To be a voice
A study of exiled Iranian activists in Norway
Helen Hillevi Ruud
Communication for Development One-year master
15 Credits
Autumn semester 2018
Ackowledgments:
Thanks to Malmö University for the possibility to take a Master’s degree online, part time, in a field that lets me combine my interests in communication and in development.
Thanks to my supervisor, Anders Høg Hansen, and to the rest of the ComDev staff.
Abstract:
Social media and increased transnational communication has given new life to activism for social change in Iran. As seen in the Iranian Green Movement in 2009, the introduction of social media gave new possibilities for activism across borders. Activists in the diaspora have been significant contributors in social and politicial movements in Iran, such as the Green Movement in 2009 and the more recent My Stealthy Freedom. This master thesis investigates the role of the diaspora in promoting social change in Iran, with Iranian exiled activists in Norway as a case study. Through in-depth interviews with prominent key activists and grassroot activists in Norway, supported by existing theories on diaspora, transnationalism and polymedia, this study explores how, and through which media, activists in exile in Norway contribute as intermediaries to build leverage against Iran’s regime. The study also asks whether the activists, in this «role», experience a gap between themselves and their contacts in Iran, and to what extent their activism has a clear long term perspective or aspiration. This study finds that the fragmented character of the Iranian diaspora in Norway as well as the situation of being in exile affects in different ways how activism is practised. Big actors such as Iran Human Rights seem to have a more prominent voice than others. A common feature for all activists in this study is a generally positive view for the future of Iran in terms of social change.
Table of Contents
Preface ... 6
Introduction ... 7
Background: The role of the Iranian diaspora in transnational activism ... 8
Why Norway? ... 10
Context and theory ... 12
Transnational networks and activism ... 12
Mirca Madianou: Transnational communication and polymedia ... 14
The Iranian diaspora – a heterogeneous community ... 15
The relationship between online and offline activities ... 16
The relationship between the local and the transnational ... 17
Methodology ... 19
Findings and analysis ... 21
The Iranian diaspora in Norway ... 21
Iran Human Rights ... 23
To be a voice: demonstrations and radio debates ... 24
Writing for awareness: the journalist and the poet ... 26
Transnational activism and the theory of polymedia ... 27
A narrowing gap? ... 29
The conditions for activism ... 30
Future aspirations and perspective ... 33
”I hate the word exile. Exile is a title that means you cannot make your home in a different place. It means you introduce yourself with borders, not with yourself as a human being, not with your
Preface
My interest for Iran began when I worked as a volunteer for the Red Cross in my home town in Norway in 2009. I was in charge of organizing activities for asylum seekers, and at that time Norway had received a high number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, as well as a relatively high number from Iran, among other countries. Later I continued this work as an activity leader and information consultant for a reception centre for asylum seekers.
What first caught my attention was the Persian language. Being a language enthusiast (and journalist) I became interested in the language because of its beautiful sound. A few years later I completed an introduction course in Persian at the University of Uppsala in Sweden.
Another reason for my interest in Iran is connected to my interest in the country’s growing movement for women’s rights. I became familiar with the online social movement My Stealthy Freedom, started by Iranian expat activist and journalist Masih Alinejad, in where women in Iran take pictures of themselves wearing no hijab (hijab is compulsory for women) and post them online. I learned that, despite strict authoritarian laws towards women in Iran, something is now in motion.
My Stealthy Freedom fostered a similar campaign, #WhiteWednesdays, in where women take pictures of themselves wearing white or no hijabs and get them posted on Facebook. Then, during the uprisings in Iran in late 2017 and January 2018, a woman tied a white hijab on a stick and waved it in the air on Revolution Street in Tehran. This symbolic gesture for women’s rights was copied by women across the country and the movement flourished on social media under the hashtag #GirlsOfRevolutionStreet. It received international attention, and when the news reached Norway, one my informants for this degree project was interviewed. His words about the movement were promising: «What we see now is the beginning of a civil movement that I think will become something very big».
Introduction
Morley and Robins put it well when citing the 1986 Commision of the European Communities that new media technologies «seem to make a mockery of borders and frontiers» (Morley and Robins, 1995, p. 176). As seen in the Iranian Green Movement in 2009, when protests broke out in Iran after the presidential election, the introduction of new media has opened up new ways for activists in Iran to promote social change and human rights in the country (Elson et al., 2012) both inside Iran as well as to the international community. The Green Movement is a frequent example of one of the first social movements that demonstrate the significance of new media in such movements. New media enables communication to take place beyond borders and make international solidarity easier and quicker (Aday et al, 2010, p. 24). Activists inside Iran and Iranians in the diaspora are connected online despite the restrictions imposed by the Iranian government (Tufecki, 2017). Moreover, new media implies a function that exceeds the purpose of activism, as Iranians in the diaspora also use social media «as a tool to connect with their roots to the Iranian society» (Khonsari, 2014).
Social movements or campaigns such as My Stealthy Freedom can be called «extentions» of the protests that occured during the movement in 2009 (Koo, 2016, p. 145). Because women’s rights were part of the agenda in the Green Movement, many women activists were forced to leave the country. Furthermore, My Stealthy Freedom, and the campaigns that later have emerged from it (such as White Wednesdays and #GirlsOfRevolutionStreet) are all recent examples of how social media is used in activism in the Islamic Republic and supported and extended by the Iranian diasporas.
Activists in exile play a significant role in what could be called a growing civil advocacy for social change in Iran. Marcus Michaelsen is a researcher with a PhD in Media and Communication studies with a dissertation on Internet’s role for political change in Iran. He states that:
«Exiled activists engaged for political change and human rights in Iran often act as intermediaries channeling information and expertise to and from the borders in order to bypass and build up leverage against authoritarian politics of control and repression.» (Michaelsen, 2016)
With this description as a starting point, this study aims to examine the role of the diaspora in activism for social change in Iran, with the Iranian exiled activists in Norway as a case study. On the basis of Michaelsen’s description, I seek to answer the following question: How and to which extent do Iranian activists in Norway contribute as intermediaries and build leverage against
the Iranian regime? Do they experience a gap, in terms of means to bring about social change, between themselves and their contacts and collaborators in Iran?
These questions are discussed in the light of theories of transnationalism, features of the Iranian diaspora as well as the conditions for activism in the state of being in exile1. This study also investigates the role of new media in activism: In the light of Mirca Madianou’s theory on
polymedia, I aim to show how activists make use of different media and thus how different media complement each other in the activism practises.
Finally, this thesis will study the future aspirations of the activists: What thoughts do they have about their home country in terms of social change and the future? To which extent does their activism have a clear long term perspective or aspiration?
Background: The role of the Iranian diaspora in transnational activism
Iran’s turbulent history is marked by several events that has brought about massive protests and changes (Ehmer, 2013), with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 as the most dramatic and well known event. Another, more recent uprising is the Green Movement in 2009, after the presidential election when the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected and announced the winner, and protests broke out (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Ehmer, Werwitzke and Wilke; Raja, 2013). During the time that followed, the conservatives in power in Iran have increasingly tried to take control of Iran’s civil society by arresting activists, shutting down newspapers and hindering transnational contact and activity in NGOs (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009). Many Iranians, including prominent political and human rights activists had to leave the country, as many had before them.
Today, basic human rights are severely threatened in many areas. One example is the extensive use of death penalty. According to the Human Rights Watch world report 2018, executions were carried out «at a high rate» in 2017 by the Iranian judiciary especially for drug offences, but also for other acts considered as crimes to be punished by death penalty. These include acts such as ««insulting the prophet, apostasy, same-sex relations, adultery, and certain non-violent drug-related offences» (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 277). Other human rights violations in Iran in 2017 involved unfair treatment of prisoners, lack of freedom of expression, imprisonment of
1 Theories on social movements would also have been relevant in this study. However, to focus on Iran specifically, as well activism in the exile situation, theoretical keywords such as Iranian diaspora, exile and transnationalism were chosen. The research on the Iranian diaspora by Ghorashi as well as Michaelsens research on Iran’s exiled activists contribute to this focus. Madianou’s theory on polymedia was chosen to maintain the focus on the importance of social media in the activism practises of the informants.
human rights defenders, discrimination of women and discrimination of religious and sexual minorities and people with disabilities (ibid).
Iranian activists in the diaspora are important intermediaries and contributors in trans-national activism. During the Green Movement in 2009, when the Iranian government shut down social media platforms such as Facebook, activists in Iran got around the blocking by using proxy servers and by e-mailing content such as videos to their contacts outside Iran, who then uploaded the videos for them (Aday et al, 2010, p. 21). Exiled Iranians also collected and translated
information coming from Iran and thus helped informing a worldwide audience on what was going on (Werwitzke and Wilke, 2013 p. 290). They helped international organizations to get in touch with Iranians in Iran, e-mailed Youtube videos to Iran when Youtube could not be accessed inside the country, and took pictures of inaccessible websites (ibid). During the post-election period, they contributed in setting up proxy servers, together with family and friends of protesters in Iran as well as other supporters. This support was vital in getting around the internet censorship (Mueller and Huellen, 2012).
Iranians in the diaspora also assisted their friends and relatives in Iran in how to protect their identities online by e-mailing primers on safe Internet usage (Bahjogli, 2012). They also played a crucial role in spreading the message of the movement online. Twitter was one of the main communication tools used mainly by Iranians in the diaspora (Khonsari, 2014). They posted their tweets «at a rate of about 30 new tweets per minute in the days immediately following the election» under the #IranElection hashtag (ibid). The hashtag was the second most popular topic on Twitter in 2009 (Elson et al, Khonsari 2014).
What is more, Aday et al, citing Keck and Sikkink, point out that when activism inside an oppressive regime like Iran does not have any effect on the authorities, organisations in these countries can turn to human rights organisations in the «global north» to address their issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Aday et al, 2010, p. 24; Bassano, 2014). These organisations can in turn appeal to the authorities of the «global north» countries to again put pressure on, in this case, Iran to put an end to their human rights violations, resulting in what can be called a «boomerang effect» (ibid). Similarly, activists outside Iran can help activists living under the oppressive regime to put pressure on the regime. For a boomerang effect to happen it is necessary to have transnational networks of activists in states that support as well as provide tools that can be used to put pressure on the oppressive regime (Aday et al, 2010).
In December 2017 protests against the Iranian government broke out again in Iran. It was the largest uprising in Iran since 2009 (Eltagouri, 2018). At first, it was a protest addressing the economic difficulties in the country, but soon it developed into demonstrations against the
theocratic regime (ibid). The protests were supported by the Iranian diaspora in different ways. Exile journalist Roohollah Zam run a channel on the messaging app Telegram (Radcliffe and Lam, 2018) which was used and followed by protesters in Iran. The channel was then closed by Telegram and soon after the Telegram app itself was shut down by the Iranian government (ibid). In Norway, exile activists supported and participated in the protests both online and offline. Iranians exiles, including the organization Iranske Politiske Fanger for Fritt Iran (Iranian Political Prisoners for a Free Iran) arranged demonstrations in Oslo in solidarity with the protesters in Iran.
This thesis also examines the role of new media in the activism practices of the Iranian activists in Norway. Since the Green Movement in 2009, new social media tools have been
introduced in Iran and they were actively used in the latest protests in December 2017 and January 2018. Since 2009, social media had now become established communication tools in Iran.
As Radcliffe and Lam highlight in their report on Social Media in the Middle East in 2017, BBC stated during the uprising that «in a tightly controlled media environment, much of the information about the demonstrations has emerged via social media, and platforms like Telegram and Instagram have been used extensively by protesters». A tweet by the CEO of the Google company Jigsaw, Jared Cohen, is included in the report to highlight the situation:
Why Norway?
The reason for choosing Norway as a case for this study is not out of convenience only. It is also a relevant country for a study because of the organisation Iran Human Rights, which has its base in Oslo. This indicates that Oslo or Norway could be one of the hubs for activism in the Iranian
Tweet by Jared Cohen, Jigsaw CEO and Advisor to Executive Chairman of Alphabet. Source: "Social Media in the Middle East: The Story of 2017". Radcliffe and A. Lam, University of Oregon, School of Journalism and Communication.
diaspora. According to the Statistics Norway, about 17700 Iranian immigrants live in Norway, as of 5th March 2018. Nine out of ten Iranians in Norway came as refugees or asylum seekers, most of them as political refugees (Henriksen, 2007; Alghasi, 2011). Regarding human rights actors, Iran Human Rights (IHR) is probably the most known Iranian human rights actor in Norway, apart from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (although this is my personal assumption based on the fact that IHR is very often mentioned and quoted in Norwegian media when Iran is covered). IHR was established in 2005 and portrays itself on its website as a «non-partisan and politically independent organization» with the vision of «building a strong civil society, through empowerment of the citizens, promoting and defending the human rights as described in the
universal declaration of the human rights.» It has a strong focus on the use of dealth penalty in Iran, and one of its main aims is to «create an abolitionist movement in Iran by increasing awareness about the death penalty» (from the IHR website).
Another actor that is occasionally mentioned in Norwegian media is Iranske Politiske Fanger for Fritt Iran (Iranian Political Prisoners for a Free Iran), or IPFFI. The association belongs to the People’s Mujahedin and is seen as controversial in Iran and also to a large extent in the Iranian diaspora. Internationally, People’s Mujahedin was for a long time seen as a terrorist group, but was taken off the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations in 2009 (Brunnstrom, 2012) and the US State Department’s list in 2012 (Shane, 2012). IPFFI arranges demonstrations in
solidarity with protesters in Iran, but otherwise it does not seem very active in the Norwegian public sphere.
Another actor that can be found is the former Radio Sedaye, that was a part of an Oslo based international radio station called Inter FM. After the Norwegian radio turned digital and the FM radio network was switched off, and Radio Sedaye was transfered to Silkeveien Radio, that was established in 2015 (Lomeland, 2016; Malm, 2016; Foreningen norsk lokalradio, 2015).
Furthermore, apart from these actors, Norway is home to poet, journalist and human rights activist Asieh Amini. She was the founder of the Iranian «Stop Stoning Forever» campaign in 2006 (Secor, 2016) and has received several awards for her poetry and activism. She fled to Norway in 2009, and in 2011 she published her poetry collection «Kom ikke til mine drømmer med gevær» («Do not enter my dreams with a gun») (Amini, 2011; Secor, 2016).
On the basis of this information about these different actors, together with the current location of me as a researcher, Norway was chosen as a case for this study.
The next section is two-fold. In the first part I will address transnational activism and networks in general. I will then continue by focusing on the Iranian diaspora in particular. In order to understand activism in the Iranian diaspora, it is useful to understand the general characteristics
and tendencies of the diaspora and therefore how its nature potentially affects activism among its members. The state of being in exile brings about questions about identity, which is also central in research on diaspora communities. Furthermore, research on transnational activism include studying the relationship between online and offline, as well as local and transnational activities.
Context and theory
Transnational networks and activism
Networks across borders is of course not a new phenomenon. The same applies to immigration. Examples of how people have always emigrated and how globalization is not recent exceeds the scope of this thesis. However, what is new for our time is that the amount of conflicts has grown and the number of immigrants has therefore increased (Alonso, 2010). Massive immigration to «Western» countries in Europe, North America and Australia has formed large diasporic
communities in these parts of the world (Alghasi, 2011). In consequence, transnational connections or transnationalism between immigrants has increased (Tarrow, 2005, p. 49). These connections exceed the acts of phone calls, chatting, e-mails and exchanging information over the internet, and can also in a broader sense include all other types of connections such as money transactions to family members at home or different kinds of involvement in home country politics (ibid). However, this study focuses specifically on activism from exile, which also involves exiled activists’ connections with the home country in their activism practises, that is, transnational activism.
Transnational activism today is certainly not what it would look like only a few years ago. What is characteristic for our time and what is now almost becoming an outdated point to make is the advent of the internet, including different social media platforms, in transnational
communication. For transnational activism the impact of social media is groundbreaking.
New media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, or rather newer applications such as Whatsapp and Telegram allow activists around the world to form online transnational activist networks (Allen, 2013) and diasporic communities in general to keep in touch in an easier way than before. In an interconnected world, people are able to «combine the resources and opportunities of their own societies into transnational networks» (Tarrow, 2005, p. 43) through «activism beyond
borders» (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005). In our case, as we have seen, the introduction of and access to new media added a new dimension to activism for Iranians both in and outside Iran. For exiled activists, combining their resources and opportunities into transnational networks means
that they do not, or do not have to, abandon their own societies and identities, but can combine and use them in their transnational activism. In addition, transnational activists often begin their
activism in their home countries, and bring this experience to their new home countries in exile. This is also true for Iranian activists in Norway.
Furthermore, transnational activists are often well educated and they know how to make use of the means of communication in an interconnected environment (Tarrow, 2005, p. 43). A high level of education also applies to the Iranian diaspora, as most of the emigrated Iranians have higher education (Alghasi, 2011). This is also true for most of the informants in this study.
As exiled activists (as can be said about immigrants in general) combine their resources and knowledge from home and the potential opportunities in their new home countries, it can be said that they live in two worlds, namely «the world of their adopted countries and the world of their homelands» (Tarrow, 2005, p. 48). As Aghvami expresses in her master’s thesis about exiled Iranian bloggers, this world of their homeland can be expressed through their blogging or the «cyber
sphere», through which they create an «imaginary national community» in order to stay connected to and maintain a sense of belonging to their home country (Aghvami, 2009). This sense of
belonging is also expressed in their activism. Aghvami observes that Iranian bloggers in exile have created what she calls a «cyber community of Iranianness» in where they «engage in the social and political development in their homeland and [...] express concerns for a homeland they were forced to leave behind» (Aghvami, 2009, p. 51). This involves, as Aghvami points out, «long-distance activism» through their blogging, connected with a feeling of nostalgia towards their home country (ibid).
I would argue that the introduction of different social media platforms brings a potential of blurring the «imaginary» character of transnational online activism, as communication through these platforms are more instant and sometimes more direct between people (such as through WhatsApp or Telegram). This also includes communication between the activists in diaspora and their families and friends, that also acts as a bridge between the two worlds of their adopted countries and their homeland.
Furthermore, the personal connections to family and friends that activists have can turn out as useful also in their activism practices, for example by maintaining contact and potentially continue cooperation with fellow activists in Iran, by receiving videos and photos of relevance for their message in their activism, as well as access information from inside Iran. This is another example of how activists can combine their resources and knowledge from home with opportunities in their new home countries.
Mirca Madianou: Transnational communication and polymedia
Mirca Madianou has studied new media in relation to interpersonal communication in migration. She describes transnational communication through new media as a complex «environment» of different communication opportunities or «polymedia» (Madianou, 2014, p. 323) in which its users find their ways in communicating through different complementary media platforms. Each type of media is defined in relation with other media in this environment, and thus, «what one media platform cannot achieve, can be accomplished by another» (ibid). The users in this environment of polymedia switch between the media in accordance with what they want to achieve (Madianou and Miller, 2012, p. 175). For example, what can’t be achieved by using What’sApp, can instead be done by using Skype, and so on. An application or communication tool is defined by not only what they are, but also what they are not.
This theory of an environment of communication opportunities in a migration context is relevant to our study of activism between diaspora and home country. Not only because of its focus on use of new media, but because of its connection with migration. In fact, Madianou shows that new media is not only a communication tool between people who have left their country and their left-behind families and friends, but new media also contributes in making migration easier because of its possibilities to communicate with friends and family. It can therefore be argued that new media also contributes in «changing migration patterns» (Madianou, 2014, p. 341). Studies show that new media in fact can help strengthen connections between diasporas and their common «geographical identity» (Madianou and Miller, 2012; Van den Bos and Nell, 2006).
In this regard it is relevant to mention Michaelsen’s observation that Iranian political exiles interviewed after they fled Iran during the 2009 uprising stated that thet did not leave the country only because of threats or security issues, but because they wished to continue their activism from outside Iran (Michaelsen, 2016, p. 7). In line with Madianou it can therefore be argued that the possibilities offered by new media lowers the threshold for migration for some activists. The nature of their activism, then, depends on the conditions or opportunities existing in their new home countries (Tarrow, 2005, p. 52) As he states, «in Western Europe there is a growing evidence that immigrant groups are bringing their local resources to the politics of their home countries» (Tarrow, 2005, p. 53).
On the other hand, people that were not activists in their home countries, might become inspired to engage in activism in their host countries. In her research on Iranian refugee women in the diaspora, Bauer has noted that the exile situation can create a new awareness among the Iranian
women about gender based inequalities and in fact revitalize their engagement in women’s rights (Bauer, 2000).
In their new home countries, exiled Iranians then continue to maintain their contact with their friends and family at home, with each other in the Iranian communities and with their new contacts and relations in their host country. This is unique for diasporas: According to Alonso and Oiarzabal, what makes diasporas different from other ethnic minority groups who have relocated from their homelands are the ties that are maintained at the same time between the diaspora communities, the home countries and the «host» countries (Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010).
In the next section I will address studies on the Iranian diaspora in particular, focusing on one of its main characteristics.
The Iranian diaspora – a heterogeneous community
As we have already touched upon, studies on diaspora communities and transnational networks between the diaspora and the homeland often brings about reflections upon identity. Increased migration to European or «Western» countries already contributes to a blurring of national identities (that is considered by some as threatening). With this in mind, studying diaspora communities from a transnational perspective is therefore important because it «could help us to rethink the notions of territory and identity» (Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009, p. 668).
A community such as Iranians in exile in for example Norway is not one homogenous entity (Bauer, 2000; Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009). It is a diverse community that consists of different generations with different experiences, and it changes when new people arrive (Bauer, 2000). In fact, there can be groups of people within a network that are unaware of one another (Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009). For example, Ghorashi (1997) has written about the lack of a strong collective among Iranians in the Netherlands.
This fragmented character of a diaspora community is also true for Iranians in Norway. For example, in relation to culture, Alghasi recognises a Norwegian-Iranian community that «is not committed to a collective reproduction of its own culture and tradition» but rather has «highly subjective identity strategies and relations to the Norwegian society»2 (Alghasi, 2011). In spite of this subjectivity, the Norwegian-Iranian community does have a few common features. Generally, he Iranian community (or communities) in Norway can be characterised as secular and sometimes even anti-Islamic, and as immigrants generally in Norway, they mostly sympathise with political
parties on the left, according to Alghasi. (The last point is however not confirmed by other sources in this study, nor by my informants.) In addition, most of the Iranians in Norway fled Iran because they were in opposition to the Iranian authorities (ibid). However, they still come from different political stances, which have led to mutual skepticism and «caution» that is still present in the Iranian-Norwegian community today (ibid).
In general, in all cases of trying to define the term diaspora, it carries a sense of
displacement. Alonso and Oiarzabal cite Sökefeld who argues that «the multiplicity of different definitions of diaspora notwithstanding, all [are] based upon a decisive condition of space: the spatial separation of the diaspora community from ‘its’ home-land. Diaspora is about not being there» (Sökefeld, 2002; Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010, p. 4).
According to Shahidian, a common defining feature of especially Iranian leftist activists in exile is that they «share similar experiences of banishment, struggle, and a desire for return under favorable conditions» (Shahidian, 2001). Generally the exile experience also involves a feeling of decline in status (ibid). Ghorashi in turn talks about their «multiple identities», that is, conflicting feelings of being a stranger in their homeland and the feeling of being excluded in their new home countries and claims that these conflicting identities makes them «extremely active in the present» (Ghorashi, 2003).
Alghasi interestingly notes that the Green Movement has contributed to a stronger feeling of togetherness among the Iranian diaspora. When demonstrations break out in Iran, Iranians in the diaspora gather for demonstrations in solidarity with the protesters at home. This is confirmed by one of my informants for this study: «when things happen in Iran, it’s easier to mobilise Iranians in Norway». Similarly, according to the same informant, when uprisings calm down and mass
demonstrations cease in Iran, activism (at least in the shape of mass demonstrations) among Iranians in Norway goes into hibernation.
The relationship between online and offline activities
The online environment is of course not separated, or disconnected, from the offline world. Protests in the streets, squares and parks are organized online and posted on social media channels. Events and conferences are covered in the media and commented online. The «networked public sphere» is a «complex interaction of publics, online and offline, all intertwined, multiple,
connected» (Tufecki, 2017). This public sphere does not exist online only, or mostly, but rather the digital media have brought new ways of communicating and organizing in this sphere (ibid). Also, as pointed out by Postill and Pink (2012), social media activism is not something that happens
«exclusively online». Studying social media activism and movements therefore also includes studying the offline activities and how they are connected to the online practises. Similarly, Ghorashi and Boersma point out the necessity to study how the online activities within a
community are connected to its offline environment, identity and power (Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009, p. 671). An example of the latter is, as I will address later, how the nation state might influence transnational communication and activism.
In their research on transnational online networks among Iranian and Turkish-Kurdish immigrants in the Netherlands, Van den Bos and Nell investigate the relationship between online interaction and the offline, local and national context. They challenge the idea that transnational online interaction platforms (such as blogs and websites, as this research was conducted before the advent of Facebook and Twitter) might blur territory-connected identity. The boundaries might be blurred by the introduction of online communication, however territoriality («persistent ties to a specific territory») is not (Van den Bos and Nell, 2006). In the offline context, the Iranian communities in the Netherlands were few and scattered, and these were reflected in the online context. National links between Turkish-Kurdish were strongly represented online. Therefore, according to Van den Bos and Nell, transnational online interaction can contribute to strengthen national identity (ibid).
The relationship between the local and the transnational
For Ghorashi and Tavakoli, transnationalism revolves around how the local space gets influenced by transnational activities. Similarly, what happens at a local level has an impact on transnational interactions. The transnational and local spaces «overlap and interact», and when this happens, one of the actors in this transnational space can become «the nation state itself» (Ghorashi and Tavakoli, 2006, p. 90). Sometimes this is not of a beneficial character. In fact, these links can have a
«paradoxical impact» for activists in Iran, as «transnational connections can be used by the state to limit the space for local activism» (ibid). At the same time, transnational activities between activists in the diaspora and activists in Iran (such as conferences or webinars) may give inspiration and support to local activities, and thus strengthen them (ibid). For example, activists in Iran may turn to well-known and more experienced activists in the diaspora for advice and encouragement, that in turn might lead to more substance to local, «small scale» campaigns. One example is a campaign in taxis in Teheran dealing with violence against female passengers, that one of my informants, Asieh Amini, told me about. The woman running the campaign had called Amini for advice for the campaign, whereupon Amini answered her with advice and encouragement. As Amini expresses:
«[The campaign] is not a huge action or activity against the regime or something, it is about awareness about women’s rights. I talked with her a lot and told that this is very important work. [I said]: don’t think that this is not big. This is important, this is activity.»
This is an example of how transnational connections, even when it is just a simple phone call, may inspire local activities, and most possibly strengthen them through encouragement, advice and support from a fellow activist in the diaspora. It is likely that the woman running the taxi campaign in Teheran was inspired by the support from the well known and experienced activist Asieh Amini, which made her continue and possibly develop further the campaign. Another example is from prominent activist and also an informant for this study, Parvin Ardalan. She tells that she, when in exile, acts as an advisor to fellow activists in Iran when it is needed and when she thinks it is suitable. We will return to Parvin Ardalan later in this study.
As addressed above, transnationalism is also closely connected to identity: «transnational exchange is based on the construction of a common identity» (Ghorashi and Tavakoli, 2006, p. 91). Correspondingly, in the communication between activists within Iran and Iranians in the diaspora lies a notion of a common identity. However, this identity is not homogenenous. As a diasporic community such as the Iranian diaspora is heterogenous and fragmented, so are the underlying questions of identity constructed between the diaspora and Iranians in Iran. Ghorashi and Tavakoli show examples of how the common struggle for social change has experienced a considerable gap between activists in Iran and activists in the diaspora, in terms how to reach the common goal. The activists residing in Iran might have a different perspective and understanding of how to promote social change in Iran than exiled activists who have lived outside of Iran for the last years and have not experienced the daily life in Iran for example since the Green Movement.
One example illustrating the gap between not only the activists inside and outside of Iran, but also between different groups, is the annual international conference organized by the Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation (IWSF). The conference has been characterised by disagreements between its participants, for example between leftist activists living in the diaspora and activists living in Iran, as well as between activists and scholars. However, this tension between participants has diminished, according to Ghorashi and Tavakoli, both because of improved contact with Iran (with the introduction of for example broadcasting the conference through internet, making it more available for Iranians in Iran) but also because of the awareness of the mentioned «paradoxical impact» that this transnational space can have for activism. Ghorashi and Tavakoli provide the following example: the IWSF conference held in Berlin in 2000 developed into a violent clash between an oppositional group from the diaspora and other participants. It also involved other actions that were picked up by Iranian authorities as offensive against Iran and islam. Consequently,
several of the participants from Iran were arrested and jailed when they returned home. This event was a wake-up call for Iranian activists in terms of what risks transnational meetings such as this conference may imply locally. In other words it is an example of how the Iranian authorities can use the transnational connections to limit local activism (Ghorashi and Tavakoli, 2006).
Exile activism and the Islamic Republic:
Continuing this point, one would assume that Iranian activists who have fled from the Islamic Republic and continue their activism in exile have now obtained the full freedom of practising their activism without any risk of surveillance by the Iranian authorities. Yet, Iran and other authoritarian regimes use the opportunities offered by new media to monitor the activities of Iranian activists in exile (Bajoghli, 2012; Michaelsen, 2016) and prevent contact between the people in Iran and the Iranian diaspora (Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009). Michaelsen points out that authoritarian regimes may take advantage of the nature of «exposure» created by communication through internet to influence the communication between the activists in exile and people in their home country (Michaelsen, 2016) For example, reports show that people hired by the Iranian government have created false accounts on social media to promote the government’s views and repress the voices of activists (Tufecki, 2017).
In addition, the Iranian government may threaten family members of activists both in and outside Iran. In this way, according to Ghorashi and Tavakoli, Iranian activists in the diaspora are challenged to consider what consequences their activism might have for their fellow Iranians at home (Ghorashi and Tavakoli, 2006).
Methodology
It is difficult to give an accurate answer, in a qualitative study of this scope, to how and to which extent Iranian activists in Norway contribute as intermediaries and build leverage against the Iranian regime. However, this study aims to give an indication on the basis of the experience and views of a few activists based in Norway.
To answer the research questions in this study I have conducted seven in-depth interviews. I have interviewed five Norway-based human rights activists (although one of them recently moved out of the country, but who, at the time of writing, still occationally works as a freelancer in Norway and participates in events and conferences). The informants selected for the study are both well known key activists (both internationally and to some extent in Norway), and grass root activists who work on a smaller scale. This kind of selection is necessary to achieve a sample that is
representative and reflects the range of the activist communities or the different connections and activities that exist in the Iranian diaspora in Norway.
In addition to the mentioned interviewees, to provide information about the Iranian diaspora in Norway and activism among the community in general, I have included one informant who does not define himself as a human rights activist, but who is able to provide useful information about the diaspora and who contributed to mobilising Iranians in Norway to demonstrate in solidarity with the Iranian uprising in 2017-early 2018. Also, to provide a broader perspective on the conditions for activism in exile, I have included activist Parvin Ardalan, who lives in Sweden, as an informant for this study.
The interviews were conducted in Oslo, Malmö and Trondheim in May and early June 2018. Because the informants and I reside in different parts of the country, it could have been necessary to conduct the interviews through Skype. However, it was important for me as a researcher to meet and speak with the informants face to face in order to establish a better connection than is possible through Skype. In this way, I was able to gain trust from the informants and therefore conduct fruitful interviews. The interviews were recorded with the consent of the informants and then transcribed and analysed. The interviewees were asked whether they prefer to be referred to by their names or whether they wanted to be anonymous. All of them answered that I could use their full names.
The interviews were mostly conducted in Norwegian, but with Asieh Amini and Parvin Ardalan they were done in English. Doing the interviews in another language than the informants’ first language posed a challenge especially with the last mentioned informant as it was sometimes difficult to understand what they meant. Also, for the informants it would have been easier to express themselves if the interviews could be done in their mother tongue. However, the informants did make themselves understood and the transcriptions were thoroughly studied by me as a
researcher to make sure I had understood them correctly.
In addition to in-depth interviews, my original intention was to study my informants’ activities online, including relevant websites, but mostly on social media, including postings on Facebook and Twitter. However, a clear obstacle and disadvantage here is that I do not speak or read the Persian language, which hinders me to study and analyse a considerable amount of written content on the social media accounts of the informants. This can be considered a weakness of this study. Although some of the written content is in English or Norwegian, such as the information on the Iran Human Rights website, there is content that becomes less accessible because of the
language barrier. In addition, a general overview of some of the Twitter and Facebook postings of my informants shows that they receive little response from the public. Therefore, I concluded that
studying content on Facebook and Twitter does not contribute in answering this study’s research questions. Instead, the information gained from the interviews is supported by relevant theory.
One obvious challenge in this research was the distance to my informants. Participant observation would be a useful research method, however, because of the distance, I was not able to participate in the protests that were arranged in solidarity with the uprisings in Iran in early January. Joining other smaller protests was also difficult, due to travel costs and my commitment to a full time job. On the other hand, bigger protests and other group activities among the activists in Norway according to my informants are rare and occational, depending on incidents or developments in Iran.
Another challenge and also a weakness in this study is that the number of informants could have been higher. Finding informants for the study was challenging, also because the activists who were interviewed for this study did not seem to have an appreciable network of fellow Iranian activists in Norway. When asked about other activists, they knew few others, or they knew those who were already contributing to the study. Also, a couple of the activists asked did not answer the requests. I also considered including a representative from Iranske Politiske Fanger for Fritt Iran, but decided not to, both due to the time limit and the controversy that this organisation involves. Nevertheless, including this informant would have added relevant and useful information which would have contributed to strengthen the study.
However, those interviewed in this study represent different groups or types of activists, including prominent key activists with well established networks. The fact that they do not all know about each other’s work turned out to be an advantage because they would otherwise belong and represent the same network of activists.
Findings and analysis
The Iranian diaspora in Norway
As Baser states, «when discussing diaspora activism, the political dividing lines within the diaspora must always be taken into account» (Baser, 2011, p. 26). A diaspora group is not a uniform group with one political opinion. However, it is relevant to ask what consequences these dividing lines may have for activism. Ghorashi’s point about a lack of a strong collective among Iranians in the Netherlands is emphasised as valid in Norway especially by one of the informants in this study: According to Siavash Mobasheri, who is a left wing politician in Norway, the Iranian diaspora in Norway can be characterised as politically very fragmented and complex. As he says: «It is hard for even me to understand the different groupings and what they stand for politically». During the late
2017-early 2018 uprisings in Iran, Mobasheri played a significant role in mobilising for a demonstration in Oslo in sympathy with the demonstrators in Iran. According to Mobasheri, the success behind the demonstration was the clear message in advance from the organisers that the demonstration was not organised by any political party, but by individuals who wished to support the uprisings for no other reason than to overthrow the regime.
«In that way we managed to mobilize a lot of people, I think we were around 300-400. And that is sensational, in my view. To manage to gather that many exile Iranians at one place, united around one theme, is something that does not happen often. But we had to be very clear about that we were not going to have any slogans that express different political fractions, especially the Mujahedin, with which many exile Iranians have bad associations. If they would show up, many Iranians would have reacted either by leaving or with anger. Fortunately, no political slogans showed up, and we received a lot of positive feedback on that.»
According to Mobasheri, arranging demonstrations and mobilising people would have been easier with a more homogeneous group. Instead, demonstrations are organised by small fractions, and they are not supported or known by exile Iranians because people don’t have the same political opinion. Mobasheri reflects upon (with a risk of generalising, he emphasises) a general assumption of Iranians as stubborn and as proud of their rich and diverse history and culture, and the fact that «everybody has their opinion about something», as a possible reason for the fragmented character of the Iranian diaspora, and the lack of good organising. This nature of stubbornness and «having an opinion about something» goes well with Ehmer’s description of Iran’s long history of rebellions, and that «protest seems in the DNA of Iranian citizens» (Ehmer, 2013, p. 304).
However, with many strong opinions from different stances, efficient organising seems difficult. Mobasheri compares the activism efforts organised by the Iranians in Norway with the well organised and active Kurdish diaspora groups, who are the most politically active of the diaspora groups (Baser, 2011) and have for example managed to place the Kurdish conflict in Turkey on the European agenda (ibid).
Naturally, the fragmented and complex Iranian diaspora in Norway affects how Iranian activists in Norway cooperate and organize themselves. As Mobasheri points out, mobilisation seems occational and follows specific events and developments in Iran. When the situation is stable in Iran and there are no particular events that bring about mass demonstrations, activism in the form of larger demonstrations seems go into hibernation in the diaspora. Still, small groups or individual activists continue their work independently of these larger events. In the next section we will look more closely at these different actors.
Iran Human Rights
Iran Human Rights (IHR) seems to have an especially prominent voice in activism for social change, and especially against the use of death penalty, both among Iranian activists in and outside of Norway, in the public sphere and in research. It is frequently included in debates when Iran is discussed in Norwegian media and when Iran’s use of death penalty is covered in international news channels such as the BBC. IHR’s reports are referred to by other key human rights organisations and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, as well as in research.
IHR’s main focus is the death penalty. Originally, according to IHR’s founder and
spokesperson and informant to this study, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, the focus on death penalty started because executions were very frequent in Iran and was, an still is, used to punish «ordinary» criminal acts such as drug trafficing. Also, Amiry-Moghaddam tells, death penalty did not get much attention from the public nor from human rights activists.
IHR first started as a network of activists in and outside of Iran who wanted to contribute in some way to activism for human rights. In 2009, when many activists had to leave Iran, this also involved deorganising activism in the network and starting to build an organisation.
Today, Amiry-Moghaddam says, IHR as an organisation has reached a more sustainable phase, compared to its earlier «waves of activism». IHR’s work consists of gathering data,
campaigning, writing and publishing reports and news, meetings with diplomats and participating in public debates. The organisation also made a TV programme about death penalty, and publishes a magazine two times a month in Persian that is sent to Iran through different channels. According to Amiry-Moghaddam, even Iranian parliament members have given interviews to the magazine and re-tweeted its content.
The organisation receives and gathers information from different reliable sources, publishes the information and redistributes it to the UN as well as western diplomats and politicians.
Its reports are used by UN and different international and national human rights organisations. The organisation has a broad network in Iran and receives reports from over 20 prisons about death penalty cases that are not announced by the Iranian authorities.
As of 2018, IHR has two people in full time positions and as well as four to five part time employees hired in different projects. It also has, according to Amiry-Moghaddam, «a few dozen» people that are regularly connected to the organisation as volunteering contributors. The
organisation does not have a physical office, but has its base in Oslo, where Amiry-Moghaddam lives and works.
To a high extent, IHR acts as an intermediary in the way that it collects, receives and brings on information from sources, including prisons, in Iran. It succeeds in building leverage against the regime by managing to get attention from the public both in and outside of Iran about human rights, especially about the use of death penalty. In this way, it counteracts to the indoctrination of death penalty as a legitimate way of punishment. As Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam said: «I believe that we have contributed not only in individual cases, but also in changing the perception and the view on death penalty in Iran and in the civil society.»
IHR also manages to get recognition from intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, and the organisation has also succeeded in mobilising Norwegian authorities to protest against specific executions (Fyhn, 2008; Iraki and Langset, 2007). For example, in 2007, after the Norwegian prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre had received information from IHR about a planned stoning, he called in for a meeting with the Iranian embassy to protest against it. The Iranian foreign ministry later informed that the stoning was been called off (Iraki and Langset, 2007).
On the other hand, reporting about executions and addressing to the authorities does not always lead to a desired result. Both Amiry-Moghaddam and grassroot activist and former radio presenter Farshid Jalili provide the same example from 2007, over 10 years ago. Nonetheless, IHR’s work could serve as an example of how transnational activism can have a «boomerang effect» as presented by originally by Keck and Sikkink, in where NGOs in authoritarian regimes can address to organisations in the «global North» who in turn can put pressure on the authoritarian regime to stop cases of human rights violation. The difference is that the NGO in question here is based in the global North. However, several of the contributors to IHR’s work are in Iran and it can therefore be said that their work causes a boomerang effect. In this process, the nation state itself, in this
example the Norwegian government when putting pressure on Iran, becomes an actor in transnational activism, as pointed out by Ghorashi and Tavakoli.
To be a voice: demonstrations and radio debates
The Tuesday protests and the White Wednesdays in Oslo are Norway based extentions to campaigns in Iran and were initiated by activist Farshid Jalili. Jalili also runs «Stop Execution in Iran», which is a registered association in Norway and has a website, freeiranonline.com. Jalili’s groups, the Tuesday protests and White Wednesdays, frequently demonstrate outside the Iranian embassy in Oslo to show their dismay against the Iranian regime. According to Jalili, their main messages include to stop executions, saying no to compulsory hijab, standing up for workers’ rights as well as promoting for environmental protection. The activities of the group are partly event based: they
gather in front of the embassy to protest at dates that are important in Iran, and during specific events, for example when Iranian politicians visit the embassy. One example is when the Iranian foreign minister visited Norway in 2016. Jalili tells that in these cases, the group sees the benefit of collaborating for example with the People’s Mujahedin, because this group often has information about times of arrival of the Iranian politicians. Jalili emphasises the importance of cooperating with the group when it is beneficial for both, instead of creating a gap because of conflicting ideas.
The group contributes to some extent in building up leverage against the Iranian regime and functions as an intermediary in terms of «being there» in person and showing a part of the Iranian people’s opinion by demonstrating in front of the embassy. However, the group is small with only 5-6 members participating to 20-30 people at the most. In addition, its connection and availability to Iran is limited, because the website connected to the group risks being blocked in Iran and therefore might not be accessible from inside the country. However, when Jalili is asked about the
effectiveness and impact of the group’s activism, he answers: «To be a voice is much, much better than to be silent. I know that I myself cannot change the Iranian regime, but this cannot be silenced. We actually have to tell people what is happening in Iran. This I believe.»
Jalili is also a former radio presenter at Radio Sedaye, a local Persian language radio station. The radio station is today called Silkeveien radio. According to radio host at Silkeveien radio and informant to this study, Ali Fekri, the station has about 3000 to 4000 listeners based in Norway, the USA and Iran. His radio programmes deal with human rights violations, politics, and culture and society. The programmes are also available on Telegram.
Fekri sees himself as a social activist and not a professional reporter. When asked about why it is important to maintain a radio station like Silkeveien radio, he answers:
«In my opinion, it is important for the following reasons: primarily, there are many people in Scandinavia and Norway who speak Farsi and Kurdish. A radio station in their language is important to be able to communicate with each other. Secondly, our programmes are broadcasted through the internet, and we have many listeners in Iran. Iran upholds high censhorship. Therefore, radio channels like ours could be very useful for people living in Iran. They are able to get free information. Our time is the age of information. If we are to develop a society, information is essential. The Iranian regime censors information because they know that if people know more, it will be difficult to govern the way they do today.»
Thus, to some extent, Ali Fekri’s radio programmes contribute (together with other radio stations like it) to build leverage against the Iranian regime by providing its listeners with free, uncensored information and creating awareness. It does not seem to function as an intermediary in that it channels information from Iran, but seems to rather fill a function as a transnational arena for debate based on for example current political developments, such as the Iran nuclear deal.
Furthermore, by offering programmes in Persian for the Iranian population in Norway, Ali Fekri’s radio programmes can be classified as a form of transnational connection that contributes to strengthening national identity, as highlighted by Van den Bos and Nell.
Also, an online «community of iranianness», as introduced by Aghvami, is maintained through the programmes, though not necessarily with a feeling of nostalgia towards Iran. The radio host maintains a connection both to Iran, to the diaspora community and to Norway, a three way connection that is described as unique to diasporas by Alonzo and Oiarzabal.
Writing for awareness: the journalist and the poet
Journalist and activist Leila Saadati is a university trained journalist with experience from pro-reform news papers in Iran, and from several news editorials in Norway. Her main area of focus is women’s and children’s rights as well as social problems, such as drug abuse and violence against women. Saadati now works for a TV station based in London, where she covers Iran.
In transnational activism, Saadati acts as an intermediary by channelling information and uses her competence in several ways, for example through contributing in arranging webinars for activists and others in Iran. In the webinars, participants learn about different themes such as internet security or take basic courses in for example how to use the internet. These webinars are a good example of how transnational arenas can be useful and provide inspiration to activists in Iran, as addressed by Ghorashi and Tavakoli. Through the webinars, the local (activists in Iran) can get inspiration and knowledge from transnational connections. Also, the webinar is an example of how a cyber-community of Iranian fellow activists can be created and upheld.
In addition to the webinars, Saadati maintains a connection with fellow journalists and activists in Iran «a lot, every day»: for example by assisting her colleagues in finding information, assisting in research and finding information about suitable courses for them to attend. She also has contact with journalists and lawyers who work with women’s rights in Iran.
On a general basis she believes her and her colleagues’ long-term contribution as journalists revolves around creating awareness among the public, both in and outside Iran. As she says: «We can send the truth to Iran, about what is going on in Iran. Awareness helps people to open their eyes. When people have awareness, they can choose the right way.»
This mission of creating awareness is shared by prominent activist and poet, Asieh Amini, now based in Trondheim, Norway. Through her poetry, in her own way, she almost sees it as her duty to tell the world, and the future generations, about what happens in Iran: «We have to do it.»
When talking about how writers can contribute to build leverage against the regime, Amini highlights the importance of building awareness:
«My struggle is for raising awareness about our rights, about what happen to us. There are people who will decide what they want. Because everything that this regime has done is to keep people silent and to accept the situation. (...)they know that if awareness is raised, people can not be
satisfied with «just a little more breath.» (...) They don’t want any activism that would influence the situation. Fortunately we have social media. Fortunately we have our networks. Fortunately people can be aware of the situation in these years with these media and this window to [the world]. The gap and the distance between inside and outside [of Iran] is less than before.»
In addition to her work as a writer, Amini tells of her network between activists in exile, including Parvin Ardalan and lawyer Shirin Ebadi (who resides in the UK), that regularly meet online or in person, to share news, experiences and activities they have engaged in. They also work together in certain individual cases. For example, when it was known that the lawyer and their common friend Nasrin Sotoudeh was imprisoned, the activists arranged a Twitter storm in collaboration with different human rights organisations to try to get her released. This form of activism is an example of what Parvin Ardalan calls «emergency networks», which are forms of mobilisation that are organised for example when an activist or human rights defender is arrested. These have a similarity with demonstrations that are arranged on specific dates or events, for example when the Tuesdays protests group arrange demonstrations on specific dates that are important for Iran or when the Iranian embassy in Norway is visited by the Iranian foreign minister.
These online/offline meetings and emergency networks represent many features of today’s transnational activism. In these meetings and networks, the activists, connected through social media, combine their resources and competence into the transnational networks that are fueled by local events (in this case the imprisonment of Nasrin Sotoudeh) and followed up in local contexts by the individual activists. Thus, the local and transnational, the offline and the online, are
connected and overlap each other. In this interaction, the activists uphold a kind of «common iranianness», although it involves a connection with both their common homeland and their new home countries.
Transnational activism and the theory of polymedia
As expressed by Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam: «While the Iranian authorities promote a culture of death penalty as something normal, we use media, both social and more established media, to promote the opposite». In their activism practises, activists navigate themselves in an environment
of (poly)media options to achieve different goals, and to a certain extent in collaboration with their fellow activists in Iran.
However, as pointed out by Madianou, polymedia «is only fully achieved when the decision between media that constitute parts of one environment can no longer be referred back to issues of either access, cost or media literacy by either of those involved in the act of communication»
(Madianou and Miller, 2012, p. 176). In Iran’s case, therefore, it can be argued that polymedia is not achieved at least not inside of Iran, as the choice of which media to use can be referred back to the issue of access. Iranian authorities regularly block different media and social media platforms, and activists’ use of social media changes in line with these restrictions. As expressed by Parvin Ardalan, «you have to go on the way they are going». Instagram is used when Telegram is shut down, and so on. Thus, the preferences among activists in Iran is to a certain extent lead by access or availability. However, the theory of polymedia is relevant in its presentation of an environment of media that complement each other, in the context of migration.
The following outline shows the answers that the informants gave when they were asked about their use of social media in their activism. It is not meant to be read as a fixed presentation of how activists use these media, but rather represents a tendency or a pattern based on the answers given in the interviews with the informants.
Aim: Media:
Reaching large audiences TV channels, radio channels, Youtube Interpersonal contact Facebook
Twitter storms Twitter
Mobilising for/informing about demonstrations and events
Telegram
Video meetings, webinars WhatsApp, Skype Sharing text/news articles WhatsApp
Sharing/receiving videos and photos
Telegram, Instagram
The outline shows that Telegram is a preferred tool for informing each other about what happens and getting people out in the streets (for example during the uprising in January 2018). It also has a good capacity for sharing videos. Leila Saadati points out Telegram as the most used social media tool among Iranians.
Youtube channels as well as traditional media such as radio and TV are the most suitable channels for reaching large audiences. With the polymedia theory in mind, Youtube’s function can be understood by what it is not: it is not about interpersonal contact, but is a tool to use when the aim is to reach a large audience. For example, the diaspora based Persian language TV and radio channels such as VOA Persian are popular sources of news and debate for Iranians in the diaspora and in Iran.
Whatsapp is a preferred tool for sharing text, for example news articles, and Instagram for pictures and videos. Whatsapp is also used for video meetings, when Skype is not considered safe. Thus, it serves several functions, including a substitute for Skype, which is used for video chatting only.
Twitter was described by Parvin Ardalan as more focused or refined, and was naturally highlighted as useful for Twitter storms, such as the Twitter storm arranged for imprisoned lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh.
The answers of the informants also indicate that Facebook is not a strong social media tool for activism, both within the Iranian diaspora in Norway and in transnational activism. It is
overshadowed by other social media such as Telegram, Instagram, Twitter and Whatsapp.
As Parvin Ardalan told: «Facebook good for interpersonal contact but not for activism». In addition, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam pointed out that personal Facebook and Twitter accounts are used more than accounts of organisations, because it is more risky for people in Iran on social media to follow organisations than individuals. He also emphasised that IHR’s goal is not always to reach as many as possible, but to reach the right people. In those cases social media might not always be the most efficient way to make contact.
In this environment of media options, this brief outline thus shows an indication of how the different options complement each other in line with different goals.
A narrowing gap?
The answers of the informants in this study indicate that, while there might have been a gap
between activists in the diasporas and activists in Iran in terms of how to bring about social change in Iran, this gap is now narrowing with the introduction of new technology and by the use of social media between Iran and the diasporas. People in Iran are able to get around the social media blockings by using VPNs and therefore they are able to maintain contact with fellow activists outside of Iran. Access to TV and radio channels through the internet also contributes to a better contact across borders and censorship. Radio host Ali Fekri points out that he has been in exile for
30 years, and therefore he experiences a considerable gap between him and his listeners. However, as he emphasises, his listeners are able to ask him questions and criticise him, and through the discussions that emerge the gap between them is narrowed.
On the other hand, he points out, a gap between Iran and the Iranian diaspora is maintained because radio listeners or consumers of other media who reside in Iran have to use anti filter systems to be able to listen to the radio shows or access certain websites.
Regarding the view on death penalty, although this is not confirmed by any research based source in this study, IHR’s Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam points out that people in Iran are
generally against death penalty and that Iranian anti death penalty movements represent the largest anti death penalty movement in the Middle East. In that case, IHR’s anti death penalty stand is not in contrast to the opinion held by activists and other people in Iran.
On the other hand, as shown by Ghorashi and Tavakoli, a gap exists between groups of activists with different points of view, such as among the participants at international conferences such as the IWSF. Parvin Ardalan also experiences this from her work as an activist. She
experiences that after 2009, when many prominent activists left Iran, there are less «unified voices», as she calls it, between activists inside and outside of Iran.
Barlow interestingly highlights the One Million Signatures Campaign, founded by Parvin Ardalan, as an example of how the efficiency of activism can be improved, in that it was backed by several, earlier conflicting groups of activists (Barlow, 2012). In other words, it contributed to narrowing the gap between the different groups. According to Barlow, Ardalan stated: «we learned that in order to achieve nonviolent activism, collaboration with other groups [and] synchronisation of demands and methodologies would strengthen the women’s movement» (Barlow, 2012, p. 331). On the basis of what we know about the conflicting stands among Iranian activists, we could conclude that the heterogeneous character of the Norwegian-Iranian diaspora reflects the
heterogeneous character of different activist groups in Iran (as well as in the diasporas). It can therefore be argued that the gap that we speak of here does not only exist between those in exile and those inside of Iran.
The conditions for activism
Tarrow points out that the nature of the activism of immigrant activists depends on, among other things, the conditions or opportunities existing in their new home countries (Tarrow, 2005, p. 52). Here it is also relevant to consider how the exile situation affects activism. The feeling of being
