Small States Seeking Status in Afghanistan : A comparative cross case congruence test of the Nordic states' status motivations in the Afghnaistan war

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Small States Seeking Status in Afghanistan

A comparative cross case congruence test of the Nordic states’ status

motivations in the Afghanistan war

Hannes Ljungkvist

Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp) War Studies

Master’s Programme in Politics and War Spring 2021

Supervisor: Niklas Karlén Word count: 17987

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1 Abstract

Why do small states contribute to great power led wars even though they lack the capabilities to determine the success of the war and there are no clear interests to gain? The peaceable states of the Nordic countries could have opted for a free-riding strategy instead of being active participants. Still, the Nordic countries were in relation to their size, some of the top military contributors in Afghanistan. In recent small state literature, it has been suggested that small states use military contributions as means to increase their international status position. There are however two competing and sometimes overlapping arguments of whether status is a means for increasing political influence or securing protection. This thesis contributes to this literature by differentiating the concept of status in two categories - influence and

security. This distinction enabled a cross case comparative congruence test which reveals that the Nordic states had different status motivations in their decision to contribute to the

Afghanistan war. Denmark and Sweden had a clear preference of seeking status seeking as means for influence while Norway used status mainly as means for enhancing security. This thesis shows that small states are not only dependent security consumers. It suggests that the decision-making processes in the small states were guided by independent preferences of enhancing status, which ultimately transformed into military contributions. However, rather than considering status as the main objective, the potential gains of enhancing the status position were the central ambition. The Nordic states’ preferences of status gains differed more than what previous research has suggested.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Research Problem

The Nordic countries strategic behavior during the 21st century have puzzled many researchers. Why would the Nordic states be active participants in the wars in Libya,

Afghanistan, and Iraq when there are high risks and no clear material interests to be gained? Also, the Nordic countries lack the military power to determine the outcome of the military missions. Despite this, the small Nordic states have been great contributors, in relation to their size, to the US-led coalitions in the wars of Kosovo, Libya, Iraq and especially in

Afghanistan. During the Cold war, Nordic foreign policy was characterized by peacefulness, diplomacy, contributions to disarmament initiatives and solidarity with the third world (Mouritzen, 1995:11). Since the 1990´s the Nordic countries have increasingly turned to military foreign policy options by contributing to US-led coalitions. An emerging field of researchers have tried to explain what the rationale is for such unnecessary risk-taking behavior when the Nordic states could have easily opted for free riding or buck-passing instead (Jakobsen, Ringsmose & Lunde Saxi, 2016:257; Pedersen, 2020:41).

East (1973:557), and Vital (1971:126) have argued that small states have limited policy options because of their smallness and the vulnerability that comes with their size. These conditions would make small states foreign policy less focused on world politics and more narrowed on immediate geographical surroundings. Research has shown that during the 20th century major powers were more likely to join US-led coalition. It has been argued that it is because small states lack strategic interests, capabilities, and the political will to contribute to coalitions (Tago,2007:182). However, during the last two decades small states like the Nordic countries, have devoted themselves to a military activist role in faraway countries. The

empiric reality of the 21st century is increasingly contesting old truths. Gannon & Kent (2020:10) for instance discovers that in the US-led coalition in Afghanistan it is neither the military strongest countries nor the countries with the strongest ties to the US who makes the largest military contribution in relation to their size. Instead, the top contributors, when accounted for state military size, was the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries, and New Zealand but it is still unclear what small states would gain from such actions. Why would small peaceful states make such costly and risky military efforts in a war they cannot win, and have no clear interests in?

By turning to notions of status and prestige, this thesis will provide an explanation for why small states make big contributions to great power-led coalitions. It will show that small states

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4 seek status by contributing militarily to achieve broader political goals which seldom are connected directly to the battlefield where their military operates.

1.2 Aim and research question

The overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to the subfield of small states literature in war studies and especially explain the rationale behind why these states go to war. Common assumptions of small states as dependent actors with narrow interests do not explain why small states would make such big efforts in costly modern wars in countries far away. As small states have increasingly becoming more prone to contribute militarily to recent wars, classic assumptions of small states in in war studies have failed to explain the rationale of such seemingly irrational behavior as there are no clear material interests to be gained. This thesis will demonstrate that small states contribute militarily to big wars to seek status. I will thereby connect to an emerging field of researchers who have started to address how small states are using military means for status seeking. The literature has however not yet addressed that the aims for small states to enhance their status may differ. I will argue that there is reason to differentiate between status seeking into influence and status seeking for security. By doing so, this thesis fills a gap in the field of war studies. This thesis will contribute to knowledge of why small states are willing to make substantial military contributions to wars led by great powers. As such, this thesis adds to an understanding of how small state strategic decision-making motives differs even when the decisional outcome is similar. This thesis aims at answering:

Why are small states contributing to great power-led wars?

To achieve this aim, I will investigate the motivations of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, to contribute to the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. I will conduct a congruence analysis of two competing status seeking theories and asses their explanatory power across the cases in relation to each other and in relation to other common explanations. As such, I will not only assess the explanatory power of status seeking, but also evaluate whether status seeking had motivational differences in the decision-making process of contributing to the Afghanistan war.

1.3 Disposition

The following will provides an overview of the arguments from earlier research on determinants of why small states join great power coalitions. The chapter introduces the emerging field of status seeking literature connected to small states.

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5 The concept of status seeking is not new but have recently been increasingly elaborated with by small state scholars. There are currently two main schools of thought in the status seeking literature which core arguments holds competing elements. One school argues that the

motives for status seeking is based on enhancing influence while the other argues that status is a means for security. These conceptualizations will be further presented in the theory chapter. I do however argue that small states differ in their motivations to seek status. In the method chapter, I introduce how congruence analysis enables a test across the cases where the two theories compete. The following section introduces two sets of predictions from each school of thought which will guide the analysis. In the following chapter I will apply each set of predictions in a congruence cluster test on the three small state cases, the results will be summarized and evaluated by its explanatory power in a following section. The final chapter presents conclusions and a discussion on its implications for previous research and decision making in small states. The chapter will also include a discussion on the limitations of this thesis.

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2. Previous Research

This chapter starts by going through some of the conventional wisdoms of small state theories. This is followed by more recent literature, in which traditional assumptions are questioned for its relevance in the 21st_{century. Lastly, the chapter introduces the concept of} status seeking.

The field of war studies tends to pay attention either to the great powers or the systemic level in the international system (Elman, 1995:175). In realist thinking, foreign policy choices of small states have been considered restricted. Jervis (1978: 173) argues that there is more constraint imposed on the foreign policies of small states since they will “feel the effects of anarchy much more than larger ones”. Snyder (1991:318) similarly argues that small states must adapt their strategies to the international environmental milieu, while great powers can adapt their strategies to their domestic environment. In realist thinking, its commonly argued that since small states lack the power of greater states, they focus on their survival and/or dependency of greater states. The smallness and vulnerability that comes with their size make small states policies less focused on world politics and more narrowed on immediate

geographical surroundings. Further, small states are less prone to take risks because of their limited resources (East, 1973:557; Watlz,1994:195, Vital, 1971;126). As such, scholar have argued that small states tend to either bandwagon or balance with greater states, as they have little deterrent or defensive strength by themselves and are vulnerable for aggressive demands from greater powers (Walt, 1991:53,72; Labs, 1993:506).

From this scholarly tradition, threat is a central driver for coalition building. States who fear threats a more likely to respond by joining a coalition. States who do not face a threat might participate as well but will be more likely to restrict their use of force (Auserwald &

Saideman, 2014:16). When explaining why small states joined the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan or Iraq these theories are often centered on a threat perspective. Some argue that small states feared the threat of Russia, and by bandwagoning with the US, these states are balancing Russia (Schuster & Maier, 2006:235). Others have argued that the fear of

international terrorism was considered the main threat, which justified joining the coalition (Davidson, 2014:262-263). A third explanation is that states feared US deflection of its security guarantees as they had expressed dissatisfaction with European commitment to security cooperation. The contribution to the war on terror was thereby considered a means of pleasing the US demands and strengthen the security ties (Tago, 2009:220, Oma & Petersson, 2019:107).

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7 As several scholars have pointed out, even though some of these explanations might add bits to an understanding of why small states join coalitions, they tend to either exaggerate the limited options for small states or do not entirely fit the empiric reality (Ångström & Honig, 2012:670; Pedersen, 2019:41;). For the Nordic countries neither the threat from Russia nor the threat of terrorism was as pressing as in other countries, still their contributions to the

coalition in Afghanistan was by the highest in relation to their size (Gannon & Kent,

2020:10). It is also argued that there is little evidence that small states were pressured by the US to over-perform (Pedersen & Reykers, 2020:19). There might however be a degree of explanatory power to the theory that small states wants to strengthen their ties with the US, but as it comes to a prize of high risk, which contradicts the assumption that small states are less willing to take big risks.

An emerging field of scholars have realized the limitations of the mentioned theories and have contested the traditional small state assumptions above. Noreen, Sjöstedt & Ångström

(2014:161), for instance, have even argued that smallness by it-self is not a sufficient variable for understanding foreign policy choices. Recent small state scholars have increasingly turned to theories focusing on identity or norms. Such scholars have for instance argued that the Nordic countries are, on contrary to traditional theories, highly active in world politics and have created a self-appointed role as norm entrepreneurs and have committed to a strategy of being “good doers” in the international system. As such, the Nordic states gain a positive reputation in the international system (Björkdahl, 2013; Ingebritsen 2002). Long (2017:200) argues that military power is increasingly becoming illegitimate, a fact that makes the small states more power full than ever. As political power increase in importance it enables small states to overcome their lack of resources, thus, small states become more symmetric in their pursuit of influence and reputation (Ibid:197). These arguments are helpful for understanding some characteristics of the Nordic countries foreign policy such as their role as conflict preventors, advocates of human rights or supporters of multilateralism, but these scholars have not engaged in applying such frameworks in military thinking.

Other scholars have explained Nordic foreign policy by focusing on how history has shaped a strategic culture which shapes strategic practices in the present (Ångström & Honig.

2012:669-670; Doeser, 2018:468). Much focus in this tradition have also addressed how strategic thinking differs in Nordic countries (see for instance “special issue on the Nordic strategic culture, 2005”). These scholars have contributed to an understanding on how norms and ideas shape decision making. They have also been able to prove that small states have

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8 independent interests in the international system and are not only obedient followers of the great power. Also, they have addressed that also small states have domestic concerns that can affect their foreign policy. What they do not address properly is what the small states think they can gain from contributing militarily.

More recently Gannon & Kent (2020) argued that states with “unrealized alliance potential” with the US was more likely to overcontribute to the coalition in Afghanistan. However, they did not address that almost every “over-contributor” was small states, and they did not have a sufficient explanation for why states wanted a closer relationship with the US. Some would perhaps point to the fact that some of the top contributors are NATO-members - but some are not, and such argument does not find support in the literature. Edström & Westberg

(2020:200-201) for instance concludes that alignment affiliation had a low correlation with strategic priorities in the Nordic countries. The non-NATO-member Sweden, for instance, like Norway and Denmark, made costly military contributions to the wars of Kosovo,

Afghanistan, and Libya. Ångström & Honig (2012:678) have pointed to the fact that Sweden is “an-eager-to-please non-member” of NATO while Norway is a “reluctant member”. As such, membership in NATO might not be an independent sufficient explanation for small power contributions. However, there might be reason to elaborate with the fact that small power has a dependency in relation to great powers.

In recent small state literature, the importance of recognition in general, and especially by great powers, has been increasingly emphasized. Students have started to address the

importance of status, reputation, prestige or standing. These concepts can of course differ, but all belongs to the same linguistic family and are often used as synonyms. Jakobsen,

Ringsmose & Lunde Saxi (2016:8) argues that status and prestige are similar concepts. Prestige and status grow from a positive reputation while reputation can be both good and bad. Pedersen (2018:220) instead argues that prestige or reputation are concepts that the actors have some control over, whereas status is a function of the international system and is granted by others. Reputation can though influence the status of the actor.

A common argument in this literature is that small states pursue a good reputation because they lack the military power that greater states can use utilize for coercion and credibility (Long, 2017:186, Oma & Petersson, 2019:107; Pedersen & 2019:42). It seems like most researchers converge under the opinion that this affects small states to seek status, and more recently small states have turned to military means in their status seeking activities. Still, more work should be done to understand what small states think they will gain by seeking

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9 status. An emerging field of researchers has theorized about the underlying interests for small states when seeking status with military means. Currently there seems to be a debate on whether small states are seeking status for gaining greater influence in general or if status seeking is especially targeted on increasing the credibility of US security assurances. The status argument is compelling, as it highlights that small states may use military means to achieve interests beyond traditional assumptions of survival. A lesson learned from previous scholars is that the interests of small states can differ. Interests can be a result of former historical experiences, dominant norms, or domestic politics. As such, it should be expected that small states would have different status seeking preferences.

The following theory chapter focuses on the current debate on what small states believe they can gain by seeking status. Some scholars argue that small states turn to status seeking for increasing their influence, others believe that small states rather use status for obtaining security. I argue that the security/influence elements in strategic choices may differ across small states, over time and context, hence, there is a need to differentiate the motivations of status seeking strategies in a competing manner to determine the explanatory power of each hypothesis.

To summarize, traditional approaches to small state strategies have not been sufficient to explain why small states make relatively costly contributions to great power wars. As recent scholars have increasingly turned to the concept of status seeking to explain this puzzle, two competing schools have emerged where one argues that status seeking is a means for security while the other argues that it is a means for increasing influence. As these theories compete, no researcher yet has tested the validity of these theories when applied in a competing

manner. By doing this, my research fills a gap in the war study-literature that enables thinking of small states strategies in a manner where the security/influence dimension in status seeking differs across states. In the next section I will introduce the core arguments of each theory which will result in a series of predictions. These predictions will later guide the analysis of the empiric material.

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3. Theory

In this chapter I present two different theoretical approaches for understanding status seeking where one considers status a means for security while the other considers status as means for influence. This differentiation is important as each school of thought base their arguments on different theoretical arguments, hence, lands in different conclusions on how status affects small state decision making. Lastly, this chapter presents a framework for each theory’s core arguments transformed into predictions. These predictions will later guide the analysis in chapter 5 based on the methodological considerations presented in chapter 4.

3.1 The Status for Security School

A central theoretical figure for scholars from the “security school” is Jack Snyder who developed the “fear of abandonment theory”. Snyder (1984:466-467) argues that when alliances are formed, states must decide how firmly they want to commit. Belonging to the same alliance does not mean that all interests are shared, but the profits of belonging are enhanced security. The alliance will however create an internal security dilemma based on the competing concepts of entrapment and abandonment. Entrapment since states in the alliance have different interests, hence, there is a risk of being “dragged” into conflict over an ally’s interest. On the other hand, by showing loyalty to one’s allies, it increases the joint security (Ibid:467). States who do not commit reduces the risk of entrapment but cannot expect the profits of enhanced security and will fear abandonment instead (Ibid:473). Snyder (1984:484) argues that states must continuously choose between alliance security guarantees and enjoying the freedom of autonomy, and choosing one tends to increase the risks of the other. When fearing abandonment, the standard response would be to increase the perception of loyalty to reduce the risk of deflection (Snyder, 1991:183-184). The internal security dilemma is not as apparent in greater states since they are less dependent on the alliance (Ibid:31)

Several researchers have departed from Snyder´s logic when explaining why small states have been contributing to US-led wars (Wivel & Crandall, 2019:413; Oma & Petersson 2019:104; Thorhallson & Brady, 2020:5-6). Oma & Petersson (2019:107) argues that smaller states would tend to fear abandonment rather than entrapment because of their dependency on greater states. When states fear abandonment, they will try to move closer to the great power and build up a reputation of loyalty as it is believed to diminish the risk of reduced security (Ibid). As such, small states seek status to increase security.

This is the core argument form the “status for security school”, where status is considered a means to increase security. Several scholars have expressed similar arguments. For instance,

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11 Brady & Thorhallsson (2020:7) argues that since small states lack capabilities, they rely on security assurances and military assistance of larger states, a concept which they call shelter. Shelter, however, comes at a cost as greater states expect their proteges to support their foreign policy. In return, small states can survive and prosper (Ibid). Oma and Petersson (2019:107) argues similarly that the Nordic states are dependent on the security provisions of the US and must establish a good reputation with the security provider. If the dependent small states fear that their patron is deflecting, small states must signal that they are loyal partners who provide the support that the US desires.

Wivel and Crandall (2019:414) argues that small states are prone to build a foreign policy based on high dependence on great powers to ensure their own security. Denmark & Estonia have for instance, conducted a policy of “Super Atlanticism” based on an extreme dependence on the US (Ibid:413). They conclude that that there is a paradoxicality to this behavior since states are “seeking security trough extreme dependency and focusing on non-essential security threats in order to secure shelter against the essential security threats” (Wivel & Crandall, 2019:413). Small states, they argue (Ibid), accepts permanent entrapment to minimize the fear of abandonment. Pedersen (2020:54) agrees on that small states are seeking status since this will increase the possibility of US support in case of an external threat. However, he argues that such statements might overestimate the importance of negative dependency, an argument which opens for the “influence school” in the small state debate (Ibid).

3.2 The Status for Influence School

As the former argument was based on status seeking for security, this section accounts for scholars who argues that status is rather a means for influence. Several of these scholars have based core assumptions on Randall L. Schweller’s bandwagon for profit-theory.

Schweller (1996:91-92) is critical to neorealist arguments claiming that security is the main concern of states because such assumptions are missing that states sometimes seek power for other aims. Schweller (1994:80) is for instance critical to Walt and Waltz definitions of bandwagoning and balance. He notes that they put these concepts in opposition where balancing is aligning with other states against the threat, while bandwagoning is alignment with the sources of danger. Schweller (1994:74-75) argues that threat will not always be the main factor for alignment. Instead bandwagoning can have opportunistic reasons and states may choose to bandwagon since they perceive that such strategy presents opportunities to obtain profit and coveted values (Ibid). Such behavior should be expected of states when there

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12 are low levels of external threat when states have no need to balance threats. This allows states to bandwagon with greater powers for “revisionist aims” (Schweller, 1994:105). As Jakobsen, Ringsmose & Lunde Saxi (2016:7) notes, Schweller’s definition of profit is often focused on territorial gains even though he does not explicitly exclude that other values can be sought for profit as well. Pedersen, (2018:222) adds that small states seldom seek territory, and revisionism in form of expansion is not a viable option for small states. So as these scholars point out, the bandwagoning for profit theory must be revised to some extent for being fruitfully applied. For instance, Pedersen (2018:222) argues that small states utilize their alliances with greater powers and by showing they can punch over their weight, they gain profit in terms of recognition and status from allies. Jakobsen et al (2018:261) further argues that social recognition gives small states influence in international politics.

Threat perception and security was central themes for the status for security camp. Scholars who are leaning on bandwagoning for prestige-theory would rather focus on, like Pedersen & Reykers (2020:20) calls it, “positive status motivations”. Jakobsen, et al (2016:9-10) for instance, argues that small states use military means for attaining status as an end it-self, and when obtained, status can be converted into influence or power. In an article they (Jakobsen et al, 2018:257) make a comparison to a bank account where status is the capital, and when needed, the capital can further the national interest. The argument is that small states seek status with military means, not because they have interests in the conflict, but because a good relationship and visibility with the great power can be converted into other benefits in the future. Graeger (2015) is a bit more specific about the gains of status. She argues likewise that small states contribute to great powers to obtain a good reputation. Small states have limited resources, but the Nordic countries are still able to develop adequate military capabilities, and by showing that they are willing to use them, they gain status in the important defence forums become influential in international decisions of security and global affairs (Ibid:89). As Pedersen & Reykers (2020:17) conclude, status for influence-arguments do not necessarily contradict scholars of the security-school since they agree upon that small states depend on greater states, but the theories rather compete on what the perceived gains are. Pedersen & Reyker (2020:19) claim that the security pursuit of small states might be over-exaggerated and that there is no evidence that indicates US-pressure on small states to over-perform. Instead, small states see positive gains in military participation in US-led coalitions as it accumulates status, not only with the US but also from other smaller states. By improving

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13 their great power recognition, small states improve their status position in the global

deference hierarchy (Ibid:20)

3.3 Concluding the Status Seeking Arguments.

Above I have addressed that there is a status seeking debate between two competing arguments for why small states use military force as status seeking. To summarize, the “Security school” argues that small states follow what they perceive are the expectations of the greater power. This is a costly strategy but in return the states believe they minimize the risk of their ally deflecting from its security provisions, which enhances national security. The “Influence school” argues that small states believe they gain influence in the defence

hierarchy by showing that they are able and willing to use force. The gains of such behavior are believed to give stronger voice in central decision-making institutions.

The logic of small states making hefty contributions to great power wars is puzzling, but the status seeking scholars have offered two competing theoretical explanations. On a theoretical level, both schools make compelling arguments. But which of these theories bears the most weight in the empirical reality?

Edström, Gyllensporre & Westberg (2019:194) have put great efforts to show that the Nordic states sometime differ in their strategic choices, even when presented with similar challenges. However, Edström et al (2019) did not assess whether the small states differed in their

preferences of security of influence. I depart from their findings but argue that small states preferences are likely to differ, even when their strategic choices are similar.

Oma & Petersson (2019:120), when testing their fear of abandonment theory, concluded that it was valid both in Sweden and Norway when committing to the Afghanistan war. However, even if their proof suggests that both cases sought status, Norway also feared abandonment, which Sweden did not to the same extent. This leads me to suspect that Sweden perhaps had a stronger influence-preference. Status seeking scholars have argued that small states made costly and risky contributions in Afghanistan because it presented an opportunity to increase their status position. Even though there are two competing status seeking theories, the

explanatory power of each theory has not yet been assessed in a competing manner. By doing so, I believe to find that status motivations will differ across cases.

3..4 Developing Predictions

I have concluded that there are two somewhat similar theories based on status seeking. These theories have overlapping elements such as that small states are striving for status by using

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14 their military power to create visibility to greater powers which is believed to generate status. There are however some core theoretical assumptions that differ. To find proof of each theory this thesis tests a series of predictions based on arguments from each theory. If theory holds true, these predictions should be present in the empirical material. As this essay conducts a congruence test, which will be discussed in more detail in the method section, there is a need for predictions which allows the researcher to make concrete observations based on the theoretical core (Blatter & Blume, 2008:235).

When summarizing how previous scholars have conducted their research, I find that it is often more focus on finding proof of status seeking, rather than influence/security preferences (Varvov & Crandall, 2016:292; Oma & Petersson, 2019:108; Jakobsen et al, 2016:10-11 & 2018:262, Pedersen & Reykers, 2020:22). For instance, several status seeking researchers, even if belonging to different schools, argue that proof of theory can be found if:

- Military contribution is deliberately designed to be visible an effective in demonstration that one is a good and loyal ally.

- That success is defined by visibility with great power and or increased good will withing the alliance.

- The small state shares common goals with the great power

- The end goal is not so much the success of the military mission, but rather visibility with the great power.

Since these indications are valid in both theories, I instead believe there is a need to develop competing predictions closer to the theoretical core that clearly addresses the difference between status seeking for security and status seeking for influence.

The status for security scholars argues that status seeking is a result of concern with the great power commitment to its security provisions (Oma & Petersson, 2019:107; Thorhallson, 2018:70). States thereby contributes to the great power wars as it is justified to increase. national security, rather than making political gains, small states are willing to make costly and risky sacrifices as it provides the state with security in terms of great power shelter

(Thorhallsson, 2018:120, Wivel & Crandall, 2019:419). Based on this logic, if small states are status seeking for security the following statements should be found in the empirical material:

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15 - The small state expresses concern with great power commitment to provide credible

future security provisions.

- The decision to contribute militarily is based on a quest of national security rather than the success of the conducted mission in the war.

- The risk of the mission is justified by the benefits of increased national security. The competing status for influence camp instead argues that there is an overestimation of the negative dependency on the great power (Pedersen & Reykers, 2020:19). They argue that small states perceive great power led wars as an opportunity to make political gains (ibid). In a broader sense, states contribute not so much of fear, but rather as means of increasing their status position and credibility (Ibid; Jakobsen et al, 2016:3). The archived gains could be for instance political access or international political or military positions. The aims of

contributing can also correspond to other areas of interests than the mission itself. (Jakobsen et al, 2016:7; Graeger, 2015:87). States are willing to take risks as it is believed to be justified by the increased political influence (Pedersen & Reykers, 2020:22; Jakobsen et al, 2016:9). Based on the logic of the authors belonging to the status for influence arguments, the following statements should be found in the empirical material:

- Participations in military coalition is considered means to improve the status position and its credibility as an international partner and/or ally.

- Military contribution is considered means to gain political access and/or increased credibility in other political issues than the war itself.

- The risk of the mission is justified by the potential of political gains that can be achieved by contributing to the mission.

The next chapter will explain how these predictions guide the analysis of this thesis. It will introduce the logic of using a congruence analysis and the strength and weaknesses of how such a test meets the aims of this thesis. It will also present the arguments for choosing my cases and material.

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4. Methods & Research design

4.1 Congruence Analysis

Congruence analysis is a method for finding congruence between theory and the empiric reality. In practical terms, congruence analysis is a form of pattern matching as the research seeks for theoretical patterns in the empiric material. Basically, the more the patterns show congruence with the theoretical prepositions, the better is the explanatory power. There is both an inductive and a deductive element in such an analysis. Deductive because it requires the researcher to generate predictions based on theory, and determine what observations are likely to appear. Inductive, as it requires reflection on how well the explanatory power of theory is rooted in the empiric observations (Blatter & Blume, 2008:325). In the deductive phase the researcher deduces fundamental elements in accordance with theory which ultimately should lead to predictions or hypothesis that are empirically testable (Blatter & Blume, 2006:326, Wauters & Beach, 2018:284)

Congruence analysis is similar to process tracing methods but there is a fundamental difference in the understanding of the causal mechanism. The aim of process tracing is to unpack the causal mechanism into relevant parts, which together creates a detailed step-by-step system to detect causality between cause and outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2016:270). This creates a relative thickness to the causal mechanism which connects the variables (Wauters & Beach, 2018:296). When conducting congruence analysis, there is no evidence suggesting such chain, hence lack of evidence for a causal mechanism. So, neither can

congruence analysis definitely rule out nor confirm alternative theories. However, the strength of congruence is that it can establish the comparative strength of theories (Wauters & Beach, 2018:297).

A difference in this thesis compared to for instance Oma & Petersson (2019) and Pedersen & Reykers (2020), would be that I will test which theory has the best explanatory power in each of my cases. In the two mentioned research articles, they conduct process tracing based on similar scope conditions- that small states are dependent on greater ones, and the same outcome- that small states contribute to US-led coalitions. Then they trace the mechanisms which connects the independent and dependent variable. Oma & Petersson (2019) built a mechanism based on fear of abandonment-theory while Pedersen & Reykers (2020) built a mechanism based on status for bandwagoning for profit-theory. In this thesis I will instead apply predictions from both theories to determine which had the best explanatory power. By

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17 conducting congruence analysis, I will be able to asses’ multiple theories across cases and determine with some confidence what theory had the better explanatory power in each case. In theory testing process tracing methods, the dependent and independent variable are known and based on theory the researcher traces the mechanism that is making them correlate (Beach & Pedersen, 2013:14). Beach & Pedersen (2013:14) argues however that theory testing

process tracing will not enable a test for the relative explanatory power of competing mechanism, or at least such test would be both time and resource consuming due to the amount of analytical resources required. Wauters & Beach (2018:302) argues, that such tests are not suitable when assessing multiple cases or theories. This gives the congruence method an advantage. So even though, congruence analysis cannot establish the presence of a

mechanism, it allows the researchers asses multiple theories and cases and make statements for the chosen theories relative support and the possible presence of causal inference. The most suitable sort of congruence test for this thesis is arguably a theory testing

congruence analysis combined with a cross case comparative design, since the aim is to test the explanatory power of multiple theories is several cases. The first step for conducting such analysis is to establish the cause and the outcome and especially the causal theories which links them together (Beach & Pedersen, 2016:280). This was done in the theoretical chapter, where I identified two schools of status seeking which connects great power dependence with military contributions. The next step is to build a causally homogeneous population of cases. The chosen cases should have similar causal conditions and outcomes because if choosing cases where neither is present, it will tell us noting (Ibid:282). Beach & Pedersen (2016:283) argues that it is not a necessity to choose cases where other potential causes are not present. There are however scholars who questions whether it is possible to make within-case inference if there is no control for other causes. I choose however to include common alternative explanations to assess their explanatory power in relation to the status seeking theories.

When conducting the congruence analysis, I intend to employ a cluster test. This is defined by Beach & Pedersen (2016:287) as “a battery of non-overlapping propositions to assess the causal hypothesis “. If evidence is found for each of the propositions the small value of each proposition summed together makes a stronger case (Ibid). Taken individually, each part of a cluster is a weak confirming test, but together the test has a higher degree of explanatory power. However as, Wauters & Beach (2018:301) argues, the researcher must also consider that even though the theoretical pattern matches the empirical evidence, the proof is to some

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18 degree dependent on how much “weight” each evidence has. As Blatter & Blume (2008:328) similarly points out, that even though some would consider every matching proof of the prediction as equally important, it is reasonable to give more wight to the predictions which are closest to the conceptual core of the tested theories.

4.2 Case Selection

Even though congruence analysis typically is a method for drawing causal inference within single cases, I argued that because of the minimal understanding of the causal mechanism, it also enables for conducting tests, not only of multiple theories, but also multiple cases. Also, having only a single case would not reveal whether small states preferences for security or influence differs. I intend to test the theoretical propositions of each theory in three different states, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. My cases are typical cases, given that the causal conditions and outcome are similar - small states dependent on great powers (causal

condition) contributing to great power wars (Outcome). There is a comparative logic when choosing cases that are similar in terms of geographical setting, cultural expressions, similar governance- and political system, which increases the theoretical degree of explanatory power since it enables me, to some extent, exclude that such factors are affecting the causal

inference.

In traditional realist alliance theory, it is argued that small states tend to join coalitions when there is a rising threat, but if there is not, the military commitment is often restricted to limited force (Pedersen & Reykers 2020:18; Auserwald & Saideman2014:16). To contest this theory, the case selection is based on states who arguably do not perceive a rising threat but offered costly contributions anyways. To increase the explanatory power of the status theories, I will also address whether the small states perceived a direct rising threat in the section for

alternative theories.

There is a comparative aspect in the research design as I test my theoretical predictions across the cases. This helps me to strengthen some of the shortcomings of conducting a congruence analysis. Beach & Pedersen (2016:291) argues that a cross-case inference gives greater confidence to a hypothesis, since it can confirm or disconfirm theories across several cases in a population. In my thesis, both the status seeking theories and two alternative theories will be applied on a sample of small state cases. This will test my hypothesis - that the motivations for small states’ status seeking activities differ, even when the military means are similar. By having a comparative approach, the research can point out relevant similarities and

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19 differences in each case but could also downgrade theory if there is disconfirming evidence for the causal relationship across cases (Ibid).

All the Nordic countries are suitable based on the logic above except for Finland since it has not contributed military to the US-led coalition. Finland might also sort to statues seeking strategies, but not by contributing to a great power coalition in Afghanistan, which is the outcome variable in play. As Beach & Pedersen (2016:281) argue, there is no point of

selecting cases where the causal condition and outcome differs, since it would tell us nothing about the causal inference. One reason for why Finland’s actions differ from its neighbors, may depend on the presence of outside threat. The boarder to Russia puts Finland in a position where considerations of its diplomatic relations to Russia are arguable higher than for the other Nordic countries. The risks are simply higher for Finland to status seek with military means; hence, Finland would not be expected to status seek by contributing to a US-led coalition according to the theoretical claims of this thesis.

Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have all contributed militarily to US-led operations in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. There might be different motivations for different wars, since wars differ in time, context, and insensitivity. Ultimately Afghanistan is however the war where the Nordic states have invested the most resources, time, and capabilities and presumably a prioritized status seeking opportunity. The perhaps most notably difference in the cases would be that their membership in NATO and the EU differs. However, Edström & Westberg, 2020:195) suggests in their research that small state alliance affiliation has a low correlation to strategic priorities.

4..3 Analytical Framework

In the theory chapter I presented predictions to each theory. These are summarized in the table 1 below for better overview. When assessing the empiric material, these predictions will guide my analysis.

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20 Table 1. Predictions

Status for Influence-predictions

Participations in military coalition is considered means to improve the status position and its credibility as an international partner and/or ally. Military contribution is considered means to gain political access and/or increased credibility in other political issues than the war itself.

The risk of the mission is justified by the potential of political gains that can be achieved by contributing to the mission.

Status for security -predicitons

The small state expresses concern with great power commitment to provide credible future security provisions. The decision to contribute militarily is based on a quest of national security rather than the success of the

conducted mission in the war.

The risk of the mission is justified by the benefits of increased national security.

A set of material will be analyzed in where I expect to find confirming or disconfirming proof for the predictions above, as such I will do an assessment of whether there was congruence between the predictions and empirical material. There should be some clarification of what sort of proof could be found for each theoretical framework.

The status for influence-predictions indicates that the small state motivates its participation by arguments which highlights the importance of being seen and heard by others, especially by the great power. Also, decisions to contribute is perceived as a way of enhancing the visibility of the state. There should be an underlying awareness that the contribution might result in political or military positions. The state might work deliberately to link its military operations to access a specific political, or military, forums or move closer in its bilateral interactions with the great power.

The status for security-predictions indicates that the small state has expressed a discomfort with the development of the great power foreign policy. The shift in policy is believed to affect, in this case, the credibility of NATO. The state fears that national security might be threatened, as it no longer can trust that the great power still finds the small state important enough to protect. The military contribution to the coalition is considered a means to reconnect with the great power and show that the small state is still relevant to protect. The state might connect its military contribution closely to its national military strategy and make

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21 arguments that indicates that the national security of the state might be at harm if it chooses to be a bystander.

As mentioned, when defining the causal conditions and outcome, I followed Pedersen & Reykers (2020) & Oma & Petersson (2019) who argued that these are small states, dependent on the great power. There is also a scope condition that there is an absence of a direct outside threat.

There should be a discussion on what is expected to be found when assessing the empirics. States may to some extents have a two folded motivation when contributing. It can be both a quest of national security and increasing their political influence in the international sphere, so how should the results be understood?

In the inductive phase of the analysis, I must determine each predictions “weight” based on the analyzed material, and one obvious challenge might be when theory is overlapping. The cluster test allows me to evaluate the explanatory power quantitative, the more predictions the better. However, there is also a qualitative element since I must reflect on the weight of the proof which confirms theory. Ultimately, what determines good verification of theory would be the combination of strong evidence for each prediction with several predictions of theory matching the empirical material.

4.4 Alternative Explanations

In the literature overview I addressed some of the central alternative explanations to why small states contribute to great power-led wars. There were mainly two competing theories with the status theories. These should be addressed in the analysis as well.

Firstly, there is the traditional realist argument which states that small states bandwagon or balance to deter or at least increase the risks of direct threats (Walt, 1991:56; Labs,1993:506). Such threats in the context of Afghanistan, Schuster & Maier (2006) argues, are terrorism and/or Russia. The second argument is that the Nordic states have a tradition of “doing good” (Ingebritsen, 2002:20). The Nordic states often adopts a norm entrepreneur strategy to

establish norms of appropriate behavior, and ultimately alter others behavior in direction of similar norms (Björkdahl, 2013:325). Björkdahl (ibid) argues that such norms are rule of law, arbitration of disputes, social solidarity, and preference of dealing with root causes on

conflict, rather than symptoms.

To address these arguments the analysis will search for observable proof of these argument. If true, we should find that:

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22 1. Small states motivate military contributions as means for either decreasing the risk of

Russian aggression or terrorist threats at home.

2. Small states motivate military contributions as means to influence the end goal of the operation to be more prone to include norms of rule of law, social solidarity, or dealing with the root causes rather than the symptoms.

The assessed analytical value of the competing explanations will be presented in a section in the results chapter.

4.5 Material

The chosen material should especially reveal governmental opinions in their decision to contribute to Afghanistan. The material will consist of both primary and secondary sources such as governmental official strategies, decision papers, governmental evaluations, and public statements as well as media reporting, interviews and resources found in previous research. The material consists of a mix of English and Nordic languages, this is however not expected to affect the results.

All three states have released evaluation reports (Swedish SOU or Norwegian NOU) of their presence in Afghanistan which summarizes and evaluates the aims and motivations of their contribution in Afghanistan. These reports will be at center for the analysis. The Danish parliament appointed the mission to University of Copenhagen which resulted in an

independent evaluation of Denmark’s military engagement in the Afghanistan war which is comparable to the Norwegian and Swedish SOU/NOU. The Danish evaluation will be referred to in the text by name of the authors who conducted the evaluation. These three evaluations give comprehensive overview and background to how and why decisions were made to contribute to the Afghanistan war. Other sources as mentioned above, will be used to complement the prime material.

The advantages with the evaluation reports, is that the authors had an extensive access to central decision makers, and governmental archives and in some cases classified documents when conducting their reports. Even though the interpretation of the material in the reports are the based on the authors assessments, the reports also include parts of interviews and internal memos which I can assess without regarding the authors interpretations. As such, they give a good picture of the events and how decision makers and officials understood the situation that they were in.

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23 It should be noted that the Danish evaluation was criticized by several central politicians such as the former prime minister Fogh Rasmussen and the leader of the conservative party Möller, who both officially stated that they do not recognize the histography of the evaluation

(Dahllöf, 2019-02-26). It is not apparent what exactly they do not recognize. This could be problematic since it downgrades the evidence of the governmental opinions. On the other hand, the report is written by several reputable researchers and as with the other reports, my interest is mostly to assess the facts present in the report, not the researchers analysis. I have also collected material independently from public interviews, official reports, and

governmental decisions, which to some extent triangulates evidence that is possibly unreliable or biased, collected from the reports (Beach & Pedersen, 2013:128). Arguments or statements that recurs repeatedly or in official governmental statements will be prioritized in the analysis as they represent the governmental opinion better than individual opinion of for instance a single parliament member.

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5. Analysis & Results

This chapter will present the analysis of the cases. It will present the proof found of

congruence between the two theories and the empiric material in each case. Each case will start by an assessment of the evidence that supports status seeking for security-theory. Such evidence should suggest that the small state had concerns regarding US commitment to international security and the links being made between making a costly contribution and national security. It will be followed up with the evidence supporting status for influence- theory. Such evidence should suggest that the state motivated the contribution to enhance its status position and increase its access to political or military forums. The analysis will later address the explanatory power of the alternative explanations in relation to status seeking. In the last section the results are summarized and compared.

5.1 Denmark

5.1.1 Status for security

The Danish evaluation report concludes the Danish government’s decision to contribute was to strengthen, or at least maintaining, the Danish-American relationship. The aim of

contributing, according to the evaluation report, was not offensive, rather defensive since “Denmark should contribute to avoid losing status with the United States, compared to other allies” (Mariager & Wivel, 2019: 237). The empiric material suggests that there was some Danish concern with the US commitment to NATO at the time, but not an explicit fear that indicated concern of US commitment to its security provision. For instance, did the Social Democratic government criticize how the US conducts its international affairs. The minister of foreign affairs, Mogens Lykketoft, argued that the US had “withdrawn for the international legal order and international agreements” (Wivel, 2019: 409). At the time there was a belief from the government that the Danish contribution was a means to keep US on the

“multilateral track” (Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019:564, Mariager & Wivel,

2019::237). The Danish ambassador Ulrik Federspiel, reported to the government that several EU-countries feared that the events of 9/11 risked strengthening isolationist movements in the US. He argued that it must be “totally clear, that EU stands together with the US in the fight against terrorism” (Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt: 288).

The Social Democratic government was however not reelected in the Danish election and was succeeded by a center-right government in November 2001 which rather framed the Danish contribution as a moral act. The new government argued that there was an obligation to pay back the security debt for the US protection during the Cold War-era (Aagard Jensen &

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25 Linnet Schmidt: 564). The Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen argued for instance that the US had “made great sacrifices in the fight for freedom and peace” (quoted in Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019:502). The party leader in the co-governing conservative party similarly argued that “we must remember what they did for us” (quoted in Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019:502)

From the assessed material no proof suggests that there were strong beliefs that Denmark could impact the success of the war, neither is there arguments indicating that the Danish contribution would increase national security. In none of the official Danish decision documents during this period, were there mentions of Afghanistan being a direct threat towards Danish national security (Wivel, 2019: 479). Danish politicians had limited focus on strengthening democratic ideals or hindering the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan, and in the Danish evaluation report it is stated that Danish threat assessment never was a central driver for the Danish participation (Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019: 564). Instead, the bilateral relations to the US were the central driver for Denmark’s decision to contribute and military action was first and foremost based on assisting the American strategy (Ibid)

The official argument for contributing to the war initially was based on three objectives: showing solidarity with the US, a wish to help humanitarian in Afghanistan and to regard the security of the international community (Wivel, 2019:426-427). Especially the first of these objectives had strong impact on Danish decision making. For instance, the center-right government argued that deployment special forces to the Afghanistan war was a clear signal of solidarity, as the US had specifically requested such a contribution (Ibid)

As this chapter will show, the most central motivation for Denmark was to improve relations to the US. Especially important was it to not be categorized a non-contributor or doing minimal effort as such a reputation was believed to harm the current strong Danish-American relationship (Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019:565-566). In the later assessment of Norway, it will show that Norway similarly based their decision on contributing on a fear of hurting their American relationship, however, Norway made a clear link between the

relationship to the US and Norwegian national security. In Danish decision making, no such explicit link was present in the material.

Concludingly, even though Denmark was eager to boost its relationship with the US, there is not much indicating that action was motivated by either concern of US security commitments or national security motives. The Social Democratic government did express some concern of

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26 how the US conducted its international affairs. As a new government was elected such

criticism silenced and was replaced by arguments suggesting that Denmark had a chance to show appreciation for American historical sacrifices.

5.1.2 Status for influence

There was almost a dialectic view in Danish decision on contributing to the Afghanistan war. Military contribution would show a clear political signal of loyalty to the US, and it was even argued that a non-contribution would be regarded as a betrayal (Mariager & Wivel, 2019:235-237). There was not much debate internally on whether Denmark should contribute rather how and what contribution was expected from the US. The Danish process was highly driven by monitoring American expectations and needs, but also intense monitoring how other states positioned themselves (Mariager & Wivel, 2019 :241-242). In the Danish cost

benefit-analysis not much attention was given to the mission itself. The Defence Minister argued that Denmark was not supposed to win the war in Afghanistan, rather show Danish presence and establish security in some of the areas (Lauritzen,2006-09-26)

The empiric material offered several examples of how Denmark perceived the Afghanistan war to be a chance to enhance its status with the US and in the international community. The Danish ambassador in Washington, for instance, argued that the contribution to Afghanistan will show “who are real friends or only friends” (quoted in Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019:588). Another example is found in the prime minister Fogh Rasmussen speech to the soon to be deployed special forces: “you should now, that your deployment has meaning for the Danish reputation” (quoted in Aagard Jensen & Linnet Schmidt, 2019558). Similarly, Fogh Rasmussen argued before being elected prime minister, that “participation in

international military operations gave Denmark a stronger position in the international scene that its size warranted” (quoted in Jakobsen et al, 2018:265).

Danish decision makers made a clear connection between gaining recognitions and making political gains. It was important to be perceived as a credible and reliable international actor as this would give you a stronger voice and increased access. The importance of keeping an especially close bound to the US was mentioned in a report from the foreign ministry where it was argued that as the US will be a crucial actor for the development in the World, and that Denmark should work actively to keep good access to American decisionmakers (Ministry of Foreign affairs, 2006:9)

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27 The strategy of enhancing Danish status was also indicated in an interview with Prime

minister Fogh Rasmussen who reflects on the Danish NATO-participation and argues that: “Denmark is what I would call an elite allied who when called upon, always can be counted on” (Ritzau, 2014-09-03). A senior official similarly argued for the importance of status: “Nations listen to the allies that deliver – to the allies with standing. […] and remember, a standing and reputation provides you with access” (quoted in Jakobsen et al, 2018:226) The assessed material suggests that contributions was believed to grant political influence and access in important political forums. This strategy seemed to give the wanted effect as the Danish evaluation report argues that most of the political and military elites in Denmark today believes that military activism gave Denmark enhanced access internationally and especially to American representatives (Mariager & Wivel, 2019:141). In a Danish news article, it is implied that Danish military commitment strengthen the relations to NATO as two Danish initiatives was about to be implemented into NATO in 2014. Fogh Rasmussen argued in the article that this was the result of the Danish military commitments in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya (Ritzau, 2014-09-03)

As this analysis have shown, there were several arguments central in the Danish decision to contribute to the coalition in Afghanistan. The most emphasized was the importance of showing solidarity with the US and paying back a historical security debt. The solidarity was however, not only driven by good faith, but also a means for strengthening the bounds with the US which gained influence and access in international politics. It was important to create the perception that Denmark supports the US, and the US supports Denmark (Wivel,

2019:480). When showing willingness to contribute, it was believed that Denmark would be listened to by others but also gain political access in central decision-making forums. The risks of the mission were mainly justified by the political gains and status that would be a result of the Danish efforts in Afghanistan.

There was not much evidence that Danish participation was motivated by a central concern of great power deflection, but there were some indications that the Social Democrats, who governed until November 2001, had some concerns about the American commitment to “multilateralism”, but such arguments were not central in the succeeding center right

government. There was neither an explicit strong concern with the US commitment to its role as a security provider nor a strong link made between Danish contributions and national security. It can be concluded that Danish military commitment was neither strongly driven by

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28 a fear of US commitment nor concerns of national security, but highly driven by a pursuit of making status gains.

5.2 Sweden

5.2.1 Status for security

In the assessed material there is no greater indication of Swedish concerns about US commitments to European security. However, in the Swedish Foreign and Defense-policy committee it was noted that there has been friction between the US and Europe, and that the US have a central role for European security (2004/05: UFöU2:44). Also, the report states that the Afghanistan and Iraq war has put pressure in the European countries to pursuit a more comprehensive security policy which could improve the transatlantic relations, which would be in the interest of both parties. (Ibid:45-46). There is however little proof that Swedish decision making was guided by a concern with US security commitment. Swedish military contribution was however to some extent a quest of national security. According to the Swedish evaluation report, there are three main reasons for the Swedish contribution to Afghanistan. It was to strengthen the security situation in Afghanistan, it was to express solidarity with the US, and it was a political signal to express Swedish support of the collective security (SOU, 2017:16 :65).

The Swedish overarching international strategy at the time was to be an active international actor who promotes peace and security in the international community and the contributions in Afghanistan was in line with this strategy (SOU, 2017:16:138) This strategy had however a national security aspect to it. As Wikman (2021:172) argues, there was increasing support in Sweden for the idea that Sweden was best defended by engaging in international conflict, since it prevents a destabilization in the international security, and threats spreading to

Sweden. Such reasoning can be found in the defence bill from 2004 (Prop 2004/05:5:29). The bill also argues that: “by strengthening our ability to participate in international work and crisis management efforts the international peace and security is strengthened, for Sweden, for the EU and for the world.” (Prop2004/05:5:23).”

The Swedish Foreign Policy and Defence Committee argued similarly that by being an international actor, the national security is enhanced: “The committee wants to stress that international cooperation and integration enhances security” (2004/05: UFöU2:12)

Wikman (2021:192) argues that there was to some extent a framing of Afghanistan as “the first line of defense” as politicians at the time promoted enhanced security by Swedish

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29 internationalism. Wikman exemplifies with an interview where a military advisor argues: “in a way, we defend Sweden indirectly by being in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Bosnia” (cited from Wikman,2021:192).

There is however no clear link being made in any of the assessed material that the Swedish contribution explicitly was motivated in a quest to enhance Swedish national security directly, such as increasing the possibilities of support in case of a crisis or war. The absence of such arguments can perhaps be explained by the fact that at this time, the Swedish government assessed that “a military attack from another state directly against Sweden is unlikely” (UFÖU2, 2004/05:10).

The empirics did not suggest a central concern of US security commitments. Even though the material indicated to some extent that the contribution to Afghanistan was framed as an issue of national security, these arguments were often more explicitly linked to enhancing

international security than the security of Sweden. National security was not a central

argument in Swedish decision making when motivating the contributions in Afghanistan and is mostly referred to in a broader context where it justifies Swedish internationalism at whole. In the official decisions to contribute to Afghanistan there were no arguments made that indicated that Swedish contributions enhances Swedish security, rather the aim is enhancing the security in Afghanistan (Prop. 2003/04:71:12; Prop.2004/05:5:21) In the official Swedish evaluation report there is neither any indications that there was a central objective to enhance Swedish national security (SOU, 2017:16).

5.2.2 Status for influence

Pedersen (2019:50) argues that Sweden had a strong willingness to support NATO in Afghanistan, driven largely by a sense of alliance solidarity and willingness to support key allies. In the assessed material I find that this willingness was motivated by a Swedish will to obtain status. The Swedish evaluation report (SOU, 2017:16:62) states that the Swedish aims in Afghanistan varied over time, but some of these were recurrent and are summarized in the report as: decreased poverty, security and stability, social and economic development,

democracy, improve the status of women and to increase the credibility of Sweden as an actor in international missions. The report states that Sweden only fully achieved the aim of

increasing Swedish credibility and that especially the Swedish participation in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and the lead responsibility of the PRT-mission (Provincial Reconstruction Team) increased the cooperation between Sweden and NATO (SOU2017:16:26).

Small States Seeking Status in Afghanistan : A comparative cross case congruence test of the Nordic states&apos; status motivations in the Afghnaistan war