The Landscape between Bureaucracy and
Political Strategy
A Qualitative Case Study of the Policy Processes in Swedish
Security and Defence Policy
Emy Larsson
Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp)
Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security Master’s Programme in Politics and War
Autumn 2020
Supervisor: Dan Hansén Word count: 19865
Abstract
The Swedish Defence bill of 2015 demonstrated a rapid change in policy objectives, consequently moving away from an expeditionary force and converging into a territorial defence force. Previous research has attributed and explained the quick shift to the geostrategic unbalance that followed after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, major policy changes are often years in the making, indicating that there must be additional explanations to the rapid shift. By applying a modified version of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework on the case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy, this thesis examines the policy process that preceded the official policy decision. The thesis provides further explanation to why the rapid policy change occurred by utilising qualitative content analysis. The analysis shows that the new policy was adopted due to several factors: one being the attention brought to several problems pertaining to the previous policy, another one was found in the timing between focusing events and the on-going work process of the Swedish defence commission, and lastly, strong actors within the policy field were in favour of a change in policy. The thesis concludes that the presence of several factors within the processes of politics, policy and problems enabled the rapid policy change.
Keywords: Security and defence policy, policy processes, policy change, Multiple Streams Framework, agenda-setting, Swedish Defence Commission
Table of content
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 BACKGROUND 1
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND AIM 3
1.3 DELIMITATIONS 4
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 6
2.1 SWEDISH SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 6
2.2 POLICY CHANGE AND THEORY 8
3. THEORY 10
3.1 THEORIZING THE POLICY PROCESS 10
3.2 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK 11
3.2.1 PROBLEM STREAM 12
3.2.2 POLITICAL STREAM 14
3.2.3 POLICY STREAM 15
3.2.4 POLICY AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 16
3.2.5 AGENDA AND DECISION WINDOWS 17
4. METHODOLOGY 19
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 19
4.2 MATERIAL 20
4.2.1 INTERVIEWS 21
4.3 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 23
4.3.1 LIMITATIONS 24 4.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 24 5. ANALYSIS 26 5.1 PROBLEM STREAM 26 5.2 POLITICAL STREAM 29 5.3 POLICY STREAM 32
5.4 THE POLICY AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 34
5.5 THE WINDOWS 37 5.5.1 THE AGENDA WINDOW 37 5.5.2 THE DECISION WINDOW 38 6. DISCUSSION 40 6.1 LIMITATIONS 40 6.2 CONCLUSIONS 40 6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 42
7. REFERENCES 44 7.1 LITERATURE 44 7.2 EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 48 7.1.2 INTERVIEWS 49 7.1.3 NEWS ARTICLES 50 8. APPENDIX 51 A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 51
1. Introduction
The last two decades of research focusing on Swedish security and defence policy have seen a change in its perception. Security and defence policies are no longer considered exceptional processes but are instead increasingly handled and thought of in the same practices as other policy areas (Holmberg 2015: 238-239; Christiansson 2020:337). Hence, can one spot an augmented politicisation of the defence and security policy process1 (Stiglund 2021: 206). In
a European state perspective, this has occurred parallel to both a general trend of defence transformation after the Cold War (Christiansson 2020: 3), and increased demilitarisation within states, that passed by without much public notice (Sheehan 2008: 179). As a result of this, research has noted a reduced political and normative influence for the military
(Holmberg 2015: 240). However, more recent events have sparked a new change, and western countries have once again reformed the focus of their security and defence policies – with, for instance, increases in defence budgets and a refocus on territorial defence. Many of these changes have been ascribed to the geostrategic shift that followed after the Russian
annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Holmberg 2015; Agrell 2016; Stiglund 2021). However, shifts in policies are famously slow in the making (Herweg et al. 2017), and a rapid change in policy stands out. One country that rapidly changed its policy after the events of 2014 was Sweden, where a new Defence bill was accepted only a year later – entailing a distinct shift in policy, which saw a transition into a territorial defence (Prop. 2014/15:109). In turn questions were sparked regarding how and why such a quick policy change came about, how it was possible and what further explanatory factors exist and can account for why such a rapid shift was achievable.
1.1 Background
During the last two decades, the Swedish defence policy has been marked by cooperation and demilitarization (Holmberg 2015; Westberg 2015; Agrell 2016). Ever since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has gradually and forcefully diminished its military. Defence and security policies were focused on international cooperation and joining foreign peacekeeping missions
1A policy process is in this thesis defined as ”the interactions that occur over time between public policies and surrounding actors, events, contexts, and outcomes.” (Weible 2017: 2).
(Berndtsson et al. 2015; Agrell 2016). The threat against Sweden’s own territory was deemed low, and a high focus was placed on participating within UN-, NATO- or EU-led missions. Security was to be created alongside Sweden’s neighbouring states and the concept of the “solidarity principle” was created as a means by which the country could generate security together with other nations (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014: 191)2.
However, a shift in the international security debate was traceable following the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, where Russia, which was deemed as having limited war capacities, entered into a full-scale war with one of its neighboring states (Asmus 2010; Agrell 2016: 223-225). Swedish officials reacted to the situation by concluding that the actions of Russia had “put the all-European security order into a state of crisis [authors own translation]” (prop. 2008/09:140). The Swedish government notably remarked on the war in Georgia in their Defence bill in 2009 (prop. 2008/09: 140). However, there was minimal explicit political action or change in policy following it – suggesting that it was not deemed as a real threat or problem at the time.
In the years following the Russo-Georgian war, Sweden was mainly engaged in discussions surrounding the ongoing, NATO-led, operation in Afghanistan, in which the country was heavily engaged (Agrell 2016). Apart from that, there were very few things that made it to the political debates. The only other thing that received some attention by the politicians was the reorganization and staffing difficulties that the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) were facing. The perception of the Russian threat was only present far away in the periphery, and warnings regarding a more vigorous, and growing military Russia were often dismissed via references to “Russian scare (rysskräck)” (Agrell 2016: 225). After the
government put forward their defence proposition in 2009, very few issues pertaining to the armed forces’ future were visible on the political agenda (Agrell 2016: 238).
However, a change in the discourse and the media narrative was traceable after several events and statements that occurred during the spring of 2013 (Lindberg 2013). Two of them received quite a lot of media attention. The first event was the on-following debate after an interview given by the then Swedish Chief of Defence (Chod), Sverker Göranson. He stated the SAF would only be able to defend one strategic location within the country, and they would only be able to do so during the duration of one week. After that, Sweden would have to rely on the help of others (Holmström 2012). The interview sparked an intense debate both
2For further reading regarding the transformation process that Swedish defence and security policy went through after the end of the Cold War and the following decade, see Holmberg (2006) and Christiansson (2020) among others.
among politicians, but also within news media organisations, as well as an increased public debate (Holmberg 2015: 246). The second event, which also sparked an increase in the debate, was a simulated Russian airstrike against Sweden. The attack, also known as the “Easter attack”, occurred on Good Friday just outside of the Swedish territorial border and the SAF was unable to launch fighter jets as a response and protective measure (Holmström 2013a). This event showcased in reality what the Chod just a few months earlier had warned about. Around this time, a change in public opinion was also traceable via public opinion polls, regarding the Swede’s views on decreased defence spending and a NATO membership (SOM-Institutet 2020: 63, 66).
Almost a year later, Russia once again shocked the world and the international system with the country's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the on-following conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This event has been attributed as “the mother” event that changed both the Swedish and the European perception of their security and defence (Agrell 2016: 238). Following the Swedish election in the autumn of 2014, a new government, led by the Social Democrats, took office and a dramatic turn occurred in the defence and security policy. Roughly a year after the Ukraine events, a new Swedish Defence bill was presented, entailing an immensely rapid policy change. A shift that entailed that national territorial defence was now the main task and focus of the Swedish defence, in stark contrast with the past 20 years’ objectives. However, conscription was also reinstated with a decision that followed two years after the defence bill, after being ended in the previous defence bill. Also, as previously noted, a shift in both the public and the politicians’ views was traceable before the Ukraine events (SOM-institutet 2020). This, alongside the unusually rapid shift in policy, indicates that a change in the Swedish defence and security policy was already underway before the early spring of 2014. Meaning, there must be other explanations as to why the shift came about, apart from the drastic change in the country’s geostrategic sphere, and also how it in a policy process context came about so quickly.
1.2 Research problem and aim
This thesis aims to obtain greater meaning surrounding the policy process that preceded the Swedish shift in policy and more explicitly it will seek to explain why and how the sudden shift in Swedish security and defence policy came about. The shift stands out in the sense that policy changes usually are quite long and intricate processes, especially within the complex
realm of security and defence policymaking (Christiansson 2020), indicating that there must exist more than only external explanatory factors. Therefore, the thesis will aim to attain more explanation for the events that lead Sweden into shifting its security and defence policy, leaving a seemingly long period of time marked by demilitarization and going into a future focusing on militarization and territorial defence. The reasons for the change are naturally several, such as strategic shifts in the international system, ideological factors, international trends, and much more (Rosati, Hagan & Sampson1994:270). However, previous research has failed in explaining how such a rapid policy shift was made possible. Therefore, the primary purpose of this thesis is to explore what other circumstances that caused the shift in policy to happen and explore the policy process that preceded the decision to change policy. In light of this and the above stated, this thesis will answer the following research question:
Why did the Swedish security and defence policy so rapidly change from an expeditionary to a territorial defence?
The formulation of the research question demonstrates how the thesis both has an
explanatory, as well as an exploratory aim. By answering the question above, it expects to offer a richer account for why and how the change of defence and security policy came about. Thus, contributing to the empirical knowledge regarding the case. The answer might not provide a vast amount of generalizable knowledge regarding policy processes, but it will account for the fruitfulness of policy process theory when explaining shifts in complex areas such as defence and security policy. Furthermore, it will provide a description of the inner “machinery” around Swedish defence and security policy, thereby generating more knowledge surrounding its practices and contributing to the research field of both policy process studies and defence and security policies.
1.3 Delimitations
Given the focus of the thesis, one conceptual consideration that is necessary to define is the thesis’s policy scope. Foreign policy, security policy, and defence policy all have an intricate relationship with one another, both in terms of theory, empirics, and concepts. Given that the case being studied primarily entailed a shift in defence and security policy, and that foreign policy is a comprehensive concept, this study will only focus on the two primary concepts
defence and security policy. Where defence policy is defined as being part of a country’s external security policy (Andrén 1997: 133), and security policy is that through which a country, or other forms of actors, identifies and defines as a threat or risk (Stiglund 2021: 201).
A second delimitation of the study is that of the time. The reasons for why the Swedish security and defence policy change are many, and where some can be traced several years back in history (Holmberg 2006; Christiansson 2020), given this and the limitations that the thesis is faced with, a decision was made in limiting the focal point of the research to the years 2007-2015. The motivation for this is that the period includes two different Defence bills, where the latter entailed the decision to shift policy.
Finally, a third delimitation entails that a primary focus has been placed on the main actors involved in the Swedish security and defence policy process – which are the
Government, the Parliament, the Government's office, the SAF and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (SCCA) (Regeringen 2017). These actors are identified as the main actors in the Defence Commissions (DC) work process, recognized as one of the primary forums for policy development regarding Swedish defence and security (Åkesson 2020; Regeringen 2017). The process includes several other agencies, and different kinds of experts, making it a large and complex process to study. Therefore, a centering and delimiting choice was made in focusing on the main actors involved in the policy process.
2. Previous research
2.1 Swedish security and defence policy
Research looking at shifts in security and/or defence policy exists in numerous amounts. However, studies looking at changes in security and defence policy in Sweden are not as abundant, but they nevertheless exist in a fair amount. A lot of the past research has focused on Sweden in the perspective of its “armed neutrality” as a security actor and non-alignment during the Cold War, and the country’s “exceptional” role in comparison with others (Noreen 1983; Agrell 2000; Kronvall and Petersson 2005), a strategy which after the end of the war quickly was replaced by one more focused on cooperation – especially within the EU (Bailes, Herolf and Sundelius 2006). An increased Europeanization within the national security
identities of particularly the Nordic EU-states was visible (Rieker 2006). This research gives a good account of some of the development that the Swedish security policy underwent during the early 2000s.
The Europeanising security policy research has more lately been followed by studies looking at variations of “Nordicness” in foreign and security policy (Doeser, Petersson and Westberg 2012). A multitude of European crises and the return of a more forceful Russia has provided more empirical evidence into references of a more Nordic turn in security and defence policies among the Nordic countries, especially after creating the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Douglas Brommesson (2018) examines this development by using a theoretical framework set on capturing the notion of security cultures within the Nordic states. His analysis is centered around Sweden and identifies that the “exceptional” aspect in Swedish policy mainly is found within its security and not foreign policy, and that a changing security environment is the most plausible explanation for this.
In the same volume that features Brommessons article, Adrian Hyde-Price (2018) writes a concluding epilogue over the five articles that have separately analysed the Nordic countries through the security cultures framework. In his article, he points out four factors that in his meaning are paramount for understanding the sudden increase in Nordic security cooperation – Russian relapse in foreign and security policy; the growing cost of defence materials; the weakening of the transatlantic security partnership; and the burden of historical defence cuts (Hyde-Price 2018: 437-439). He further pushes his case by pointing at the importance of identifying the geopolitical and strategic context to obtain greater explanatory power
in the article, only in the sense that role theory and the study of security cultures need to be further supplemented with aspects of geopolitical and strategic context.
A study that looked at both Sweden as a case study and the processes behind Swedish defence and security policy is an article by Arita Holmberg (2015). The paper aims to explain the explanatory power of the existing relevant literature in explaining the demilitarisation that has happened in Europe since the end of the Second World War and how it has changed in the past decade. For her case study, she uses Sweden as an example on which she tests her
analytical framework. In her study, she finds that the demilitarisation process in Sweden has affected and changed both the military's role and its influence within society. The study's primary focus is that of de- and militarisation processes, the study's focus is hence different, but it shares similarities because it studies the interaction between the military and
government and how it affects policy.
A very recent study that has looked at the discursive shifts and consequences of the Swedish demilitarization process, as well as the results of the most recent shift in Sweden’s security and defence policy – following the Russian annexation of Crimea – is done by Jonatan Stiglund (2021). In his research, a focus is placed on obtaining greater meaning regarding the on-going broadening and redefinition of the concept of security policy and usage of Sweden as a setting for a case study. It is one of few studies identified that have looked at the most recent shift in Swedish defence and security policy, following the events around 2014, and identifies several discursive changes occurring around the period. The primary findings being that security problems now relate to several policy areas, and that policy today does not abide under one overall security paradigm. Concluding that more research regarding security and defence policies is needed to grasp the underlying purposes of the discursive shifts.
Concludingly, after going through this timeline of previously conducted research regarding Swedish security policy, two aspects stand out. Firstly, so far, quite a little research has been conducted on the topic of this latest shift in Swedish security and defence policy. This can naturally be explained by the simple fact that these events and the shift are relatively recent in time and still on-going. That does not, however, diminish the relevance and interest of studying them. Instead, it provides insight into the security fluctuation that has occurred during the past two decades, in Sweden and the world. Secondly, a lot of the previously conducted research on the topic of Swedish security and defence policy has either been done and explained via either more external factors (Doeser, Petersson and Westberg 2012; Hyde-Price 2018) or by more internal discursive ones (Brommesson 2018, Stiglund 2021).
However, the processes by which policy alternatives end up on the political decision-making agenda and influence action is an explanatory aspect that thus far has not been widely used among research set on understanding security and defence policy. This thesis will contribute to the empirical knowledge surrounding one of the more significant changes in modern Swedish defence and security policy, given that the shift constitutes a break with post-Cold War policies.
2.2 Policy change and theory
The theoretical lenses of previously conducted research regarding Swedish security and defence policy have varied between those of the Foreign Policy Analysis theory (Doeser 2008), a framework of security cultures (Brommesson 2018), security politicization
(Bynander 2003), and that of strategic governance (Christiansson 2020). A lot of the previous research has had an institutional or structural focus, where key individuals’ roles have not been as widely researched - indicating a lack of research focusing on both the processes that shape policy output and the actors that are part of it.
The dissertation of Arita Holmberg (2006) has several similarities with this thesis, because it uses Sweden as a case example and that it partly uses the theoretical lenses of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework. Holmberg sets out to investigate how the Swedish defence policy became Europeanized, to identify how Europeanization within the policy area looks like (Holmberg 2006:4-5, 197, 205). The dissertation is a good illustration for applying the framework on the case example of Sweden, and as a source of how the Swedish defence policy changed during the beginning of the 2000s. It differentiates itself by only focusing on defence, and not also security policy. Thereby, it misses some of the broader security aspects, more specifically in how security policies constitute a country’s self-image, which in turn affects its actions outwards. Nevertheless, it provides inspiration and insight to this thesis.
A third, useful work on policy change is the dissertation of Magnus Christiansson (2020), in which he studies the defence transformation that Sweden underwent between 2000 and 2010. It relates to this study in the sense that it looks at the three defence bills that came before the one of primary focus in this thesis, the Defence bill of 2015-2020 (Prop. 2014/15: 109). The dissertation studies, more specifically, the administrative and political methods and processes by which the SAF are governed, via the case of practices in defence transformation.
A second aspect that it analyses is the conceptual understanding of governance in the defence sector (Christiansson 2020:10). The dissertation’s perspective is based on a neutralist
conception and provides insight into the usage of strategic governance in the Swedish government and governing. One of the critical points identified is the increased need among leaders within the SAF to learn how to adhere to the norms of higher government.
Christiansson’s primary focus is defence transformation, and not policy changes, indicating that emphasis is placed on the SAF:s role in the development process and how they responded to policy output, not the policy process in itself.
A study set on explaining the occurrence of rapid changes in defence and security policy alternative is an article by Stephen Ceccoli (2019). He finds credible usage of the Multiple Streams Framework to explain why drone strikes became the US’s preferred policy alternative in the Yemen War. The article also finds that the framework has fortitude in explaining decisions with elements of ambiguity surrounding them (Ceccoli 2019), which indicates that it should be able to provide good explanatory value to this thesis case study.
Furthermore, an essential contribution to the thesis’s research field is its study of the Swedish Defence Commission and its documentation of the “machinery” behind the Swedish defence and security policy process. The processes surrounding Swedish policy- and decision-making in security and defence matters, have not received much attention by previous
research, at least not from a policy process perspective. This thesis will fill parts of that gap and provide empirical knowledge surrounding Swedish defence and security politics practices.
3. Theory
3.1 Theorizing the policy process
What this thesis aims at capturing within the vast area of policy is situated within the field of the policy process. More specifically, this thesis will focus on the aspects of the process concerned with what ends up on the political agenda and what decisions that get made - it will not focus as much on the aspects of implementation and evaluation within the process. The reasons for this are both because of the delimitations that the thesis is faced with, but also because how problems are defined, to some extent, shape how they are handled within the political system (Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 4; Knaggård 2009: 18-19). The degree of complexity of a policy process is also of relevance for the studied case, given that rational decision-making by some researchers is considered insufficient when it comes to complex issues or problems (Knaggård 2009: 91-92), indicating that a theoretical model able to account for a high degree of complexity is necessary for the thesis empirical case.
A fair number of theories claims to explain changes in policies and the often-complex processes in which they are changed. Three of the more prominent ones, which also share a few similarities, are the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Weible 2017). They share a couple of assumptions, but two instances where the three theories differ are their explanations of the individual and collective action. The MSF sees the individual as a
“satisficer”, while the other two sees it in terms of “preferences and situation characteristics” (PET) or guided by inner “belief systems” (ACF) (Schlager 1999: 242-244). Collective action is a second concept which differentiates them, where the MSF cares the least about collective action and instead focuses on the critical roles of specific individuals, policy entrepreneurs, for instance. The two other theories pay a lot more interest in the force of collective action (Schlager 1999: 244-245). Given this, it is found that the MSF theory is deemed most
applicable to the inquiries of this thesis, due to its explanatory value in assessing the processes of policy change through the actions of specific individuals. This is deemed especially
relevant, given that the actors within Swedish defence and security policy are of a small numeral, indicating that individuals’ roles should be prominent. Furthermore, the MSF is chosen due to its acclaimed prominence in explaining the policy process while maintaining its complexity. The framework has also received prominence for explaining rapid policy
changes, suggesting that it will give a good account for the rapid shift that this thesis means to explain (Rüb 2016). Lastly, the MSFs view of rationality and favouring of bounded rationality is seen as a final reason for why it will be able to explain the complex ways of the policy process, given that rational decision-making models, for instance, have been found insufficient in explaining complex issues or problems (Knaggård 2009).
3.2 Multiple Streams Framework
The framework, which originally was developed and put forward by Kingdon (2011, first published in 1984) with inspiration from the garbage-can model (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972), consists of six different basic assumptions – ambiguity, time constraints, problematic policy preferences, unclear technology, fluid participation, and stream independence (Herweg et al. 2017: 18-20). All these assumptions provide the guidelines by which the framework is to be used and understood.
The basic outline and structural elements of the MSF are firstly signified by the notion of stream independence among the three streams – problem, policy, and political. The streams manifest the independent processes that flow through the political system (Herweg et al. 2017). Given the assumption that the consensus-building within the streams is done via different dynamics (Kingdon 2011). The MSF further assumes that there is no natural connection between a problem and a policy solution, which is why it uses the term coupling to indicate the possible linkage between the two (Herweg et al. 2017). The second stage involves how an issue or problem might attain agenda prominence and further along become decided upon by decision-makers, which requires the independent streams to at some point come together. That opportunity arises when and if a “policy window” opens. Often enough, though, a third factor is required to happen, according to the theory. Namely, the coupling between a problem and a solution needs to have been done by a “policy entrepreneur”, which presents this to receptive policymakers (Herweg et al. 2017: 20). In recent years, a modified version of Kingdon’s original framework was developed by Herweg, Huß and Zohlnhöfer (2015), to be more adapted to parliamentary political systems.
Given that Sweden uses a parliamentary system and that defence and security policy to a high degree are handled on the national level, the modified frameworks’ usage is deemed instinctive. The modified process is signified by two coupling processes and two different outcome windows, the agenda window, and the decision window. The coupling for the second
window is done via “political entrepreneurs'', and the decision window enables the policy solution to become policy output (Herweg et al. 2015). All of the structural elements of the MSF are further elaborated upon in the next sections and can be seen below in the figure.
The framework is, naturally, not without limitations. A reoccurring discussion among users and critics of it is the actual independence of the streams. The critics question the usefulness of having independent streams, stressing that interdependent ones are more fruitful. Pointing to the notion that changes in one stream can reinforce or trigger changes in the other ones (Robinson and Eller 2010; Mucciaroni 2013). The counterargument is that the independence of then can be seen or used as a conceptual tool, in order to, for instance, capture rationality (Herweg et al. 2017:39). A second factor relevant regarding the limitations of the framework is the inclusion of the mass media (Rüb 2016: 62). Their reporting on issues, and
non-reporting, does indeed have some effect in terms of which problems make it to the political agenda or not. Hence, this is something that the thesis will use, by way of using the news reporting done about the studied problems.
3.2.1 Problem Stream
According to the MSF, a problem is “a condition that deviates from policymakers or citizens' ideal state” (Béland and Howlett 2016: 222) and is also defined as a public problem, meaning that government action is needed in resolving it. Furthermore, conditions can turn into
problems if one, for instance, sees another country acting differently upon it and managing it
Figure 1. The modified multiple streams framework
better, or the condition starts being seen through a different perspective and gets seen as a problem (Herweg et al. 2017: 21). Also, meaning that different problems include a “perceptual, interpretive element” (Kingdon 2011: 110).
Problems come to decision-makers’ attention by various systemic indicators – either monitored by themselves or by governmental or nongovernmental agencies. They seldom do so via different kinds of political pressure or perceptual sleight of hand (Kingdon 2011: 90). Some of the most common indicators are either expenditures and budgetary impacts or
commissioned studies. These are not used as indicators of whether a problem exists or not but are instead mainly used in two ways: receiving an indication of changes in problems and assessing the magnitude of them (Kingdon 2011 :91). The notion of indicators is not without problem in itself, given that they come with interpretations. Indicators can in themselves come with powerful implications, and the interpretation of these can result in extensive debates regarding their meaning (Kindon 2011: 94).
However, according to Kingdon, these indicators are not always in themselves enough to grab decision-makers attention. This is often achieved by what he calls focusing events – such as a crisis or disaster that points at the problem, or a kind of powerful symbol that catches attention, or that a policymaker has personal experience of the problem (Kingdon 2011: 94-95). What it is that constitutes as a symbol or a personal experience for a
policymaker, is not clearly defined by Kingdon. The constitution of focusing events has been both assumed and critically discussed by other research (Birkland and Warnement 2016: 99-103). Nonetheless, Kingdon stresses the fact that a focusing event in and of itself very seldomly is enough to carry a subject to the policy agenda. Instead, the events could be seen as, firstly, something that brings attention to a problem that is already in “the back of people’s minds”; or secondly, as an early warning of something that could possibly evolve into a problem; and thirdly, a combination of focusing events can jointly affect the problem definition (Kingdon 2011: 98) – suggesting that enough awareness to a problem requires at least two events.
The third factor by which attention for a problem can be gathered is via feedback on existing programs. For instance, it becomes known to the policymakers and the public that a program is not meeting its goals, or the budget is spiralling, and feedback regarding this can be used in framing something as a problem (Herweg et al. 2017: 22). The notion of framing then tells us that agency is in play and that the theory discards objective facts. However, Kingdon does not introduce agency in the problem stream, more recent research has done this. The concept of problem brokers addresses this and is defined as actors that “frame conditions
as public problems and work to make policymakers accept these frames. Problem brokers thus define conditions as problems.” (Knaggård 2015: 452). With this development of the problem stream, it is easier to distinguish between it and the policy stream, and policy entrepreneurs - something that previous research has stated as being a difficulty (Knaggård 2015: 451; Herweg et al. 2017: 22).
3.2.2 Political Stream
There are three core elements within the political stream: government, interest groups, and the national mood. The general core of the stream is based on bargaining and power, given that it is within this stream that the moves for a majority are made. Therefore, the stream is naturally located in the middle of the political system (Herweg et al. 2017: 24).
In the first element, governments, the focus is placed on changes in composition. Because some policy proposals might be more in line ideologically with some politicians, then others, could a turnover in government help put an item on the political agenda. A second aspect within the element that is important is the power and turf battles that might exist among the bureaucratic administrators and legislators (Herweg et al. 2017: 25) – which naturally affects what issues make it to the agenda or not. Noteworthy in this aspect, is also the terminological inclusion of governments – where Kingdon incorporates (as in the
American system) the administration, civil servants and Congress in the term (2011: 21). In a Swedish context, these actors would, for instance, be divided into at least four separate sub-elements – such as the Government (the Administration), the Governments Offices (the Administration and civil servants), Government agencies (civil servants), and the Parliament (Congress) (Larsson and Bäck 2008: 187-188). However, where political parties should fit in the stream is somewhat unclear - Herweg, Huß and Zohlnhöfer (2015), debates and lands in the conclusion that it should be a variable on its own within the stream.
The second element, interest groups, is relevant given the effects they can have on the voiced support for an idea. Focus here is the effects interest groups can have via campaigns, not in the softening-up of policy ideas – which occurs in the policy stream (Herweg et al. 2017: 25). The degree and way interest groups work in Sweden differ to some extent, and research suggests that interaction methods have become much more informal, and the general influence weaker (Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Christiansen et al. 2010).
The final element, the national mood, is arguably an elusive factor, but important because it provides empirical results and is often referred to by politicians (Herweg et al. 2017: 24). An important factor in this is how parties compete over space on the political agenda, and which policy areas or questions that are seen being “owned” by a party. Research tells us that an issue owned by a governing party is more likely to end up on the agenda, than those owned by parties in the opposition (Herweg et al. 2015: 439-440). In the end, however, the national mood is manly up to the interpretation and perception of it by the politicians, except in the cases where the national mood is particularly strong and heavily in favour of a policy, where the government is more likely to bandwagon on this expression of preference (Herweg et al. 2015: 440).
However, notable is the lack of a specific factor within the stream, namely, the mass media. The factor has been recognised as most certainly being a factor of important influence regarding what issues that receive the media’s attention or not (Herweg et al. 2017: 42) but is, nevertheless, unresearched. Tools by which to analyse the media's role are thereby missing.
Research shows that the three elements do not need to agree in order for the political stream to be ready for coupling. Instead, it indicates that as long as a “political entrepreneur”, a key policymaker (an influential legislator or relevant minister), has been convinced of an idea and is willing to stitch together a majority backing it, the stream is ready for coupling (Herweg et al. 2017: 26), which means that the political stream merely requires enough persuasion of the “right” policymakers in order to be ready for an agenda window opening.
3.2.3 Policy Stream
In this stream, it is all about the policy alternatives, which are generated within different policy communities. These communities are defined as “mainly a loose connection of civil servants, interest groups, academics, researchers and consultants (the so-called hidden participants), who engage in working out alternatives to the policy problems of a specific policy field” (Herweg 2016: 132), also known as policy experts - where some even come from political parties (Herweg et al. 2017: 23, 36). Hence, participants are located both inside and outside of government, and their visibility to the public is both hidden and observable (Herweg 2016: 128). These experts join in what Kingdon calls the policy “primeval soup” (2011: 116), where several ideas float around. This is then often followed by a process which Kingdon named “softening up” (2011: 127), in which different ideas are discussed, debated
and eventually turn into a couple of viable and backed alternatives (Herweg et al. 2017: 23). A lot of it is done in a parliamentary system within the political parties (Herweg et al. 2015: 442). The process of the policy stream is heavily influenced by how the policy community is structured. More integrated communities that are consensual and smaller are more likely to engage in idea generations that are signified by an emergent to a convergent pattern (Herweg et al. 2017: 23). Meaning that they engage in a gradual gestation when it comes to new ideas, and a rapid gestation if it involves old ideas.
A second factor to highlight, concerning the policy stream, is the influence of external causes. Lovell (2016) finds that the MSF application must be supplemented with a reflection regarding the mobility of policy and how it travels across national boundaries. Suggesting that a policy might not “move” until it has gained enough legitimacy abroad from other states (Herweg et al. 2017: 23).
According to Kingdon, it is by no way random which policy alternatives that makes it past the “primeval soup”, he discussed this as “criteria for survival” (2011: 131-139);
technical feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints (comprised by financial viability and public acceptance). This meaning that if a policy alternative is deemed as being too hard to implement, or is in contradiction with the values of many in the policy community, is believed not to gain majority support in the political stream, or seen as too costly, it is not deemed as very likely that is will survive past the “softening up”-process (Herweg et al. 2017: 24). Finally, the stream can be seen as ready for coupling when there exists at least one alternative that has made it through the criteria. Otherwise, the MSF tells us that a coupling between the three streams is unlikely.
3.2.4 Policy and political entrepreneurs
Policy entrepreneurs are, in Kingdon’s words “advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidarity benefits.” (2011: 179), and they are key actors within the MSF. From a journalist to a bureaucrat, anyone can become a policy entrepreneur, and push their (pet projects) proposals within the policy stream. They push and adapt them within the policy community, and once they succeed in that, the process of coupling the idea with the two other streams gets initiated. The skill is to await an agenda window opening and then immediately start connecting one's policy solution to the arisen
problem, and then find a political entrepreneur that can push the solution in the political stream (Herweg et al. 2017:28). The policy entrepreneurs have several instruments to their disposal – such as the use of symbols, framing of problems, and “salami tactics”3 (Zahariadis
2007).
Previous research states that the more resources an entrepreneur has, the higher the likelihood of success. It also states that the more access an entrepreneur has to policymakers, the more successful he/she is. However, in a choice between the two, the accessibility to policymakers is deemed more valuable than the number of resources or negotiating skills an entrepreneur has. Lastly, policy entrepreneurs that match the policymakers ideologically, also have a higher rate of success. Given that some problems that surface can already have existing policy-solutions coupled with them and they just “fit” or the other way around, a new
minister, for instance, wants a new policy on the agenda and that then needs coupling with a problem (Herweg et al. 2017: 29).
A final element in, is the political entrepreneurs, defined by being elected to leadership positions. They are highly relevant in the second face of the policy process when a decision window opens. Their job is to couple the streams and get the policy adopted. At their disposal, they have three different instruments: package deals, concessions, or manipulation (Herweg et al. 2015: 446). This additional entrepreneur is vital because it adds explanatory power to parliamentarian systems where the actions of political parties are of high
importance, such as in Sweden.
3.2.5 Agenda and Decision Windows
At the heart of the MSF is the process of coupling, already described further up, and it is the successful coupling of the three streams that enable agenda change. However, that is not always necessarily enough to enact a change, the odds of enabling it is much higher if it is timed at specific moments in time, namely, via agenda or decision windows (Herweg et al. 2017: 26). According to the theory, these kinds of windows can open in two of the streams – either you have a problem window or a political window. However, the theory stresses that these types of windows are quite rare and often very short-lived. A problem window opens when there is a focusing event or a severe deterioration in specific indicators, such as sudden
3”Salami tactics” are defined as and meant to “ cut the process into distinct stages which are presented sequentially to policy-makers. Doing so promotes agreement in steps” (Zahariadis 2007: 78).
high rises in budget deficits or a considerable dissonance between set tasks and agencies’ actual capability (Herweg et al. 2017: 26-27). However, another factor that also affects the problem window, is the already discussed notion of decision-makers’ attention spans. If they, for instance, already are busy handling other issues on the agenda, they might not have enough attention to spar at that moment, given that they at that time have more pressing problems to handle (Herweg et al. 2015: 437). The opening of problem windows is then somewhat subjugated to what other issues call for the attention of decision-makers. However, necessary to add is that severe focusing events can be a crucial factor when it comes to opening problem windows in politically less prominent fields (Herweg et al. 2017 :28).
The opening of windows in the political stream is somewhat more easily identified, due to it being subjugated to changes in government or parliament. New members enter one or both entities and bring along an interest in new or different ideas and can push fourth reformed policy proposals, or their own pet projects. A drastic swing in the national mood, concerning a specific policy area, can also initiate an agenda window opening in the political stream (Herweg et al. 2017: 26). An upcoming election or a change in government has been attributed as two key factors that can open windows, given that sweeping changes in policies can be used as tools in the political struggle for votes and influence (Herweg et al. 2015:443).
A third coupling mechanism, which is leaser researched, is commissioning - introduced by Ackrill and Kay (2011), commissioning captures policymakers’ attention differently than doctrinal or consequential coupling. It differs in the sense that instead of a policy entrepreneur selling a policy idea to a policymaker, the policymaker (somewhat) impartially selects a solution that they deem suitable for the occurring changes in the problem or political stream. This instead indicates an active reaction by policymakers´ on the opening of policy windows (Ackrill and Kay 2011: 77-78). Implying that both policy entrepreneurs and policymakers can use windows.
The final stage of the process is the decision window, in which the policy solution decided upon in the agenda window, moves all the way up to the decision-making stage – the legislative body. Here the policy gets its final formulation and legitimation. The main focus is to create a majority for the solution; a task carried out by the political entrepreneurs (Herweg et al. 2015). How all of this will be applied to the case is defined and operationalized at the end of the next chapter, in section 4.4 Analytical Framework.
4. Methodology
4.1 Research design
Given the explanatory aim of this thesis, with its stated research question, it has a theory consuming purpose. The goal is to see in what ways the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) can provide further explanation to what made the shift in Sweden’s defence and security policy occur. Furthermore, the research design is signified by the thesis being a single case study that further means to generate a broader understanding of why a state changed its defence and security policy. Being that the study only consists of a single case, it will of course, not be able to make predominantly generalisable conclusions (Risjord 2014).
However, it will tell us more about security and defence policy processes in Sweden and how well the MSF can account for these. The case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy can be seen as rather intriguing, due to the country’s somewhat singular position in defence and security policy (Brommesson 2018). The country is a member of the European Union, only a partner nation with NATO and the country underwent a drastic defence transformation following the end of the Cold War (Agrell 2010: 241; Christiansson 2020: 5-6). Focusing on the theoretical framework that the thesis will use, also here does the case differentiate itself, given that the theory has only to a small degree been used on cases
including security and defence policy (Ceccoli 2019). The general strength of case studies lies in their ability to develop historical explanations of particular events, identify omitted or new hypotheses and variables, attain high levels of conceptual validity, and also their ability to address causal complexity (George and Bennett 2005: 19; Bennett 2010: 19), where the latter is of most importance for this study. The exploratory and explanatory purpose of the case study will, thereto, make it a good introductory study for future research concerning either Swedish defence policy or policy processes in defence and security.
Given the purpose of the thesis, the choice of research design is not necessarily straightforward. Many researchers can agree upon, no matter their ontological or theoretical point of departure, the relevance and explanatory power of causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The methods by which single cases can be studied are several, but given the chosen theoretical frameworks focus on causal processes, a research design able to identify causal mechanisms or processes is deemed essential. Also, given that the thesis merely has a
“discovering” purpose, a reflection surrounding matters of biasness or causal generalisable claims is deemed unnecessary (Risjord 2014).
The thesis’s task is to try and capture the events and processes that preceded the shift in policy that occurred in 2015. In order to achieve that, a large amount of empirical material is needed. For instance, the actual Defence bill (Prop. 2014/15:109), entailing the actual shift in policy, was preceded by two large White papers4 by the Defence Commission (DC), public
inquiries, and other official documents. Important to mention is also the Defence bill of 2009 (Prop. 2008/09:140), with a similar trail of official documents preceding it, which provides insight into the lay of the land before the new Defence bill of 2015. This large body of official documents is supplemented by two other types of textual material, interviews and news media reporting (see 4.2 Material). These three are used by way of triangulation, to achieve a richer explanatory power to the research question. The method by which all of this empirical material will be analysed is explained further down in the chapter.
4.2 Material
To achieve the task of qualitative content analysis and analysing the three different streams: political, problem, and policy, as well as the entrepreneurs and the possible windows, it is important to capture the material by which these are found. A qualitative textual analysis of official documents, news reporting, and interviews will serve as a basis for locating the three streams, and the entrepreneurs and the windows. In qualitative research, it is expected that studies draw upon a multitude of sources (at least two different). This is done in order to seek convergence and corroboration. Hence, one way of achieving this is by triangulating different sources of empirics, to reach as much credibility as possible for the conducted research. Using different methods by which to collect empirics, such as official documents; interviews; media coverage, the researcher can safeguard herself from the risk that the findings of a study are more than her own biases, or a single source (Bowen 2009: 28). Documentary material has a vital role in this, given the many types that exist, and how information, for instance, in specific official reports can provide context and historical insight into how things were
4White paper is the general term for different Defence Commissions presented reports, used by several countries
situated (Bowen 2009: 29-30). Hence, the material used for this thesis will be a collection of official documents, interviews, and relevant media material5.
Kingdon stresses the importance of identifying actors that shape the agenda, both inside government and outside (the media, interest groups, public opinion, researchers, etc.) (2011: 21). The political system’s layout differs between the United States and Sweden, which indicates that there might be differences in the actors that are of relevance and interest. The work process of the Swedish DC is, in this sense, somewhat atypical – given that the form of it is similar to official reports conducted by the Government, but comments on them by expert agencies are not made via the traditional form of a letter of comments (remissvar). Instead, the process of comments is done more internally via the Commission, appointed experts from each concerned agency of expertise (predominantly the SAF and the SCCA) (Regeringen 2017; Åkesson 2020). Hence, is the usage of interviews for the thesis deemed as particularly valuable, due to somewhat lack of official, accessible, documentation.
One important factor related to the above stated and differentiates research within the field of security and defence policy, from that conducted in other policy fields – is the degree of secrecy surrounding certain areas within the two areas. This thesis will, hence, only use open-source material for its analysis. Meaning, that there could exist explanatory factors that are beyond the scope and grasp of this analysis.
For the analysis, a news article search was conducted via the database Retriver.se, in which the search words “säkerhetspolitik [security politics]” and “försvarspolitik [defence politics]” were used. The search included news articles published between 2007-01-01 and 2015-12-31, the dates selected on the premise that they are within the period motivated and selected by the thesis. Given the considerable numbers of local and regional newspapers in Sweden, a decision was made to only use the most important national papers and news websites6 - due to the more prominent coverage and national spread. For the analysis, a
sampling of the news articles was done with the purpose of having key articles for references.
4.2.1 Interviews
For his work and the development of the Multiple Streams Framework, Kingdon used interviews as a method for gathering empirics. Emphasis was placed on locating and
5See chapter 7.2 and the Appendix for a complete presentation of the material used for the analysis 6Aftonbladet, Expressen, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet (Kantar Sifo 2019)
interviewing individuals in key positions within congressional committees, top career civil servants close to decision-makers, and representatives of influential interest groups (Kingdon 2011: 250-255). In this thesis, interviews are deemed a purposeful tool to obtain a greater understanding of the processes that preceded decision-making - especially given that the interaction that occurs between key actors might not be located via official documents solely. Therefore, a focus has been placed on identifying key individuals within the different DC that were active during the studied period, the years 2007-2015. Key individuals within the
Commission are here identified as the appointed politicians, the head of the secretariat7,
experts and specialists from head agencies, and the head Government Offices (Defence and Foreign). See section 4.3.1 Limitations for further reflections regarding the thesis usage of interviews. A snowballing method was used at the end of each interview, to identify key individuals within the processes more precisely.
A difficult task to reflect upon in any study, but especially in research occupied with interviews, is validity and reliability. Regarding reliability, the question of what answers an interview subject gives to the same inquiry at different times becomes a necessary reflection. For the sake of validity, a strong connection between that of purpose, theory, and method is necessary (Kvale and Brinkmann 2014: 293-294). The principal interview usage for the analysis has been semi-structured formal interviews (see below and Appendix A), but it has also been supplemented with informal interviews – however, mainly for the sake of
background information.
Name Organization Role
Urban Ahlin Parliamentarian for the Social democrats (retired)
Member of Parliament and the Defence Commission, 2012-2014
Kristina Bergendal Swedish Armed Forces Political Advisor to the Chief of Defence, 2010-2015
Dennis Gyllensporre Swedish Armed Forces Military expert in the Defence Commission, 2012-2014
Sverker Göranson Swedish Armed Forces (retired) Chief of Defence, 2009-2015
Hans-Christian Hagman Ministry for Foreign Affairs Expert in the Defence Commission, 2007-2008
Ola Hedin Ministry of Defence Expert in the Defence Commission, 2012-2014
Jörgen Sollin The Moderate Party Senior political advisor, 2008-
Björn von Sydow Parliamentarian for the Social democrats (retired)
Member of Parliament, former Chairman of the Defence Commission 2017-2919
Nils Svartz Civil Contingency Agency Expert in the Defence Commission, 2013-2014
Allan Widman Parliamentarian for the Liberals Member of Parliament and the Defence Commission, 2007-
Tommy Åkesson Ministry of Defence Head Secretary of the Defence Commission, 2012-
7The Secretariat has a key role within the Commission, given that it is tasked with writing all official documents and also planning and structuring the work process of the Commission.
4.3 Qualitative content analysis
Qualitative content analysis is a method used by a wide range of researchers in many different fields of study. The approach has reached acclaim for its usage in analyzing changes over time and finding patterns in larger bodies of materials – such as official documents, media reporting or large transcripts of interviews (Boréus and Bergström 2017: 25). For the sake of intersubjectivity, coding of a sort is necessary for conducting a content analysis. A traditional way of using content analysis involves some sort of word counting. Straightforward in its application perhaps, but it also presents difficulties in the sense that it misses the way in which things are expressed. (Boréus and Bergström 2017). Therefore, for the thesis analysis, a qualitative content reading was conducted, using the analytical elements provided by the chosen theory, the MSF. This means that essential sections of the collected empirical material were sorted via the analysing elements of the theoretical framework, problems, political, policy, policy entrepreneurs, political entrepreneurs, agenda window and decision window. A categorization of the textual material was hence conducted. When conducting the content analysis, a linear time study of the official documents was done. The textual studying was initiated with the White papers and official documents that preceded the Defence bill of 2009 (Prop. 2008/09:140), then the Defence bill of 2009, followed by the same types of official documents informing the Defence bill of 2015, and then lastly the defence bill (Prop. 2014/15:109). That reading was followed by the same method application done on the interview transcriptions conducted for the thesis. Lastly, a qualitative content analysis was conducted on the sampled news media articles. The operationalization done for the thesis is found in the final section of this chapter. It identifies how the five elements of the MSF are located within the official documents, news articles and the interview transcripts.
Given the thesis aim of identifying how the shift in policy came about, one could also have contemplated the usage of the process-tracing method in locating the causal mechanism inside the policy process. However, given that the method has clear path-dependent usages and is applicable for identifying temporal sequencings (Kay and Baker 2015), it can prove problematic to use in combination with the MSF - especially given the temporal independence that exists between the frameworks three streams.
4.3.1 Limitations
As with most research, there are naturally some limitations to the research design that a study uses. One of the more directly affecting limitations is the Covid-19 pandemic and the
consequences the on-following interaction limitations had for formal interviews. The effect that a distinct interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee was often lost and important details can have been missed. Ideally, the thesis should have conducted two interview sessions with the interviewees to attain great precision in terms of both reliability and validity, but the time limits of the thesis made it a too difficult task to achieve.
The second limitation in this is the number of persons interviewed and the width and scope they together provided. An attempt was made in attaining interviews with at least one politician, part of the DC during the 2012-2014 period, from each parliamentary party, which sadly was unsuccessful. However, as with all time-limited studies, choices had to be made, resulting in a not ideal representation of interview subjects. Ideally, the scope of the
interviewees should have included politicians from all parliamentary parties, more members of the two DC’s, and relevant external actors from the media and other interest groups. Especially unfortunate was the unavailability of two prominent actors, Peter Hultqvist and Karin Enström, who were both identified as insightful individuals. Nonetheless, a choice was made in focusing on the three parties pointed out as the primary actors engaged in defence and security policy and some of the key experts and policy advisors involved in the process.
Moreover, it is necessary to touch upon the limitations of the data collected from the interviews. Qualitative interviews are by some researchers considered too subjective and non-scientific, and also troublesome given the power/knowledge relationship that arises between the interviewer and the interviewee (Kvale and Brinkmann 2014: 210-213). However, this is handled in the sense that the purpose of the thesis is to access new knowledge, by which interviews are a good tool to accomplish this and that the thesis uses triangulation of the material to access objective knowledge.
4.4 Analytical framework
To apply the modified Multiple Streams Framework on this thesis case and the Swedish political system, an operationalization is conducted. The original theory was, as already mentioned, developed and tested on the US political system, which entails that a small
adaptation to the Swedish model has been made, see chapter 3.2 Multiple Streams
Framework. Below are the five analytical elements of the thesis stated, and with them a short operationalization regarding how the streams, the windows and the entrepreneurs will be identified.
- The Problem stream is here defined and represented by indicators that signal possible changes in the perception of problems; these are identified via problem formulations in commissioned reports as well as the conducted interviews. Feedback on existing problems is the second indicator in this, located via official reports, interviews, and media reporting. These indicators are subjugated to interpretation and can be
influenced via problem brokers, which are identified via interviews and news media reporting. Focusing events are deemed as a contributing factor, more so if two or more events connect with one another, which are identified via interviews and media
reporting. The events are signified via their effect on the perception of a problem. - The Political stream is here marked by the opinions of the time, focusing on public
opinion and how parties and politicians react to and fight over this. These are
identified with opinion polls, interviews, parliamentary discussions, and news media reporting. Ideology and closeness to election also come into play, given that the move towards attaining a majority for a policy is gained here. Identifying these aspects is done via the official commissioned reports, alongside debates surrounding the Government bills, and the interviews.
- The Policy stream will be analysed via the policy community that was engaged during the policy process. A key part in this is the working process in and around the DC, which is central within the Swedish context. Identifying the alternatives that circled and moved forward within this community is done via interviews, news media reporting, parliamentary debates and deviating opinions. The alternatives are identified via the criteria of survival.
- Policy and political entrepreneurs will be identified among the politicians and civil servants engaged in security and defence policy, mainly individuals’ part of the DC, since it is the politicians that are part of the direct outcome of the policy process, whether a policy gets accepted or not. Moreover, possible entrepreneurs located outside of the defence and security politicians' inner workings will be identified via their usage of possible methods such as framing, use of symbols, and salami tactics.
- Agenda and decision windows are identified via their essential part in coupling the streams. A window is considered opened when there is an evident deterioration in either the problem stream, sparked by certain events that jeopardise the national security or a severe issue regarding the current policy. Changes in parliament or government can also open a window, or a drastic change in the public mood regarding the defence, and security policy.
5. Analysis
5.1 Problem stream
The analysis finds proof that several of the problem stream factors were present in the studied case. Four different problem indicators are located, as well as provided feedback regarding these. Further, it is found that two separate focusing events had a significant effect on the problems’ perception. Lastly, the analysis finds that a problem broker's presence played a big part in the framing of the problems.
All four problem indicators identified in the process leading up to the policy shift in 2015, had already been present in the debates leading up to the 2009 Defence bill – namely, budget, staffing, threat perception and strategic outline. The budget indicator entailed that the SAF lacked the funds necessary to perform all the policy goals the organization was tasked with (Försvarsmakten 2009; Göranson 2020). Further, it was indicated that the organization had problems in staffing all of its units and would continue to have problems doing so (Försvarsmakten 2009: 32). The third indicator identified is most easily described as a factor of threat perception. It entails to what degree and what types of threats that are described as facing Sweden. The types are depicted as several, ranging from terrorism, and climate change, to conflicts in the Swedish geostrategic sphere. Put more precisely, the problem indicator pertains to what degree Sweden was facing a threat against its sovereignty and values (Ds. 2008:48; Ds. 2014). One of the more prominent and discussed problems is Russia's actions and their effect on Sweden. The indicators being that Russia was modernising and increasing its military forces and became more of a threat against its neighbouring states (Bergendal 2020; Gyllensporre 2020; Ahlin 2020; Sollin 2020). The final indicator is somewhat harder to explain, given that it has more strategic and ideological aspects connected to it. Several of the actors interviewed for the thesis indicated that the SAF problems and the more general aspects of the defence and security policy were that the whole apparatus had become too reduced. The primary objective of the defence and security policy was, in a sense, lost. Capacity and
objectives on the national scene no longer matched, too much focus had been placed on slimming the costs of the defence and having an operational force that worked well on international missions (Göranson 2020; Ahlin 2020, Åkesson 2020).
However, the problems facing the SAF were not sufficiently solved by the policy solutions presented in the 2009 Defence bill, and already around 2011 the SAF started
indicating that they still had problems regarding staffing and that budget allocated to them was not enough to solve their policy goals (Lindberg 2011; Göranson 2020; Bergendal 2020; 2013/14:FöU7). The SAF continuously provided the Government with feedback regarding the problems, but the feedback and the indicators were not enough to grab the decision-makers' attention (Bengtsson 2012; Lindberg 2012; Göranson 2020).
Instead, it is found that the combination of two focusing events was the factor that brought the problems up to the political agenda and the public's attention. The two events identified are the following: on the 30th of December 2012, Chod Sverker Göranson made an
interview statement that would have far longer consequences than first expected. In the interview, he tries as visibly and simply as possible to explain the current national defence capacities of the SAF. The term “one-week-defence” is coined, and suddenly defence-related topics receive a lot of attention both from the media and the opposition (Bergendahl 2020; Göranson 2020; Holmström 2012). The decision to do the interview was preceded by a long period of time during which Göranson and the SAF had tried to indicate to the incumbent government that there was a big gap between the funds allocated to the SAF and the policy goals they were tasked to complete (Göranson 2020; Försvarsmakten 2009). The previous budgetary cuts that had been made were too great, and the SAF would no longer be able to perform one of its main tasks – defend Sweden and its territorial borders (Prop. 2008/09:140). A lack of sufficient resources and staffing difficulties were described as two of the main problems facing the SAF in achieving their tasks (Försvarsmakten 2009; Göranson 2020). The problem was met with mixed responses, Defence Minister Enström made a vague remark and was shortly after criticized by the leading figure of the opposition, Peter Hultqvist, who instead insisted on higher demands and an increased capability of the SAF (Hultqvist 2013). Moreover, the statement was referred to as a “political bomb” by parliamentarian Allan Widman, who also stated that the event would change the entire debate surrounding the Swedish defence policy (Stenberg 2013a). The incumbent prime minister Reinfeldt responded a month later and simply stated that the SAF was one agency among several others and that Göranson was simply worried about general funding, like all heads of agencies (Stenberg 2013b). Showing that the problems were not considered as more pressing than other matters in the political agenda.
The statement by Göranson did generate even greater importance when his warnings became realized via the second identified focusing event, namely the “Russian Easter” attack that occurred circa four months later. The “Easter attack” had materialized the Chods’
