The US’ view on Just War

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The US’ view on Just War

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A content analysis of the Trump administration’s justification of the attack on

general Soleimani

Anna Wallerå

Uppsala University

Department of Government

Bachelor's thesis in Political Science Autumn 2020

Supervisor: Joakim Kreutz Word count: 13 260

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Abstract

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1. Introduction

On September 20, 2001, days after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the former President of the United States, George W. Bush, declared during an address to a joint session of Congress and to the nation, the War on Terror. Bush stated that:

“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated” (President George W. Bush, 2001).

The War on Terror is the international military campaign targeting groups and individuals designated as terrorists. Ever since the attack on September 11, 2001, it has been the US’ primary focus and main political and military purpose in both domestic and foreign policymaking. The Bush administration claimed the right to use military force not only against terrorist organisations but also against states that support these groups. Bush stated that:

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” (President George W. Bush, 2001).

Further, it is in the United States´ 2002 National Security Strategy stated that the US after the September 11 attacks has asserted a right of preemptive self-defence against threats posed by a terrorist organisation, even if these are non-imminent (United States, 2002). A strategy in the War on Terror is the usage of targeted killings, the intentional use of lethal force with deliberation to kill, targeting individuals. The phenomenon of targeted killing has throughout history been present but is viewed as very restricted. However, today, targeted killings are gaining legitimacy as a method of counterterrorism as some states, including the US, have acknowledged their usage of targeted killings in an effort to avert terrorist actions (Melzer, 2008). One recent targeted killing conducted at the authorisation of the US President Donald Trump is the killing of Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020).

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4 stated that the action was defensive and that Soleimani was “actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members” in the region. The Department states that “This strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.” and that “The United States will continue to take all necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they are around the world.” (Department of Defense, 2020). Whether or not the usage of targeted killings can be justified within international law is heavily discussed. In a recently presented report, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes Callamard, concluded that “the course of action taken by the US was unlawful” according to international law (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). However, instead of looking at the legality for the killing of general Soleimani from the perspective of international law as in the report by the Special Rapporteur, this thesis will take another perspective and focus on the moral use of military force. The theory of Just War will be used for the conduction of the analysis for this thesis. It approaches the ethics of using military force and argues that war can be morally defensible only under certain conditions when principles that justify the right to resort to armed force are met (Silverstone 2011).

1.1. Aim and Research Question

The aim of this thesis is to investigate if, and in that case how, the Trump administration justifies the killing of general Soleimani and, by analysing four official statements made by the Trump administration in a two months period after the killing, examine the moral discourses in the arguments presented. This thesis intends to give a deeper understanding of how the Trump administration views and respects the principles of Just War theory and how it justifies the killing of general Soleimani in relation to these principles. Therefore, the research question this thesis aims to answer is:

If, and in that case how, are the arguments presented by the Trump administration used to justify the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani in line with the principles of Just War theory?

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5 official statements will be analysed according to the same principles of Just War theory. The research question will be answered through a content analysis where the four official statements are analysed by actively searching for wordings and expressions presented by the Trump administration that could indicate an argument to be just in accordance or not in accordance with Just War theory. This thesis will show that in some aspects, the arguments presented in the official documents can be interpreted to be in accordance with the principles of Just War theory, but none of the statements satisfy the criteria’s in all of the principles. Therefore, the conclusion of this thesis is that the Trump administration has the intention of justifying the attack but does not seek to justify the killing om general Soleimani with an argumentation rooted in Just war theory. Further, the analysis also shows an inconsistency in arguments presented.

1.2. Contribution

Whether the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani was in accordance with international law or not has been evaluated by Special Rapporteur Callamard (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). The contribution from this study lays in the analysis of the argumentation presented by the Trump administration, whose arguments used to justify the killing of general Soleimani are analysed to see if those are in line with the principles of Just War theory. Thus, this thesis does not intend to analyse if the attack itself can be seen as just according to Just War theory, but to look at the argumentation presented by the Trump administration. The killing of general Soleimani is an extraordinary killing as it concerns a state official. Therefore, it is of greatest interest to analyse how the Trump administration justify this killing from the moral perspective of Just War theory. The Jus War theory has not been used in any scientific paper analysing the killing of Soleimani, despite being used in the analysis regarding other terrorist leaders, thus hoping to fill this void within the research area.

1.3. Disposition

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6 sections will conclude the results and its implications and suggest future questions to be researched, and also bring out a broader discussion about the topic of this thesis.

2. Background

On January 3, 2020, Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was killed together with nine other persons through a targeted drone strike near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq at the authorisation of the US President Donald Trump (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Thus, thee attack took place in a third state, Iraq. However, this thesis will not take this fact into account while analysing as the scope of this study is limited. General Soleimani was considered the second most powerful person of Iran, subordinate to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and was commander of the IRGC’ Quds Force, which has been designated a terrorist organisation by the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Crowley, Hassan, and Schmitt, 2020). The attack sharply escalated tension between the US and Iran, with rising fear of a military conflict between the countries. Five days after the attack, on 8 January 2020, Iran launched numerous precision ballistic missiles at the Ain al-Assad airbase in Iraq, from where the US drone strike against Soleimani was launched, where American personnel were located (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020).

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7 export. The relations deteriorated when explosions hit six oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman in May and June 2019, to which Iran denied Washington’s accusations. In December 2019, the US accused Iran-backed militia for a rocket attack killing an American contractor, to which the US retaliated with bombing bases in Iraq and Syria associated to that militia, killing at least 15 servicemen (US-Iran relations: A brief history, 2020 and The US, Iran and Qasem Soleimani story explained in 400 words, 2020). The attack on general Soleimani led to Iran reducing its commitments to the 2015 international nuclear deal, saying it will no longer abide by its enrichment limits (Soleimani killing: Iran abandons nuclear deal limits, 2020).

3. Theoretical Framework and Previous Research

This section aims to present the Just War theory, followed by a review of the previous research regarding the War on Terror, preemptive war and targeted killings.

3.1. Just War Theory

The Just War theory approach to the ethics of the use of military force and is based on the claim that war can be morally defensible only under certain conditions. With roots in both secular and religious sources, the theory can be traced back to the fourth-century writings of St. Augustine, in ideas by Thomas Aquinas during the thirteenth century, to Immanuel Kant and Michael Walzer (Silverstone 2011). Elements of the Just War framework have today been incorporated in both treaties and international law. While agreement over important questions or whether a particular war is just have not always been met, they share the approach to argue around the justice of war. Discussions regarding the Just War theory does not treat it as a theory per se, rather, the Just War tradition is a “framework for ethical reasoning grounded on the belief in human dignity”, intended for dialogue about the just causes and conducts for war (Crawford, 2003). The Just War theory is usually divided into two categories – jus ad bellum and jus in

bello, which are defined as “the conditions that justify engaging in war” versus “the rules

governing how war should be fought once it has started”, the moral conduct within war (Silverstone 2011).

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8 for jus in bello are the protection of non-combatants and proportionality of means, wherein the first refers to the defining of non-combatants, the avoidance of direct, intentional harm and the efforts to protect them, while the second refers to that the violence must be in proportion to the aims (Crawford, 2003). This thesis will analyse the official documents regarding the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani based on the principles of jus ad bellum, and thus, not include an analysis for the principles of jus in bello. This because the UN, including Special Rapporteur Callamard, does not consider there to be an ongoing International Armed Conflict (IAC) between the US and Iran (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Callamard states that “The existence of previous attacks could be a legal argument for the legality of the use of force under international humanitarian law [IHL] – if an international armed conflict between the states existed prior to the strike.”. However, the US and Iran cannot be considered to be involved in an IAC, and, thus, the principles of jus ad bellum should apply. Callamard continues to say that “the strike itself cannot be justified on the basis of retaliation/reprisal/degrading forces under jus ad bellum.” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). However, today we are moving in a grey area which lacks clear distinction of what is an IAC and what is not, thus, the question arises of in what situations the principles for jus ad bellum respective jus in bello should apply. This problem will be further reviewed at the end of this thesis.

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9 necessarily causes. Last resort means that “Determination at the time of the decision to employ force that no other means will achieve the justified ends sought”. Finally, the aim of peace means that the aim must be to establish international stability, security, and peaceful interaction, rather than for the intervening state to gain power (Johnson, 1999). The second principle regarding right authority implies that both national governments and the UN Security Council can be the right authority to justify the use of force, provided they both have a sovereign political entity and the ability to control that use. Contemporary interpretations of the principle leans toward the UN Security Council being the right body to authorize military intervention, and not individual states (Johnson, 1999). All principles of jus ad bellum have to be met for engaging in war within the Just War theory to be seen as just. Since the three first principles of just cause, legitimate authority and right intention have priority over the rest (Johnson, 1999), only the three first principles will be used for the analysis of this thesis.

Outcomes

In this thesis, the arguments presented by the Trump administration in the four official statements will be applied to the three first principles of jus ad bellum, to analyse if, and in that case how, the argumentation correspond with the principles. Thus, if the cause, authority and intention argued for are in line with Just War theory. This thesis sees several possible outcomes for the research question asked, derived from the theory. The possible outcome for the arguments presented by the Trump administration to justify the killing of general Soleimani are:

1. The argumentation does not intend to justify the attack.

2. The argumentation does intend to justify the killing, but not based on the principles of Just War theory.

3. The arguments are in some aspects in accordance with the principles of Just War Theory but does not satisfies all the criteria’s.

4. The arguments are entirely in accordance with the principles of Just War theory 5. The arguments reflect a perspective of retaliation.

6. The arguments reflect a situation of jus in bello, where different principles for justification applies.

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3.2. Previous Research

Firstly, the US has waged a far-reaching war against terrorism, and since Soleimani is argued to be a terrorist, this thesis needs to examine the background to how the US argues in this case. Further, it will be discussed when under Just War theory it is just to use self-defence. Self-defence is a key code word in the legitimation of attacks, which is why this discussion on the limits of self-defence is conducted. It is also of importance to examine the limits of preemptive actions under Just War theory when analysing arguments regarding the justification of preemptive actions. Lastly, central from the background on the attack on general Soleimani is also the fact that the attack was a targeted killing (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Thus, it is of the highest importance to evaluate the legality of targeted killings under Just War theory.

The War on Terror

Ever since the US declared its War on Terror, there has been an intense debate about the legality of this “war”, the right to use force extraterritorially against terrorism, and where to draw the line for self-defence. We can see that, since 9/11, the US has asserted and exercised the right to use military force against both terrorist actors and governments that harbour them (Weiner, 2007). According to Allen S. Weiner (2007), the US “characterizes the war against terrorism as a real war, a war in the legal sense, and it is exercising many of the extraordinary authorities that are available only during wartime”. The US has also claimed the right to, not only treating the conflicts with one terrorist group as a war but also to extend the “war regime” to all terrorist organisations. Thus, the means by which the US has conducted, and still is conducting, the War on Terror does not “satisfy the formal international law definition of war” and “undermines the justification for threatening the conflict as ‘war’” (Weiner, 2007).

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11 self-perpetuating military campaign serving a range of objectives. It is submitted that that campaign has clearly overstretched the boundaries of even the broadest understanding of self-defence.” (Tams, 2009).

Under Just War theory, the only anticipatory force allowed is preemption as a response to an imminent attack (Dais, 2007). Following Tams´ (2009) statement on a wider definition of self-defence, Eugene E. Dais (2007) argues that “The difficulty with waging a counterwar on terrorism is that the war against terrorist networks has to be waged in states from whom no imminent armed attack would be observable or even forthcoming. Such use of force clearly goes beyond the preemptive self-defense that JWT […] permit.”. Thus, even with the justification of the use of a wider definition of self-defence when attacks are carried out by non-state actors, difficulties arise. Weiner (2007) continues that “There can be no question that governments that harbour terrorists act in violation of international law.”, and, thus, can be the subject of an attack under the use of self-defence. Weiner asserts that “Nevertheless, unless terrorists engage in forcible acts that are legally attributable to the supporting state under principles of state responsibility – that is, unless the terrorists are acting on the instructions or under the control of the supporting state – such violations do not justify the use of force against the supporting state.” (Weiner, 2007).

Preemptivewar

Under international law, states can refer to self-defence for using preemptive actions when an act of aggression by another state is imminent (Rittberger et al., 2019). The same applies to jus

ad bellum criterion, where preemptive actions to prevent a credible threat of an imminent attack

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12 will say this, there is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every country does, of self-defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against the terrorists at every place and every time against every conceivable technique. Therefore, the only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them. That is in fact what we're doing. That is in effect self-defense of a preemptive nature.” (Rumsfeld, D. 2001b).

According to Crawford (2003), the Bush administration’s preemptive strategy is in large a preventive war strategy seeking to “maintain U.S. preeminence by reducing or eliminating the military capabilities of potential adversaries even before potential rivals have acquired that capabilities – and in the absence of a clear intention and plan to use weapons against the United States.”, where preventive war strategies are considered unjust (Crawford, 2003). Even so, the 2002 US National Security Strategy states that “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." (United States, 2002). The Bush administration argued that a terrorist attack will give little evidence in advance, and, thus, the requirement for evidence should be reduced to the fear of means and motive for an assault (Crawford, 2003). However, the Bush administration still claimed that the preemptive war doctrine is legitimate and in accordance with international law (President George W. Bush, 2002).

Targeted killings

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13 extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, the legal framework for a targeted killing outside an armed conflict is that “A State killing is legal only if it is required to protect life […] and there is no other means, such as capture or nonlethal incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010). However, targeted killings “cannot be legal because, unlike in armed conflict, it is never permissible for killing to be the sole objective of an operation”. Nonetheless, states have under humanitarian rights law “an obligation to exercise “due diligence” to protect the lives of individuals from attacks by […] terrorists.” Thus, lethal force is legal under human rights law if it is “strictly and directly necessary to save life” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010).

Since the attacks of 9/11, targeted killings have become an accepted part of the American foreign policy (Hunter, 2009). According to the Legal Adviser to the Department of State during the Obama administration, Harold Hongju Koh (2010), the Government’s legal justifications for targeted killings is the country’s inherent right to self-defence. Koh stated in 2010 that “the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law”. Thus, the justification for targeted killings comes from the US claim that the country has been and still are involved in an ongoing armed attack. Koh (2010) refers to the US as “continue to fight a war” and that “in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.”. The US justifies the approach of targeted killings as a part of the War on Terror, where terrorists are seen as combatants and not civilians, thus, legitimising them as targets (Hunter, 2009). Following this, this thesis would in its analysis have to take its stance from the principles of jus

in bello, and the statement of an ongoing war should also apply to the killing of general

Soleimani.

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14 (2008) argues that the legality of a defensive response in contemporary jus ad bellum instead should be judged by the “accumulation of discrete attacks […] – even if no one of these attacks would, in isolation, justify force against that state – may in the aggregate be deemed an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, giving rise to a right of self-defense.” (Sloane, 2008). Other, as the US scholar Kenneth Anderson (2009), advocates a broader view of the legality regarding self-defence sees that the self-defence doctrine can “justify the use of force against an individual.”. Thus, as Alston (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010) states, this would mean that “once the doctrine is invoked, no other legal frameworks or limiting principles – such as IHL – would apply to targeted killings”. This, according to Alston, shows a trend where the broadening view of self-defence justifies the extraterritorial use of force in targeted killings that leads to a further blurring of the line between jus ad bellum and jus ad bello (United Nations, General Assembly, 2010). To conclude, as Tams (2009) states, the developments that have been made in the practice of international law during the two last decades illustrates that the law of jus ad bellum is capable of adaptation. Unlike international law, “jus ad bellum is not deducted from some legal principle but borne out by actual practice of states” (Tams, 2009).

4. Research Design

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15 administration are consistent over a time period of two months, thus using a longitudinal element.

3.1. Content analysis

This thesis originates from the moral principles of Just War theory and seeks to analyse if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump administration used to justify the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, is in line with this theory. In order to interpret the arguments given in the official statements made by the Trump administration to justify the killing of general Soleimani, an analytical tool for the language-based approach is the qualitative content analysis, a study of documents to examine patterns in the communication in a replicable and systematic manner (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative content analysis allows for an analysis that focuses on some selected aspects of the material and, thus, providing a substantial and relevant discussion of the research problem. The method involves the search of underlying themes in the material, which divides the material into different categories. The initial categories are taken from the theory guide of the study, with the operationalisation emerging during the reading of the material. Thus, the method provides for flexibility in the analysis that is useful in the search for different arguments in the material. However, this leads to a risk of certain themes being missed to be categorized (Bryman, 2012).

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3.2. Selection of material

In order to analyse if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump administration used to justify the killing of general Soleimani are in line with Just War theory, this thesis will analyse statements from the Trump administration in the time period of just under two month after the attack. The analysis will build upon four official statements containing discussions regarding the aims justifying this attack from the perspective of the US. Starting from the afternoon after the attack, the first official statement that this thesis will build its analysis upon is the “Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani” issued by the White House on January 3, 2020. The remark analysed is a transcribed speech by President Trump from his private resort in Mar-a-lago and is to a large extent directed to the American public. The second official statement is a statement to the President of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy, by the Permanent Representative, Ambassador Kelly Craft. The statement was sent on January 8, 2020, five days after the attack. Third, a “United States Military Action Against Qassem Soleimani”, by the Trump administration sent to the Committee of Foreign Affairs on February 14, 2020 was analysed. Lastly, the fourth statement analysed is a transcribed speech from a hearing in the Committee of Foreign Affairs by the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on February 28, 2020. The statements have been found on the White House’s and the Committee of Foreign Affairs’ website. The materials used for this thesis are concluded in Table 1.

Title Source Date

Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani

US President Donald Trump January 3, 2020

United States Mission to the United Nations

United States Mission to the United Nations by the Permanent Representative, Ambassador Kelly Craft

January 8, 20202

United States Military Action Against Qassem Soleimani

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Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

February 28, 2020

Table 1: Materials

These four statements are central statements from the Trump administration. While other statements exist, as the initial statement from the Department of Defense (Department of Defense, 2020) and comments made to the press, these have not been included in the analysis as they are too concise or not touching on the justification of the attack. Thus, it is possible that another selection of materials would yield a different conclusion. The first and the last statements, by President Trump and Secretary Pompeo, are more rhetorical, and thus, does not have as their main purpose to justify the attack based on international law. However, the other two statements aim to seek legitimacy from the UN Security Council and the Congress, more specifically the Committee of Foreign Affairs. The speech by President Trump is of importance to this thesis as is the first statement from the President and the initial justification presented to the American people. The letter to the UN is the US obliged to send according to Article 51 of the UN Charter (United Nations. 1945). Thus, this statement shows the justification presented to an actor as the UN. Further, the statement to the Congress is included as the President has responsibilities under the Congress, and thus, the Trump administration must answer to them. Lastly, the speech by Secretary Pompeo is of importance as it is a complement to the notice to Congress, as Secretary Pompeo after his speech where to answer questions from the representatives on the Committee of Foreign Affairs.

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3.3. Operationalisation

In order to analyse if, and in that case how, the arguments presented by the Trump administration used to justify the US’s action are in line with the principles of Just War theory through a qualitative content analysis, we need to look at the definitions of the principles of jus ad bellum, and how these should be interpreted. First and foremost, this thesis will search for if there is, or is not, an attempt made to justify the killing of general Soleimani based on the Just War theory in the statements analysed. Thus, this thesis will also acknowledge what is not stated. Further, this thesis will, if there is an attempt to justify the killing of general Soleimani based on the Just War theory, search for how these arguments are used. This thesis will firstly search for the phrases cause, legitimate authority or intention. However, as we cannot expect the statements to be structured in the way of cause, authority and intention, we further need to actively search for wordings and expressions that can be interpreted to express these principles. In Table 2 below, wordings and expressions that can be interpreted to express the cause, the authority and the intention, are presented. The analysis is not based on the literal phrases given in Table 2, but the broader interpretation of these phrases that indicates justifying arguments to the respective principles.

Definition of principle (Johnson, 1999)

Could indicate a

justification in line with Just War theory

Could indicate a justification not in line with Just War theory Just Cause Justifies the use of force not out of

self-interest but for the sake of others: those who are in need of defence or who have suffered wrongs needing to be righted

§ Protect civilians § Inherent right to

self-defence § Imminent threat § International peace and security § Response to previous attacks § Fight against terrorists § War on Terror Legitimate Authority

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Right intention

The intention must be in

accordance with the just cause and not with the aim of territorial expansion, intimidation or coercion

§ Restore international peace and security § End hostilities

§ Regime change § Protect national

interests Table 2: Operationalisation

These phrases are decided on by the author of this thesis and build on the definition of the principles defined above in the section for theory. As the operationalisation is constructed by the author of this thesis, another author might interpret the definition differently and thus chose other key wordings to build their analysis upon, thus creating problems of validity. Validity is the lack of systematic errors, that the operationalisation corresponds accurately with the theoretical definition, that we analyse what we intend to analyse (Esaiasson et al., 2017). The operationalisation builds upon the definition and discussion regarding the principles made by Johnson (1999) and uses wordings and expressions that could indicate a justification in line with or not in line, the antonyms of these wordings and expressions, with the Just War theory.

5. Results and Analysis

In this section, the empirical findings of this study will be presented and analysed. The section will begin by analysing each of the four official statements structured after the principles of just cause, legitimate authority and right intention, according to the wordings and expressions presented in the operationalisation. Lastly, this analysis will conduct a summarising discussion comparing the similarities and differences in the arguments presented. Examples of arguments from the material will be presented in forms of quotations and discussed. Each part of this section will be explored in the light of the selected theory and argue in accordance with the research question - if, and in that case how, are the arguments presented by the Trump

administration used to justify the killing of major general Qasem Soleimani in line with the principles of Just War theory?

4.1. Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani

Just Cause

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20 and servicemen”, contributed in the planning of terror plots around the world, and that Soleimani “has been perpetrating acts of terror to destabilize the Middle East for the last 20 years.”. By labelling Soleimani a top terrorist, one could say that Trump justifies the killing as part of the US´ War on Terror doctrine, where Soleimani on the basis of being a designated terrorist becomes a legitimate target, although not mentioning the War on Terror explicitly. Trump refers to protecting American civilians in the Middle East region and on American ground from terrorist attacks in the future. In a broader perspective, Trump also speaks of the protection of civilians around the world from future terrorist attacks. In the remarks, it is also said that Soleimani recently led the “repression of protestors in Iran” were “civilians were tortured and killed by their own government”. Referring to the protection of civilians, not only American civilians in the region but also Iranian civilians, is an argument seeking to justify the US´ action on humanitarian ground with references to the Iranian state committing crimes to their own people. The definition for just cause states that force should not be used out of self-interest but for the sake of others. Thus, the use of military force based on humanitarian ground is to be seen as just according to the Just War theory. However, this argument is not brought up as the reason for the attack, but rather seems to be a reconstruction after the attack in an attempt to justify it.

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Legitimate Authority

Throughout the statement, Trump points to his responsibility and authority as President to take action. He starts by referring to the duty as a president and uses the language of “at my direction” and “Under my leadership”. The US has the military power to and the ability to "control and cease that use” of force, as stated in the definition of legitimate authority. However, never once in this remark he lifts the topic of international law, if this attack is authorised by the Charter of the UN, if this lies within his mandate as the President or if he has obligations under the Congress. Towards the end of the speech, Trump states that “I am ready and prepared to take whatever action is necessary.”, meaning that his administration unilaterally is prepared to use military power to answer threats or attacks. Thus, it can be questioned if President Trump was an authorized representative under the UN and Congress.

Right Intention

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4.2. United States Mission to the United Nations

Just Cause

The arguments presented to justify the cause of the attack on Soleimani in the letter to the UN differs from President Trump's remarks. The letter, published on January 8, takes its stance on the US´s “exercise of its inherent right of self-defense.”, pointing to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The letter states that “These actions were in response to an escalating series of armed attacks in recent months by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran-supported militias on U.S. forces and interests in the Middle East region” implemented in order to maintain “international peace and security”. The letter brings up several examples of attacks, and even threats of attacks, which all can be seen as rather moderate and, thus, not in proportion of killing a high-ranking military leader of a state. What is notable is the change in what arguments are used depending on whom is the recipient. References to international peace and security or the UN-Charter did not occur in the remarks by the President on the morning after the attack, but is of importance in this letter, given the recipient is the Security Council. What is further notable is the absence of any reference to an imminent threat. This can be interpreted as the Trump administration lacks substantial evidence for the imminent threat brought up in the remarks by the President and haven't found such evidence at the time of publishing this letter. As the existence of an imminent threat is a key vindication for an act of self-defence, it is remarkable. The principle of self-defence can, thus, be questioned. As in the remarks from the President, the underlying motive for the attack can be understood as retaliation, which does not go in line with just cause.

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23 Force as a terrorist organisation. The group is only a designated terrorist organisation by the US, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Legitimate Authority

In the letter to the UN, unlike in the Remarks by the President, the Trump administration seeks authority from the Charter of the UN and Article 51, and states that “the United States has undertaken certain actions in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense.”. However, also in this letter, the US reserves the right to carry out further actions in the region as it deems necessary and sees itself as having the authority needed to act with military power without a mandate from the UN. The letter states that “The United States is prepared to take additional actions in the region as necessary to continue to protect U.S. personnel and interests.”. However, the strong statement of using military force unilaterally while the contemporary interpretations of the principle show the UN Security Council to be the right body to authorize military intervention and not individual states, calls into question whether the Trump administration has the authority needed to authorise such action under Just War theory.

Right Intention

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4.3. United States Military Action Against Qassem Soleimani

Just Cause

In the statement to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the argument brought forward to justify the attack goes on the same line as in the letter to the UN. It is stated that the attack was carried out “in response to an escalating series of attacks in preceding months by Iran and Iran-backed militias on United States forces and interests in the Middle East region.”. As in the letter to the UN, there is an absence of any mention of an imminent threat, proving further the lack of substantial evidence for the imminent threat brought up in the remarks by the President. This once again points us to interpret that the underlying cause for the attack is retaliation and not an act of self-defence to prevent an imminent attack. Even though no evidence for an imminent threat existed, it is in the very end of the statement a reference to the US´ inherent right to self-defence, as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is stated that “Although the threat of further attacks existed, recourse to the inherent right of self-defense was justified sufficiently by the series of attacks that preceded the January 2 strike.”. It is notable that they recognize the absence of an imminent threat and still justify the usage of self-defence, even though it is a matter of retaliation. This highlights the overarching distinction of being in a war or preventing a war, the case of jus ad bellum or jus in bello, where the US´ argument in this case can be interpreted as meaning that the situation concerns jus in bello. It coincides with President Trumps rhetorical statement “We took action last night to stop a war. We did not take action to start a war.”.

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Legitimate Authority

Similarly to Remarks by the President, the focus is in this statement underlines the authority of the President rather than the state, as seen in the letter to the UN. The statement refers to the presidential authority as “At the President’s direction” and the President is later referred to several times in the statement. What makes this statement stand out in comparison with the two others is the focus on the president's authority from Congress. As a way of justifying that President Trump used military power without direct Congressional approval, this statement refers to the United States Constitution and the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002 AUMF). Firstly, the statement says that “Article II of the United States Constitution, empowers the President, as Commander in Chief, to direct the use of military force to protect the Nation from an attack or threat of imminent attack and to protect important national interests.”. As discussed in the section above, no substantial evidence for an imminent threat is mentioned in this statement. Further, no arguments regarding the protection of important national interests were brought up, and to legitimate, the use of military force for the protection of national interests does not go in line with the principles of Just War. Thus, this section from the United States Constitution does not with clarity seem to empower the President in this case.

The reference to 2002 AUMF has been criticised by representatives from the Democrats. It gives the president the authority to use military force against “the continuing threat posed by Iraq”. However, to use a decision intended to be used on Saddam Hussein´s regime to justify the killing of a military leader of another country on the territory of Iraq strikes not to be legitimised. The statement also refers to international law and that this action “was taken in United States national self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in response to a series of escalating armed attacks that Iran and Iran-supported militias had already conducted against the United States.” However, it does not refer to working together with the UN Security Council to achieve more stability in the region.

Right Intention

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26 on general Soleimani lies heavily on the value of protecting national interest in the region. As seen in the letter to the UN, the intention is out of self-interest, to ensure the protection of US economic and political interests in the region. Thus, this cannot be seen as a just cause based on the principles of Just War theory. The statement uses a broadened term of self-defence, where the Trump administration argues to justify violence against “Qods Force-backed militias”, which are not mentioned in neither of the first two official statements. This is in line with the declaration of the War on Terror during the Bush administration where it was stated that military force will also be used by those that support these groups. However, this goes against the principle of just cause as no imminent threats are seen from that group.

4.4. Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo Before the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Just Cause

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Legitimate Authority

As in the remarks by the President, there is in the speech by Pompeo no reference to international law or that the attack is conducted in accordance with the UN Charter and Article 51. Nor is there any reference to the action being justified and done under presidential authority from the Congress, as said in the statement to the Committee of Foreign Affairs. As in the letter to the UN, in his speech, Secretary Pompeo rather argues for the US' right to use force unilaterally to protect American personnel and interests. He states that “We will continue to protect the American people and American interests by any means necessary.” Thus, serves the right to carry out further attacks in the region if that is considered necessary. The Trump administration sees itself as having the authority needed to use military force without the mandate from the Security Council. However, questions can be raised if the Trump administration is the right body authorising this action under Just War theory and not the UN Security Council.

Right Intention

In his speech, Secretary Pompeo states that the US is conducting a “pressure campaign” in the region, thus, going against the principles for Just War theory, as it is morally unjust to use intimidation or coercion. To add to that, Pompeo also uses statements as “They know if we fight, they’ll lose. That’s deterrence. It’s our policy.”, which stands in contrary to the theory in the same way. It is further argued that the killing of general Soleimani, or “Removing him from the battlefield” as Pompeo calls is, “was a de-escalatory measure.”, and that “His death reduced the risk to our personnel overseas, both my diplomats and our military, and made clear that we are willing and able to impose costs on our adversaries if they threaten or attack us.”. Here is the emphasis on the prevention of further attacks, and, thus, to restore peace and security, though not in a way that can be justified under jus ad bellum.

4.5. Summary

Just Cause

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28 attacks and to the states inherent right to self-defence. Referring to their, according to the US, right to self-defence and to respond to previous attacks by Iran as a way of justifying the cause, is also seen in the statement to Congress. Here it is also stated that the US had the right to retaliation because of the previous attacks, even though no threats of further attacks existed. Thus, the Trump administration refers in these statements to a wide definition of self-defence, where the states right to self-defence would apply even as a response to several previous attacks. In both the statements to the UN and to Congress, international law is brought up, however, not to a greater extent than to state their right to self-defence from Article 51 in the UN Charter. The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, also argues that the previous attacks by Iran targeting US personnel and interest are a justification for retaliation, however, he makes no mention of the states right to self-defence, but rather openly states that deterrence is the working policy. Thus, this thesis sees in the argumentation by the Trump administration no evidence of any proof for an imminent threat for such self-defence would be in accordance with Just War theory. This thesis has further shown that the arguments presented are not consistent but change over time and according to the recipient, which obstructs the analysis of how the Trump administration argues to justify the attack.

Further, in all but the letter to the UN, Soleimani presents as one of the world’s top terrorists, where President Trump and Secretary Pompeo lays the focus on the individual while in the statement to Committee of Foreign Affairs the focus is on the organisation he leads. As there is no widespread support for the IRGC’ Quds Force being a designated terrorist organisation, the question of terrorism is not made an argument before the UN. By labelling Soleimani a terrorist in the three other official statements, the justification for the cause, thus, aligns to the US War on Terror, even though there is no direct reference to the War on Terror. Lastly, seeing that the speeches by President Trump and Secretary Pompeo are of a more rhetorical nature, we here see references to the protection of civilians in Iran. However, to argue for the protection of civilians in this attack cannot be seen as a reasonable justification. This is not the main focus for the attack, but rather a reconstruction made after the event.

Legitimate Authority

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29 in Iraq, and before the UN the reference is made towards international law and the inherent right to self-defence according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. What is further worth noticing is that none of the statements argues for whether it is legitimate to kill a high-level state official of another state and how this differs from targeting and killing leaders for non-state terrorist organisations. The concluding remark is thus that from where one seeks legitimacy in the statements differs. It might be in the American view that the state is entitled to conduct these attacks unilaterally, and thus, no attempts are made to show that the attack is consistent with international law or Just War theory.

Right Intention

The definition of right intention in the Just War theory states that the aim cannot be that of intimidation or coercion. The only attempt made to anchor the attack in international law is in the statement to the UN, where the argument made is to maintain international peace and security which, according to the Trump administration, has been endangered by Iran’s action. However, both in the speech from President Trump and from Secretary Pompeo, there are clear usages of language that points to intimidation and deterrence. In the speech by President Trump, there are also implications to him wanting to see a regime change, even though he states the opposite. The usage of phrases as “we will eliminate you”, deter, and degrade, goes against the principle for right intention. Further, the argumentation is in the first three official statements heavily values of protecting national interest in the region. However, conducting an attack killing a high-level state official to ensure the protection of US economic and political interests in the region is done out of self-interest, and thus, cannot be said to be in accordance with the principles for just cause.

6. Conclusion

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30 an argumentation entirely in accordance with the principles of Just War theory to an argumentation of retaliation and to where the arguments do not intend to justify the killing. The conclusion of the analysis of this thesis is that the arguments presented in these official statements generally do not go in line with the principles of Just War theory, regarding just cause, legitimate authority and right intention. In some aspects, the arguments can be interpreted to be in accordance with one of the principles, but none of the statements satisfy the criteria’s in all of the principles. For example, the argumentation shows the usage of retaliation. Therefore, the overall conclusion of this analysis is that the Trump administration has the intention of justifying the attack but does not seek to justify the killing om general Soleimani with an argumentation rooted in Just war theory. Thus, the argumentation presented does not intend to justify the attack based on the principles of Just War theory.

One important finding of this report is the inconsistency of arguments presented by the Trump administration in the official statements analysed. The initial claims of an imminent threat were not mentioned in any of the three later statements. This even though it is a credible threat of an imminent attack that justifies preemptive actions within Just War theory. The Trump administration refers in these statements to a wide definition of self-defence, where the states right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter would apply as a response to several previous attacks. The usage of a wider definition for self-defence can here be argued to have taken to serve the purposes of retaliation.

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31 great importance, both to see how the attack affects the countries and, in a broader perspective, if this will lead to new practices for what is seen as acceptable within the international community.

7. Further discussion

In “Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani”, Trump states that “We took action last night to stop a war. We did not take action to start a war.”. If this attack took place within an IAC and not as a start of an IAC, it would be a case of jus in bello, the rules governing how a war should be fought once it has started, and not jus ad bellum, the conditions that justify engaging in war, as used in the analysis of this thesis. This topic is discussed in the report by Special Rapporteur Callamard, where the killing of Soleimani is analysed on the bases of international law (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Callamard examines the targeted killing by the US on Iran´s major general Qasem Soleimani. Callamard concludes that surrounding the attack was “insufficient evidence provided of an ongoing or imminent attack.” and that “No evidence has been provided that General Soleimani specifically was planning an imminent attack against US interests, particularly in Iraq, for which immediate action was necessary and would have been justified” under international law. Therefore, she states that “absent an actual imminent threat to life, the course of action taken by the US was unlawful.” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020).

What is of extra importance in this report is the reference to the distinction between jus ad

bellum and jus ad bello. Callamard states that “Were the blurring of these lines to be allowed,

states could cherry-pick rationalizations from the different legal frameworks to justify acts of aggression. A clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello must be maintained to secure the safeguards of each system and their complementary function.” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2020). Similar problems apply to the Just War theory, and in some instances the research question for this thesis would have been better to apply to the principles of jus in

bello. Therefore, for further research, to examine the moral justification of the killing of general

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The US’ view on Just War