Europe and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

(1)

Europe and the 2030 Agenda for

Sustainable Development

The Future of European Integration

(2)

Abstract

This thesis is a theory consuming case study that aims to examine how the Council of the European Union voted in matters regarding the environment between 2015 and 2019 in order to begin the implementation of the 2030 Agenda’s Sustainable Development Goal number 13. Moreover, the thesis further examines the impact of the Council’s voting results on the European integration process by using rational choice institutionalism and three explanatory factors; ideology, institutional factors and economical position in the EU. The findings of the thesis show that the member states in the EU voted diversely and that only four member states constantly voted yes throughout 2015 to 2019. Despite the diversity in voting, the factors and the theory utilised here helped explain why it is unlikely that disintegration would occur. As a result, it is clear that the European integration process will continue even though the voting results of the Council could impact further integration or even disintegration due to the member states’ various preferences. The future of European integration thus continues to be uncertain.

(3)

1. Introduction ... 6

1.1 Aim and Research Questions... 8

2. Background ... 8

2.1 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ... 9

2.2 Sustainable Development Goal number 13 – “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” ... 10

2.3 Decision-making in the Council of the European Union ... 11

2.4 Voting System in the Council of the European Union ... 14

3. Previous Research and Theory ... 14

3.1 Previous Research ... 14

3.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism ... 17

4. Method and Material ... 19

4.1 Method ... 19

4.2 Material ... 21

5. Presentation of the Council of the European Union’s Voting

Results 2015 – 2019 ... 22

5.1 Voting Results of 2015... 22 5.2 Voting Results of 2016... 26 5.3 Voting Results of 2017... 28 5.4 Voting Results of 2018... 30 5.5 Voting Results of 2019... 34

6. Analysis of the Impact of the Council of the European Union’s

Voting Results 2015 – 2019 on the European Integration Process.... 36

6.1 Ideology ... 37

6.2 Institutional factors ... 40

6.3 Economical position in the European Union ... 43

7. Conclusion ... 44

(4)

List of Tables

Table 1. Overview of the Voting Results of 2015

Table 2. Summary of the EU Member States’ Position on Environmental Matters in 2015

Table 3. Overview of the Voting Results of 2016

(5)

List of Abbreviations

EU European Union

(6)

1. Introduction

In today’s politics and media, climate change is one of the most discussed subjects around the world and it is becoming increasingly important to make sure that politicians and institutions are taking the necessary measures in order to combat climate change and its impacts. For instance, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) are two key institutions that are fighting climate change through ambitious policies and goals. At the same time, a large number of agendas and

resolutions have been created over time as a means to achieve a more sustainable development, such as preventing further environmental damage. These key institutions have played a significant role in shaping and the implementation of different resolutions and agendas. As a matter of fact, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on the 25th of September 2015 a universal resolution called

Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in order to

get the world onto a sustainable and resistant pathway. This Agenda contains 17

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets, and is intended to be an

outline for achieving an improved and a more sustainable future for the whole world by 2030.1_{Through the 2030 Agenda, one of the most important pledges that the UN’s}

193 member states have made is to ensure a comprehensive and sustained

environmental protection, which is reflected throughout the Agenda with goals that are intended to combat climate change and environmental damage.2 One particular goal is especially interesting when examining the effects of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda’s SDGs regarding the environmental protection on the European

integration process. The aforementioned goal is SDG number 13, which encompasses

1_{UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable}

Development. A/RES/70/1. 2015.

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20 Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (Accessed 2019-12-04)

(7)

taking action against climate change and its impacts.3 This goal, as with all other goals, is divided into so-called targets, but for the purpose of this thesis, only target number 13.2 and indicator number 13.2.1 are relevant. This indicator measures the integration of climate change into national policies, and is defined as the amount of countries that have reported the existence or creation of a policy, strategy or plan that is integrated into their system. This will increase or grant their ability to adapt to the problematic effects of climate change and increase the resilience of the climate, as well as increase the development of projects and technology that lowers greenhouse gas emission.4

Even though, the primary global, intergovernmental forum for discussing the international action to fight climate change is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, another key institution is the European Union in combatting climate change.5 As a matter of fact, the EU is one of the forerunners implementing the 2030 Agenda’s SDGs and has taken various environmental

measures to prevent further climate change and environmental damage. However, this would surely impact the integration process in one way or another, and exactly what that impact could look like is the main question of this thesis. By examining the voting results from 2015, when the 2030 Agenda was adopted, to 2019, of the European member states in the Council of the European Union (i.e. the Council of Ministers, or Council) regarding issues of environmental policies and sustainability, it is possible to distinguish the yes-voters, no-voters, abstain-voters and those member

4_{Roser, Ritchie and Ortiz-Ospina, Mispy. Measuring progress towards the Sustainable}

Development Goals. 2018. https://sdg-tracker.org/climate-change#targets (Accessed 2019-12-05)

(8)

states not participating in the voting procedure. So, by dividing the votes in this way, it is possible to examine whether or not certain countries act for or against further integration within this specific environmental policy area, and by extension, in the entire European Union since the Council represents the national interests in the European integration process.6 The impact of the votes in regards to SDG 13 will be analysed using the integration theory Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), and used to explain how the implementation of this goal could impact the European integration process, a topic that is highly important to the EU’s future.

1.1 Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goal number 13 on the European integration process by using rational choice institutionalism.

This will be accomplished by answering the following questions:

1. How has the Council of the European Union voted in matters regarding the

environment in order to begin the implementation of the 2030 Agenda’s Sustainable Development Goal number 13?

2. How could the voting of the Council of the European Union impact the

European integration?

2. Background

In this section, a detailed description of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development and the Sustainable Development Goal number 13 will be given in order to provide a comprehension of what they stand for. This will be followed by an

6_{Lewis, Jeffery. “The European Council and the Council of the European Union”. In}

European Union Politics. Cini, Michelle and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, Nieves (ed.), 138–

(9)

explanation of how the decision-making and voting system in the Council of the EU function.

2.1 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable seeks to take action for planet, prosperity and people, but also to reinforce the universal peace. These goals and targets are united and integrated, and they also balance the three dimensions of sustainable development – the social, environmental and economic. Its main purpose is to eliminate poverty and to reach global sustainable development by 2030. The SDGs and targets took effect on 1 January 2016 and over the next 15 years it will be a guideline of the decision-making.7

The Agenda is built on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were concluded 2015, but also attempts to achieve those MDGs that were unfinished. In addition, the 2030 Agenda is also a follow-up from the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development and focuses on issues that appeared in the Millennium Declaration. However, one thing that differs from these old additions is the universality of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which means that the Agenda is applied to every country and every level of development, but it will take the countries’ different circumstances and capacities into account. A new Global Partnership will drive the implementation forward that is defined by a mutual

accountability, a shared responsibility and that all countries are committed. The outline for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda are in the Sustainable

Development Goals and complemented by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which is an essential part. Furthermore, the follow-up and assessment framework will be

(10)

stronger in the 2030 Agenda than they were in the MDGs in order to guarantee that the Agenda is applied for all and that no one will be left behind.8

Nevertheless, this new framework that has been adopted by the UN’s General Assembly surpasses the MDGs, because at the same time it continues to develop priorities like health, eradicating poverty, food security and education, it will also provide an extensive variety of environmental, social and economic goals.9_By

implementing the 2030 Agenda and its goals, it will change the global policies on development collaboration. When it comes to the European Union, it will implement the 17 SDGs in its external and internal policies – something that is shown in the EU’s already begun implementation of the SDGs in the aforementioned development policy.10

2.2 Sustainable Development Goal number 13 – “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”

The Sustainable Development Goal number 13 is called “Take urgent action to

combat climate change and its impacts”.11 It seeks to operationalise the Green Climate Fund even further and to implement the dedication to the UN’s Framework

Convention on Climate Change. Additionally, the aim of this SDG is to strengthen nations’ adaptive capacity and resilience to natural disasters and climate-related

8_{European Commission. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs.}

2019. https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm

(Accessed 2019-12-05)

10_{European Commission. The Sustainable Development Goals. 2019.}

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/sustainable-development-goals_en (Accessed 2019-12-09)

(11)

threats by incorporating adaption measures and climate change mitigation into different national policies, planning and strategies. In turn, this also necessitates awareness-raising, capacity and improved education on climate change adaptation and mitigation. Considering that the impacts of climate change affects the most vulnerable and poorest people more severely, the Sustainable Development Goal 13 explicitly demands for increased capacity for management and planning that are climate change-related in those countries least developed.12

Moreover, this SDG has five targets and eight indicators. The targets define the goals and the indicators stand for the measurements, which are used to track if the targets are accomplished. For the purpose of this thesis, only target number 13.2 called “Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning” and indicator 13.2.1 are relevant. This indicator measures the integration of climate change into national policies and is defined as the amount of countries that have reported the existence or creation of a strategy that is integrated into their system and that allows them to adapt to the problematic effects of climate change. It also allows them to increase the resilience of the climate, as well as increase the development of projects and technology that lowers greenhouse gas emission, but this development should not threaten food production.13

2.3 Decision-making in the Council of the European Union

The European Union has worked hard to develop and implement the 2030 Agenda into the EU, which is a big step towards a sustainable future. Such an important matter is one that requires countries to vote and participate in the decision-making process, which most often occurs in the Council of the European Union. Due to the

12_{Bley, Simon Johannes, et al. (ed.). Sustainable development in the European Union –}

Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context, Luxembourg:

Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, p. 253.

13_{Roser, Ritchie and Ortiz-Ospina, Mispy. Measuring progress towards the Sustainable}

(12)

Council’s heavy role in EU decision-making, it is important to understand how the Council operates and functions.

In general, the decision-making in the Council is taking place behind doors – meaning that the procedures are not public records. As a result, it is not fully known what really occurs in these summits, which could be one reason why there are so few empirical studies about voting in the Council.14_{For this reason, it is essential to}

understand the decision-making in the Council of Ministers. The Council of the European Union is the foremost legislative power in the EU and consists of one representative of each member state at ministerial level.15 Its most prominent function is to make binding decisions on new EU legislation, on the initiative of the

Commission and in cooperation with the European Parliament.16 This means that an adoption of a legislation in the Council is led by a widespread preparatory phase in different EU bodies.17 In order to ensure that the proposal undergoes technical scrutiny and political responsibility, the proposal goes through three levels in the Council. These are the working party, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Council configuration.18

First, the proposals are normally discussed in a working party specialised in different matters (e.g. environmental matters),19 which ensures technical scrutiny of the

14_{Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union}

Council of Ministers”. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 43, no. 1, 2004, 29–50.

https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15)

15_{Tallberg, Jonas. EU:s politiska system. 6th ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, p. 109–}

110.

16_{Ibid, p. 119.}

18_{Council of the European Union. The decision-making process in the Council, 2019.} https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ (Accessed 2020-01-15)

(13)

proposal.20 Then, the proposal progressively proceeds through the preparatory bodies that are closer to the Council. COREPER is the most important preparatory committee and consists of the permanent representatives from the member states respectively.21

The treatment of the proposal in COREPER depends on what level of agreement that has been reached at the working party level. So, if an agreement has been reached without discussion, it appears on Part I of the COREPER agenda. However, if extra discussions are needed in COREPER because the working party did not reach an agreement on specific parts of the proposal, it appears on Part II of the COREPER agenda. Many proposals appear on the COREPER agenda several times since they attempt to solve the disagreements that the working party has not succeeded to overcome.22 Moreover, if indeed COREPER has finalised a discussion on a proposal, it comes to be an A-item on the Council agenda. This means that an agreement is anticipated without debate. Nonetheless, if one or more member states request to re-open a discussion on one of these A-items, it will be re-re-opened. Another section of the agenda is where the B-items appear and includes points such as what has been left over from a previous summit, that are too politically sensitive to be resolved at a lower level or if no agreement has been reached at working party level or in

COREPER. When the Council acts in its function as legislator, the results of the votes automatically become public.23 These voting results, with focus on environmental matters, is what this thesis will build on.

(14)

2.4 Voting System in the Council of the European Union

For the carefully selected voting results to be relevant in any way, it is also important to understand the voting system of the Council of Ministers. The Council can vote multiple times during the course of the procedure that eventually results in an approval of a proposal, which depends on the decision-making process.24 For instance, in this thesis the empirical data used only consists of one vote for each voting procedure – meaning that this is the vote that the Council of Ministers

determines if the final proposition is rejected or approved. Additionally, the Council takes its decisions by simple majority, qualified majority and unanimous vote. Simple majority entails that 15 member states have voted in favour and is used for non-legislative votes, but when 55% of the member states – representing no less than 65% of the European Union population – vote in favour of a proposal, it is called qualified majority and is the most used voting method in the Council of the EU. When all votes are in favour of the proposal it is called a unanimous vote, but the Council of the EU can only vote when a majority of the member states are present.25

3. Previous Research and Theory

In the following section, a presentation of previous research will be given regarding the contemporary research field under investigation. This will be followed by a

description of the theory selected for this thesis, being rational choice institutionalism.

3.1 Previous Research

In order to fully understand the basic theoretical premise of this thesis, namely rational choice institutionalism, it is necessary to understand the foundation of this specific integration theory. To do so, we must define exactly what European

25_{Council of the European Union. Voting System, 2019.}

(15)

integration is. This is a highly debated topic, and there are a multitude of different definitions, based on individual understandings of how it functions. For example, one of the most famous theorists, Ernst Haas, did subscribe to the Neo-functionalist theory of European integration, and defined integration as the procedure “whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties,

expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”.26_{This definition contains}

both a social and a political process, which can be defined as the changing of loyalties and the appearance of newly created institutions of politics that possess some degree of influence regarding at least a fraction of the affairs of their member states,

respectively. This is just an example of a definition of the term integration, and in fact, the definition varies depending on the integration theory of the person who does in fact give the definition in the first place. For example, not all theorists would include both the social and the political process, and may choose to favour one over the other. For example, the definition that is preferred by the Intergovernmentalist theorists places its focus on the political process and explores the creation of political institutions that member states subscribe to. Nonetheless, regardless of the focus of the various definitions, they all share one thing in common: an understanding of integration as a process.27

In order to understand all aspects of integration, it is also important to understand its counterpart–disintegration. As Hans Vollaard argues, disintegration is not integration in reverse, meaning that it is not sufficient to just take any integration theory and reverse its function. It should be noted that disintegration theories barely exist and it is a very unexplored and neglected topic within European studies. Therefore, how the

26_{Diez, Thomas and Wiener, Antje. “Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory”, In}

European Integration Theory. Wiener, Antje, Börzel, A. Tanja and Risse, Thomas (ed.). 1–

24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 3.

(16)

EU might disintegrate is an interesting topic in of itself and one that is very important to the European Union’s future.28

Furthermore, there is an extreme lack of studies and literature regarding disintegration as a main topic. This is because political scientists that study European integration have focused on exactly that – integration. Disintegration has never seemed like a relevant topic, because it is not something that has occurred, and as such, it has not been examined properly by the scientific community. Perhaps the most important reason, however, is the explanation that Ernst Haas provided: that the opportunity to study the ongoing integration process of the European Union was too great to pass up, and so disintegration was left in the headwind, so to speak. Another reason as to why disintegration theories are relatively non-existent is the phenomenon called the institutionalist bias of the mainstream integration theories. Many of the mainstream theories do not possess an explanation or definition for disintegration because they are fundamentally biased to work in a situation where disintegration will never occur, and it is exactly this expectation which constitutes the problem. Otherwise, the

mainstream theories might simply be refusing to acknowledge that disintegration may very well happen, in one form or another.29

As Ben Rosamond writes in his article Brexit and the Problem of European

Disintegration, the mainstream integration theories are ill equipped to handle

disintegration as a phenomenon, and they all contain some form of reason or concept to explain that disintegration will not happen. As Rosamond writes, it seems that the standard antonym for “integration” is not “disintegration” but instead

“differentiation”, according to most of the mainstream European integration theories. But differentiation – the phenomenon where member states differ in their

participation regarding both policy areas and depth of involvement – is not the same

28_{Vollaard, Hans. “Explaining European Disintegration”. Journal of Common Market}

Studies. Vol. 52, no. 5, 2014, p. 1–18. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12132

29_{Rosamond, Ben. “Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration”. Journal of}

(17)

thing as disintegration, that is, states and organisations retreating from its involvement in the European Union across the board of policy areas.30

In this case, the chosen theoretical approach rational choice institutionalism has not been presented as one of the theories that possesses a direct explanation for

disintegration, however, it does contain a very easy way of reasoning regarding disintegration. Since the theory bases itself off of the rational behaviour of actors in institutions, one can reason that disintegration in light of a rational choice

institutionalism system may be the effect of actors who no longer view the institution as something that maximises their utility, and as such they would withdraw or retreat in their cooperation and involvement in the institution. This is arguably a very reasonable explanation for the rational choice institutionalist approach regarding this specific topic, and it is this hand-crafted definition and understanding of disintegration that will be used in this thesis.

3.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism

In order to understand how the voting of the Council of the European Union in matters regarding the environment could impact the European integration process, rational choice institutionalism (RCI) will be applied.

Rational choice theory relies on a few elementary premises regarding the behaviour of individual actors and the social world that they inhabit. Rational choice, at its core, is a methodological approach that explains the outcomes of both collective and

individual nature regarding individual goal-seeking under constraints. This approach contains three core elements. Firstly, there is the methodological individualism, secondly, the goal seeking or utility-maximisation, and lastly, the existence of various

institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice.31_{The methodological}

30_{Ibid, p. 866–867.}

31_{Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union}

Politics. Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, A. Mark and Rosamond, Ben (ed.), 31–56. London:

(18)

individualism means that rational choice regards the individual as the rudimentary units in social analysis. Rational choice approaches seek to use the assemblage of individual choices to explain the behaviour of both the collective and the individual. In this case, individuals are understood to act based on specific, changing preferences that are external. Secondly, the behaviour of individuals is expected to ensure

maximum possible utility, whilst also subjected to constraints and boundaries. This means that individuals who possess fixed preferences regarding what the world around them should look like, will act in accordance with the behaviour that maximises their utility. Thirdly and finally, individuals pick the best option for

maximising their utility whilst under constraints. Despite the fact that this sounds near identical to the second point, it is actually quite different. It means that individuals and actors do not directly choose what the world looks like according to their wishes, but instead weigh the benefits and costs of different alternatives and chooses the best course of action based on the constraints from their physical and social

surroundings.32

In contrast, RCI focuses on how the formal institutional structures restrict actors and implies that in order to understand the political actors’ behaviour, it is imperative to identify the restrictions that are determined by a specific framework of rules that the actors act within. For instance, the interest groups’ activities highlight the processes that succeed in passing the legislation that could affect the interest groups, the past relationships that they have created with central decision makers.33_{Therefore, RCI}

claims that political institutions contain systems of regulations and incentives, and that individuals within these systems try to maximise their benefits.34

Sage Publications, 2006, p. 32.

33 _{Bache, Ian, Bulmer, Simon, George, Stephen and Parker, Owen. In Politics in the}

European Union.4th ed. Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 26–27.

34_{Lowndes, Vivien. “Institutionalism”. In Theory and Methods in Political Science.}

(19)

4. Method and Material

In this section the method used for this study will be explained, which will be

followed by an overview of the materials used in order to lay the foundations for this thesis.

4.1 Method

Given that this thesis is to examine the impact of the voting results from 2015 to 2019, regarding environmental matters, of the Council of the EU on the European integration process by applying a theoretical framework called rational choice

institutionalism, it is appropriate to conduct a theory consuming case study. A theory consuming study refers to the use of a theoretical framework with the intention of explaining a case. Therefore, the case, the voting results of the Council, will be the centre of this thesis and the theory, RCI, will be the tool used to analyse the case, since the theory is used in order to explain why something has developed in the way it did.35 Furthermore, RCI as a theory is good at explaining general behaviour, as it is based on a system of self-interest, which greatly aligns with the idea of an anarchic world stage and the self-interest of national actors. Through this reasoning, the EU can be seen as a platform for discussion and debate where nations come together to follow their separate national interests in a cooperative manner. Within this setting, the RCI theory is good at explaining the particularities of the behaviours of the various nations, and it is for this reason that RCI has been chosen as the theory of this thesis.36

As this is a qualitative research study the gathered and analysed empirical data is from the period between 2015 to 2019, and specifically only the goals regarding

35_{Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik and Wängnerud, Lena.}

Metodpraktikan - konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad.3:1 ed. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB, 2007, p. 42–43.

(20)

environmental policies that are based on goal 13. The results will be divided into two categories; one positive category (Yes-votes) and one negative (No-votes and abstain-votes), which means that abstain-votes will be treated as no-votes. This has been done in order to present how the Council have voted on environmental matters relating to goal 13. Therefore, various directives and policies, in combination with the voting results regarding them, have been analysed based on the RCI’s distinctive set of behavioural speculations – for example, the concept of self-interested, rational actors within institutions that act in a way that directly benefits themselves, usually, but not exclusively, in a monetary/economic way. That is why three explanatory factors have been carefully chosen by the logic of which factors that can influence a rational actor based on RCI in order to explain the actors’ behaviour towards integration. These factors have been chosen based on the plausibility of them affecting the behaviour of a rational, self-interested actor within an institution.

Additionally, the rational school of political theory has a deductive reasoning that allows it to efficiently capture the large range of reasons as to why actors behave in the way they do regarding any action, as well as identify structural incentives within institutions, foresee plausible outcomes, and finally, reveal exceptions in regards to the actions that are unusual to the general theory that is employed. That said, RCI struggles to explain these exceptional cases, especially those that remove themselves from actions motivated by (self-)interest. In addition, there are large and numerous issues with overgeneralisation due to the theory’s inherent push towards

generalisation on a universal level. This is important to keep in mind because it shows the inherent strengths and weaknesses of this theory, however, for the task it has been selected in this thesis, RCI theory is a strong and highly applicable tool, due to its natural aptitude at analysing the reasoning behind the behaviour of actors regarding further integration.37

(21)

4.2 Material

The material being utilised for analysis are carefully chosen voting results of the Council of the European Union on environmental matters retrieved from the website consilium.europa.eu. The voting results that will be used are from 2015 until 2019. Furthermore, in this thesis the empirical data used only consists of one vote for each voting procedure – meaning that this is the vote that the Council of Ministers

determines if the final proposition is rejected or approved. Other material being used for this study is in the theory section where key integration theorists are used to discuss the various definitions of integration.

Certain central aspects that are necessary have been considered when selecting the material for this study in order to present legitimate empirical material. This has been done by using the following four classical rules when evaluating the collected

material: authenticity, independence, contemporaneity and non-tendency.38 First, authenticity of the sources has been guaranteed by only collecting the material from established sources like Onesearch and the EU. This ensures that the material has been critically assessed and is not fabricated. Second, independence of the material is guaranteed by primarily utilising material from the institutional files of the Council of EU and by including complementary material – which decreases the possibility of biased material since similar information has also been verified by additional sources. However, the possibility of tendentiousness is the considerable utilisation of the material from the EU, but this is only done when general information about the function of the Council of the EU is provided. For this reason, the material utilised in this thesis has been thoroughly selected and systematically examined for guaranteeing validity and reliabilityof the thesis’s results.

38_{Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik and Wängnerud, Lena.}

(22)

5. Presentation of the Council of the European Union’s Voting

Results 2015 – 2019

During these four years since the 2030 Agenda was adopted, the voting results of the Council have shifted variously regarding environmental matters. The following section will present a concise explanation of the various voting results of every year post-2015 until 2019. This has been done in order to understand the relevant actors and the context of this study.

5.1 Voting Results of 2015

In an overall look at the voting results from 2015, it is clear that many member states voted yes in different environmental subjects, but there were some no-voters and abstain-voters during this year as well.39

Year Yes No Abstain Not participating Total members

2015 21 7 0 0 28 2015 22 6 0 0 28 2015 27 0 1 0 28 2015 28 0 0 0 28 2015 25 2 1 0 28 2015 28 0 0 0 28 2015 27 0 1 0 28 2015 27 0 1 0 28 2015 28 0 0 0 28 2015 28 0 0 0 28 2015 28 0 0 0 28 2015 26 0 2 0 28

(23)

2015 24 3 1 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

As can be seen in table 1, there has been fifteen voting procedures where the Council voted on environmental matters in 2015, in which all member states participated. The first column in table 1 had the lowest yes-votes with 21 member states voting yes and the highest no-votes with as much as 7 no-votes. Those countries that voted no in this session were Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria and Slovakia. Even though it was only 21 member states that voted yes, the directive was still approved since the voting rule was qualified majority. No member states abstained at this occasion, but there have been occasions where the EU member states have

abstained. For instance, in 2015 there were six occasions in total where member states had abstained from voting and on one of those occasions can be displayed in the twelfth column, where there were two member states that had abstained in the same session – these were Belgium and Portugal.

Another interesting voting session can be seen in column two where another vote to combat climate change and its impacts were cast. At this occasion 22 of the member states voted yes and 6 of them voted no. The countries that voted no were Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. By looking at table 1, we can only see two more voting sessions that resulted with member states voting no for a regulation regarding the environment. These are displayed in columns five and thirteen. In column five, we can see that only two member states voted no, being Germany and Austria, and one country abstained, being Spain. In column thirteen, we can also see that one country abstained from voting, this was Poland, but there were three

(24)

columns four, six, nine, ten, eleven, fourteen and fifteen. Additionally, all voting procedures had the qualified majority voting rule, which means that these directives were still approved.

These countries that voted in these different environmental matters that will enable the European Union and its member states to combat climate change and its impacts, are of particular interest when interpreting the voting results. So, by creating a table that summarise what the positions the European member states have on environmental matters, makes it possible to observe how many times they have voted yes, no or abstained from voting on these important matters in 2015. Below, table 2 provides such a summary.

Table 2. Summary of the EU Member States’ Position on Environmental Matters in 2015

Country Yes No Abstain

(25)

Latvia 15 Lithuania 15 Luxembourg 15 Malta 12 2 1 The Netherlands 14 1 Poland 13 1 1 Portugal 14 1 Romania 13 1 1 Slovakia 14 1 Slovenia 15 Spain 14 1 Sweden 15 United Kingdom 15

(26)

In 2016, there were ten voting procedures where the Council voted on environmental matters – meaning that there were five less voting procedures in 2016 than in 2015.40 An overall look on table 3 shows that all member states participated in the various voting sessions and that more countries voted yes for the different environmental regulations.

2016 27 0 1 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28 2016 21 6 1 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28 2016 27 0 1 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28 2016 28 0 0 0 28

The lowest yes-votes and the highest no-votes during 2016 can be displayed in the fifth column in table 3, where 21 member states voted yes, 6 voted no and 1 abstained. Those countries that voted no in this session were Denmark, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Poland and Romania. This was the only session that had no-votes. The country that abstained in this voting procedure was Croatia, but there were two more occasions where a country abstained. These can be found in columns one, where Austria abstained, and seven, where the Netherlands abstained. Additionally, of these ten voting procedures there were only seven voting sessions in total where all member

(27)

states voted yes for different environmental matters. These can be seen in columns two, three, four, six, eight, nine and ten. In addition, all voting procedures had the qualified majority voting rule – meaning that these directives were approved.

(28)

Slovakia 10

Slovenia 10

Spain 10

Sweden 10

United Kingdom 10

Furthermore, in table 4 we see that Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania voted no for different proposals. None of the member states voted no twice during this year, which meant that there were six no-votes in total and by looking at table 3, we see that those six no-votes occurred during one voting procedure. Nevertheless, there were only three countries that abstained in total this year and they were Austria, Croatia and the Netherlands, which happened on different voting occasions. As a result, as much as 20 out of 28 member states voted yes in all voting procedures during 2016.

In 2017, there were much fewer voting procedures than the previous years with only four procedures where the Council voted on environmental matters.41 An overall look on table 5 shows that all member states participated in the various voting sessions.

2017 28 0 0 0 28

2017 25 0 3 0 28

2017 28 0 0 0 28

2017 26 0 2 0 28

(29)

As can be observed in table 5, no member states voted no in the four voting procedures that took place in 2017. However, in column two we can see that there were only three countries that abstained from voting. Thus, making it the lowest yes-votes and the highest abstain-yes-votes during 2017. Additionally, the fourth column also had abstain-votes, but only two countries abstained. Of these mere four sessions there were only two voting sessions in total where all member states voted yes for various environmental matters. These can be seen in columns one and three. Also, all voting procedures utilised the qualified majority voting rule, which again resulted in approved directives.

(30)

Luxembourg 4 Malta 4 The Netherlands 3 1 Poland 3 1 Portugal 4 Romania 4 Slovakia 4 Slovenia 4 Spain 4 Sweden 4 United Kingdom 4

In table 6, we can see that 23 out of 28 member states voted yes in all voting procedures during 2017 and that Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Belgium and the Netherlands were those to abstain from voting in various procedures. None of the member states voted no this year.

In this year, a total of twentyvoting sessions where the Council voted on environmental matters took place – meaning that this year had the most voting procedures than the previous years.42_{An overall look on table 7, displays that all}

member states participated and that it was more member states abstaining this year than the previous years.

2018 28 0 0 0 28

(31)

2018 28 0 0 0 28 2018 28 0 0 0 28 2018 28 0 0 0 28 2018 24 2 2 0 28 2018 28 0 0 0 28 2018 24 1 3 0 28 2018 28 0 0 0 28 2018 25 0 3 0 28 2018 26 1 1 0 28 2018 20 5 3 0 28 2018 27 0 1 0 28 2018 27 0 1 0 28 2018 27 0 1 0 28 2018 26 0 2 0 28 2018 24 2 2 0 28 2018 25 1 2 0 28 2018 25 2 1 0 28 2018 25 0 3 0 28

(32)

As can be seen in table 7, many member states abstained on different voting sessions compared to previous years. At some occasions there were three member states that abstained – these occasions are displayed in columns eight, ten, twelve and twenty. In other sessions there were two member states that abstained from voting – these sessions are displayed on columns six, sixteen, seventeen and eighteen. There were also some occasions where one country abstained, which are displayed in columns eleven, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and nineteen. In total, there were thirteen sessions where the EU member states abstained and of these twenty voting procedures there were only seven voting sessions in total where all member states voted yes for different environmental matters. These can be seen in columns one, two, three, four, five, seven and nine. In addition, only one voting procedure, in column one, had the unanimity voting rule when voting and the rest used the qualified majority voting rule. Even though one procedure used the unanimity voting rule, all regulations were approved.

(33)

Hungary 13 7 Ireland 19 1 Italy 20 Latvia 18 2 Lithuania 18 2 Luxembourg 20 Malta 19 1 The Netherlands 19 1 Poland 17 1 2 Portugal 19 1 Romania 20 Slovakia 16 2 2 Slovenia 20 Spain 20 Sweden 19 1 United Kingdom 18 1 1

Moreover, in table 8 we can see that Czech Republic was the only country that voted no in three different voting procedures. We can also see that Lithuania and Slovakia voted no in two procedures and seven other countries voted no once. This brings the total to ten countries voting no in the voting sessions this year and therefore a total of fourteen no-votes were cast in 2018. When it comes to the abstain-votes, Hungary was the only country that had abstained as much as seven times in total. In addition, there were also one country, Croatia, that abstained three times and four countries that abstained two times – these were Latvia, Belgium, Poland and Slovakia. So, there were thirteen countries that abstained in total and twenty-five abstain-votes were cast this year. As a result, only 9 out of 28 member states voted yes in all voting

(34)

In 2019, a total of sixteen voting procedures where the Council voted on

environmental matters took place.43 This means that this year had less procedures than the previous year. An overall look on table 9 shows that all member states participated and that not many member states voted no or abstained.

2019 27 0 1 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 27 0 1 0 28 2019 27 1 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 21 4 3 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 28 0 0 0 28 2019 26 1 1 0 28 2019 26 1 1 0 28 2019 27 0 1 0 28

The lowest yes-votes, the highest no-votes and the highest abstain-votes during 2019 can be displayed in the tenth column in table 9, where 21 member states voted yes, 4 voted no and 3 abstained. Those countries that voted no in this session were Czech

(35)

Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovakia. The three countries that abstained were Estonia, Latvia and Austria. Apart from column ten, we can see that in columns one, four, five, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen all display no- and/or abstain-votes during the various voting procedures. In total, there were four occasions where member states voted no, six occasions where the countries abstained and nine occasions where all countries voted yes. The sessions where all countries voted yes are displayed in columns two, three, six, seven, eight, nine, eleven, twelve and thirteen. Furthermore, two voting procedures, in columns one and three, used the unanimity voting rule and the rest used the qualified majority voting rule. Despite two procedures using the unanimity voting rule and that one country abstained (column one), all regulations were once again approved.

(36)

Latvia 15 1 Lithuania 16 Luxembourg 16 Malta 16 The Netherlands 16 Poland 15 1 Portugal 16 Romania 16 Slovakia 15 1 Slovenia 16 Spain 16 Sweden 16 United Kingdom 15 1

Furthermore, in table 10 we can see that Germany was the only member state that voted no twice on various occasions, but Germany was not alone in voting no. Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia all voted no once. In total, there were six countries that voted no – thus making a grand total of seven no-votes that were cast during 2019. Moving on to abstain-votes, Bulgaria was the only country that abstained twice in different sessions and Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and the UK was the ones that abstained once. This indicates that seven countries abstained, which means a grand total of eight abstain-votes were cast. Consequently, 16 out of 28 countries voted yes in all voting procedures during 2019.

(37)

provide a clearer overview. Furthermore, the voting results are analysed through rational choice institutionalism.

6.1 Ideology

When analysing the voting results, we get the opportunity to identify which member states that could be for or against further integration. For example, governments that are pro-integration and/or left-wing are unlikely to oppose the majority in the Council and are therefore more likely to vote yes for various proposals.44_{By using rational}

choice institutionalism’s distinctive set of behavioural speculations,it is clear that the member states voting yes could indicate that the individuals within governing

institutions find it more rational to vote in favour of environmental matters, because of the additional integration that will occur when the proposal is adopted since it becomes more beneficial in the long run, both economically and environmentally. Usually, specific policies and reforms are a result of national representatives pandering to the interests and wishes of key voters, and by extension shaping the European integration process.45

Only four countries consistently voted yes in total between 2015-2019 – meaning that they could have different priorities and as such see different proposals as more

rational than those countries that abstained and/or voted no. The countries that continually voted yes were France, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia, which would imply that these four countries either do not mind spending resources or find greater value in investing in environmental protection in order to preserve nature and prevent

45_{Gabel, Matthew. “European integration, voters and national politics”. West European}

Politics. Vol. 23, no. 4, 2000, 52–72.

(38)

climate change. In addition, it could also mean that they are more willing to integrate further with the EU in environmental policy areas.46

As EU-level and national-level politics probably are interacted, the governments’ voting regarding further integration or not could partially be influenced by national political circumstances (e.g. the ideology of the current government) and partially by the EU-level factors (e.g. the numbers of votes the member state has in the Council or if the member state is a net contributor to the EU budget or is a net beneficiary).47_So,

ideology, institutional conditions and economical position in the EU could be strong factors on how a member state votes regarding environmental matters and further or less integration.

This could mean that depending on the ideology of the member states’ governments, they will prioritise and rationalise different topics. For instance, the preferred position of governments on increased or decreased integration could depend on the

government’s ideology and then depending on the government’s position, the integration would be prioritised or disregarded. So, if a government supports an increase in integration, then it is unlikely that it would vote no.48 Additionally,

depending on if the ideologies that exist in the governments are pro-environment, they will prioritise environmental issues. Hence, France, Luxembourg, Italy and Slovenia might then have a government that wants increased integration in regards to the implementation of SDG 13, which is why they continuously voted yes.

When it comes to no-votes and abstain-votes, the member states that voted no or abstained could have an anti-integration and/or right-wing government – since these are usually the most active no-voters.49_{Three countries voted no four times in total}

(39)

between 2015-2019 and they were Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia – all of them abstained as well. Furthermore, significantly more countries voted no three times, these were Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Malta, while four of them abstained as well. These were Austria, Germany, Hungary and Malta. It is clear that Hungary, with nine abstains in total, was the only country that had the highest amount of abstains and Belgium, with five abstains in total, was the second country that had the second highest amount of abstains. This could mean that these countries could have a government that opposes an increased integration, which also could depend on the ideologies existing in their governments. As a result, they could instead overlook integration in environmental policy areas and in turn prioritise other matters not relating to climate change at all. All things considered, the member states voting no or have abstained could have individuals within governing institutions that find it more rational to vote against various environmental issues, because they do not see additional integration as a benefit and thus are more unwilling to integrate further with EU.50 This indicates that the no- and abstain-voters have other priorities and then consider other proposals more rational than those countries voting yes.

Furthermore, no- and abstain-votes could also be a result of Euroscepticism. For instance, left-wing governments could also vote no or abstain due to the majority of their voters being Eurosceptics – meaning that they try to adapt their voting in order to hold a majority of the voters. In contrast, the same thing could happen to a right-wing government, but instead the majority of their voters are for further integration with the EU.51_{Another reason as to why a country may vote yes or no in}

environmental matters may simply come down to the country’s general position on climate change. Countries with higher climate scepticism are more likely to vote

(40)

against environmental policies to begin with.52 This may also be because of a general opposition against SDGs from Eurosceptic countries, since the new goals constitute a more integrated system than the former MDGs, a fact that can cause both policy integration and policy disintegration, depending on a nation’s stance and general attitude towards both EU integration and environmental integration policy.53

6.2 Institutional factors

In the light of institutional factors, it is clear that the size (population) of the member states and their political resources could also influence the countries voting

preferences. The dissimilarities in size are reflected in the division of votes, which indicates that a country with more votes is more likely to be part of the victorious faction. So, it is unlikely that the countries that have more votes are against the majority. As a matter of fact, larger member states probably have more authority in the introductory stage of several decisions, because the officials in the preparatory work have to consider the large countries’ opinions beforehand to make sure that their proposals will succeed. Larger countries usually also have larger staffs in Brussels and their native countries in order to manage the preparatory work of the many proposals the Commission sends.54 This suggests that depending on how large the countries are, the larger number of votes they have, which makes it unlikely that they would oppose the majority in the Council. This could explain the motivation and interests behind large countries like France and Italy voting yes in all voting procedures between 2015-2019.

52_{McCrea, Rod, Leviston, Zoe and Walker, A. Iain. “Climate Change Skepticism and}

Voting Behavior: What Causes What?”. Environment and Behavior. Vol. 48, no. 10, 2016, 1309–1334. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1177/0013916515599571

(Accessed 2020-01-17)

53_{Le Blanc, David. “Towards Integration at Last? The Sustainable Development Goals as a}

Network of Targets”. Sustainable Development. Vol. 23, no. 3, 2015, 176–187.

https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1002/sd.1582 (Accessed 2020-01-17)

(41)

In contrast, the larger countries might vote against the majority more regularly than the smaller countries, because the smaller countries could recognise their restricted abilities and resources to affect each decision taken by the EU. That is why they limit their focus on matters that they regard as more significant. For instance, the reason why small countries like Luxembourg and Slovenia voted yes in all voting procedures 2015-2019, might be that they limit their focus on proposals that involves more integration in the environmental policy area and climate change because they regard it as something significant. This in turn is in alignment with the base ideas of rational intuitionalist theory; namely, the idea that political outcomes are a product of individual preferences of actors as well as the separate arrangements of various institutions.55

Though, this is problematic from an integrative standpoint, as EU environmental policies, by the extent of their nature, furthers the integrative process.56 Larger countries, however, might want to express their opinions more strongly if they do not agree with the majority. In fact, large countries such as the UK and Germany could have voted no and/or abstained in order to express disagreement with further

integration in areas like the environment and climate change. In addition, it may also be difficult for the voters in major EU countries to accept EU decisions that is in opposition to their national interest or the major opinion within the country.57 By voicing its dissatisfaction, the government of such a country may make it easier on themselves – a behaviour that shows that countries, regardless of size, are probable to

55_{Sullivan, Jonathan. “Political preferences, revealed positions and strategic votes:}

explaining decision-making in the EU Council”. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 14, no. 7, 2007, 1150–1161.

https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1080/13501760701576643 (Accessed 2020-01-17)

56_{Wurzel, K.W. Rüdiger. “The European Council, the Council and the Member States:}

changing environmental leadership dynamics in the European Union”. Environmental

Politics. Vol. 28, no. 2, 2019, 248–270.

https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2019.1549783 (Accessed 2020-01-17)

(42)

vote against the majority in the Council. This also indicates that the no- and abstain-voters have other priorities and preferences than the yes-abstain-voters.

Furthermore, the rotating presidency of the Council could also influence the member states’ voting since it is unlikely that a county that holds the presidency would vote in opposition to the majority.58_{This position lasts for six months and enforces a variety}

of roles for the member state in control.59_{For instance, Slovakia had the presidency in}

2016 and they voted yes in all ten voting procedures regarding environmental matters, but in other years when Slovakia did not have the presidency, they abstained or voted no. Another example of this is when Estonia had the presidency in 2018 and they voted yes in all twenty voting sessions, but voted no or abstained in other years.60 In this case when the member states hold the presidency, they gain new preferences – meaning that they have to partly renounce their mission of endorsing its own opinions and instead attempt to discover solutions that will be accepted by the majority. So, instead of trying to maximise their previous preferences, they must now try to

maximise a new common preference.61 If the country holding the presidency takes its roles as representative and negotiator seriously that is, because if they do, they do not get much room for independent action and that could be a reason why some member states still votes no or abstains even if they hold the presidency.62

59_{Tallberg, Jonas. EU:s politiska system. 6th ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, p. 109–}

113.

60_{Ibid, p. 109–113.}

61_{Schmidt, A. Vivien. “Comparative Institutional Analysis”. In The Handbook of}

Comparative Politics. Landman, Todd and Robinson, Neil (ed.), 125–143. London: Sage

Publications, 2009, p. 126.

(43)

6.3 Economical position in the European Union

A member state’s economical position in the EU can also be a factor that can affect a country’s voting. The EU is both a political and an economic institution, where the shape of the internal EU market is very likely to lead to an increased economic welfare in all member countries; at least, over a longer period of time. A key part of the economic aspect of the EU’s role as an economic institution is the rebalancing of money within the EU. This is also one of the EU’s most politically controversial issues; how much money each state pays to the EU budget and how much it receives in the form of various EU financial and economic aids, also called subsidies.63_{It has}

been suggested by Carrubba that this function is essentially a transaction, where the richer EU states, through the EU as an institution, purchase the poorer member countries’ acceptance of EU policies, furthering the integrative process.64_Something

of great interest regarding Carrubba’s notion is the fact that during the period where the used data has been collected, one of the smaller member states, Slovenia, voted yes to every single suggestion that has been listed previously. This plays into Carrubba’s theory of “integration-purchase”, because Slovenia, like many other smaller EU member states, receives more money from the EU than it gives.65 Thus, one can assume that Carrubba’s theory applies. However, there are many other states that are in the same position regarding financing who did not exclusively vote yes. Poland is one of these countries. In 2012, Poland was the main receiver of the EU budget’s benefits and received four times as much money as it gave to the EU in the

64_{Carrubba, J. Clifford. “Net Financial Transfers in the European Union: Who Gets What}

and Why?”. The Journal of Politics. Vol. 59, no. 2, 1997, 469–496. https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lnu.se/stable/2998173?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (Accessed 2020-01-15)

65_{Directorate-General for Budget (European Commission). The EU budget in my country –}

Europe and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development