1
The Moderation of the Ennahda Movement
A case study of moderation within an Islamic political party
Author: Karl Fahlvik Human Rights Bachelor Program Bachelor Thesis, 12 credits Spring Semester 2021 Supervisor: Jon Wittrock
2 Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to try to understand the moderation process of the Tunisian Islamic political party Ennahda between the years of 2011-2016. This case is studied within the context of the democratisation process that took place in Tunisia, in the five years after the Arab spring and the idea that political Islam might provide a path to democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. The theoretical framework chosen for understanding this process was in form of a theory about under which circumstances religious political parties politically moderate
.
The method used was a qualitative content analysis. The analysis was conducted by dividing the chapters into thematic topics that emerged out of the material with the framework then being applied to those themes. The research found that the theory provided theoretical understanding for why the Ennahda Movement became more moderate, especially when looking at factors regarding political entrepreneurship. However, other factors such as a dedication to democratic values, non-violence, and a willingness to change throughout its history, also proved important in the case of moderation within the Ennahda Movement.Keywords: Political Islam, Arab Spring, Tunisia, Ennahda, Democracy, Moderation. Word count: 13 127
3 Table of Contents
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1 Aim of Research and Research Question ... 4
1.2 Relevance to Human Rights ... 5
1.3 Delimitations ... 6
2. Historical background and Previous Research ... 6
3. Theory ... 10 3.1 Analytical framework ... 10 3.1.1 Political Entrepreneurship ... 12 3.1.2 Institutions ... 12 3.1.3 Ideology ... 13 3.1.4 Party Constituents ... 14
3.2 Critique of the Theory ... 14
3.3 Operationalization of theory ... 15 4. Methodological Approach ... 16 4.1 Research Design ... 16 4.2 Research Method ... 17 4.2 Positioning Myself ... 19 5. Material ... 19 5.1 Presentation of Material ... 20 6. Analysis ... 20
6.1 The Re-emergence of Ennahda ... 21
6.2 Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood ... 23
6.3 The Rise of Salafist-jihadism ... 25
6.4 The Bardo Crisis and the Constitutional Drafting Process ... 27
6.5 The 2016 National Congress ... 31
7. Conclusion ... 32
4
1. Introduction
After the Arab Spring scholar such as Oliver Roy and Eugene Rogen argued about a possible revival of political Islam and the possibility of it being democratic (Roy, 2012; 12-13) (Rogen, 2013; 338-341). Tunisia, where the revolution started, would soon be the proving grounds for this theory. An Islamic religious political party called Ennahda quickly emerged as the leading party and formed a democratic coalition government with secular parties. The party was initially seen with scepticism, and many feared it would lead the country back to its authoritarian past. The fear was not unreasonable, other political organisations under the same ideological banner had been Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the religious regime in Iran. Ennahda has since then gone through a moderation process and during its national convention in 2016 the party went further in separating its religious activities with its political. The party leader Rachid Ghannouchi wrote in the magazine Foreign Affairs that:
“Ennahda has moved beyond its origins as an Islamist party and has fully embraced a new identity as a party of Muslim democrats. … is no longer both a political party and a social movement. It has ended all of its cultural and religious activities and now focuses only on politics.” (Ghannouchi, Foreign Affairs 2016).
During the years between 2011 and 2016 Ennahda has had to reinvent itself, form coalitions with secular actors and sacrifice parts of its own religious agenda to protect the democratic transition. This thesis will try to understand Ennahda’s moderation process through the political events and circumstances Tunisia experienced in the years after the revolution. By conducting this research, this thesis hopes to further the understanding of how political Islam was transformed in Tunisia which could provide a path for a new way to understand political Islam and even democracy in the Middle East and North Africa.
1.1 Aim of Research and Research Question
The aim of this research is to understand how the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia changed over the years from 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab spring and the Jasmine Revolution, to 2016, where the party declared themselves Muslim democrats and they abandoned the terminology and ideology of political Islam. Understanding this process is important in gaining knowledge on how the ideology of political Islam might change within a democratic system and the prerequisites for such a change. As political Islam is sometimes described as a
5 possible path for achieving democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, by scholars such as Oliver Roy and Asef Bayat (Cavatorta, Torelli, 2021; 1-2) therefore understanding the case of Ennahda means gaining knowledge of one possible path of democratization in the MENA region and understanding what such as process might require. Tunisia is currently the only majority Muslim country in the MENA region who are a considered a democracy (Freedom House, 2021) and the Ennahda Movement has during this process achieved a self-proclaimed moderation. Understanding the circumstances of Ennahda’s moderation can therefore provide a path for understanding both how the ideology of political Islam is affected in a democratic system but also understand democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. This thesis will also test Elman and Warner's analytical framework for understanding when religious political parties moderate, in a democratic system, by applying the case of Ennahda to it. Furthermore, it should be clarified that this thesis is not looking to answer questions on whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy or liberal values. Instead, it is merely looking at the circumstances that affected the political evolution of the Ennahda Movement between the years of 2011 and 2016 in a hope to understand how the ideology of political Islam can be affected within a democratic system. The research question is the following:
- How can Ennahda’s moderation process, between the years 2011 and 2016, be explained theoretically?
1.2 Relevance to Human Rights
This research field is deemed relevant to human rights and human rights studies as it examines democracy and religious actors within the creation of a democratic system.
Understanding Ennahda’s role in the Tunisian democracy and how that process affected them but also how they tried to implement their view of what an Islamic democracy entails means gaining a new perspective of the phrase “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”, that is written in the UN declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, pp.art. 21.3). The evolution of the democracy in Tunisia has therefore the potential to lead to a re-understanding of democracy and subsequently human rights both in a
philosophical, legal, and political manner. This possible newfound perspective might then help with the implementation of democracy and human rights throughout the MENA region.
The thesis also, indirectly, references the development of human rights in Tunisia. The country underwent a transformation in the development of political rights, as set forth in the ICCPR (The United Nations General Assembly), between 2011-2016. Understanding
6 Ennahda, during this period, is therefore also a way to understand the development of such rights.
1.3 Delimitations
This thesis will limit itself to the case study of the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia and try to explain their moderation process, during the democratic transitions of Tunisia, between the years 2011 and 2016. This provides a structure with clear timeframe limitations as it involves a limited period of time. The case of the Ennahda Movement also provides clear limitations in the conducted research, as it is only active in Tunisia which results in the regional scope being limited to a single country and one political party’s work within said country. The analytical framework also creates clear theoretical limitations for understanding the party.
2. Historical background and Previous Research
After the Arab Spring, scholars specialized in the Middle East, started talking about the revival of political Islam and how that ideology could provide a path to democracy. When the Arab spring started and authoritarian regimes were overthrown all over North Africa and the Middle East, political Islam was described as a way to achieve democracy. Scholars like Olivier Roy wrote that the movement might not be liberal or secular, but it seems like they might be democrats (Roy, 2012; 12-13). Other scholars, such as Eugene Rogan, pointed to the fact that when these parties rose to power, they often formed broad based governments with secular liberal parties (Rogen, 2014; 338-341). Often the people in Egypt and Tunisia voted for these parties not because of their Islamic connection, but because of their political policies, such as anti-corruption, social services, and education (ibid). They argued that this perhaps was one of the best chances to achieve democracy in the MENA region. The political Islam movement arose when people lost faith in secular ideologies all over the Middle East (Esposito, 2000; 50). The failure to provide internal stability and social services to the
population became a catalyst for Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolutionary Movement (ibid). Other Islamic movements such as Hamas and
Hezbollah were not only a reaction to failed political policy but also a response to the Israeli occupation in Palestine and Lebanon and secular Arabs states' failure to handle Israel (ibid). Esposito defines political Islam in his article Political Islam and the West as “Islamic symbols, rhetoric, actors, and organizations have become sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing political and social activism.” Governments tries to appeal to the
7 masses and increase their legitimacy by politicizing Islam (ibid). Zubaida provides a
definition of political Islam as ideas and programs that use Islam to create social and political transformation (Zubaida, 2000; 63). Zubaida adds that in the more modern aspects of the ideology, they are more likely to understand and embrace democratic ideologies as they often see it as a tool to achieve their political goals (ibid).
Tunisia became independent in 1956 from France and Ennahda was formally formed in 1979 as a reaction to Bourguiba the then president of Tunisia’s, dismantling of religious institutions (Wolf 2017, ch.2, 13). During the 50s and 60s Bourguiba started closing religious schools and tried to weaken the popular religious Sufi movement by discrediting their leaders (ibid; ch.2, 2-4). In a controversial move Bourguiba also tried to dismantle Zaytouna University, one of the world's oldest Islamic universities and one reason for why Islam always has been quite progressive in Tunisia (Stepan, 2018; 47). Stepan’s example of this is the fact that Tunisia abolished slavery in 1846, two years before France (ibid). Bourguiba also went as far as trying to stop the fast during the holy month of Ramadan, to increase productivity, due to a
struggling economy (Wolf, 2017; ch.2, 4). His plea was framed as “jihad against
underdevelopment” in a hope to get support from the religious elite, as jihad is a reason for being exempted from doing the fast. When the religious elite publicly disagreed, they were fired from their religious posts (ibid).
Ennahda, or al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyy as it was called, was formed in secrecy by Rachid Ghannouchi, Hmida Ennaifer, and Abdelfattah Mourou and was initially a religious
organisation who subscribed to the notion of the implementation of Sharia law throughout the whole civil state (Cavatorta, Merone, 2013; 860). They saw issues in society as a result of unbelief and that belief would resolve political issues and conflicts (ibid). The organisation was also formed as a reaction to Bourguiba’s anti-religious policies (Wolf, 2017; ch.2, 1). The three founders started going around Tunis and Tunisia to talk about Islamic consciousness and as the movement grew, they started to adopt more of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood recruitment structure, which created a foundation for the organisation to expand quick.
Recruitment was built around formal members who taught informal members about Islam and morality (ibid; ch.2, 9). The informal members did not know they were a part of a wider organisation and once they were deemed morally intact, they were offered to join the
organisation. People who reached this stage paid a membership fee and soon the organisation was economically self-sufficient (ibid; ch.2, 10). During the 70s the organisation started to
8 split into two different factions (ibid; ch.2, 17-18). One side, that eventually became the dominant, wanted to get closer to the Muslim Brotherhood, while the other side strived to create a Tunisian Islam. The revolution in Iran 1979 influenced Ghannouchi which led to the creation of the political party called the Islamic Tendency Movement, who created a political platform built on democratic elements (ibid; ch.2, 19). In 1987 Ben Ali rose to power and criticized Bourguiba’s policies for repressing political and religious organisations. He gave organisations such as Ennahda, more political influence and scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections (ibid; ch.3, 15). It was during this time Ennahda adopted the name of Ennahda, meaning renaissance in English (Yildirim, 2017; 197). They saw the chance of becoming accepted as a legal political party as higher if they removed religious references in their name (ibid). Ennahda backed politicians got 14.5% of the seats in parliament but after the election Ben Ali refused to allow them to form a party (Wolf, 2017; ch.3 15-16) and in 1991 he cracked down on the political party accusing them of plotting against him after people with ties to Ennahda had burned down offices belonging to Ben Ali's party (ibid; ch.3 17-19). Members were forced to flee the country and those who failed became imprisoned (ibid).
After the crackdown, Ennahda disappeared from the public eye. Parts of the organisation became imprisoned, and parts were exiled in Europe (Wolf, 2017; ch.4, 1). The ones who were imprisoned were subjected to torture and were put in solitary confinement (ibid; ch.4, 2-3). The members who were not imprisoned, but not in exile, were often blacklisted from employment and educational opportunities. Some were forced to register at the police several times a day and others faced police harassment, involving sexual abuse, rape, and torture (Marks, 2017; 34). The party members who managed to flee ended up as refugees in Europe and efforts to set up a fully functioning organisation abroad proved overwhelming as money started to run out and the challenge to organize over different countries proved too difficult (ibid; ch.4, 8-9). Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the organisation, ended up in London and took public political stances against the regime, to increase his support in Tunisia (ibid; ch.4, 13). Anne Wolf describes Ghannouchi as a political strategist who often takes stances or supports views that will further his own political agenda but might be considered
controversial (ibid; ch.4, 13-16). He supported Saddam Hussein in the early 90s but would eventually change his views after criticism from within the movement (ibid). He also supported FIS, an Islamic organisation in Algeria who weren't afraid to use violence.
9 civil war broke out (ibid). This forced Ghannouchi to see the suffering that could arise from using force and he completely embraced the non-violence ideology (ibid).
During this he also started to develop and redefine his political views. He saw political Islam going through a renaissance and that the ideology should focus on freedom, dignity, power sharing and investment in socio-economic growth (Wolf, 2017; ch.4, 15-16). He also suggested that the problem with the western democracy was its lack of soul and spiritually (ibid). This would not be a problem in an Islamic democracy as Allah would be present and Sharia law could be implemented by institutions who are elected by the people (Tamimi, 170-171). Cavatorta and Torelli writes that “By the early 2000s the Ennahda leadership argued openly that the true Islamic state is one where democracy triumphs because only democracy can deliver justice and justice is the ultimate goal of Islam” (Cavatorta, Torelli 2021; 9). Ennahda’s weakened and more moderate state would lead to Ben Ali removing some of the repressive policing against Ennahda’s members (Wolf, 2017; ch.5, 2-3). During the first decade of the new millennia the Salafi-movement started to grow, who believed in an
extremist interpretation of Islam (ibid; ch.5, 15-16). They started to challenge the regime both politically and by using violence which resulted in Ben Ali trying to negotiate with the
Ennahda as they were perceived as the more moderate Islamic alternative. The party also instigated discussions with secular pro-democratic actors in the early 2000s to combat Ben Ali’s repressive stance and reach common grounds for democracy (ibid). These meetings would create the framework for the future Troika coalition which governed between 2011 and 2014 (Stepan, 2018; 50).
The easing of repression and Ennahda’s cooperation with secular actors put them in a strong position for the parliamentary elections that were held after the fall of the Ben Ali regime (Stepan, 2018; 50)(Wolf, 2018; ch.7 2). The regime fell after Tarek al-Tayeb Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest of police harassment which would trigger the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia and the Arab spring throughout the Arab world. The fall of the Ben Ali regime came as a surprise to Ennahda’s leadership, and the party quickly started to organise (Marks, 2017; 34). The party still had a wide range of networks and support spread out through Tunisia and the organisation's long fight against the regime granted them legitimacy (Wolf, 2018; ch.7 2-3). This made it possible for them to quickly rebuild their network and gain public support. They became by far the biggest political party in the elections of October 2011 and with the support of two secular parties, formed a coalition government that would
10 be called the Troika coalition (Stepan, 2018; 54-55). During upcoming 5 years the party went through tumultuous political times both because events that transpired in Tunisia, such as the rise of Salafi-jihadism, but also events such as the coup in Egypt that overthrew the
democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that had been influential during Ennahda’s history (Stepen, 2018; 58). These years were, which are going to be analysed in chapter 6, would lead to the party embracing new ideas. In 2016 the party held it 10th National congress since 1979 and embraced a new terminology by defining themselves as Muslim Democrats (Marks, 2017; 53).
3. Theory
This chapter will present the analytical framework used to try and understand Ennahda’s moderation process. The theory provides a framework for understanding under which circumstances religious parties moderate within a democratic system and was published in 2008 by Miriam Elman and Carolyn Warner. The theory will later undergo operationalised and then be applied to the case of Ennahda.
3.1 Analytical framework
Miriam Elman and Carolyn Warner analyses, in their academic article from 2008, the effects of democracy on religious political parties. To do this, they provide an analytical framework and try to understand under which circumstances democracy can act as a force of moderation. They ask the question when democracy can tame radicals and apply the framework, they have created by doing cross-regionally comparisons, with a specific focus on Israel, India,
Indonesia, and Italy. By choosing these cases they also cover the four world’s most known religions. They argue that comparing different political parties from different religion in different regions, made them build a framework applicable to more cases going forward. Miriam Elman and Carolyn Warner also wrote that they decided against picking the MENA region as one of the cases as many democratization processes in the region have failed and therefore provided misleading empirical data (Elman, Warner 2008; 1-3). They explain their choice mentioning cases such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood and use these cases to bring up different sides of the argumentation on whether or not democracy tames radicals. On one hand, some scholars argued that these are examples where political Islamic parties contest in parliamentary elections thus abiding by a democratic framework (ibid). On the other hand, other scholars argue that these instead are examples of when Islamic
11 parties have risen to power through democracy but to, once in power, try to subvert it.
Another criticism of Islamic movement brough up in the article is the fact that they try to implement Sharia law and therefore the ideology of Islamism is contrary to the liberal value that democracy is. Warner and Elman also reference doubters that point out that religious parties cannot be trusted as they often are divided between a moderate and a radical faction. The argument is that this split results in religious parties not being able to follow through on the promised political agenda (ibid). According to Elman and Warner, Hamas is often used as an example to criticize the political Islam movement. They refused to cooperate with the secular party Fatha on the Westbank in Palestine and were ready to use violence against Israel and the Fatha section of domestic Palestinian affairs (ibid). Similar can be said about
Hezbollah, as they are a singular political organisation that wages war against Israel (ibid). Elman and Warner’s criticizes the either-or approach, with one side arguing that democracy has a moderating effect and one side arguing the opposite. The goal of their academic article is instead to provide an analytical framework for under which circumstances democracy can tame radical religious parties, not to answer the question whether or not it does (ibid; 4-5). Their framework of understanding religious political parties involves the themes of political entrepreneurship, institutions, ideology, and party constituents (ibid; 3). This theory is relevant for this case study of the Ennahda Movement as it came a few years before the Arab Spring and therefore doesn’t apply this framework to any democratisation process in a Middle Eastern or North African country that is predominantly Muslim. To further test this theory, it needs to be applied in a new region and new cultural setting. It also provides a clear and accessible framework for understanding why the Ennahda Movement has become more moderate over the past 10 years. As Tunisia now is 10 years into their democratization process which has partly been driven by Ennahda, it seems fitting to revisit this theory and test it on a new case, in a new region, which would lead to a further understanding of Ennahda’s moderation process. Another possible theory that could have been applied is the Inclusion Moderation theory. The builds on the case that inclusion in a democratic process can result in political groups becoming more moderate as they integrate with other actors within the system (Cavatorta, Merone 2013; 862-865). That theory fundamentally asks the question if democracy causes moderation. It is therefore not deemed relevant for this thesis. The reasoning behind this is the fact that Ennahda underwent moderation both before they became a part of the democratic process and during. Therefore, it is deemed more relevant, in this case, to understand the circumstances of moderation instead of whether or not democracy moderate. As this thesis asks the questions why and when, instead of if and tries to explain
12 that theoretically Elman and Warner’s theory provides a better framework for doing that. Moderation, in this case, will be defined as “an avoidance of extremes in one's actions, beliefs, or habits” (Merriam-Webster). In this case wanting to implement religious ideals in legislation will be perceived as extreme and moving away from that will be seen as “an avoidance of extremes in one's actions”
3.1.1 Political Entrepreneurship
Political entrepreneurship references, according to Elman and Warner, the fact that religious parties often emerge when political entrepreneurs exploit tumultuous political situations (Elman Warner, 2008; 6-7). Religious organisations often engage in offering social services who compete with state services (ibid). This generates goodwill and support from the population, which is something the political entrepreneurs can use when the political
opportunity presents itself. Once in power they usually strategize similarly to secular parties to maintain in power. They form alliances, foster and build support from the civil society and they use government resources to protect certain important political groups to bolster their support (ibid). Religious parties are often a result of a social movement, often fuelled by a large group of underprivileged voters, therefore religious parties often try to invest in social services to win broad public support. However, since many religious parties and organisations provide their own social services, they are often forced to compromise, once in power, as their own services compete with the governments, often more limited, social services. The result is that they compromise on other core issues to maintain their own social services to protect the political advantage that gives them (ibid). Elman and Warner list political parties such as the AK Party in Turkey, Hezbollah, Hamas and Shas in Israel that can be applied to this theory, but they also state that these parties are also very different (ibid).
3.1.2 Institutions
Institutions reference how institutions can make an organisation that does not strongly aspire to democracy to do so (Elman, Warner 2008; 7-8). Some political organisations, according to Elman and Warner, use democracy as a tool to reach and fulfil political ambitions, however once a position of power is reached the organisation can start to dismantle democratic institutions to maintain in power (ibid). According to Elman and Warner, the longer a
democratic institution is in place the less extreme the mainstream political views will become and the harder it will weaken said institutions. Depending on how these institutions are set up
13 can therefore affect how well they can withstand pressure and ensure democratic survival (ibid). The result is that strong democratic cultural norms and institutions can have a
moderating influence on society as it forces extreme groups to play by the rules if they want to participate within the political realm. Extremism can emerge in established democracies, but it usually occurs when that group is suddenly excluded from power or when activists of powerful religious parties are suddenly put in minority positions (ibid). Government
coalitions and electoral systems may also affect the trajectories of religious parties. Proportional representation systems with a low threshold can be a vital force in pushing religious parties into moderation. The reason behind this is that they are not likely to reach a majority by themselves and must moderate their views if they want to participate in
government coalitions (ibid). Proportional representation might, however, also give extremist parties a pathway to political representation (ibid). Small religious parties may also gain a lot of power in the case of a weak minority government. Their efforts might be a vital part in ensuring stability, but they can also bring the whole government down (ibid). What it means is that as an important part in giving the elected government a majority they might influence the political process more than their actual electoral support. In a multiparty system religious parties can therefore appeal to a niche electoral base and trade support for political reforms unimportant for the base in return for support regarding legislation that matter to the party and its base (ibid). Therefore, depending on the institutional framework set up around and the situation they face, religious parties can therefore evolve very differently (ibid).
3.1.3 Ideology
Ideology references the difference between secular and religious parties and the fact that religious parties build their political platform and opinions around religion and theology instead of political ideologies (Elman, Warner 2008; 8-9). Elman and Warner write that religious parties do sometimes go outside their political realm and adopt policies that pander to the political masses. For political parties to become highly successful they do have to adopt a wider political program to get more voters and to enter government coalitions (ibid). This means that religious parties are subject to the same type of political pressures that all political parties experience. The result is religious parties often ending up sharing power when they can't reach their own majority, often with secular parties or parties that belong to other religions (ibid). Of course, how likely it is that a religious political party is interested in forming coalitions depends on their political platform which also can influence the party in a moderate or extremist direction (ibid). Elman and Warner use Vali Nasr idea about the
14 difference between Muslim democrats and Islamists. Muslim democrats are seen as more pragmatic and willing to participate in coalition governments while Islamists are more
interested in disregarding democracy and only see it as a tool to implement their own political agenda. Elman and Warner argue that such distinction enables scholars to see the difference between moderates and extremists. Finally, they point out that religious parties may be extremists along certain political questions and moderates concerning other policies. To then analyse a religious political party's platform requires taking their stance on multiple political issues into account (ibid).
3.1.4 Party Constituents
Finally, Elman and Warner discuss the role constituents play in forming these parties (Elman, Warner 2008; 9). Voters who pull the lever for religious parties are usually believers
themselves, however, this is not the exclusive reason for voting the way they do. Therefore, an analysis of religious parties must consider that religion is not the primary reason when voters decide who they are voting for (ibid). This means that there is necessarily no correlation between how religious a country is and who they vote for. In some of the more established democracies the voters are relatively religious but vote for secular parties (ibid). Some examples of this are the Congress Party in India, La République En Marche! in France and the Democratic Party in Italy. Therefore, religious parties cannot solely depend on the religious parts of the population to maintain political influence (ibid). They are just as dependent on political entrepreneurship and the effectiveness of the other political
organisations. Religious parties also often depend on society-based organisations (ibid). The support from these organisations is not automatic even if they claim to support the same religions ideals. These organisations can be vital in ensuring grassroots support, useful endorsements, and campaign resources (ibid). These must be attracted by religious parties by offering support for policies or loyalty to religious leaders, earned either by adoring masses or threats. As religious parties get support from both religious and secular voters, an analysis of such parties must consider that they are not exclusively religious or secular (ibid).
3.2 Critique of the Theory
This theory does offer a structured analytical framework to understand religious parties and how democracy can act as a force for moderation. However, the theory does not make it clear
15 why certain organisations decide to become moderate or refuse to participate within
governmental institutions such as elections and parliaments. It is mostly centred around the idea that the organisation is being affected by society and not as a participant in society that can influence it back. However, in this case that would require a research question that looked into how Ennahda formed the democratic process in Tunisia. As this research instead looks at if and how democracy played a role in Ennahda’s political moderation, that specific criticism is not perceived as relevant, although it highlights potential refinement and development of the theory.
Another criticism of this theory is its current relevance. During the course of the past decade many democratic nations have seen a rise of political parties with an authoritarian nature (Berberoglu, 2020; 15-25). Such parties are often right wing and sometimes religious. This upswing of authoritarian values within established democracies certainly raises questions regarding Elman and Warner’s framework. This criticism is however not relevant for this thesis. First of all, this analytical framework is set up to explain under which circumstances democracy can act as a force for moderation, it does not provide an explanation for why political parties become more radical in a democratic system. What this means is that it does not ask whether or not democracy is a force of moderation but rather under which
circumstances democracy can moderate religious political parties. To fully test the validity of this theory it then needs to be applied to these cases, mentioned above, to see if they have gone through the circumstances of moderation but still became more radical. As this thesis looks at the Ennahda Movement and that organisation's self-proclaimed moderation within the democratic system this theory is still highly relevant. Since this is a case of moderation with a democratic system this theory will be just as tested as in any other case. The ideological shift that some nations, cultures and religions are currently going through are therefore irrelevant to this specific conducted research. These cases will just be seen as other theoretical cases that could be applied to this analytical framework.
3.3 Operationalization of theory
Operationalization means, according to Halperin and Heath, defining a variable or a concept (2020; 149). Usually there is a widely accepted societal definition of certain concepts or words. Operationalization is done to specify and provide a clear understanding of these concepts, in the context of the research conducted, to avoid misunderstandings. The operational definitions provided in this chapter will reference the theory in chapter 2 and
16 provide clear definitions of Elman and Warner’s framework by specifying the concepts of political entrepreneurship, institutions, ideology, and party constituents. These definitions will be presented in the operational chart below and subsequently be used when analysing the material.
4. Methodological Approach
In which a methodological approach is presented, and the conducted research design and method will be explained. The research design is an extreme single case study with the method being a qualitative content analysis.
4.1 Research Design
The research will be designed around a single case study that will be applied to a theory of when democracy can have a moderating effect. The chosen theory provides indicators on Political
Entrepreneurship
Institutions Ideology Party Constituents
- Exploitation of tumultuous political situations
- Religious parties are therefore often a result of social movements. - Build relationships with secular parties to maintain power.
- Investments in social services to gain wide support.
- Willingness to form coalitions and compromise to ensure implementation of key issues.
- Democratic cultural norms and institutions can have a moderating influence.
- Extremism can emerge if a group is suddenly excluded from power. - Proportional
representation can act as a force of moderation under certain
circumstances
- Institutions therefore have the power to make an organisation that does not aspire to democracy to do so.
- Religious parties build their platform around religious values but sometimes incorporate other ideologies to reach a wider base. - Experience similar types of pressure as secular parties. - How interested a religious party is in forming coalitions can differentiate moderates from extremists - Religious parties can be extreme along certain policies and moderates regarding others.
- Voters of religious parties are usually
religious but that is not the primary reason for why voters choose to vote for them.
- Therefore, to earn political support religious parties are dependent on their own political entrepreneurship.
- These circumstances and the support they earn shapes the trajectory of the religious party
- Religious parties are therefore not fully religious and often partly secular.
17 which circumstances a religious political party will become more moderate in a democratic system. This theory will then be applied to the case of Ennahda, which is a critical case in understanding how Islamic religious parties might become more moderate in a democratic system. A case study should, according to one definition, contain a subject to be analysed to understand its development in relation to its environment (Flyvbjerg, 2011; 301). Regarding what type of case Ennahda in Tunisia is, Seawright and Gerring’s definition of an extreme case provides the clearest definition (Seawright, Gerring, 2008; 297). According to them, an extreme case is a case when a parameter exemplifies a value outside of what is considered normal. In this case, Tunisia being the only democracy in North Africa and the only
democratic Muslim majority country throughout the whole MENA region, therefore Tunisia is an example of an extreme case regarding democratisation in the MENA region. Ennahda on the other hand, depending on the context it put in, can either be a typical, deviant or an
extreme case (ibid). If Ennahda is studied from the context of it being a purely religious party who transcribes to democracy, then they are a typical case as religious parties throughout the world exists and often endorses a democratic system. With these parameters Seawright and Gerring would define Ennahda as a typical case. Would more parameters be added, such as Ennahda being a democratic Islamic religious party, then Ennahda could be perceived as a deviant case (ibid). Similar parties have existed in Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia and Egypt. As similar cases exist and could be compared, Seawright and Gerring would, within this
framework, define Ennahda as a deviant case. Even other political parties such as Hamas and Hezbollah who are transcribing to a similar ideology as Ennahda have reach power through democratic elections. However, if more parameters were to be added, such as the fact that Ennahda is currently the only Islamic religious political party openly advocating for democracy in a democratic country. It could be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood or the Turkish AKP could belong to this category as well. But since the Muslim Brotherhood failed and was ousted in a coup in Egypt and the AKP has reverted to authoritarianism over the past years which Ennahda is yet to do, it is therefore one of its kind in the MENA region and therefore, according to Seawright and Gerring’s, an extreme case (ibid).
4.2 Research Method
This research will use an empirical qualitative research method to reach its conclusion. This is chosen over a quantitative method as the theory will look more into the recent historical political development of Tunisia and Ennahda’s role in it then look at numbers and statistical data that are more likely to explain economic development instead of power dynamics that led
18 to democracy (Halperin, Heath 2020; 196). The data will be analysed and understood by using Elman and Warner's framework of understanding religious political parties and under which circumstances they become more moderate. The purpose of this research is not to generate new theories but to understand this specific case and explain it using the analytical framework provided in the theory chapter. The case will therefore use a deductive approach in trying to understand if Elman and Warner’s theory can explain Ennahda’s moderation process. As the case study is used to further an in-depth understanding of a certain subject or situation it is deemed to fit this type of research (Halperin, Heath 234-235).
The material will be gathered by primarily looking at articles published in academic journals connected to the case of Ennahda. It will then be analysed by conducting a qualitative content analysis where the secondary material will be used to understand the theory. A qualitative content analysis refers to an analysis where nothing is counted or measured but instead
interpreted by the reader (Bergström, Boréus 2005; 44). This method is used as it assumes that underlying meaning or conclusions can be found in texts and used to further the academic understanding of a certain field (Halperin, Heath 376-377). The intention of this research is to primarily find the explicit meaning of the material instead of the underlying meaning as the implicit information will not add anything to this research. The reasoning behind this is that the implicit information is not relevant in this research as the aim is to use explicit stated conclusions and material and draw a conclusion based on this. The risk of looking into
implicit material is also that it can affect the reliability of the research that is being conducted. The material will be gathered looking for keywords in certain themes and categories. When this material and data is gathered, it will be analysed as a case study by using the framework of Elman and Warner’s theory. The analysis will be conducted by presenting certain
influential thematic events between the period of 2011 and 2016 and how it affected the party. These influential events will be chosen based on themes and topics that emerged in the
material. The analytical framework will then be applied to these thematic events to understand how they shaped Ennahda’s trajectory. Applying the theory to the case is decided over
applying the case to the theory as that would have created a structure and chronological narrative that would have been impossible for a reader with no prior knowledge to follow. The thematic events chosen are the re-emergence of Ennahda to the political scene and how that came about, the common assumption that Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood are closely related, the rise of Salafist jihadism and Ennahda’s reaction to that, the constitutional drafting process and how Ennahda navigated that time period. Finally, it will look at Tunisia’s
19 economic struggle and Ennahda’s national convention in 2016 where they redefined
themselves as Muslim democrats. This will then be used to form a conclusion and an answer to the presented research question. To ensure that this thesis maintains and ensure validity, or that the data measures the phenomenon it claims, will ultimately be a question of judgement (ibid; 287). What that means for this thesis is choosing material that is peer reviewed and from established academic institutions. Using establish sources and being transparent in where they come from will therefore hope to ensure reliability and that a similar result will be reached regardless of who conducts the research (ibid; 385). To summarize, the method used will be qualitative content analysis and the material will be gathered in academic journals using keywords that relates to the case. It will then be analysed using an analytical framework and based on that analysis a conclusion will be reached.
4.2 Positioning Myself
As the researcher is affected and shaped by values, discourse and ethics present in the
Scandinavian society in which the research grew up in, lives and conducts this research it can therefore be assumed that these values will trickle down in the research (Creswell, Creswell, 2017; 183-184). It can regard assumptions based on what’s considered politicly extreme and politically moderate and it needs to be clearly stated that just because something might be perceived in a certain manner doesn’t mean that the organisation researched, in itself view certain aspects as more or less extreme or more or less religious. Eurocentric notions of how things are might therefore play a role, both in the material chosen but also in the researcher itself. As this research is trying to apply an analytical framework to understand a moderation process of a certain party, it therefore builds on assumptions on what id more or less
moderate, which will therefore have an effect on the conclusion. The author will therefore try to analyse its own rhetoric and assumptions to try to move away from it affecting the
conclusions as much as possible.
5. Material
The material consists primarily of peer reviewed academic articles. The following will be a description of the material gathered and the criteria for the sampling of data. It will then contain a discussion on some concerns regarding the data gathered.
20 5.1 Presentation of Material
The material used in this thesis leans heavily on academic secondary material. The reason for choosing secondary material lies within the author's geographic and linguistic limitation. The academic sources do not provide a full perspective on Ennahda’s moderation but instead they all focus on different parts of the circumstances and thus add different information and perspective. These academic sources have all undergone peer review which helps guarantee a level of quality. The two main academic literature that was extensively used throughout was “The History of Ennahda” by Anne Wolf and Monica Marks chapter in Rethinking Political Islam. Both of these books were conducted by researchers at and published by the prestigious Oxford University which creates a reliable foundation for the research. Other academic sources have also been published by other academic institutions and undergone peer review. This helps cement the foundation this academic research is conducted on. Two sources in the material are not academic journals. It is one article from the Washington Post, and one is a podcast. Both of these are products of Monica Marks, one of the top researchers of Ennahda between the years 2011 and 2016. They are therefore deemed relevant and trustworthy as they bring observations by a top researcher from a top university. The search for academic articles and literature was primarily conducted on Google Scholar which was chosen because of its accessibility and the fact that it gathers data from many different academic journals, which provides a wide range of sources and perspectives. There was an abundance of articles written about the subject over the course of the past 5 years and some sources were even published this year which made it easy to find information that was up to date and peer reviewed. Keywords used to find information was: Political Islam, Arab Spring, Tunisia, Ennahda, Democracy, Moderation.
6. Analysis
As mentioned in the method chapter, the subsections will be divided based on themes and topics that emerged out of the material. This is done to make it easier for the reader to follow the events and therefore understand the progress of the Ennahda Movement. These themes will then be analysed using the framework of Elman and Warner, presented in chapter 3 and operationalized in chapter 3.3.
21 6.1 The Re-emergence of Ennahda
Ennahda’s emergence back on the scene after the fall of President Ben Ali was made possible by the social movement around Ennahda and its ability to quickly regroup and rebuild
networks of supporters who had never agreed to the secular ideals of the former regime of Tunisia (Wolf, 2018; ch.7 2). In October 2011 Ennahda became the biggest party with 37% of the votes with the eight most successful parties after Ennahda getting, altogether, 35% of the vote (ibid). Ennahda’s success was achieved by extensive grassroots campaigning. In a period of six weeks the party set up 2,064 offices around the country and adopted an “all welcome” approach to mobilizing (ibid; ch.7 3-4). This meant that party sympathisers did not need to be vouched for by existing members when becoming members. The wives of the party veterans were also suddenly compelled to join the party (ibid). This had not been possible before as party members needed to divide the roles between husbands and wives to reduce repression against the family from the former regime. They were also brought in to show Ennahda’s commitment to women's rights (ibid). The leadership of Ennahda had identified that women had been very visible and leading in overthrowing the regime and that women’s rights had become a heated debate. The party wanted to capitalize on this to widen its base (ibid) and did this by including more women in the party and promised to protect women's freedom, such as their right to work (Zhang, 2019; 221). Ennahda also supported a legislation that would have made it a law to put an equal number of men and women on the list ahead of an election (ibid). The legislation failed but Ennahda ended up nominating more women than any of the secular parties (ibid). Ennahda’s strategy also stemmed from their will to show voters that they would not weaken women's rights, as many feared an Islamic party would (ibid). It is therefore questionable if Ennahda’s commitment to women's rights came from a position of true belief or that they saw an opportunity to appeal to more voters. Their goal to appeal to women certainly plays into Elman and Warner’s ideas of how a religious party tries to earn support outside the classic religious realm. Whether they truly believed in women's rights or not, they saw an opportunity and used their political entrepreneurship to increase their base, which is within the framework of Elman and Warner idea of political entrepreneurship and ideology. As Ennahda saw an opportunity in increasing its base, by capitalising on a social movement and they also shaped their ideology to fit the circumstances. Of the 49 women elected to the Tunisian parliament in 2011, 42 came from Ennahda (Bartal, 2020; 5). However, Ennahda did of course get 37% of the vote with the next 8 parties getting 35% so the numbers of women representatives should be put in the light of Ennahda's political
22 dominance during this period. The party leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, writes a chapter in the book Democratic Transition in the Muslim World: A Global Perspective about gender equality as an important part in the democratic transition of Tunisia (2018; 24-25). He states that the number of women in parliament rose to over 31% during the first years after the revolution. He pointed out that this is higher than some countries in Europe and that female Ennahda members of parliament played a big role in crafting legislation and doing oversight. Ennahda also nominated a woman to the position of vice chair of the assembly, thus making her the highest-ranking woman in Arab politics at the time (Ghannouchi, 2018; 25).
Elman and Warner’s aspect of political entrepreneurship and the fact that Ennahda saw a political opportunity in embracing women's issues as it could increase their base, could have contributed to Ennahda’s moderation process. The notion of seeing opportunities and acting on them does, according to the analytical framework, play a big role in the trajectory of the party. One such example is the outreach to the female electorate and Ennahda seeing women as an important part of their electoral base which then led to the party having to adopt to women's rights legislation. This be connected to Elman and Warner's idea that the constituents can also shape the party trajectory. In this case it pushed Ennahda in a women’s rights values direction which could have played a role in Ennahda’s moderation process, from the
perspective of embracing women's rights issues as something that indicates moderation. Another part of the analytical framework that indicates moderation is the willingness to form coalitions with secular actors. Once power was won Ennahda was met with a lot of scepticism regarding its commitment to democratic ideals. To calm these nerves Ennahda announced that it would not participate in the presidential election and form a coalition government (Marks, 2017; 34). Ennahda ended up forming a coalition government with two secular centrist-left parties, a coalition known as the Troika (Yardımcı-Geyikçi, Tür, 2018; 790). The party was however still met with distrust in secular circles, who were afraid the party would move in an Islamic direction and away from Europe (Marks, 2017; 35). Ennahda, being the biggest party took all ministerial positions which only increased the suspension towards them and made it easy for the opposition to attack (Wolf, 2017; Ch. 7 p. 3-4). Apart from the unwillingness to include other parties in ministerial roles, Ennahda showed willingness to be pragmatic and to compromise. They realised they needed coalitions to not appear frightening which they hoped would ensure long term success (Marks, 2017; 36-37). The willingness to form coalitions, even when they did not have to, plays into Elman and Warner's notion of both ideology and political entrepreneurship. The party choose entering into a coalition which is the more moderate path but also a way for them to earn political support and acceptance from voters
23 and other political parties. Elman and Warner’s idea that voters do not primarily vote for a party because of their religious background also fits into Ennahda's success during 2011. They aimed to bring in more women, not by focusing on religious issues but by focusing on
protecting women’s rights, which could be perceived as acknowledging secular ideals. The party's agenda was therefore not fully religious but had secular influences which together with skilled political entrepreneurship reached a wider base and helped them achieve success at the ballot box. To summarise, Ennahda’s emergence back on the political scene and their
subsequent formation of a coalition government can be tied to Elman and Warner’s notion of how political entrepreneurship, ideology and party constituents can help shape a party’s trajectory in a more moderate manner. As Ennahda’s success was a result of a social
movement than meant including women, a new type of voter, which meant changing ideology to appease those voters. These factors could arguably, according to the framework, have set Ennahda on a moderation trajectory from the start.
6.2 Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood
A substantial part of the conversation about Ennahda’s religiousness and ideology regarding its stance on both religion, democracy and social development has usually been in comparison to their former source of political inspiration, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. However, according to Monica Marks, who conducted interviews with Ennahda party members ahead of the 2011 election, the relation between the Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood was instead described by as “We are related, yes, and we continue to be inspired by their ideas… But we also have our own ideas ... We get our color [character] from Tunisia, which is more open than Egypt” (Marks, 2017; 35). Another party member, active in Ennahda’s youth
organisation pointed out that Ennahda instead looks at the Turkish model and that Ennahda are more advanced and developed than the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid). Other party leaders also referenced the Christian Democrats in Germany as an example of a current inspiration since Ennahda sees itself as a conservative democratic party with religious roots that promotes an open and liberal economy (ibid; 36). Marks argues that the best contemporary comparison with Ennahda, is the Turkish AKP (Marks, 2017; 112-113). A very clear difference between Ennahda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood became clear during the drafting of the constitution. The drafting of the Tunisian constitutions was seen as a success and civil society groups involved in the process were given the Nobel Peace Prize (Yardimci-Geyikci, Tür 2018; 793). The Muslim Brotherhoods constitutional creation process was instead seen as a failure and one of the causes behind the subsequent coup which had an influence on the
24 trajectory of the Ennahda Movement (Cavatorta, Torelli 2017; 11). As the Muslim
Brotherhood won the election in 2012 the Ennahda Movement worried about them deciding to govern alone and even strongly and openly recommended against it (Marks, 2017; 37). When the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood decided against the recommendation of Ennahda it worried the Tunisian party (bid). Some party members complained that it would lead to disaster, a prediction that turned out to be true, and a missed opportunity to show that Islam and democracy was compatible. A failure of the Muslim Brotherhood would also look badly on Ennahda as they are often, in their own words, unfairly judge together (ibid). According to Muqtedar Khan, the Muslim Brotherhood did not exclusively fail because of their
unwillingness to share power but it certainly made them unpopular (Khan, 2014; 79). Morsi, the president of Egypt, tried to rush through a hastily written constitution that only received support from 66% of the 33% of the citizens who actually went to vote (ibid). Khan argues that if the founding document does not have universal support, it will be seen as illegitimate. The fact that it was only written by Islamists without input from other groups did not make it the unifying force it had the potential to be (ibid). When the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown in 2013 it did not come as a surprise for the Tunisian party (ibid; 37-38). They were however shocked at the massacre that took place in Cairo a month afterwards where 1000 demonstrators were killed by Egyptian forces (Marks, 2017; 37-38). The weak response of the US and the European Union to the coup and the massacre was also a clear reminder that many in the west still preferred authoritarian stability over democracy (ibid). Regional governments, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE quickly swooped in and gave the new military dictatorship, in Egypt, billions in support (ibid). This left the Ennahda
Movement members feeling alone and fearful of the democratic transition suddenly falling apart and that their country now represented the sole democratic holdout in North Africa and the Middle East (ibid; 38). The different path the two parties decided to take was an early indicator of Ennahda’s willingness to compromise and prioritise the democratic transition over their own political and religious agenda. Some scholars argue that the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood forced Ennahda to realise the need to build wide range political support for policies (ibid; 52-53) (Cavatorta, Torelli 2017; 11). Without this the democratic project could fail which would danger the political aspirations of the party and their belief in an Islamic democracy. Elman and Warner see parties that are willing to sit in a coalition as less likely to be extreme and Ennahda’s understanding that a wide coalition government and a constitution with widespread support was vital in uniting the country. As the constitution creates the foundation for institutions and democratic ideals it can have a moderating
25 influence. Building this strong foundation is crucial in ensuring the survival of the democratic system. Ennahda realised this and shaped their approach accordingly which both put them on a path of political survival and moderation. As institutions also can contribute to organisations being less extreme, therefore the more organisations being part of the process of shaping institutions, the more moderate the country could become. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood decided to form their constitution by themselves and could therefore set up a structure
relevant for only themselves. While Ennahda worked in the opposite direction and tried to include a wide range of parties and groups instead. To summarise, this chapter is meant to show how Ennahda’s early willingness and understanding that forming a democracy by creating coalitions and a wide range of support, and the possible danger of not doing that. The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood served as a lesson of how things could spiral and forced Ennahda to realise what’s at play and commit even more to their ideals of governance. This meant fully committing to forming coalition governments, which would be a common theme throughout these years, and building a constitution with wide support. As Elman and
Warner’s framework indicates that a willingness to bring in secular actors to a government or a legislation process indicates a move away from extremism, in that way Ennahda was different from the Muslim Brotherhood. By adding more actors into a process also forces the more extreme ideas of everyone involved to be left aside for compromises, which could generate a more moderate political environment.
6.3 The Rise of Salafist-jihadism
A big issue facing Tunisian politics in the years after the revolution was the rise of Salafi-jihadism. The rise was partly caused by veterans of former violent jihads, such as Afghanistan in the 80, Bosnia in the 90s and Iraq during the 2000s (Marks, 2017; 38-39). These veterans had been imprisoned under Ben Ali but were now released and came in contact with an aimless youth (ibid). The young people who started driving the rise of Salafi-jihadism came mostly from marginalized socioeconomic groups and saw this movement as a hugely inspiring in its goal of creating an ultra-Islamist future (ibid; 39). Some groups promoted peaceful but forceful preaching while other groups committed direct acts of violence and some even left the country in pursuit of ultra-Islamist ideals (ibid). It is estimated that about 6000 Tunisians joined jihadists groups in Syria with the Islamic State being the biggest recruiter (ibid). As the Salafist organisations grew Ennahda failed to take them seriously. Ennahda did not take the chance to condemn them and often had a hard time figuring out what to make of the organisations (ibid; 40). They were often seen as a misguided youth who
26 needed socio economic support and spiritual outreach(ibid). Ennahda also promoted political inclusion for the Salafists and in hope that they would support nonviolent political parties. This came from a strong belief in the inclusion moderation hypothesis that was popular among many political scientists (ibid). Ennahda’s own experience in being oppressed also played a role in them not seeing the dangers with the emergence of Salafi-jihadism. Francesco Cavatorta and Stefano Torelli describe this relationship “as both paternal and paternalistic” (Cavatorta, Torelli, 2021; 9). The Salafists grew more and more violent and in 2012 they attacked the US embassy (ibid; 8). The Tunisian population grew more and more suspicious that Ennahda was sympathetic to the cause and Ennahda tried to politically distance
themselves from the Salafist by agreeing to not support Sharia law in the constitution (Marks, 2017; 44-45). This would however lead to 10 percent of the party’s youth leaving the
organisation in protest and joining Salafist groups instead (Wolf 2018; ch.7 9-10). The opposition tried to tie Ennahda to the failures of the Muslim Brotherhood and that they were enabling extremist groups to grow within the Tunisian society (ibid). In February 2013 jihadists assassinated a member of parliament from the leading leftist opposition party and in July 2013 another member of the party was assassinated. When Ennahda reacted by cracking down on the violent aspects of the Salafist movement and declaring the Salafist organisation AST, a terrorist organisation (Cavatorta and Torelli, 2021; 10). Cavatorta and Torelli argue that this decision in part was very political to show the Tunisian population that they were taking the problem seriously. But the party leadership also realised that the AST was not going to be institutionalised the same way Ennahda had become (ibid). The AST was actively telling its members to not participate in elections which would undermine Ennahda’s whole purpose (Cavatorta and Torelli, 2021; 10-11). The opposition was not happy, and protestors demanded that Ennahda would step down. Ennahda refused and instead looked to form a compromise while creating the constitutional document. To appease the protestors the party promised to step down and hand over the government to technocrats after the constitution was drafted. This decision would end up playing a big role in protecting the Tunisian democracy (Marks, 2017; 46).
In Ennahda’s interaction with the Salafist movement we see a party on one hand trying to include the more extreme version of itself in the hope of it causing moderation. We also see a political party that realises that it needs to crackdown on the religiously extreme elements. Both to survive themselves but also when they realise that the organisation will not become institutionalized. Elman and Warner point out that organisations tend to become more extreme
27 when they are excluded from the process, which is partly what happened here. Ennahda decided to go in the more secular route and excluded the more extremist parts of its and Tunisia's electorate from power who then rebelled and became violent. Of course, the party could have decided to go in the more extreme direction themselves but instead they stood firm and kept going in their own ideological direction. Monica Marks argues in in POMEPS
Middle East Political Science Podcasts, that the party hardliners realised the fragility of the democracy after the twin assassinations and decided to agree to the more moderate ideology of Ennahda (Episode from 2016-08-11). This would lead to them wanting to draft a
constitution with wide political support and it also meant that they were ready to step down from power after the process was done. Applying this to Elman and Warner shows another indication of political entrepreneurship and the realisation that to implement their ideology they have to compromise. However, Elman and Warner analytical framework does not necessarily explain Ennahda’s the decision to take a harder stance on extremism. What it instead shows is Ennahda doubling down on a path they had already decided on, the
democratic route and the importance of protecting a fragile system. As the rise of Salafism is an important part of the history of Ennahda and Tunisia during these years it is important as it affected the party’s decision making during the drafting constitutional process, which will be further examined in the next chapter. More specifically, the circumstances and lessons learned as a result of the rise of Salafism would be hugely important in Ennahda’s moderation process (Marks, 2017; 52-53.)
6.4 The Bardo Crisis and the Constitutional Drafting Process
The summer of 2013 was a turbulent time in the history of Tunisia. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was ousted in a coup and the subsequent massacre of 1000 protestors was a serious reminder that how quickly a situation could spiral. After the second assassination of a Tunisian member of parliament by Salafi-jihadists protestors rallied at the Bardo Square in Tunis and called for Ennahda and the Troika coalition to step down, as they saw Ennahda as the reason for the stagnated economy and enablers of violent jihadism (Marks, 2017; 44-45). Monica Marks argues that the Bardo crisis was a soft coup attempt and seriously could have damaged or set back the democratic transition in Tunisia. Ennahda’s handling and posture over the cause of the crisis and their willingness to compromise over the next 7 months protected the democratic transition and possibly kept the Tunisian democracy alive (Marks, 2017; 103). During these months, the party was pressured both externally and internally and the period would play a massive role in the party redefining itself a few years later.
28 Shaul Bartal connects the ideological path Ennahda to three ideals centred to the party leader, Rachid Ghannouchi (Bartal, 2020; 112). The first ideal was to from coalitions with secular parties, which they did with the Troika coalition. The second ideal was the establishment of a constitution with wide range support. The third ideal was the drafting of articles and literature that justifies democracy within the theological frameworks of Islam. The constitutional drafting process took place during the cause of constant crisis (ibid) but Muqtedar Khan, a scholar within the field, hailed the pragmatism of Rachid Ghannouchi and his willingness to form coalitions and compromise as fostering the ideological framework for the success of democracy in Tunisia (Khan, 2014; 77). The two primary leading negotiations during the constitutional drafting process were Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. Nidaa Tounes was the ideological enemy of Ennahda as they promoted secular values, had ties to the old regime and had played a big role in the soft coup attempt on Ennahda just a few weeks earlier (Bartal, 2020; 113). Many Ennahda members feared that if Nidaa Tounes would be elected, they would crackdown on Ennahda and start repressing them similarly to what Ben Ali had done (Marks, 2017; 50). A big part of the debate over the constitution was centred around the role of Islam. The party had decided to not include the role of Sharia law in the constitution. (Wolf, 2018; ch. 7, 10). But Rachid Ghannouchi instead pushed for including the simple wording of “Islam being the state religion in Tunisia” (Bartal, 2020; 113). Some chunks of the party disagreed and wanted to see Islam play a bigger role (Wolf, 2018; ch.7, 9). Some
members of Ennahda pushed for the inclusion of the wording that Sharia law would be a source for legislation. However, Rachid Ghannouchi saw things differently (ibid). He argued that the inclusion of Sharia law in the constitution opened up the possibility of political infighting as it have many different interpretations. He strengthened his point by arguing the fact that in an April 2013 poll, 73% of Tunisians thought that Sharia law had many different interpretations which meant that the inclusion of Sharia law could cause serious instability throughout the country (ibid). It should also be pointed out that 56% of the Tunisian population supported Sharia law as legislation in 2011, which however was substantially lower than other Muslim majority countries such as Egypt and Jordan (ibid). Rachid Ghannouchi argued that people were therefore not yet ready to embrace and understand Islamic law and that they needed to be educated before it could be implemented (Wolf, 2018; ch.7, 9-10). Ghannouchi arguments, the fear of the secular opposition and western pressure did, according to Wolf, win over the more sceptical parts of the party and in the end, they ended up unifying around Islam as the state religion as the only reference to religion in the
