Critical Thinking in Scholarship: : Meanings, Conditions and Development

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LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00

Critical Thinking in Scholarship: Meanings, Conditions and Development

Brodin, Eva

2007

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Brodin, E. (2007). Critical Thinking in Scholarship: Meanings, Conditions and Development. Department of Education, Lund University.

Total number of authors: 1

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Eva Brodin

Critical Thinking in Scholarship:

Meanings, Conditions and Development

Lund University

Department of Education

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Sättning Jonas Palm ISBN 978-9-68-74-7 printed by Media-Tryck, Sociologen 007

Lund University Department of Education

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the phenomenon of critical thinking in schol-arship as regards its meanings, conditions, and development using a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach. This exploration takes its departure in ancient Greece, following a historical movement of the phenomenon up to present day perspectives on critical thinking, revealing a range of different meanings and conditions. Thus, the reader is invited to follow my synthetic meaning constitution of the pheno-menon of critical thinking as it appears in different philosophical and educational texts. Through this gradual process of meaning constitution it is shown that the scholarly critical thinker is in one way or another concerned with abstract relation-ships, in order to either master, understand, or change the world. These underlying interests may, in turn, be derived from the critical thinker’s sense of responsibility towards God, nature, society, and humanity as a whole. It also appears that even though critical thinking in scholarship is traditionally framed within rational and principle based thinking, the development of the meaning of critical thinking is on its way to new dimensions. Besides rationality, other qualities of critical thinking are highlighted, such as reflective thinking, emotions, creativity, imagination, and intui-tion. Despite the fact that research on critical thinking has started to move in new directions, educational policy documents implicitly conceptualize critical thinking in traditional terms. This means that the phenomenon is captured within its own instrumentality, with no further concern for its possible ends. The same circum-stance can be noted in relation to contemporary perspectives on critical thinking, which tend to focus on the process of critical thinking, since critical thinking is implicitly understood as an assurance of attaining normatively good ends. However, critical thinking is a phenomenon that is future oriented, involving its intention and possible ends. Against this background, it is therefore argued that critical thinking receives its most critical feature when intention, process and end constitute a con-structive interrelated whole.

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Acknowledgments

This thesis is not the result of my own thinking alone, but others have contributed to it as well, in different ways. I would therefore like to express great thanks to these people, from the bottom of my heart. First of all, I would like to thank my family for their tremendous support and patience. It has certainly not been an easy task to live with me! If I was not busy reading or writing, I was immersed with my favourite activity: Thinking. Sometimes I got ensnared in my own train of thoughts, however, with no way out. When something like this occurs, it is really good to have a super-visor. I am a very lucky person, since I had two. Hence, I am grateful to Professor Lennart Svensson, who helped me find my direction of research, and, moreover, was wise enough to give a rather self-willed young woman freedom in her creative pro-cess. Without your tolerance and the support of your critical viewpoints along the way, I would not have developed as far as I have today.

My associate supervisor, Åsa Lindberg-Sand, became a part of the process after the first year of my study. It took months of our first time before I could admit that culture and context might have an impact on critical thinking. Today I would rather assert that the critical thinker is undoubtedly an embedded and embodied being. Thank you, Åsa, for your patience. Over the years, Åsa has followed my development with seri-ous commitment. We have had innumerable moments of penetratingly discussing my texts, where you had a tremendous ability to widen my horizon. I will remember our critical discussions as a wondrous combination of deep gravity and hearty laughter. Åsa has been more than just a supportive supervisor. All days were certainly not good days. In such moments, when I had almost forgotten how to deal with the complicated task of living life, you were always there for me – always. I really look forward to continu-ing our collaboration in prosperity as well as adversity.

I am also indebted to Piotr Szybek, who introduced me into the world of philosophy and phenomenology, where I could finally find my way home. With-out our inspiring discussions during my undergraduate years, I would probably not have written this thesis in the first place. Since neither of my supervisors are phenomenologists, Piotr has been an invaluable knowledge source, every time I got lost in Husserl’s phenomenology. Furthermore, I am in great debt to Mina O’Dowd, my best smoking-pal. In rain, snow, and sunshine, we have had countless conver-sations out by the bench about everything that one can ever imagine to discuss. Among the innumerable things that we discussed, my thesis was one topic. Another topic was the delicate task of writing a thesis in English. In these respects, and others as well, Mina has helped me a great deal. With no obligations Mina carefully read my texts and managed to invoke a sense of uncertainty into my thinking more than

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one time. Hence, I am thankful for your amazing ability to put things into a new light. In many ways, you have developed me as a person.

Furthermore, I am thankful to Johan Brännmark, the opponent at my final seminar. You really helped me see beyond what was already given. I would also like to thank Helen Avery, for correcting my English and putting it into an understandable shape. I hope I did not give you too many nightmares with my predilection for using certain concepts, regardless of whether they are appropriate for the context or not. I am still very fond of the expression ‘pondering upon’, since I think it fits well with me as a person… Besides the people mentioned above, there are others who have helped me through the work. I would like to thank all those friends and colleagues, who have lent me books and articles that they thought could be of relevance for my thesis and drawn my attention to further aspects I needed to explore. Moreover, I want to say thanks to all persons, who have shown an interest in my work and tried to help me further in my thinking and to those who inspired me in other ways. I do not have to mention any names, since you all know who you are. Finally, I am grate-ful to my dear colleagues on the second floor, who encouraged me every morning with their smile.

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To Philip and Amanda

with the hope that you will

see the possibilities of life…

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Some reflections upon my experiences from Siegel’s classroom 69 Practical implications of Siegel’s perspective on critical thinking 70 Visiting the developmental-reflective department 7 Experiences from King’s and Kitchener’s classroom 7 Some reflections upon my experiences from King’s and Kitchener’s classroom 7 Practical implications of King’s and Kitchener’s perspective on critical thinking 76

Experiences from Brookfield’s classroom 77

Some reflections upon my experiences from Brookfield’s classroom 79 Practical implications of Brookfield’s perspective on critical thinking 79

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Visiting the feminist department 8

Experiences from Thayer-Bacon’s classroom 8

Some reflections upon my experiences from Thayer-Bacon’s classroom 8 Practical implications of Thayer-Bacon’s perspective on critical thinking 84

Dialogue with My Alter Ego 86

The aspects of critical thinking 86

The directions of critical thinking 89

The intentional directions of critical thinking 96

Being a critical thinker 00

CHAPTER

The Conditions and Development of

Critical Thinking

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Potentials for Critical Thinking 04

Four ways of understanding potential 04

The potential for realizing critical thinking in contemporary perspectives 09

The Development of Critical Thinking in Scholarship

Understanding current developments in relation to Weber Understanding the historical development in relation to Weber

Intertwining the present with the past 9

The current instrumentalization of critical thinking 0 Redeeming the consequences of critical thinking

Self-Critical Reflections and Confessions

Contemplations upon the Method

Reflections upon the Historical Account 4

Consequences of the delimitation to epistemological issues 4

Consequences of using the hermeneutic tools

Reflections upon the Contemporary Perspectives on Critical Thinking My own development from the first wave to the second wave

The re-constituted meaning of King’s and Kitchener’s perspective 6

Remaining in the Constitution of Meaning 7

References

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Appendix:

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Introduction

Outlining the Field of Research

The topic of this work is critical thinking within the frame of scholarship. The mean-ing of scholarship is not clear, however, and became a topic of debate in the early 980s (Sullivan, 996). Writers often use scholarship in a two-fold manner, describ-ing it as an activity and as an outcome of that activity at the same time (Trigwell & Shale, 004). This could derive from the fact that scholarship has traditionally been associated with the advancement and discovery of knowledge (Dauphinee, 998; Hathaway, 996; Nora et al, 000). Another conventional way of describing scholar-ship is to classify academic work as consisting of research, teaching, and service (Kre-ber, 000). With reference to these three activities, however, Boyer (990) pointed out that the activity of research has a higher status than the other two, since teaching and service related activities are not equally qualifying for the scholar’s career. He therefore made a great effort of redefining scholarship in order to increase the values of the other scholarly activities beyond the domain of research. Through his work, Boyer identified four forms of scholarship, which are all interrelated activities: the scholarship of discovery, the scholarship of integration, the scholarship of applica-tion, and the scholarship of teaching. The scholarship of discovery corresponds to the act of creating new knowledge within a discipline, whereas the scholarship of integration refers to knowledge resulting from the encounter between different dis-ciplines and areas of knowledge. The scholarship of application embraces the prag-matic facet of scholarship, posing questions regarding how new knowledge is used in practice. Finally, the scholarship of teaching refers to the act of implementing new knowledge in education. Hence, against the background of Boyer’s redefinition, scholarship is a complex activity that inferentially involves students and teachers, as well as researchers, in one way or another. All the referred forms of scholarship will be manifested in different ways throughout the forthcoming work.

The struggle to discover the conditions for critical thinking

Critical thinking has always been – and still is – a fundamental part of scholarly knowledge. Even though it plays a central role in scholarship, the meanings and the conditions that underlie critical thinking have been implicit throughout history, embedded in a range of epistemological viewpoints and scholarly methods. Eventu-ally, in the twentieth century, critical thinking became a phenomenon of educational

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concern, due to the fact that students in higher education do not manage to de-velop their critical thinking ability to the extent that is expected from them (Persson, 996; Rolf, 004; Walters, 994). Furthermore, the existence of critical thinking in individuals is regarded as fundamental for maintaining a democratic society (Brook-field, 987; Siegel, 988; ten Dam & Volman, 004; Thayer-Bacon, 000). These circumstances have led to a range of empirical studies, searching for the conditions underlying critical thinking. In some cases, these conditions are considered to be mainly an individual matter, such as the importance of having a questioning ap-proach (Ikuenobe, 00b; Sloffer, Dueber & Duffy, 999). Critical thinking is also often regarded as dependent upon certain character traits in the individual who is to be moulded by education (Brookfield, 987; Elder & Paul, 998; Siegel, 988). For example, Elder and Paul (998) hold that critical thinking is not only a set of skills, but entails intellectual traits, such as “intellectual integrity, intellectual empa-thy, intellectual humility, intellectual courage, intellectual perseverance, and so on” (ibid., p. 4). Furthermore, the importance of autonomy is repeatedly emphasized, as in Kreber’s study (998), showing a significant relationship between self-directed learning_{and critical thinking. Although critical thinking is usually associated with}

autonomous individuals, displaying the ‘proper’ character traits, attitudes and skills, some scholars stress the point that positing these faculties is not sufficient to ensure a disposition to think critically (Facione, Facione & Giancarlo, 000; Siegel, 988). Hence, something more is needed for critical thinking to be realized, a circumstance that has directed research towards the outer conditions.

Considering the outer conditions needed for critical thinking, one important factor seems to be whether the individual is socially integrated in the academic com-munity (Li, Long & Simpson, 999). Even though social and academic integration is of weight, all academic communities do not optimally reinforce the development of critical thinking. For instance, moving in homogeneous circles with convergent thinking appears to be less beneficial, a conclusion which is supported by Nelson Laird (00), who showed that experiences of diversity have a significant positive influence on the individual’s disposition to think critically. The importance of di-vergence was also found in Tsui’s (000) studies, in which students coming from institutions that encouraged cooperation and divergence between both teachers and students experienced an increased faculty of thinking critically. Along with the toler-ance of cooperative and divergent thinking, Tsui also revealed that such institutions instilled responsibility and self-reflection, as well as social and political awareness, in their students, all factors which appeared to be of benefit for the development of critical thinking. Although the institutional average critical thinking level among With references to Guglielmino, Kreber (998) used the Self-directed Learning Readiness Scale to measure people’s self-estimated scores of their own self-directed learning. This scale involves eight factors: openness to learning opportunities, self-concept as an effective learner, initiative and inde-pendence in learning, informed acceptance of responsibility for one’s own learning, a love to learn, creativity, future orientation, and the ability to use basic study skills and problem-solving skills.

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students has a significant positive influence on the individual’s development of criti-cal thinking, the institutional influence significantly declines over time (Serra Hage-dorn et al., 999). This decline could, however, be explained by the fact that senior students have developed the aspired ability to independently make use of their critical thinking. Besides these factors, there are scholars who highlight an additional condition for developing critical thinking in students in higher education: the inclusion of critical thinking into educational policy instruments. However, this educational condition for the development of critical thinking has hitherto largely been missing.

An educational paradox

Despite the fact that critical thinking is essential in scholarship, and that the phe-nomenon is of immediate interest today, the concept of critical thinking itself is conspicuous by its absence in educational policy instruments. This is evident when considering syllabi (Rolf, 004), curricula (Siegel, 988), Bloom’s widely used tax-onomy of educational objectives, both in its original and revised form (Anderson, L. et al. 00), and the framework of qualifications for the European Higher Education Area (EHEA)_{. Accordingly, this circumstance could be a contributing factor to why}

it is difficult to implement critical thinking among students (Rolf, 004). A closer examination of Bloom’s taxonomy and the framework of qualification for the EHEA shows, however, that they provide an implicit discourse on critical thinking, and that this discourse could be derived from certain perspectives of critical thinking. Bloom’s taxonomy is initially intended to be a tool for helping “teachers [to] plan and deliver appropriate instruction, design valid assessment tasks and strategies, and ensure that instruction and assessment are aligned with the objectives” (Anderson, L. et al., 00, Preface, p. xxii). Originally, Bloom’s taxonomy consisted of three major domains: the cognitive, the affective, and the psychomotor domain, which were all considered relevant in relation to educational objectives. The borderlines between the domains turned out to be fluid, however, inasmuch as it became evident through the work that “although one could place an objective very readily in one of the three major domains or classes, no objective in one class was entirely devoid of some components of the other two classes” (Kratwohl, Bloom & Masia, 96, p. 8). Even though all three of the domains seem to be interrelated to one another, Kratwohl, Bloom and Masia (96) found that teachers at college and secondary levels mainly emphasized objectives encompassed within the cognitive domain. This In 999, a large-scale political project was initiated: the Bologna process, which entails a voluntary cooperation between 4 European countries. The goal of the Bologna process is to create a common European Area for Higher Education until 00. The paramount ambition of the Bologna process is to facilitate the mobility and employability between the countries, and furthermore to promote the competitiveness of higher education in Europe. Among the range of agreements reached in the Bologna process, the most important is that higher education should be divided into three cycles: a bachelor level, a master level, and a doctoral level. The framework of qualifications for the EHEA was adopted at the Bergen Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education in May 00.

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might explain why Bloom’s original taxonomy has been stripped of both its affec-tive and psychomotor domain in its recent revised form, so that only the cogniaffec-tive domain remains (see Anderson, L. et al., 00). When a process dimension is added to this domain, as in the revised form (in contrast to the original form containing a knowledge domain only), it means that students are supposed to attain an ability to remember, understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, and create different types of know-ledge. The point is that nowhere in Bloom’s taxonomy, neither in its original, nor in its revised form, exists a category for critical thinking. Accordingly, critical think-ing is not considered as a specific learnthink-ing outcome. The authors of Bloom’s revised taxonomy (ibid.) explain their omission of critical thinking by the fact that critical thinking embraces several of the already existing categories:

...critical thinking most likely call for cognitive processes in several categories on the process dimension. For example, to think critically about an issue prob-ably involves some Conceptual knowledge to Analyze the issue. Then, one can Evaluate different perspectives in terms of the criteria and, perhaps, Create a novel, yet defensible perspective on the issue. (Anderson, L. et al., 00, p. -)

This circumstance has certain consequences for educational practice, inasmuch as teachers usually refer to Bloom’s taxonomy when conceptualizing critical thinking (Paul, Elder & Bartell, 997). In the long run, this implies that critical thinking be-comes a purely cognitive skill, which entails the mastering of certain modes of proce-dures when approaching problems. In the discussion of the cognitive perspective on critical thinking further on in this thesis, it appears that these modes of procedures tend to let critical thinking coincide with scientific methods for knowledge develop-ment. Thus teaching critical thinking means to encourage students to solve problems by making use of scientifically recognized methods, such as hypothesis testing.

As regards the framework of qualification for the EHEA, there is predominantly a palpable emphasis on the above-mentioned cognitive skills, although another per-spective and meaning of critical thinking appears in the background as well. Since the EHEA framework consists of three cycles, constituting different degrees in higher education, it is valuable to consider the cycles one by one. It is thereby possible to get a picture of which aspects of critical thinking are required at different educational stages. This analysis reveals an interesting phenomenon, namely that aspects relating to critical thinking are enclosed in the last and most advanced educational level, the doctor’s degree in the third cycle. As a matter of fact, the implicit demand for critical thinking at this level corresponds well with the categories of the process dimension in the revised form of Bloom’s taxonomy. When extracts of relevance from the frame-work of qualification for the EHEA are considered as a whole, however, it appears that critical thinking has a wider meaning than that which is implicitly comprehend-ed within Bloom’s taxonomy. This is evident, for instance, when scrutinizing some of the EHEA criteria for attaining a bachelor’s degree, corresponding to the first cycle:

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7 Qualifications that signify completion of the first cycle [bachelor’s degree] are awarded to students who:

can apply their knowledge and understanding in a manner that indicates a profes-sional approach to their work or vocation, and have competences typically dem-onstrated through devising and sustaining arguments and solving problems within their field of study;

have the ability to gather and interpret relevant data (usually within their field of study) to inform judgments that include reflection on relevant social, scientific or ethical issues;

have developed those learning skills that are necessary for them to continue to un-dertake further study with a high degree of autonomy.

(Bologna Working Group on Qualifications Frameworks, 00)

Besides the demand for cognitive skills, such as applying knowledge, solving prob-lems, gathering and interpreting relevant data, there is a call for sound arguments, judgments, reflection, and autonomy as well. These are aspects that are mainly high-lighted within the informal logic movement, another perspective on critical thinking that will be discussed further on. With respect to the second cycle, corresponding to a master’s degree, the same criteria are presented as in the first cycle, although the student is supposed to make use of his or her skill in new or familiar environments. Furthermore, he or she is assumed to be able to attain a higher degree of complexity and integration of knowledge in his or her thinking. The most important contribu-tion to the meaning of critical thinking in the second cycle is, however, that it inau-gurates the aspect of responsibility in relation to the social and ethical consequences of one’s judgments and applied knowledge. This is manifest when considering the following quotations from the section on the second cycle in the EHEA document, maintaining certain aspects which could be associated to critical thinking:

Qualifications that signify completion of the second cycle [master’s degree] are awarded to students who:

can apply their knowledge and understanding, and problem solving abilities in new or unfamiliar environments within broader (or multidisciplinary) contexts related to their field of study;

have the ability to integrate knowledge and handle complexity, and formulate judg-ments with incomplete or limited information, but that include reflecting on social and ethical responsibilities linked to the application of their knowledge and judg-ments;

have the learning skills to allow them to continue to study in a manner that may be largely self-directed or autonomous.

(Bologna Working Group on Qualifications Frameworks, 00)

In the third cycle, where the student attains a doctoral degree, there is a return to the cognitive domain, in which critical thinking becomes a pure skill, very similar to problem solving (in a wide sense of the concept). Equating critical thinking with

• • • • • • • •

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problem solving is, however, something that contradicts the general opinion among philosophers throughout the twentieth century, who agree that critical thinking and problem solving only intersect but do not coincide (Streib, 99). However that might be, it appears that critical thinking in the third cycle is embedded in a single paragraph, where it is intertwined with scholarly and scientific methods. The earlier requirement of an ability to make sound arguments and judgments is either left out, or implicitly involved in the demand for evaluation, depending on how one inter-prets the meaning of evaluation. Most striking is, however, that the doctoral student is not exhorted to have a sense of responsibility as regards the social and ethical con-sequences of his or her research:

Qualifications that signify completion of the third cycle [doctoral degree] are awarded to students who:

are capable of critical analysis, evaluation and synthesis of new and complex ideas; (Bologna Working Group on Qualifications Frameworks, 00) Against this background, an intricate paradoxical problem has arisen. On the one hand, there is an urgent request for developing critical thinking in higher education and scholarship as a whole. On the other hand, critical thinking is a concept that is carefully avoided in educational policy documents. Furthermore, the implicit view of critical thinking in these documents seems to be mainly framed within a cognitive perspective, generating a specific meaning of the phenomenon: It is understood as a purely cognitive rational skill.

The struggle to find the meaning of critical thinking

Over the past three decades, however, a range of scholars have struggled with the problem of conceptualizing critical thinking, with the consequence that today there exists a range of different perspectives on critical thinking, which each constitute different meanings of the phenomenon. The scholars concerned with the concept of critical thinking may, roughly speaking, be divided into absolutists, on the one hand, and relativists, on the other. The former are known for their characterization of critical thinking as being a rational skill with general principles (e.g. see Halpern, 984; Ikuenobe, 00a; Siegel, 988). Thus, according to these scholars, critical thinking could be taught and learned by following certain procedures. This sugges-tion is strongly opposed by relativists, who hold that the character of critical thinking is context-dependent. Hence, it cannot be taught independently of the current con-text. Furthermore, relativists hold that critical thinking is more than just a rational skill, emphasizing the importance of “irrational” qualities as well, such as empathy, imagination, intuition and emotions (e.g. see Garrison, 999; Thayer-Bacon, 998, 000; Walters, 990). What the relativists are pointing to at its most general level is that the critical thinker is an embedded and embodied being, moved by certain values due to his or her culture. Accordingly, it is not possible to be completely

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9 ased in one’s rational approach, as the absolutists assert. This is interesting, since the relativists highlight the same notion that was once included in Bloom’s taxonomy in the affective domain: values have an impact on the individual’s thinking. Still other scholars choose a diplomatic position between the two camps, asserting that a com-bination of both special courses in critical thinking and an infusion of the subject in ordinary classes is perhaps the best choice for an optimal development among students (Bailin et al., 999b), understood that critical thinking has some general characteristics, but is context-dependent too.

In this context it can be noted that the empirical evidence supports both sides. According to Wolcott et al. (00) there is “a significant lack of empirical evidence, in both the accounting education and higher education literature, that any specific instructional method can enhance the critical thinking skills of students” (ibid., p. 8). When examining the field further, it appears that some studies show that spe-cific training in argumentation does in fact enhance critical thinking to some extent (e.g. see Anderson, T. et al., 00; Sanders, Wiseman & Gass, 994). This ambiguity in evidence could, however, be traceable to the fact that critical thinking is concep-tualized differently by different researchers. For instance, everyone does not agree that critical thinking corresponds to argumentation skills, as in the studies just men-tioned. Irrespective of whether critical thinking is considered as a general skill that could be taught in special courses or not, the difficult state of affairs remains: Critical thinking is a fluid concept, conveying a range of different meanings with no con-scious horizon relating them to one another. After all, it is maybe not so surprising that the concept of critical thinking is difficult to trace in educational policy docu-ments, inasmuch as it is a phenomenon that is complicated to grasp. Apparently, a first appropriate step would be to explore the different meanings of critical thinking in order to acquire a holistic understanding of the phenomenon, since a more com-prehensive and integrated understanding might facilitate the explicit incorporation of critical thinking into educational policy instruments. Furthermore, this manner of proceeding would result in a more complex understanding of critical thinking than that which is implicitly depicted in the current instruments at present.

The Direction of Research

This thesis provides a theoretical study dealing with different meanings of critical thinking in scholarship as it appears in Western thought, with the ambition to attain a multi-faceted and synthetic understanding of the phenomenon. In order to achieve these aims, a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach has been considered appro-priate for the purpose. In brief terms, this approach means to be concerned with the subject’s intentional directedness to his or her world, which constitutes a range of meanings and different modes of being. Applying this approach also means to have an open-minded attitude, accepting all possible meanings as valid modes of being.

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From a hermeneutic-phenomenological viewpoint, no possible meanings should be rejected, since each meaning is considered to contribute to the holistic understand-ing of the world. Transferred to the current context, this implies a focus upon diverse ways in which critical thinking appears and the different meanings that originate from these “appearances” (in a phenomenological sense of the word). In order to gain knowledge about these meanings, a historical analysis of critical thinking has been carried out and different perspectives on contemporary critical thinking have been explored. Thereby a varied and synthetic picture of critical thinking has been developed, which in turn facilitates comprehension of the conditions, as well as the development of critical thinking in scholarship.

Purpose

Against this background, the purpose of the thesis is to explore the phenomenon of critical thinking in scholarship as regards its meanings, conditions, and development using a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach. The study is delimited to explor-ing the phenomenon of critical thinkexplor-ing as it appears in different philosophical and educational texts. Based upon these readings, an attempt will be made to clarify the meanings of critical thinking, as well as to investigate the conditional origins and possible directions of development that appear in relation to these meanings.

Disposition of the thesis

In Chapter , the hermeneutic-phenomenological approach of the thesis is discussed. On the one hand, a number of characteristic features of the hermeneutic-phenomeno-logical approach are highlighted, in order to clarify the ontohermeneutic-phenomeno-logical, epistemohermeneutic-phenomeno-logical, and methodological underpinnings of the current thesis. On the other hand, my own original understanding of critical thinking develops within a hermeneutic-phenom-enological approach. According to my understanding, four concepts appear as funda-mental for critical thinking: Interpretation, explanation, understanding, and abstrac-tion. Based upon these concepts, an interpretative depiction of how critical thinking in scholarship has made itself manifest throughout history is outlined in Chapter . This depiction is delimited to different philosophical texts within the realm of epistemology. Chapter consists of descriptions of four significant perspectives on critical thinking today: The cognitive perspective, the informal logic movement, the developmental-reflective perspective, and the feminist perspective. In Chapter 4, critical thinking is worked out by staging contemporary perspectives on critical thinking in six imaginary classrooms. Against the background of these classrooms, different meanings of critical thinking are constituted, which together with the appearances of critical thinking in history result in a synthetic understanding of the phenomenon. Chapter concludes with a discussion of the results in relation to the conditions and development of critical thinking in scholarship as a whole. Finally, the thesis ends with a self-critical section, in which I make a retrospective reflective review of the work.

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CHAPTER 1

Critical Thinking through a

Herme-neutic-Phenomenological Approach

Delimitations

When referring to hermeneutic phenomenology as a scholarly approach, it is neces-sary to explicate its meaning. In very broad terms, hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches could be characterized as intertwining descriptive and interpretative phe-nomenology. This explanation is, however, not really clarifying, inasmuch as there is a wide range of possible hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches, which are more or less descriptive and interpretive (Cohen, Kahn & Steeves, 000). Hence, the forthcoming chapter will illuminate the specific hermeneutic-phenomenological approach that forms the foundation of the methodology and results of this thesis. Rather than using a wide hermeneutic-phenomenological approach, I have delim-ited my approach to including basic aspects of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, in recognition of their foundational work in the hermeneutic-phenomenological move-ment (Bengtsson, 999; Ihde, 99). In addition, some aspects of Arendt’s thinking have also been incorporated into my approach, since her work is of relevance for this thesis too. Thus, by drawing on Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Arendt, my own hermeneutic-phenomenological approach has developed. This turns out to be an approach that is consistent with my own prejudiced view of critical thinking, which will be clarified further on. Even though Husserl does not belong to the realm of hermeneutic phenomenology, but rather to transcendental phenomenology, one cannot disregard his importance for the hermeneutic-phenomenological movement, since hermeneutic phenomenology has its foundation in Husserl’s phenomenology. Thus, in order to understand the phenomenological method used in this thesis, cer-tain aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology must first be considered.

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4

Hermeneutic-Phenomenology: An Extension of Husserl’s

Later Philosophy

The concept of phenomenology

Phenomenology is generally associated with individuals’ concrete experience in their life-world, so it could be viewed as troublesome to apply a phenomenological ap-proach to a theoretical framework. Phenomenological apap-proaches can be observed, however, in a range of studies within knowledge sociology, existential philosophy and anthropological philosophy (Bengtsson, 998). Thus phenomenology is not limited to experiences in the concrete world, but is an all-embracing approach to understand human activity and being in the world in relation to certain phenomena. When us-ing a phenomenological approach in order to understand the phenomenon of critical thinking, we must first understand what phenomenology means. Heidegger (996) clarifies the definition of phenomenology by deriving it from its conceptual roots in phenomenon and logos respectively, thereby explaining the composed meaning of phenomenon and logos into phenomenology. According to Heidegger, phenomenon is derived from “phainomenon,” which has two meanings, structurally related to one another: phenomenon as self-showing (what it truly is), and phenomenon as semblance (what it seems to be, but is not). Even though both of these meanings of phenomenon are relevant for the phenomenologist, focus is put upon the former, phenomenon as self-showing. A phenomenon is manifested in different appearances, revealing a range of meanings. The crucial point is, however, that this self-showing is usually con-cealed in the appearances. In relation to critical thinking in scholarship, the element of concealment is found in that the appearances of critical thinking are embedded in scholarly and scientific frames, or ‘systems’ as Heidegger expresses it. The danger when a phenomenon is embedded into a system is that the phenomenon seems to be ‘clear’, with no further need to question its meaning. The results of this thesis sug-gest that Heidegger’s warning is partly justified. In some perspectives, the meaning of critical thinking is not questioned, while other perspectives ponder seriously upon this issue. Irrespective of perspective, however, none of the advocators question their own perspective and the consequences it has for the meaning of critical thinking. Thus, this will be one task of the current thesis.

As regards logos, Heidegger points out that it has lost its original meaning. Rath-er than intRath-erpreting logos “as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, [or] relation” (Heidegger, 996, §7b: , p. 8), logos should be understood from its basic meaning, which is speech. Then logos means “to make manifest ‘what is being talked about’ in speech” (ibid., p. 8), which implies that logos lets something be seen “straightforwardly” by speech. It is from this point, Heidegger thinks, that logos has been possible to modify into reason, judgment and so on. However, combining phenomenon with logos constitutes phenomenology as being a way of research that

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describes and lets “what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from it-self” (ibid, §7c: 4, p. 0). Thus it seems as if logos constitutes the condition for phe-nomenology to make a phenomenon become manifest in its appearances, since logos gives the phenomenon a voice through the individual, intertwining the phenomenon and the individual into a single mutually interacting being. This interactive process is important, inasmuch as it implies that the access to the phenomenon goes through the consideration of its act of being, its appearances, which in turn shape themselves in the individual’s meaning constitution of the phenomenon. Thus the task of phe-nomenology is not to “characterize the ‘what’ of the object of philosophical research in terms of their content but the ‘how’ of such research” (Heidegger, 996, §7: 7, p. 4).

The phenomenological experience

In order to understand Heidegger’s above-mentioned statement appropriately, one has to consider its source in Husserl, who is the founder of phenomenology in its recent form_{. It is not an easy task, however, to grasp Husserl’s philosophy, since the}

whole meaning of it cannot be grasped by reading single works of him. Rather, his transcendental phenomenology is fragmentary, extended over all his writings, due to the fact that Husserl himself was in a constant process of developing his transcen-dental phenomenology. Furthermore, “if one is to follow Husserl in the performance of his phenomenology, one must pay more attention to what he actually does than to what he says about what he does” (Ströker, 99, p. 6). In the context of this thesis, my readings were limited to Husserl’s later work, The Crisis of European Sci-ences and Transcendental Phenomenology, and Ströker’s (99) careful analysis of the development of Husserl’s genetic constitutive analysis. The reason for choosing these sources was that they provide the notions needed for understanding the development of Husserl’s later philosophy, constituting the foundation for understanding herme-neutic-phenomenology.

If one knows anything at all about Husserl’s phenomenology, one probably as-sociates it with his famous call: Go back to the ‘things themselves’! Those who expect phenomenology to provide a direct access to the ‘things’ will, however, be disap-pointed, since:

…phenomenology is entirely incapable of finding its “things” immediately and in the direct examination of objects. For the things of phenomenology are nothing other than the acts of knowing and, further, the intentional experi-ences of consciousness taken altogether in their essential generality. (Ströker, 99, p. 8)

 The original concept of phenomenology has its roots in Hegel’s work The Phenomenology of Mind from 807, which will be discussed further on. By Husserl’s works during the 0th_{century, however,} the meaning of phenomenology changed. Husserl’s phenomenology emphasizes that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, which means that consciousness is always directed to an object, which will be discussed further on.

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6

Thus, phenomenology is basically a matter of exploring the acts of knowing, with an emphasis on the acts. Originally, knowledge acts were commonly understood as corresponding to the content of consciousness. Husserl eventually re-construed the meaning of knowledge acts, however, into intentional experiences (Ströker, 99). By intentional experiences, he meant that the experiencing subject’s consciousness is directed to certain objects in the world, since being conscious is always to be con-scious of something. Thus, being concerned with the acts of knowing, that is to say the intentional experiences, is to make apparent the “different modes of conscious-ness in which the intended objectivity appears determined in a particular manner” (ibid., p. 4).

Husserl’s phenomenology is also understood as a philosophy, which searches for the beginnings in a two-fold way. On the one hand, Husserl made a great endeavor to make phenomenology a self-grounding philosophy. In order to do that, Husserl had to critically consider its claims of validity by scrutinizing the beginning of phe-nomenology over and over again. On the other hand, Husserl’s original effort was to find the origin of all experiences, by describing the structure of knowledge acts, freed from all presuppositions. Accordingly, Husserl’s purpose was at one point to find the essence of the intentional experiences. As his work proceeded, however, Husserl’s original concern with finding the essence was superseded by an increased emphasis on the constitution of meaning (Ströker, 99). This shift is important, inasmuch as phenomenology was no longer a matter of defining knowledge acts in relation to certain phenomena, but rather to consider how knowledge acts are constituted in the subject. According to Ströker (99), Husserl’s altered focus could be explained against the background of a range of insights and modifications of his earlier phe-nomenology. Most significant for the development of hermeneutic-phenomenology is that Husserl realized that intentional experiences cannot be dissociated from the ego, and furthermore that the ego’s experience is always constituted within a horizon. Inasmuch as the horizon settles the frames and possibilities of the subject’s meaning constitutions, one cannot disregard its impact on the acts of knowing. Hence, explor-ing intentionality is to deal with horizontal intentionality. The crucial point is that a horizon entails more than the object which the subject’s intentionality is directed to. This implies that the phenomenon, which the subject directs his or her interest to, is related to still other objects, which are co-given and in a sense constitute the condi-tion for the phenomenon to be constituted the way it is. These objects and relacondi-tion- relation-ships are, however, not immediately given in the specific moment of approaching the phenomenon in concern. In order to see what is co-given, the phenomenologist has to alter his or her seeing in relation to the phenomenon, letting some aspects come into the forefront, whereas others are put in the background. This is what happens in Husserl’s renowned phenomenological method, the epoché, which will be discussed further on. However, all this led Husserl to another important insight: Conscious-ness has a temporal structure, which reveals itself in the constitution of an object. Thus, objects are temporal objects, which are constituted against the background of

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7 the subject’s earlier experiences of them. Accordingly, the constitution of meaning is in fact a genetic constitution:

…the temporality of the process of constitution is, for its part, constitutive for the product of constitution. This means in particular that formerly produced accomplishments are involved in present constitution. It is in precisely this respect that present constitution is genetic constitution. (Ströker, 99, p. 47)

At this point, the peak of Husserl’s later phenomenology is reached, and the ideas which contributed to the development of the hermeneutic-phenomenological move-ment. Since the knowledge acts of phenomena are temporarily and horizontally con-stituted in the ego, they can never be defined. That would be to narrow down the possibility of further meaning constitution of the phenomenon. Hence, only the modes as to how the phenomenon appears through the subject’s temporal and hori-zontal meaning constitutions are within reach. Thus, approaching a phenomenon, such as critical thinking, in a phenomenological sense, means to open up a conscious horizon in which the phenomenon is understood in relation to all that which is co-given within the horizon. It also means to be consciously aware of that the meaning of critical thinking will never be complete, inasmuch as the past meaning constitu-tions of the phenomenon provide still new possibilities as to how it could be further understood. Therefore, the aim of the forthcoming thesis is not to provide a defini-tion of critical thinking. Rather, there will be an exploradefini-tion of the different mean-ings of critical thinking that are constituted within my own continually expanding horizon.

Against this background, it is possible to understand Husserl’s concern with finding the appropriate method as to how to approach the constitutions of mean-ings, namely the epoché. It should be mentioned that the epoché has been subject to sharp criticism, which is due to the fact that the epoché has been misunder-stood as a privative and eliminating way of describing the world (Moustakas, 994; Ströker, 987). According to Ströker (987), this misunderstanding has its roots in Husserl’s earlier philosophy, where he made a marked distinction between exist-ence and content. Against the background of Husserl’s later philosophy as discussed above, however, the meaning of the epoché comes into a new light. Before entering upon this developed understanding of the meaning of the epoché, there must be some consideration of its ontological ground. According to Husserl (970), there is a pregiven world, which constitutes the origin for all human living. Human beings are not aware of this pregiven world, however, due to the fact that they live in their life-world, in which certain interests move them. In order to see the world in its true being, one needs to search for the origin of every experience, beyond the habituated ways of being and thinking, Husserl claims. Hence the development of the epoché, which broadly implies that one releases oneself from one’s natural attitude. The nat-ural attitude involves certain values and cultnat-ural frames, determining the individual’s

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8

perceptions of the world. Furthermore, the natural attitude presumes that the world appears just the way it is. Thus, what happens, when carrying out the epoché, is that the natural attitude is put aside when considering an object in order to attain a transcendental attitude. The transcendental attitude is freed from the assumption that the world is analogous with how it is perceived by the natural attitude. Accord-ingly, attaining a transcendental attitude means to raise oneself above one’s life-world in order to see the world in a new way. Then the world appears as a phenomenon, given that new meanings as to how to understand the world are experienced. Husserl carefully points out, however, that carrying out the epoché is not to abandon the life-world, but only to force oneself to view the world in a new unprejudiced manner:

...through the epoché a new way of experiencing, of thinking, of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated above his own natural being and above the natural world, he loses nothing of their being and their objective truths and likewise nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life or those of the whole historical communal life; he simply forbids himself – as a philosopher, in the uniqueness of his direction of interest – to continue the whole natural performance of his world-life; that is, he forbids himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, questions of be-ing, questions of value, practical questions, questions about being or not-be-ing, about being valuable, being useful, being beautiful, being good, etc. All natural interests are put out of play. But the world, exactly as it was for me earlier and still is, as my world, our world, humanity’s world, having validity in its various subjective ways, has not disappeared; it is just that, during the consistently carried-out epoché, it is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, though whose validities the world “is” at all. [...]...every opinion about “the” world, has its ground in the pregiven world. It is from this very ground that I have freed myself through the epoché; I stand above the world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon. (Husserl, 970, §4, p. )

Husserl’s claim to ‘put all natural interests out of play’, in order to consider the world from ‘above’, reveals his idealistic approach to phenomenology, which is condemned by the hermeneutic movement. Granted, such pretensions are beyond human faculty in a hermeneutic perspective, inasmuch as human beings are irrevocably embed-ded in a history. This implies that human beings cannot possibly release themselves from their interpretative way of understanding the world. Hence, according to a hermeneutic view, the world is experienced from within, rather than from above. This is not to say that phenomenology is incompatible with hermeneutics, since “what hermeneutics has ruined is not phenomenology but one of its interpreta-tions, namely its idealistic interpretation by Husserl himself” (Ricoeur, 998a, p. 0). Husserl’s description of the epoché should not be judged too rigorously from a hermeneutic viewpoint, however. When keeping in mind Husserl’s assertion that the epoché in no way means to deprive oneself of one’s life-world, it is possible to interpret his choice of words in another light. To ‘put all natural interests out of play’

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9 should rather be understood as an exhortation to find other ways to see the world than those one is used to apply. Thus, it is a matter of careful self inquiry aiming at the emancipation of one’s habituated lines of thought. Furthermore, considering the world from ‘above’ should not be construed as being dissociated from the world. By means of the epoché a range of meaning constitutions are unveiled, which renders it possible to perceive the world beyond one’s natural understanding. One could say that one moves to another intellectual plateau, where one understands one’s natural attitude as only one possible way of being. In that sense one could construe Husserl’s expression of raising oneself above the world, as the abstraction from one’s natural being through the manifestation of the manifoldness of possible ways of being. Thus, carrying out the epoché is a reflective way of opening up possibilities – different possible ways of being, different possible ways of seeing, and different possible ways of understanding. In fact, by interpreting the meaning of the epoché in this way, it appears that phenomenology and hermeneutics are dialectically related to one another, as Ricoeur (998a) asserts: On the one hand, phenomenology needs hermeneutics since the experiences derived from the epoché would otherwise not be possible to reflect upon, inasmuch as all reflection is preceded by interpretation and understanding. On the other hand, the hermeneutic experience is dependent on the interpreter’s ability to distance him- or herself from the text and let it speak for itself before making any hasty interpretations of it. Hence, the need for the phenomeno-logical epoché:

Hermeneutical distanciation is not unrelated to the phenomenological epoché, that is, to an epoché interpreted in a non-idealistic sense as an aspect of the intentional movement of consciousness towards meaning. For all conscious-ness of meaning involves a moment of distanciation a distancing from ‘lived experience’ as purely and simply adhered to. Phenomenology begins when, no content to ‘live’ or ‘relive’, we interrupt lived experience in order to signify it. Thus the epoché and the meaning-intention [visée de sens] are closely linked.

(Ricoeur, 998a, p. 6) More concretely, the epoché means to reflectively experience something from a range of viewpoints, considering different aspects of the phenomenon. As mentioned ear-lier, it is a matter of letting some aspects come to the forefront, whereas others con-stitute the background, and the reverse. Even though these experiences offer a variety of different meaning constitutions of the phenomenon, they are all considered to make manifest varying sides of one and the same phenomenon. This is an including way of approaching a phenomenon, inasmuch as each new side is understood against the background of the previously experienced sides:

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0

Each side gives me something of the seen thing. In the continuous alteration of seeing, the side just seen ceases being actually still seen, but it is “retained” and “taken” together with those retained from before; and thus I “get to know” the thing. [...]...what I attribute to the thing itself – for example, its seen, colored shape in the alteration of near-and-far orientation – is again something which exhibits itself in manifold ways. I am speaking now of the alteration of per-spectives. The perspectives of the shape and also of its color are different, but each is in this new way an exhibiting of – of this shape, of this color. [...] ...the perspectives combine in an advancing enrichment of meaning and a continu-ing development of meancontinu-ing, such that what no longer appears is still valid as retained and such that the prior meaning which anticipates a continuous flow, the expectation of “what is to come,” is straightway fulfilled and more closely determined. Thus everything is taken up into the unity of validity or into the one, the thing. (Husserl, 970, p. 8)

Thus the phenomenological experience aims at a holistic understanding of the phe-nomenon. The understanding can never be complete, however, inasmuch as there are infinite possibilities as to how the phenomenon could be perceived. Approaching a phenomenon is the same as being in the middle of a continuous stream of con-sciousness directed to this specific being. Some aspects will pass by without one even noticing it, while other aspects call upon one’s attention. Due to the fact that one can never seize the phenomenon in its complete wholeness, but only capture some aspects of it in the continuous flow of consciousness, there will always be undiscov-ered meanings left. Accordingly, an important character of the phenomenologist is to have a humble attitude towards the phenomenon and his or her own understanding of it, at the same time as there is an endeavor to examine the different sides of the phenomenon as far as possible.

The Manifestation of My

Hermeneutic-Phenomenologi-cal Approach

The variation of appearances

Throughout this thesis, my hermeneutic-phenomenological approach is shown in different ways. Based upon Husserl’s phenomenology, there is an attempt to vary the phenomenon of critical thinking as far as possible, in order to show it in its dif-ferent appearances, and hence meaning constitutions. Furthermore, with reference to the hermeneutic movement, the phenomenon has to be considered against the background of its history. Therefore, the forthcoming exploration of the different meanings of critical thinking takes its start in ancient Greece. By encountering dif-ferent philosophical texts through history, it appeared that critical thinking has many meanings, dependent on the background. This implies that the history constituted a

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wide horizon, offering a range of possible appearances of critical thinking, of which some were depicted through the chosen historical texts. Metaphorically, one could say that I made a historical journey in order to visit different exotic places, which made it possible for me to experience the phenomenon of critical thinking in new ways. At each place, I took some photos of such aspects I found especially meaning-ful for my purpose, and put them into my photo album. Thereby my understanding of the phenomenon of critical thinking developed continuously. Besides my phe-nomenological camera, my suitcase was also equipped with some hermeneutic tools (explanation, interpretation, understanding, and abstraction) for describing my ex-perience. These tools reflected my own prejudiced view on critical thinking at the outset of the journey. The background and development of this prejudiced view will be presented below. It appeared through my historical journey that critical think-ing had not explicitly become a concept yet, but that the phenomenon made itself manifest in different concealed appearances. Thus, one could say that critical think-ing appeared in the background of its different historical contexts. At the end of the journey, however, I arrived at the present time, in which critical thinking has started to become a phenomenon in scholarship, which scholars struggled to understand. Thus, critical thinking was now posited in the foreground.

Since critical thinking itself had come into the forefront in the texts of present times, and due to the fact that my suitcase was full of photos from history, my original hermeneutic tools for understanding my experience of critical thinking were no longer needed. Therefore, I decided to experience the phenomenon in contemporary texts without any explicit tools. Hence, it is possible to see a shift between my approaches to critical thinking in history and critical thinking in present times. The former approach has an emphasis on interpretation, while the latter approach is more descriptive in its character. It turned out that the concept of critical thinking played such a central role in today’s scholarly discourse, that it was possible to invent the fictive “University of Critical Thinking”. This university was imagined to consist of four departments, which bestowed different perspectives on critical thinking. At the university, I visited six class-rooms, which staged critical thinking in practice. The scenes from these classrooms were composed by a combination of my own life experiences and significant meanings derived from each perspective on critical thinking. Thereby, I had the opportunity to experience different appearances of the phenomenon of critical thinking in practical pedagogical contexts too. The experiences from the classrooms were reflectively written down and put together with the photos in my historical album. Thus, by carrying out my investigation in this way, the album of different appearances contains numerous aspects, which could be arranged in different ways. Depending upon how the photos and classroom stories were arranged, the meaning of critical thinking changed. After several such reconstructions, it was possible to discern a set of themes, constituting certain meanings of critical thinking. By providing the impetus to this process, my hermeneutic-phenomenological approach had fulfilled its purpose: A synthetic and new way of understanding critical thinking had emerged.

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A beginning horizon

In order to find out my own prejudiced view of critical thinking, I asked myself certain questions such as: When do I start thinking critically? What do I do, when thinking critically? What are the results of my critical thinking? How can the result of my critical thinking constitute the basis for further critical thinking? It is notewor-thy that the last question refers back to the first one. The answers of these questions ended up in certain themes, reflecting different fundamental aspects of my approach to critical thinking, such as affection, interpretation, explanation, understanding, abstraction, and responsibility. Although these abilities could be considered to be characteristic for the human species as such, they also seem to be specifically bound to critical thinking in a certain way, which will be explored below.

The origin of critical thinking

The question of “What makes us think?” is treated by Arendt (978) in relation to the history of philosophy. It involves three related aspects to be answered: the mean-ing of thinkmean-ing, the goal of thinkmean-ing, and the beginnmean-ing of it. Accordmean-ing to Arendt, the original meaning of thinking, if one refers to ancient Greece, was being. Thus to be and to think was considered to be one and the same thing. Thinking was con-nected to immortality, since the thoughts of a man could live on by means of others, even though he was dead. Immortality was the only thing that differentiated human beings from Gods, so achieving immortality by thinking made it possible for man to become divine. All this resulted in a way of viewing thinking as always being good, since thinking was tantamount to God being inherent in human beings. Against this background, in which thinking was considered to be the same as being, and the goal of thinking was to attain the divine quality of immortality, the beginning of thinking was subject to certain limitations. Inasmuch as thinking was related to immortality, it had its start in the contemplation of everlasting objects, which never change. Con-templating the everlasting objects implied that philosophy had its origin in wonder. Stating that philosophy, hence thinking, has its origin in wonder is an idea that also Arendt devotes herself to. In this context, wonder does not mean to be confounded by something unexpected, but rather to be filled with admiration:

...wondering is something familiar and yet normally invisible, and something men are forced to admire. The wonder that is the starting-point of thinking is neither puzzlement nor surprise nor perplexity; it is an admiring wonder. (Arendt, 978, p. 4)

Further on in history, the idea of the origin of thinking takes a new turn, however. Inspired by the Romans, Hegel emphasizes the need for reconciliation, when human beings are lost from the human unity (Arendt, 978). Thus the goal of this new way of viewing thinking and philosophy is to create another world, which is more mean-ingful. This turn is interesting, since thinking is now associated with active changes

Critical Thinking in Scholarship: : Meanings, Conditions and Development

Critical Thinking in Scholarship: Meanings, Conditions and Development

Brodin, Eva

Eva Brodin

Critical Thinking in Scholarship:

Meanings, Conditions and Development

Lund University

Department of Education

Abstract

Acknowledgments

To Philip and Amanda

with the hope that you will

see the possibilities of life…

Contents

Introduction

Critical Thinking through a

Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Approach

The Historical Development of Critical

Thinking in Scholarship

Different Contemporary Perspectives on

Critical Thinking

Arriving at a Synthetic Understanding of

Critical Thinking

The Conditions and Development of

Critical Thinking

Self-Critical Reflections and Confessions

References

Appendix:

Introduction

Outlining the Field of Research

The struggle to discover the conditions for critical thinking

An educational paradox

The struggle to find the meaning of critical thinking

The Direction of Research

Purpose

Disposition of the thesis

CHAPTER 1

Critical Thinking through a

Herme-neutic-Phenomenological Approach

Delimitations

Hermeneutic-Phenomenology: An Extension of Husserl’s

Later Philosophy

The concept of phenomenology

The phenomenological experience

The Manifestation of My

Hermeneutic-Phenomenologi-cal Approach

The variation of appearances

A beginning horizon

The origin of critical thinking