The Disguised Variable - The Influence of Russian Elite Clans on Russian Foreign Policy

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International Relations

Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits thesis

Spring 2020

Supervisor: John Åberg

The Disguised Variable: The Influence

of Russian Elite Clans on Russian

Foreign Policy

Domininkas Deksnys

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the influence of Russian elite clans on Russian foreign policy-making. The goal of this paper is to discover the missing link that connects the changes in the International System to the formation of Russian foreign policy, more specifically the Russo-Georgian War, the occupation of Crimea, and the intervention in Syria. Therefore, the theory of neo-classical realism is applied to a systematic process analysis in order to trace the chain of causal relations in which the struggle of elite clans influences foreign policy-making. The combination of realism and state capacity analysis complements the approach of neo-classical realism. This paper argues that the beliefs of the elite clans play an important role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy. The elite clans struggle to establish themselves and consolidate their power within the Russian government structures, which affected the shift from pragmatism and a multipolar approach to a transimperialist approach in Russian foreign policy.

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1. Introduction

Russia is the largest country by area in the world, with a population of over 142 million people and a GDP of around 1.5 trillion USD (CIA, 2020). These numbers suggest that Russia is a great power in the world, which is also demonstrated by Russia itself through its foreign policy. Certain foreign policies led to the events of the Russo-Georgian war, the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ukraine and the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as the intervention in Syria. The question that remains is why these foreign policies were implemented in the first place. They are not responses to security threats to the Russian state, and as a state that often practices non-intervention and praises the concept of sovereignty within the UN, these foreign policies seem rather contradictory to Russian state beliefs and interests. The aim of this paper is thus to find the missing link that explains and led to these foreign policies.

The analysis of Russian foreign policy is not unpopular in International Relations (IR), and as Mearsheimer’s article on the annexation of Crimea demonstrates, it is popular to analyze Russia’s actions in the international arena from the perspective of neo-realism (Mearsheimer, 2014). However, this approach in IR simplifies the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy, since the state is perceived only as a rational actor who is simply reacting to changes in the international system (IS) and acting according to its national interest. Instead, an alternative approach should be used to argue that Russian foreign policy is based on the interests of individuals rather than national interests, seeing that many actions are detrimental to the position of the Russian state (Drezner, 2012).

To gain a better understanding of Russia’s foreign policy, one must look deeper into the internal factors. Thus, neo-classical realism, which combines the importance of structural and internal influences in foreign policy-making, serves this purpose well. In Russia, power is exploited for the benefit of individual interests, as seen through clashes between elite clans that rely not on formal institutions but their relationship with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (Dawisha, 2011: 333-334). This type of relationship calls into question the rationality premise and raises the research question: how does the struggle of the Russian elite clans influence Russian foreign policy-making? The hypothesis of this paper suggests that the changes within the IS do not influence Russian foreign policy itself, but rather the elite clans that are predominant in Russia, who, in turn, struggle for power within the Russian government.

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To support my claim by uncovering the influence of elite clans on foreign policy-making, a solid theoretical basis will be established from the perspective of neo-classical realism. This will allow me to analyze informal networks in Russia. The theory of neo-realism will be used to define the effects of the IS affecting Russia, which will be counterbalanced by examining internal factors through a state capacity approach. The assumptions of both approaches will be complemented by neo-classical realism to find out how the internal intervening variable affects foreign policy-making. To achieve this, I will use the method of process tracing, more specifically a systematic process analysis, which is used to identify the chain of causation which led to the mentioned foreign policies of Russia in response to the changes in the IS. This paper will proceed with a literature review, followed by a methodology explaining the four steps of systematic process analysis, which in turn will be followed by the theory definition which constitutes the first step. Afterwards, I will conduct the analysis and end the paper with a conclusion.

2. Literature review

In this chapter, I will review previous literature of IR scholars about themes that are relevant to my analysis, namely the theory of neo-realism, the Russian state, and Russian elite clans. Although the theory I will apply to my analysis is neo-classical realism, the theories of realism and neo-realism need to be examined first as it will present an understanding of the main concepts and benefits of neo-classical realism. In the beginning of this chapter, I will explain the traditional assumptions of realism and neo-realism in IR, and explain how different scholars and academics utilize these theories. Following, I will review how other scholars have previously analyzed the Russian state, including its characteristics and foreign policy. In the third section, I will look at Russian elite clans and how they can be analyzed.

2.1 The theory of Neo-realism

Many theories try to explain IR but when analyzing great powers there is usually a specific theoretical approach. Realism in IR can be traced back to Niccolò Machiavelli’s time in the 16th_{century. It is argued that the state has become a major unit in IR and since there is no}

higher power over the state, many authors could argue that the international arena is anarchic. However, Lake has argued that there is a form of hierarchy in IR, where states surrender to a single sovereign, which is mostly a hegemonic power at that time (Lake, 2009: 1-2). Authority in this case becomes an expression of state power and is associated with a certain

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subtext of legitimacy. Lake claims since the United States has started the war with Iraq in 2003, subsequently the US has lost its legitimacy as a world hegemon (Lake, 2009: 32). The status of the US as a global policeman is a constantly debated topic amid various events.

Just like the question of US hegemony in the contemporary international arena, the dominance of realism in IR scholarship is contested. Realism is a deterministic theory whose perspective is to predict state action in a deductive way. Especially neo-realism is considered one of the most influential theories of international relations, along with neo-liberalism (Powell, 1994: 313). Neo-realism, also known as structural realism, is divided into offensive and defensive. According to Mearsheimer, who is known to be an offensive realist, the basic principle of neo-realism is the realization that the international system is dominated by anarchy with the major powers having military power (Snyder, 2002: 151). The states themselves are never sure of the intentions of others, which creates a situation of constant fear for their safety. States’ primary goal is survival and they act as rational actors, where each action is calculated and serves the fundamental interests of the state (Snyder, 2002: 152). In turn, defensive realism, represented by Waltz, follows the basic principles of offensive realism with the only significant difference being a sufficient amount of power. Defensive realism argues that states do not seek to have as much power as possible to maximize their security, instead they seek to have conditional power to maintain a balance of power in the international arena (Golovics, 2017: 365-366).

Both theories of offensive and defensive realism share the common idea of the structure of IR as an independent variable. The great powers become the centerpiece of the theory of realism and their actions are driven by changes in the anarchic space. In the aforementioned US retreat as a global hegemon, structural realism would argue that there has been a breakthrough in the international system and a fragile power balance that leaves a power vacuum in different regions of the world. Therefore, states seek to either increase their power or to rebalance the IS, or in other words, states seek to fill that empty power vacuum. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, another state started to rise to the surface of the IS, whose actions are mostly analyzed through the prism of realism.

2.2 Russian characteristics, foreign policy, and state

In this century, Russia is characterized by its foreign policies, which emerged during the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, and military intervention in Syria in 2015. From a realist point of view, the current situation is fueling uncertainty about US dominance in the IS and its ability to maintain a unipolar world. Thus, Russia wants to use

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this opportunity to emerge in the IS and this was attempted through intervention in the Middle East (Korolev, 2018: 889). Russia’s actions and foreign policy have also been analyzed using constructivism, which is based on the constructed idea of Russian honor (Tsygankov, 2012: 31-32). Russia as one of the great powers reacted to the NATO and the European Union (EU) expansion as a threat to its security and thus tried to employ specific foreign policies when it could.

However, the interpretation of neo-realism using the IS as an independent variable and unitary states as a dependent variable has its explanatory problems. It can be argued that there is no concrete evidence that NATO or EU alliances seek to drag Ukraine from Russia into their sphere of influence (Askonas, 2015). At the time (in 2013), Ukraine was not on the verge of joining the EU, which would have been a long process, and at the same time, there was not even a consistent debate on Ukraine’s NATO membership. Was Russia’s action in Ukraine based on rational calculation and pursued in the national interest? Ironically, however, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine placed it at the top of the list of threats to the IS which led to the mobilization of NATO forces (Schaffner, 2019). If Putin aimed to suspend NATO’s power by preventing it from expanding, it had the opposite effect. The 2014 case of the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine shows that Russia’s foreign policy is not fully explained by the doctrine of realism. The arguments put forward by proponents of realism are strong, but there is a lack of an additional unit of analysis. The crisis in Ukraine demonstrates that foreign policy is not only shaped by the united interest of the state in response to structural pressures. Additional factors that may influence state action are also discovered.

Scholars Sandholtz and Gray (2003) analyzed the Russian case arguing that the more the state is involved in the international community, the more the two levels of pressure (economic and normative) that reduce the potential for corruption come into play. The first one has to do with cost-benefit analysis through economic transactions, while the second one deals more with corruption as a stigmatizing practice in the international community (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003: 765-766). Using their analysis on the example of Russia, it does not willingly operate on the platform of international organizations unless it is an obvious tool for demonstrating national interests or power, for example the United Nations Security Council. In this case, neo-liberalism can be mentioned as a counterweight to neo-realist interpretation. Scholars Deutsch and Hass put more emphasis on the role of interest groups in the process of European integration (Etzioni, 1961: 533). Meanwhile, Keohane wrote about the impact of international organizations on state politics (Keohane & Nye, 1987: 727). The

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foreign policy itself can be defined as the sum of official external relations carried out in the international relations of an independent actor, usually a state (Hussain, 2020). It can be military action, trade, humanitarian action et cetera. Domestic policy is in many ways the foundation of foreign policy. Moravcsik (1996) contributed to the debate by stating that in systematic theories, rational states with established clear preferences respond to the international arena. However, the assumption of rationality suggests that a change in state preferences, which requires an analysis of internal structures, also changes foreign policy. Interaction between states lies in domestic, institutional and political systems (Moravcsik, 1996).

However, it will not be possible to explain a country’s foreign policy solely through its internal institutions, as they are also affected by structural effects. Putnam took a more radical approach to the problem, stating that it makes no sense to debate whether the inside influences the outside or vice versa (Putnam, 1988: 459-460). If we look at the state from a neo-realist perspective we will not see a causal connection whereas if we look only inside, we will lose the effects of the IS. Both must be combined to establish a chain of causes in a specific case. In this case, neo-classical realism becomes a theory that can more accurately assess Russia’s foreign policy. This theory emphasizes the interdependence between internal and external factors and seeks a fundamental breakthrough in the behavior of states. The starting point must be the IS and how it operates. The system creates constraints and opportunities, but it is not deterministic. This intervenes with the internal structure of the state, which draws attention to clusters that may currently influence foreign policy choices.

2.3 Elite clans in Russia

The very nature of the Russian regime is and has been a matter of debate and it has had various interpretations in academic literature. Russia has been analyzed as a neopatrimonialist state, where the survival depends on the consolidation of power by the elite and the establishment of public relations (White & Herzog, 2016: 552-553). Just like the rise of the siloviki elite clan or representatives of power structures, there has been some debate about the Russian state regime as militocracy type (Taylor, 2011: 37). Other authors have also proposed a description of Russia’s government being corporatist-kleptocratic (Dawisha, 2011: 331), meanwhile in Russia, the term ‘sovereign democracy’ is often mentioned (Lipman, 2006). Neo-realism would reduce Russia’s internal peculiarities to a strong, centralized and united government that makes rational decisions. The narrative of Putin’s rise to power, which has centralized power, punished oligarchs and formed a common national

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interest and is often used to reinforce such narrative (Way, 2005: 232-234). However, the introduction of the analysis of internal aspects suggests that Russian power is not only accumulated by Putin, instead, it is a popular assumption that power is not united, different interests are at play, there is a dependence on changes in the economic situation and specific relationship with the electorate.

This suggests that Russia’s specific regime allows important domestic or foreign policy decisions to be made by a small, unelected group of bureaucratic elite clans around Putin (Staun, 2007: 4). The definition of the elite clan itself is sufficiently abstract and more related to the network of personal contacts. Putin acts as an arbitrator or mediator in all elite clans. Russian elite clans operate under the disguise of formal political institutions - the courts, the presidency and the Duma. Instead of the judicial system, elite clans have an ‘understanding’ of bribes and corruption, whereas trust is assured through marriage, secrecy, or compromise (Jensen, 2013). Corruption in the Russian government makes it possible to bypass the complicated Russian bureaucratic system, suggesting that informal elite clan networks have a greater influence on policymaking in Russia (Cheloukhine & King, 2007: 108-110). One cannot dismiss the formal institutional set-up as a unit of analysis and claim that the elite clans are operating in an uncontrolled manner. Apart from the institutions, civil society also acts as a controlling mechanism, but the Russian government seems to be focusing on state-building rather than on consolidating democracy (Mohsin Hashim, 2005: 26-27).

For this reason, it is not clear whether Putin will succeed and whether he will seek to establish a state that will operate through institutions rather than through personal networks. Analyzing the involvement of the public in the political sphere, one can identify an interesting direction of the movement: in 1990 Russia, there were 20 daily newspapers with ideologies ranging from liberalism to Stalinism compared to today with more than 20 television channels that are directly or indirectly controlled by the Russian government (Åslund, 2017). But the Russian authorities cannot be reduced to a despotic dictatorship because internal pressures are constantly felt and the elite face electoral, media and state dilemmas (Petrov, et al., 2014: 2-4). According to Moravcsik, the state is a representative, which does not necessarily mean that it is democratic, but rather represents different power groups, ideas that exist at the moment and is constantly under pressure from different powers (Staun, 2007: 10). This does not mean that Russia’s foreign policy is not affected by the IS. State preferences reflect the current international situation, but it also means that state internal preferences are more important than capabilities in the short term. They become important in

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the long run when it comes to deciding on the state’s behavior. As a result, elite clans in Russia are becoming an important part of Russian domestic politics.

Analyzing Russian clans is not a new discovery, earlier works have attempted to group different influential Russian elites into groups that they have defined as clans. Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya divided the clans into three groups - the Family clan which is comprised of associates of Russian president Boris Yeltsin, the St. Petersburg clan, who are friends and trustees of Putin, and the siloviki who are powerful ministry leaders, police or military (Staun, 2007: 27). The term siloviki refers to power structures, meaning people that are part of military structures, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Eventually, different divisions were proposed which focused more on the political views of officials than on the origin of the officials, thus purifying two groups: the liberal technocrats and the siloviki. In some analyses, liberal technocrats and siloviki are suggested to be analyzed as ‘silovarchs’, a combination of siloviki and oligarchs, that more closely reflects the current transformation of power in Russia (Derinova, 2013).

Often, neo-realist interpretations that argue for changes in the IS and state-based foreign policy cannot explain in detail why states sometimes do not act rationally or pursue national interests. In an emerging debate, if neo-realism is able to explain Russia’s foreign policy, it is important to notice that it only explains Russia’s interaction with smaller states or within its supposed sphere of influence. This theoretical gap can be filled by interpreting neo-classical realism. It allows us to view the Russian government as an irrational, unified entity, thus enriching foreign policy scrutiny without moving away from neo-realism. In this respect, the analysis of the Russian elite clans opens a different angle from the perspective of neo-classical realism. This allows for an analysis of Putin’s authority not as a rational response only to structural changes in the IS, but as a unit dependent on the influence of internal groups.

3. Methodology

An analysis of Russia requires an in-depth approach to the causal elite relationships that shape foreign policy. As mentioned before, attempts are made to supplement the theory of neo-classical realism by considering current domestic processes and dispelling the deterministic logic that dictates that power is a homogeneous unit influenced only by external changes. Of course, since it is impossible to see inside the heads of state officials and read what they think, it is necessary to analyze those factors which may have influenced the

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perception of the decision-maker as such that it was able to shape the outcome in the state’s foreign policy (Carpes, 2014). In the analysis, one of the most appropriate methods is process-tracing. The origin of this approach is related to the science of psychology, which used this method to figure out the steps a person takes when making decisions (Bennett & Checkel, 2014: 4-5).

In the case of Russian foreign policy analysis, the domino metaphor can be used (George & Bennett, 2004: 9) which says: dominos are placed in a row, which symbolizes a chain of causation. The whole row of dominos is covered except for the first and last figures. An observer can only see that the uncovered dominos have fallen, both in the same direction. Thus, to avoid false assumptions or interpretations, the observer must uncover the rest of the row and analyze the situation according to the full picture, and not just what meets the eye. A similar implication is guided by neo-realist theory, which analyzes the structural factors of the IS as the first domino and connects it to a state’s foreign policy, symbolizing the last domino, as a response. However, in this case, the whole chain of causation is missed, which was obscured and it is not known whether the fall of the first domino figurine resulted in the fall of the entire chain and it overturned the last figurine or the latter fell over for other reasons not visible through the curtain. Process tracing analyzes and emphasizes the discovery of causal relationships that evaluate fundamental variables from the perspective of neo-classical realism.

Hall developed a rather abstract approach to process tracing and proposed the systematic process analysis, which the author says is a great methodological way to analyze cases (Hall, 2008: 304-305). Recent developments in academic theories in the social sciences are more likely to define the world as a structure of causal factors that is too complex to be effectively analyzed by conventional statistical methods (Hall, 2003: 391-393). Of course, the choice of methodology always depends on the question being analyzed and it is certainly not possible to claim that one method is superior.

Hall has illustrated this idea by asking what could be defined as a good causal explanation. In this way, three major models of interpretation in social sciences were distinguished. The first model of explanation was coined historically specific, which, as the name implies, is mainly used by historians. The purpose of this is to explain the specific sequence of events that formed the investigated event or group of events, for example, World War I. Events of this nature are usually the effects of a long causal chain in which a change in one part can affect the development of another. It is not merely a description of facts, but rather an effort to discover the main drivers that explain why an event is inevitable and originated at the time

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(Hall, 2008: 305). The second model is a multivariate explanation, which is similar in many respects to the historical one, but the purpose is not to explain the causal sequence of a single event, but to identify the factors that determine a wide range of events. This model relies more on statistics and attempts to formulate more general theories by including only a small group of variables that have the greatest effect at different time stages (Hall, 2008: 305-306). The third model is a theory-oriented explanation, which is constructed using theoretical frameworks and testing which approach identifies the key factors of the outcome. The purpose, in this case, is not to provide a full explanation of why an event occurs at a particular time and place, but to identify the key factors in the chain of causation that produce the result (Hall, 2008: 306). This third model is defined by Hall as the most appropriate option using the method of systematic process analysis, so the logical sequence of the theory-driven explanation will follow the course of the study.

3.1 Four steps of systematic process analysis

The first step is to formulate a theory that can identify the underlying causal variables that can

explain the results. The theory should be formulated in a deductive way, based on broader, already analyzed assumptions about the world from an existing field of research. The theory not only identifies several important variables that are expected to have the greatest impact but also defines the process in which the variables have a material effect. The second step is the formulation of predictions, which derive directly from the assumptions of the theoretical approach formed in the first step. Predictions should predict the sequence of events that will be analyzed during the study if the theory is right or wrong. The third step is the observations, the essence of which is to check whether the various actors’ activities and statements, in each stage of the causal chain, correspond to the theory formulated by the perception of the world. The distinctive feature of this approach is that the correlation between variables is not the only way to confirm the legitimacy of a theory. The fourth step is the comparison, in which the observations formulated are compared with the predictions derived from the theories and thus the suitability of the explanatory power of the theory is determined. Following these steps, a systematic approach to process analysis will answer the key question and test how the Russian elite clans affect Russian foreign policymaking. Graph number 1 outlines the specific events that are going to be analyzed in this paper, which are directly affecting each other and thus forming a causal chain that leads to the creation of Russian foreign policy.

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4. Theory definition

In the first step of systematic process analysis, the theory is formulated which helps to highlight key factors in the chain of causation. The main theory that will be applied to the study is neo-classical realism. The IS, which is analyzed as an independent variable, plays an important role in the theory. Therefore, in the beginning, the factors of the IS will be defined using neo-realism as the basis. However, the IS merely frames the functioning of states and does not directly affect foreign policy. At this point, an intervening variable emerges, a state whose internal processes direct the development of foreign policy, based on the possibilities or constraints created by the IS. The analysis of state capacities will reveal the importance of the factors of the intervening variable and together with the factors of the IS defined by neo-realism, will complement the theory of neo-classical realism.

4.1 Russia’s foreign policy from the perspective of neo-realism

Regardless of whether the last foreign policy actions of Russia should be called bold or audacious, the point is that they were prominent and felt in the international system. In 2008, the Russo-Georgian war started, in 2014, the Ukrainian-Crimean crisis and in 2015, military intervention in Syria. The current situation has created uncertainty about the potential for US dominance in the world and that systemic US pressure on other major powers is steadily weakening. In response to this situation, Russia is attempting to fill a power vacuum by renewing its military capabilities and seeking to reconsider the end of the Cold War. The logic of this kind of thinking is guided by the theory of neo-realism, which is an important unit in the first step of systematic process analysis. This approach to neo-realism must be

Graph number 1 (created by the author) Starting point _{The two elite}

clans react to the changes with different beliefs, struggle for influence on foreign policy Siloviki consolidate their power through obtaining economic rents Putin has to mediate between the two elite clans

to maintain their support Outcome Changes in the International System Russian foreign policy-making

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defined to identify the key structural factors that shape the environment of the IS in which the Russian state operates.

On August 8, 2008, the Russian army and air force attacked Georgia over North and South Ossetia. From the perspective of neo-realism, the Russian attack was fueled by a sense of insecurity and a desire to protect its borders. It is associated with Georgia’s relatively strong military, strong ties with the US and NATO membership talks as well as some ties with the EU (Reichwein, 2016). NATO enlargement is an important conversation in the theory of neo-realism. In 1999, The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO. In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO. The Bucharest Summit in 2008 was about the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine, but at that time Germany and France did not agree on this idea (Cook, 2015: 75). In the same year, the Russo-Georgian war broke out, which may be linked to the desire to keep Georgia weak and divided. From the perspective of offensive realism, Georgia did not calculate its military capabilities and was the first to attack Russia, regardless of whether it was a provoked reaction. Defensive realism theorists argue that these actions are Russia’s response to a US-dominated world in which Russia wants to establish its neighborhood of influence. However, the legitimization of war, which outlined the principles of international law and humanitarian objectives, which were primarily related to the protection of Russian civilians from persecution, punishment or genocide, fell outside the neo-realist theory (Reichwein, 2016).

However, this kind of neo-realistic analysis does not fully explain Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Even with the new government, Ukraine was not a serious security threat to Russia. It is possible to challenge the idea that the West was trying to ‘take over’ Ukraine from Russian power, because the membership of EU at that time was only a potential opportunity, not a solid fact. Additionally, after Euromaidan, Ukraine’s chances of joining NATO remained limited. While former presidents have expressed such a desire, NATO has not seriously considered this possibility. Even the Ukrainians themselves were skeptical of such opportunity. After the 2014 Crimean occupation, a poll on Ukrainians’ opinion on joining NATO resulted with 41,6% of Ukrainians opposed to joining NATO and 36.7% supporting it (Interfax-Ukraine, 2014). It is possible to debate whether in general NATO is a real threat to Russia’s interests. According to most realists, NATO had no clear purpose after the Cold War (Askonas, 2015). The enlargements of NATO in 1999 and 2004 were not a factor that was very positively received in Russia and did not generate a huge reaction. On the other hand, the current actions of Russia have certainly provoked NATO’s response, which can be attributed to the perception of offensive realism about the security dilemma, which in this

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case would act as a cycle. Quite recently, Russia seems to be turning its sphere of influence to the Middle East, prompted not only by economic, strategic or political changes in that region but also in response to the continually deteriorating relationship between the West and Russia (Korolev, 2018: 904-905). Since the 2011 protests against the government in Syria, Russia has always supported the Bashar Al-Assad regime, both militarily and diplomatically. In September 2015, Russia launched airstrikes aimed at protecting the Al-Assad regime. Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, has assured that there is no peaceful solution without Al-Assad’s involvement in Syria (Allcock, 2015). Russia’s interventionist foreign policy can be explained as a new Western ideological foreign policy, under the shield of international law and humanitarianism.

This allows for a neo-realistic approach to Russian foreign policy in the last decade. Many aspects of the structural analysis highlight the power distribution between NATO bloc nations, which is often reduced to US spheres of interest, and Russia’s regional neighborhood interests. Enlargement of the EU can also be identified as an important aspect of the international structure, although the impact is less visible in the case of Syria. However, it can be argued that the sanctions imposed by the EU and other countries towards Russia after the Ukrainian crisis are also an important structural factor. In the formulated neo-realist approach, there is a gap between the possibilities and examples of explaining the theory. Of course, it is important to realize that foreign policy in these cases is not directed at the great powers. Although causality links are usually there, the underlying internal causes that have led to action in this direction must also be considered.

4.2 Russia’s foreign policy from the perspective of neo-classical realism

The structural analysis of the IS from the perspective of neo-realism and the review of internal factors, using the concept of state capacity, revealed different variables that can influence the formation of foreign policy. Neo-classical realism is a theory that can combine different angles of attitudes outlined. Following the first step of systematic process analysis, the perspectives of neo-realism and the assumptions of the analysis of state capacities can complement the approach of the theory of neo-classical realism when analyzing the foreign policy of Russia.

It can be argued that the choice of foreign policy is not necessarily the optimal option, it simply can be the one that is possible within external and internal limits (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 28-30). Such logic explains the principle of neo-classical realism which argues that external factors are important and cannot be ignored, but it is also important to understand

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what these factors consist of, as this can determine its trajectory of direction. Neo-classical realism analyzes internal processes that help determine how states choose to act in response to pressures and opportunities created by the IS. In the long run, under pressure from the IS, countries will seek to maximize their global influence, power and security but in the short to medium term, it is crucial to understand the intervening variables (Tomada, 2015). The aim is not to develop a general theory that explains everything, but rather to explain the formation of foreign policy in a particular state.

The IS creates limitations on possible foreign policy actions, but it does not in itself dictate the individual functioning of units. The principle of system anarchy creates some uncertainty among the main actors. The material capacity of a state is measured in terms of GDP, defense spending, the size and structure of the military, research conducted by the military, population size or demography (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 41-44). All of these units of measurement are ultimately summed up into key independent variables that affect a country’s foreign policy. The first independent variable is the transparency of the system, which defines how much is known about existing threats and opportunities. It is important to understand the extent to which the system provides information on the inevitability of threats and whether there is a clear foreign policy plan on how to respond (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 45-50). According to this measure, the system can be either transparent or not. The second variable is the strategic environment, which in turn can be either permissive or restrictive. This is related to the magnitude and inevitability of the threats. The very purpose of the threat should be to undermine territorial integrity or the national interest, to undermine economic and military capabilities and to have a certain degree of inevitability (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 51-55). If the threat is close and severe, the strategic environment is limiting the available options. From this point of view, the IS either limiting or enabling action, and while it is not dictating the action, it has a strong impact.

In neo-classical realism, the state becomes an intervening variable and foreign policy can be influenced by clusters of different factors at a given moment. Because this is a theory that is still evolving and is constantly evolving, a specific set of internal factors has not been identified, but four groups are usually distinguished (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 58-68). The first

group is the beliefs of the state elite, which focuses more on a set of beliefs of the president,

prime minister, or other important officials that may have an impact on foreign policy. The

second group is strategic culture, which can be divided into two parts: one that analyzes

organizational culture more than the military or bureaucracy and the other that analyzes a broader understanding of strategic culture arising from common societal beliefs. The third

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group is state-society relations, which analyzes the relationship between state institutions and

various economic or social groups. The fourth group is domestic institutions, which analyze formal institutions, their routines, opportunities for action takers, veto players and so on.

The foreign policy of Russia, in the perspective of neo-classical realism, becomes a more confusing mechanism. The problems posed by the neo-realistic approach to the determinism of the IS are solved by involving the state as an intervening variable. However, in the next step, it must be determined which internal factor has a significant effect on foreign policy-making, which can be achieved through deductive or inductive methods.

4.3 Measuring Russia’s state capacity

The interpretation of Russian foreign policy through the theory of neo-realism leaves missing parts in the chain of causation. Therefore, following the logic of neo-classical realism, one must look at internal factors that could explain the direction of foreign policy. The foreign policy itself is formulated by the government to achieve internal and international goals. Decision-making capacity is limited by the specifics of the regime, international organizations and other aspects that can be brought into the political environment (Hussain, 2011). Fukuyama argued that the capacity of the state must be measured by the ability of the state to function, by measuring bureaucratic procedures, the ability to execute jobs and its autonomy from political influence (Fukuyama, 2013:349-350). Security issues can also be looked at from the other side. Fragile, crumbling states may, at one time or another, be responsible for the rise of civil wars, international or internal terrorism, refugee crises and so on. Simply, the state should have a monopoly of power in the area, but if the capacity is weak, new factions may emerge to seek security for themselves (John, 2008: 2). The capacities of the Russian state were being developed but used more for the consolidation of the regime than for state development. The growth of social welfare was more due to oil-based economic growth than to the development or management of certain policies (White & Herzog, 2016: 555). According to these aspects, the state’s capacity in Russia can be interpreted as low, but on the other hand, it would be difficult to prove that the Russian government has no monopoly on power and is unstable.

The problem in conceptualization arises because the literature that defines state capacities mostly links to dominant regions like Western Europe. Fukuyama has set an example for Denmark and it is becoming a starting point for measuring state capacity. In turn, this sounds like an interpretation that does not take into account the specifics of each case (Lindvall & Teorell, 2016). It is important to see how states can influence, bribe or convince a society that

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would otherwise disagree with government decisions. In general, state capacity is the ability of a state to accomplish work, which implies that the most efficient state is one that has a wide choice of policies and can implement them all, thus achieve a wide choice of outputs. Fukuyama noted that some states were effective in one place but less effective in another (Lindvall & Teorell, 2016).

State capacity can be divided into three dimensions: ability to collect taxes, ability to carry out coercion and ability to administer effectively. According to Skocpol, the components of state capacity are: “plentiful resources, administrative-military control of a territory and loyal and skilled officials” (White & Herzog, 2016: 556). Russia’s 1999 crisis may be attributed to a drop in oil prices, but it also showed weakness in the Russian tax system. Although the law has been reformed during Putin’s rule in Russia, the problem remains. There is dependency on natural resources, which means that there is practically no diversification of tax sources in Russia. There are also two sectors in Russia, the first is predominantly oil, gas, and minerals, while the second is industries that cannot compete globally and must be sustained (White, 2017: 133-134). The Four Russias Theory explains in more detail the nature of the closed Russian economic circle, which identifies as second Russia - the mid-size monotowns that have the remaining uncompetitive factories of the Soviet era. However, since most people in the city work there, factories cannot be closed and must be maintained. A similar situation is found in third Russia - small rural towns. Both parts have strong Soviet values, which dictate that the state must take care of everything. As it represents a large portion of the population, the government is forced to subsidize the regions from the first sector to prevent insurgency (Zubarevich, 2016).

While the analysis of state capacity raises questions about the effectiveness of the Russian state, the state itself does not collapse and maintains a relatively stable situation. In territorial centralization, Russia is demonstrating stronger capabilities than in administration, but the regime remains strong. This can be interpreted through restricted access to power. In formal spaces, the powers of the president are immense. In 2008, the presidential term was changed from 4 to 6 years. Also, the parliamentary term was extended to 5 years. The president’s position is raised above parliament, which is illustrated by the fact that the Duma may theoretically vote for distrust of the government, but the vote may be vetoed by the president. In 2007, single-member elections were abolished and the percentage of votes was raised to 7% for parties, which virtually eliminated opportunities for small parties to intervene. The judicial system is also under control. The Constitutional Court consists of 19 judges appointed by the President with the approval of the Federation Council (Darlington, 2020).

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However, the real power lies not in the formal space. Authorities are constantly balancing three dilemmas in informal spaces to survive. The electoral dilemma creates a situation where, on the one hand, elections can lead to the loss of positions of power, but on the other, elections allow for even stronger establishment by creating an opposition that legitimizes the position of power (Petrov, et al., 2014: 2).

In the media dilemma, the government has an interest in producing high-quality information that can be used for its purposes. It is dealt with in a similar way to the electoral dilemma, the sources of information remain large, but the state carefully controls the most important channels that mainly talk about politics (Petrov, et al., 2014: 6-7). Lastly, the dilemma of the state shows that the state must manage diverse interests in society. This can occur through institutions like the parliament, which represent different interests and can pose problems for the ruling elite. However, it can also help the government mitigate certain emerging issues through the established mechanism of representation. This was controlled by abolishing single-member regions and raising the positions of the United Russia Party (Petrov, et al., 2014: 9-10). These methods are aimed at maintaining the regime, not the development of the state and show how the government is trying to overcome its dependency on society. Putin seems to remain a strong leader in a fragile state. Russia is becoming even weaker without civil society. Without open sources of information and open opportunities for public representation, policymaking becomes a guess as to how much power the government can press for. A similar logic can be seen in foreign policy when the limits of international law are tested. The work of the Russian authorities is risk management, which usually leads to short-term decisions (Petrov, et al., 2014: 21-22).

Russian state capacity analysis demonstrates that Russia can be considered effective in areas that are important for economic and military survival and that they are mostly under the authority of specific elite clans. For this reason, it is important to consider internal informal institutions when analyzing Russian foreign policy, which in turn may influence policymaking. Everything is highlighted by the fact that Russia’s foreign policy is becoming short-lived and devoid of a broader perspective, as there is more focus on plans to stay in power. The economy is becoming an important factor that has a major impact on regime stability and in that case, the state’s important spheres of interest: oil, gas and warfare create an illusion of realism, though in reality, it seems to be only a field of influence of individual interests.

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5. Analysis

Systematic process analysis, as already explained, consists of four interrelated steps. In the previous chapter, I have already completed the first step, which was to formulate the theory which I will use to make predictions. This analysis will thus be divided into three larger sections, each covering one of the remaining steps. I will begin with the predictions, then use the theory to make observations, and eventually compare the observations with the predictions. This will ultimately lead me to the conclusion of this paper.

5.1 Predictions: The decisive factors of Russian foreign policy

The second step of systematic process analysis is the formation of predictions, in which the sequence of events is determined based on the theory formulated in the first step. Within the framework of the theory of neo-classical realism, intervening variables influence the formation of foreign policy, so a specific cluster must be found that has the most important impact on the Russian state at a given moment. This internal factor will determine the sequence of events in the causal chain. However, to identify the most appropriate cluster for further analysis, the transparency and strategic environment of the IS must first be defined.

5.1.1 The international system

The logic of neo-classical realism suggests that the IS must first be defined, and an attempt made to explain the extent to which systemic factors influence foreign policy. Since structural factors are considered to be the main variable in the theory of neo-realism, the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy from the perspective of neo-realism allows to form a spectrum of independent variables, which can be seen in graph number 2. Russia’s foreign policy actions over the past decade, which may include the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and the 2015 Russian intervention in Syria, tend to focus on several structural factors. One of the key factors are the expansionist policies of the NATO bloc countries, which allegedly encroached on Russia’s sphere of interest and changed the balance of power. In addition to NATO, the enlargement of the EU is also mentioned.

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The premise of the theory of neo-realism would dictate a situation in which each of the reactions to these actions could be considered a rational choice of the state. However, the arguments already mentioned suggest a different picture. In the case of Ukraine, it is difficult to find evidence that the West’s goal is to ‘strip’ Ukraine from Russia. And the latter’s actions in annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine can be understood to have put Russia in an even worse position in terms of security. There should be clear threats in a transparent system, usually from states that should have expressed hostility or a desire to violate territorial integrity, have economic and military capabilities to do so and the action should be unavoidable. NATO or the US could be perceived as a military threat, but there was no clear hostility to Russia on their part, and the only issues of the inevitability of the threat could be attributed to the Euromaidan that led to the change of government in Ukraine. The analysis of Russia’s state capacity has shown that the economy can be considered an important factor. A seemingly strong, centralized state is run by a small elite group whose goal is to stay in power. All efforts are concentrated on consolidating the regime, which is done through economic means. Dependence on oil prices affects Russia’s ability to operate in the international arena, which is further compounded by economic sanctions. Economics, in this respect, combine the inner and outer spheres because they are directly intertwined.

The strategic environment of the international system is not seemingly restrictive, but when analyzing the inevitability and magnitude of the threats, a different perspective can be seen. Additional factors include Western sanctions against Russia, which frame the choice of The premise of the theory of neo-realism states that nation-states act as rational actors, thinking strategically and acting purposefully towards their national goal. It can be argued that foreign

policy is shaped by a direct response to the stimulators of the international system. The International

System

Crucial moments in Russian foreign policy

1. Enlargement of NATO

2. Enlargement of the European Union

1. Russo-Georgian War in 2008

2. The annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014

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state action and the principles of international law, often expressed through the United Nations, which force Russia to take other measures. It is important to assess the existence of international law, which in a neo-realistic perspective should not be important to the state, but in reality, Russia has changed its instruments as a result. International law and UN oversight have created an environment in which the use of direct military force is no longer a preference (Becker, et al., 2016: 120). This has not fundamentally changed Russia's foreign policy, but has forced a change in the instruments used. In the case of the annexation of Crimea, the question of a referendum arises, in the case of the Ukrainian crisis, action is taken through local rebels, and in Syria, the actions of private military groups, such as the so-called Wagner groups, are seen. The latter is believed to have worked in Ukraine (Ioanes, 2019). On the other hand, the analysis of Russia’s capacities has shown that the economy can be considered an important factor. A seemingly strong, centralized state is run by a small elite group whose goal is to stay in power. All efforts are concentrated on consolidating the regime, which is done through economic means. Dependence on oil prices affects Russia's ability to operate in the international arena, which is further compounded by economic sanctions. Economics, in this respect, combines the inner and outer spheres because they are directly intertwined.

5.1.2 The beliefs of the state elite

From the perspective of Russia’s foreign policy, there are enough arguments to name the IS as non-transparent and restrictive. Of course, this is a relative approach, but it can be agreed that the current structure does not have the same transparency as during the Cold War with two obvious poles and not as much freedom to act as the US had after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the method of deduction, this would suggest the importance of the beliefs of the state elite and the intervening variables of strategic culture. Since the period under analysis is relatively short, the importance of elite beliefs is brought forward (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 98-140). The inductive method can be used to analyze why it is expected that the remaining two clusters will have a smaller impact: the relationship between the state and society, and internal institutions.

The analysis of Russia’s state capacity has revealed the specific nature of the regime, in which Putin remains a strong leader in a weak state without civil society. Of course, this is not a dictatorship and to distance itself from public protests, various mechanisms have been put in place to control the dissemination of information, the nature of representation and the idea of democracy, in response to three major dilemmas. The importance of internal

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institutions plays a greater role in the long run, but it can be argued that the regime of Russia creates a situation in which the institutions do not have much influence on the political process and are relatively controlled. It is important to mention that this does not mean that in another situation these clusters will have no explanatory power.

Continuing the analysis of intervening variables, Schweller, in defining the theory of underbalancing, singled out internal variables as elite consensus and elite relationship, both of which fall within the cluster of state elite beliefs (Ripsman, et al., 2016: 25-30). The theory of underbalancing has analyzed the actions of states that have failed to assess the threat, responding disproportionately or seemingly recklessly to what can be attributed to the principle of irrationality already highlighted in previous chapters in analyzing the specifics of Russia’s foreign policy. This kind of definition perfectly describes the situation in the Russian government, where Putin acts as an arbitrator between Russian elite clans. Russia can be defined as a messy democracy with a heterogeneous foreign policy and this raises questions about the consolidation of the regime. Elite groups were formed to achieve their personal financial goals and formal institutions are bypassed through a network of personal contacts and corrupt practices. This kind of situation highlights the cluster of beliefs of the state elite as an important intervening variable in the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy, which can help trace the process in which the clan struggle affects foreign policy. Such causal logic is depicted in graph number 3, in which the above-mentioned independent variables of Western sanctions and the principles of international law are additionally inserted.

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The theory of neo-classical realism deviates from the assumption that states are rational actors, which allows them to be analyzed as intervening variables in the interaction of the international system and foreign policy. The identification of four main factors operating in the international system allows us to

assume that the system is not transparent and is relatively restrictive. The premise of neo-classical realism is that the international system does not directly affect the foreign policy of a state, but establishes the framework for its operation. The analysis of the specifics of the Russian regime through

state capacity analysis revealed that a cluster of beliefs of the state elite has a significant effect in shaping foreign policy.

The International

System Foreign Policy

1. Enlargement of NATO

2. Enlargement of the European Union

3. Western sanctions directed against Russia

4. International law principles expressed through the UN 1. Russo-Georgian War in 2008 2. The annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014

3. 2015 Russian intervention in Syria

Specifics of the Russian regime

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5.2 Observations: Tracing clan struggle in foreign policy

The analysis of Russia’s foreign policy, based on neo-classical realism, predicts that the most important influence, in this case, is the cluster of beliefs of the state elite clans. Although Putin is often presented as a key member of Russia’s elite, it is questionable whether the influence of Putin’s convictions on the formation of Russia’s foreign policy is the most important element. The analysis of Russia’s internal factors highlighted the importance of the activities of informal clans in maintaining the regime. Therefore, this chapter will analyze how the intervening variable of elite clan beliefs influences the formation of Russia’s foreign policy. In the third step of the systematic process analysis, the actions of the main actors in the chain of causal relations must be analyzed, which will allow comparing the influence of Putin and elite clans on the formation of Russian foreign policy.

5.2.1 Who is leading Russia?

Putin’s foreign policy is called strong, united, centralized, and respected in the Russian state. On the one hand, a cult of Putin’s personality was created, which is based on a relatively militocratic hierarchy of power with the Siloviki clan at the forefront. The United Russia party seemingly is a reflection of a democratic society representing different interest groups, but its monopoly on politics raises questions, especially given the fact that regional leaders, representatives of the presidential administration, and federal ministries have fallen into elite clan hands. On the other hand, this kind of analysis simplifies the current reality, which is perhaps more conducive to a neo-realistic interpretation, so the question needs to be asked whether Putin is a guarantor of stability. Control problems exist, which manifests itself in the absence of absolute control of regional commanders. In the last regional mayoral election, the United Russia party lost a surprising number of positions (Slider, 2010: 258-263). Even a powerful leader like Putin is dependent on his closest group, the elite clans, who have undergone quite a few fundamental turning points that have shaped Putin’s perspective. The claim that Putin must remain in power because he is a ‘guarantor of stability’ is a myth rooted in the change of power in the modern Russian state (Zygar, 2016: 345-347).

One of the main factors that consolidated Putin’s power is his close circle, who sought to control privatization, restrict democracy and raise Russian power. This approach is reinforced by the fact that the current Western sanctions are not directed against the Russian state, but against a specifically selected network of individuals (Dawisha, 2015: 15-16). Now, economic instability has highlighted the internal logic of Putin’s government, which seeks to maintain the existing elite so that personal financial gain can be achieved by building a strong

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Russia both domestically and internationally. The question remains whether Putin himself is a stable entity. Regarding Putin, one can see different personalities comparing the president now and at the turn of the century. Of course, it is hardly a surprise that a person’s attitude has changed over the years. At this point, however, one is constantly confronted with the emerging drawing of a rational, firm, and stable leader with a president whose opinion is dependent on other factors and is relatively unstable. Looking at Putin in respect to his values, it can be said that he is more Western than other members of his administration, but dislikes Western democracy and its approach to Russia’s borders (Dawisha, 2011: 346-347). Rather, there is another factor at play that has specifically affected Russia’s emerging foreign policy.

The success of elite clans in shaping foreign policy in Western countries is limited by existing rules that do not allow bribes to be given or accepted, yet in the post-Soviet space, it is easier to find officials who want to profit together. If, for example, one follows the logic of transimperialist foreign policy, the question arises as to whether Russia can be compared to a rentier state. In foreign policy, the effect of the rentier state is the creation of a government whose employment depends directly on external rents (Dawisha, 2011: 338). In such a regime, there is a tendency to reject the rise of alternative approaches and foreign policy is measured through the relationship between exports and imports. As society is suppressed, there is a lack of internal accountability. These descriptions could be applied to Russia, but that would be a critical approach. In Russia’s budget, over almost a third of revenue comes from the non-energy sector, so partial diversification exists. Of course, it is not the state itself that receives energy revenues, it is done indirectly through taxes, but as mentioned earlier the key sectors that are important to the state are managed by politically active people (Dawisha, 2011: 338-339). Although Russia does not meet the classical definition of a rentier state, it is clear that in Russian foreign policy, energy falls within the sphere of most important interests and one of the most important goals is to maintain a regime that ensures uninterrupted rent sharing among the elite.

The structure and names of the elite clans vary among different analysts, but usually they are defined as Liberal and Siloviki elite clans, who are constantly struggling for power in the local government in Russia. Representatives of the Siloviki elite clan are united by a common understanding of values and politics, which is that the state must be strong and in control of the economy, at least in strategic sectors. The prevailing belief among this group is that Russia’s resources belong to the state, so there can be no question of privatization. Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft, and Sergei Ivanov, former head of the presidential administration,

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deputy prime minister and Russian defense minister, are often singled out as leaders of the Siloviki clan (Harding, 2012). Other members of the Siloviki clan include: Viktor Ivanov, a former KGB official and head of Almaz-Antey and Aeroflot, Vladimir Ustinov, former Minister of Justice, Nikolai Patrushev, longtime FSB chief and secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and others. In the international sphere, the goal of the Siloviki is to restore Russia’s greatness and influence in the former Soviet republics. NATO is considered a major enemy of Russia’s interests (Staun, 2007: 30). At first glance, it would seem that the Siloviki elite clan is a unified entity guided by common provisions on policy enforcement. However, these are more than just aspects that allow a group of individuals to be called a united elite clan, because when viewed from a more pragmatic economic perspective, struggle for positions and beliefs become more apparent.

The Liberal elite clan is a less defined unit. It is important to realize that while the name may suggest a Western approach to politics, it is only a more liberal approach than the Siloviki take, so authoritarian ideas exist in this elite clan as well. The Liberal elite clan disagrees with the Siloviki on economic development and one of the main points of disagreement is privatization. Although there was no strong opposition to nationalization in strategic sectors, the Liberals said it should be pursued over a long period and in compliance with all laws (Staun, 2007: 31). The sudden nationalization of companies is believed to have undermined investment, and privatization must be pursued in all areas where this is feasible. Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and currently Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, is considered the Liberal leader. Other personalities include Herman Gref, CEO of Sberbank, Arkady Dvorkovich, former Deputy Prime Minister, Alexei Miller, CEO of Gazprom, and others.

The issues between the elite clans began during Yeltsin’s reign. In 1992, the partial privatization of the oil market was supposed to put an end to declining production capacity and create a new group of entrepreneurs to offset the regional elites, also known as oligarchs. Already at that time, more conservative officials were pushing for state-important sectors to be nationalized, yet privatization continued with the rise of the Liberal elite clan and the emergence of oligarchs run by Sibneft and Yukos. It is important to mention that the current Liberal elite clan is not the same entity that worked with Yeltsin, but the continuation of ideas is visible, such as the accession of Alexander Voloshin, the former head of Yeltsin’s administration, to Medvedev’s Liberal elite clan (Zygar, 2016: 203-223). When Putin came to power, it was believed that the problem with Yeltsin’s leadership was the disproportionate rise of the Liberals. The aforementioned Russian tax collection system was problematic, and

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the Liberal elite clan failed to persuade Mikhail Khodorkovsky to change Yukos’ corporate tax system. Igor Sechin sought to acquire Yukos’ most important stake in Yuganskneftegaz and rebuild it according to the Rosneft company model. Khodorkovsky was imprisoned, the tax system was partially tidied up and Igor Sechin established Rosneft as one of the main companies in Russia and as one of the foundations of the Siloviki elite clan (Mehdi & Yenikeyeff, 2013: 11-15).

In the long run, the idea of merging Gazprom and Rosneft was considered, but it did not happen because it was feared that it could expose Gazprom’s internal problems. The bankruptcy of Yukos was a turning point that allowed the Siloviki to rise to the top. At this point, the main struggle for economic rents began between the Siloviki and Liberal elite clans, with Putin sitting at the top as a mediator. There is a shift between elite clans in Russia that relies not on formal institutions but relations with Putin. These struggles are important for the formation of foreign policy and began at a time when Putin’s pragmatism and a multipolar approach to foreign policy were beginning to change to a transimperialist one.

5.2.2 The rise of the Siloviki

Siloviki are individuals descended from military structures, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This has to do with Putin’s quest to balance power and counterbalance the liberal predominance. The aim was to restore power with FSB and ex-KGB officials and this created a situation where, unlike in the Soviet era when the KGB was a tool of the Communist Party, the FSB now began to control the state and shape the direction of the national idea (Soldatov & Rochlitz, 2018). Internal Siloviki struggles probably did not allow for the full consolidation of power in the Russian government, as actions were more motivated by personal economic gain. Nikolai Patrushev, the longtime head of the FSB who received this position after Putin’s resignation, was one of the key figures in trying to convince him that the US cannot be trusted and the only security guarantor is the FSB in directing foreign policy (Zygar, 2016: 341-342). There were many people with radical views in Putin’s immediate circle. The foreign policy of Sergei Ivanov, a man who was one of the greatest potential heirs to Putin in 2008, is called multipolar and neo-imperialist with frequent ideas about traditionalism and Slavic supremacy (Staun, 2007: 5).

Igor Sechin himself has become an important player in Russia’s foreign policy. During the Georgian-Russo war he managed to travel with Nikolai Patrushev to Cuba, where Sechin persuaded Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to recognize the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Zygar, 2016: 178-179). The rise of

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Sechin to the top together with the Siloviki elite clan was planned in detail. Until 2008, Sechin worked in Putin’s administration. He was interested in the possibilities of acquiring Gazprom and constantly tried to instill in Putin the idea that he should not trust Alexei Miller. Still, he was defeated and the company remained in the hands of its owners, who are associated with the Liberal elite clan. Sechin believed that the state must govern all areas and gradually raised Rosneft’s capacity. Since 2008, Sechin and Moscow’s longtime mayor Yuri Luzhkov, have insisted that Crimea is not part of Ukraine (Levy, 2008). And it is not a secret that Sechin, as part of Putin’s administration and head of the Kremlin’s office, had a major influence on Putin’s agenda and bureaucracy (Bremmer & Charap, 2007: 87).

All past actions showed that the Siloviki had an aspiration to manage key economic resources in the Russian state. This was partially for personal financial gain, as well as a desire to protect their positions in power (Bremmer & Charap, 2007: 90). The biggest ‘battle’ between the Siloviki and the Liberals began with the election of Putin’s successor before the 2008 elections, culminating in Medvedev’s reign. The latter period has not been a victory for the Liberals. After two terms of Putin, the main candidates for successor were Sergei Ivanov and Medvedev, interestingly both were hated by Sechin. Possibly two reasons led to Medvedev’s choice and his victory in the election. First, Putin as a mediator between two elite clans noticed a disproportionate increase in Siloviki’s power, especially after Vladimir Ustinov was appointed Prosecutor General in 2000 and became one of the most influential members of the Siloviki elite clan responsible for the Yukos case. Secondly, Ivanov was very popular in society and at one point had already begun to comment on economic issues without Putin’s consent (Zygar, 2016: 142-145). This could have been an important moment in choosing a candidate who would not allow the Siloviki elite clan to gain absolute power and would not be more popular than Putin. Regardless of that fact, Medvedev seriously considered the possibility of a second term, but at this point, Sechin had to put an end to it. Medvedev’s open foreign policy and exceptional interest in the events in Libya with the rise of Twitter and Facebook shocked the Siloviki elite clan and efforts were made to convince Putin that this could lead to the potential for revolution in Russia as well (Zygar, 2016: 203-205).

According to realism, Putin becomes a mediator between elite clans and a guarantor of stability, but it is also seen that he is affected by a change of power in the government and the beliefs of the elite clans. Thus, it is difficult to say how much of Russia’s foreign policy reflects Putin’s ideas and how much of it reflects the ideas of the elite clans. The question remains whether Putin can be called a guarantor of stability when his views have changed