From Nobel Peace Prize Winner to War Criminal

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From Nobel Peace Prize Winner to War

Criminal

A qualitative text analysis of the Abiy Ahmed

administration’s discursive patterns of democratic

backsliding

Moa Berming

Uppsala University, Department of Government Development Studies C (Bachelor Thesis) Spring 2021, 15hp

Thesis Supervisor: Hans Blomkvist Word Count: 11 344

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Abstract

This study examines if the process of democratic backsliding is observable in the discursive patterns of a government that is the driving force of democratic erosion which can be useful when attempting to discern if a government has undemocratic ambitions. The actor analyzed to answer the research question is the government of Ethiopia. Three hypotheses have been developed based on Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding and from these, an analytical framework containing a set of questions has been developed. The questions have been used to systematically analyze the source material. This study found that the Ethiopian government framed those in law and law enforcement agencies and other opposition it perceives as adversaries as illegitimate actors while glorifying and legitimizing their own. In addition, the study found that the government argued that criticism directed at it not following laws or the constitution was either from an illegitimate source or not based on facts.

Key words: democratic backsliding, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding, Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia

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1. Introduction

"War makes for bitter men. Heartless and savage men"

Abiy Ahmed, 2019

Recently, there seems to be an uptick in cases of democratic backsliding around the world.

Leaders who previously expressed a firm desire to consolidate democracy in their respective countries turn around and instead do everything to consolidate their power. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) researched this phenomenon by doing several case studies and developed a theoretical model of how this process happens: a government will firstly try to discredit critical individuals within law and law agencies, secondly try to discredit the political opposition, and thirdly adjust laws or even the constitution in order to stay in power. But are leaders of such governments creating new narratives that favor them, arguing for their position in order to sway public opinion, or are they ignoring criticism? This study aims to understand this by building on Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding by asking if there are observable discursive patterns of democratic backsliding in the case of the Ethiopian government.

In 2018, I was in Ethiopia on a school field trip, and Abiy Ahmed had been elected Prime Minister about a half a year earlier. All around us, pictures of Ahmed were being proudly displayed, on cars, walls and signs. Everyone that we talked to was hopeful as he was the first Prime Minister to come from the marginalized Oromo people and outspoken as a dedicated reformist. They hoped that he would put an end to the oppression of free speech, the ethnic tensions and the socioeconomic difficulties that some marginalized groups faced which the previous administration had ignored and even perpetuated. In many ways, Abiy Ahmed did fulfil these hopes, something that is further discussed in this study. He even received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for these efforts and the speech he gave included the quote that introduced this text. After he accepted the prize, however, there have been worrying signs that the country is in the process of democratic backsliding. Central to this study is the conflict in Tigray, where the state government’s pursuit to the right to full self-governance is met by the national armed forces of Ethiopia. The Tigrayan conflict is used to understand how a government frames an issue in which many accuse the government of showing signs of democratic backsliding.

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1.1. Aim and Research Question

This study aims to understand if the process of democratic backsliding is observable in the discursive patterns used by a government that is the driver of eroding democratic institutions.

Understanding the discursive patterns of democratic backsliding can be used as a tool to discern early warning signs when a government begins such a trajectory and is thus useful for future research. The study does so by analyzing how the same actor, namely Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed and his office, frames the issue of Tigray. In order to examine the discursive patterns, the study focuses on speeches, press releases and articles that Abiy Ahmed and his administration have released that concerns Tigray from the time that the military operation in the region began, which was the fourth of November 2020 until the first of April 2021, when this study began to conduct its analysis.

This study has put forward three hypotheses that are derived from the theoretical framework of democratic backsliding. The hypotheses are then used to develop questions that will be asked of the material, of which conclusions about the accuracy of the hypotheses can be drawn. The concise research question is:

What discursive patterns of democratic backsliding are observable in the Abiy Ahmed administration?

1.2. Disposition

A brief background of the conflict in Tigray will be presented in order to provide the full context of this study. Following the introduction, previous research and the academic field of democratic backsliding, which is the central concept of this study, will be summarized. The theoretical framework containing the chosen definition of democratic backsliding, why it can be applied to the case of Ethiopia and the theory used in this study will then be explained. After this, the chosen methodology and research design will be discussed before the analytical framework is developed. Following this, the findings of this study will be presented and then discussed. Lastly, this study concludes with conclusions drawn from this study, a critical reflection of this work and suggestions for future research regarding the topic.

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1.3. Background

As stated previously, this study uses the conflict in the Tigray region to discern discursive patterns of democratic backsliding, and as such, a brief background of this conflict will be given here.

In line with the constitution founded after the socialist revolution 1991, each region in Ethiopia is governed by a party within the EPRDF-coalition that is representative of the dominant ethnic group in that region. Consequently, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) governs the Tigray region (Fisher, Gebrewahd, 2018: 197). For the last 17 years, the TPLF has been arguing for the right to self-government and when the party lost the position of federal leader for the first time since 1991 the rhetoric has become even more prevalent. Ahmed is known for advocating in favor of a pan-Ethiopian view, rejecting the traditional ethnicity-focused politics, which has led the Prime Minister to make policy decisions that centralizes power and limits regional power. Among other voices against this vision are the TPLF who are, as previously mentioned, of the opposite view (Nordberg, 2021; Gavin, 2021).

The Ethiopian election was set for 29th of August 2020, however the federal government announced in May that it would be postponed, citing COVID-19 as the reason. The TPLF, arguing that this decision was a threat to democracy and that Abiy Ahmed should now be considered an illegitimate ruler, proceeded with its own regional election in September of 2020.

With tensions already at an all-time high, the TPLF’s attack on federal forces that was stationed in the region triggered a military confrontation on the fourth of November 2020 as the Ethiopian National Defense Force (EDNF) were ordered to invade the region on the same day.

The Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) joined the EDNF’s forces for their aid. Abiy Ahmed called this operation ”a law and order operation” that had the purpose of targeting domestic terrorists.

However, critics are arguing that using the national army and bombing a region from above should not be called a ”law and order operation”, but instead a military invasion. The EDNF and EDF are fighting against the Tigray Special Forces, a force that had a considerable number of weapons and soldiers ready due to the TPLF’s historical grasp of power. Furthermore, the Tigray Special Forces has had a significant success in attracting reinforcements from civilians and deserters After capturing the city of Mekelle, the state capital of Tigray, the government declared that the operation was over. Yet, the military confrontations have continued (Gavin, 2021).

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Both sides have been known to commit war crimes, but most of the reports are accusing the EDNF and the EDP. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human rights there have been “deeply distressing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, extrajudicial killings, widespread destruction and looting of public and private property” (UN News, 2021). Other consequences of the confrontation are that sixty thousand people have had to flee Ethiopia and half of a million persons are displaced (Gavin, 2021).

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2. Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

In the following section, a brief summation of previous research in the academic field of democratic backsliding will be presented to put this study in its proper context. Then the definition used will be explained, as well as how the concept is relevant for the case of Ethiopia.

For this study, the theoretical framework used is Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding which will be introduced and discussed. Finally, hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework will be developed.

2.1. Previous Research

Scholars Licia Cianetti, James Dawson and Seán Hanley analyzed studies of democratic backsliding done on cases besides specifically Hungary and Poland as these two cases are the most common in the literature. As a result, Hungary and Poland are now what much of the theoretical framework of democratic backsliding is based on and much of the literature has revolved around the scenario of an illiberal populist party suddenly taking power that changes the political landscape to lean more towards conservatism and nationalism and exerting partisan control over public institutions. This means that other cases that did not begin this way do not fit into this trajectory. Thus, the theoretical framework of democratic backsliding that has been accepted as true in the academic field is difficult to generalize (Cianetti, Dawson, Hanley, 2018: 243-244).

Cianetti, Dawson and Hanley found through their studies that democratic backsliding usually happens in low-quality democracies, where the checks of democratic institutions are weak.

This is in contrast to the previous main assumption about the process which was that democratic backsliding could happen even in high-quality democracies. Thus, the authors contest the very term ’backsliding’ because it implies that democracy was consolidated and then started to erode (Ibid: 246). This is taken into consideration throughout this study as is discussed in “2.3 Hypotheses”.

There are several studies that have been done on democratic backsliding, of which have used very different approaches to answer each respective research question. This study takes an actor-based approach to democratic backsliding, which will be further discussed later in this

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section. However, other approaches to democratic backsliding offer the perspective needed to understand shortcomings and strengths that the approach used in this thesis may have.

One approach is to begin with the political culture in the society to explain the phenomena of democratic backsliding. With political culture, most academics mean that political outcomes are the result of, for example, norms, beliefs and attitudes that are shared in the general population, which creates norms of appropriate and inappropriate behavior. The understanding is then that democratic backsliding happens if the democratic institutions in place are not accepted by the people or if democracy was pushed by a movement but failed to consolidate later on because of spoilers. However, Ellen Lust and David Waldner (2018) question if this would be logical. They point out that through their work of mapping the democratic process in several countries, Inglehart and Welzel arrived at the conclusion that with democracy comes a cultural transition from traditional and survival- oriented values to secular and self- expressive values. The question then becomes why such a society, that has already adopted modern society and democratic institutions, would backslide (Lust, Waldner, 2018: 98-99).

Political institutions can also be of interest to academics. The idea is that institutions affect the level of accountability and representativeness, horizontal accountability and the level of governmental efficiency and performance. When these institutions erode, the risk of democratic backsliding increases. To understand institutional deterioration, partisan preferences are of relevance. If any agents decide to grasp more power, the institutions that empower them will not deter backsliding. Lust and Waldner question this approach as they point out that this would ignore the studies from such scholars as Negretto and Pepinsky that have concluded that political actors themselves can have a strong influence over political institutions. For this reason, they do not see that institutions themselves can exercise any causal influence, thus making it redundant to focus a study on them (Ibid: 99-101).

The theory of political economy posits that structural economic variables lead to regime outcomes, and the political economy can have explanatory power regarding democratic backsliding. The economic variables include the level of income among the population, distribution of income, source of income and short-term macroeconomic performance. This theory is grounded in some empirical evidence, for example, Boix and Stokes found that rising levels of income are linked to a higher chance that democracy consolidated and lower risk that it backslides. However, recent studies by, for instance, Bermeo and Yashar, shows that the

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“price of admission” into the club of democracies has lowered significantly which means that countries are transitioning into democracies at a higher level of inequality than ever. This finding is reflected in studies done by Haggard, Kaufman and Slater, who showed that inequality affected democratic transition and backsliding at a higher rate in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than later on. Furthermore, oil countries, while having high numbers in the GDP scale, are at a much higher chance to suffer from democratic backsliding, as shown in the study done by Waldner and Smith. According to these authors the reason for this is most likely that leaders in oil countries can escape vertical and horizontal accountability. Lust and Waldner also point out that it is difficult to determine which way the causal relationship between the economy and democracy works. There is little to dispute that it is not democracy that has an effect on the economy and not the other way around (Ibid: 101-102).

Theories of social structure and political coalitions focus on social heterogeneity and conceptualizes this by analyzing the formation of groups of citizens, the potential for conflict among these groups, and the political implications of group formation and intergroup conflict and how these variables affect democratic backsliding. However, as Lust and Waldner emphasize, studies have shown that there are a number of different sources of identity. Each individual can combine these sources in their own way at different times and in different contexts. This means that identity is more complex than what is implied in theories of social structure and political coalitions. Furthermore, scholars that approach democratic backsliding in this way face the problem that social divisions appear through a complex social context- a process that can be difficult to discern correctly. It is also not correct to claim that these social divisions are first formed and then influencing political processes and structures. Instead, Lust and Waldner are of the view, based on previous studies, that political structures and processes also influence group identity formation. Political entrepreneurs, for example, might deliberately facilitate certain forms of group formation and restrain others. The authors also point out that there are too few case studies done with this approach in mind to properly generalize the findings (Ibid: 103-104).

Another approach is the international approach to democratic outcomes. It does not necessarily differ from any other theory presented in this section, but it differs in that the primary agent in a democratic transition or backslide is an international actor. Levitsky and Way showed that when Western leverage and linkage in an authoritarian country is high, there will be a strong pressure for democratization, and if the opposite is true, the pressure will be lower. One simple

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empirical evidence for this finding is that democracies are usually spatially clustered, as Gleditsch and Ward showed, which indicates that peer pressure can be powerful. Furthermore, there have been cases of democratic movements in one country inspiring another in a neighboring country. In addition, Hyde showed that the international community can have a positive influence in election fraud, as they have the capacity to provide electoral monitoring of elections. This has a positive outcome on the level of democracy. Nevertheless, high levels of foreign aid stimulate rent- seeking behavior, while also curtailing the capacity of citizens to hold rulers accountable, thus creating a possibility of democratic backsliding. In contrast to these findings, Lust and Waldner emphasize that this approach may underestimate how much of a role the domestic factors play in this context, as well as overestimating the role of the international community (Ibid: 104-105).

Lastly, there are studies that have used an agency- based theory to approach democratic transitions and backslides. The studies focus on political actors and see it irrelevant to expect structural conditions to be an obstacle for individual decision-making. To conceptualize these theories one can analyze a leader’s personal attributes, such as temperament or intellect as Linz did. Cappoccia looked at strategic decision- making and concluded that democratic backsliding happens because the actor in charge consciously takes a path for more or more long-term power which undermines the democratic institutions. Similarly, O’Donnel and Schmitter researched the strategic interaction of groups in the government and in the opposition. Critics of this approach argue that it ignores structural conditions that scholars argue has an equal, if not even larger, role in democratic transitions and backslides. Yet, some, for example Fish and Van de Walle, have found that this approach is especially fitting when the leader or leaders in question are unconstrained by powerful institutions (Ibid: 97-98). In the case of Ethiopia, it has indeed been the government that has been the driver in the democratic backsliding, as will be further discussed under “2.2.2 Choice of Case”. For the purpose of this study, the lens of an agency- based reasoning for democratic backsliding is thus considered most fitting.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Definition

This study uses Lust and Waldner’s definition of democratic backsliding. According to the authors, the definition of democratic backsliding is “the deterioration of qualities associated

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with democratic governance, within any regime” (Lust, Waldner, 2018: 95). Note here that the concept does not mean a full regression to authoritarianism. Norms of what the authors refer to as ‘answerability’ (if officials are obligated to be transparent about their actions) and

‘punishment’ (if the public is able to hold the government accountable)are eroded so that citizens’ capability of governmental accountability lessens, however, most norms of democracy can still be prevalent in society (Ibid).

2.2.2 Choice of case

In Abiy Ahmed’s first year he introduced a number of democratic reforms. In regard to domestic policies, Ahmed guaranteed free press, lifted Internet blockades and liberalized the economy. He also released tens of thousands of political prisoners and allowed exiled parties to return to Ethiopia. Previously deemed ’terrorist-groups’, such as Ginbot 7 and the ONLF, were now decriminalized (Weber, 2018: 1). For the first time, the human rights violations of former administrations, as well as the torture practices that had been regularly used by the police, were acknowledged by an Ethiopian Prime Minister (Kelecha, 2019: 11-12).

However, there has recently been an increase of arrests of protesters, critical of the government, since 2019. Journalists that have reported unfavorably of the Abiy Ahmed administration have reportedly been harassed by government employees and the internet shutdowns that were promised to stop with the election of Abiy Ahmed have continued (Hagmann, Tronvoll, 2019).

The election that was set to 2020 was postponed as Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity party cited the need to avoid crowding due to COVID-19. Critics, who pointed out that according to the constitution elections are the only legitimate way to office, claim that the reasoning given was only a way for the current government to stay in power. COVID-19 did lead to the public health state of emergency, and law enforcement agencies are no longer obligated to comply with the provisions regarding the appointment and date of the court, something that worries many. It is important here to consider that Ethiopia has a long tradition where previous administrations have exploited the state of emergencies to keep the claim of the leadership position (Kelecha, 2020: 3-5). As explained in the introduction of this text, the postponement of the election was also one of the catalysts of the war in Tigray.

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2.2.3 Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding

Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) studied the patterns of democratic backsliding and arrived at the conclusion that the process can be expected to happen in three distinct consecutive steps.

Firstly, the government will attempt to control the law and law enforcement agencies, called the ‘referees’, that are supposed to check the governmental overstep as per the laws and constitution of the particular country. These agencies are for example police, military, courts, and regulatory agencies and in a liberal democracy, these institutions have the capacity to regulate unlawful government behavior. Without these, or rather, with the complete control of these, the government has a chance to violate democratic norms without the fear of punishment.

They are also used against the state government’s opposition. For example, assuring the loyalty of the police means that they can be used against protesters all while allowing pro- government movements to protest. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt, methods that are used to reach this goal are: blackmailing or bribing employees of these institutions to obtain loyalty; firing critical voices and; hiring new employees that are trusted (Levitsky, Ziblatt, 2018: 78).

Secondly, after the first step is completed, the government no longer has to worry about state institutions regulating unlawful behavior. Now, it can aim to target the opposition, who may be politicians from other parties, media that have been critical of the government as well as significant cultural and religious individuals. Gaining control over the opposition has two benefits: 1) control allows the government to avoid criticism and 2) control can be used to gain further legitimacy as ‘referees’ are seemingly in favor of the government. Allowing opposition parties creates a legitimate platform that allows the government to be criticized. Furthermore, opposition parties are an alternative to the state government and thus, have the capacity to snub the next election- something that a leader with ambitions of the authoritarian nature would want to avoid. The media is the institution that can publicize the wrongdoings of the government, thus targeting the media means that such things no longer get revealed. Furthermore, the subsequent lack of critical monitoring from the media could be used by the government to claim legitimacy, as it could claim that the absence of criticism means that there is no threat of civil rights nor the laws and the constitution. Important figures have the capacity to shift public opinion, and therefore, their loyalty or disloyalty matters for a government that is attempting to keep voters while still violating democratic norms (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018: 78).

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Levitsky and Ziblatt stress that the targeting of opponents is strategic, in that it is aimed at specific individuals or groups rather than the entire opposition. In this way, the government can still claim legitimacy as it is more difficult to argue that it is targeting the opposition in order to stay in power. Methods include: blackmailing or bribing key figures, for silence or more favorable attitude; suing critical media for libel or defamation suits and; arresting key figures for invented or exaggerated crimes. These methods can lead to self- censorship, as other actors within the opposition grow fearful of the consequences of speaking freely (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018: 87).

Lastly, the government will alter or even introduce new laws, and similarly, the constitution may be adjusted, in order to retain the leadership position. As laws are still technically being followed the government can claim that it has no authoritarian characteristics which means that it can still claim legitimacy. Levitsky and Ziblatt write that election fraud is rarely used for this objective as it is easier to manipulate the electoral system to work in the government’s favor.

For example, it can be altered in larger parties’ favor, thus making it more difficult for smaller parties to succeed. Smaller parties are more often the opposition, especially after the first and second step have been completed (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018: 88).

2.3. Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework used in this study, I have developed three hypotheses regarding how the discursive patterns of an administration that has begun eroding democratic norms could be observed. As stated, these are centered around Levitsky and Ziblatt’s three main assumptions about the process of democratic backsliding which are that a government that is subjected to democratic erosion is expected to: attempt to control the judiciary and other state institutions; delegitimize its opposition in order to control the narrative and; attempt to stay in power through various means. The hypotheses are all formulated with a consideration that democratic backsliding happens in societies where most democratic norms are more or less accepted by the society. As norm-breaking behavior generally is not accepted by the wider population, a government that has the aspiration to defy these norms would tread carefully and not speak freely of its goals so as to not risk losing support.

The first hypothesis derives from the first step of the Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding and seeks to conceptualize how a leader may use language in order to

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take the first steps to gain control over state institutions. This hypothesis considers the methods that Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that a government uses to obtain this goal, such as bribing or blackmailing officials. However, as this study aims to analyze the discursive patterns, it will not cover everything that is considered a possible method. For example, it is deemed unlikely that the practice of blackmailing critical individuals would be detectable in government approved documents. Instead, it is more likely that a more general negative attitude towards critics and a positive attitude towards loyalists would be found.

H1: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will speak favorably of individuals employed by the law and law enforcement agencies that are deemed loyal to the government and attempt to delegitimize those that are not.

The following hypothesis derives from the second step of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding: that governments heading towards a democratic regression will attempt to delegitimize the opposition. To reiterate, the goals of this step are to avoid monitoring, weaken opposition and increase legitimacy by claiming that there is nothing about its behavior that others may criticize. Similarly, as with the first hypothesis, a more general negative attitude towards the opposition is expected to be found in the discursive patterns.

Furthermore, as Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model predicts, the government would try to embellish its own actions, in order to claim legitimacy.

H2: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will attempt to frame the opposition in a negative light while legitimizing their own actions.

The final hypothesis derives from the last step of the model, where the government will begin to adjust the constitution or introduce laws to continue its claim of power. Here, the discursive patterns are projected to change gradually towards more arguments of why the current government should stay in power. Taking into consideration that the goal for a government in this position is to avoid losing the support of the constituents these arguments would not explicitly state that the aspiration to maintain the leadership position is the reason for the change but there would rather be a different reason that is central to the argument.

H3: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will argue for constitutional adjustments and/or law reforms that help them keep the power but will not explicitly state that this is the reason.

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3. Methodology and Research Design

Below, the methodology, material and the analytical framework chosen and their limitations will be presented. The methodological decisions made in this study will be justified throughout this section. In the last section, the analytical framework that this study uses will be introduced and discussed.

3.1. Methodology

For this study, the chosen method is a qualitative text analysis. This is the preferred method when the aim is to see the meaning of a text as it will allow a researcher to closely examine data and it puts a text in its social meaning rather than viewing statements as objective truths (Esaiasson et al., 2018: 211-212). As this study intends to do exactly this, by seeking to catch potential hidden meanings of statements made by Abiy Ahmed's administration and why these may be there, the qualitative text analysis is argued to be the most suitable method.

A text analysis is usually systematic, in order to, as objectively as possible, lift the hidden meanings from the material chosen. Through this way, a researcher can create a comprehensive analysis of the hidden meanings which allows for a study beyond a simple read-through of the material and the results that such an analysis would bring (Ibid: 213-214). This will be further discussed below.

3.2. Research Design

This study uses a critical approach to a policy analysis, otherwise it would be difficult to ensure objectivity as a text analysis allows for interpretation. What one researcher may perceive as the most important passage in a text, may not be seen as important in the eyes of another. Thus, in order to remain as impartial as possible, a systematic approach has been taken for the analysis.

This will ensure both that the study approaches the texts in the same way thus minimizing the risk of subjectivity and that transparency regarding how the study is conducted is ensured. It is also useful as a researcher can create a comprehensive analysis of the hidden meanings (Ibid:

213-214). For this particular study, the systematic approach is taken by using the hypotheses that are discussed under the title “2.4 Hypotheses” to develop a set of questions. These questions are all aimed to answer the research question as they are designed to reveal how the Abiy Ahmed administration presents the problem of the Tigrayan crisis. Considerations of the

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level of validity between the hypotheses and the questions have continuously been made throughout the process of constructing these questions and a further discussion about this can be found in “3.5 Analytical Framework”. This will ensure that the study is indeed measuring what is necessary to answer the research question (Ibid: 216). The questions that have been developed will be presented and further discussed in “3.5 Analytical Framework”. In the analysis, the results from asking these questions of the material will be applied to the hypotheses developed in this study, thus concluding with an answer if they have been strengthened or weakened.

3.3. Limitations

The ability to generalize the results of the study is limited. Drawing general conclusions based on one case is not recommended as it may very well be an outlier in relation to other cases.

However, the Ethiopian government has followed Levitsky and Ziblatt’s trajectory of democratic backsliding. Thus, the case is considered to be a typical case and therefore there is more reason to believe that it is representative to the population. If this study then concludes with results that strengthen or weaken the hypotheses it has developed, then it can still contribute to the current research field of democratic backsliding (Ibid: 164-165).

It should also be mentioned that this study uses a theoretical model in which the process of democratic backsliding happens in three consecutive steps. As no source material was available from before 2020 it was not possible to take this into consideration. Nevertheless, it should be clarified that Levitsky and Ziblatt do not claim that the steps cannot happen simultaneously.

This study uses data from the official Ethiopian government website and there are limitations of using this material. The documents released on the website are in some instances written in Amharic, which is not a language that I master nor have the capability to translate in other ways. This means that some data that could contribute to the results of this study is possibly and unfortunately not included.

3.4. Selection of Material

This study uses speeches, press releases and articles that have been released by the official website for the office of the prime minister (pmo.gov.et). The specific texts have been chosen based on whether or not they mention the Tigray conflict, or the Tigray region. There is

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unfortunately no available search tool on the website, however this is resolved by using the google mechanism that allows a searcher to find all texts where a website has mentioned a specific word by typing the word followed by site:sitename. In this case, the search is “tigray site:pmo.gov.et”. This means that every document that mentions Tigray will be included in this analysis, however, if they are not relevant, they will not be presented later in the results. The time frame of this study is from the fourth of November 2020, when the law and order- operation in Tigray happened, until the first of April 2021 when this analysis began.

Using this material will be relevant to this study as these will reveal discursive patterns regarding the Tigrayan crisis. The documents available on the government website are considered to reveal the most about the real policy position that the administration has as it is official and made directly by them. They are also useful in that they are lengthier and can thus reiterate more complex arguments for their policy position. As explained under “3.3 Limitations” some texts are written in Amharic and so there is a risk that all relevant data is not included.

Data from non-official statements, such as tweets, interviews and so on, are not included. Posts on social media contain less information than longer policy documents and are thus limited in their capability to convey a more complex policy position. Statements from interviews or other news media are excluded as there is a risk of a third party influencing what arguments are highlighted or that arguments are misunderstood. This study is interested in the narrative that has been directly constructed by the administration, therefore, source material from news outlets is not needed.

3.5. Analytical Framework

In order to answer the research problem this study has developed systematic questions that are derived from the three hypotheses previously presented. All of these questions are open by design which will allow for a more complex analysis of the empirical data.

H1: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will speak favorably of individuals employed by the law and law enforcement agencies that are deemed loyal to the government and attempt to delegitimize those that are not.

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● How are law and law enforcement agencies who are loyal to the TPLF represented?

● How are law and law enforcement agencies who are loyal to the government represented?

H2: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will attempt to frame the opposition in a negative light while legitimizing their own actions.

● How is the TPLF represented?

● How does the Ethiopian government represent itself?

● How does the Ethiopian government justify its own actions in the conflict?

H3: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will argue for constitutional adjustments and/or law reforms that help them increase power but will not explicitly state that this is the reason.

● What new laws or adjustments to the laws and the constitution are discussed, and what are the arguments for them?

● Is oppositional criticism of these arguments acknowledged, and if so, how is that countered by the government?

Many of the concepts that are central to the questions are considered to be fairly obvious. For example, in the first question of the second hypothesis, “How is the TPLF represented?”, it is clear when the government is speaking of the TPLF as they mention it explicitly. However, the operationalization of the term ‘loyal’ requires further discussion to increase validity.

What is deemed ‘loyal’ in the first question of the first hypothesis, “How are law and law enforcement agencies who are loyal to the TPLF represented?”, is if there is mention of amicable ties between the individual or group to the TPLF. As the question regards law and law enforcement agencies, this includes military personnel, police officers, judges and regulatory agencies whose decisions the government conveys disagreements with. More specifically for this study, the only group that was mentioned were the TPLF army. Similar to this logic, for the second question of the first hypothesis, “How are law and law enforcement

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agencies who are loyal to the government represented?”, ‘loyalty’ is in regard to if the government mentions amicable ties between the agencies and the government.

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4. Results and Discussion

This section will begin with presenting the results that the analysis has brought. Quotes from the source material will be included to justify these answers as well. This is structured in the order found in the analytical framework. Lastly, the data will be presented again but in application to the hypotheses to be able to answer the research question.

4.1. Results

4.1.1 H1

Leaders seeking to erode democracy will speak favorably of individuals employed by the law and law enforcement agencies that are deemed loyal to the government and attempt to delegitimize those that are not.

How are law and law enforcement agencies who are loyal to the TPLF represented?

On the 30th of November 2020, a speech was given by the administration to answer questions that the House of People’s Representatives raised regarding the law enforcement operations in the Tigray Region. Abiy Ahmed pointed out that a substantial number of officers, both with higher and lower rank, were from the Tigray region. As shown in the quote below, he was clear that this was an issue as it pointed to a previous system, created by the previous government led by the TPLF, in which officers were employed not by merit but by where they were born.

A general may be politically appointed but for a person to be a major or colonel, twenty years are required. What was done by the ousted regime in the defense force was to incapacitate the leadership by ensuring military leadership will originate only from one area (Ahmed, 2020a).

The quotes below further shows that Ahmed indicates to civilians that they should be aware of the issue.

This does not benefit Tigray or Ethiopia. Neither Amhara, Tigray, Oromo, Benishangul or other regions should not have an outsized role in the military. If this pattern continues, the current problem will eventually be recreated (Ahmed, 2020a).

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The people of Tigray as well as the entire Ethiopian people should know about these unusual circumstances. It should not be hidden. Everyone should get their fair share and we need to create a military that represents all of Ethiopia. This is not only something to be desired but something that is demanded by the laws and the Constitution (Ahmed, 2020a).

These quotes signify that the administration is attempting to 1) frame officers employed by the previous administration as less deserving of their roles than others who one can be sure got the job by merit and 2) appeal to citizens by framing this issue as something that is unfair to them.

What does this mean? These officers know the kinds of weapons available in the defense force.

They know the available training and the communication lines. Everything was in their hands (Ahmed, 2020a).

The quote above, which is about officers employed by the previous administration who are mostly Tigrayan, has two implicit meanings. Firstly, this indicates that the officers are still loyal to the previous administration and by extension, the TPLF. Secondly, it implies that their knowledge of warfare makes them dangerous to the current administration, because their loyalty to the TPLF means that they are potentially going to turn against the Abiy Ahmed administration.

How are law and law enforcement agencies who are loyal to the government represented?

In the press release on November 4th, 2020, on the same day of the TPLF attack and the Ethiopian National Defense operation in Tigray, the administration frames their own military in a positive light. Particularly, the press release mentions how the military will “save the country” and that this operation will stop “the region from spiraling into instability”. For context, this quote is presented in full below.

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces, under the direction of a Command Post, have been ordered to carry out their mission to save the country and the region from spiraling into instability (Ahmed adm., 2020a).

This indicates that the government is aspiring to convince others that theirs is both the winning side and the correct side in this conflict. The quote below further contributes as evidence for this conclusion, as it shows that the administration is appealing to the civilians.

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The Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, calls upon the Ethiopian people to remain calm, to be vigilant in the face of possible harassment, and to stand by our National Defense Forces in this critical time (Ahmed adm., 2020a).

In the speech from the 30th of November 2020, Abiy Ahmed named and praised individuals within the military for their accomplishments in this conflict. The paragraph which mentions these people is presented below to give full context.

In all this, Dil Kursu General Berhanu Jula (“The Victorious”) and other generals achieved extraordinary success in 24 hours. Among these were Hager Wedadu General Yohannes (“The Patriot”), the Behageru Yemayderaderew general who will not negotiate his country’s honor Tesfaye (“The Pursuer”) and Anefnafiw General Asrat who reads maps like a book and battle commanders General Tesfaye and General Abdurahman who were intent on finishing off the enemy, General Hachalu who coordinated logistics and General Hasan who sustained the manpower. Here there are two forces I would like to mention. The first is Ared Anqetqetu General Yilma (“Shock and Awe”) commander of the Air Force. Together with our heroic fighters, they contributed immensely to our quick victory (Ahmed, 2020a).

As shown here, Ahmed spoke of them as heroes. He gave them titles, such as “The Victorious”, in the same manner that historical heroes are often celebrated. This indicates that the administration is attempting to glorify loyal individuals within the military in a potential attempt to improve public opinion of them.

4.1.2 H2

Leaders seeking to erode democracy will attempt to frame the opposition in a negative light while legitimizing their own actions.

How is the TPLF represented?

Ahmed told the House of People’s Representatives and indirectly the people of Ethiopia that the TPLF are illegitimate rulers of the Tigray region as shown in the quote below.

We do not want political discussions except with legitimate parties in Tigray including Arena Tigray Democratic Party, Tigray Prosperity Party and others like them. We do not want anyone to administer Tigray except through their legitimate parties. We will not do it. The people of Tigray are honorable people. They can manage their own affairs. They are now free from the

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repressive junta regime. They can elect and administer their affairs with their own representatives (Ahmed, 2020a).

Ahmed compared the TPLF to the Kuomintang, a nationalist party in China, as shown in the quote below.

Ironically, they ended up creating a so-called federalist alliance with the very people and organizations they had once labeled terrorists. They had no reservations in engaging in such hypocrisy. In this regard, the junta handled themselves in much the same way as the Kuomintang (nationalist party of China) (Ahmed, 2020a).

He further compared the TPLF to the confederate side of the American civil war:

Abraham Lincoln came to power promising to abolish slavery. But the people in the south who were profiting from slave labor to produce cotton and oil seeds opposed abolition of slavery.

They insisted slavery should continue [...]. General Jefferson Davis [...] made himself chief of staff and led a campaign of secession from the United States and rejected the Lincoln administration. [...] One-night Southern militia forces unexpectedly attacked the federal Fort Sumter. Abraham Lincoln was unprepared. Lincoln called up the militia to defend against the attack and closed off ports to cut off supplies to the rebel forces. What the TPLF junta did on the Northern Command is similar to the attack on the American federal fort (Ahmed, 2020a).

These two comparisons indicate that Ahmed is framing the TPLF as the “villains” as who he is comparing them to are generally acknowledged as such by the international community.

In addition, it is clear that the administration frames the TPLF as criminals. In the press release from the 6th of November 2020, they wrote that:

Instead, the TPLF criminal clique made a public vow to make Ethiopia ungovernable, which they carried out by planning, training, financing, and actually executing – both directly as well as through their criminal surrogates - horrendous crimes in several parts of the country (Ahmed adm., 2020b).

They also frame the TPLF as an expertly organized criminal group. In the November speech, Ahmed told the House of People’s Representatives that there are major conflicts in every region except for Tigray. While no direct evidence for his claim is provided, he tells listeners that this

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is no coincidence but actually organized by the TPLF for the goal of appearing legitimate to others.

There were at least 113 major conflicts that had occurred in every region except Tigray. They shamelessly proclaimed they were the only ones in the country that remained at peace [...] Of course, there is peace in Tigray because those causing destruction were working day and night to create chaos elsewhere (Ahmed, 2020a).

However, Ahmed also states that the TPLF are reckless, which may contradict the previous quote. For example, he says:

When committing such a treasonous act, the enemy was filled with hubris because they had large caches of weapons under their control. They were openly bragging to diplomats in different forums that if their demands were not met by the federal government, they would destabilize not only Ethiopia but also the entire East African region (Ahmed, 2020a).

Furthermore, the quote below shows how Ahmed frames the TPLF as a group that will use violent methods to obtain their goal rather than diplomatic methods which indicates a framing of the TPLF as reckless.

There are some among them who say they will continue the battle. With whom are they going to do battle? They should battle with their inner selves. Battle with their evil ideas. Why should young people battle for their wicked ideas, repressive ideas? They can organize and defeat the Prosperity Party in an election (Ahmed, 2020a).

This goes into the last point of how the government represents the TPLF which is that they are attempting to push a narrative that the group is willing to sacrifice civilians in order to hold power. This narrative is perhaps best shown in the quote from the speech below.

What they mean by “let’s fight” is to tell Tigrayan youth, “Protect me. I don’t want to die. You die for me.” But what fool is there who will sacrifice his life for their survival. If they were really concerned about the people, they would have fought right there in Mekelle and died in battle (Ahmed, 2020a).

How does the Ethiopian government represent itself?

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In the press release on the 6th of November, the administration represents itself as diplomats who have been gracious up until the attack on the 4th of November. The quote is shown in full below but what should particularly be pointed out is that the administration writes that they have had “extreme patience” and that a military response did not occur until the TPLF attack.

Over the past two years, the Federal Government has adopted an attitude of patience to contain transgressions by the TPLF and the illegal elements it has been funding and mobilizing to destabilize the nation. Over the past months of continued provocation and incitement for violence by TPLF, the Federal Government has maintained a policy of extreme patience and caution in order to avoid any harm that such provocations would cause the people of Tigray.

Only then did the Government order the Federal Defense Forces to defend themselves by all necessary means and restore law and order in the country (Ahmed adm., 2020b).

This narrative is reflected in the speech Ahmed gave on the 30th of November, for example in the quote below.

Ethiopia has only one government. Ethiopia has a government that functions on the principle of the rule of law. It has a government accountable to the law. A government that respects its citizens. As much as possible, it will build a democracy that looks like Ethiopia (Ahmed, 2020a).

In this speech, it is also clear that Ahmed positions himself and his government as particularly gracious towards the TPLF. For example, he said:

Domestically, regarding the junta, I do not have any personal hatred of any kind towards them.

I urge you not to harbor any hatred towards them. We hate their ideas. Driven by hatred, we should be careful not to get rid of one junta and end up being another (Ahmed, 2020a).

They also make clear that they are better than the other side in different ways. For one, Ahmed was clear that the Ethiopian National Defense Force possesses more military capacity than the TPLF does. For another, he reiterates that the reason that they did not use it all was because they are taking more responsibility than the TPLF. Both of these points are shown in the following quote: “Despite the fact that we outnumbered them in our rocket capabilities, we did not use it because our country was at stake. We are not juntas; we operate with responsibility”

(Ahmed, 2020a).

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Abiy Ahmed was also sure to appeal to the people in his speech by emphasizing that the government has their safety as a priority. For example, he said:

99 percent of our targets without collateral damage. When in doubt, we did not fire. For example, we did not attack at night because of fear that children could get killed. They are our children too (Ahmed, 2020a).

How does the Ethiopian government justify its own actions in the conflict?

The government justifies its actions in the conflict in a few ways. Firstly, as evident in the quotes found below from the press releases on the 4th and 6th of November 2020 and the 19th of March 2021, the military operation was necessary for defense purposes. The administration writes that the Northern command is important for the safety of the people, thus, the attack threatens that security. The following quote and the two below are examples of this narrative:

“The Northern command has been stationed in the Tigray region for more than two decades in service and protection of the people of Tigray from any threats.” (Ahmed adm., 2020a).

Only then [after the attack] did the Government order the Federal Defense Forces to defend themselves by all necessary means and restore law and order in the country (Ahmed adm., 2020b).

The situation was imminent, forcing the government to take appropriate legal action. When such things happen, it is clear that the government has both moral and legal obligation to take appropriate rule of law enforcement action to protect the sovereignty and security of the country (Ahmed adm., 2021a).

Secondly, it is clear from the source material that the government justifies its actions by reiterating that its past diplomatic ways were not enough to resolve the conflict. For example, this is shown in Ahmed’s description of the events in an article on the 24th of December 2020.

[I] declared that the only enemy I would mobilize my people and resources to wage war against was poverty. However, my vision and determination came under severe strain right from the start of my premiership. It did not take long for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership to launch a campaign, covertly and overtly, to undermine my administration and make our people and the rest of the world believe that, without them at the helm, Ethiopia would be ungovernable (Ahmed, 2020b).

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Thirdly, as evident in the press release on the 6th of November, the government did not view TPLF as legitimate actors. The implicit meaning of the quote below is that this means that the government is justified in its attack.

On the contrary, the TPLF orchestrated an illegal election, anointed themselves the legitimate rulers of the Tigray region and, most importantly of all, declared the Federal Government illegitimate and purported to withdraw recognition from it (Ahmed adm., 2020b).

Lastly, as discussed previously, the government has framed the TPLF as criminals and dangerous for the safety of civilians. This has also been used by the administration to stress that they are in the right in the conflict and that the intervention was justified. The quotes below, both by articles written by Abiy Ahmed, represent this.

Using traitors recruited from within the army along ethnic lines, not only did the TPLF leadership cause the massacre of unarmed soldiers in their pyjamas in the dead of night, they also took possession, illegally, of the entire military arsenal of the Northern Command. I was thus left with a decision only of how, not whether, to fight to defend the integrity of my country and restore the constitutional order (Ahmed, 2020b).

No government can tolerate its soldiers and innocent civilians being ambushed and killed in their dozens, as happened at the hands of the TPLF last autumn. My primary duty as prime minister and commander in chief of the national armed forces, after all, is to protect Ethiopia and its people from internal and external enemies (Ahmed, 2021).

4.1.2 H3

Leaders seeking to erode democracy will argue for constitutional adjustments and/or law reforms that help them keep the power but will not explicitly state that this is the reason.

What new laws or adjustments to the laws and the constitution are discussed, and what are the arguments for them?

The State of Emergency declared due to the conflict allows the government to conduct the military operation in Tigray and the administration cites article 93(1)(a) of the constitution for why it is legitimate. The arguments for why it was used are presented below but to summarize, the government sees it necessary because it has a responsibility to ensure peace and safety of

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civilians, there is a need to defeat the TPLF as they are a threat of this security and because the conflict could not be solved through diplomatic means.

[There is a] constitutional responsibility of the state to maintain the country’s peace, the safety and security of its citizens and to prevent acts that may lead the country to further unrest and instability; [...] illegal and violent activities within the National Regional State of Tigray are endangering the constitution and constitutional order, public peace and security, specially threatening the country’s sovereignty. [...] This situation has reached a level where it cannot be prevented and controlled through the regular law enforcement mechanism (Ahmed adm., 2020b).

The issue regarding the postponement of the election in 2020 was addressed in Abiy Ahmed’s article in December but only to discuss that the government will be ensuring a free and fair election in 2021 and not to acknowledge the criticism that the decision faced.

At the same time, the peace and security we have restored at so much cost remain fragile. That is why we are determined to ensure our next elections, scheduled to take place in mid-2021, are fair, free, and inclusive, and that the people of Tigray, like all other Ethiopians, shall soon be led by a regional government of their free own choice (Ahmed, 2020b).

Is oppositional criticism of these arguments acknowledged, and if so, how is that countered by the government?

The government has acknowledged criticism of human rights violations, as shown in for example the press release on the 24th of February 2021. In this press release, they stated that they would investigate the human rights violations and prosecute perpetrators. However, they do not directly mention that these allegations are directed against the government. The quote below shows this.

The Government of Ethiopia takes seriously allegations of human rights violations and has set up mechanisms to investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of alleged human rights violations committed, including sexual violations (Ahmed adm., 2021b).

However, while directly acknowledging criticism that the media has claimed that they have not been allowed in the Tigray region, the government also states that this information is wrong.

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Unlike the prevailing and inaccurate narrative that purport vast parts of the region are inaccessible, the Federal Government in partnership with international and local organizations has made significant progress in delivering humanitarian assistance to care for our citizens in Tigray (Ahmed adm., 2021b).

The accusations made regarding this issue are also attributed to be coming from the TPLF, who are, according to the government, spreading misinformation.

The Government of Ethiopia is cognizant of the overt and covert misinformation campaigns that have been launched against it in relation to the rule of law operations undertaken. The criminal clique’s well financed networks abroad continue to employ the use of digital media and other means, to portray an exaggerated or misleading account of events unfolding on the ground (Ahmed adm., 2021b).

As previously discussed in this thesis, there has been staunch opposition to the postponement of the election. The government does not acknowledge this criticism, however, there is a discussion about the next election. The discussion is centered around how this election will be free and fair as shown when the administration wrote “[t]he highly anticipated elections will arguably be the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s first free and fair elections.”

(Ahmed adm., 2021c).

Criticism regarding how the government has been unable to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those who need it in the Tigray region is met by the argument that the situation is the fault of the TPLF. For example, Abiy Ahmed wrote in his article that “[r]econnecting communication lines deliberately destroyed by the TPLF is testing our capacity to deliver humanitarian aid.” (Ahmed, 2021). Further, the administration wrote in a press release that

“[t]he Government of Ethiopia has also taken concrete steps to address human rights abuses that have occurred within the context of the conflict triggered by the TPLF.” (Ahmed adm., 2021d).

Turning to the international community, Ahmed welcomed potential aid in the conflict, but also pointed to Ethiopia’s sovereignty as a reason for why concerns of human rights abuses should be directed by the government and not investigated by any other actor.

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As a sovereign country, while we welcome the concerns and tangible contributions of our international partners for a much-needed humanitarian support, coordination of humanitarian assistance remains the mandate of the Federal Government, facilitated by the Ministry of Peace (Ahmed adm., 2021b).

4.2. Discussion

H1: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will speak favorably of individuals employed by the law and law enforcement agencies that are deemed loyal to the government and attempt to delegitimize those that are not.

Tigrayan officers, particularly those employed by the previous administration led by the TPLF, are said to be employed not by their own merit but by what their ethnicity happens to be.

Furthermore, there is much in the source material that indicates that the government is framing these officers as dangerous. Both the general administration and Abiy Ahmed himself convey the image that these officers possess knowledge about how the Ethiopian National Defense Force works and because they are more likely to be disloyal thus increasing the risk that an attack will occur and the sheer force of it. In addition, there is also a framing of the loyal officers to the TPLF as violent. All of these points enforce a narrative that these officers are more illegitimate actors than others. This mirrors how the Levitsky and Ziblatt model predicts the process of the first step during democratic backsliding- that is, that a government will delegitimize critical voices within these sorts of agencies. Presumably, the Ethiopian government does this in the hopes that these ‘referees’ will be discouraged from monitoring or by punishing abnormal behavior in the future.

These findings correspond with the model of democratic backsliding. Levitsky and Ziblatt mention that a government in the process of pursuing democratic backsliding will be hiring loyal voices in law and law enforcement agencies as the goal is to get rid of ‘referees’ who potentially will be punishing it. Of course, as discussed when developing these hypotheses, this method will not be observable in discursive patterns, but the end goal is still the same regardless of the methods used.

Furthermore, the government frames their own military officers as saviors, speaking of the general military, and heroes, when pointing out specific individuals. Furthermore, Abiy Amhed is clear to mention that the national military possesses more military capacity than what the

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TPLF does. In addition, Ahmed and his administration encouraged civilians to feel safe in the knowledge that the military is winning in the conflict. These points indicate that the government is attempting to glorify its own military, as no criticism in relation to the officers’

actions is brought up, but rather, only positive feedback. From the theoretical framework of this study, it is understood that a government in the process of democratic backsliding would be carefully attempting to legitimize itself, instead of this abrupt way. As such, this finding might point to a new method that the government uses in order to push a skewed narrative.

This glorification indicates that a government in the process of democratic backsliding will be ready to enforce a positive image on those that are loyal with the goal that more people will be incentivized to endorse.

In conclusion, this hypothesis has been strengthened in the analysis done in this study. A government will both frame those loyal to it in the most positive light it can, while simultaneously delegitimizing those that are critical to it. Furthermore, according to the findings in this study, this hypothesis should be adjusted to also include that the government will potentially even glorify loyalists, not just attempting to legitimize them.

H2: Leaders seeking to erode democracy will attempt to frame the opposition in a negative light while legitimizing their own actions.

As is familiar, the opposition in this case is the TPLF. The Ethiopian government frames the group as the illegitimate rulers of the Tigray region, as villains, as expertly organized criminals and as reckless and violent. The Ethiopian government positions itself as levelheaded diplomats and as primarily concerned with the safety of civilians. According to the administration, the conflict began in an act of self-defense and it was not until the attack of the Northern Command that it realized that past diplomatic efforts were not enough. This narrative signifies to others that the TPLF are not legitimate actors while the government is, thus, the narrative may be pushed as it can garner support from civilians. According to the Ziblatt and Levitsky model, framing the opposition in this light can help the government to avoid criticism as it is coming from what it has already represented as illegitimate actors. The model correctly predicted that the government would be focused on one group, in this case, the TPLF, instead of attempting to delegitimize the entire opposition. As discussed in the section with the theoretical framework of this study, this is because it is more difficult to argue that the government is framing the

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