Identifying Counterhegemonic Spaces: Kosovo and EU-Enlargement

(1)

International Relations

Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits thesis

Spring 2020

Identifying Counterhegemonic Spaces

Kosovo and EU-Enlargement

(2)

Abstract

In everyday life, imposing your will on your neighbour is likely to turn out counterproductive for your mutual relationship in the long term. Yet, the EU’s Enlargement-policy is commonly perceived as embedded with a spirit of policy imposition. While this is commonly perceived as a by-product of the EU’s power vis-à-vis pre-accession countries, few scholars have studied the implications of such imposition in its pre-accession contexts. This thesis aims to study such implications by drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical approach (1985). It therefore asks, how can we identify spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses emerge?

In answering this, it applies a multi-method case study of Kosovo’s pre-accession context and conceives of Enlargement as a hegemonic discourse. It argues that counterhegemonic spaces can be identified by studying the undecidability of Enlargement’s discursive structure. It finds that Kosovans are subject to a plethora of hegemonic narratives, which simultaneously possess the potential for counterhegemonic disarticulations. From this perspective, events such as the general election in 2019 in Kosovo can be understood as a counterhegemonic moment. In developing its discourse theoretical approach, it contributes to poststructuralist IR and European Integration Studies by developing our understandings of the interplay between hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses.

(3)

o Functionality and normativity: the empty signifiers of Enlargement 20 o Internal othering – the relational configuration of Enlargment 22 o Othering witout others? Kosovo’s visa liberalization 25 o Discrepant support – the emergence of counterhegemonic spaces 29 o Kosovan discontent and internal othering 31

•_Conclusion 33

(4)

List of abbreviations:

EC = European Commision EU = European Union

EULEX = European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo IP = Interview Person

IR = International Relations

LGBT = Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transexual NDI = National Democratic Institute

MEI = Ministry of European Integration MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NEAR = Commissioner for Enlargement Negotiations RBA = Region-Building Approach

RDT = Radical Discourse Theory

SAA = Stabilization and Association Agreement SAP = Stabilization and Association Process UNDP = United Nations Development Program

USAID = United States Agency for International Developemnt WBs = the Western Balkans

(5)

Identifying counterhegemonic spaces: Kosovo and

EU-Enlargement

“As a rule, the European Union must refrain as much as possible from trying to impose political choices. That risks causing a negative reaction against Europe”

(D’Estaing, 2000:19) The central puzzle driving this thesis concerns the above belief that policy imposition generates negative sentiments towards the European Union (EU), while academics and policy-makers contend to the Union’s Enlargement policy being embedded with a spirit of policy imposition (Börzel, 2011). This inspires two interrelated puzzles relevant to this thesis. On the one hand, while the policy imposition of Enlargement is conceived by many as a mere consequence of the ‘power’ of the EU (Manners, 2002; Grabbe, 2014; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004), few have studied the implications of such imposition in the candidate countries (Noutcheva, 2012) and even fewer from the perspective of radical discourse theory (RDT) (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Unlike other approaches of poststructuralist International Relations (IR) (Hansen, 2006; Neumann, 1999), RDT possesses the conceptual depth required to analyse the implications of Enlargement’s policy imposition in its candidate countries, this thesis argues. On the other hand, RDT however suffers heuristically under decades of scholarly conceptual cherry-picking (Stengel and Nabers, 2019:249), which this thesis seeks to overcome. In so doing, it deploys an approach to understand the dynamics underlying the emergence of counterhegemonic discourses (Howarth, 2010). This thesis thus opens up the black box of discursivity in relation to Enlargement from a RDT-perspective. Consequently, it asks, how can we identify spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses emerge?

To answer this, I conduct a multi-method case study of Kosovo’s pre-accession context towards EU-membership. Kosovo’s pre-accession context is chosen as the case on the grounds of the Enlargement-puzzle as outlined at the outset of this section, because of its unique historical relations to Western countries and because of its accessibility to the author. I conceive of Enlargement as a hegemonic discourse (Howarth, 2010; Hansen and Williams, 1999; Delanty, 1995b;). I study the social context on the receiving end of the Enlargement discourse (Noutcheva, 2012) by analysing and interpreting local responses and perceptions of Kosovo vis-à-vis the EU. I argue that recent events in Kosovo suggest that the discourse of Enlargement today is made increasingly visible enabling counterhegemonic discourses (Rexhepi, 2016; O’Brennan, 2014), although a single and unifying counterhegemonic discourse has yet to materialize as the analysis will display. I find that Kosovo’s pre-accession

(6)

conditions influence most spheres of Kosovan domestic politics. From this perspective, the overwhelming discontent with unemployment and corruption in Kosovo (UNDP, 2019), the victory of the Vetevendosje-party at the October 2019 election campaigning on an anti-corruption platform and resembling typical left-wing Euroscepticism (Yabanci, 2015) or the persistence and popularity of the 100 % tariff on Serbian and Bosnian goods (Sopi and Morina, 2019) all display discontent with the EU-agenda in one way or another. Importantly, they indicate the enablement of counterhegemonic tendencies in Kosovan society. These disparate counterhegemonic events, this thesis argues, are enabled by spaces of undecidability of the discourse of Enlargement. This view, it argues, contextualizes Enlargement’s yielding to other discursive forces in Kosovo. In other words, Enlargement’s “promise of a fullness to come” (Howarth, 2010:322) is no longer unequivocally credible in the eyes of Kosovans, and hence policies, sentiments and elections increasingly turn out in ways that deviate from the hegemonic narrative.

The thesis has two overlapping scholarly contributions. First, a theoretical contribution to the poststructuralist field of IR and RDT (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). By empirically looking to further develop the ways in which we can identify spaces for counterhegemonic discourses, it contributes to RDT. By studying and improving the ways we identify counterhegemonic spaces, I argue, we are better enabled to identify, analyse and reflect on counterhegemonic discourses, regardless of their content and contexts. Thereby, I contend to Stengel and Naber’s (2019:249) argument that the field of RDT lack the breadth of empirical endeavours as opposed to other realms of poststructuralist IR, to which this thesis in turn attempts to contribute. Importantly, it also contributes to European Integration Studies, through a critical analysis of the practice, policy and discourse of Enlargement and the EU by conceiving of it as a hegemonic discourse. In so doing, it offers alternative perspectives as to the practices and influence of the EU, and through its ontology of the social as discursive (Stengel and Nabers, 2019:250), it accounts comprehensively for issues of political fragmentation.

To demonstrate this argument, the thesis proceeds as follows. The first part establishes Enlargement as a hegemonic discourse (Howarth, 2010) by drawing on existing literature. This part starts with an outline of the ontological tenets of RDT (Stengel and Nabers, 2019) and then engages with scholarly literature for the key analytical tenets for this thesis. The core concepts of RDT, thus, guides the literature review by providing an overarching ontological and conceptual framework, whereas the reviewed literature provide the empirical content and context of the concepts. Initially, it identifies and characterizes the ‘Self’ of Western Europe, embodied in the EU (Hansen and Williams, 1999; Delanty, 1995a), and subsequently, it

(7)

engages with literature concerning how this ‘Self’ identifies in relation to its Eastern ‘Other’ (Todovora, 1997; Thomas, 2017). This ultimately provides an intersubjective characterization of the ‘Self’. Building on that foundation, it engages with the discourse of Enlargement as the materialization of the intersubjective identity of our ‘Self’, both in relation to Kosovo and generally (Blokker, 2005; 2014; Rexhepi, 2016).

The second part elaborates on the multi-method approach of this thesis. what scholarly work it draws on methodologically (Biegon, 2016) and expand on data collection. Notably, I gathered various EU documents so as to demonstrate the particularity of the discourse of Enlargement in relation to Kosovo. I also examined surveys of public opinion in Kosovo looking to understand and interpret the connection between domestic discontent and EU-related issues. Finally, and importantly, I conducted five semi-structured interviews with civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo and Ministry of European Integration of Kosovo. All interviewees have engaged directly with Kosovo’s EU agenda. The interviews revolved around three thematic issues: personal perceptions of the EU generally and as a regional actor; their professional experience engaging with Enlargement and Kosovo’s EU-agenda; their perceptions of the Kosovan public’s experience with Enlargement. This trinity of data, it is argued, provide the foundation for understanding and identifying counterhegemonic spaces in the context of Kosovo’s pre-accession.

The final part demonstrates how we can identify spaces for counterhegemonic discourses by analysing Kosovo’s pre-accession context towards EU-membership through the prism of RDT. It finds that recent developments in Kosovo are not unequivocal and explicit responses to the discourse of Enlargement. Put differently, there is no causal connection. However, interpreting them through the framework of RDT, they do seem to relate to and emerge out of the undecidability of the Enlargement-discourse, thus displaying the introduction of a new set of discursive logics into the Kosovo-EU context (Howarth, 2010:325).

Enlargement: policy, discourse and hegemony

In the following section, key areas of scholarly work are identified to support this thesis’ core purpose of identifying spaces in which counterhegemonic discourse might emerge. At the outset, I outline the ontological tenets of RDT (Stengel and Nabers, 2019). I then proceed conceptually along the lines of RDT identifying the conceptual content of the ‘Self’ (Hansen and Williams, 1999; Delanty, 1995a) of the discourse of Enlargement and its intersubjective constitution to its Eastern European ‘Other’ (Todovora, 1997). Subsequently, I examine the Enlargement-discourse as the conceptual context of the intersubjective identity of the ‘Self’,

(8)

both in relation to Kosovo and the Western Balkans (WBs). This framework provides a foundation from which to analyse how spaces for counterhegemonic discourses are generated in Kosovo.

Radical Discourse Theory

In a seminal piece, Laclau and Mouffe find identity, discourse and hegemony as part of the same unity, hegemonic discourses (1985). A hegemonic discourse is constituted by making

equivalent a broad range of seemingly disparate demands. The unifying logic consists of a relational configuration, i.e. articulations of politico-antagonistic frontiers between a Self and

an Other, and a shared way of apprehending the world, i.e. empty signifiers, formally representing the totality of the seemingly disparate demands (Stengel and Nabers, 2019:256). Empty signifiers – or floating signifiers as coined by Levi Strauss (Mehlman, 1972) serve a temporal purpose in promising a fullness-to-come, i.e. a fantasmatic logic, and by definition comprise only unattainable terms e.g. freedom, security or equality. Discourses, be they hegemonic or not, project the antagonistic Other as blocking the identity of the Self (Howarth, 2010:313), and if only the Other were to be overcome,the empty signifier could be realized, and the Self would attain “a full identity” (Stengel and Nabers, 2019:258). Importantly, the Otherness or antagonism of the Other does not necessarily imply radically threatening Otherness by an ‘Other’, rather there are “varying degrees of Otherness” (Herschinger, 2012:73).

Articulating a discourse is understood as a power practice excluding “possibilities and forms of the self” through the logics of equivalence and difference (Howarth, 2010:314). By discursively making disparate struggles seem equivalent or different, frontiers are drawn between the inside and outside of an equivalential chain of a discourse. This, in turn, produces inconsistent and incomplete identities, labelled the undecidability of social

structures (Howarth, 2010:312). Undecidability is a key term in this thesis and requires

further clarification. The ontology of RDT and this thesis perceives subjects and demands as radically and historically contingent and hence as ever-changing. A discourse, e.g. materialized as a policy regime, will exhibit inconsistencies since the equivalential chain is composed of an attempt to dislocate disparate demands which serves to naturalize a particular division of social relations. Undecidability thus lies at the heart of any social order, structure or hegemonic discourse, but when “made visible by events, new forms of political agency are made possible”, i.e. counterhegemonic discourses. The failure of a discursive structure to

(9)

provide a “stable point from which to speak or act […] opens the space for a more radical form of subjectivity” (Howarth, 2010:314).

It is this last phrase, that is of utmost importance to this thesis, since it provides the ontological foundation for how to approach the research question of how we can identify spaces for counterhegemonic discourses to emerge. Put differently, this thesis is an empirical investigation of the concept of undecidability, aiming to understand how the making-visible of undecidability and the failure of discursive structures generate spaces for the emergence of counterhegemonic discourses. Drawing on the above, I outline two interrelated tenets constituting the core analytical focus when examining the undecidability of hegemonic discourses. Moreover, it assumes, that when made visible, undecidability inform the generation of space for counterhegemonic discourses. Conversely, counterhegemonic discourses emerge as disarticulations of the hegemonic discourses, exploiting the features of undecidability of the hegemonic discourse. The tenets are: the articulation of a ‘Self’ revolving around particular empty signifiers; and the relational configuration of the hegemonic discourse vis-à-vis an ’Other’. This I label the framework of undecidability. Importantly, the logics of difference and equivalence permeate the framework, which is considered when engaging with the framework. This framework, then, encapsulates the dynamics by which spaces for counterhegemonic discourses is generated. Thus, when situating the Enlargement-discourse and Kosovo’s pre-accession context in the above framework of undecidability, the ‘Self’ refers to the EU while the ‘Other’ to Kosovo.

This thesis could have aligned to other realms of poststructuralist IR, e.g. Hansen’s combinability (2006), yet its focus deviates slightly from that of this thesis. My main reservation concerns the study of how policies and articulations of discourse “appear consistent with each other” (ibid:25) to understand how discourses materialize as policy (Biegon, 2016:27), which, I argue, lack the conceptual depth of RDT. Similarly, given the regionalist character of the topic, I could have endeavoured on a regionalist inquiry avoiding the Eurocentric mainstreams (Söderbaum, 2016; Moravscik, 1998; Schmitter, 2005) and drawn on Neumann’s region-building approach (RBA) (1994; 1999; Anderson, 1983). RBA in many ways resemble the ontology of RDT in focusing on articulations of differences between Selves and Others (Neumann, 1999:148; Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). However, I argue, it is too focused on the role of elites in region-building, and presupposes only partial agency of those subject to region-building and consequently lacks the scope of hegemony’s evil-twin, counterhegemony. This thesis thereby considers Kosovo’s pre-accession context as a case for exploring the spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses might emerge and

(10)

disarticulate the hegemonic discourse. In the following two sections, I outline the Enlargement-specific conceptual content of the framework of undecidability, initiating by engaging with articulations of the European ‘Self’ and its empty signifiers.

The European ‘Self’

The late 1990’s literature on the EUs alleged democratic deficit and its lack of legitimacy (Friis and Murphy, 2000) offers fruitful contributions as to characterizing the ‘Self’ of Enlargement. In our framework, such characterization entails outlining the empty signifiers around which the ‘Self’ revolves. In this section, I argue that the European ‘Self’ revolves around empty signifiers of functionality and normativity.

Hansen and Williams’ (1999) prominent contribution argues that the EU’s identity revolve around a deeply internalized myth of rationality. This myth, they argue, impedes academics and EU-decision makers from understanding the crises of the Union (ibid:235). In short, the myth of rationality concerns an internalized perception among European political elites that European integration is a functionalist project – of functional spill-overs and non-political processes of integration – rather than a political one (ibid:240). The EU, they argue, thus has come to be seen by its elite as the depoliticized and objective embodiment of rationality as progress, despite its political and subjective nature (ibid:44). This implies that a functionalist identity has become ‘common-sensical’ among the EU-elite. In the terminology of this thesis, it is labelled a hegemonic discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), exemplified in the EU as a functional actor, around which demands of the EU-elite modify their identities (Howarth, 2010:318). This hegemonic discourse, then, is co-constituted by policies like Enlargement. Thus, if we assume that the EU identifies as a functionalist and depoliticized actor, its discourse of Enlargement must necessarily reflect and reiterate that perception. However, as with all discourses, it must also encompass inconsistencies.

Delanty (1995a) further contends that the notions of Europe and European identity revolve around a shallow universalism of rationality, resembling the pre-Enlightenment universality of Christianity. The invocation of ‘Europe’ embodying both universalism (implying normativity) and rationality (implying ‘depoliticization’) enables an illusion of a privileged ‘We’ as the subject of history unleashing “a corresponding belief in the universality of Western norms” (Delanty, 1995b:12). In this view, the EU, as the embodiment of a unitary European discourse, perceives itself as a functionalist, depoliticized agent, while embodying universal norms and thereby a superior normativity. Such discourse, Delanty argues, will

(11)

ultimately lack legitimation (1995a:30; Stavrakakis, 2004). This perspective, then, offers a foundation on which to understand how the EU’s membership norms have altered since the Union’s inception in the 1950’s as argued by Thomas (2017). The Union will simply conform its norms according to the political goals of the time. Hereby, rationality, as one empty signifier of ‘Europe’, can imply geographic affiliation (Thomas, 2017:223) at one instance, whereas the universality of European norms, as another empty signifier, can imply anti-communism at another (ibid:226). The academic appraisal of the EU as a ‘normative’ power (Manners, 2002) and as a ‘neo-functional’ actor (Visoka and Doyle, 2016), in this view, seems sensible since it seemingly embodies both (Moisio et. al., 2012).

However, from the perspective of this thesis, embodying these two inconsistent empty signifiers as unifying demands display one of our tenets of undecidability, although in a discursive realm of ‘Europe’ and not Enlargement. The inconsistency materializes in the way the EU is articulated as a non-political actor, while also as a normative actor promoting a set of allegedly universal norms (Thomas, 2017). The persistence of the discourse of ‘Europe’ and the inconsistency above fits well within the ontology of RDT, as it demonstrates the breadth of the equivalential chain of the discourse of ‘Europe’ (Stengel and Nabers, 2019:257; Mälksoo, 2009). By articulating itself in functional and normative terms, it generates a discursive space in which it can appear as both, which contextualizes the argument of Thomas (2017) to an extent. In the case of Kosovo’s pre-accession context, the discourse of Enlargement operates as a derivative discourse to that of ‘Europe’ and the EU. In it, the above characterization of the undecidability of the EU acts as the ‘Self’, representing the empty signifiers of functionality and normativity. When situating the EU with such undecidability as the ‘Self’ in the discursive framework of ‘Enlargement’, we are thereby enabled to identify the undecidability particular to the discourse of Enlargement. Importantly, we can theoretically assume that the making-visible of this undecidability might serve as a catalyst of spaces for counterhegemonic discourses to emerge. It is the purpose of this thesis to empirically study such emergence.

Adopting the above conception of the EU as the ‘Self’ of the Enlargement-discourse, I henceforth refer to it as the European ‘Self’. Importantly, this ‘Self’ is articulated in relation to a multiplicity of empty signifiers. For analytical purposes, I have clustered this multiplicity into the clusters of normativity and functionality. Henceforth, a reference to e.g. functionality is therefore a reference to its cluster of signifiers. I now turn to the relational configuration of hegemonic discourses as the second tenet of undecidability, focusing on articulations of politico-antagonistic frontiers in relation to Enlargement.

(12)

Balkanism

Below, I outline the intersubjective constitution of the European ‘Self’ vis-à-vis its Eastern European ‘Other’. An influential contribution in this regard is Todovora’s piece, “Balkanism” (1997). For Todovora, Balkanism is a similar practice of identification by the ‘West’ as Orientalism: the peoples of the Balkans are, like those of the Orient, perceived and represented as inferior by Western Europeans. While Orientalism is spatially intangible, the spatially particulay Balkans are recognized as Europeans, but not quite, which is reflected e.g. in metaphors of the Balkans as ‘the bridge between West and East’. Europeans but not quite (Todovora, 1997). Interestingly, scholars have demonstrated how Balkanism pervades Western Europe’s dealing with most of Post-Communist Eastern Europe (see e.g. Browning and Joennimi, 2008; Light and Young, 2009; Mälksoo, 2009).

Moreover, Todovora expands on Balkanism’s particularity arguing that the Balkans largely share a Christian heritage with Western Europe. This leads her to argue that Balkanism deals with differences within one type (e.g. Christians, Europeans), whereas Orientalism deals with differences between types (e.g. Christians vs Muslims) (Todovora, 1997: 19).

Returning to Delanty (1995b), this reflects the inconsistency of the notion of ‘Europe’ given that various markers of European-ness. As mentioned, the empty signifiers of rationality and normativity are mutually inconsistent, yet they pertain and enable the European ‘Self’ to differentiate itself from its Eastern European ‘Other’. In the terminology of this thesis, this is a relational configuration ensured through the logic of difference. This relational configuration serves to ascribe meaning to the empty signifiers, for “each element of a discursive structure acquires its meaning only in relation to others” (Howarth, 2010:311). The empty signifiers, functionality and normativity, thus not only serve to attribute certain characteristics to the European ‘Self’, it further articulates an exclusionary line between itself and its ‘Others’.

Importantly, such relational configurations also encompass undecidability. For Delanty (1995b), such undecidability relates to the replacement of Christianity with rationality, enabling the articulation of politico-antagonistic frontiers by means of tangibility (religion) and of intangibility (modernity). Then, Enlargement appears a Balkanist practice, in which the European ‘Self’ alone is capable of articulating political frontiers within types (Europeans) in terms of e.g. modernity as argued by Behr (2007). Such practice resembles Spivak’s (1988) seminal observation insofar as e.g. Kosovo, on the receiving end of Enlargement, only achieve subjectivity by subjecting to the political frontiers as articulated by the European

(13)

‘Self’. It is this undecidability – a discursive space, constituted by Enlargement’s relational configuration of superiority-inferiority, enabling the interpretative domination of the European ‘Self’ – which it is the purpose of this thesis to investigate.

In the sections above, I outlined the intersubjective constitution of the European ‘Self’ vis-à-vis its Eastern European ‘Other’. Moreover, I identified its characteristics of undecidability in terms of Todovora’s Balkanism (1997) enabling articulations of specific signifiers and politico-antagonistic frontiers. This intersubjectivity is adopted for operationalizing Enlargement as a hegemonic discourse. Now, I turn to how this intersubjective identity materializes in the EU’s Enlargement-policy, focusing particularly on Kosovo.

EU-Enlargement: Kosovo and hegemonic discourse

The purpose of this thesis is an empirical investigation of the concept of undecidability, defined as the failure of a discursive structure to provide a “stable point from which to speak or act (Howarth, 2010:314). It looks to improve our theoretical understanding of how spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses might emerge disarticulating the hegemonic discourse by the making-visible of the latter’s undecidability. The previous two sections outlined the Enlargement-specific content of the framework of undecidability in relation to the European ‘Self’ and its Balkan ‘Other’. The following two sections provide the Enlargement-specific conceptual context to understand how undecidability is articulated as a hegemonic discourse. It focuses specifically on Kosovo, the WBs and their relations with the EU. I further apply the framework of undecidability (Howarth, 2010), establishing first; the empty signifiers of the Enlargement-discourse in relation to Kosovo and the WBs and how undecidability operates in it, and secondly; the relational configuration of Enlargement and the articulation of politico-antagonistic frontiers.

Empty signifiers, Enlargement and undecidability

Enlargement and the EU’s relations with the WBs neighbours have been theorized by regionalist scholars whose mainstream conceive of it as macro-regional integration. Here, EU-WB relations are non-political and mutual practices emerge out of mere functionality (Visoka and Doyle, 2016). Some even praise Enlargement as the biggest foreign policy success of the EU (Börzel, 2011). Enlargement, the mainstream argues, is primarily incentivized by mutual material interests (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) but would importantly “not have been able to achieve the desired effect if their targets (enlargement opponents) did not

(14)

recognize the Western ‘liberal identity, values and norms’ as a meaningful reference point” (Bakalov, 2019:8). In our perspective, these are the empty signifiers of the European ‘Self’ permeating the Enlargement-discourse, being non-political and functional (Visoka and Doyle, 2016) while also normative (Bakalov, 2019).

A central critique of this position comes from Noutcheva (2012), questioning the mainstream appraisal of Enlargement as the biggest foreign policy success of the EU by examining its ‘receiving end’ in the WBs (also Agh, 2010; Olsen, 2002; Vollaard, 2014). Success-assessments, she argues, should be preconditioned on the policies of the EU being perceived as legitimate by those on Enlargement’s receiving end, since such are largely absent today (Noutcheva, 2012). In the framework of hegemonic discourses and in terms of Enlargement, Noutcheva’s argument is central, since Enlargement arguably serves to geographically expand the hegemony of its discourse (Delanty, 1995b). Therefore, it is necessarily always in need of new subjects for subordination. Thus, building on Noutcheva’s emphasis (2012), to understand the hegemony of the Enlargement-discourse we need to understand how new subjects, like Kosovans, relate to and reproduce it. For that reason, I identify the Enlargement-discourse as embodying both normativity and functionality as its central empty signifiers. Now, I turn to critical perspectives as to the discursive implications of embodying such empty signifiers.

As demonstrated, the EU is currently articulated through a set of membership norms emphasising vaguely-defined liberal-democratic values (Thomas, 2017:235). Yet, scholars have explored the implications of candidate countries’ integration of such ‘vague’ norms, and find that Enlargements from 2004-onwards have privileged legal-formalistic compliance to EU rules over its politico-substantive integration (Blokker, 2014:5). Enlargement becomes a “transfer” of institutions from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’, Blokker argues (2005:515), resulting in democracies becoming unevenly institutionalized (Blokker, 2014:1). Noutcheva explores the implications of the integration of membership norms from a domestic perspective in the WBs and similarly finds that EU conditionality here yields immediate, formal results, but such will in turn require “external tutelage” if they are to be sustained. The result, she argues, is a lack of perceived legitimacy of Enlargement in the eyes of the WB-publics (2012:6).

Interestingly, then, issues of legitimacy and formal compliance appear to be reoccurring themes in Enlargement-studies, circumventing the democratic and political practices of the candidate countries in the pursuit of formal and functional Enlargement achievements (Blokker, 2014; Malova and Dolny, 2011; Gallina, 2011; Sissenich, 2008; Grabbe, 2001). In other words, bypassing democracy by means of functionality in the name of normativity.

(15)

However, as Noutcheva (2012) and Blokker (2014) suggests, the need for sustained involvement by the EU may turn out counterproductive in the long run. In our terminology, these observations constitute the undecidability of the Enlargement-discourse deriving from the European ‘Self’. It reflects undecidability insofar as Enlargement on the one hand articulates a normative vision of the attainability of a ‘democratic market society’ (Behr, 2007) and a Western liberal identity (Bakalov, 2019). On the other hand, it considers the implementation of such a process of mere functional transfer of institutions, which, it is believed, can be ‘objectively’ measured and monitored by the European Commission (EC) (Blokker, 2005:515). This view of discursive undecidability thereby provides a background against which the findings of critical scholarship contextualize.

As expected, the undecidability of the Enlargement-discourse also operates in Kosovo e.g. with regards to the promotion of the rights of lesbian, queer, gay and transsexual (LGBT) persons (Rexhepi 2016). Rexhepi labels such promotion ‘EU-washing’, describing the way in which the EU utilizes its accession-conditionality to make Kosovan civil society embrace LGBT-rights. This effectively promotes an image of Europe as “multicultural, tolerant and secular” as opposed to the backwards Kosovan people (ibid:49). Once more, we see the articulation of empty signifiers projecting a particular vision of ‘Europe’ in Kosovo. However, these empty signifiers are embedded in two inconsistent discourses: First, that of functionality (Hansen and Wiliams, 1999), in which Enlargement is described as yielding “objective” (Agh, 2010:1241) benefits (LGBT-rights) for candidate countries. Second, that of normativity (Delanty, 1995b) in which Enlargement is also described as the candidate countries choosing deliberately to adopt “the Western liberal identity” (Bakalov, 2019:8), i.e. LGBT-rights, for the future of society (Olsen, 2002). Rexhepi demonstrates how Enlargement materialize in this inconsistent discourse driven by the empty signifiers of functionality and normativity. Their mutual inconsistency thereby constitutes the basis of undecidability of Enlargement and thereby a potential space for counterhegemony.

Building on both mainstream and critical accounts, this has led me to identify the Enlargement-discourse as encompassing both signifiers of normativity and functionality (Delanty, 1995b). Enlargement, in this view, is both a matter of complying formally to EU rules (Economides and Ker-Lindsay, 2015), and of deliberately transitioning to a democratic society (Blokker, 2014; Malova and Dolny, 2011). The tension, however, lies in Enlargement’s discursive undecidedability, which enables it to articulate the inconsistent signifiers largely unopposed, but also exposes it to disarticulations by counterhegemonic discourses if made visible. In other words, if the discursive structure fails to provide a

(16)

reference point for agency – i.e. if the candidate countries cease to perceive the ‘modern’ and capitalist ‘Europe’ as a desired future (Mayblin et. al., 2016) – new forms of radical subjectivity emerge, i.e. counterhegemonic discourses (Howarth, 2010:314). It is the purpose of this thesis to develop an understanding of how such spaces can be empirically identified. In the following, I examine the relational configuration of the Enlargement-discourse, namely through articulated politico-antagonistic frontiers with a particular view to Kosovo.

Enlargement’s relational configuration

Besides empty signifiers, hegemonic discourses and undecidability are constituted by a relational configuration, for it is in the relation to ‘others’ that objects and subjects alike acquire meaning. Various scholars (e.g. Mälksoo, 2009) touch upon this, arguing that the Enlargement-discourse since the 2000’s resembles a terminology of modernity (Todovora, 1997). For these authors, the discourse of Enlargement is ultimately a homogenizing practice based on the belief that the Eastern ‘Other’ can become like the Western ‘Us’ if they emulate

our practices and institutions (Blokker, 2005:508). This, then, necessarily produces a

politico-antagonistic frontier within the candidate countries: adopting modernity, as progressing with Enlargement, implies antagonizing one’s heritage, for modernity is characterized by the derogation of the non-West (Mignolo, 2011; Behr, 2007).

Paradoxically, the message conveyed to candidate countries reads: To become like the European ‘Self’ you must ‘other’ your current-not-fully-European ‘Self’. I call this ‘internal othering’ (Mayblin et.al., 2016:70), thus dealing with differences within types (Todovora, 1997:17). This second-class status of Enlargement countries, which scholars argue persist beyond accession (see e.g. Mälksoo, 2009), arguably represent a defining feature of the undecidability of the Enlargement-discourse. Here, I explore the content of this undecidability of Enlargement’s relational configuration further to understand the emergence of counterhegemonic spaces enabling disarticulations.

Rexhepi (2016) similarly demonstrates how internal othering is present in Kosovo today. He argues, that the EU, in doing EU-washing, also depicts LGBT-persons and supporters of their rights as “victims to a supposed pre-modern, irrational, patriarchal, fundamentalist Islam” (ibid:49). Thereby, the EU articulates a politico-antagonistic frontier between the supporters of the rights of LGBT-persons, associated to the European ‘Self’, and those that do not. It might be an exercise of the EU “cleansing its own homophobic relationships to queer communities […] present and past” (ibid:49), but it is as much an exclusionary practice

(17)

serving to provide Kosovan civil society with the means to ‘other’ its soon-to-be-former-‘Self’ (Todovora, 1997). Put differently, internal othering. It is moreover symptomatic of the a-historicism of our ‘Self’ (Mälksoo, 2009; Thomas, 2017), given that conforming to the Enlargement-discourse eventually implies eroding the histories of socialism and the Ottoman Empire in the case of Kosovo (Rexhepi, 2016).

In this regard, internal othering serves as the defining feature of the undecidability of the relational configuration of the Enlargement-discourse vis-à-vis Kosovo and the WBs. As Howarth, however, reminds us (2010:321), “the logic of difference involves the loosening-up or disarticulation of equivalential chains of demands”. In Kosovo, the hegemonic structure of the Enlargement-discourse is constituted by this internal othering, which enables the disarticulation of discourses that might engage in a discursive struggle with the Enlargement-discourse. Internal othering is also constitutive of the signifiers of normativity and functionality representing the promise of a ‘fullness-to-come’ (ibid:326). This, however, is preconditioned on Kosovo having to overcome its internal ‘Other’ (their former-Selves). Together, this constitutes the central feature of the undecidability of the relational configuration of the Enlargement-discourse, which interrelates with the articulation of empty signifiers. Such features theoretically imply the failure of the hegemonic structure if made visible, thereby opening up spaces in which counterhegemonic discourse can emerge. In the following, I engage further with conceptualizations of the relations between Kosovo, the WBs and the EU. This, then, lays the conceptual ground and context for empirically analysing and identifying counterhegemonic spaces in Kosovo.

Kosovo, the WBs and the EU

Setting off, some scholars argue that the EU has had limited success with Enlargement in the WBs due to the limited levels of statehood in the region compared to the countries of the 2004-accession (Börzel, 2011). Börzel argues that the EU’s WB-policy, principally embodied in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), is similar in design to that of the Central and Eastern European Countries’ Association Agreements. The SAP-approach of empowering domestic reform coalitions has, however, not yielded significant results (Ker-Lindsay and Economides, 2012), attributed to the lack of “infrastructural capacities to introduce domestic change” (Börzel, 2011:8). In Kosovo, that materializes as the government still lack the effective authority over the Serb-dominated municipalities in the country’s north (Troncota, 2018). Contrarily, Keil (2018) and Beha and Hajrullahu (2020) argue that in fact the EU has

(18)

privileged societal stabilization over democratization in the WBs, by supporting semi-authoritarian reform coalitions in Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia.

In this view, Enlargement’s undecidability materializes through two interrelated implications: first, a literal implication in applying its two inconsistent empty signifiers to the publics of the WBs. It follows that EU integration is a matter of democratization (normativity) while simultaneously supporting stabilization (functionality), by cementing authoritarian leaders that merely “pay lip service to EU membership conditionality” (O’Brennan, 2014:237). Second, by promoting stability over democratization, the EU’s approach also run the risk of frustrating the relational configuration that ultimately constitutes its hegemonic discourse. Put differently, as long as the EU supports semi-authoritarian rulers e.g. Thaci in Kosovo, it risks associating progress and modernity in these contexts with the rule of semi-authoritarians. Here, Kosovans face an ambiguous choice between: 1) a corrupt, authoritarian elite that nonetheless represent progress and modernity and enjoy the backing of the EU (Keil, 2018; Beha and Hajruhallu, 2020) or 2) pursue a different path, which nonetheless is portrayed as pre-modern and traditional, which will likely not be admitted to the EU (Rexhepi, 2016). This is emblematic of the perception of the EU, Delanty’s normative ‘We’ (1995b:12), since it arguably assumes little to no political subjectivity on the receiving end of Enlargement (Todovora, 1997). It also demonstrates the functionalist belief that ensuring formal compliance will yield long-term results (Blokker, 2014). These points further pose as central features of the undecidability of Enlargement, and potential spaces for disarticulation.

Yabanci (2016) similarly contribute to the scope of counterhegemonic spaces in Kosovo, largely drawing on Noutcheva (2012) and Krasner and Risse (2014. In a constructivist study, she focuses on Kosovo due to a puzzling contradiction in Kosovan public opinion; on the one hand, policies deriving from the EU-conditionality are mistrusted and enjoy low levels of popular support, while on the other, support for EU membership is near unanimous from political elites to rural farmers (Yabanci, 2016:346). Similar to Noutcheva (2012), she emphasises that the potential success of conditionality depends on the EU enjoying popular legitimacy in Kosovo. She however finds that the EU possesses very weak long-term influence in the WBs deriving from a) the distant prospect of EU-accession and b) Kosovans feeling externalized in the integration process, thereby failing to generate popular consent and democratic deliberation (Yabanci, 2016:364). The 2019-election into government of the left-wing Vetevendosje-party and its leader Albin Kurti seems to reinforce this point as Kurti particularly have been a staunch critic of the role and influence of international and European missions in Kosovo (see e.g. Kurti, 2009; Yabanci, 2015). Importantly, the contradiction in

(19)

public opinion reflects the internalization of the Enlargement-discourse as the EU is still perceived as a future home by the majority of Kosovans (Yabanci, 2016).

The EU’s approach in Kosovo can thus be summarised as: The EU privileges stability over democratization (Keil, 2018) to ensure the success of Enlargement as formal compliance (Blokker, 2014). This in turn places Kosovans in an ambiguous choice-situation in which internal othering is embedded. Simultaneously, it imposes political conditionality on the elites whose designations the EU nonetheless endorse. This in turn generates public discontent given that the political leadership is seen as corrupt and the EU, then, as a close ally of the corrupt political elite (Yabanci, 2016:364). Public discontent is seen to emerge out of despair that the political process is beyond democratic decision-making and perceived as creating and institutionalizing dependency of the international. These are the “important consequences of the weak societal acceptance of the EU as a legitimate actor in Kosovo” (ibid:363). From this view, the discursive structure of Enlargement, its derivative undecidability and subsequent implications seem to persist today in Kosovo and the WBs (Yabanci, 2016; Noutcheva, 2012) and have done so since the early 2000’s (Malova and Dolny, 2011).

This points to the argument of this thesis. It argues that the Enlargement-discourse is embedded with empty signifiers of normativity (Bakalov, 2019) and functionality (Hansen and Williams, 1999), serving as the focal points of undecidability. These serve to naturalize the internal othering of Kosovans (Rexhepi, 2016; Howarth and Griggs, 2012) in providing a promise of a fullness-to-come (Howarth, 2010). However, it is argued, such discursive structure might be contested if made visible. It is the purpose of this thesis to investigate how we can identify such making-visible in Kosovo, assuming that it entails the opening up of spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses can emerge.

Methodology

The sections above outlined the theoretical framework of this thesis, adopting the ontological presupposition that “everything that is meaningful is ultimately produced through discursive systems of signification” (Biegon, 2016:25). Here it highlighted the framework of undecidability, emphasising the constitutive function of articulations of empty signifiers and ‘Others’ in relation to the European ‘Self’ (Todovora, 1997) in the Enlargement-discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). By reviewing literature of various sub-disciplines of IR, it has produced a theoretical, conceptual and contextual foundation on which to answer the research question guiding this thesis: how can we identify spaces in which counterhegemonic

(20)

discourses emerge? The following section outlines how the framework for answering this question is methodologically operationalized, how data has been collected and how the analysis will be conducted.

Key methodological influences

The methodology of this thesis finds its inspiration in various scholarly influences. Although tempting, the purpose of this thesis is not to study the path dependency of the Enlargement-discourse (Blokker, 2005:508), although the origins of Enlargement-discourses constitute a central question in RDT (Howarth and Griggs, 2012:324). Instead, it proceeds with a strong intertextual focus, although the ontology of this thesis does not conceive of discourses in solely linguistic terms. Rather it assumtes that “the properties of language hold for all meaningful and articulatory configurations”, yet in this view, institutions like the EU can be conceptualized as “more or less sedimented systems of discourse” (Howarth 2010,312). In that vein, two methodological influences have contributed in important ways to the methodology of this thesis.

First, Biegon’s (2016:81) intertextual approach of metaphor identification have inspired this thesis’ methodology of identifying empty signifiers and relational configurations. Importantly, Biegon’s approach aligns well with that of this thesis insofar as metaphors perform an essential task in hegemonizing demands through creating “analogical relations” by its articulation as empty signifiers (Howarth and Griggs, 2012:321). Furthermore, empty signifiers revolve around relational configurations (Howarth, 2010:313), why the determination of the former is intimately tied to the latter. Biegon’s approach, in this thesis, is three-fold: 1) read the text to establish a general understanding of the meaning, 2) determine the empty signifier and its relational configuration in the text-discourse, 3) establish the context of the empty signifier and its relational configuration (2016:81).

Second, Yabanci’s (2016) methodology and analysis of legitimacy in Kosovo has inspired this thesis in making claims about the hegemony of Enlargement in Kosovo in relation to which counterhegemonic spaces emerge. Here, I apply a discursive measure as inspired by Yabanci’s use of Easton’s important concepts of specific and diffuse support (1975). The former refers to the approval or critique of particular policies and institutions, whereas the latter refers to the “genuine trust and belief in the overall system of governance” (Yabanci, 2016:352). Distinguishing between the two allows this thesis to make claims about the relation between e.g. the diffuse support of the EU in Kosovo and the generation of particular counterhegemonic spaces. The interviews and EU discourses in relation to the measures of

(21)

support provide the empirical context from which to identify and understand the contexts of counterhegemonic spaces, i.e. normativity, functionality and internal othering.

Choice of case

Kosovo’s pre-accession context is the case chosen for exploring the emergence of counterhegemonic spaces, and reasoned as follows. 1) Its internationally contested independence in 2008 makes Kosovo historically unique and generates several implications in relation to Enlargement. Not only is it the least advanced country in the WBs in terms of pre-accession progress, five EU-member states (Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus and Greece) do not recognize Kosovo’s statehood. Kosovo’s Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) (Börzel, 2011), the central treaty governing relations between the EU and Kosovo, thus differs from its neighbours’ (see also Krasniqi, 2019 on the issue of visa liberalization for Kosovan citizens). 2) Although the country largely stabilized after 1999, the EU deployed it rule-of-law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo which possessed executive power during its initial years (Economides and Ker-Lindsay, 2015). This makes mutual engagement between Kosovo and the EU unique. 3) As a result of 1 and particularly 2, the international influence in Kosovo has been locally challenged, which recent events furthermore suggest. These are e.g. the victory of Vetevendojse at the October 2019-election, which is popularly deemed a left-wing populist party and staunch critics of the international missions in Kosovo. (Yabanci, 2015). Or the imposition of a 100% tariff on Serbian and Bosnian goods by the former Haradinaj-government (2017-2019). If these are counterhegemonic events, from which spaces do they emerge?

Getting at counterhegemonic discourses – multiple methods

The case study revolves around a multi-method approach. Three methods were used for data collection. First; primary material as press releases from the office of the Commissioner for Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR) were gathered, since NEAR is the principal EU-body engaging with pre-accession countries. The press releases were collected by searching for ‘Kosovo’ at the office’s website in the timeframe of January 2018 until March 2020, thereby totalling 21 texts. From this material, I analyse and identify the EU’s discourse vis-à-vis Kosovo. Second; secondary material as surveys of public opinion in Kosovo was gathered. Unfortunately, there are no Eurobarometer-surveys in Kosovo given the issue of recognition. I therefore draw upon other relevant international surveys available online from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2019) and the NGO, National Democratic Institute

(22)

(NDI, 2019). Both surveys received funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has been considered when engaging with their findings. The scrutinized surveys measure largely the same parameters, whose results have been cross-referenced with other surveys prior to their inclusion in this thesis. Cross-referencing showed largely similar results, why they are deemed relatively trustworthy. The secondary material will serve to provide a general picture of Kosovan sentiments in relation to counterhegemonic spaces.

Third; primary material was gathered through the qualitative method of interviewing. Here I conducted five semi-structured interviews with current and former civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of European Integration (MEI) of Kosovo. The interviews were based on an interview guide, revolving around three themes: perceptions of the EU; experience with Enlargement; perceptions of the Enlargement-experience of the Kosovan public. I chose the method of semi-structured interviews in order for the interviewees to elaborate on the issues they find important within the above themes. Such points necessarily denote the discourse within which they operate. The segment was chosen due to its exposure to the EU-agenda and its discourse. Besides possessing vast technical knowledge regarding Kosovo’s Enlargement-agenda, this segment has first-hand experience in dealing with the EU, which is of relevance to this thesis examining counterhegemonic spaces in relation to such EU discourse. All interviews were carried out as video-calls via Skype due to the global outbreak of corona-virus. The conversations were recorded for subsequent transcription with the consent of the interviewees, with whom I had email correspondences beforehand, informing them about the procedures of the interview. I also offered possibilities of anonymization1_{, which three of the interviewees requested. Out of} ethical concerns, I have chosen to anonymize the identities of all interviewees in the thesis2_.

Two analytical methods were similarly used to process the material. The primary material was principally approached as inspired by Biegon’s three-step method (2016) outlining in-text empty signifiers and relational configurations. A fourth step is then introduced as the in-text empty signifiers and relational configurations are coded as belonging to or falling outside the

1_{A standard request was sent to all interviewees after showing initial interest in participating} in the study. The request included information regarding the recording, transcription and role of the interviews in the thesis. Moreover, various degrees of anonymization were offered. The request can be forwarded on demand.

2_{Transcripts of the interviews can be forwarded as per request. Transcripts of the anonymous} interviewees have had their identities removed, and certain phrases have been concealed so as to fulfil their request of anonymity.

(23)

previously established clusters of empty signifiers of functionality and normativity and the relational configuration of internal othering. Importantly, the press releases are treated with precaution since these are carefully worded texts whose messages operate in a specific author-recipient context. Moreover, the interview-transcripts were read so as to identify intertextual issues and themes central to Kosovo’s Enlargement-agenda falling outside the above coding scheme. These two sets of processed primary material then provide a foundation from which to analyse the Enlargement-discourse vis-à-vis Kosovo and the potentials for counterhegemonic spaces. The secondary material was approached as inspired by Yabanci (2016). The surveys were first read to identify the measures relevant to the study of this thesis, e.g. sentiments on the EU, state institutions, EU-related issues. Then, these measures were classified as measures of specific or diffuse support, drawing on the conceptualizations of Easton (1975). This then provides a foundation in which to contextualize the analytical findings of the primary material, enabling claims as to the quality and relation of the counterhegemonic spaces.

The overall approach of this thesis is retroductive (Howarth and Griggs, 2012); an inconsistency between the EU’s rhetoric as a promoter of democracy and its functional dealings with Kosovo was observed. Then, I scrutinized literature that could generate a basis in terms of content and context from which to apply the theoretical framework looking to examine Enlargement’s receiving end. Here, I gathered primary and secondary material, which was coded as inspired by Biegon (2016) and Yabanci (2016). These methodological influences, then, offered viewpoints that both deviate and align to the theoretical and conceptual basis of this thesis. On that foundation, it proceeds to the analysis of counterhegemonic spaces. I thereby aim to study the social context on the receiving end of the accession process and use triangulation to increase the depth of understanding. Inspired by Noutcheva (2012) and Yabanci (2016), studying the local impact of Enlargement is a crucial precondition for understanding how counterhegemonic spaces emerge in relation to a hegemonic discourse. Understanding how and identifying the spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses emerge in relation to a hegemonic discourse is the principal purpose of this thesis.

Analysis

In the following, this thesis investigates how spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses emerge. It applies the analytical framework of undecidability, which means exploring

(24)

Enlargement’s empty signifiers of normativity and functionality and its relational configuration of internal othering. It is in the interrelation of these three analytical parameters, it argues, that we are enabled to identify spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses emerge and disarticulate the hegemonic discourse. The analysis is divided into three parts: 1) Enlargement’s empty signifiers, its relational configuration and their undecidability are analysed, leading me to identify five spaces in which counterhegemonic discourses can emerge and disarticulate Enlargement. Here, the EU’s discourse and its reproduction/disapproval among the interviewees are considered key variables in relation to potential counterhegemonic spaces. 2) I examine the issue of Kosovo’s visa liberalization to demonstrate the interrelations between the identified counterhegemonic spaces. 3) The secondary material is analysed and related to the spaces identified in the first part to make claims as to the existence of counterhegemonic spaces in Kosovo and their relation to the Enlargement-discourse. These findings are then discussed in relation to recent events in Kosovo, arguing that counterhegemonic spaces indeed emerge, however in relation to but not as a direct consequence of the Enlargement-discourse.

Functionality and normativity: the empty signifiers of Enlargement

In the following, this thesis examines the empty signifiers of the primary material. First, a recurring theme in the EU-press releases is the projection of the EU as a community of laws and values (EC, 2018b). This is then co-constituted by articulations of Enlargement as an “investment in peace, security and stability in Europe” (EC, 2018c) or in “stablility, peace and prosperity” (EC, 2020a) for Kosovo and the EU alike. Simultaneously, the basis of the Union is articulated as the rule of law (EC, 2018b) and various freedom(s), the respect of which is a key indicator of the EU accession process (EC, 2019). The cost of this investment for candidate countries is the comprehensive “modernisation” of one’s society, enabled by Enlargement itself, the process of which is embedded with “positive democratic, political, economic change” towards EU standards (EC, 2018c).

The wording of the EU’s discourse here is indicative of its latent ontological assumptions. For instance, the basis of the Union, i.e. the rule of law and respect for freedoms, demonstrates how one set of signifiers today characterize the membership norms of the Union, suitable for the political necessities of the time (Thomas, 2017). Enlargement’s aspired destination of a (European) society ruled by laws, then, reflects the empty signifier of normativity (Bakalov, 2019). Consequently, the Union is projected as a unitary and normative space, which is the aspired destination for Kosovo. However, only by carrying out the

(25)

Enlargement-agenda, i.e. modernising, can Kosovo necessarily achieve an equivalent harmonious society. The use of the metaphor of ‘investment’ in this regard perform a crucial role as it reflects the empty signifier of functionality (Hansen and Williams 1999). The process of reaching the normative destination, thus, is not a political but rather a functional one, since the metaphor of investing does not connote a political nor normative act. Rather, it implies a functional act in which an active investment yields a passive benefit. Thus, normativity and functionality are present in the Enlargement-discourse articulating a particular vision of ‘the European’. However, the discursive structure possesses undecidability insofar as the process of reaching this destination of a society ruled by laws is an inherently political one. As the 1988-ruling of the European Court of Justice regarding Danish beer and soft-drink containers demonstrate (ECJ, 1988): even the most functional of issues, as liquid containers, derive from political decision-making.

The origins of this discourse, Blokker argues (2005:515), stems from the neo-utiliatarianist belief that the proper state institutions, by means of its design, will eventually shape the subjects of that institution. However, as the above findings indicate, the normative content of Kosovo’s destination (a community of laws and values) is pre-fabricated. In other words, progressing with Enlargement means adopting a pre-fabricated design of institutions, which subsequently shape its subjects (functionality). The undecidability, therefore, lies in the simultaneous promotion of the empty signifiers of normativity, i.e. rule of law and democracy, and functionality, i.e. implementing a pre-fabricated societal design. Put differently, asking Kosovans to become democratic while denying them the self-determination to design their domestic institutions constitute a discursive paradox. This, I argue, is one of the central features of the undecidability of the Enlargement-discourse, because its making-visible, or disarticulation, can potentially entail the failure of its discursive structure. I label this the neo-utilitarianist space.

Turning to the interviewees, the stated perceptions of the EU in many ways suggest that the empty signifiers of functionality and normativity are being reproduced intertwiningly, although to varying extents. All interview persons (IPs) contend to the claim that the EU possesses certain values that Kosovo should aspire to. Generally, they refer to the EU as possessing principles and values relating to “stable and democratic institutions […] and respect for rights” (Transcript D:2), “democracy, freedom, human rights” (Transcript B:3) or “Western, progressive, democratic values” (Transcript C:9). Although differing in terms of the extent to which they subscribe to these signifiers of normativity, their use of such is an interesting observation. In our terminology, their reproduction of the normativity-signifier

(26)

reflects the breadth of the equivalential chain of the discourse of Enlargement. Or simply, the degree of Enlargement’s hegemony. Similarly, IP1 and 2 argue that over the past few decades Kosovans have generally perceived Kosovo as part of the European family (Transcript A:2), although Kosovo is still “learning how to apply” these European values (Transcript B:3).

Thus, the IPs are not only contending to the signifiers of Enlargement, but as the last citation demonstrates, some are even reproducing the metaphorical approach of ‘learning’ to act in a European fashion (Hülsse, 2006). IP3 and 5 equally use the ‘homework’ metaphor (Transcript C:5; Transcript E:1). This resembles the widespread articulations in media outlets, where Enlargement is a matter of doing one’s ‘homework’ (see e.g. Collaku and Marzouk, 2010). It also resembles the arguments of e.g. Todovora (1997) and Delanty (1995b) relating to the idea of a ‘privileged’ European ‘We’ vis-à-vis its ‘Others’, rooted in 19th_century European imperialism (Behr, 2007:242). The use of the ‘homework’ metaphor essentially demonstrate how the IPs reproduce a depiction of Kosovo as the student and the EU as the teacher. Significantly, the ‘homework’ metaphor connotes a purely functional relation: in order for the student to progress, it has to be attentive to the teacher. Similarly, in the case of Kosovo and the Enlargement-discourse, it serves as an empty signifier of functionality, by naturalizing the, arguably, asymmetrical relation between Kosovo and the EU

Although this also relates to the relational configuration of the empty signifiers, it demonstrates that such signifiers and articulations of Enlargement have internalized among some Kosovans at least. Consequently, the intertwined use of the empty signifiers of functionality and normativity by the IPs demonstrate the character and degree of the hegemony of the Enlargement-discourse in Kosovo. From our perspective, increasing awareness of the asymmetrical relation between Kosovo and the EU, and the articulations by which it seeks to naturalize such asymmetry necessarily possess the potential for disarticulating the hegemonic discursive structure. Hence, this element of the Enlargement-discourse equally constitutes a central feature of its undecidability, although not explicitly identified by the IPs as such. This is another space in which counterhegemonic discourses can emerge. I label this the asymmetric space. Let us now turn to the relational configuration of the empty signifiers of functionality and normativity.

Internal othering: Enlargement’s relational configuration

Here, I look to articulations of internal othering in order to see clearer the exclusionary practices of the Enlargement-discourse. Identifying what ‘Other’ Kosovans need to overcome provides the context for rendering the empty signifiers intelligible and accordingly also the

(27)

promise of Enlargement, i.e. a ‘complete’, European identity. Internal othering is a recurring, yet, subtle theme in the press releases, given that the target-recipients of the statements are both member states and candidate countries. An all-encompassing example, in this regard, is the Commission’s statement accompanying the presentation of its new Union-wide strategy (EC, 2018a) towards the WBs. Here it states that the WB-countries, particularly Serbia and Kosovo, need “to overcome the legacy of the past” well before accession to the Union and that meeting the EU membership criteria is “in their own interest” (EC, 2018d). These excerpts exhibit excellently the ‘internal othering’ of the Enlargement-discourse.

Setting off, overcoming the legacy of one’s past appears as a noble precondition. However, talking of such before there can be talk of accession implicitly points towards an underlying assumption of violence residing in the realm of the ‘non-European’. Becoming European as embracing the community of laws and values by means of modernizing one’s society (resembling the neo-utilitarianist space), then, necessitates leaving one’s historical legacy behind. This effectively ‘others’ the ‘Selves’ of the formerly conflicting parties since had that overcoming already taken place, then, we must assume, it would not be a decisive impediment for talking of accession. For Kosovans, then, othering onself to attain the alleged full identity of the European ‘Self’ is a pre-condition for engaging in the Enlargement process. Otherness here has a very subtle character (Herschinger, 2012), but constitutes a central feature of Enlargement’s undecidability. Moreover, the derogation of the deeply sensitive issue of Kosovos’ historical relations with Serbia reflects the alleged ahistoricism of the EU by portraying Kosovo’s reconciliation as a mere matter of ‘overcoming’ (Rexhepi, 2016). Put differently, the above discursive structure, which evolves around historical reconciliation as a functional issue based on the paradoxical ‘othering’ of oneself, enables a space in which counterhegemonic discourses can disarticulate the Enlargement-discourse. I label this the historico-paradoxical space.

Moreover, the historico-paradoxical space also suggests a lack of political determination to solve the conflict by the formerly-warring parties. This point is similarly reflected e.g. in the remarks of the High Representative of the Union, Josep Borrell, during a visit to Kosovo in January 2020 when EU funding was revealed for the refurbishment of a heavily-polluting power plant. Here, Borrell stated that the EU “hope[s] and expect[s] that our determination will be matched by that of Kosovo’s policy-makers” (EC, 2020b). The issue of air pollution, it seems, will only be tackled if the EU shows determination which the Kosovan political elite can – or ought to – match.

(28)

This suggests that what stands in between Kosovo and the attaining of non-violence and environmentally-friendly power plants, it follows, is simply the Kosovan elite’s political determination to modernise. Here the asymmetric and historico-paradoxical spaces overlap, since it is seemingly by virtue of their logics that Kosovo should continue on the path of “positive democratic, political and economic change” (EC, 2018c). However, a distinct logic also operates here: The ‘other’ blocking the attainability of a full identity is seemingly the Kosovans themselves, i.e. internal othering. Yet, here, it is not simply a matter of history nor learning to attain ‘positive change’, rather it is Kosovans who are indeterminate as to the possibility of their societies to attain such ‘positive change’. This constitutes another feature of undecidability of the relational configuration of Enlargement, since it aims at naturalizing the projection of the EU as a normative and functional actor and as the future destination of Kosovo. It is another space in which counterhegemonic discourses can disarticulate such naturalized projections. I label this the elite space.

Turning to the interviewees, IP2 shared how “a lot of people in the EU” see Kosovo as a Muslim country, although IP2 see Kosovans as being largely religiously indifferent (Transcript B:3). This illustrates excellently the operation of Enlargement’s relational configuration, which in this case is articulated by EU officials affiliated with IP2. Furthermore, IP2 states that “but realistically, you stop anybody on the street in Prishtina, and they will tell you that we [Kosovans] share the same values as the free nations in Europe” (Transcript B:4). The perception operating here is similar to Rexhepi’s (2016) dichotomy between being a Muslim country – alleged by the EU counterparts of IP2 – and being a free nation in Europe.

IP2’s example suggests that Kosovo as a Muslim country is seemingly incompatible with the values of the EU. Here we see the operation of the relational configuration by means of tangibility (Delanty, 1995b; Todovora, 1997), in that alleged religious differences (Muslim-Christian heritages) legitimize an articulation of a politico-antagonistic frontier. This, equally, produces an ‘internal other’ which Kosovo needs to overcome in order to become ‘fully European’. This is another space in which counterhegemonic discourses may disarticulate Enlargement’s relational configuration, given that religion does not inform the values of Kosovan society in the minds of Kosovans. I label this the religious space. As displayed, however, both measures of differentiation apply to Kosovo, implying that the internal ‘other’ to overcome is, at least, two-fold. These two spaces therefore stand central in the undecidability of the relational configuration of the Enlargement-discourse