculinity it is revealed how ‘adding women’ has been the main approach but that the use of ‘feminism’ has challenged the hegemonic masculinity embedded in foreign policy. The thesis concludes that aspects of feminism have been institutionalized, however, feminism as a structure is still at its emerging stage internationally. Moreover, it is discussed how the relationship between national and international political spheres affect the institutionalization process of norms cyclically.

Acknowledgments

Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I have enjoyed much assistance and support.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Per Janson, for encouraging me to think outside the box, look into the Swedish foreign policy statements, and inspiring me to use constructivism and feminism. Your perceptive feedback pushed me to pursue a more complex understanding of the issue.

A special thanks should also go to Rickard Montgomery-Bjurhult and Ove Bjurhult for the great help with search words when linguistics was getting in the way. Without your help, I would not have dared to focus on the Swedish statements.

I would like to thank my fellow students Rickard, Mahika, and Johannes for their feedback, long discussions, cups of coffee, and fun moments throughout this process. Without it, this would have been a lonely journey. A thank you also goes to my mom for always lending an ear and having a great deal of patience.

And lastly, a thank you to Covid-19 for keeping me focused and making sure I never lost sight of what was most important.

Table of Contents

Feminist foreign policy ... 23

Domestic vs international explanations ... 23

Adding Women ... 24

Feminist enough or Defining feminist foreign policy ... 25

External relations ... 26 UN resolution 1325 ... 27 Analysis ... 28 2000 ... 28 2001 ... 29 2002 ... 30 2003 ... 31 2004 ... 32 2005 ... 33 2006/2007 ... 34 2008 ... 35 2009 ... 37 2010 ... 37 2011 ... 38

2012 ... 39 2013 ... 41 2014 ... 42 2015 ... 43 2016 ... 46 2017 ... 47 2018 ... 48 2019 ... 50 2020 ... 52 Discussion ... 53 Conclusion ... 57 Works Cited ... 60

Introduction

“In 2014, the Swedish red-green coalition government adopted a feminist foreign policy, which

[signaled] a substantial change in its external conduct. Its pronounced ambition was to become the ‘strongest global voice for gender equality and full employment of human rights by all women and girls’” (Aggestam et al., 2019).

The move of including feminism so overtly in the entire foreign policy triggered a wave of research into what such a foreign policy might entail (Aggestam et al., 2019; Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Egnell, 2017; Irwin, 2019; Mazurana & Maxwell, 2016; Robinson, 2019; Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). This interest in the concept of feminist foreign policy (FFP), whether that be the implications, the concrete policy changes, or the theoretical developments necessary for academia to follow suit with policy developments has led many feminist researchers to consider explicitly as well as implicitly the relationship with and power of international organization and national governments in a globalized world. However, the question of how the feminist foreign policy came into being has as many answers as there are research papers. The influence of international organizations on national policy and that of national policy on international actors is well known, but how did it enable this ‘radical’ change to happen (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016).

When Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström declared her intention to pursue a feminist foreign policy it was a surprise to many and was met with ‘giggles’ internationally (Alwan & Weldon, 2017). Much of the recent literature on feminist foreign policy starts at this very moment in time and looks back at other foreign policies that contained feminist ideas to different degrees. Some point to Hillary Clintons time as Secretary of State of the USA where she pledged that women would be at the core of policy, and her focus on women’s inclusion, others to the Trudeau government of Canada whose development aid policies are based on feminist ideals (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 2). Further examples include the French implementation of feminist diplomacy and the Norwegian National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of the UN security council resolution 1325 from 2000 (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 20; Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 1). That particular resolution, 1325, on Women, Peace, and Security is throughout the literature considered the starting point of the implementation of feminism into foreign policy in all these cases (Aggestam et al., 2019; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Thompson & Clement, 2019).

Thompson and Clement (2019) argue that the new-found interest in feminist policies should be seen as a second wave of feminism in foreign policy, where earlier it has been implemented as just one of many variables with often underfunded projects to improve the lives of women and girl through development policy (Thompson & Clement, 2019). The new turn, they argue, is including a much broader spectrum of actions, including using feminism as a guiding principle in the comprehensive foreign policy (Thompson & Clement, 2019).

To understand the developments that made it possible for Wallström to declare the Swedish foreign policy feminist it is necessary to look back at what the Swedish state has presented as its foreign policy priorities over the last two decades, since October 31st, 2000 when the Landmark resolution on Women, Peace, and Security by the United Nations Security Council was signed (Security Council resolution 1325, 2000).

This thesis will, therefore, explore how feminism has been institutionalized in the Swedish

foreign policy statements since the year 2000, and how this has affected the priorities of Swedish foreign policy?

To answer these questions, this paper will employ a single case study to investigate the specific institutionalization of feminism in the Swedish foreign policy by analyzing the annual foreign policy statements. The choice of the Swedish case is based on it being the first country to introduce a feminist foreign policy, that it encompasses the entire foreign policy and is explicitly feminist (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Furthermore, Sweden is widely considered a best-case scenario when it comes to institutionalizing feminism in foreign policy because of a historical leaning towards feminist values and a history of implementing a gendered perspective since the 1960s (Rosamond, 2020, p. 223).

By using a constructivist approach it is possible to investigate “how and why … certain collective expressions of human understanding, neither valid nor true a priori, develop into social practices, become firmly established within social and political systems, spread around the world and become reified or taken for granted” (Adler, 1997, p. 337)

Or as Björkdahl puts it “[by] [a]dopting a social constructivist perspective this study explores the link between ideas, norms, interests and practices.” (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 16)

This paper will begin with a methodological discussion particularly relating to the constructivist and feminist approaches this paper will utilize as well as a discussion on materials and research design. This will be complemented by a theoretical discussion of the operationalization of these approaches. The following section will go through the literature on

the subject of feminist foreign policy to establish the theoretical work and concepts which have already been considered in the field. Then UN Security Council Resolution 1325 will be shortly discussed for clarity which leads to the analysis of the Swedish foreign policy statements from 2000-2020. Finally, there will be a discussion of the findings made in this paper and a conclusion.

Methodology

This section will contain a discussion of the approaches, methods, theory, and limitations of this thesis. To make it as clear as possible it will start with a discussion of constructivism both as an approach and a theory, and the constructivist methods that will be used throughout this paper, followed by a similar section on feminism. At the end of the section, there will be a discussion on how the two can function together, the purpose and restrictions of this combination as well as the limitations it imposes on the thesis.

Constructivism

Constructivism is a broad spectrum of scientific inquiry; it is an approach but can also, within specific fields, be a rather specific theory (Björkdahl, 2007). This section will discuss how the constructivist approach will be used in this thesis and which part of the constructivist spectrum will be used as well as the specific theories and the operationalization of these.

Firstly, the thesis will examine constructivism as an approach. As the name indicates, constructivism is based on the assumption that the world is constructed, the degree to which this construction is relevant depends on which branch of constructivism one is working with. Some lean towards the rationalist approaches by assuming that this construction is one of many factors that need to be taken into account to explain the international world, while the other end of the spectrum leans towards the postmodernist and Frankfurt School critical theories that believe the world is fully constructed through discourse and that this is the most important variable of analysis (Locher & Prugl, 2001). This paper will be employing the type of constructivism that, as Adler (1997) described it, is rather middle of the road, both within the constructivist approach, but also because it places itself as a middle theory between rationalist and postmodernist schools of thought within the field of IR (Björkdahl, 2007; Locher & Prugl, 2001). As Björkdahl explains: “[a]s a middle road approach, social constructivism claims that

reality is socially constructed, and ideas give meaning to the material world” (Björkdahl, 2007). This thesis, therefore, places itself within a constructivist approach that accepts that there is an interplay between the material world and the intersubjectivity that gives it meaning.

The choice of this specific type of constructivism is based on multiple factors. First, the need to consider the interplay between structures and actors to understand the development of an international norm necessitates a constructivist approach that allows investigation of the interplay between the physical and discursive construction (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 22). Second, this thesis seeks to understand how a feminist norm in foreign policy has been constructed and constructs the way foreign policy is conducted, this necessitates a constructivist approach that acknowledges the discursive construct as well as structural constraints that affects this on both a domestic and international level (Adler, 1997, p. 322).

As this paper asks the questions of how feminism has been institutionalized in foreign policy, constructivism is an ideal approach as it is the investigation of the social construction of feminism and the effects of this that are at the center of the thesis (Browning, 2008, p. 22). Because of the constructivist base assumption that the material world matters but does not have any meaning before it has been socially constructed it is important to understand how these structures have been constructed to understand the meaning that they give to the material structures (Browning, 2008, p. 22). The changes of meaning will depend on the feminist framework and the theory of gender mainstreaming as much as on the theory of institutionalization of norms.

Institutionalization. To identify how this paper will employ constructivism as a theory

it is necessary to consider the different options for analysis. The intersubjectivity between actors and structures is central to the creation of identities through the establishment of norms, meanings, ideologies, and rules that guide the actions of individuals and states alike (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 8). When these norms or meanings become stable and widely accepted to the point where they dictate the social order they have become structures or institutions (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 8). This process of evolving from a meaning, into a norm that is widely accepted and guides actors, through dictating the social order, is what is at the center of this thesis. It is often assumed that structure is continuous, and actors are the drivers for change, however, change is created in the interaction between structures and actors (Björkdahl, 2013). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) explains that “[t]here is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”

(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891) By using these criteria we can identify emerging norms beyond the point when they are introduced into the foreign policy statement.

Furthermore, a norm in the sociological sense is a single standard of behavior while an institution is a collection of interrelated behaviors and rules (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). The importance of this distinction is that when talking about a system such as feminism it will consist of multiple norms that interrelate and affect each other which is why institutionalization as a process is then the interrelation between these norms creating the institution of ex. feminism (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). By looking at norms as individual actions and rules we can look inside social structures and institutions to understand what they are made up of and how they are renegotiated over time (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891).

Because of this, the continuous change of intersubjectivity and the changes in structures are important to study to understand what has allowed feminism to become integrated into foreign policy, and specifically do so in the limited context of Sweden. This will allow this thesis to understand the specific circumstances that form the basis for the FFP (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 8). Furthermore, norms are not openly stated, rather, they are indirectly underlying in the texts which will be analyzed in this thesis, their evidence being indirect (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). The indirect evidence will consist of justification for action, among other statements, that reveal the “oughtness” which is at the heart of a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). These justifications, arguments, or even remarks will appear as indications of the knowledge that a norm is emerging against something or to convince others to follow a new norm – it is both a defense of and a sales pitch for actions. As this paper will be conducting a document analysis of 20 years of Swedish foreign policy statements the focus will be on the existence and strength of the norms rather than on the changed behavior, or lack thereof, it might lead to (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892).

As with any norm, feminism can manifest varyingly across time and space depending on the circumstances and structures with which it co-exists (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 9). Therefore, evaluating whether feminism has been institutionalized in the Swedish foreign policy is dependent on the contemporary context. Another important aspect of institutionalization is that norms exist in a continuum, not as dichotomous entities, one norm might be emerging in a space where another already resides without necessarily pushing the existing norm out (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). Furthermore, norms can exist in one space while not in another, which occurs in national vs international spheres as much as between policy areas inside the foreign policy statement (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892).

The discourse and practice play a key part in both maintaining and challenging existing norms and the development of those as well as in the introduction and establishment of new norms (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 10). The power that is exerted through discourse and practice, e.g. the power of processes, means that the constructivist understanding of power rests on the ability to construct and deconstruct discourse thereby altering the normative structures (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 11).

Because this study seeks to understand the process of feminism becoming an institutionalized norm in Swedish foreign policy it is of significant importance to understand the role of the norm in the identity of Sweden. The way this will be done is through text analysis, specifically the foreign policy statements, to demonstrate a continuous pattern (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 18). This can be done as actors express shared expectations which give them normative power which therefore can substantiate claims of these norms increasing their influence and thereby power (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 18).

The other important relationship that affects the institutionalization of norms is the relationship between norms in the national and international spheres which is highly intertwined (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). Some norms originate domestically and are transferred to the international level by actors while international norms are transferred into the domestic sphere either by actors or by legislation such as directives or international agreements or resolutions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). These transfers mean that norms must be adaptable into greatly differing structures and institutions to gain any level of power which produces a great variation in norms that originate from the same idea but are institutionalized in different contexts (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). One of these contexts is the interrelationship created with other existing norms in the system within which the norm is being introduced. Furthermore, this challenges the influence and ownership of a norm when it transcends to another area or level of policy (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893).

By looking for repetitions in discourse that could be supporting the norm of feminism as relevant in foreign policy it will be possible to determine the level of institutionalization the norm is at in that area - these types of repetition can be interpreted as an indication of the norm becoming a structure (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 24). As Klotz and Lynch argue “meanings stabilize into rules; sets of rules constitute institutions; clusters of institutions constitute structures, which in turn are the building blocks of systems.” (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 25) meaning that structures are not necessarily stable as the process of becoming a structure is constantly moving, though not in a linear manner.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) uses stages of institutionalization to describe this process. They argue that norms exist at three main stages: emergence, acceptance or cascade, and internalization or stabilization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). The acceptance stage is of particular importance in this paper as the cascading or acceptance of norms across the foreign policy statement is central to this thesis because of the “tipping point” where the gender has reached a critical mass in the foreign policy statement to become commonly accepted across different policy areas (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895).

As this tipping point is the area between norm emergence and acceptance it is of particular interest. The norm emergence stage involves norm entrepreneurs convincing other actors to accept the norm by justifying and arguing for its presence, while the norm acceptance stage is when the norm is moving more smoothly into other policy areas because it is being imitated in these areas, here there will be less justification and persuasion, and more focus on imitating the norm as it is in other areas (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). The last stage of internalization is when the norm has settled to be stable and has acquired a taken-for-granted quality to its presence, at this stage it is unlikely to be justified heavily why the norm is present (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895).

This process is, however, not necessarily linear. A norm might disappear, only to return in a different form later at any of the first two stages, while an internalized norm might be challenged by other emerging norms and lose its position and power (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). On the other hand, a norm might become internalized to a degree where it will be the standard other norms are measured against (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895).

The framework created by structures plays a key role in the actions of actors in that they frame the meaning within which individuals act and think. However, this relationship between structures and actors is co-constitutive in the sense that the action of an actor can change the meanings of the structure, this can be done through a change of discourse, interpretation, or context. Depending on the persuasiveness of the change made by the actor this can then alter the structure to different degrees and ultimately change the actions of other actors when they replicate the change (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 44). The actors who introduce and advocate for a norm and are the support that creates norm emergence and ensure the convergence to norm acceptance, or in the words of Finnemore and Sikkink “Norm cascade,” are also known as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898). As can be seen in the table below, Finnemore and Sikkink simplify the process down to a relationship between actors, their motives, and the dominant mechanisms at each stage:

(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898)

Because of the “taken for granted”-ness of stabilized norms they will often be considered good norms, however, throughout the competition between norms to become established one main issue is the competition to be seen as good which will be argued by its proponents (Björkdahl, 2013). This is a factor that can be examined in so far as to whether actors are still arguing that the norm is good or if it is at a stage where this is implicitly understood.

This paper is particularly concerned with the occurrence of change which correlates with one of the main interests in the field of international norm research. It is important to understand how norms change and evolve, however, the concrete evolution of the norms concerning feminism in foreign policy will not be the main focus but rather the process of institutionalization across the spectrum of different areas of policy that make up the foreign policy statement. The way in which norms constrain and govern behavior and action between the national and international sphere is where this theory connects with the methodological framework of constructivism.

To operationalize this constructivist framework the analysis will, therefore, focus on identifying instances of actors, while also looking for discursive repetitions over time and

indications of the dominant mechanisms as shown in the table above to determine the stage the norm is at. These steps will be further elaborated in the final section of this chapter.

Feminism

Much like constructivism, feminism is both an approach and a range of specific theories. As an approach feminism uncovers gendered aspects of international relations that have otherwise been taken for granted.

The work of feminist scholars, such as J. A. Tickner, opened up the possibilities to understand not just how women were affected by the international system but also how masculine ideas shaped the institutions that dominated the mainstream (Locher & Prugl, 2001; Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). The concept of hegemonic masculinity became particularly prominent in explaining how these structures were formed and maintained through the opposition to the feminine and subordinate masculinities such as members of the LGBTQ communities (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Traits such as toughness, bravery, strength, and power are at the core of the hegemonic masculinity both in general but also specifically in the spheres that concern international relations (Locher & Prugl, 2001). It is a useful way in which to describe the underlying assumptions that the international structures are built on as well as the space in which foreign policy is formed. Especially, when considering the dichotomous relationship between masculine and feminine, which is often assumed in feminist research, it becomes clear that this relationship is similar to the framing of the relationship between states in foreign policy. The framing of countries as inherently feminine, in need of protection, weak, barbarian are all ways in which this dichotomous relationship manifests which lends itself very well to analysis in order to understand the feminist traits of a foreign policy (Agius & Edenborg, 2019; Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993).

The theoretical framework from a feminist perspective must therefore assume two main factors as the basis of foreign policy:

Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as “a type of culturally dominant masculinity

that … distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is a socially constructed cultural ideal that, while it does not correspond to the actual personality of the majority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order” (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 9) – Important here is the distinction between other subordinate masculinities and femininities, and hegemonic masculinity as hegemonic masculinity is understood as

specific ideals and norms that are reinforced through the opposition to subordinate identities (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, pp. 3–4). An important aspect of this approach to feminism in IR is the emphasis on the social construction of gender as well as the recognition of the importance of the context within which the observed gendered structures exist as these can vary in time and space (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 10). The prevalent normative assumption of binary gender relations structures the way in which the power dynamics function in much of the western world (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). According to Tickner, the gender binary can be found in most norms where there are binary distinctions such as public vs private, reason vs emotion, self vs other, which further means that by challenging these binary constructs and investigating their engendered nature it is possible to challenge the power of these norms that have been socially constructed (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 10). The point of doing a feminist analysis of international relations and foreign policy alike is to not only explain the construction and reproduction of gender in these areas but also to understand how they can be removed in order to construct a fully equal/non-gendered approach to international issues (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 19).

By being aware of the hegemonic masculinity underlying foreign policy it will be possible to enlighten the unequal relationship between genders in the foreign policy statement. This is important to understand that the androgynous portrayal of gender is only surface level and indicates that the norm in foreign policy is one of hegemonic masculinity (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). This can be seen by the explicit mention of women/LGBT+ or the complete absence of the male gender.

Power relations. The importance of using a feminist approach is to shine a light on the

power relations that are created in foreign policy. When adding an explicitly feminist focus to foreign policy it is based on the idea that the world is not only a social construction but a construction happening through the negotiation of super and subordinated relations, or simply put, through the struggle for power (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Power in this sense is understood as a part of the formation of identities whether that of a state or an individual, but arguably also as part of the struggle for one norm to establish over another (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Power, and in extension identity, is therefore socially constructed through the relationship to ‘others’ of different kinds. Identity thereby is created as a negative definition of what it is not, rather than a positive definition of what it is (Locher & Prugl, 2001). The gendered identity is here understood as a particularly strong mode of identification as it is socially constructed on assumptions of biological sex which can explain why gendered relationships are prevalent in spheres that do not obviously interact with gender (Locher & Prugl, 2001). To be able to

understand how this all relates to international relations and foreign policy the slogan of the second wave feminist movement: ‘the personal is political and the political is personal’ can be adapted so that not only power politics is relevant in foreign policy but that we must ask security for whom, and include the personal and domestic issues onto an international scale (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). An indication of this approach can be seen through an extended focus on individuals or groups of individuals rather than states being the target of the policy.

As there are multiple approaches to feminism in IR, much like with constructivism it will be necessary to decide on one specific branch for this study that is simultaneously compatible with the chosen constructivism on an ontological and epistemological level to avoid issues with internal validity from these very abstract but in the end deciding factors (Bjorkdahl, 2002). It is important here to stress that the feminist approach used in this paper should and will not be used as an addition subordinated to the constructivist framework but rather as an independent and equal part of the approach (Bjorkdahl, 2002). This means that the constructivist and feminist approaches are to complement each other with the knowledge and variables of analysis they allow for, rather than one dominating the other.

The strand of feminism used in this thesis assumes ever-evolving relations of power that is not just within structures and actors but also, and this is key, between genders (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993).

When adding these two base understandings to the theory of gender mainstreaming a

theoretical framework is created which will be the basis of the feminist exploration in this

paper.

Gender mainstreaming was introduced into Swedish policy in the 1990s as a way of

ensuring a gendered perspective and gender analysis of all areas of policy, it is, therefore, important to understand what gender mainstreaming entails when analyzing the Swedish foreign policies of the last two decades (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). Gender mainstreaming as a policy approach has been sponsored in particular by the EU and the Council of Europe, however, Sweden has been an important constant pressure on the EU to do so which adds an additional layer which will be discussed later in this paper (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). For practitioners within the field of gender equality policy, gender mainstreaming is

”…a strategy towards realising gender equality. [That] involves the integration of a gender perspective into the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures

and spending programmes, with a view to promoting equality between women and men, and combating discrimination.” (What is gender mainstreaming, 2020)

Another definition is that of the Council of Europe,

“gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making.” (Council of Europe, 2004)

Which is often used in earlier works on gender mainstreaming such as Daly, and Sainsbury and Bergquist (Daly, 2005; Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009).

It is, however, not only a practical approach within policy that promotes gender equality through different processes, but it is also a theoretical approach that allows the researcher to understand the gendered nature of key concepts present in the structures of policy process (Walby, 2005, p. 321).

Both of these definitions make it clear that gender mainstreaming is an approach to gender equality that focuses on the making of policy, however, they both lack the theoretical implications concerning structural inequalities and power imbalances. A theoretical definition is used by Daly (2005) which states that the

“gender mainstreaming approach is [one] that seeks to institutionalize equality by embedding gender-sensitive practices and norms in the structures, processes, and environment of public policy.” (Daly, 2005)

This definition takes into account the effect of both practice and norms which makes it broader and allows for the analysis of, not simply how gender mainstreaming is done in practice but also how norms affect and are changed by gender mainstreaming.

The competition of norms to become institutionalized means that gender must compete with a multitude of other issues for prioritization (Walby, 2005, p. 322). One way in which this has been done is through gender mainstreaming where the issue of gender has been integrated into institutional processes. This integration entails a dedication to some form of analytical tools being used in relation to different decisions. However, the implementation of gender mainstreaming does not mean that gender is considered in all areas and aspects of policy but rather that in some areas gender has been deemed enough of a priority to require a consideration of the gendered effects of the structures, processes or policy that is being worked on (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009).

An example of how gender mainstreaming affects norms is when the use of gender analysis in the state spreads and becomes the norm in other institutions on multiple levels of society, including voluntary organizations, corporations, etc. (Daly, 2005).

The transformative aspect of gender mainstreaming is highly debated, however, the theoretical aspect of transformation in gender mainstreaming should be understood as a new and positive form of gender-equal relations within the mainstream which has come about through gender mainstreaming (Walby, 2005, p. 323).

When considering how this transformation should come about there are two strands of thought; ‘integration’ and ‘agenda-setting’, which can be argued to either be opposite and thereby mutually exclusive, or complementary and thereby paving the way for each other. Agenda setting is the way in which transformation can happen by reorientation of structural processes (Walby, 2005, p. 323). Whereas integration is when gender becomes part of the mainstream without necessarily changing it (True, 2003, p. 370).

When working with a theory that is so closely tied with practice it is important to consider what constitutes success. Here is it helpful to consider the continuously changing environment in which policy happens. Because of the socially constructed nature of policy, the goal of gender mainstreaming needs to change according to the structures within which it operates (Walby, 2005, pp. 234–235). The social construction of gender in policy should be considered not from a perspective of linear progress but rather as a process with dynamic and changing priorities. The continuously changing nature of structures, norms, systems, and processes entails an approach to gender mainstreaming that responds to these changes (Daly, 2005). This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering what is possible now, in the past, and the future. These opportunity structures can be affected positively by gender mainstreaming meaning that over time gendered issues can become better integrated into the structures and become agenda setting on their own.

Gender mainstreaming theory focuses on two types of action. First, structural inequality is analyzed which allows for determining how it is embedded in the system (Daly, 2005). Second, this analysis allows for the development of tools that make it possible to dismantle these structural issues (Daly, 2005). Thus, by drawing on feminist analysis combined with an interest in understanding the structural framework which reproduces gender inequality, gender mainstreaming is able to uncover the ways in which norms and constructed gender relations are embedded in social structures and suggest approaches to dismantle these (Daly, 2005).

Through the institutionalization of gender, it should be possible to see changes in decision-making processes, structures, policy objectives, strategies of implementation of policy, and a general prioritization of gender issues and perspectives among both men and women (Daly, 2005). It is important to underline that gender mainstreaming aims at gender equality and therefore is not an approach that should mainly target women (Daly, 2005).

Gender mainstreaming is a state-centric approach assuming rationality from actors which have led to criticism from both feminists and other researchers who find it important to consider the state inherently gendered as well as the importance of civil society and the family realm (Daly, 2005).

Gender mainstreaming as a theory and practice has received much criticism both for being too broad and policy-focused and thereby resembling an approach (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). But also, for its inability to deliver transformative results when implemented (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). Both of these points of criticism are worth considering when using the theory, however, the latter one opens up considerations of the time the process of gender mainstreaming should take for transformative results to show. This is interesting considering some of the empirical evidence collected for these studies on the effect of gender mainstreaming has only considered or been carried out over a short period of time, often with the assumption that gender equality should soon be done or close to implemented. However, most major changes to societal structures do not happen overnight, rather it is an often-lengthy

process of undoing, integrating, and changing existing structures to accommodate the new

ideas (True, 2003).

The need to consider the changes over time opens up for how far back such a study should look. In the case of this thesis, it is most relevant to consider changes since the year 2000 as this was the time when gender equality in Sweden spread from being a self-contained issue to being implemented into a broader spectrum of policy (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). Meaning that at this point there is more focus on the individual ministries’ being able to carry out and implement a gender perspective on their work (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009).

By having an understanding of the effect of hegemonic masculinity, which is embedded in foreign policy, together with the importance of power relations, and, a practical understanding of implementing gender in policy from gender mainstreaming, it enables this thesis to discover the gendered aspects of the foreign policy statements.

A feminist-constructivist approach

Now that both constructivism and feminism have been considered it is possible to look at how these two approaches can be combined in this thesis to create a different perspective on feminism in the Swedish foreign policy.

Firstly, if we were to only use a constructivist approach, we would struggle to understand feminism as more than a norm developing in the Swedish foreign policy because of the marginal interest in gender generally held by constructivists (Locher & Prugl, 2001). This would lead to a lack of understanding in terms of how the feminist foreign policy affects gendered constructs and relationships of power in the international sphere – particularly the balancing between masculine and feminine constructs that is necessary. A purely constructivist approach would therefore be insufficient to investigate the full implications of the inclusion of feminism in foreign policy.

On the other hand, while feminism on its own would allow this thesis to focus on the gendered implications of feminism in foreign policy it would not allow for a wider picture that includes the development of feminism as a norm in the international sphere (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Feminism’s focus on power as a social construct is of particular importance in this thesis as it allows for a deeper analysis of how feminism in foreign policy challenges and maintains power structures, however, the structures themselves are part of a constant negotiation which a constructivist approach gives us a better picture of.

By combining a feminist and constructivist approach we, therefore, limit both approaches to specific aspects they excel at while letting them interact in a way that will be able to give a highly nuanced picture of the effect of feminism in foreign policy in the specific case of Sweden (Locher & Prugl, 2001). As both approaches appreciate the importance of complex understandings over-generalizations this should be a strength of the thesis (Locher & Prugl, 2001).

In more concrete terms the combination of constructivism and feminism means that a constructivist understanding of agent and structure, not as dichotomous but as co-constitutive will allow for a complex understanding of how feminism has developed as a norm in international relations in general and Swedish foreign policy in specific (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This should allow us to understand how and, potentially even, why feminism is seen as compatible with foreign policy in Sweden. The feminist approach will simultaneously allow us to look at the changes or lack thereof which has occurred in the gendered power relations (Ackerly et al., 2006). This will be done by looking at discursive framing, changes in participation or action related to gender/equality focused work. When combining these findings, we should be left with a detailed and complex understanding of the process which

has led to feminism being a part of the Swedish foreign policy and how feminism is part of it. In practice this means that the constructivist theory of institutionalization will be

• Instances of actorness, either by Sweden or International Organizations such as the EU or UN

• Discursive repetitions over time to indicate stabilization of a norm

• Indications of any of the actors, motives, or dominant mechanisms shown in table one This will be done through indexing areas in the 19 foreign policy statements that relate to feminism and identifying keywords. These sections will then be reexamined to reveal the underlying messages. Then the feminist theoretical framework will be applied to understand:

• The gendered understanding in the text

• Changing meanings of terms relating to gender • Underlying power struggles

• The level to which gender has been institutionalized/mainstreamed in the text

Research design

As this thesis aims to understand how feminism as a norm has developed and influenced Swedish foreign policy a single case study is considered to be appropriate. As a case study does not aim at determining universal ‘laws’ but rather to describe in detail the specific case in its contemporary context, with a potential to suggest areas where generalization could be an option it is fitting with the combination of constructivist and feminist approaches that will be used (Bjorkdahl, 2002). As both constructivism and feminism value studies of complexity within a specific context, and further, argue that changes are context-specific it will not be the objective of this paper to make broad generalizations or find universal ‘laws’, this case study will, therefore, fall in the descriptive, interpretivist end of the spectrum of case studies (Locher & Prugl, 2001). It will be an intrinsic case study to enable a complex understanding of the specific case of Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy (Punch, 2005, p. 121). One of the main reasons for choosing an intrinsic case study, where generalizability is not the main objective, is that for generalizability to be an option it is necessary to work at a level of abstraction that disregards a varying amount of detail - as the details of the case are what makes it interesting this would be problematic (Punch, 2005, p. 123).

The case study will therefore focus on the development of feminism in the foreign policy statements of Sweden. This has been chosen as the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy of 2014/15 is considered the first explicitly feminist foreign policy in the world and it could,

therefore, be seen as a new step in the development of feminism in foreign policy (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). It will be seen in the light of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 as this is considered the common starting point for the contemporary feminist foreign policies and it is therefore of interest to investigate how close the Swedish foreign policy lies to it (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016).

Furthermore, the effect of gender mainstreaming on the institutionalization process will be considered both on an internal level in the Swedish foreign policy statement and in relation to the pressure imposed from a European side. This study will, therefore, be able to contribute to our understanding of how Sweden’s feminist foreign policy became what it is, it will, however, not be compared to other countries with aspects of their foreign policies being feminist as the domestic and perceived differences between the cases and the limits to this thesis would force the analysis onto a more abstract level for that to be possible.

Limitations

One limitation of this study is that it disregards the role of individual actors such as bureaucrats and the foreign minister, it thereby falls short of exploring the dynamic that these actors create in the process of institutionalization of feminism in the Swedish foreign policy statement (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 184).

It should be stated that the scope of this study is limited to the study of the Swedish foreign policy statement and can therefore not be generalized to the everyday work at the ministry of foreign affairs or the inner workings of the foreign policy (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 17). Furthermore, it is not the intention of this study to generalize the institutionalization of feminism in foreign policy but rather to uncover how this process has transpired in the Swedish case.

The data will be collected from the Swedish Governments web site as well as other relevant databases with access to official government and UN documents, this will be further discussed in the materials section.

Materials

In this section, the choice of materials for this thesis will be discussed. As the thesis will be based on official government documents published by the Swedish state in their online database and on their web site it will have limitations specific to the use of official documents published by governments themselves. The documents will be the annual foreign policy

statements from 2000-2020. Furthermore, the Security Council Resolution 1325 will be used as a reference point to understand the commonalities between it and the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy. By using the government documents as primary sources of data this paper will analyze the content of them, rather than using them as a secondary source of opinions (Punch, 2005, p. 159; Sapsford et al., 2012). The goal is to learn from a text analysis how the norm of feminism has become integrated into Swedish foreign policy, therefore the documents published by the Swedish government should be an ideal primary data source. The objective of the text analysis will not be to understand the impact of the specific policies on their targets. The documents used will exclude documents relating to questions of domestic policy as the scope of this paper does not involve the relationship between domestic and foreign policy.

The thesis will be analyzing the foreign policy statements held by the Swedish foreign minister at the beginning of each year. More specifically the analysis will be of the written documents that are published by the foreign ministry as this thesis will be relying purely on text analysis. If this had been a discourse analysis of the whole speech it would have been relevant to examine the visual recordings of the speech as well, however, the emphasis here is focused on the institutionalization of a norm within the text, not the person delivering it.

As the foreign policy statement is the official, annual statement of the Swedish priorities in the foreign policy this is a relevant document to examine. For the purpose of understanding the institutionalization of a norm in the Swedish foreign policy, it is useful that the prioritization of topics included in the foreign policy statement is high. Only topics that are seen as important to Sweden will be included in this statement.

The intended audience of the foreign policy statement is primarily the Swedish parliament and foreign states, though naturally the Swedish public also has an interest in this. It is a government's way of informing the parliament of their priorities, while also being a way for the state to inform other states and international actors what they will be prioritizing in the coming year. Lastly, it is a way for the Swedish public to learn the government's foreign policy priorities.

A choice has been made to work with the Swedish language texts for multiple reasons. First to avoid translation bias, by using the Swedish language document the text is a transcript of the speech and therefore expresses as closely as possible the intent of the speaker. Second, there is an inconsistency in the translations available, the first years used there are no translations available, while later years either include French, Spanish, or mostly English – this makes it difficult to justify using the translated documents as they require a fluent knowledge of multiple languages, furthermore, the biases inherent with translations of this type of

document is that the target of these texts will be a foreign audience specifically. Lastly, as digitalization has increased, platforms and formats have changed which has led to the Swedish language version being the most continuous versions.

The limitations of using the foreign policy statements as the only primary source of analysis are that it only shows the institutionalization of the norm in the statement and not necessarily provides a generalized view of the institutionalization of the norm in the Swedish foreign policy or the practices within them. Further, as a foreign policy statement is targeted at other states as well as the parliament, the projection of a specific image is an important part of the statement. This leads to bias in regard to the statement portraying the desired institutionalization instead of actual institutionalization. The use of these statements, therefore, means that it will not be possible to conclude how institutionalized these norms are in the foreign policy as such or the foreign ministry’s work, only how it is institutionalized in the foreign policy statement.

Literature review

In this section, the context of research in the field of feminist foreign policy will be elaborated upon. The literature in this area will be divided into four sections which provide the structure for this chapter.

Domestic vs international explanations

Rosamond (2020) argues that the Swedish feminist foreign policy is a result of the social-democratic legacy, particularly its friendliness towards gendered issues (Rosamond, 2020, p. 218). This domestic view on the development of the Swedish FFP allows her to trace the developments back to the 1960s (Rosamond, 2020, p. 223).

She echoes Kronsell’s opinion that “[t]he externalization of the Swedish pro-gender norm beyond its borders is a cosmopolitan response to global calls for states to support the UN Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda” (Rosamond, 2020). This portrayal that the UN WPS agenda related to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the main reasoning for including feminism or a gender-sensitive approach in the Swedish foreign policy is repeated across the research on the topic, however, it does not account for the reciprocal relationship of

international and domestic norms as it is concerned more with the feminist and domestic factors contributing to the FFP’s development.

In the work of Aggestam and Rosamond (2020) they argue that Sweden’s “commitment to the advancement of global gender equality and mainstreaming is closely linked to its support for UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), adopted in 2000” (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, p. 38). Which then adds the Swedish FFP onto an international agenda.

Alwan and Weldon (2017) similarly argue that Sweden’s adoption of the FFP is “embedded in the broader global efforts to promote gender equality in the international arena, which we have seen evolving over the past few decades in the aftermath of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 323).

The focus on the domestic vs international factors in the development of the Swedish FFP takes center stage in a majority of the research on the Swedish FFP (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Rosamond, 2020).

Adding Women

Rosamond (2020) argues that the focus of gender as meaning women is reproducing gendering and reinforces gender roles (Rosamond, 2020). This is echoed by Scheyer and Kumskova’s (2019) review of the existing feminist foreign policies “[m]any of these policies are focusing disproportionately on the rights and experiences of women.” (2019, p. 64) They elaborate that “every single policy from this list focuses disproportionately on the situation of women, their rights, and needs, instead of addressing gendered power structures, identifying silenced groups, building empathic communities, and rethinking important concepts, such as sovereignty, militarism, and nationalism.”(Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, pp. 64–65) Thompson and Clement (2019) add to this point by highlighting the general criticism of the “binary focus on women rather than gender” when it comes to rights (Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 2). They further justify this by concluding that “use[ing] the word feminist when they mean “women and girls” … reinforces the binary and undermines work to overcome white, ethnocentric, and western-centric, cis feminism’s historical (and current) sins.” (Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 5)

Aggestam and Rosamond (2020) argue that the reasoning for Sweden’s pursuit of FFP is that its “adoption of a feminist foreign policy is an attempt to push the gender-security nexus to the very center of global politics” (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, p. 38). This stands in

contrast to the former article by Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) where they argue that “governments continue to pursue power by traditional means and only attempt to embed women into the system rather than adopting a comprehensive feminist policy” (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, p. 69).

Aggestam and Rosamond counter this idea by arguing that “feminist foreign policy is both an expression of ethical conduct and pragmatism, which at times may trigger policy contradictions and tensions.”(Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, p. 38). They further argue that the guiding principle of the FFP is ethical in combination with seeking concrete results which justifies the lack of “obliterating national interests”, furthermore, this is justified according to Aggestam and Rosamond by the targeting of women and marginalized groups in the Swedish FFP (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, pp. 45–46).

Feminist enough or Defining feminist foreign policy

One of Rosamond’s (2020) main conclusions are the call for an intersectional approach in the Swedish FFP. Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) suggest that “gender parity and attempts to make women visible in international relations are not enough to realize a comprehensive feminist foreign policy.” Robinson (Robinson, 2019) argues, that the liberal cosmopolitan approach to an FFP is not feminist enough as it, according to her research, reproduces existing power structures, including gendered power relations and western domination (Robinson, 2019). She further argues that the ethical aspect of this approach, mainly proposed by Aggestam and Rosamond, undermines a truly feminist foreign policy (Robinson, 2019). Her alternative approach is to use a concept known as ‘ethics of care’ within the framework of radical feminism echoing other authors who are calling for a more transformative and intersectional FFP (Robinson, 2019; Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019). Aggestam and Rosamond instead argue for an ethical component to be incorporated through a theoretical framework of English School analysis with an emphasis on justice over order (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). This, they argue, would create a way of better measuring if an FFP is feminist enough (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016).

Thompson and Clement (2019) instead suggest that FFP can be improved upon by focusing on “pushing countries to increase their commitments to gender equality as a principle and funded goal and adopting a more rigorous and independent practice for monitoring, evaluation, research and learning tied to policies’ intended outcomes.”

Overlapping with the previous section is the papers working on defining what an FFP entails. These papers are particularly concerned with developing frameworks and definitions to measure how feminist a feminist foreign policy is or should be.

Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) argues that “Feminist foreign policy is one that includes whole populations, appreciates diversity, inspires comprehensive analysis, and leaves no one behind.” (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, p. 58). They advocate for an FFP that “should be about looking into the structures, addressing gendered power relations, building gender-inclusive institutions, and pursuing policies that incorporate the interests of and seek to benefit all.” Instead of the current focus on adding women as discussed in the previous section.

Their further argument goes that much like other IR theories “[f]eminist analysis represents another component of an alternative view on global politics, not an idealistic departure from it.” (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, p. 58). They thereby oppose the concept of an FFP to that of neo-realist or neo-liberalist approaches to foreign policy and advocate for an intersectional, anti-capitalist approach to feminism in foreign policy (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019). Egnell echoes a similar idea when he states that FFP is a fundamentally wider and new approach to issues of what security entails (Egnell, 2017, p. 584).

Alwan and Weldon take this point even further by assuming that “[t]he declaration of a distinct feminist foreign policy signals a departure from traditional elite-oriented foreign policy practices and discourses toward a policy framework that is guided by normative and ethical principles” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 327).

Another contented point is whether an FFP should be pacifist or not, Aggestam and Rosamond argue that “a feminist foreign policy is not as closely associated with pacifism as is often assumed, but encourages pragmatism in the alternation between the use of soft and hard power as the most appropriate diplomatic and military strategy to manage security threats” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Alwan and Weldon instead argue for including pacifism as a necessary indicator of a truly feminist foreign policy but encourages that this goes beyond just abstinence from military activity to include issues of domestic violence as well (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 25). Meanwhile, Egnell classifies the contention between liberal and pacifist feminism as a catch 22 situation in the FFP (Egnell, 2017, p. 570).

External relations

Rosén Sundström and Elgström (2019) argues that the role Sweden plays as a norm entrepreneur within the EU while not being considered a powerful state has a disadvantage in

that other states are less likely to follow suit and adopt an FFP (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). Furthermore, they argue that against the backdrop of rising nationalism and populism, the FFP is in danger of becoming just another -ism in the EU (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430).

Their study found that the norm of feminism in the EU is highly contested and therefore less likely to reach internalization internationally (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). This risk together with the slow spread of FFP in the global space leads them to conclude that FFP as a norm is in its infant stage of norm emergence (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). What is in favor of the FFP being promoted by Sweden is that Sweden is already perceived as a norm entrepreneur for gender in international relations (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). In opposition to the view that Rosén Sundström and Elgström presents, Egnell (2017) finds that the FFP has a greater capacity for international power than many commentators expected and that it should, therefore, be used mindfully (Egnell, 2017, p. 584).

UN resolution 1325

On October 31st, 2000 the Landmark resolution on Women, Peace, and Security was adopted by the United Nations Security Council (Security Council resolution 1325, 2000). This resolution meant that the parties recognized women as integral to peace and security including, among other things, as participants in peacebuilding. Furthermore, it committed the UN to consider issues of gender in aspects of peace and security issues and encouraged all parties in conflict to not use gendered violence including rape as a means of warfare. However, it also involved a new focus on women as fully participating soldiers in peacekeeping missions, national armies, and international intervention (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 31). The idea of the WPS was to start a process of gender mainstreaming on a global scale (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 31). To implement resolution 1325 a number of countries adopted National Action Plans (NAP) that clarified the concrete measures the individual states would be taking to fulfill their commitment (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 31). The overall concept of the WPS resolution was that through the inclusion of women in the processes of peace and conflict it would be possible to create long and stable peace (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 32). The adoption of the WPS was in itself build on the efforts of civil society organizations and ambassadors of countries in favor of the resolution, particularly through finding a common language in already existing UN

resolutions to negotiate an agreement framed as already agreed upon but in a new wrapping (Basu, 2016). It being a security council resolution has meant that the UN has been working with WPS continuously since the year 2000, compared to UN conferences for example that set a time-specific goal for the work with the topic in question. This continuous focus on women’s role in peace and security through resolution 1325 has encouraged participating states to continuously work with women’s inclusion through developing NAPs. The UN security council, however, has also agreed on further resolutions on women such as resolution 1960 from 2010 which focused on sexual violence in conflict and resolution 2122 from 2013 which concerned the integration of women at all stages of conflict, building on top of these as well as other goals set at UN conferences and through security council resolutions (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 33).

Analysis

This section will go through how women are presented in Swedish foreign policy as well as how this has developed over time. By starting in 2000 we will be able to see how women are presented from the year when the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted. This is of importance as 1325 is considered to be the first push to implement feminism or women’s issues into foreign policy in much of the literature (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Egnell, 2017; Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019).

2000

(Utrikesfrågor, 2000), Anna Lindh (S)

In the year 2000, the main focus of the foreign policy is security and human rights. When listing the priorities of the Swedish EU presidency, equality is stated as the main concern that should be all-encompassing in the EU's work (Line 92, line 106). The Swedish EU presidency prioritizing equality is an indication that equality is a somewhat established norm inside Sweden, but that it still needs attention in the EU where Sweden as an actor or norm entrepreneur appears to push for its institutionalization, thereby being aware of the contested state of equality in the EU. The push for all-encompassing equality in the work of the EU is furthermore interesting from the perspective of gender mainstreaming as Sweden here is pushing for its interpretation of the EU's push for gender mainstreaming (True, 2003). Women and equality are mentioned both as a topic to be pursued in the EU and as part of human and children’s rights on a global level. Particularly the lack of equality when it comes to gender

discrimination, this is the first explicit mention of gender as an independent issue (line 142-143). The issues related to gender discrimination and oppression of women are elaborated upon in line 142-143 where the issue of the majority of poor people in the world at the time are women as well as the issue of women not having appropriate access or power to demand respect for their rights are mentioned (line 142-143).

The intersection between equality and children’s rights in the Swedish approach to aid is shown through the example of the forced closing of schools for girls in Afghanistan because of unrest, while another is opened in Mozambique because of increasing stability (line 262-263). The varying contexts within which gender appears in the foreign policy statement of the year 2000 shows that the broad implantation of gender mainstreaming appears to broaden the range of relevant areas and the depth of concrete examples of work that involved a gender-sensitive angle. Equality has gained the added institutionalization by gender being mentioned explicitly and with a focus on strengthening equality in an EU framework shows how internally it has been accepted as an acceptable foreign policy element in this area. Furthermore, the aspect of Swedish foreign policy done through the UN has gotten a distinct gender and equality angle both indirectly and in relation to the rights of education for girls in both Afghanistan and Mozambique.

2001

(Riksdagens Protokoll, 2001) Anna Lindh (S)

The 2001 foreign policy has a strong focus on human and individual rights. It is a Swedish priority to strengthen the rights of people who experience discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, etc. (lines 10-11). The presentation of gender as a category on the same footing as ethnicity, political, and religious belonging is a new angle compared to the year earlier where gender is mentioned under human rights but as a completely separate issue from these. It shows clearly how gender and equality are competing with other norms and is under continuous pressure to find the right belonging within the foreign policy. Since this is expressed in the foreign policy statement, it is clear that the increased attention to gender shows a level of institutionalization as a foreign policy statement is the Swedish governments moment to inform the Swedish parliament, as well as foreign government and international organization what their priorities are for the forthcoming year. The gender-related goals are in 2001 presented as a part of the pressure on the UN which Sweden considered a vital international player (line 10-16). The goal of the 2001 foreign policy is to be present in more places whether that be conflict, crisis, or through diplomatic postings and civilian cooperation. In this text,