A Swiss Tale of Security
Critical Analysis of Switzerland’s Federal Council’s Security Narrative
Petra Katrin Jud
Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp)Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security Master’s Programme in Politics and War
Autumn 2020
Supervisor: Charlotte Wagnsson Word count: 20.000
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to Charlotte Wagnsson for her supportive and kind-hearted supervision, and Simon Hollis for his valuable feedback at the mid-seminar.
This thesis would not have been possible without the support from my friends and peers Melinda Nilsson and Selma Johansson, and of course Bilbo, the cat.
A heartfelt thank you also goes to my ever-supportive parents, Annika and Marcel Jud, and last but not least to my fiancé Alexander Emerson for sustaining me and my academic aspirations.
Abstract
This paper seeks to explore why the people of Switzerland have preponderantly voted in favour of a strong military defence despite the reality of Swiss security in the 21st century being dependent on international collaboration outside the military arena. The conundrum is answered by determining the Swiss Federal Council’s strategic narrative regarding security, through examination of its explanatory texts in voting booklets between 1978 and 2020, finding that the matter of armed neutrality is a red thread. Either neutrality is used as justification of an act supported by the Federal Council, or that neutrality would be harmed by popular initiatives the Council does not endorse.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research Problem 2
1.2 Aim and Research Question 3
1.3 Delimitations 3
1.4 Thesis Outline 4
2. Background 5
2.1 The Context of Switzerland 5
2.1.1 Switzerland’s political system 6
2.1.2 Neutrality 7 3. Previous Research 9 4. Theory Section 11 4.1 Constructivism 11 4.2 Narratives 12 5. Methodology 14 5.1 Research Design 14 5.2. Method 15 5.2.1 Narrative Analysis 15 5.2.2 Framework 16 5.3 Material 18 5.4 Reflexivity 20 6. Analysis 21 6.1 Empirical Analysis 21 6.2 Discussion 57
6.2.1 Projection and Reception 62
7. Conclusion 63
7.1 Implications for future research 64
8. References 65
8.1 Literature 65
8.2 Empirical Material 67
1. Introduction
European security policy has undergone big changes since the end of the Cold War, with questions of security touching upon issues far beyond the traditional threat to sovereignty over territory. First, the reunification of Europe ended the direct military threat, that had been around for most of the 20th century, resulting in West European states downsizing their armed forces and spending their “peace dividends” on other sectors. The European security agenda was not only broadened to cover non-military threats, but also deepened to include individuals’ security – in addition to state security. Both the reduced national defence capacities and new threat definitions were a fertile breeding ground for enlargement processes of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the 1990s, resulting in most European states having moving away from the idea of national security and thinking in terms of collective security.1
The end of the Cold War also entailed a shift in political science, with the field moving from studies of material realities and hard power to social constructions and soft power. One considerabely prominent area in the study of soft political power is the study of strategic narratives. Political science and International Relations scholars have found several examples of states and non-state actors employing strategic narratives in order to influence others’ behaviours and to have an effect on political outcomes. However, the author has identified a gap in the existing research on strategic narratives. Almost all of it deals with internationally employed narratives – the greater share scrutinising authoritarian regimes’ and rebel groups’ narratives against the West. But the theory of strategic narratives is not confined to the international arena, since it alleges that narratives can be employed by any political actor on any arena, including the domestic one. Strategic narratives are in fact an important tool in democracies to gain legitimacy from voters.2
Meanwhile, even after the Iron Curtain’s fall, the Swiss government has held onto its
Sonderweg of armed neutrality, which it has since the Napoleonic era, and claims autonomy
from most international organisations. While Geneva is a prominent hub for international organisations, like the United Nations, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Red Cross and Médicins Sans Frontières, the Swiss government has consistently maintained conscription
1 Chappell, Galbreath, and Mawdsley, ‘A Changing Security Architecture’, 2–23.
2 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations,
for all Swiss able-bodied males aged 18-30, and a strong arms industry. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranks Switzerland as the 12th biggest arms exporter 1960-2019 – in absolute terms, not per capita.3
Another feature of Switzerland is that it has a fairly unique form of direct democracy, which allows the general population to have the last word on any issue, even those concerning national security. Yet, the head of the Swiss government – the Federal Council – always hands out a voting recommendation with the voting papers, and they have a cogent success rate of 80%.4 This is an important aspect, since according to constructivist theory, whoever owns a narrative, sets the agenda. Specifically concerning security, the Swiss people have voted in accordance with the Federal Council’s recommendation in 84% of the cases.5 The recommendations are in nearly all cases in favour of the armed forces and a strong national defence sector.
1.1 Research Problem
Although the Swiss government espouses the stance of armed neutrality, the reality of Swiss security is that it is not so different from the rest of Europe. The Swiss army has played an active role in several military peacekeeping missions, for instance in Kosovo (KFOR6) and Bosnia-Hercegovina (EUFOR7 Althea). The Swiss company (SWISSCOY) at KFOR amounts to 165 armed military personnel – 195 as of April 2021 – and Switzerland is the lead nation for the Mobile Training Teams in the Althea mission. There has even been a permanent Swiss mission at the NATO headquarters in Brussels since 1997.8 Moreover, Swiss security is highly dependent on international collaboration, and the Swiss defence sector alone is not capable of securing Switzerland. A study in Swiss Political Science Review, where international and national cooperation between security agents was measured, has shown that “threat management has become a complex trans-functional multi-agency practice”9.
3 SIPRI, ‘Top List TIV Tables’.
4 In the years 1978-2020 the Swiss people have voted 365 times and 292 out of those, they followed the Federal Council’s recommendation. Numbers taken from Année Politique Suisse, ‘Votes’.
5 Same years as above, 37 votes concerning security policy, 30 out of those in accordance with the Federal Council’s recommendation. Numbers taken from Année Politique Suisse.
6 Kosovo Force
7 European Union Force
8 Swiss Armed Forces International Command, ‘SWISSINT’; Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection
and Sport, ‘Partnership for Peace’.
9 Hagmann et al., ‘The Programmatic and Institutional (Re-)Configuration of the Swiss National Security Field’,
Why then do the Swiss people still vote in favour of a strong military defence? And why are they less prone to embrace a broader security agenda?
Citizens never vote in a vacuum – they are influenced by narratives employed by political actors.10 One of the most influential narratives in Switzerland is that deployed by the highest political entity: The Federal Council, consisting of seven members from different political parties, which is why this thesis will examine the Swiss Federal Council’s narrative on security over the past 42 years.
1.2 Aim and Research Question
This thesis aims to bring clarity to why the Swiss people still subscribe to the idea of a strong military defence and traditionalist worldview despite the reality of Swiss security being dependent on international collaboration outside the military arena. Since the outcomes of votes follow the Federal Council’s recommendation in 80% of cases, it is critical to look closer at the Federal Council’s strategic narrative regarding national security. The Swiss Federal Council’s concept of security will be examined through a narrative analysis of its public statements prior to popular votes on the issue since 1978. The research question is thus:
“How does the Swiss Federal Council’s narrative influence voters on issues of security?”
Apart from the main goal of explaining the specific case of Switzerland, the thesis also aims to contribute to existing theories of strategic narratives and neutral states.
1.3 Delimitations
This thesis will only examine the advising texts by the Federal Council in voting booklets, and disregard any other public statements, like speeches and press releases. Further, only booklets between the years 1978 and 2020 will be examined. The reasoning behind the choice of material will be further explained in the methods section.
Since the Swiss constitution is constructed to limit individual party power, this thesis will analyse a narrative that has been employed by a total of 38 different Federal Councillors
10 Bacon, Edwin, ‘Public Political Narratives: Developing a Neglected Source through the Exploratory Case of
from five different parties over a timespan of over 40 years.11 At times, there have been more than one Councillor from the same party, and it is reasonable to assume that that party’s agenda influenced the narrative more than the voices from the other Councillors.
The booklets are available in French, Italian and German.12 Since the author is fluent in German, only the German booklets are subject to analysis. Seeing as narratives heavily rely on language, potentially important nuances from the French or Italian texts are lost. However, the majority of the Swiss people (62.6%) have German as their first language, and the booklets are usually first drafted in German, before being translated to the other languages, meaning that including Italian and French booklets would not deliver a significant inference.13
Another caveat is gender balance. Firstly, the Federal Council has been male dominated. The first female Federal Councillor was elected in 1984, and 2010 was the first year when the Council consisted of more female than male members.14 Neither the reception side of the narrative – the voting population – was equalised until 1991. All Swiss women did get the right to vote on the federal level in 1971, but there were several cantons who did not let female citizens vote on cantonal and municipal issues until 20 years later. Since this thesis is concerned only with national issues, the cantons’ late adoption of women’s suffrage is not expected to have a great impact on the analysis, but it is not impossible that the lack of voting culture for women in those cantons may have had some sort of influence on the Federal Council’s narrative of security.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The thesis will proceed with background information on Switzerland and previous research regarding narrative analysis in political science with a focus on strategic narratives. The theory section deliberates on constructivism and its significance for narratives, followed by a methodology section consisting of research design and framework, including a discussion of both. After brief expositions of the material and the author’s reflexivity, the narrative analysis is first presented in its full glory, followed by a summary and discussion of the findings. Subsequently, a conclusion of the thesis and its implications for further research can be found.
11 The Federal Council, ‘All Federal Councils’.
12 Since 1996, the booklets have also been distributed in Romansh upon request. They are however not available via the Federal Chancellery’s web page.
13 Presence Switzerland, ‘Language – Facts and Figures’. 14 The Federal Council, ‘All Federal Councils’.
2. Background
Switzerland’s unique form of direct democracy brings a lack of generalisability with it, which the author believes to be the core reason for lack of research on Swiss (security) politics. Even the Swiss Political Science Review has published more articles on the foreign and security policies of Scandinavian countries than on Switzerland’s.15 Unlike with other states, where the person holding the highest political position is often subject to research, not much light has been shed on Switzerland’s head of government. This is partly due to the fact that the Federal Council consists of seven people from different parties, so their public statements are often rather middle-of-the-road. The other reason is, that according to the constitution, the Swiss people essentially have a veto right, which takes away a considerable amount of deciding power from the Federal Council. All the more, the people’s veto right makes Switzerland a particularly interesting case to study.
2.1 The Context of Switzerland
Switzerland’s modern federal state consisting of 26 cantons was established 1848 after two failed Confederations and was designed to have a weak central leadership, by demand of the Catholic cantons. Overall, religion played a large role in the development of the Swiss nation state, resulting in several bilingual cantons. During the latter half of the 19th century, a project of nation-building began, with nationalist historiography at the forefront. Myths about historic battles against “mighty evil lords from the surrounding empires” depicted an eternal fight for independence, uniting the cantons.16 The narrative of Switzerland’s identity emphasizes the following characteristics: neutrality, federalism and direct democracy. All three characteristics have the main purpose of unifying the different religious and language communities.17 Federalism and direct democracy have allowed communities to live relatively unbothered by each other. While both federalism and direct democracy are fascinating, they will only be outlined marginally. The main focus will lie on neutrality as a nation-building property, since that is most relevant for Swiss security policy.
15 Hagmann et al., ‘The Programmatic and Institutional (Re-)Configuration of the Swiss National Security
Field’, 215.
16 Kriesi and Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy, 1–9. 17 Kriesi and Trechsel, 11–12; DeVore and Stähli, ‘From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence: Swiss
2.1.1 Switzerland’s political system
Switzerland’s parliament, the Federal Assembly, consists of two chambers. The National Council has 200 members according to population size of the different cantons, while the Council ofStates consists of 46 members – two from each canton.18
Switzerland’s direct democracy gives the Swiss people two main tools of shaping political outcomes: popular initiatives and referenda. Popular initiatives are used to propose new bills, while referenda intervene at the end stage of the Federal Assembly’s decision-making process. An initiative is put to a vote if 100.000 valid signatures are gathered within 18 months, and beyond the majority of voters, a majority of the cantons is needed for it to pass. The referendum is separated into two types: mandatory and optional. The optional referendum occurs when the people disagree with the decision of the Federal Assembly. In that case, 50.000 valid signatures must be collected within 100 days – or eight cantons submit a request – leading to a popular vote on the issue, where a simple majority is needed for the bill to pass. The mandatory referendum comes into play regarding certain laws, as stated in the Federal Constitution:
Art. 140 Mandatory referendum
The following must be put to the vote of the People and the Cantons: a. amendments to the Federal Constitution;
b. accession to organisations for collective security or to supranational communities; c. emergency federal acts that are not based on a provision of the Constitution and whose
term of validity exceeds one year; such federal acts must be put to the vote within one year of being passed by the Federal Assembly.
The following are submitted to a vote of the People:
a. popular initiatives for a total revision of the Federal Constitution;
b. popular initiatives for a partial revision of the Federal Constitution in the form of a general proposal that have been rejected by the Federal Assembly;
c. the question of whether a total revision of the Federal Constitution should be carried out, in the event that there is disagreement between the two Councils.19
18 The Swiss Authorities Online, ‘Swiss Parliament’.
The Federal Council consists of seven members and is the executive government of Switzerland. There is a magic formula, an unwritten law for dividing the seven executive seats among the largest parties, as to hinder a party majority in the Council. Choosing Councillors is the only political issue where the Federal Assembly has exclusive control and the Swiss people do not get a say. There is a presidency to the Federal Council, but it inhabits representational duties only and is attributed according to a rotation system.20
2.1.2 Neutrality
Classical realist scholars have long proclaimed that neutrality is the only viable choice for small states, even if prominent realist Carl Schmitt went so far as to say neutrality was the death of politics, as he viewed the friend/enemy distinction as the core of politics.21 Furthermore, the founding father of realism Hans J. Morgenthau argued in 1939 that even neutral states have the need for a strong defence, due to the anarchic nature of the international system.22
The current Federal Constitution gives the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council competence to maintain Switzerland’s neutrality, although without a definition of what neutrality is. Firstly, it is important to differentiate between neutrality law and neutrality policy. Neutrality law is about the rights and obligations of neutral states in times of war, while neutrality policy refers to foreign policies the neutral state itself imposes. Switzerland’s neutrality policy is permanent and self-imposed. Additionally, Kriesi and Trechsel differentiate three different forms of neutrality: integral, super-integral and differential neutrality. Integrally neutral states must have adequate military forces to defend themselves (armed neutrality), may not enter any military alliance and may not participate in economic sanctions. Super-integral neutrality is integral neutrality plus a principle of not entering any international organisations “with a political vocation potentially impacting on Switzerland’s impartiality”23, whiledifferential neutrality entails armed neutrality and abstention from entering military alliances while allowing participation in economic sanctions. Historically speaking, Swiss neutrality policy has been quite flexible when policymakers were put under pressure or saw trading opportunities.24 Officially, Switzerland was integrally neutral during World War II, but
20 The Federal Council, ‘Federal Presidency’.
21 Agius, ‘Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality’, 373. 22 Morgenthau, ‘International Affairs: The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe’, 482–83.
23 Kriesi and Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy, 22. 24 Kriesi and Trechsel, 19–23.
an independent commission investigated Switzerland’s role during the war by order of the Federal Assembly in 2001 and found that it was not only Switzerland’s armed forces and willingness to trade with the Axis Powers that prevented a military attack on Swiss territory. They also found evidence for a covert military alliance with France.25 In the 1950s, Switzerland adopted super-integral neutrality, but only until it joined the Council of Europe in 1963. Until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland went back to integral neutrality, and has since then pursued a policy of differential neutrality.26 Most scholars, however, agree that Switzerland’s security cannot be upheld by its armed forces alone, but is strongly dependent on cooperation with other states and international organisations. DeVore and Stähli at the University of St. Gallen proclaim that “[a]lthough the Swiss public has remained emotionally attached to the idea of providing for their own security through armed neutrality, Switzerland has, in reality, come to depend on foreign inputs, organizations and agreements for its security.”27 Hagmann et al. demonstrate in a large-N study of Swiss security agencies that “the current Swiss security work is remarkably removed from the country’s traditional concept of self-help.”28
Christine Agius has shown a national identity can shift from neutral to former neutral by example of Finland, Austria and Sweden. All three are still militarily non-aligned,29 but do not define their identities as neutral. According to Agius, they all experienced similar shifts in narratives, starting at 1) neutrality as a security choice for small states during the first half of the 20th century, shifting to 2) neutrality as a diplomatic tool during the Cold War, culminating in 3) neutrality is no longer needed thanks to liberal democracy’s win and is incompatible with
European integration.30 Agius claims that 9/11 was what put the nail in neutrality’s coffin, because the Bush narrative on the war on terror was that there could be no neutrals, and that anyone (state or not) would be held accountable for inactivity.31
25 Bergier et al., ‘Die Schweiz, der Nationalsozialismus und der Zweite Weltkrieg [Switzerland, National
Socialism and the Second World War]’.
26 Kriesi and Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy, 22–23. 27 DeVore and Stähli, ‘From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century’, 5. 28 Hagmann et al., ‘The Programmatic and Institutional (Re-)Configuration of the Swiss National Security
Field’, 236.
29 Agius, ‘Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality’, 371. 30 Agius, 374–77.
From a strict perspective of military alliance, Switzerland is about as (non-)neutral as Austria, Finland and Sweden.32 The biggest difference is that Switzerland is not an EU member, but as the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy is non-binding, and all four states have active cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)33 and with NATO, for instance by participating in the peacekeeping force Kosovo Force (KFOR)34, the countries are not so different after all.
3. Previous Research
Strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.35
The study of strategic narratives stems from the field of International Relations and as such has been almost exclusively centred around internationally employed narratives. Prominent strategic narratives that have been studied thoroughly are Putin’s narrative of “the decaying West”,36 the EU’s use of narratives to encourage compliance with human rights outside of the Union,37 or Al-Qaeda’s story of a “historical global attack on Islam”.38 Relatively little attention has been given to strategic narratives used on the domestic arena to form national identities and consensus regarding international matters, despite democratic leaders constantly employing narratives to seek legitimacy and gain public support from their constituents.
Historically, strategic narratives have to a large extent been used during wartime, in an attempt to delegitimise enemy forces. But narratives are deployed in all realms of politics, be it crisis response, foreign policy, public diplomacy, or international development assistance.39
32 Kriesi and Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy, 25;
Hagmann et al., ‘The Programmatic and Institutional (Re-)Configuration of the Swiss National Security Field’, 215.
33 OSCE, ‘Participating States’.
34 JFC NAPLES Allied Joint Force Command Naples, ‘Contributing Nations’.
35 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 2.
36 EEAS European External Action Service, ‘5 Common Pro-Kremlin Disinformation Narratives’. 37 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 3.
38 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, 42.
39 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations,
Laura Roselle, for instance, shows how the Cold War narrative, where both the United States and the Soviet Union / Russian Federation claim to be the great power in a bipolar world order, has persisted to this day. Although the Cold War ended over 40 years ago, the narrative has great effect on the contemporary foreign policy of the two countries. Roselle argues that U.S. military intervention in Iraq 1990-1991 and 2003-2004 and Russian intervention in Chechnya 1994-1996 and 1999-2004 and Crimea 2014 respectively were fostered by the Cold War narrative, inasmuch as both states wanted to reassert “great power” through the use of force. As usual for narratives, it goes both ways. The narrative did not only strengthen political power, but the narrative was also intensified by military advances. The fact that the two “great powers” subscribed to the Cold War narrative undermined the contesting narrative of a “new world order”, promoting international cooperation and shared interest.40
It is against this Cold War narrative that the EU is competing with its own narrative of integration and cooperation. Alister Miskimmon shows the struggles the EU has had with the formation, projection and reception of a coherent narrative, and how these struggles are closely tied to the failure of agreeing on the EU’s identity. The lack of a military force has conditioned the EU to find a different identity from the other “great powers” but the different member states to this day have differing normative claims about what type of role the Union has to play. The inability to form a coherent narrative and identity internally undoubtedly impedes efforts to communicate it externally, which in turn drastically reduces the EU’s normative power outside of the EU. Miskimmon notes that member states often have their own competing narratives of the EU, where the member state at hand and its national interests are still very much at the centre, and the Union is a power tool to reach those interests.41 This internal struggle of EU narratives is also present in Switzerland. Even though it is not a member state, it is surrounded by and heavily dependent on the EU – not least in terms of security. These competing narratives of the EU as a security provider, and the EU as a security threat will be further discussed in the analysis of the Federal Council’s security narrative.
Generally, the rising interest in studying strategic narratives marks an important evolution in political science but the one-sided focus on internationally employed strategic narratives risks to distort the understanding of them. As a scholar of both International Relations and political science, the author wishes to see more collaboration between the two fields and an increased cross-application of theories. Contrary to traditionalist IR theories,
40 Roselle, ‘Strategic Narratives and Great Power Identity’, 56–79. 41 Miskimmon, ‘Finding a Unified Voice?’, 85–91.
which define states as international actors, separate from domestic politics, contemporary theories see the interconnectedness of international and national politics. The mechanisms present within the European Union for example are not fundamentally different from a federal state like Switzerland. This thesis stems from a belief that most social science theories are applicable to political science and International Relations, and contributes to shifting a silo mentality into a holistic view of politics.
4. Theory Section
Strategic narratives are closely tied to norms and identities – two concepts that are central in constructivist studies of International Relations.42 The proceeding section will clarify the meaning of norms and identities according to constructivism, followed by an account of their interconnectedness with strategic narratives.
4.1 Constructivism
The main theoretical assumption this paper builds on is that the Federal Council exerts normative power by advising citizens on what to vote. This assumption relies on Alexander Wendt’s interpretation of constructivism, which in contrast to classic theories of International Relations does not see the state as an ontologically independent actor, but one that is constructed by social structures.43 Wendt explains the social system as a construct of material conditions, interests, and ideas. These three elements can interact with each other but they each have a distinct role to play in explaining the structures of society. For instance, material realities are given significance by interests. Hence, Wendt claims that: “Without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all.”44 Narratives consist of shared ideas, or common knowledge, which are kept alive over generations through repetition and rituals.45
Although Wendt mainly theorises about the international system, his theories are very much concerned with the national level, since states are made up of the societies inhabiting them – “no society, no state”46. The state is prescribed agency by “internal structures, that
42 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 31.
43 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 199. 44 Wendt, 139.
45 Wendt, 160–63. 46 Wendt, 209.
combine a collective idea of the state with rules that institutionalize and authorize collective action by their members”.47 Furthermore, the theories that lie at the base of constructivism are rooted in sociology, which typically considers individuals rather than states to be actors.48 Wendt even proclaims that constructivism is more suitable in a national setting, since norms and social structures are stronger in domestic politics than politics between states,49 thus constructivism is deemed a most appropriate choice of theory for the analysis of a domestically employed narrative.
4.2 Narratives
Narrative analysis in political science builds on the importance of language.50 Politics could not exist without language and thus the study of political language is essential to understanding politics. Narrative analysis is about discerning stories – about understanding communication and the beliefs, experiences and motivations that lie behind. On a cultural level, narratives serve the purpose of transmitting beliefs and values. Good narratives are sense-making tools that tie together events into a beginning, middle, and conclusion. They are means of knowing and explaining.51 A strategic narrative contains the additional level of convincing. “The point of strategic narratives is to influence the behavior of others.”52 Miskimmon et al. argue that narratives are a tool for political actors to shape others’ – both abroad and at home – understanding of themselves, the world and where it is and ought to be heading. They link the power of narratives to Joseph S. Nye’s concept of soft power,53 defined as “the ability to obtain desired outcomes through attraction or persuasion rather than coercion or payment.”54 Nye and Welch find that hard and soft power are often interrelated, in that “material success [hard power] makes a culture and ideology [soft power] attractive, and decreases in economic and military success [loss of hard power] lead to self-doubt and crises of identity [loss of soft power]”.55 Soft power is by no means more ethical than hard power, but it is slower and more difficult to establish and maintain. Because soft power takes time and trust to build, it is most
47 Wendt, 243. 48 Wendt, 1. 49 Wendt, 1–2.
50 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 161. 51 Fischer, 161–63.
52 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 2.
53 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, 2–3.
54 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict & Cooperation: Intro to Theory & History, 5. 55 Nye and Welch, 52.
prominent in peaceful post-industrial societies.56 Soft power is also more important in democracies than autocracies, and especially so in direct democracies, since the direct democratic constitution limits the government’s hard power. A functioning government can exert hard power over all their citizens through the monopoly on violence, but it can only exert soft power on the citizens who identify themselves with the government. Furthermore, soft power is not only dependent on an intact group identity, it also helps shape the identity.
Constructivist accounts of the causal connection between norms, culture, identities and national security policies can further clarify the power of strategic narratives. Katzenstein, Jepperson and Wendt makes the following five arguments:
1. Effects of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ environments […] shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states.
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environments […] shape state identity.
3. Effects of identity (I). Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states.
4. Effects of identity (II). Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities.
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure.57
The authors define norms as “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” and norms can have either a constitutive (define identities) or regulative effect (proscribe behaviours for already constituted identities).58 Narratives are an effective tool to shape norms; how things are and how they should be. Public political narratives, more specifically, help explain a political actor’s actions and their motivations behind it.59
To conclude: According to constructivist theory, narratives shape norms, norms shape identity, and identity shapes policy. So, the real power of determining security policy is in the
56 Nye and Welch, 52.
57 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, 52–53. 58 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 54.
59 Bacon, Edwin, ‘Public Political Narratives: Developing a Neglected Source through the Exploratory Case of
hands of whoever owns the security narrative. In the case of Switzerland, that would be the Federal Council.
5. Methodology
There are many different ways to analyse political texts. The ambition of this thesis is to discern the Swiss Federal Council’s security narrative by examining 36explanatory texts60 regarding popular votes on security policy. This chapter presents and discusses the method of analysis, the chosen framework and the selection of material.
5.1 Research Design
The chosen research design is a single case study. Political science scholars are not quite in agreement on what a case study is. There are some who define a case as “a spatially and temporally bounded set of events”61, while others argue it must be “an instance of something else, […] a theoretically defined class of events”62. The most important question, that a researcher must answer when choosing a case, however, is “what is this a case of?”63. The author defines the case analysed in this thesis as a case of strategic narrative in a direct
democracy, which is bound temporally (1978-2020) and spatially (Switzerland).
The advantage of single case studies is a high internal validity, meaning one can find trustworthy causal mechanisms concerning that specific case. The downside of single case studies, compared to cross case or quantitative studies, is a relatively low external validity, meaning the results will not be generalisable to other cases. That is not the aim of this thesis, though, since it is a qualitative study seeking to understand the specific case of a Swiss security narrative, and with that contribute to theories on strategic narratives and perhaps be an illustrative example of a strategic narrative deployed in a democratic context.
Since this is an interpretive study, complete objectivity is not possible to attain. What interpretivist researchers can and must do to give their research trustworthiness is to be transparent regarding the interpretation of the analysed text and their own positionality.64
60 There are 37 popular votes regarding security policy in that timeframe but the booklet to the initiative “S.o.S. – Switzerland without snooping police” from the 7 June 1998 is not complete online. The author has reached out to the Federal Chancellery, but it does not have time to fulfill the demand given the current pandemic. 61 Levy, ‘Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference’, 2.
62 Levy, 2. 63 Levy, 2.
Chapter 5.2.2 presents the framework used for the analysis and exemplify how the findings
will be interpreted. Furthermore, Chapter 5.4 facilitates the author’s reflexivity and stance concerning the material.
5.2. Method
5.2.1 Narrative Analysis
Traditionally, narratives are construed through actors and time; usually the timeframe can be divided into beginning, middle, and end; “an initial situation or order, a problem that disrupts that order, and a resolution that reestablishes order”65. The actors can entail both the initiators of a problem and the problem-solvers. While framing and discourse analysis are typically also concerned with actors and events, it is the timeline that is specific to narrative analysis. Narratives embed events in a temporal setting and include cause and effect. Discourses and framing are however crucial to narratives, seeing as “[a]ctors can only form and project a narrative based upon the discourses available to them in their historical situation”66, and that “the various components of a narrative must be framed a certain way”67.68
What separates strategic narratives from other forms of narratives it that there is a clear goal, albeit not always openly stated. Miskimmon et al. argue that strategy is at the core of (democratic) politics, because political actors will always try and influence others in their vote. If a narrative is strategic or not is not dependent on its intended success.69 Analyses of public political narratives have the potential to unveil the motivations and intentions of the narrator(s) by analysing the elements of the story told.70
In order to fully understand a strategic narrative, Miskimmon et al. believe one must understand and analyse the three pillars of a narrative: formation, projection, and reception.
Formation concerns the role of the political actor and the institutions and procedures through
which the political actor construes and spreads the narrative. Projection focuses on the medium distributing a narrative and the environment this medium operates in. Reception concentrates
65 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 5.
66 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, 7. 67 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, 7. 68 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, 5–7. 69 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, 13.
70 Bacon, Edwin, ‘Public Political Narratives: Developing a Neglected Source through the Exploratory Case of
on how a narrative is interpreted and processed by the audience.71 These three aspects will be addressed in chapter 5.3 Material, and projection and reception will be part of the analysis.
5.2.2 Framework
As stated above, most analyses of strategic narratives aid in uncovering a political actor’s intentions and goals, but seeing as the Federal Council openly states their intentions in the voting booklets, the focus of this thesis lies on a narrative of Swiss security identity. Edwin Bacon’s research is predominantly dedicated to deducing identity, policy stances, and priorities by analysing narratives told by regimes, which is why his framework is deemed most appropriate for the task at hand. The analysis will be founded on Edwin Bacon’s framework of a qualitative narrative analysis, which is concerned with five core elements: central motifs,
temporalities, symbols, agency, and plots/subplots. A sixth element of referent object will be
added, explained further down in this chapter.
Central motifs
Bacon defines central motifs as “the priorities to which other elements take second place”72, and with which a narrative’s agent should identify itself. According to Bacon’s research, for example, Russia’s narrative of Putinism holds national unity and long-term stability as central motifs, which trump “lesser” motifs, such as democracy. As long as the Putinism narrative is the dominant narrative in Russia, political agents benefit from identifying themselves with it.73
Temporalities
Temporalities ask about the timeline of a narrative: When does it start? When does it end? Which events are included or omitted in a narrative?74 For the chosen material, it will be interesting to see shifts in temporalities between the different votes. How much history is included, for instance will World War II be mentioned? How long is the Cold War referred to? How far ahead in the future does the Federal Council plan? Does the horizon depend on the issue up for vote?
71 Miskimmon, O´Loughlin, and Roselle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations,
9–10.
72 Bacon, Edwin, ‘Public Political Narratives: Developing a Neglected Source through the Exploratory Case of
Russia in the Putin-Medvedev Era’, 775.
73 Bacon, Edwin, 775–76. 74 Bacon, Edwin, 776.
Symbols
Symbols are a powerful narrative technique and can enhance its effect. They can be of visual or metaphorical nature and analysing symbols can contribute to a holistic understanding of the narrator. Flags and national holidays are typical symbols used to enhance an identity narrative.75 The Swiss national day is a commemoration of the first day in August 1291 when three men from the cantons Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden swore alliance to protect each other from the Habsburgs on the Rütli meadow near Lake Lucerne. This legend is often used by political actors to plead for neutrality and independence from great powers. The Swiss flag, with its white cross on red backdrop is a reverse image of the Red Cross logo – a similarity that is often used to invoke Christian and humanitarian values as Swiss values. Other interpretations of the Swiss flag are that the four arms of the cross symbolise the four language groups. How factual symbols are does not matter in narratives. All that matters is that the story is bought.
Agency
Agents are the cornerstone of a narrative. Agency examines who is a main character in a narrative, who is a side character and who is omitted. Further, how are the agents portrayed? Who is good, who is evil? How abstract the actors are in public political narratives depends a lot on the political system. Liberal democracies tend to use agents, who are not a single person but rather a regime or a system. The Putin regime and other authoritarian administrations with an inclination for cult of personality prefer personal agents, such as war heroes or President Putin on horseback.76
Plots/subplots
Embedding a subplot into the main plot of a public political narrative can be a useful tool to impede counternarratives. It gives the narrator “the developmental flexibility essential to its usefulness and longevity”. In a subplot one can address anticipated criticism against the main plot and possibly disarm one’s political enemies. Further, “[s]ubplots serve a narrative by widening its appeal and keeping potential political pathways open”.77 So by having a subplot, the Swiss government could potentially hold several doors open – neutrality and protectionism one day, international cooperation and integration on the next.
75 Bacon, Edwin, 778–79. 76 Bacon, Edwin, 779–80. 77 Bacon, Edwin, 780–81.
To clarify, only subplots which are taken up by the Federal Council in the booklet are included in the analysis, not any from the opposing side’s text.
Referent object
One important question is omitted in Bacon’s framework, which will be included in this thesis’ framework – the issue of the referent object of security.78 A central question in constructivist security studies is “whose security?”. Who or what is threatened and needs to be protected? The referent object tells us if the narrator has a traditionalist or a widened security agenda. Typical traditionalist referent objects are territorial integrity or sovereignty – always with the state at the centre – while wider ones include the environment or economic security.79 In this last element of the framework, the answers can also vary in their level of abstraction – anything from values like sovereignty or neutrality over economic resources to human lives.
5.3 Material
The Swiss population gets to cast their vote four times a year on several issues on the local, regional and national level. Since 1978, together with the ballot papers, every citizen receives an explanatory booklet, where the Federal Council advises on how to vote. These booklets (in German) make up the main material for the thesis.
For reasons of relevance and feasibility, only votes concerning security are included in the analysis. The selection rests on Swissvotes, an information platform run by Année Politique
Suisse at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Bern. Swissvotes has categorised
all popular votes according to policy area, and it is this categorisation the selection rests upon; all votes in the category security policy (Sicherheitspolitik) since 1978 are included in the analysis. Since 1978, the Swiss people have voted on security policy a total of 37 times. 18 of those were popular initiatives, 13 optional referenda and only six mandatory referenda.80
The rather long timeline 1978-2020 was chosen because, firstly, narratives are strengthened through repetition, and secondly, because narratives remain relevant by reacting to daily life.81 By analysing over 40 years of Switzerland’s security narrative, the author is
78 Coined by the Copenhagen School in Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framefork for Analysis. 79 Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, 187–89.
80 Année Politique Suisse, ‘Votes’.
81 Bacon, Edwin, ‘Public Political Narratives: Developing a Neglected Source through the Exploratory Case of
hoping to answer questions of how the Swiss government has managed to hold on to their traditional security agenda and convince voters to do the same.
The formation process of the booklets starts about six months prior to a popular vote, shortly before the Federal Assembly votes on the issues at hand. Officials from the appropriate Federal Office(s), together with a communication specialist and translators, compose a preliminary draft. Once a third version has been drafted, the head of the applicable department will look it over, and after that, the whole Federal Council discusses and revises the text together. Since 1996, the initiative or referendum committee has been given space in the booklets to present their arguments directly. While the initiative or referendum committee must condense their arguments on one and a half A5 page, the explanatory text of the Federal Council had no limits concerning its length until 2018. Since then, the initiative or referendum committee and the Federal Council get the same amount of space to make their arguments. The Federal Council’s text must, however, be objective and based on facts and the authors attach importance to writing in clear and comprehensible language, without bureaucratic jargon. Only once so far, in 2011, has the Federal Supreme Court condemned the explanatory text for being incomplete and unobjective.82
The chosen material is considered relevant firstly because of its projection – its consistent availability to the voter – and secondly because of its strong normative and strategic character. Just because a text is available, does not mean, of course, that everyone actually reads it. One could believe that voters are more influenced through their daily media intake, especially in modern times, when it is easier and more convenient to watch a television segment or a quick video clip online than to read a rather dry written political text. While that may be true, the voting booklet has been consistently around for the timeframe examined, and Swiss television holds a very small share of the market due to the different languages spoken and the versatile range available from neighbouring countries. There are indeed news shows in all four official languages, but most television consumption stems from channels abroad. Less than 30% of hours watched in Switzerland are Swiss television channels.83 In fact, a survey regarding the popular vote in September 2020 found that 91% of voters used the voting booklet as their primary source of information, while social media was the least consulted information
82 The Federal Chancellery, ‘Abstimmungsbüchlein: Design 2018 und Rückblick [Voting Booklet: Design 2018
and Review]’; Forster, ‘Der Bestseller Aus Der Bundesverwaltung [Bestseller by the Federal Chancellery]’.
channel with 36%.84 These numbers, together with the success rate of the Federal Council regarding the outcomes of popular votes, speak for an exceptional reception.
As to the normative and strategic character, political texts always inhabit elements of normative nature, according to Norman and Isabela Fairclough, since they are concerned with decision making about what ought to be and how to reach the desired state.85 The normative elements can be implicit or explicit. The material examined in this thesis inhabits a very explicit voting recommendation (Yes/No), which is accompanied by an explanatory text, containing more implicit, between-the-lines, deliberations. The pronounced recommendation makes it indisputable that the voting booklet is a strategy to influence voters.
Finally, the credibility and reliability of the material is ensured by accessing it directly from the Federal Chancellery’s online archive.
5.4 Reflexivity
Construction of reality and meaning is the epicentre of interpretivist social sciences. At the same time, the scientists exploring the construction are part of exactly this construction. For reasons of authenticity and credibility of the study, reflection on one’s own partiality and identity are of utmost importance.86
The author of this thesis was born 1991 and grew up in Switzerland, meaning she spent her formative years in a Europe of peace and cooperation. She was first schooled in traditionalist approaches at Zurich University but has spent the last five years in Stockholm, where a more constructivist and widened approach – to both security and politics in general – is encouraged and discussions on norms and normative power are more prevalent. She has both Swiss (non-EU) and Swedish (EU) citizenship, making her more inclined to support a Swiss EU integration than the average Swiss. For full disclosure, it should be mentioned that she has voted in several of the analysed votes.
84 Milic, Feller, and Kübler, ‘VOTO-Studie zur eidgenössischen Volksabstimmung vom 27. September 2020
[VOTO-study concerning the federal popular vote of the 27 September 2020]’.
85 Fairclough and Fairclough, ‘Textual Analysis’, 188.
6. Analysis
This chapter is structured in the way that the first subchapter contains the entire empirical analysis of the 36 explanatory texts by the Federal Council structured in tables, followed by a discussion of the findings.
6.1 Empirical Analysis
Table 6.1: Narrative Analysis of “Customs Tariff Act”
Date 28 May 1978
Title Zolltarifgesetz (Brotpreis) Title in English Customs Tariff Act (bread price) Legal form Optional referendum
Summary The Federal Council wants to raise the tax on imported grain. The Swiss state reimburses Swiss grain farmers according to the difference between local and imported grains, and since the price of imported grain has dropped, the cost for the Swiss state has increased.
Recommendation Accept
Result Accepted 54.81% Yes
Central motifs Cut government spending Maintain food sovereignty
Temporalities Since July 1976 the price of bread grain abroad has steadily sunk.
On 12 June 1977 the Swiss voters and the cantons voted no on a new value-added tax (VAT).
Subsequently the Federal Council interpreted that as a mandate to cut government spending.
In autumn 1977 the Federal Council increased the import tax on grain. In order for it to stay like that in the future, the public needs to agree.
Symbols -
Agency Swiss voters and cantons said no to an increased VAT and are as such the reason why the central government needs to cut government spending. The central government compensates Swiss farmers so that the Swiss farmers can compete on the market with imported grain.
The central government secures food sovereignty.
A regular Swiss man consumes 29 kg bread a year, meaning he will have to pay around 3 CHF more a year, while the central government can save up to 100 million CHF.
Plot The Federal Council has tried to cut spending through other measures, which were dismissed, so this is a new attempt to keep subsidising Swiss farmers while saving money in the state treasury.
Subplot The Social Democratic Party accuses the Federal Council of violating the constitution and of saving costs by putting extra costs on consumers, which is unfair to employees and in favour of employers, but the Federal Council deems the heightened costs small enough to be fair and constitutional. Referent object Food sovereignty
Table 6.2: Narrative Analysis of “Security Police Act”
Date 3 December 1978
Title Sicherheitspolizeigesetz Title in English Security Police Act Legal form Optional referendum
Summary New law proposing a national police force. The cantons shall provide officers to protect national matters such as state offices, state visits and international conferences and Swiss air space. The Federal Council decides upon
contingencies per canton and appoints a commander. The state bears all costs. Recommendation Accept
Result Rejected 44.02% Yes
Central motifs A more predictable and stable security force Less double administration
Temporalities The current police system was constructed last century, but in the past couple of years international terrorism has grown.
In the near future, attacks and violence can affect Switzerland.
Symbols There is a picture of an airport with a Swissair aircraft in the back- and a Swiss policeman on a motorbike in the foreground. Swissair is a strong symbol for Swiss diplomacy, because it used to be the first and sometimes only Western airline allowed to fly to several states in Africa and the Middle East thanks to Switzerland’s neutral status.
Agency Emphasis on continued agency by the cantons even though the central government’s agency increases.
Terror attacks, outrages hostage-taking and kidnapping are mentioned but the actors behind are not defined.
Plot Switzerland has held important diplomatic engagements and been a natural choice for international conferences in the past and wishes to keep that status. There are threats to diplomatic missions and conferences, which shall be tackled with a stronger central police force.
Subplot The central state does not want to disrupt federalism and suppress strikes and demonstrations. Cantons’ police sovereignty will be respected and
demonstrations will only be tackled with the central police force if the cantonal one cannot handle the situation and if there are serious acts of violence.
Referent object Diplomatic missions Consular centres
International organisations International conferences
è Status as diplomatic actor Airports and aircrafts
Government buildings and agencies Public order
Swiss lives
Table 6.3: Narrative Analysis of “Restructuring of National Supply”
Date 2 March 1980
Title Neuordnung der Landesversorgung Title in English Restructuring of national supply Legal form Mandatory referendum
Summary Change in the constitution to give the Federal Council power to take
“necessary measures”, such as food rationing or control over private transport companies, regarding food and energy supply, not only in times of war but also in times of peace.
Recommendation Accept
Result Accepted 86.05% Yes
Central motifs Cut government spending Maintain food sovereignty
Temporalities The text starts with reminders of the oil crisis 1973/1974, sugar and rice hoardings a few years ago and warns of similar situations in the future. Symbols The oil crisis is used several times as a symbol of crises outside of war. Agency Each citizen has a responsibility to have a personal food supply in case of
emergency.
The central government shall get more power and more agency through the new law and private transport companies are expected to cooperate. Actions that can lead to food supply emergencies are wars, boycotts, strikes, civil unrests and political means of pressure but the actors behind are not specified.
Plot The international system is unstable, and Switzerland is dependent on import of several resources, such as oil, iron, chemicals, rice and sugar.
Subplot -
Referent object Resource sovereignty
Table 6.4: Narrative Analysis of “Revision of Regulation of Bread Grain”
Date 30 November 1980
Title Revision der Brotgetreideordnung Title in English Revision of regulation of bread grain Legal form Mandatory referendum
Summary As a part of a larger austerity package “Sparmassnahmen 1980”, the federal state shall stop subsidising Swiss grain farmers. The price of flour and bread will increase by -.29 CHF respectively -.22 CHF per kilogram.
Recommendation Accept
Result Accepted 63.54% Yes
Central motifs Cut government spending
Temporalities Since the 1960s, state expenses have increased but the intake has decreased. In 1971 the deficit was 300 million CHF, 1979 1.7 billion CHF.
The average consumption of bread has decreased from 90 kg in 1929 to 25 kg in 1979.
Today is a better time to start saving money than a couple years ago, since the overall economy is good, and unemployment is low.
The deficit in the state budget shall be reduced by 700 million CHF yearly by 1983.
Symbols It is emphasised that 2/3 of grain subsidies go to pastry goods, to symbolise unnecessary luxury.
The state pays more in debt interest than in disability insurance or health insurance.
Agency Other saving measures are listed to show how much the Federal Council has acted already.
The average Swiss citizen now has the agency to buy more expensive bread and to take responsibility for Swiss agriculture.
Plot The Federal Council must reduce state deficit, and this is one part in a much larger austerity package. There is a sense of urgency.
Subplot -
Referent object State budget Economy CHF
Table 6.5: Narrative Analysis of “Revision of Criminal Law”
Date 6 June 1982
Title Revision des Strafgesetzes (Gewaltverbrechen) Title in English Revision of criminal law (Violent offenses) Legal form Optional referendum
Summary Tougher punishments for “violent offenses”, such as kidnapping, hostage-taking and armed robberies. Preparations for or incitement of such offenses shall become punishable.
Recommendation Accept
Result Accepted 63.71% Yes
Central motifs Law and order
Temporalities Crime has changed over the last years and criminal law today is not well-equipped enough for today’s crimes.
Crimes will be committed in the future.
Symbols Regulars’ table, associations, unions and sports clubs as places where the typical Swiss would utter their opinion.
There is one fictional example of a young man, who commits robbery for the first time without using a weapon, who could still get probation even after the revision.
Agency Perpetrators, who commit violent crimes.
“Hostage-takers do not respect state borders.”
Swiss citizens can still use their freedom of speech.
Plot The Federal Council wants to protect Swiss citizens from violent crimes and punish those who commit them.
Subplot The central government does not want to supress free speech. Referent object Swiss lives
Table 6.6: Narrative Analysis of “Civil Service Initiative”
Date 26 February 1984
Title Zivildienst-Initiative Title in English Civil service initiative Legal form Popular initiative
Summary Introduction of a civil service as replacement of military conscription for those who wish. The civil service shall be 1,5x the length of military service and shall “promote peace”.
Recommendation Reject
Result Rejected 36.17% Yes
Central motifs Continued conscription
Temporalities This initiative is more extreme than the one rejected in 1977.
Symbols -
Agency A predominant majority of Swiss men fulfil their conscription duties. Approximately hundred Swiss men yearly, who refuse military service. Federal Assembly and Federal Council are actively trying to find an alternative to military conscription but have not found a viable solution yet. Other states have moral conflict as a requirement to do civil service instead of military service.
Plot Free choice between military and civil service is not compatible with the conscription as it is defined in the constitution.
Subplot Military conscription is good for the state budget.
There is already a peaceful alternative to the regular military service: a weapons-free military service.
Civil service is not needed to promote peace – the army already does that. Referent object Peace
Independence Sovereignty Liberty
Table 6.7: Narrative Analysis of “Repeal of Subsidy of Self-Sufficiency of Bread Grain”
Date 9 June 1985
Title Aufhebung der Unterstützung für die Selbstversorgung mit Brotgetreide Title in English Repeal of subsidy of self-sufficiency of bread grain
Legal form Mandatory referendum
Summary All farmers, who supply the state with grain used to get subsidies to mill a portion of their grain to use for themselves. This shall now be abolished, leading to valley farmers losing 50 CHF and mountain farmers 200 CHF yearly. The state will save 600,000 CHF in administrational costs. Recommendation Accept
Result Accepted 57.04% Yes
Central motifs Cut government spending Temporalities Today farmers get subsidies.
In the future they will lose a negligible amount yearly.
Symbols -
Agency Farmers, who sell their grain to the state. Bakers, who choose to buy imported grain. The central state takes a fiscally smart decision.
Plot The milling subvention is unnecessary and too expensive. Subplot Parliament fears food shortages during wartime.
Referent object State economy
Table 6.8: Narrative Analysis of “Initiative for the People’s Say in Military Expenditure (armament referendum)”
Date 5 April 1987
Title Initiative “für die Mitsprache des Volkes bei Militärausgaben (Rüstungsreferendum)“
Title in English Initiative “for the people’s say in military expenditure (armament referendum)”
Legal form Popular initiative
Summary The initiative demands the possibility of an optional referendum regarding the procurement of armaments, and the construction of buildings or acquisition of land by the military department.
Recommendation Reject
Result Rejected 40.56% Yes
Central motifs Parliamentary sovereignty regarding state budget
Temporalities 1956 the public voted no to a popular veto regarding state budget.
Putting just one state department’s budget up for popular votes today does not make sense.
In the future the military defence could be jeopardised.
Symbols The Federal Assembly is used as a symbol of democracy, since “no other parliament is as involved in military budgets as Switzerland’s”.
Agency The Federal Assembly should keep their agency. The people should not get any agency.
Plot The Federal Assembly has taken care of state budget well in the past and should continue to do so. Only putting the military budget, out of all state budgets, up for a referendum is unfair and unconstitutional.
Subplot Military defence could be in jeopardy because the people do not know what is best.
Referent object State budget Territorial integrity
Table 6.9: Narrative Analysis of “For the Protection of Moors – Rothenthurm-Initiative”
Date 6 December 1987
Title Initiative “zum Schutz der Moore – Rothenthurm-Initiative” Title in English Initiative “for the protection of moors – Rothenthurm-Initiative” Legal form Popular initiative
Summary The Swiss government had plans of constructing a military training facility in the moor area of Rothenturm. The initiative proposes that moors and
moorlands “of particular beauty” be protected and all construction on such sites be banned.
Recommendation Reject
Result Accepted 57.76% Yes
Central motifs Protect nature without restricting military defence
Temporalities 1976 - 1983 farming on moor landscapes has increased by 21%
Since over 20 years the area has been used for military training of cyclists and reconnaissance soldier
Symbols “The military training area will be a puffer zone between farming land and nature reserve.”
è Swiss army as protector of nature
Agency Cantons Schwyz and Zug, where Rothenturm is located, and the Federal Assembly have approved of the military training facility.
Plot The Federal Council actually wants to protect nature even more than the initiative committee.
Subplot The training facility in Rothenturm is necessary for Switzerland’s military defence.
Referent object Nature
Territorial integrity
