The securitization of climate
change in the United States
-
A case-study of the Biden-Harris
administration’s first hundred days
in office
ANNA SÄLL
Spring 2021
Master’s Thesis in Political Science Department of Government
Uppsala University
Supervisor: Hans Blomkvist
Abstract
The Biden-Harris administration’s discussion of climate change is analyzed during the transformative time of the administration’s first hundred days in office. The theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS) is used to develop the coding frame to perform a qualitative content analysis of empirical material consisting of speeches and other documents of the administration. Several securitization moves have been identified and climate change has been presented as a security issue and an existential threat by the Biden-Harris administration. A wide range of referent objects are identified, which is the people and things presented to be threatened by climate change. The whole world, ecosystems, the American people and future generations are a few of the identified referent objects. International and national solutions are presented, though the solutions are not interpreted as extreme measures as discussed by the CS. Therefore, this study supports the critique of a too narrow definition of securitization by the CS.
Keywords: Climate change, Security, Securitization, Copenhagen School of Security Studies,
1. INTRODUCTION 3 1.1 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 4
1.2 LIMITATION 5
1.3 DISPOSITION 5
2. BACKGROUND 6
2.1CLIMATE AND SECURITY 6
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 8
3.1SECURITIZATION –COPENHAGEN SCHOOL OF SECURITY STUDIES 8
4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 12
4.1THE SECURITIZATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 12
4.2SECURITIZATION OF CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES 14
5. METHODOLOGY 16
5.1ANALYTICAL TOOL – QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 16
5.2CODING FRAME 18
5.3EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 20
6. ANALYSIS 23
6.1CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT 24
6.2REFERENT OBJECTS 32
6.3PRESENTED SOLUTION 37
6.4CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIZATION THEORY 43
7. CONCLUSION 46
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 47
1. INTRODUCTION
“I think in many ways that we autistic are the normal ones and the rest of the people are pretty strange. They keep saying that climate change is an existential threat and the most important issue of all. And yet they just carry on like before. If the emissions have to stop, then we must stop the emissions. To me that is black or white. There are no grey areas when it comes to survival. Either we go on as a civilization or we don’t. We have to change.” – Greta Thunberg1
The citation of the Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg is from a speech held at the Parliament Square in London, October 2018. Greta, then at the age of 15, clearly states that the climate change is about the survival of the human civilization. Her disappointment in the world leaders’ action to deal with the existential threat of climate change is crystal clear. That climate change will cause severe consequences around the world is no news for the world leaders. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming at 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels. The climate models presented in the report predicts at high confidence that there will be an increase in the mean temperature in the ocean, on land and that there will also be hot extremes. The risk for heavy precipitation and droughts is at medium confidence at 1,5°C, but is predicted to be much higher at 2°C of global warming. This is just two of many predicted impacts of global warming. Impact on biodiversity, water supply, food security and loss of species are some of the additional predicted consequences of climate change. One of the conclusions made in the IPCC report is that the need of adaptation to climate change will be higher at a 2°C than at 1,5°C of global warming.2
There is no lack of knowledge of the impacts of climate change.
Approximately one year before the IPCC released the report and Greta held the cited speech in London, President Trump announced that the United States was going to leave the Paris Climate Agreement, a promise that was fulfilled in 2020.3 The existential threat of a changing climate
was not only opposed, President Trump did not acknowledge the existence of climate change itself. From the end of January 2021 there is a new administration in the United States and
1 Thunberg, No One Is Too Small to Make a Difference, 7f. 2 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5 oC’.
President Biden has another approach to the climate than his predecessor. During the first day in office President Biden signed an Executive order to reenter the Paris Agreement,4 and the
climate is one of the Biden-Harris administration top priorities.5
To have the United States, one of the great powers in the world, onboard the Paris Agreement is crucial. Leaders’ discussion of an issue will determine the actions taken to handle it, in this case how to tackle climate change. The theory of securitization argues that speaking of an issue as an existential threat will have a great impact on political action. When an issue is accepted to be a matter of national security, leaders will be able to take actions that wouldn’t be possible if the issue wasn’t considered as a threat to national security.6 One recent example of
extraordinary actions legitimized by a security threat is how states have handled the COVID-19 pandemic. No citizen would accept lockdowns if they did not consider it to be a matter of their own and others protection from the virus. To study if the climate is presented as a security issue is of interest since a securitization would legitimize extreme action.
1.1 Purpose and Research Question
The purpose of this thesis is to study if the Biden-Harris administration talks about the climate and climate change as a possible security threat during their first one hundred days in office. The first one hundred days of a presidency is commonly considered as a benchmark of the president’s efficiency in office. Therefore, it is of interest to study how the administration chooses to discuss the climate during this transformative time. Climate change is a global issue and policy must be handled at an international level to make an impact. Though, changes has to be implemented nationally as well as at local level. The aim of this paper is to study how the Biden-Harris administration discusses the climate issue as a matter of security in an international setting as well as nationally. The United States’ position of power internationally and its capability to affect the global discourse on climate and security, not at least as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council, makes the Biden-Harris administration and the United States an interesting case to study. The analytical framework of this thesis is developed within the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS). By applying the theoretical framework of the CS on statements and other empirical material of the
Biden-4 The White House, ‘Paris Climate Agreement’. 5 The White House, ‘Priorities’.
Harris administration through a qualitative content analysis this thesis will analyze the following research question:
Is the Biden-Harris administration aiming to securitize the climate change during the first hundred days in office and if so, how?
This thesis, by studying the particular case of the United States and the Biden-Harris administration will contribute to a further understanding of securitization theory at the same time as knowledge on the discussion of the climate issue in the United States is generated.
1.2 Limitation
This paper will analyze the Biden-Harris administration’s securitization moves on the issue of climate change. As will be described in detail in the chapter on the theoretical framework a successful securitization requires the acceptance of the audience, which is not analyzed in this paper. Therefore, no claim will be made on a successful securitization of the climate change in the United States. The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the empirical material will be on if and how the Biden-Harris administration speaks of climate change as a matter of security, referred to as securitization moves.
1.3 Disposition
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Climate and security
Historically, climate has been seen as relatively constant at the same time as environmental threats like storms, earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters have occurred regularly. The view of the climate as something constant and as a background factor is no longer the reality. The development over the last century with human activity triggering climate change resulting in an increase of ecological threats.7 Given the observed impacts of climate change there has
been an increase to treat the climate change as a security risk.8 The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) describes the climate security nexus as impacts of climate change mainly on human security. Furthermore, to maintain international security and peace and the security of the state is also considered to be related to the climate security nexus. There is no empirical evidence on causal or linear effects of climate change on conflicts according to the UNDP. Though, in some contexts there is a correlation between conflict and climate change. In these contexts climate change is considered as a risk-multiplier since the change of climate can intensify the drivers for both conflict and violent extremism.9 The narrow definition of security
as strictly military has been disputed since the 1980’s and the climate security nexus contributes to extend the concept of security.10 In 1983 Ullman wrote a journal article Redefining Security,
criticizing the narrow definition of security.11 The article influenced the security debate and
contributed to broaden the definition of security.12
This broader definition of security has developed over the years and in April 2007 the interlinkages between climate and security was discussed in the United Nation Security Council for the first time. Since then several briefings and open debates on climate has been on the council’s agenda.13 The adoption of climate change at the Security Council’s agenda contributes
to the linkage between climate change and security in international politics. Furthermore, the Security Council as the only United Nation body that could adopt binding measures for the 193 Member States gives the council a special status. As article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations describes the council’s function and power, “In order to ensure prompt and effective
7 Buzan, People, States & Fear, 117f.
8 Mobjörk et al., ‘Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach’, 1. 9 UNDP, ‘UNDP Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent Extremism’, 3f. 10 Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, The Securitisation of Climate Change, 1. 11 Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’.
12 Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, The Securitisation of Climate Change, 1f.
action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”14 To bring
climate to the council’s agenda could increase climate action to prevent the threat of climate change to international security. The German thinktank Adelphi has studied the security council’s action on climate and security. They argue that the growing recognition of how climate change affects security should be reflected by increased action in the Security Council. However, the action and attention in the council is limited due to the polarized dynamics within the Security Council.15
In the beginning of 2021 the UNDP together with Oxford University published a survey on public opinion on climate change. It is the World’s largest study of this kind with 1.2 million respondents from 50 countries, the United States was one of the selected countries. 72 per cent of the respondents in high-income countries, including the United States, said that climate change is a global emergency. 64 per cent of the respondents in all 50 countries said the same thing. Almost six out of ten of the respondents who said that climate change in a global emergency would like the response to include everything necessary and urgent. 16 The report
was published at a time when many countries were in the process to update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. The result of the survey is a clear call for the world leaders to step up their ambitions on the climate issue.
14 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, Article
24.
15 Vivekananda, Day, and Wolfmaier, ‘What Can the UN Security Council Do on Climate and Security?’, 12. 16 UNDP, Cassie Flynn and Eri Yamasumi and University of Oxford, Professor Stephen Fisher, Dan Snow, Zack
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis and that is highly associated with the concept of securitization is the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS). The process of securitization which is defined by the authors of the CS, will be described in this chapter.
3.1 Securitization – Copenhagen School of Security Studies
The CS associated with the authors Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde analyzes the concept of security and develops the framework of securitization. The authors distinguish between different kinds of security as for example social security and international security. It is the later that is of interest for the CS. International security is analyzed in a traditional military-political understanding of security, where international security is about survival. If an existential threat occurs, international security might be endangered. The existential threat legitimizes extraordinary measures to deal with the threat.17 Within the CS the concept of national security
is discussed in relation to international security. Buzan argues that the term of national security is preferable to approach international relations to both peace and power, that is commonly used.18 Furthermore, there are different levels and sectors of analyzing security and existential
threats.19 The levels of analysis goes from the macro level including the international system to
the micro level which is the individual.20 Buzan et.al. analysis security in five sectors, the
military, the environmental, the economic, the societal and the political sector.21 Security in the
environmental sector discussed by the CS will be described further in this chapter, at the same time as the concept of security and securitization is specified.
The CS argues that security is not objective, though an issue can be “presented as an existential threat”.22 When the CS discusses security they use the term referent objects, which is defined
as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have the legitimate claim to survival”.23 Depending on which sector and level that is analyzed the referent objects will differ.
The authors argue that plenty of referent objects can be identified in the environmental sector. The survival of different species and habitats is concrete examples of referent objects in the
17 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 21ff. 18 Buzan, People, States & Fear, 25f.
19 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 21ff. 20 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 5f.
environmental sector. Though, not all referent objects in this sector are as concrete. The climate or the biosphere are examples of more diffuse referent objects within the environmental sector.24 To study the securitization of an issue the referent objects, what should be protected
from the existential threat, can be identified. How referent objects will be analyzed in this thesis will be further discussed in the chapter on methodology.
Security is described as a move beyond politics or as a special kind of politics. The CS argues that issues can be located at a spectrum of nonpolitical, political and security issues. Issues can also be moved along the spectrum, through a speech act. The environment and the climate has moved along this spectrum from belonging to the nonpoliticized category to be moved to a political or a security issue.25 This movement is referred to as a securitization move. In other
words, a securitization move is when a referent object is presented to be existentially threatened through the discourse. A securitization move does not immediately lead to a successful securitization of the issue. This means that it is possible to observe a securitization move in a discourse, but the issue is not fully securitized. The component that is needed for an issue to be securitized according to the CS is that the audience accepts it as a security issue. Without the acceptance by the audience there might be securitization moves without securitization. When the audience accept the issue as a matter of security, it is securitized.26 For an issue to be
successfully securitized three components or steps are needed, first an existential threat, second an emergency action and third effects on the relations between the audience and the people or person who securitizes the issue because of breaking free of the rules of politics.27 The CS also
refers to the grammar of security which is described as three stages. The first stage is the including of an existential threat within a construction of a plot, second there is no way to avoid the existential threat and finally that there is a way to handle the existential threat.28 The process
of securitization of an existential threat is defined as a discursive construction29 and is referred
to as a speech act within language theory.30 When a threat is discursively constructed as
existential, extraordinary means are legitimized. Securitization can in this way be interpreted as an extreme variant of politization of an issue.31 Extreme actions legitimized to tackle an issue
24 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 23. 25 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 24. 26 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 25. 27 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 26. 28 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 33.
29 von Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez, ‘What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change?’, 858. 30 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 26.
through a securitization of the issue is at the core of the CS. The securitization move of an issue from politics to security, through the speech act, is illustrated in the picture below. When the issue is successfully securitized and has been moved to the right hand side of the threshold, the issue is framed to be beyond politics as described before. At this stage extreme measures are legitimized and actions that would not be accepted without the securitization move is possible.32
Furthermore, the CS describes to accept securitization or to securitize as a political choice.33
Figure 1. Securitization move
The speech act must of course be performed by one or several actors. When actors declare the referent object as existentially threatened, they are called securitizing actors.34 A securitizing
actor can both be one single individual or a group of people.35 The CS further refers to
functional actors who might affect dynamics within the sector where the securitization is
analyzed. An example of a functional actor described by Buzan et.al. is a factory that pollutes the air or water. They do not try to securitize the issue but they still affect the environment. According to the CS these three types of units, referent objects, securitization actors and functional actors can be included in the security analysis of the speech act.36 In the case of
securitizing actors it does matter who the person or group are, since who is speaking about security will affect if the audience accepts the issue as a matter of security, in other words some kind of acknowledgement and leverage is necessary.37
It should be noticed that the authors of the CS argue that securitizing issues should be considered as negative. This is because a securitization is described as a failure of normal politics. Even though they acknowledge the use of securitization, of for example environmental issues, in the short run to give the issues attention, they argue that it is optimal to desecuritize in the long run.38
As described the acceptance of the audience is the difference between securitization moves and a successful securitization. The CS has been criticized for not developing the concept of the audience.39 Therefore, to study successful securitization the audience must be specified.
Though this thesis will not further develop this concept of audience since the purpose is to study the administration’s securitizing moves. Furthermore, the CS has been criticized for being stuck in a theoretical discussion even though the developed concept of securitization does imply for empirical research.40 As will be discussed in the next chapter other writers have used the
framework to preform empirical research.
38 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 29.
4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The CS and its theoretical framework of securitization has been subject to a comprehensive academic discussion during the last twenty years. Balzacq and Guzzini has descried a broad theoretical discussion on what kind of theory securitization is and presents that the framework of securitization embraces different kinds of theorizing, including empirical theorizing.41
Securitization has also been argued to be a causal mechanism.42 However, this broad theoretical
discussion will not be fully covered in this chapter. In this chapter the discussion at the theoretical level will be presented briefly with a focus on previous research on securitization of climate change. Furthermore, the theoretical framework of the CS has been used in empirical research and this chapter will present previous research on the securitization of the climate in the United States.
4.1 The Securitization of Climate Change
As described in the background climate and the environment has been seen as constant historically. Though, a move has been experienced for environmental issues, from not being considered as a political issue to being on the political agenda and also to becoming an issue about security.43 According to the writers of the CS the climate security is about maintaining
the achieved levels of human civilization.44 Even though the attempt to securitize the climate
change began later than other issues,45 empirical studies on securitization of the environment
has become more frequent over the last years.46 The great interest in securitization of climate
change and the environment has been explained by the way it challenges the theoretical framework.47 The writers of the CS acknowledged that even if policy included securitization
moves, the issues of climate and environment were not securitized. This is because the threats seems to be to distant and the politics therefore do not include a sense of panic to act in the near future.48 Furthermore, the referent object can be paradoxical. This implies that if the referent
object of the civilization should be saved from the existential threat of climate change, at the same time as the action to tackle climate change might also negatively affect the civilization
41 Balzacq and Guzzini, ‘Introduction: “What Kind of Theory – If Any – Is Securitization?”’ 42 Guzzini, ‘Securitization as a Causal Mechanism’.
43 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 23. 44 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 76.
45 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, ‘“Securitization” Revisited: Theory and Cases’, 511. 46 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, 507.
47 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, 511.
itself.49 This paradox is also discussed by Trombetta who has analyzed the discourse of climate
change. She argues that there is two overlapping securitizations connected to climate change. The first acknowledges the threat of climate change and the second identifies politics to tackle climate change as a threat. She exemplifies the second approach with the United States’ withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol because it was considered as a threat to the national economy. In relation to this discussion Trombetta also quotes George Bush, who said “the American lifestyle is not up for negotiation”.50
Trombetta argues that the normative suggestion by Wæver “less security, more politics” is problematic in relation to climate change, since serious and urgent issues are at risk of being marginalized and depoliticized. Furthermore, she refers to the intention to talk about security in the environmental sector as a way of prioritization51 and the securitization of the
environmental sector, as a nontraditional sector, can transform the logics of security.52 In her
own words, “the securitization of the environment, it is argued, is transforming existing security practices and provisions.”53 In this way the fixed practices of the CS is questioned. According
to Trombetta actors attempt to securitize this non-traditional security issue is about prioritizing the issue. The extreme and urgent measures to tackle the threat which are argued by the CS, does not have to be necessary.54 The conclusion of her analysis on climate security, despite the
lack of extraordinary measures in the policy debate, is that there is a securitization of climate change.55 On the other hand Scott argues, in an article from 2008, that since the introduction of
climate security in the United Nations Security council in 2007 there was a reduction of treating climate change as a matter of international security in the diplomatic circles. This was explained by the council taking global lead on the issue.56 However, in a later study of Diez, Von Lucke
and Wellman on the discursive framing of climate security, it is argued that there is big differences between and within countries on how climate and security is debated.57 Warner and
Boas also argue that there is a lack of extreme action to tackle the climate change even though it is often described as a security threat. By studying two empirical cases in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands where securitization moves has been observed, they find that
49 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, ‘“Securitization” Revisited: Theory and Cases’, 551. 50 Trombetta, ‘Environmental Security and Climate Change’, 596.
51 Trombetta, 589. 52 Trombetta, 590f. 53 Trombetta, 585.
54 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, ‘“Securitization” Revisited: Theory and Cases’, 511f. 55 Trombetta, ‘Environmental Security and Climate Change’, 598.
institutional securitization may backfire and create what they call a ‘policy boomerang’. This means that there is no call for action to tackle the existential threat,58 or in their own words
“both cases furthermore illustrate that security language does not necessarily help to increase the urgency of climate action”.59
4.2 Securitization of climate in the United States
The Biden-Harris administration is not the first administration in the United States that has put the climate change on the political agenda and the securitization of climate change in the United States has been analyzed before. Diez, von Lucke and Wellmann describes securitization moves of the climate change in the US until around 2015. The authors criticize the CS for having a to narrow definition of securitization, which prevents the framework from capturing the securitization of non-military and non-western contexts.60 They developed a framework from
the CS that distinguish between risk and security at different levels, territory, individual and planetary. They argued that to introduce the terms ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ in the analysis would better capture the securitization of climate and the normative implications.61 In their analysis they
found that the debate in the United States on climate security can be divided into two parts. The first included a broad debate on environmental security during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Later in the mid-2000’s the debate was instead focused on climate change.62 The arguments that had
dominated the debate in the United States in the 1990’s was mainly on planetary and individual climate risks described as a global and distant risk.63 The second phase was more influenced by
territorial danger and the planetary level was no longer as prominent in the discourse.64
Thomas studied the securitization of climate change of the United States’ Military in 2003-2013. The conclusion made of this analysis is that there was no intention of the military to securitize climate change in a way to put pressure on politicians to take extreme actions. Only in the case of the Arctic a discourse on “climatization of the security field” could be observed to some extent.65 In an article written by Schäfer, Scheffran and Penniket the securitization of
climate change was analyzed through a cross-national analysis of media reporting in nine
58 Warner and Boas, ‘Securitization of Climate Change: How Invoking Global Dangers for Instrumental Ends
Can Backfire’.
59 Jeroen and Ingrid, ‘Securitisation of Climate Change: The Risk of Exaggeration’, 215. 60 Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, The Securitisation of Climate Change, 7.
61 von Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez, ‘What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change?’ 62 Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, The Securitisation of Climate Change, 41.
63 Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, 45. 64 Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, 47ff.
countries, including the United States. Their results showed an increase in climate change securitization in the United States and other studied western countries, with a focus on energy and national security in the western countries.66
The presented previous research in this chapter on the securitization of climate change in general and in the particular case of the United States will be further discussed in relation to the empirical analysis of this thesis. This discussion will contribute to further understanding of securitization theory and climate change.
5. METHODOLOGY
In this thesis the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School of Security (CS), described in the previous chapter, will be used to study if the Biden-Harris administration aims to securitize the climate change. As described in the introduction, this thesis will not make any claim on successful securitization of the climate change in the United States, since the acceptance of the audience is not analyzed. However, possible securitization moves of the Biden-Harris administration will be analyzed. To perform a critical analysis on political messages of the administration during its first hundred days in office the following section will develop the analytical tool. The analytical tool enables the study of political texts and statements in a systematic manner.67 To critically analyze political messages it is possible to focus on the
political actors who are speaking the political message or to focus on the idea itself.68 The
interest of this study is to analyze the Biden-Harris administration’s discussion of the climate hence the political actors will be in focus for the selection of the empirical material. Documents and statements of the Biden-Harris administration will be the empirical resource to perform a qualitative content analysis. Before the empirical material is described in detail, the analytical tool that will be applied in this thesis will be presented and discussed.
5.1 Analytical tool – qualitative content analysis
The analytical tool used in this paper is developed from the theoretical framework of the CS. This paper will perform a qualitative content analysis of speeches, statements and other relevant documents of the Biden-Harris administration. The selection of the empirical material and whom are considered to speak for the Biden-Harris administration will be further discussed in the following section. To study a text using qualitative content analysis is described as active reading of the empirical material. Operationally this can be done by asking questions to the text, that the researcher can answer with help of the text.69 Qualitative content analysis is a suitable
analytical tool to answer the research question since it enables to perform a critical study of a relatively large empirical material. Furthermore, qualitative content analysis is suitable for answering question about how a certain issue is described within a context. It is not as usable to answer questions about why or to claim causality.70 Since this paper aims to analyze how
climate change is described by the Biden-Harris administration to answer the question if there
67 Beckman, Grundbok i Idéanalys: Det Kritiska Studiet Av Politiska Texter Och Idéer, 9f. 68 Beckman, 17.
is an aim to securitize the issue, a qualitative content analysis is suitable for this purpose. As stated before, possible securitization moves will be analyzed in this thesis, no claim about a successful securitization will be made. To make conclusions on a successful securitization the acceptance of the audience must be analyzed. The acceptance of the audience is not captured with this method, though it is not the purpose of this thesis to do that kind of analysis. To study the discussion of climate change and the possible securitization moves by the administration a qualitative content analysis on the administration’s statements will be useful. It should be noticed that the authors of the CS means that several methods can be used to study securitization.71 Discourse analysis have been dominant, though there has been a call for other
approaches including content analysis and ethnographic research.72
Boréus and Bergström describes content analysis in their book Analyzing text and Discourse,
Eight Approaches for the Social Sciences. Content analysis is traditionally divided into
quantitative and qualitative analysis. A quantitative content analysis measures and counts the frequency of something in the text. For example, by studying how frequent a specific word, like climate, is used the researcher gets indications how climate is considered outside the text as well. Qualitative content analysis, the analytical tool of this paper, is used to analyze texts as well, though in contrast to the quantitative version nothing is counted.73 Schreier acknowledges
that there are similarities between qualitative and quantitative content analysis. This can be considered as expected since the qualitative analytical method was developed from the quantitative content analysis. Though, Schreier argues that the qualitative content analysis, due to its special features, should be considered as a method apart from the quantitative version. One thing that distinguish the qualitative from the quantitative content analysis is that the first is traditionally used to analyze data and the second is commonly considered as a tool to collect data.74 According to Schreier “qualitative content analysis is a method for systematically
describing the meaning of qualitative data”.75 Qualitative content analysis enables a systematic
description of the meaning of a text through a coding frame that is developed from both theory and the empirical material. In other words, the coding frame is to some extent data-driven. The coding frame is tested and improved on the same empirical material that will be analyzed in contrast with the coding scheme in quantitative content analysis that is tested on a different
71 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 177. 72 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, ‘“Securitization” Revisited: Theory and Cases’, 519.
73 Boréus and Bergström, Analyzing Text and Discourse: Eight Approaches for the Social Sciences, 24. 74 Schreier, ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’, 172.
empirical material.76 A combined approach, deductive and inductive, is recommended by
Boréus and Bergström to develop the analytical tool.77 In qualitative content analysis the coding
frame consists of a main category and some subcategories. It is also possible to identify multiple main categories, which is defined as “those aspects of the material about which the researcher would like more information”.78 In this research three main categories are identified,
a potential existential threat, referent objects and proposed solutions. These main categories of analysis are developed from the theoretical framework of CS. Before discussing the main categories further a definition of subcategories is in place. In the coding frame subcategories are developed to enable a specification of the empirical material with respect to the already identified main categories. One criteria for subcategories is mutual exclusiveness within each main category.79 In other words, an analytical observation cannot be interpreted as more than
one subcategory within the same main category. Main categories is required to cover one single aspect of the empirical material, this is called the requirement of unidimensionality. Finally, the requirement of exhaustiveness should be met, which implies that the categories in the coding frame covers all relevant aspects of the empirical material.80 These requirements of the coding
frame will be further discussed for this particular analysis.
5.2 Coding frame
The three identified main categories, a potential existential threat, referent objects and proposed solutions will be studied by analyzing the following questions. (1) Is the description on climate change developed by the Biden-Harris administration constructed to include existential threats? (2) Which referent objects can be identified? (3) Is a possible solution presented? This thesis will analyze the empirical material using these questions to answer the research question if the Biden-Harris administration is aiming to securitize the climate change during the time period of interest. By developing the coding frame with a combined approach, using both the theoretical framework and the empirics, the requirement of exhaustiveness is met. Which means that the main categories and the subcategories of the coding frame covers all relevant aspects of the empirical material.
76 Schreier, 172.
77 Boréus and Bergström, Analyzing Text and Discourse: Eight Approaches for the Social Sciences, 28. 78 Schreier, ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’, 174.
The main category of potential existential threats has two subcategories that is quite straight forward. An empirical observation can either belong to the first subcategory if the climate change is described as an existential threat or to the second if it is not described as an existential threat. The observations to answer the first question will in other words be divided into positive or negative. The criteria of exclusiveness for the subcategories in the main category existential threat are therefore met. An empirical observation will be interpreted to include an existential threat if the climate change is literally described as a threat of existence or by using synonyms. These synonyms for an existential threat could be if climate change is presented to negatively affect people’s ability to eat and drink or if climate change is presented as a security threat. Furthermore, when speaking about climate change as an existential threat it can be described as an emergency or as a crisis. If there is a critical time component included the interpretation of climate change as an existential threat is strengthened. If the climate change is described as an existential threat only once by the Biden-Harris administration it would still mean that the administration has spoken of climate change as an existential threat. However, the securitization move in this case cannot be considered to be strong. If climate change is described as an existential threat frequently it should be interpreted as a stronger securitization move. Therefore, several observations need to include existential threats to be interpreted as systematic securitization moves.
The answers to the last analytical question on the main category of proposed solutions are divided into two subcategories, international and national solutions. The climate change is an international issue and needs international solutions and cooperation. The United States as one of the main global powers is an important actor to affect the international cooperation on climate change. Therefore, the United States’ international politics to tackle climate change and proposed international solutions are of importance. Furthermore, to tackle climate change there must be changes at the national level, which is acknowledged in the Paris Agreement. According to the agreement countries shall submit their national plans to reduce emissions of greenhouse gas, these plans are called nationally determined contributions (NDCs).81 Solutions
at the national level proposed by the Biden-Harris administration will be captured by this second subcategory. These two subcategories covers the Biden-Harris administration’s possibility to take political actions at home and abroad. Therefore, no residual category is needed in the study of possible solutions and the requirement of exhaustiveness is considered to be fulfilled. Table one summarizes the described analytical questions, main categories and subcategories.
Table 1. Coding frame
Analytical question Main categories Subcategories
(1) Is the description on climate change developed by the Biden-Harris
administration constructed to include existential threats?
Potential existential threat (1) Existential threat described
(2) No existential threat described
(2) Which referent objects can be identified?
Referent objects (1) Global level (2) National level (3) Group level (4) Individual level (3) Is a possible solution
presented?
Proposed solutions (1) International solutions (2) National solutions
5.3 Empirical material
As described in the introduction of this chapter, the political actors of the Biden-Harris administration will be in focus to answer the research question. According to the actor centered approach the empirical material will be selected based on identified actors who are a part of the administration or a spokesperson of the same. These identified actors are legitimate representatives for the Biden-Harris administration and therefore possible securitizing actors.
As described in the chapter on theoretical framework, a securitizing actor is an actor that declare the referent object as existentially threatened. This implies that a possible securitizing actor in this case has some sort of power and legitimacy to talk about climate change on the behalf of the administration. Only people that legitimately can speak for the Biden-Harris administration and the government of the United States can be interpreted as securitizing actors in this sense. With these criteria on administration’s representatives, several people are of interest as possible securitizing actors. The empirical material is collected from the formal channels of the administration, for example the White House official website. The selection of the channels is based on where statements of possible securitizing actors is published.
President Joseph R. Biden is of course one of the most important actors among with Vice President Kamala Harris. President Biden announced early that a new post would be introduced in the administration, the United States Special Presidential Envoy for Climate. John Kerry, the former Secretary of State under President Obama, is the United States Special Envoy for Climate. In his capacity of Secretary of State, Kerry was the one who signed the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 and during his work in Congress he has repeatedly linked climate and the environment to security.82 The present Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, the Secretary of
defense Lloyd J. Austin III, the National Climate advisor, Gina McCarty and the National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, are also possible securitizing actors. The American ambassador to the United Nations is of interest as a possible securitizing actor since the ambassador speaks for the United States in the United Nations. During the time period of interest the United States had two ambassadors. Richard M. Mills Jr. was acting ambassador from 20th of January until 25th of February when the nominated ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield was accepted. Formal groups can also be considered as securitizing actors, which adds the United States National security council to the list of possible securitizing actors.
Different kinds of documents are used as empirical material. Speeches and formal statements made by the identified securitizing actors are analyzed. Executive orders by the president will also be a part of the empirics, both in terms of the order in itself and the presidential statement in conjunction with the order. The administration’s press briefings will be analyzed, which are published as written text at the White house website. It also occurs that the administration publishes fact sheets on certain issues. When climate is discussed in these, they will also be
analyzed since it is a product of the administration. The administration also publishes readouts after bilateral calls to world leaders, which will be included in the empirical material. Statements of the State department on climate will also be of interest. Readouts from the National security council will be analyzed in this study. The Special Envoy for Climate is invited to attend at the council when appropriate.83
Some high level meetings at the international level will be object for analysis. The United Nation Security Council is an important institution in terms of international security issues and climate and security has been on the council’s agenda several times. The United Kingdom hosted an open debate on “Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate and security” during its presidency in February 2021. Due to the rotation of the presidency in the council the United States led the council during March 2021. The United States hosted an open debate on Food Security during its presidency. The statements of the United States in both debates will be analyzed as a part of the empirical material in this paper. President Biden hosted a high level summit on climate change during 22-23 of April. To host a high level meeting of this kind can be interpreted as an act of global leadership on the issue. How the possible securitizing actors presents climate and security during the summit is an important empirical material to answer the research question. All statements of the United States at the Leaders’ Summit on Climate will be analyzed, which adds Ambassador Katherine Tai, Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen and Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines as possible securitizing actors. The setting of the high level meeting was opened and could be viewed online.
6. ANALYSIS
The inauguration of the 46th President of the United States, President Biden took place the 20th
of January 2021, just weeks after the storming of the Capitol in early January. The 20th of
January was also the first day in office of the Biden-Harris administration and it’s from this date and one hundred days forward that the administration will be analyzed. Already before president Biden took office it was clear what his intentions was on the climate issue. In his campaign he promised to reenter the Paris climate Agreement during his first day in office, a pledge that was fulfilled the 20th of January 2021.84 The inaugural address of President Biden
held at the stairs of the Capitol was clearly marked by the riots two weeks earlier. Though, the attack on the United States’ democracy was not the only challenge that the President addressed.
This is a time of testing. We face an attack on democracy and on truth. A raging virus. Growing inequity. The sting of systemic racism. A climate in crisis. America’s role in the world. Any one of these would be enough to challenge us in profound ways. But the fact is we face them all at once, presenting this nation with the gravest of responsibilities. Now we must step up. All of us. It is a time for boldness, for there is so much to do. And, this is certain.85
The climate is presented as a crisis among others in this citation from the President’s inaugural speech. In a presidential proclamation published the same day the climate crisis was described to be with force and fury.86 The plot of several challenges that needs to be addressed by the
administration corresponds to the Biden-Harris administration priorities. Seven policy areas are identified by the administration as immediate priorities. The climate is found on second place just after the COVID-19 crisis. This is said about the prioritized climate “President Biden will take swift action to tackle the climate emergency. The Biden Administration will ensure we meet the demands of science, while empowering American workers and businesses to lead a clean energy revolution.”87 The administration is determined to take action and the use of the
term climate emergency demonstrates the seriousness and urgency to deal with the climate
84 The White House, ‘Paris Climate Agreement’.
85 The White House, ‘Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’ 86 The White House, ‘A National Day of Unity’.
change. Though, to be able to analyze if the administration aims to securitize the climate change we now turn to the first analytical question on existential threats.
6.1 Climate change as an existential threat
The climate was described as a crisis within President Bidens inaugural address that has been cited. However, to say that something is a crisis is not enough to be interpreted as a securitizing move. To analyze the administration’s possible securitization moves the first analytical question will be discussed. Is the description on climate change developed by the Biden-Harris
administration constructed to include existential threats? How the Biden-Harris administration
talks about climate change as an existential threat will be presented in the following segment. It should be noted that observations that contradicts this description has not been identified.
As noticed the first day in office was quite busy for the Biden-Harris administration. President Biden did not only speak at the inauguration ceremony and reentered the Paris Agreement, he also issued several executive orders. One of these was an Executive Order on Protecting Public
Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.88 In this
executive order the climate change is presented as a threat that the administration has to take action against. Section six of the executive order revokes the permit of the Keystone XL Pipeline decided by President Trump in March 2019. Climate change and its effects on the economy is one of the arguments for this political action. It is described that costs related to climate change have increased over the last four year period. Furthermore, the urgency to combat climate change has increased due to effects related to the climate has harmed Americans’ safety, health and security.89 The paragraph on climate change in the sixth section
finishes with the following sentence “the world must be put on a sustainable climate pathway to protect Americans and the domestic economy from harmful climate impacts, and to create well-paying union jobs as part of the climate solution.”90 The oil pipeline is not in line with the
sustainable pathway for the climate described by the administration and the permit is therefore revoked. It should also be noticed that the quote that Americans and the domestic economy should be protected from harmful climate impacts indicates that climate is presented as a threat to both the American people and the economy, though it is not described as an existential threat in this particular example. One week after this executive order President Biden issued another
88 The White House, ‘Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science
to Tackle the Climate Crisis’.
executive order, Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.91 This
executive order took further steps to describe the climate change as an existential threat. Before signing the executive order President Biden said “that’s why I’m signing today an executive order to supercharge our administration ambitious plan to confront the existential threat of climate change. And it is an existential threat”.92 In this quote President Biden clearly states
that the climate change is considered to be an existential threat. He exemplifies the existential threat by climate change with natural disasters in the United States in recent years, the wildfires in California, hurricanes and tropical storms along the east and gulf coast, historic floods and severe droughts.93 In the executive order a whole-of-government approach to tackle the climate
crisis is presented as an action to deal with the climate crisis that threatens the “ability to live on this planet”.94 Even if the exact words “existential threat” is not mentioned in the executive
order, it refers to a threatened ability to live on this planet, which is interpreted as a synonym of an existential threat. This is further strengthened by the president’s remarks before signing the executive order. At the same occasion President Biden introduces Secretary Kerry as “speaking for America on one of the most pressing threats of our time”95 referring to the threat
of climate change.
In conjunction to these executive orders Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry and National Climate Advisor Gina McCarty participated in a press briefing. During the briefing McCarty said that the climate crisis is identified by the President as an existential crisis that is interrelated to three other crises. Therefore, President Biden is addressing all four, including the climate crisis.96 McCarty did not specify which these other four crisis are during the press briefing,
though she probably referred to the global COVID-19 pandemic, American economy, racial equity and the climate crisis which are prioritized by the administration.97 Kerry talked about
the climate in the same manner, “the stakes on climate change just simply couldn’t be any higher than they are right now. It is existential”. Kerry also mentions during the same press briefing that President Biden makes climate central to national security preparedness, as well
91 The White House, ‘Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad’.
92 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden Before Signing Executive Actions on Tackling Climate
Change, Creating Jobs, and Restoring Scientific Integrity’.
93 The White House.
94 The White House, ‘Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad’, Sec. 201. 95 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden Before Signing Executive Actions on Tackling Climate
Change, Creating Jobs, and Restoring Scientific Integrity’.
96 The White House, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John
Kerry, and National Climate Advisor Gina McCarthy, January 27, 2021’.
as foreign policy and diplomacy.98 The acting United States’ Ambassador to the United Nations
Mills echoed to put the climate crisis at center of United States’ foreign policy and diplomacy during a briefing on preparations for COP26 in early February 2021. Furthermore, Ambassador Mills said that the United States’ view on the climate crisis as not only a threat to national security but to global security as well.99 The following week President Biden descried climate
change as “a global, existential crisis, and we’ll all suffer — we’ll all suffer the consequences if we fail” during the Munich Security Conference.100 At the same conference Secretary Kerry
said that the climate change is “among the most complex security issues we’ve ever faced”.101
In President Biden’s remarks before signing the executive orders on the 27th of January he said
he was going to convene a high-level summit on earth day, “in order to establish a new effort to integrate the security implications of climate change as part of our national security and risk assessment and analysis […]”.102 The administration’s approach to integrate climate change in
the strategic national security work was specified in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance which was signed by the President in March 2021. The global security landscape is described as, due to recent events, many of the threats of today must be tackled through collective action, including the escalating climate crisis. Hence these threats does not respect boarders.103 In the strategic guidance a broad definition of security is developed including the
threat of climate change. In the section on National Security Priorities it is written “[…]to protect the security of the American people. This requires us to meet challenges not only from great powers and regional adversaries, but also from violent and criminal non-state actors and extremists, and from threats like climate change […]".104 This quote clearly states the threat of
climate change as a matter of security of the American people. Furthermore, a future with clean and resilient energy is described as “urgently required to head off the existential risk posed by the climate crisis.”105 The climate crisis is thereby described as a security issue and as an
existential risk in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.
98 The White House, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John
Kerry, and National Climate Advisor Gina McCarthy, January 27, 2021’.
99 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks at a Briefing on Preparations for COP26 (via VTC)’. 100 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference’. 101 U.S. Department of State, ‘Remarks at Munich Security Conference Special Session’.
102 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden Before Signing Executive Actions on Tackling Climate
Change, Creating Jobs, and Restoring Scientific Integrity’.
103 The White House, ‘Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’, 7. 104 The White House, 9.
As stated in the previous chapter the United States’ action will affect the global response to climate change. Statements made by United States representatives in the United Nations is therefore of interest when analyzing securitization moves by the United States, since this has implications in international politics. In February 2021 the United Kingdom hosted an open debate on climate and security during their presidency in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). The United States was represented at high-level by Secretary Kerry. To put the climate on the agenda of the UNSC can be seen as an act of securitization in itself of the United Kingdom, since the council only deal with matters of security. Even if the topic of climate and security was on the council’s agenda the members of the UNSC could either embrace the climate issue as a matter of security that the UNSC should deal with or reject the same in their national statements. Secretary Kerry on behalf of the United States welcomed the topic on the council’s agenda and talked about the climate crisis as an existential threat and a threat multiplier.
I think it’s particularly important we are before the Security Council because the climate crisis is indisputably a Security Council issue. Our Pentagon has for years described the impact of climate as a threat multiplier. In fact, it is among the most complex and compelling security issues that I think we have ever faced. We’re told repeatedly that it is an existential threat and yet despite impacts that can exacerbate existing political, social, and economic tensions, we honestly have yet as a world to respond with the urgency required.106
Furthermore, Secretary Kerry continued to describe the climate crisis as an existential threat by comparing not to act on the climate crisis and build back better as a mutual suicide pact.107 The
United States’ intention to treat the climate crisis as a security issue is particularly clear in the final part of the statement during the open debate on climate and security in the UNSC.
Some argue that climate change isn’t the business of the UN Security Council. Well, we could only wish that was true, but the fact is the climate threat is so massive, so multi-faceted, that it’s impossible to disentangle it from other challenges that the Security Council faces. We bury our heads in the sand at
106 U.S. Department of State, ‘Secretary Kerry Participates in the UN Security Council Open Debate on Climate
and Security’.
our own peril. It is time to start treating the climate crisis like the urgent security threat that it is. This is literally the challenge of all of our generations.108
Before the Biden-Harris administration the United States had never, as a permanent member of the UNSC, initiated a discussion on climate-related security in the UNSC.109 During its
presidency in the council in March 2021 the United States hosted an open debate on Conflict-Driven Hunger.110 Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield said in her remarks that conflicts are both
more complex and last longer which has a negative effect on hunger and famine. Implications of climate change makes the already bad situation even worse.111
The threat of weather events that are becoming more extreme because of climate change is presented by the administration. Secretary Blinken referred to the weather’s lethal powers of the extreme cold in Texas in 2021, that caused 125 deaths.112 Vice President Harris talked about
the wildfires that is getting more intense in California, her home state, in her opening remarks at the Leaders’ Summit on Climate. She continued to acknowledge that the threat of extreme weather is not unique for the United States, “[…] Western Europe, where heat waves have made it very difficult to stay indoors, while risking a health risk; or the Pacific Islands, where rising sea levels threaten to encroach on the land and homes of lifelong residents; or in Central America, where, last year, two major hurricanes devastated entire communities”.113
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield echoed the common global threat of extreme weather and acknowledged it as a matter of collective security in her remarks at the summit’s panel discussion on climate security.
And of course, we were far from alone. The world saw monsoons, and droughts, and rising sea levels, toxic air pollution. My point is, it doesn’t matter where you live, climate change is a challenge for every person, in
108 U.S. Department of State.
109 Climate Diplomacy and Adelphi, ‘Climate Security at the UNSC - A Short History’.
110 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield to Host a UN Security Council
High-Level Open Debate on Conflict-Driven Hunger’.
111 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security
Council High-Level Open Debate on Conflict-Driven Hunger’.
112 U.S. Department of State, ‘Tackling the Crisis and Seizing the Opportunity: America’s Global Climate
Leadership - United States Department of State’.
113 The White House, ‘Remarks by Vice President Harris at the Virtual Leaders Summit on Climate Opening
every nation, and on every continent. And one reason we bring it up so often at the United Nations, and in the Security Council in particular, is because the threat isn’t just to all of our climates, but to our collective security.114
Secretary of Defence Lloyd J. Austin III, who also participated in the panel discussion, lifted hunger, displacement and drought caused by extreme weather in Africa and Central America which threatens millions of people. Furthermore, he said “the U.S. Department of Defense has been impacted directly in just the past few years by extreme weather caused by climate change” referring to material damage of military installations and interrupted exercises with allies.115
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield connected the Pentagon’s statement of climate as a threat multiplier to extreme weather, scarcity and violence, “[…] the Pentagon has designated climate change as a national security threat and a threat multiplier. That’s because unpredictable and extreme weather will make vital resources – like food and water – even more scarce in impoverished regions. Scarcity spurs desperation. And desperation leads to violence”.116 The
discussion on climate as a threat multiplier takes the existential threat of climate change one step further. There is not only the threat of lack of water and food, caused by the changing and unpredictable climate, but also the interlinked threat of violence. This description was also lifted by Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield when the United States joined the United Nations’ Group of Friends on Climate and Security.117 Secretary Austin also said “today, no nation can find
lasting security without addressing the climate crisis. We face all kinds of threats in our line of work, but few of them truly deserve to be called existential. The climate crisis does. […] Climate change is making the world more unsafe and we need to act”.118 These remarks of the
Secretary of defense clearly describes the climate crisis as an existential threat and acknowledges the need to address the climate to establish security. He continues “[…] climate crisis has caused substantial damage and put people in danger, making it more difficult for us to carry out our mission of defending the United States and our allies”.119 To address the climate
change is described to be important to defend the state and its people, according to Secretary Austin. The United States’ Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, also participated in
114 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a Panel
Discussion on Climate Security during the White House Leaders Summit on Climate’.
115 U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Secretary Austin Remarks at Climate Change Summit’.
116 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a Panel
Discussion on Climate Security during the White House Leaders Summit on Climate’.
117 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks at a Joint UN Security Council Stakeout with Germany and
Nauru on the United States Joining the UN Group of Friends on Climate and Security’.
