Civil society and civic space.: The meaning of the closure of civic space for liberal and rights-based organisations in Serbia.

(1)

Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

University of Uppsala University of Udine

August 2019

Civil society and civic space.

The meaning of the closure of civic space for liberal and rights-based organisations in Serbia.

Submitted by:

Antoine Guitteny Student number first university: 19940531-T375 Tel: +33 6 81 24 01 66 Email: guitteny.a@gmail.com

First semester university: Uppsala University Second semester university: University of Udine Belgrade, 1st August 2019

(2)

MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

I, Antoine Guitteny hereby declare that this thesis, entitled ‘Civil society and civic space. The meaning of the closure of civic space for liberal and rights-based organisations in Serbia.”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules of the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Antoine Guitteny 1st August 2019

(3)

Abstract

The concept of civil society has greatly evolve over time, from describing civilisation, the bourgeoisie, to all non-State and non-economic actors. The conception of civil society can be approached in different ways according to contexts and times. When civil society is presented as essentially ‘good’ for some, the concept of ‘uncivil’ society needs to be taken into consideration to further an understanding of the dynamics of society. As a result, when international observers call for the closure of civic space, we notice rather a change in the opening of civic space. In Serbia, when civic space was open for liberal and rights-based organisations, it is now more limited, while opening to actors presenting opposing views on society and rejecting liberal values.

The narrative emerging for Serbian liberal organisations presents an alarming assessment: the shrinking of civic space. However, while these organisations are suffering the closure of civil space, their narrative seeks civil legitimisation and presents itself as the real representative of civil society, it serves then a political and social agenda. Nevertheless, the conception of legitimacy is subjective and rights-based organisation in Serbia cannot pretend anymore to be a representative of the mass.

(4)

Introduction 4

Defining and framing civil society 6

An introduction to civil society 6

Approaches to civil society 7

Democracy building and civil society 8

Civil society: an ideal(isation) in the democratic process 10

The broad perspective of civil society 10

Is civil society beneficial for democracy? 12

Civil and civic space, how can civil society measured? 14

Social capital in Serbia 15

Peace building and civil society 18

Serbian civil society in a post-conflict context 18

Civil society, development and peace building 20

Uncivil society 23

Defining uncivil society 23

Use and features of uncivil society 24

The shrinking of civic space phenomenon 28

Introduction to the concept of closure of civil and civic space 28 The theoretical dynamics and causes of the closure civil space 29 Case study: an insight into the closure of the civic space phenomenon from a civil

society organisation view point 32

Conclusion 50

Bibliography 51

(5)

Introduction

Civil society as a concept can be found in multiple political theories. For John Locke, a society was civil when it could meet a sense of security, whether the physical integrity of a population accorded and assured to them by power-holders, or reflected economic prosperity, and consequently, economic comfort. Civil society in that case, is rather a synonym of civilisation, as opposed to a ‘savage’ society. For Hegel, civil society worked hand in hand with capitalism. However, he drew a line between civil society and civility. Thus, civil society would not necessarily be civil, but express economic development. According to Hegel, civil society cannot be civil by itself and is not essentially civil without the State. The latter needs to assure the respect of the rule of law and checks and balances to bring forth civility. For Karl Marx, the definition of civil society takes a more social dimension, he used the phrase to describe the bourgeoisie. Therefore, our modern conception of civil society as representing the mass and common citizens was quite the opposite in Marx’s mind. The foundations for what we perceive today as civil society was led by Antonio Gramsci. The XXth century marked the distinction between civil society, the State, and the economy.

While the notion of civil space was almost strictly used in philosophical and political theory, the XXth century witnesses a significant democratisation of the use of civil society.

Following the Polish popular upheaval in the 1980s, the concept found itself widely used.

Once solely used by thinkers and intellectuals, the idea of civil society spread to all spheres of society in many different contexts. Consequently, the meaning of civil society took different shapes and colours according to the actors using it and depending on which socio-political and economic contexts. Globally, civil society is understood today as anything within a society which is either non-State or non-market. Civil society is then considered as the sphere of society allowing common citizens to express themselves and create social connexions.

Today, it seems that the space allocated to citizens to express opinions openly and influence decision-making processes is under threat in a number of States. Thomas Carothers calls for a global pushback of civil space. A trend that is expected to be lasting . However, ¹ when the pushback phenomenon has occurred, and is occuring, around the globe, it is primordial to reconsider the notion of ‘shrinking of civic space’. Indeed, rather than a global closure on civil society, it seems that civic actors within civil society are not affected in a uniform way. It appears that the restrictions target specific groups within civil society, these groups being most commonly liberal organisations, mostly reliable on foreign aid for their financial sustainability, and having close relations with international organisations, foundations, or foreign governments. We may then question the very appellation of

‘shrinking’ or ‘closing’ of civil space. But rather, we shall consider who is part of civil society, and if the closure for some means an opening for others.

1Thomas Carothers, Saskia Brechenmacher, “Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014)

(6)

The Republic of Serbia is one of the States engaged in the restriction of civic space.

Numerous international observers depict a downfall of civil liberties and a continuously limited civil space and its consequences on civil society actors, whether workers or activists.

For instance, Freedom House observed in 2018 the deterioration of “political rights and civil liberties” in Serbia. Other reports call for the deterioration of the environment for civil² society organisations, and the State efforts to muzzle organisations and movements critical to the leading authorities. To learn more about the dynamics of closing of civil spaces, the paper will first attempt to broaden the perspective of civil society in general, to understand what is civil society, who is part of it, and on what terms. Then, in order to deepen the understanding of civil space movement, the paper will analyse the narrative of the report “Associations of Citizens: Shrinking Civic Space - Serbia 2014-2018”. The analysis of the report shall give an insight into the perception of actors targeted by the closure of civil space, while highlighting the dynamics of the phenomenon through the eyes of civil society organisations. We shall then see how the state is presented, and most and foremost, how civil society wish to be presented and how our understanding of civil society can be then challenged.

2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2018, Freedom House (2018)

(7)

Defining and framing civil society

An introduction to civil society

To begin with, before addressing the phenomenon of closing or changing civil society as such in a Serbian context, fundamental questions arise: what it civil society, where does it come from and how can it be understood? As much as it is essential to take into consideration a person’s past experience to understand their present behaviour and personality, it is necessary to theoretically frame the term “civil society” to further our understanding. This first part aims at identifying the history of the concept by exploring the variety of meanings it carried over time and the flexibility and elasticity in understanding of “civil society” used today around the globe. The use of civil society in our modern societies is very much open to interpretations and debates, it is modeled, used in a way or another depending on what is a stake, takes different shapes and colours from a context to another. As a result, the first step that needs to be taken is defining civil society and isolate the different academic approaches to the phrase. This process shall allow us to show civil society through several lights, thus, improve the understanding not only of the essence of civil society, if there is one, but also the human factor behind the strategic use of the concept depending on which actor uses it and what ends it would serve. This methodology aims at building a solid analytical tool to read through the civil society actors’ narratives along with what meaning it privileges over another to suit specific agendas.

The use of civil society can be traced back to the late 18 ^th and early 19^th century Europe. Originally, civil society was used to describe and draw a distinction between the State and the rest of society as a whole. Civil society was then rather an umbrella term use to describe any individual or organisation that was neither governmental nor institutional . The ³ traditional meaning of civil society has been described by John Keane (University of Westminster) as a “peaceful political order governed by law” . Already, an ambiguity appears ⁴ in relation to the common and natural understanding of today’s civil society. It seems that this definition already distances itself from what the fundamental idea of civil society was: the State and everything else, by excluding what would be not be under the control of the State, and by defining it as “political”. We observe the drastic change and transformation the concept underwent. Keane describes our modern understanding of civil society as followed:

civil society is “legally protected” non-governmental institutions. His definition highlights in ⁵ parallel its usually non-violent nature, as well as a dimension of self-organisation separate from the State. Already, by highlighting a usual peaceful nature, another concept shows beneath the surface of the definition: what could be described as “uncivil society”. This concept will be elaborated further in this paper.

3 John Keane, “Civil society, definitions and approaches,” International Encyclopedia of Civil Society (Springler-Verlag , 2010)

4Ibid.

5Ibid.

(8)

Jumping from one definition to another exposes the great number a meanings the concept carries. Indeed, from a political standpoint, civil society has been used to describe a variety of phenomena, more or less complexe, and sometimes conflicting. Phenomena such as the idea of “global civil society”, used by a number of international non-governmental organisations. The conflict in this phenomenon lies in the will to gather under the same umbrella different “civil societies”, driven by different interests, organised in different ways, and evolving in different political, social and economic contexts. The main change underwent by the definition is a democratisation of its use, once exclusively used in political theories, the concept of civil society is widely used today with a modern and liberal understanding.

Civil society as we imagine it today in our collective imagination emerged in the 80s in Poland, following the Polish democratic opposition movement . ⁶

Approaches to civil society

In order to understand how the concept of civil society can be academically tackled, three main approaches can be identified to describe civil society.

Firstly, civil society can be observed through a empirical and analytical interpretation.

This methodology could be described as purely observatorial. The aim is simple: observe and describe the existing relationship between political and social forces. An advantage in seeing civil society though an empirical and analytical magnifying glass is its absence of moral judgment, widely present when addressing civil society. Empirical analyses seek to theorize existing mechanisms by observing the development of socio-political realities and what result from such mechanisms. This approach can be seen a too theoretical to define a social and political construction which is for a big part relying on a human factor and evolving in different ways depending on the context. But offer a more partial reading of the existence, aims and dynamics of civil society in general.

Secondly, civil society can be approach in a pragmatic way, meaning considering the concept as a tactical way of action. In the context of civil society, it aims at organising a socio-political agenda to achieve a goal considered, theoretically, ‘good’. Here, we observe the introduction of a more moral aspect of civil society, what is good, what is not, and how the assumed flaws of society or State should be addressed by civil society. This approach is mainly used in the fight against totalitarianism, and this early on in history, as tactics to

“contest despotic power the best” . According to Kean, the pragmatic way of thinking civil⁷ society was widely developed in the study of civil society in Southern Europe, former communist countries, and countries in democratic transition, including in Serbia over the past 20 years. Civil society became then a tool for democracy. This relation between civil society and democracy will be developed below.

6 Marc Morjé Howard, “Civil society and democracy,” International Encyclopedia of Civil Society (Springler-Verlag , 2010)

7 Thomas Pain, Common Sense (1776)

(9)

The last possible academic approach to civil society is the normative approach. Here, not only civil society would embody a fight judged right and fair, but also emphasizes a level of “ethical superiority” over the rest of society. Civil society would incarnate the natural and⁸ transcendent rights of human, a divine gift to mankind. This idea also appeared early on and was defended by thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson . Whether civil society is approached ⁹ from a normative way and a republican standpoint or in other class struggle contexts, the reading of civil society lacks in nuance and could be in a number of context be considered as a populist tool to fight a number of assumed injustice that needs to be overcome by the greater number. In parallel to political strategies, civil society is for some a genuine and essentially good social construct, Emile Durkheim described civil society as a spontaneous

“loving, kindness and fraternity” . A normative approach could then include both a self¹⁰ conscious use of the term civil society and what could be described as a more naive, or rather idealistic approach to civil society.

The common understanding of civil society and the most common use is then mainly normative, with a touch of pragmatism. The public opinion sees civil society as good and fair by essence, it represents the people fighting for their natural rights. Simultaneously, civil society actors describe themselves as such, but also consider civil society to be a means to an end: democracy.

Democracy building and civil society

Despite an obvious relation between civil society and democracy in today’s understanding, the two concepts only met in the second half of the 20 ^th century. The importance of civil society in democracy follows global conflicts, fights against totalitarianism and other conflicts. The first impactful demonstration of civil society in the fight for democracy occurred during Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989) . The¹¹ victory of civil movements against dictatorship bonded and affirmed the interdependence of civil society and democracy. Hence, an active and healthy civil society is seen as one of the main criteria for the development or the maintenance of democracy. This conception is widely spread in the Balkans and especially in Serbia with the participation of civil society in the non-violent overthrow of Milosevic dictatorial regime. This point will be further developed later in the paper. However, the normative approach to civil society needs to be put into perspective, if not doubted, as it carries a number of contradictions. Keane writes:

“those who practically deny civil society in this normative sense are probably arrogant

9 Gordon S. Wood, “Thomas Jefferson, Equality, and the Creation of Civil Society,” Fordham Law Review (1996)

10 Emile Durkheim, “L’Allemagne au Dessus de Tout”, la Mentalité Allemande et la Guerre, Armand Colin (1915)

11 Marciej Barkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989),” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (December 2009)

(10)

monists - and most likely manipulators, bullies, tyrants, or totalitarians” . Again, a normative ¹² approach to civil society can be seen as instrumentalisation to discredit and draw a manichean opposition between a good, fair, tolerant civil society and the rest: violent, intolerant and despotic. Nevertheless, the normative view on civil society is for a big part a self definition of civil society by civil society, or rather how some actors appropriate the concept to reflect a positive image of themselves on local, national, and international stages.

(11)

Civil society: an ideal(isation) in the democratic process

The broad perspective of civil society

Despite having been used in political theories relatively early on, civil civil made its appearance in the democratic and liberal narrative during the second part of the 20 ^thcentury.

The fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and a general process of democratisation engaged then put civil society at the core of the democratisation process. The concept of civil society served as a tool to measure the advancement of developing and former totalitarian regimes in the field of democracy. Civil society facilitated the research on democratisation by definy a specific frame . To this day, an healthy democracy implies a ¹³ dynamic and active civil society. However, the ambiguity and plurality of meanings orbiting around the term civil society increased during the 80s and 90s, the concept being used widely by different actors. As a component of democracy, civil society is shown as a Western model, and ideal to follow for countries in democratic transition. An active civil society would be the key to democracy as it is perceived as a counter-balancing body to political and economic power. Civil society is seen as the essence of democracy and good governance, it would reflect the will and interests of the mass, of the people. Civil society is now a sphere interacting with other forces within society. In our modern understanding, civil society would be interacting with political and economic forces as described in Figure 1.

13Marc Morjé Howard, “Civil society and democracy,” International Encyclopedia of Civil Society (Springler-Verlag , 2010)

(12)

Figure 1. Broad perspective of civil society. Interactive spheres . ¹⁴

The broad perspective described in the figure above was first conceived by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan to define the five main interactive spheres in society . This figure ¹⁵ introduced civil society as a balancing power. In this conception, civil society is composed of ordinary citizens voluntarily organising themselves in organisations and associations that are legally established . This conception correspond to the modern definition of civil society as¹⁶ described by Keane, which, it can be argued, marginalizes citizens not involved in civil society organisations or informal groups, when they could possibly advocate for similar civil interests. It is essential to understand what civil society is interacting with within this

14 From Marc Morjé Howard, “The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe,” Cambridge University Press (New York, 2003)

15 Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe,” Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore, 1996)

(13)

conception. Political and economic societies are presented as “individual elites” seeking ¹⁷ either political power or economic profit within a capitalist context. Civil society appears as a counter-balance to personal ambitions and individual profits by theoretically represent the mass of society and citizens’ daily interests and preoccupations. As it can be easily assumed, the three spheres are not perfectly isolated from one another, they are not only interacting, but also overlapping. As a result, for instance, civil society seeks political influence, but do not officially recognizes an ambition for power in their narrative. Besides, civil society is itself composed of a great variety of groups and interests, including cultural organisations, human rights organisations, environmental movements, religious groups and many more.

The position of non-governmental organisations is more ambiguous. Despite a common imagery of NGOs being a full component of civil society, their place in society is extremely fluid and can be found in all spheres with a variety of agendas and interests.

However, taking into consideration the definition of political and economic arenas defined above, NGOs are not willing to be associated to other spheres than the civil society arena . In ¹⁸ addition, we can find other overlapping organisation throughout the different spheres such as workers unions, which can be considered being part of both civil and economic spheres. To give another example, certain NGOs are not based on public support and can be described as

“elite-based political-economic interest groups” , some of these organisation could be then¹⁹ also referred as political-economic advocacy groups, or lobbies. The media for its part, goes through all sphere at once. It can be considered as a powerful and influential tool in political and economic spheres, while its means of communication are directed mainly to and among common people.

Is civil society beneficial for democracy?

It is commonly assumed that civil society is a positive and beneficial element for

peace and democracy building. Howard describes the common opinion on civil society as

“peaceful, moral and idealistic image” . However, the direct correlation between democracy²⁰ building and civil society is not always obvious.

Firstly, civil society can be presented as a shield for individuals against violence and ²¹ a legal security for groups to express their social identity free from incivilities by developing solidarity . Larry Diamond (Stanford University) emphasized the beneficial aspects of civil²² society and created a list demonstrating how positive civil society is as a counter-power to the State. It firstly offers an alternative way of representing civil interests, while developing the exchange of information to, from, and within citizens to theoretically avoid State controlled information and populism. Civil society would also keep the State in check and limit its power by monitoring and use this improved flow of information to the citizens, therefore

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 John Keane, Violence and Democracy, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge/New-York, 2004)

22 Jeffrey Alexander, The Civil Sphere, Oxford University Press (New-York, 2006)

(14)

limiting a possible State impunity and ideally control corruption. By extension, a healthy civil society would bring forth better, reliable and more democratic institutions. Civil society, moreover, would both improve citizens’ socio-political awareness and active participation in decision-making processes, creating on the long-term a “democratic culture of tolerance” . ²³

Academic research on civil society often highlights a strong and positive relation between civil society and democracy. The beneficial effects on society and democracy can be approached through two main scholar standpoints: firstly, through a social-capitalist approach. This approach emphasizes the positive effects of civil society on individuals. Marc Morjé Howard (Georgetown University) compares this view to Tocqueville’s “school for democracy” . In other words, the role of civil society on individual would be strongly²⁴ educational. Individuals would be able the develop awareness related to their place and civic possibilities within society, increasing their civic participation to decision-making processes ²⁵ . Robert Putman developed the idea of civil society as an empowering tool for citizens to create civic bonds, to obtain the capacity of act as a mass of connected citizens aware of the socio-political context in which they evolve. In addition to building a more powerful and effective civil sphere, civil society would have a positive impact in building trust among people and creating a tradition of tolerance. The academic approach relies on the concepts of civil society and social capital. The latter concept will be developed further in this paper and applied to the Serbian context.

The second approach is referred to as the “institutionalist view”. The institutionalist approach emphasizes the idea of a democratic struggle between political and economic forces, and the rest of society . Civil society, and more specifically civil society²⁶ organisations, would represent a positive popular influence to meet the interest of the greater number. Although this approach is presented as a key element in the democratisation process, the foundation of the values and interests carried by civil society organisations can be doubted if sene through a normative standpoint.

Indeed, an active and influential civil society cannot compensate a weak political sphere and weak legal institutions, although it could have a role in modifying and strengthening them. However, a number of scholars are skeptical regarding the empirical causal effect of civil society on the democratic process. Some argue that the influence of civil society alone cannot without difficulty be a direct factor for an healthy democracy, it would undermine other factors that need to be kept in mind, factors such as a general economic prosperity, cultural factors, and the efficiency of democratic institutions . Besides, it is also ²⁷ argued that a weak civil society would be more beneficial for democracy. This last point is disputable, as it can be easily demonstrated that human development can be greatly improved

23 Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore, 1996)

25 Robert Putman, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon and Schuster (New-York, 2000)

26 Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to management in American Civic Life, University of Oklahoma Press (2004)

27 Sheri Berman, Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, World Politics 49 (1997)

(15)

in countries with a weak civil society, such as China for instance, but the relation between a weak civil society and the development of democracy is hard to establish . ²⁸

Civil and civic space, how can civil society measured?

No academic consensus has been reached to this day regarding an exact measurement method of the development of civil society. Nevertheless, different methods had been designed as an attempt to measure civil and civic space. The two terms being closely related and used in the same sense in most academic papers, they will also share the same semantic features in this thesis. Civic space was described by Carmen Malena as “the freedom and means to speak, access information, associate, organise and participate in public decision-making” . The measurement of civic space is then relevant to judge whether a civil²⁹ society is healthy and is able to operate in an efficient way to serve as a counter-balance power within society.

The conceptualization of civic space is established through five main dimensions as exposed by Malena: 1) the first component of an ideal civic space is the freedom of information and expression. A functioning civic space should allow the expression of opinions and have a free flow of information, free from political and economic involvement;

2) the right of assembly and associate should be legally assured to the citizens and organisations; 3) citizens should be active and participate in a transparent way to decision-making processes and be a representative if they will. This goes through, for instance, free and fair elections; 4) civic space should be a virtual and physical space for inclusion and reject discrimination against any kind of group or minority, whether they are ethnic, religious or sexual minorities; 5) finally, civic space should carry the respect of human rights values and the rule of law. This last point compromises the very existence of civic space in non-democratic regimes with weak institutions on which citizens cannot rely on to defend their interests, or legally assure them protection.

Already, it can be assumed that measuring civic space taking into consideration all these aspects can be challenging on a local, national or global level. As a result, two different empirical approaches can be identified in the measurement of civic space. The first one concentrates exclusively on organisations themselves. The methodology consists in identifying the distribution of different types of organisations and the number of associations established within this categorisation. Howard points out the flaws in this methodology as it is not alway representative due to the unclear methodology used to collect the data . Besides, ³⁰ there is no agreement within the research community regarding the categorisation of the established organisations, the result is a variation from study to study, even though the

28 Naomi Hossain, Nalini Khurana, Shandana Mohmand, Sohela Nazneen, Marjoke Oosterom et al., “What Does Closing Civic Space Mean for Development? A Literature Review and proposed Conceptual Framework,” IDS Working Paper N.515 (July 2018)

29 Carmen Malena, “Improving the Measurement of Civic Space,” Open Society Foundation, Transparency and Accountability Initiative (2015)

(16)

approach is similar, defining organisation categories in an non-standardized way will result in measuring civic space in an imprecise and unreliable way. Moreover, this methodology used to the Serbian context would be flawed by the establishment of non-transparent non-governmental organisations created as a strategic tool to reduce funding to legitimate organisations . The weakness of this methodology lies in the absence of concern related to³¹ the activities and missions of the organisations and voluntary associations taken into account while analysing the results.

The second approach to the measurement of civic space chooses to focus more on what the established organisations and associates achieve, rather than their number. The method is based on representative surveys, it favours the number of citizens engaged in voluntary associations and organisation rather than how many of these are established, which seems to be more relevant in the measurement of civic space.

However, the meaning of civil society through these two methodologies is restricted, civil society is often seen as being a “fruit of the “West”” . This conception of civil society ³² from a western point of view would suggest that civil society and civic space is a result of westernization and would deny the existence of civil society in non-democratic countries or countries in democratic transition with remaining weak institutions. The issue around this perception of civil society is the absence of consensus regarding what civil society is and whether it is a concept that has features applicable to any socio-political context, anywhere, at any time. The inconsistency in defining the frame of civic society seems to compromise every kind of measurement designed to this day and the judgment whether civil space is growing, stable, or shrinking, and on what terms.

Social capital in Serbia

The notion of social capital is often, if not essentially, considered a full part of studies related to civil society in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. The common denominator among the countries embedded in these area is the past influence of communist regimes that both influenced the population historically, culturally and socially. The concept of social capital in a key component to understand Serbian civil society. The very existence of civil society was neither legally recognised nor protected by the State. Civil society was perceived as a more subversive movement working against the State and therefore, civil society was categorised as a form of dissidence . The population, instead of relying on a legally protected ³³ sphere of society, would seek citizen support through social capital. The very idea of social capital is the building of a strong social network between people to facilitate their daily life and seek inter-personal aid and support. Robert Putman described social capital as a social organisation build on social humanitarian values and norms such as trust and social networks.

31 Dragan Popovic, Maja Stojanovic, Bojana Selakovic, “Associations of Citizens: Shrinking Civic Space, Serbia 2014-2018 (November 2018)

32 Marc Morjé Howard, “Civil society and democracy,”  International Encyclopedia of Civil Society (Springler-Verlag , 2010)

33 Klára Czike, “Civil Society and Social Capital in Central and Eastern Europe”, International Encyclopedia of Civil Society (Springler-Verlag , 2010)

(17)

In the absence of an established civil society composed of a multiple of different organisations of varied natures, citizens would coordinate their actions and improve the efficiency of the society they evolve in through networks . When civil society is described as ³⁴ being in some kind of relation with the state, even though it would be composed of voluntary citizens, social capital would fully rely on human values, mainly trust and fellowship.

However, social capital aims at achieving more than just social development and cooperation.

Indeed, the most common definition of social capital was expressed by Nan Lin (Duke University) and is presented as an “investment in social relations with expected return in the marketplace” . In this sense, social capital is very similar to civil society, it intrinsically³⁵ seeks economic prosperity. Social capital, in the way civil society is usually presented, would be an essential element in the sustainable development, social cohesion, inclusion, civil participation, transparency and accountability.

However, even though it is no easy task to measure social capital, it seems that in has been decreasing in Serbia and in other surrounding countries since the 1990s with the rise of civic movement and the abundance of foreign aid. Indeed, while social capital rely mainly on trust, we can observe that interpersonal trust has been drastically declining in Serbia.

Between 1998 and 2009, interpersonal trust in Serbia has been divided by two . This number ³⁶ needs to be put into perspective, the World Values Survey aims at showing a general trust between individuals, however, even in a country with an extremely law social capital, social capital can be high within more private spheres such as in family or friendship networks. The decrease of a global social capital in Serbia can be be both explained by social and economic factors. Firstly, the new digital era and the importance of the internet and social networks ³⁷ that would tend to rather diminish the sense of community, widely common in Serbia before the 1990s. A difficult economic situation could also result on the decreasing of social capital, Klára Czike (National Volunteer Center of Hungary) explains that the increasing pressure and time and money on individuals would eventually erode social capital . To this day³⁸ nevertheless, the communist past of Serbia seems to be culturally deeply rooted. To demonstrate this, the Hofstede’s six dimensions of culture can be used. Despite expecting Serbian society to have progressively evolved to an individualistic and “westernised”

country, Serbia is still considered a collectivist society. One dimension of the Hofstede model intends to measure the level of individualism within a nation. The Hofstede study has been carried on for decades and aims at identifying general trend, it cannot be considered as an absolute truth, however, in our case, it is a good tool how individualist Serbia is on a general level. Each dimension is evaluated with a number from 0 to 100, here, 0 being extremely collectivist and 100 extremely individualist. With a score of 25, the results show that the “the

34 Robert Putman, Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, “Making Democracy Work,” Princeton University Press (1993)

35 Nan Lin, “Social Capital, a Theory of Social Structure and Action,” Cambridge University Press (2002)

36 World Values Survey (2014)

37 Robert Putman, Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, “Making Democracy Work,” Princeton University Press (1993)

38 Klára Czike, “Civil Society and Social Capital in Central and Eastern Europe”, International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, Springler-Verlag (2010)

(18)

society fosters strong relationship where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group” . As a comparison, France scores 71, being classified as an individualistic³⁹ society. Thus, Serbia does not seem to be fully representative of the idea that globalization, electronics and technological progress anihilated its social capital.

39 Country Comparison, Hofstede Insights,

https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/france,serbia/ Last accessed July 19, 2019

(19)

Peace building and civil society

Serbian civil society in a post-conflict context

As the Serbian civil society inherited certain features and evolved in a certain way due to its communist past, recent armed, violent and deadly conflicts shattered societies in the Balkans. The 1990s in the Balkans were dominated by wars bringing both divisions and instability within the region. Multi-ethnicity is often targeted in post-modern wars and orbits around an idea of building a state with an exclusive identity. In Serbia, the climax was reach with the NATO bombing of its territory in 1999 during the Kosovo War. We may wonder in what way this series of events shaped civil society, or rather, how the post-conflict context in Serbia resulting from these conflicts shaped civil society. The post-conflictual nature of the Serbian society is not simply defined by the time passed between the end of the war and today. Mariel-Soleil Frère and Nina Wilen explained that “conflicts do not necessarily end with the signing of official peace agreements. [...] Often, low-intensity conflicts replace violents conflicts” . In that sense, and to give an example, conflicts regarding the conclusion⁴⁰ of the Kosovo War and later the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo (2008) still feeds social and geopolitical conflicts, mainly around the normalisation of relations between the Republic of Serbia and its former province of Kosovo and Metohija. The case of Serbia allows us to study the new nature of conflicts within a globalised context.

Firstly, in any post-conflict context, the main issue arising is the persistence of dynamics created during the conflicts remaining rooted in the political, economic and social spheres in the aftermath of the conflict. The economy based on violence for profit during the war tries to survive once the conflict is concluded , as a result, some ideas developed during ⁴¹ warfare remain, along with social, political and economic organisations and the individuals feeding the post-conflict dynamics. Denisa Kostovicova (London School of Economics and Political Science) explains that the legitimacy of the States being born after a fragmentation, such as the actual Serbia, relies on exclusive identities to mask their dysfonction . And as a ⁴² result, weak States are “inadequate providers either of public good or national cohesion” . ⁴³ Thus, citizens struggle to rely on political bodies and public institutions to bring forth their interests and protect them.The dynamics emerging from conflicts create a State supporting ideology such as ethnic exclusivity. Stanley Cohen described the phenomenon as “ideological denial” . In Serbia, the process of denial goes through several argumentations and narratives.⁴⁴ Mainly, the actual Serbian government intend to minimise its role in the Balkan conflicts by amplifying the role of other actors and denying the role of Serbian forces in thousands of deaths. To do so, the State uses tools such as the media or public banners to influence public

40 Mariel-Soleil Frère, Nina Wilen, “Post-Conflcit,” INFOCORE Definitions, ULB (Bruxelles, 2015)

41 Mark Duffield, Globalization, Transborder Trade and War Economies, in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars, Lynne Rienner Publishers (2000)

42 Denisa Kotovicova, “Civil Society in Post-Conflict Scenarios,” International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, Springler-Verlag (2010)

43Ibid.

44 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Cambridge: Polity (2001)

(20)

opinion and therefore gain legitimacy. Another striking example is the rehabilitation of war criminals condemned by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The strategy used could be described as a “heroisation” of individuals involved in crimes against humanity. The invitation of such individual by officials send a clear message to the population and confirms its support to actors originating from warfare and contributing to the post-war dynamics. We may wonder then what place civil society has in a post-conflict context such as the Serbian context.

The process of peace building in a post-conflict context is a complicated one engaging a great number of actors and dynamics. However, many scholars highlight the positive role of civil society in a sustainable and democratic peace building in any post-conflict context. For instance, according to Robert Putman, civil society and social capital is a intrinsic component of human development and is inherent to peace-building. This idea of exclusive positivity of civil society joins the idea of Jürgen Habermas, who conceives civil society as a shield or a response to sectarianism. In other word, sectarianism would be the antonym of civil society, which would by essence represent civility and tolerance to show the way toward a lasting peace and tolerance. Most studies related to the subject tend to show a positive effect of civil society in peace building in post-conflict contexts , for some, it is even considered and ⁴⁵ essential part of the process.

The role of civil society in a post-conflict context is multiple. In Serbia, the role of civil society emerged during the conflict, as a contestation of the war and the bloodshed. As mentioned above, this type of opposition should have been seen as a form of dissidence, however, a strong support of the international community, not only legitimised the anti-war movement in Serbia, but also amplified its impact. In a post-conflict context, the role of civil society is mainly a reconstruction mission. Civil society seem to be a key element to rebuild the State and the society. When the distinction between State and society became unclear right after after the conflict, civil society’s role is to rebuild the connexion between the State and the rest of society by also becoming a source of legitimacy for the State in the aftermath of the conflicts . Moreover, civil society , by keeping the State in check, assures the maturing⁴⁶ of the state and in theory, participates in the deconstruction of the dynamics erected during the conflicts. Therefore, a strong and active civil society would not only develops the efficiency and legitimization of the State, but provide for the citizens socio-political and economic rights that cannot be fully guaranteed by the State, it allows the population to rise issues that would normally not reach public debates, such as the rights of minorities. The democratisation process after a conflict can be seen as a long project involving a great number of actors, ideally genuinely cooperating to establish a fair peace and a peaceful democracy.

A crucial element involving civil society is the development of a good governance.

When government simply implies the action of ruling, governance focuses on the manner a State is ruled. Dereck Brinkerhoff wrote that “[g]overnance is about the relationship between

46 Ibid.

(21)

state and society” . While this definition can seen simplistic at first, it incorporates a strong⁴⁷ sicio-political dimension and a direct interdependent relationship between the ruling bodies and the rest of the citizens. It brings to the term governance a human factor and expertise to progress and strengthen the capacity of the State. In that sense, as social capital does, a level of trust within social and political actors must be reached to successfully develop good governance. However, in a post-conflict society such as Serbia, expertise is more difficult to be found as post-modern war and their aftermath are characterized by a strong brain-drain and the destruction of administrations. Civil society seems then necessary to address the challenge of rebuilding the State and establish good governance. The role of governance is essential in traumatised post-conflict societies, it provides security, efficiency and legitimises the State . The precise role of civil society in the building of good governance would be both⁴⁸ a collaborative and assisting role to the State. Civil society completes to some extent the role of the State but providing services on national and local level. It shapes the governance by providing advice to the State by gathering expert on one hand, and by monitoring the decision-making process and policy making. The support of civil society within a State lacking the capacity to address its shortcomings seems then rather logical and needed.

Civil society, development and peace building

Peace building can academically be approached in two ways, both ways involving civil society. The two approaches focus on two key elements to establish peace and eventually, democracy.

The first approach chooses to focus on economic and human development, it is therefore called the ‘developmentalist approach’. When conflicts were often born from economic difficulties or crisis, they generally end on a bitter economic note, usually in a situation of general poverty and socioeconomic inequalities. As poverty and inequalities could become a source for further national conflicts and dissatisfaction, it seems natural to put economic recovery at the center of State reconstruction to create a viable and sustainable relation between the State and the rest of society. Nevertheless, it is no easy task to solve poverty due to the economic dynamics established during the conflicts persisting once the conflict is over and the peace signed. Denisa Kotovicova identifies four persistent features that hinder economic recovery . Firstly, the establishment of informal economies, generally⁴⁹ illegal, that provide the general population from the profits generated, while enriching a handful of individuals. Then, the presence of predatory elites, which hold in an illegitimate way both power and wealth and exercise control over the political, social and economic life.

Thirdly, the presence of patronage networks, feeding corruption and nepotism. Finally, Post-conflict societies are usually integrated in global illicit flows . These parallel economies ⁵⁰

47 Dereck W. Brinkerhoff, “Introduction - Governance in Post-Conflict societies: Rebuilding Fragile States,”

Routledge (London/New-York, 2007)

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

(22)

are often powerful, hampering the establishment of a formal and controlled national economy. These features are allowed to develop significantly during a conflict due to the impact of war on formal economies, and stay strongly rooted during the recovery process.

As a result, civil society can be useful in a certain number of ways, if we consider civil society as a sphere of influence, it can pressure the political economy to reduce poverty and inequalities directly emerging from the conflict, thus improving the living conditions of the population. Therefore, it would not only impact the daily life of citizens, but also prevent possible future conflicts, especially between different ethnicities. Then, the structures created during the conflicts need to be dismantled, to do so, good governance is crucial to create reliable and trustworthy dynamics. The role of civil society to build a strong State with strong institutions within the respect of the rule of law is acknowledged in most of recent academic studies. The objective is for a good governance to positively influence economy to tackle inequalities and end war and criminal economy. Civil society, especially NGOs also have a role of service provider in post-conflict countries. They first bring humanitarian assistance to the populations victim of the conflicts. In Serbia, it meant providing support to displaced populations, provide food and accomodation to the people in need, when the State still did not have the capacity to provide humanitarian aid to all. Over time, the role of NGOs switched to a direct crisis assistance in the monitoring of the reconstruction process and the policy making regarding human and economic development

A second approach of civil society to development is a participatory approach. This idea relies mainly on non-government organisations as service providers . NGOs are seen as ⁵¹ an efficient tool to provide social services and a way for international assistance to reach the most vulnerable populations. They are also more likely to receive economic aid as they are technically distinct from public and private spheres, and because they carry in the eyes of the public more democratic and peaceful values. The role of NGOs in peace building offers a great number of advantages: they boost participation within citizens, they offer innovative and alternative solutions in the peace building process and they are moreover cost-effective.

The result is a better economic situation, the support of marginalised groups, and the strengthening of social networks within civil society.

However peace building is a difficult process that can be hindered by the post-conflict political situation itself. For NGOs to be fully effective and have a greater impact, the deconstruction of criminal structures and parallel economies is necessary to eventually achieve the transition between a warfare economy to a peace economy. Those structures however are deeply rooted and the political or economic elites are never fully inclined to abandon economic profit or political privileges. We need to bear in mind then that peace building in a post-conflict context is a constraining environment for civil society actors to act in an open and effective way. Besides, civil society is linked to more global actors, whether they are foreign donors (governments or international organisations) or other global or financial institution . The interaction between all these actors with sometimes different⁵²

51 Ibid.

52Ibid.

(23)

interests is then critical for an optimal peace building and the development of democracy in post-conflict countries such as Serbia.

Civil society is however paradoxical, and contrary to the common idea that the whole of civil society is the key to develop a lasting a sustainable peace and democracy, it is necessary to consider the role of civil society itself in the slowdown of these processes. The notion of civil need to be reconsidered and cannot be understood completely without considering the ‘uncivil society’, which puts into perspective the ideal image of a tolerant and peaceful civil society.

(24)

Uncivil society

Defining uncivil society

The concept of “uncivil society” as a part of civil society is hard to conceive in a common imaginary of civil society, the normative vision and conception of a “good” civil society is to be challenged. The global perception of civil society is inextricably linked to democracy, rights and the rule of law. The first debate appearing as a result is: should uncivil society be considered as a part of civil society and an entire component of it, or should it be dissociated? Throughout time, civil society was opposed to barbarism . Therefore, an uncivil ⁵³ society would be defined by the absence of complexe socio-political and cultural mechanisms in addition to totalitarian and ruthless ruling methods. Incivility was then not recognised as a legitimate acting forces within society. The meaning and use of the term changed, or rather appeared as defining a brand new concept after the 1980s and the the revolution in Prague.

Following the events in Eastern Europe, uncivil society started to be described by some as representing a specific sphere within civil society. Defining uncivil society precisely is difficult for the same reason civil society is sometimes hard to grasp. Indeed, as civil society, uncivil society was given several definitions around the globe depending of specific socio-political or economic contexts, used to describe anarchist movements in some context or anti-liberal demonstrations in others. However, contrary to civil society, uncivil society is not widely theorized and studied. Uncivil society can also be found under the phrase “uncivil civil society” , which leaves less ambiguity regarding its full role within civil society rather⁵⁴ than outside of it. Nevertheless, and despite a lack of scholarly works related to the subject, the use of “uncivil society” is extensively used by different actors in society, especially political actors, which tend to instrumentalise the concept and use it as a tool against political detractors. As a result, political actors from different political background and ideologies would use it to describe any idea or ideologies in contradiction with theirs . Paradoxically, ⁵⁵ this strategic use of uncivil society presents detractors are part of civil society, while attempting to isolate them from what is considered the “good civil society”, or within political strategy, the part of civil society approving the political idea exposed.

However, a few scholars tackled the concept of uncivil society. According to Chris Rumford, the use of uncivil society is neither necessary nor helping in the understanding of civil society. He describes uncivil society as an umbrella term that gathers “disruptive, unwelcome, and threatening elements”⁵⁶ in an unclear society sphere between common citizens and State power. This definition, while conveying the uncertainty of what uncivil society represents exactly, undermines the role and influence the uncivil society could have in the arising of conflicts and the hampering of peace and democracy building in post-conflict

53 John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, Cambridge: Polity (1998)

54 Marlies Glasius, “Uncivil Society”, International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, Springler-Verlag (2010)

55 Ibid.

56 Chris Rumford, “Confronting “Uncivil Society” and the “Dark Side of Globalization”: Are Sociological Concepts up to the Task?” (2001)

(25)

contexts. A few other academics gave a more precise definition of what civil society represents and what are its features in our modern societies. Firstly, they added to the definition the idea that uncivil society carries extreme ideas. However the definition does not stop there and emphasizes on the methods and common features of these individuals which are considered violent, fundamentalist, and exclusivist . According to Mary Kaldor and⁵⁷ Diego Muro, uncivil society can mainly be applied to “extreme” and violent nationalist and religious groups. Other existing definitions generally follow the footsteps of the latter, Amy Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg specified and added extreme right-wing political parties and militants fed by ideological concerns within their definition. They established a list of ideologies that could be considered as part of uncivil society and it includes nationalism, anti-democracy, racism, xenophobia and the wish for an inflexible and more authoritarian State . The common denominator is an apparent wish for uncivil society, as described above,⁵⁸ to put itself in opposition to liberal, democratic and peaceful values. The influence of such movements it our modern societies is not to prove anymore. We may wonder to what extent such movements influence the Serbian political and social life, especially the indirect support for violent method against democracy and rights organisation, this last point will be developed further in the paper.

Use and features of uncivil society

In modern times, the concept of uncivil society, as seen above, can carry multiple meaning according to what cause is defended and in what context it is used. However, the notion of uncivil society is also a question of perspective in relation to civil society. Marlies Glasius (University of Amsterdam) identified two main modern uses of the concept of uncivil society. The first once could be qualified as a ‘manichean vision on uncivil society’. A society that is entirely uncivil would only exist in relation and opposition to a society that is by essence civil. However, both of these society would exist within the State’s limits . This ⁵⁹ vision of civil and uncivil society is however narrow and does not take into account extra-legal actors and their influence on society on a transnational and local level. The second use identified by Glasius is simply a defined set of values applied to specific groups within a wider civil society . To briefly summarize, those two different uses are not helpful in⁶⁰ understanding what uncivil society is, as it simply exposes the concept as either a part, or a sphere out of civil society. Nevertheless, the leading idea attributes democratic and more liberal values such as tolerance, when uncivil society would represent a lack, or the complete absence of these values. Although most scholars agree to count uncivil society within civil society, the notion of civility implies the notions of respect and tolerance of others, a notion contradictory to violence. Beyond the values carried by the different actors of civil society,

57 Mary Kaldor, Diego Muro, “Religious and Nationalist Militant Groups”, in Global Civil Society, Oxford University Press (2003)

58 Ami Pedahzur, Leonard Weinberg, Modern European Democracy and its enemies: the Threat of the Extreme Right, Totalitarian Movement and Political Religion 2(2) (2001)

59 Marlies Glasius, “Uncivil Society”, International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, Springler-Verlag (2010)

60 Ibid.

(26)

what differentiate the most civil and uncivil actors is principally the ways used to defend their stand or criticize what they judge as unfair and inacceptable. The attitude adopted in relation to others is a key element to judge whether a type of action is uncivil or not.

The features identified by scholars are first related by the types of ideologies defended and by what is considered to be uncivil movements. The first one is exclusivism , whether it ⁶¹ is of an ethnic or religious nature. Exclusivism is especially present in Serbia and in other Balkan countries and is translated by an identity crisis, strong nationalism and identity-based violence emerging from a will to preserve a supposed identity superiority. The use of violence is again a key element, however, drawing the line between legitimate and uncivil violence is a subjective task, as some types of violence are not considered uncivil in the eyes of some. Secondly, uncivil society would be also based on fundamentalism, or an attempt to impose certain doctrines on the rest of society. Here again, the nature of fundamentalism can take various forms, from political to religious, to ethnic-based ideologies. What emerges from fundamentalism and exclusivism are both the ideas of inflexibility and intolerance. As a result, these two values would constitute the very core of uncivil society, meaning consequently that civil society would represent opposite values. However, despite the fact that we imagine uncivil society actors being either extreme right-wing nationalist actors or members of obscurantist religious movements, Kaldor and Muro showed that uncivil society could be considered to be a broader spectrum . Indeed, if we consider uncivil society based ⁶² on intolerance and inflexibility, it does not exclusively comprises religious, xenophobic and nationalist movements. The two scholars give the example of secular ideologies that are neither religious nor nationalist, but still very much inflexible and intolerant of other ideologies. For instance Stalinism or other forms of extreme radicalization of leftist movements, along with extreme forms of neoliberalism . Thus, we can better understand the ⁶³ extent of uncivil society, not as a uniformed demonstration, but as a variety of different interests sometimes opposing each other.

For Keane, the difference between civil and uncivil society is also the presence of violence. However, his point of view differs slightly, rather than considering uncivil society as a normal component of civil society, he perceives it a poisoning civil society . Despite the ⁶⁴ fact he considers the existence of logical and natural “sources of incivility” , he warns that ⁶⁵ the danger lies in the possible escalating of violence. Uncivil society is a threat when sporadic acts of violence are normalized to the point it creates a “constant violence of all against all” . ⁶⁶ This scenario would constitute the death of civil society to the generalisation of incivility in a wider society.

Besides, uncivil society, regardless of what ideas compose it, carries most of the time a strong political meaning. The dominant idea of common citizens and academics, pictures

61 Mary Kaldor, Diego Muro, “Religious and Nationalist Militant Groups”, in Global Civil Society, Oxford University Press (2003)

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, Cambridge: Polity (1998)

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.