Past Injustices
An argumentative analysis on the inherited responsibilities
to repair past injustices
Simone Melbye Larsen
Human Rights Bachelor 15 credits Spring 2020
Abstract
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate what circumstances supports inherited responsibility to afford reparations. The general arguments for and against inherited obligations are presented and discussed. Hereafter, Denmark and Australia’s forced assimilation policies are examined in order to establish their responsibilities to correct the past injustice. The general arguments are applied when scrutinizing the cases. It is visible that it remains difficult to determine a nation’s responsibilities to correct past injustices, however, once considering the continuance of communities as well as inherited benefits and desert-claims, it seems justified that nations also inherit liabilities. The thesis is argumentative and normative in nature, entailing suggestions both for and against inherited responsibility. Once nations recognize that the purpose is to correct an injustice, and not take responsibility for its occurrence, it becomes clear that nations ought to accept inherited responsibility to afford reparations.
Keywords: Past injustice, reparations, inherited responsibility, obligations, assimilation. Word Count: 13.910
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ……….……… p. 5 1.1. Aim ……….………... p. 5 1.2. Research Question ………..……… p. 6 1.2.1. Sub Question ..……….……….. p. 6 1.3. Delimitations ………..………..………..……….………... p. 7 1.3.1. Prescription ………....…… p. 7 1.3.2. Temporal ……….……….. p. 7 1.4. Ethical Implications ………..……….. p. 7 2. Background ………. p. 7 2.1. National Responsibility ………. p. 7 2.2. Forced Assimilation – a Human Rights Issue? ………. p. 8 2.3. Denmark and Australia ……….... p. 103. Important Concepts ………...……...………....…… p. 12 3.1. Desert ………...……….………. p. 12 3.2. National Self-determination ………..………....………….……..…… p. 13 3.3. Ancient, Historic, and Recent Injustices ………..……….…... p. 14
4. Theory: Intergenerational justice ………..……….…...………..… p. 15 4.1. Reparations for past injustices …………..…….………...……… p. 15
5. Method ……….. p. 17 6. Argumentation ……….……….…… p. 19 6.1. Arguments for Inherited Responsibility to Afford Reparations for Past Injustices ..…... p. 19
6.1.1. Inheriting the Good with the Bad ………..……….. p. 19 6.1.2. Sense of Community ………... p. 21 6.1.3. Desert ……….……..…… p. 24 6.2. Arguments against Inherited Responsibility to Afford Reparations for Past Injustices .. p. 26 6.2.1. The Non-identity Problem …………...……….……... p. 26 6.2.2. Superseding Historic Injustice ………...……….… p. 27 6.2.3. Infeasibility ………...……….….. p. 29 6.3. Argumentative Summary ………...……….…………. p. 31 6.4. The Case of Denmark and the Greenlandic Inuit ………..….... p. 32 6.5. The Case of Australia and the Stolen Generation …………...……… p. 35
7. Conclusion ……….…...…. p. 37 7.1. Limitations and Future Research ………..………...….……… p. 38
1. Introduction
Having access to justice is an intrinsic part of the human rights arena. Victims of injustices must have pathways to justice available to them. This pathway can be in the form of reparations. Reparations are a valuable tool for both individuals and nations as they aim to secure a reconciliatory foundation. Intergenerational justice concerns forward-looking and backward-looking justice. The moral responsibilities and obligations we have to future and past generations are essential in this matter. Present generations’ responsibilities to future generations are widely accepted and considered an obligation for currently living people. However, the idea that we have similar responsibilities to past generations is controversial. Claiming to be a victim of past injustice can thus raise several concerns and asserting a right to reparations is not straightforward. Why is it that we are more inclined to admit obligations to current and future generations than past? Is it not hypocritical to consider the future whilst not the past? That is some of the issues this thesis aims to comprehend.
Affording reparations to victims of past injustice can be an instrument to correct the wrongs of the past and to acknowledge the unfair and harmful treatment of people. Past policies like forced assimilation have affected several indigenous communities who now suffer from distrust of their government, lack of education, proper healthcare, and other similar disadvantages (Australian Human Rights Commission 2008). Establishing appropriate conditions as to when claims for reparations can be met and afforded is an important task, and it requires examination of both contemporary and historic injustices. Many past injustices include countless victims such as genocide and slavery, and these injustices carry much weight in the existing research. However, more research is needed concerning injustices that are more recent and remains unsettled. If nations take responsibility for past injustices it can eventually allow past, present, and future generations to move beyond the injustice and towards a more inclusive tomorrow.
1.1 Aim
The thesis aims to determine what responsibilities contemporary nations have to repair past injustices. It has proven difficult to establish the responsible parties of past injustices, and what claims victims have on the grounds of the wrongdoing. To get a hands-on approach, two examples will be illustrated to demonstrate how inherited obligations are considered by
nations. National responsibility in the thesis is limited to the area of inherited responsibility and reparations for past injustices.
The theoretical framework is applied in the argumentation in order to establish how Denmark and Australia’s forced assimilation policies have affected the involved victims and how to correct it. The method of argumentative analysis will either encourage or discourage the idea of inherited responsibility. Furthermore, the purpose is to scrutinize the conflict between what responsibilities current generations have to past generations, which requires further analysis, re-examination, and improvement. Lastly, the thesis intends to encourage further discussion of the contested notion. Reparations for past injustices remain the core of the thesis’ intention to initiate a debate about how measures of desert can be of value to consider to ensure all individuals have what they ought to.
The scholarly discussion mainly emphasise injustices occurring two or more generations ago. Much of the research proceeded are based on major and ancient injustices, thus applying contemporary examples could help the research move beyond the philosophical and abstract discussion towards a comprehensible doctrine. There is a need to focus on other injustices including those where the number of victims is not as great, yet where the symbolic value of reparations is substantial. The examples in the scholarly debate often emphasise the victims and perpetrators as being of most importance and the injustices themselves are rarely examined in an effort to locate its origin. There is a need to incorporate the history of the specific injustice as well. Applying specific cases is, therefore, of significance to determine the validity and justifiability of the topic, as well as providing further discussion.
1.2 Research Question
Under what circumstances do contemporary nations inherit obligations to repair and correct past injustices?
1.2.1 Sub Question
Does the forced assimilation policies of Denmark and Australia justify claims for reparations?
1.3 Delimitations 1.3.1 Prescription
The research area is philosophical and normative in nature and will eventually provide principles as to how individuals and nations should act compared to how they actually act. The thesis aims to determine the desirable and undesirable parts of national responsibility concerning inherited obligations, as well as providing a value-laden judgment about what ought to be done.
1.3.2 Temporal
There is no prescribed difference between ancient, historic, and recent injustices in the scholarly debate. Their distinction is formulated based on previous research and
scholarly use of the concepts. When using the concepts it will hence be based on relative considerations as there are no agreed-upon definitions.
1.4 Ethical Implications
As the thesis is theoretical and evaluative in nature, there are no direct implications that require ethical consideration. However, recognizing that the purpose of a normative approach is to evaluate what is either desirable or undesirable, it can be noted that the findings could eventually affect the moral rules people ought to follow.
2. Background
2.1 National Responsibility
In contemporary politics, it is difficult to determine responsibility in many cases, though it becomes further problematic regarding responsibility for past injustices. It does because the ability to determine who is accountable and who ought to correct the injustice is unclear. The injustices of relevance to the thesis are transmitted across generations and are considered as non-contemporaneous, i.e., the injustice occurred at a different period in time. There are no standard approaches, principles, or regulations that determine how nations ought to respond to claims of reparations for past injustices. It is merely the responsibility of the nation to determine its validity.
National responsibility entails several perspectives, notions, etc., but as a general definition, it can be maintained that all members of a nation are accountable for the decisions that are
made regardless of whether they support or oppose those decisions (Miller 2007: 113). As long as members participate in society, they are responsible for the burdens that collective decisions possibly demand (Miller 2007: 120). Hence, being inactive in decision-making does not equal people being excused for their responsibilities and obligations to society, and a member’s passivity remains to be a support to the collective decisions as they continue to enjoy the benefits they receive thereof (Miller 2007: 120). It can, however, be claimed that individuals do not choose which nations they are part of, and therefore ought not to be responsible for the actions and decisions in which they have contributed. Nonetheless, members cannot pick and choose. A nation is recognized as being a group of people who identify with one another and who feel a sense of belonging due to certain commonalities (Miller 2007: 124). Furthermore, it has been established that the more democratic a society is, the more likely they are to take responsibility for the decisions they take (Miller 2007: 130). With this in mind, it can indeed be accepted that a nation’s decisions impose both burdens and benefits on all individual members (Miller 2007: 133).
It is also important to determine the responsibilities members have towards one another. As mentioned, compatriots share certain responsibilities (Miller 2007: 113). It is also well-established that currently living members share obligations to future living members. This is quite visible in the contemporary climate change debate, stating that we have to commit to preventing climate change now to protect future members from its implications. The problem thus arises when defenders of inherited responsibility state that compatriots also have obligations to past generations. Other than the issue of determining whether current generations have obligations to past generations, there is also the question of what ought to be done to correct the wrongs of the past. How should debts be calculated and how can we be sure that victims deserve repair?
2.2 Forced Assimilation – A Human Rights Issue?
Assimilation is the practise where new members of a society engage in and absorb a society’s language, culture, customs, norms, etc. (Klint 2017). The purpose of the policies is to ensure that new members eventually become indistinguishable from original members (ibid). It is hence a step beyond integration where the purpose is the co-existence of multiple groups whilst accepting their differences (ibid). Assimilation continues to be implemented in contemporary societies including Denmark (Jørgensen 2017). The negative connotations that
follow remain troublesome, yet it can be argued that nations have a sovereign right to implement such policies. Assimilation policies are used in the scholarly debate to some extent, however, they are rarely emphasised (Miller 2007; Thompson 1999; Kukathas 2003).
A recent example of the implementation of assimilation is the policies prohibiting the concealment of the individual’s face also known as the “burqa ban”. Several European nations have established similar policies including Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. As these bans are recent it demonstrates that assimilation still occurs, but continues to be highly debatable in the international arena. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is also concerned with assimilation. Article 8 states that:
1. “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture;
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as
distinct peoples, or of the cultural values or ethnic identities; […]
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration”
(UNDRIP 2007). UN and several member states recognize forced assimilation as conflicting with human rights. Australia originally voted against the international instrument, however, following a change in government in 2009, Australia revised their vote (Australian Human Rights Commission n.d.). It is of relevance to consider legal instruments such as UNDRIP, however, the thesis concerns injustices that took place before the modern human rights era. Certainly, it is worth considering the legal obligations that might arise from contemporary assimilation policies. Yet, with respect to the aim of the thesis, it will be the moral obligations that are investigated going further.
According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs for Indigenous Peoples, forced assimilation continues to be a serious human rights abuse (United Nations n.d.). The reason why assimilation continues to be a sensitive issue is most likely because it is marginalized and minority groups who are being subjected to the policies, that is,
groups who are already suffering from, e.g., stigmatization. Implementing assimilation policies can then threaten minorities’ culture, language, and more. As a response to this, cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage became a joint achievement in the UN in 2016 (OHCHR n.d.). The purpose is to raise awareness about minority rights, as well as identifying the risks that may be involved when defending the rights to cultural heritage (ibid). Hence, the protection of minorities’ rights to their culture remains a human rights issue. This is relevant to the thesis since assimilation policies in Denmark and Australia affected the indigenous communities’ rights to their culture, language, etc. There is a dominant culture in most liberal societies, despite the existence of minorities. This can lead to the marginalization of minorities, e.g., the Greenlandic Inuit who reside in Denmark. However, it can also be difficult to get around this, as nations do have to make decisions on their national identity. Unfortunately, larger nations are often inclined to diminish smaller groups who might want to establish an association independently (Moore 1997: 904). Indeed the nations feel confident in their institutions and identity, but they may feel threatened when members of their society try to create political claims (ibid).
The scholarly discussion on forced assimilation tends to emphasise cases where bans conflict with other rights such as freedom of religion. An example is France where the burqa ban conflicts with the nation’s expectations to its members and the individual’s rights to wear religious headwear. It is not uncommon that assimilation policies are associated with religious liberty and indigenous rights in contemporary discussions. Due to the scope of the thesis, assimilation policies affecting religious liberty will not be investigated further. Further analysis of how the Greenlandic Inuit and indigenous Australians have been affected by forced assimilation is conducted in the argumentative part of the thesis.
2.3 Denmark and Australia
The cases chosen to be of relevance to the aim of the thesis are Denmark and Australia, as they practiced forced assimilation on indigenous communities at similar points in time, though they have handled claims for reparations differently despite their otherwise inclination to compare themselves to each other. These states were not the only ones who practiced assimilation, e.g. assimilation was a cornerstone in France’s colonial policies (Newton-Small 2015). However, to be able to sufficiently investigate whether forced assimilation justifies claims for reparations, these states are of relevance because the respective victims have
different claims for reparations and the states have different perceptions of these claims. Australia has recognized that what occurred during the forced assimilation policies was harmful, and they are committed to making sure nothing similar will happen again. Denmark is reluctant to take responsibility for events that occurred in the past arguing that the past cannot be changed, and the values of contemporary Denmark do not equal the values visible at the time in question. Denmark thus argues that an apology to the Greenlandic Inuit is insubstantial. It is worth considering the different approaches that are to apologies, but also the different approaches in general to the wrongdoings that were committed in the past.
In 1951 Denmark conducted an experiment on 22 Greenlandic Inuit children to assimilate them into Danish culture (Sørensen 2019). Similarly, Australia practiced forced assimilation for several decades during the 1900s on indigenous Australian children more commonly known as the Stolen Generation. The purpose of the policies was to assimilate indigenous children to “white culture”. Furthermore, in the case of Australia, it has been confirmed that the policies have led to long-term consequences for the affected children and parents (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018). Denmark is yet to recognize the harm they caused the Greenlandic society and culture (Sørensen 2019). This is despite the well-known organization, Save the Children Denmark, took responsibility for their support in the assimilation and publicly apologized for the harms they caused (ibid). On the other hand, Australia has established reparative and reconciliatory programmes to encourage and help indigenous communities. The two cases are, however, quite different in numbers. The Danish experiment involved 22 Greenlandic Inuit children, whereas in Australia it has been estimated that between one in three and one in ten indigenous Australian children were affected by the assimilation (Sørensen 2019; Commonwealth of Australia 1997). The clarification of the long-term consequences in the Australian case is therefore more manageable both due to the extent of research conducted, the number of victims, and the years of practice. Even though the main focus in the Danish case is the 22 children, the entire Greenlandic community can benefit from receiving an apology as well. The numbers might not be large, but the symbolic value is great because the experiment ultimately influenced the Greenlandic community for years to come.
3. Important Concepts
Concepts that are relevant to the research area are introduced and clarified in the following section. The notions are important to the content of the thesis and will be applied in the argumentative chapter. Principles of desert will be presented, as well as national self-determination. Furthermore, a distinction between ancient, historic, and recent injustices are offered.
3.1 Desert
Victims who have suffered from injustice and have not been afforded any reparations or reconciliatory measures remain to be owed something and justice has not been achieved. In order to achieve justice, those who are owed something has to be granted repair if the injustice is to be corrected. To be deserving is a normative description since people can deserve something while not having the right to it (Sher 1987). In contrast to justice, desert is backward-looking and a notion of moral integrity (Kukathas 2003: 169). It is therefore relevant to the thesis to consider desert and reparations as connected.
The difference between rights and desert is that people can deserve things whilst not having a right to get it (Sher 1987: 194). Similarly, people can also have a right to something they may not deserve (ibid). When rights and desert conflict this way, it is often rights that take precedence, meaning that having a right is of higher prevalence than to deserve something (ibid). By this account, it is difficult to argue that victims of past injustices deserve reparations if it conflicts with the rights of others. However, the conflict can be overridden by arguing that the two rarely coincide in matters of justice (Sher 1987: 194-195). The value of desert-claims is not to suggest whether anyone has an obligation that ought to be fulfilled. Instead, it is to claim that someone is not getting what they deserve (Sher 1987: 195). It is a two-way approach as desert-claims are related to both victims and perpetrators who remain to deserve punishment for their wrongdoing. When accepting this notion of desert, it strengthens the idea that present generations have obligations to past. As mentioned, desert is a moral notion (Kukathas 2003: 169; Feinberg 1970: 56). Rewards and punishment are hence only two parts of desert claims (Feinberg 1970: 56). “To say that a person deserves something is to say that there is a certain sort of propriety in his having it” (Feinberg 1970: 56). A desert-claim also entails that you have to be worthy of what is owed (Feinberg 1970: 57). Moreover, there has to be some base of desert present, as a person cannot deserve something unless there is a
justified reason (Feinberg 1970: 58). An individual has to be able to answer why she deserves something, and the desert has to be relevant to the person claiming it (Feinberg 1970: 61). Feinberg has divided desert-claims into five characteristics, one of them being of high relevance to the thesis: reparation, liability, and other modes of compensation (Feinberg 1970: 62). By this, people can deserve compensation due to a loss or injury (Feinberg 1970: 74). Reparations are hence not mainly offered to repair the damage but to restore the moral
balance (ibid).
3.2 National Self-determination
A nation is a group of people who identify with each other and share obligations as well as certain characteristics like language and culture (Miller 1998: 66). There are bound to be minorities who do not share this common identity, nevertheless, the majority do (ibid). If people accept the general idea of national responsibility they also ought to accept inherited obligations (Miller 2007: 161). Inherited responsibilities only make sense insofar as nations are able to have control of their resources and decision-making and since decisions change over time, so will the amount of resources available to members (Miller 2007: 151).
With the establishment of the UN, self-determination became a primary principle. The Charter of the United Nations Article 1 (2) states, inter alia, that the purpose of the UN is:
“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”
(The Charter of the United Nations 1945).
Self-determination of peoples signifies that a group of people who share common characteristics has the self-determination to form a distinct nation. Self-determination is thus that people have the right to determine their destiny. By creating a distinct nation, national self-determination will become a primary principle. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) further established the principle of self-determination. It states, that colonialism and all other forms of segregation and discriminatory practices should be terminated and that all people have the right to self-determination. National self-determination was then a primary principle in the following
de-colonization. However, between 1947 and 1991 there was only one instance of secession (Moore 1998: 1). This begs the question of whether large colonial nations indeed accepted the principle or aimed to diminish it. The scholarly discussion on inherited responsibilities is often exemplified by colonialism and national self-determination is thus an important aspect to consider.
The original appeal of self-determination was to enable peoples to establish political independence (Miller 1998: 63). Self-determination is commonly interpreted as the right to sovereignty in contemporary discussions, but it is of value to consider the concept of nations in ways other than their sovereign right. Nationality remains to be the association of people on a given territory, who establishes a community claiming political self-determination (Miller 1998: 65). It is possible to agree with this perception because the notion of self-determination has developed much. After World War II, self-self-determination and the “people” were no longer regarded on grounds of ethnic relations but of “multi-ethnic people under colonial rule” (Moore 1998: 3). The reason is that the original notion threatened multi-nation states (Moore 1997: 901). Self-determination is often favoured in the sense that it recognized the equality between different identities (ibid). This makes sense considering the homogenous state is rare.
3.3 Ancient, Historic, and Recent Injustices
In the scholarly discussion, there are often three cases of past injustices: ancient, historic, and recent. Their differences will be clarified in order to understand their purpose and the general debate. An ancient injustice is not considered as either prehistoric or primitive. It is widely accepted in the scholarly debate that injustices that occurred in other time periods are not relevant and infeasible considering inherited responsibility for past injustices. It would be impossible to determine the effects of the injustices and the relevant parties (Waldron 1992). There are most likely not any valid claims for reparations either as the relationship between the original victims and their descendants are non-existent (ibid). When referring to ancient injustices it is rather injustices that occurred earlier than the 20th century. Slavery, however, can be considered both an ancient and historic injustice despite its earlier origin, because its endurance is enormous (Ridge 2003: 40). Historic injustices and recent injustices can coincide. Their distinction is therefore harder to establish. Historic injustices are, e.g., the forced assimilation in Denmark and Australia. Here, there are still alive victims and direct
descendants. Recent injustices are if a person got their bicycle stolen yesterday and repairing that would then be to deliver the bicycle back to its original owner (Waldron 1992: 14). However, the thesis is not concerned with recent injustices by this definition. Instead, the historic injustices of assimilation can be considered recent as well in the sense that there are still visible repercussions. Hence, when referring to recent and historic injustices, these are the definitions that are intended.
4. Theory: Intergenerational Justice
Elements of intergenerational justice theory establish the structure of the thesis and aim to provide an understanding of the chosen normative approach. Intergenerational justice concerns the relations prevailing between different generations, most often of moral character. There are specifically three issues that are significant to the research questions. First is the relations between past and currently living people, second is how to determine the responsible agents for past injustices, and lastly is the question of reparations and whether claims for reparations are reasonable. It is important to afford reparations to victims of past injustices because their existence and identity are affected and somewhat determined based on the injustice. However, this does not necessarily consider the infeasibility of affording reparations as it can have negative implications for current generations, for example, when monetary compensation is awarded. In the underlying section, the theoretical framework is presented, and theories of reparations and inherited obligations are incorporated to establish a normative and rational response.
4.1 Reparations for Past Injustices
National responsibility can be extended to include responsibility for past generations (Miller 2007: 137). That current generations can inherit responsibilities from past generations is widely contested, yet, it seems to gain respect in contemporary politics (Miller 2007: 135). As declared, current generations have forward-looking responsibilities, i.e., to future generations. It has become the rule rather than the exception that victims of past injustice seek reparations (ibid). A reason for this might be that people are becoming more aware of their rights. However, certain difficulties can appear alongside claims for reparations. One is, how can we know de facto what occurred in the past that justifies victims’ claims for reparations (Miller 2007: 136). Another difficulty is to determine the responsible agents, as the original
perpetrators may no longer be present. Structural processes that have been part of many injustices like colonialism makes it that more difficult to determine the responsible agents (Lu 2011). Because the injustice occurred during a previous generation, there have to be validating and reasonable answers as to why current generations ought to take responsibility to correct their nation’s past wrongdoings (ibid). If current generations refuse to correct the wrong, there are no other agents able to take responsibility. There is thus no one to whom the victims can claim reparations. Politicians and political leaders are especially reluctant to take on such responsibilities (Miller 2008: 137).
To establish the responsibility to afford reparations for past injustices, it is worth investigating the different claims of reparations. Claims of reparations can be divided into five groups:
1. Claims for restitution: This claims demands that stolen objects are returned to the original owners, e.g., the wrongful appropriation of art (Miller 2007: 138).
2. Claims of unjust enrichment: These claims concern exploitation such as slavery. They are mostly made by descendants of victims demanding that they are afforded the benefits that are equivalent to what was taken from their predecessors (ibid).
3. Compensable historic wrongs: Here, the injustice has not necessarily benefitted the perpetrator (Miller 2007: 139). Still, the injustice remains until the victims or their descendants are awarded reparations by monetary or other material compensation (ibid).
4. Acknowledgement of responsibility: This claim is especially relevant to politicians’ responsibilities. In this claim the victims want a formal representative to take responsibility for the injustice and acknowledge that it was harmful (ibid). It is usually a symbolic reparation in the form of an apology. Here, those who identify with the original victims can continue to claim reparations as long as no formal representative has offered an apology, as it continues to be an ongoing injustice (ibid).
5. Long-term consequences: This claim is that there is a group of people who, due to the injustice, are lesser off in terms of access to resources and benefits (ibid). The claim is not that of reparations. Instead, it is to make sure that the victims and possibly their descendants as well are lifted above a certain threshold (ibid). This claim is not backward-looking as the others, as it does not aim to correct the injustice itself (ibid). It aims to secure that the current state of affairs is improved. This claim is also a valid
argument against those who do not consider reparations for past injustices as a contemporary concern (ibid).
Despite this substantial list there continues to be the assertion, that the passage of time and thereby changes in circumstances, has an incentive to supersede claims of historic injustices (Waldron 1992; 2002). Injustices that occurred in the distant past can conflict with changes in circumstances, which might conflict with current claims of justice (Waldron 2002: 155-156). The purpose is to clarify that claims for reparations can change over time, and an act that was once considered harmful and wrong can become tolerable due to other circumstances prevailing (ibid). The infeasibility that can originate from claims for reparations can lead to unfair distribution of resources, i.e., no one should have either less or more than what is fair with concern to currently living people (Waldron 2002: 156-157). We have to accept how things have turned out, regardless of how that may have come to be (Waldron 2002: 158-159).
5. Method
The research questions will be answered using a normative approach while investigating the obligations of Denmark and Australia. The argumentation will attempt to determine the way nations ought to take responsibility for past wrongdoings, by applying the theoretical framework and relevant concepts.
The analysis is structured as an argumentation analysis, which is an appropriate method to use alongside a normative approach. The method is relevant to the aim of the thesis since it becomes possible to clarify and consider to what extent nations are responsible for affording reparations for past injustices. Therefore, different analyses and ideas are discussed in the argumentative part of the thesis in order to locate the best possible solution to the controversial area. An argumentation analysis will help provide a normative response to how nations ought to behave with respect to reparations for past injustices. The purpose of an argumentative analysis is to clarify and assess the validity of argumentations. Conclusions and reasons are identified in the argumentation analysis, and premises and counter premises are applied alongside concluding remarks (Boréus 2017: 55). The theoretical framework, premises, and counter premises are applied to examples where national responsibility for past injustices is relevant to consider. The examples are clarified in such a way that both arguments for and against nations having responsibility with regard to past wrongdoings are exemplified and analysed. The temporal part of the examples is important to consider. To ensure that the notion
of the “past” is not unproportioned, the examples chosen originate from the early to mid-1900s. This will allow a contemporary use of the examples since they continue to be of relevance to currently living people. Going further back in history might jeopardize the extent to which it is possible to determine obligations.
An argumentation analysis attempts to appeal to rational ideas and often involves multiple aspects including descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptivism (Boréus 2017: 54). The descriptive part involves reconstructing the arguments made in the discussions and recreate their connection in order for the reader to easily locate premises and counter premises (ibid). Evaluation of the argumentation is assessed from different perspectives since one of the main parts of an argumentation is to find arguments both for and against the hypothesis (ibid). Misconceptions should also be examined in order to maintain the credibility of the argumentation (ibid). Here, prescription can be a good way to avoid misconceptions.
An argumentative analysis is an appropriate method to use due to the normative approach of the thesis, and because the research area cannot be studied empirically. It is therefore important to consider several standpoints and discussions before concluding. Since the approach is normative, the argumentation includes normative statements. However, factual statements are also valuable to present in the argumentation, e.g., to establish what is being done to ensure justice to victims. Due to the normative nature of the thesis, the argumentation analysis is a philosophical discussion on how nations ought to behave. To be able to test whether the normative statements are valid and relevant, they will be applied to two cases: Denmark and Australia’s forced assimilation policies. Thus, it can be determined if the behaviour of nations who have obligations to past generations are compatible with general moral principles. The argumentation analysis is divided in three parts. First, there is a section where the general and most commonly used arguments for and against inherited responsibilities for past injustices are discussed. Thereafter, a summary of the findings is included to establish the arguments and conclusions. Thereafter, the general arguments are applied to the specific cases. Structuring the arguments this way benefits the conclusion as both general and specific arguments are examined.
It is useful and significant to apply examples in the argumentative analysis because the analysis should not be based merely on philosophical and abstract perspectives, but include practical discussions and contemporary cases. As two examples are utilized it becomes visible how obligations to past generations can be applied in practice. Based on the theoretical
framework, the examples can be used to determine if the behaviour conducted by the two nations is appropriate and justified. The Australian case is often exemplified in the academic discourse and is therefore also relevant to the general principles of the research.
6. Argumentation
In the underlying sections, the most common arguments in favour of and against inherited responsibilities to afford reparations for past injustices are discussed. The arguments most commonly used to defend inherited obligations and reparations are discussed first. Thereafter, the arguments most commonly approached to confront inherited obligations and reparations are then applied and scrutinized. The arguments are carefully evaluated and scrutinized to provide a nuanced analysis of inherited obligations to afford reparations for past injustice. Subsequently, a summary of the arguments is outlined to discern the main points of the arguments, before they are applied to the cases. Lastly, the cases of Denmark and Australia’s responsibilities to their indigenous communities regarding forced assimilation policies are discussed by means of the general arguments.
6.1 Arguments for Inherited Responsibility to Afford Reparations for Past Injustices 6.1.1 Inheriting the Good with the Bad
Current generations inherit the benefits from the decisions and actions of past generations, whether it regards infrastructure, hospitals, schools, or the like. They inherit these benefits without having to ask for them, pay for them, or otherwise provide any form of transaction. They simply inherit the benefits due to their common identity which stretches both backwards and forwards as communities continue to exist regardless of change in membership. Because the membership of nations changes constantly, there is no distinct moment where it can be said that membership changes or that the community is suddenly inherently different. Therefore, generation after generation continues to inherit benefits such as territory, capital, schools, hospitals, etc. from former generations (Miller 2007: 151; Tan 2008: 452). These benefits would not have been present had it not been for the decisions made by past generations (ibid). Current and future generations inherit these benefits and have unlimited access to them (ibid). Furthermore, they have the privilege to decide how to develop them further (ibid). Supporters of inherited responsibility consider that inherited benefits ought to be sustained to ensure that the distinguishable values of
the community exist regardless of membership (Thompson 1999: 494). Keeping this in mind, current generations ought to accept that they can also inherit the liabilities that may be, inter alia, responsibilities to correct past injustices. If we inherit benefits, we also inherit liabilities.
Accepting inherited liabilities arising from past injustices is not equal to current generations having to state that they are responsible for the injustice taking place. Rather, it is to accept that there are obligations to correct the wrongs and harms once committed in order for victims, their descendants, and their surrounding community to move forward. The main focus is the original victims, however, the effects of the injustices can have affected their descendants and community, while they are worth considering as possible claimants as well. Victims who continue to suffer long-term consequences as a result of the injustice should be of particular concern as their lives are directly affected by the injustice and lack of restitutive measures. However, what a large part of victims of past injustices desire are reparations in the form of monetary compensation, as much as it is an apology alongside a recognition that what they went through was wrong and harmful. Unfortunately, many politicians and state leaders remain reluctant to offer apologies as they do not want their legacy and politics to be synonymous with an injustice they were not directly a part of (Miller 2007: 137). This is very much a liberal thought, that one not ought to be responsible for the outcomes they had no part in. As long as this belief remains, it continues to be difficult for victims of past injustices to get an apology if they so desire. Liberals are aware that their predecessors had different opinions, beliefs, and ideas than they have (ibid). Consequently, what liberals decide to do with the benefits originating from the decisions of past generations depends on their current needs and the needs of future generations (ibid). Furthermore, liberals will not support that one group can gain more benefits than another (ibid). However, it can be acknowledged that liberals are obligated to understand what their predecessors valued and why (Thompson 1999: 513). It is expected that people are aware of their history and have an understanding of the decisions and outcomes. Nevertheless, it not equivalent to them identifying with these decisions. As visible in the cases of Denmark and Australia, it will most likely take several years before an apology is afforded, if there will be. Therefore, there has to be an increased focus on what the symbolic value of apologies is considering both the receiver and benefactor. The patterns that exist due to the injustice, e.g., continued suffering, will
continue to be a part of many people’s lives until reparations are afforded (Butt 2013: 266). It is thus vital that current generations both accept and compensate with respect to the injustice (ibid). As long as there remain to be individuals within a society who are not getting what they are owed, the nature of the past wrongdoing will remain an essential part of contemporary politics, and they will be until the victims have been offered reparations (ibid). A response to this could be to consider that it is most rational and fair that the inherited liabilities are as important to a nation’s identity as the inherited and appreciated benefits are.
By inheriting benefits there will most likely be members who argue that the nation should be as protective of the benefits as they are of their common identity (Tan 2008: 452). Members are expected to both sacrifice and provide certain resources in order to maintain and continue the existence of the nation (ibid). It can thus be argued that members cooperate to protect their common identity and that they share benefits, knowledge, and privileges. Moreover, members of a nation are responsible as a collective for the cultural features of their society as well as the political hallmarks they enjoy, because they are committed, as an association, to maintain the life they commonly share and benefit from (ibid). This supports the argument that members of nations can be held collectively responsible for the present circumstances (ibid). It is not necessary to prove that members have actively contributed to the outcomes, as it shows that certain values are shared (ibid). It also supports the hypocrisy that is if members hold that they only inherit benefits and not negative legacies (Tan 2008: 453). Hence, members of a society can claim a right to the benefits, yet only if they similarly accept the liabilities and
obligations (ibid).
6.1.2 Sense of Community
Communities allow us to identify with a larger group of people, which ultimately enables us to feel both shame and pride (Miller 2007: 142). When we identify with a group to such an extent, we likewise agree to share a common responsibility (ibid). This sense of community is backward-looking as the identity of the community stretches backwards (ibid). With this in mind, it is reasonable that such a sense of community includes our predecessors. However, a community who supports inherited responsibilities conflict with the liberal view that individuals can and should be able to freely choose what obligations
to concern themselves with (ibid). Both the communitarian and liberal view is justified and valid when applied in the scholarly debate. Therefore, it is not enough to state that individuals feel shame and pride concerning the actions of their compatriots. Support for the sense of community mentioned has to be established whilst accepting the consequences that may arise from inherited responsibility (Miller 2007: 142-143).
Those accepting inherited responsibilities also have to accept that it can lead to restrictions for current generations. When individuals identify strongly with their community and said identity, they are more likely to accept desert-claims of compensation and inherited obligations to past generations (Thompson 1999: 496). Liberals are often searching for the good and are hence inclined to reject inherited obligations as it conflicts with their conception of the good (Thompson 1999: 496). Liberalism states that we are only responsible for actions if we have made a causal contribution to the outcome (Miller 2007: 140). Liberals support the idea that individuals are in control of what happens with their lives so if they are asked to take responsibility for the decisions of others, they eventually lose some aspect of that control (ibid). The collective obligations that communitarians accept in order to uphold the decisions of past generations are not accepted by liberals (Thompson 1999: 512). If liberals are to accept inherited responsibilities, they have to accept that people’s lives are bound by fate (Thompson 1999: 499). Rational people who accept that will most likely have posterity-directed desires (ibid). These include moral commitments that remain to be fulfilled, i.e., our debts and commitments transcend across time as long as they are not satisfied, and injuries remain until they are corrected (Thompson 1999: 501-502). If the perpetrator of an injustice has passed or ceased to exist before the wrong has been corrected, the debt inevitably becomes the responsibility of someone with whom the perpetrator identified with, e.g., their community. Similarly, if the original victim of the injustice has passed, one of the more prosperous ways to correct the wrong is to afford reparations to their descendants or communities (ibid). It can be argued that affording reparations to an individual’s descendants satisfies the original victim’s posterity-directed desires as most people would want their descendants to succeed in life. The idea that it is possible to benefit the dead like this may come off as strange, yet it is not uncommon that we praise the dead (Ridge 2003: 43).
When collectives are held responsible for their actions, individuals may also be imposed with burdens (Ridge 2003: 46). The individuals may be innocent for what the collective is guilty of, however, when an individual gains benefits from a reciprocal community they also have obligations to ensure that the morality of the collective is sincere (ibid). If the original perpetrator is no longer present, other related agents, collective or individual, are responsible for correcting the wrong (Ridge 2003: 49). Affording reparations is a duty of justice, thus, the claims of victims, whether dead or alive, are equally significant (Ridge 2003: 50). Nonetheless, the more time that passes, the less able we are to benefit the original victim of the injustice (Ridge 2003: 52). This is partly because people are less likely to be concerned with descendants who exist generations apart from themselves (ibid). Consequently, it can be said that only descendants who are perhaps two or three generations apart from the original victim can benefit from reparations.
The view victims have of their perpetrators can also have a say in whether reparations ought to be afforded. Individuals are indeed independent and have a dignity of their own, but to say that we cannot owe something to someone we have contributed in harming is to dismiss that people’s lives are interlinked (Radzik 2001: 459). Those who encourage harm are also liable to some extent. Descendants of perpetrators may have obligations to correct injustices because the victims fear them (Radzik 2001: 467). This is valid because fear is a strong emotion that potentially can limit a person’s opportunities (ibid). Therefore, if there is not anyone who corrects the injustice, the original victims and their descendants will continue to feel fear towards the perpetrators as well as their descendants (Radzik 2001). Fear can cause a community to function poorly and unsteady emotions will continue to exist (Radzik 2001: 467). Members of the perpetrating group are the ones who are obligated to correct the original wrong, most likely because they are the ones who are in a position to do so (ibid). Fear is transmitted across generations, hence, the obligation to correct it is as well (ibid).
We ought to value the relationships that endure over time and the institutions that have enabled the relationships to exist (Thompson 1999: 515). It can be of importance to victims to tell future generations the truth about what happened in the past (Waldron 1992: 6). If we look back in history, we have to know the truth about what happened. This is because something else might as well have happened (ibid). Recollecting history like this is important for communities, as history is a major part of communities, and communities
are a major part of people’s identities (ibid). We would thus undermine people’s identities if the truth is not revealed (ibid). Due to this, symbolic reparations are valid since people’s identities often are bound by symbolism (Waldron 1992: 7). Certainly, the perspectives of what happened differ depending on who is being asked as the perpetrator and the victims will have different viewpoints (Waldron 1992: 6). Yet, that does not diminish the importance of honesty.
6.1.3 Desert
Having access to justice and receiving what one is owed is of great importance to victims of injustice. When something has been taken from a person, justice would be to return what is rightfully theirs. This applies regardless of whether it is a material good or other. The fact is, something has been taken that should not need have been taken. A person then has a desert-claim. As long as the person is not given what they are owed, the desert claims and injustice endure. The perpetrator will, likewise, be owed punishment as long as the wrong is not corrected. If people continue to enjoy the benefits they know originates from an unjust event, it suggests that the perpetrators have not recognized their actions as being wrong and harmful (Ridge 2003: 41). The distress that may originate from being a victim of injustice is worse than having a material good stolen: “Many of the worst injustices were not thefts on inheritable material goods. Africans who were enslaved were robbed of material goods, but that was hardly the worst of the injustices they suffered. The outsight denial of their most basic human rights and liberties, the fact that they were treated as the property of another, the heinous cruelty and social invisibility they suffered, the incalculable damage to their self-esteem and self-respect, the destruction of their culture, the rapes, beating and forced labour – these are more serious than the theft of material goods” (Ridge 2003: 42). Individuals who were unfairly treated and suffer from long-term consequences due to the injustice may lack certain capabilities that they had prior to the injustice, and which were important to whom they identified as. Slavery, for instance, has led to structural racist processes that continue to be visible in contemporary society, as thousands of people are not able to live the lives they might otherwise have chosen had they had the opportunity (Ridge 2003: 40).
If an injustice occurred a long time ago it is unrealistic to consider that it is possible to determine how the victims have suffered from the injustice (Sher 1981: 3). We can think
that people are worse off due to an ancient injustice, but we do not have the correct information that can validate how the injustice has affected their current way of life (Sher 1981: 4). Furthermore, it would include counterfactual knowledge to such an extent that it is not reasonable to determine the validity of desert-claims (ibid). Perhaps it is not possible to reach an understanding of how ancient or historic injustices affect current well-being (ibid). But it cannot be dismissed either. People can also be worse off if they are deprived of their self-respect and have lost some of the opportunities they would have had, had the injustice not happened (Sher 1981: 10). Nussbaum’s ten basic capabilities include the capability of affiliation, which is of special concern to those who are experiencing unfair ways of life due to an injustice: “Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, case, religion, national origin” (Nussbaum 2006: 77). If this capability is to be achieved, then no person should lose their self-respect. If they have, something has to be done to give them back their self-respect so they can live a life in equal dignity. Affording reparations may allow victims of past injustices to gain self-respect and escape from humiliating circumstances which they had no part in creating. Desert-claims weaken as time passes, and it is therefore probable that ancient wrongs do not require any compensation (Sher 1981: 16). But what of injustices that are not ancient but historic, e.g., occurred two generations ago? It may not be the injustice itself that calls for reparations, but that the injustice has repercussions that continue to affect the current state of affairs. Then it becomes both a historic and a recent injustice, i.e., the boundary between recent and historic becomes unclear.
Desert can tell us what has value and how these values influence obligations (Sher 1987: 202). Reparations are owed when a perpetrator has harmed a victim, leaving the perpetrator in a position to correct the injustice (Ridge 2003: 39). However, when victims are deceased this leaves unsolved questions such as whether or not the perpetrator is still in debt (ibid). Can the desert-claim be transcended to the descendants of the original victim? The non-identity problem states that as impossible because the descendants would not have existed had the circumstances been otherwise. Can a descendant then only be owed reparations if they are worse off due to the injustice (ibid)? When studying colonialism as a structural injustice it becomes visible that reparations are not only owed
if the descendants are worse off. As long as structural injustice continues to exist, there remains to be a political responsibility to correct it, which transcends across generations until they are repaired (Lu 2011: 264). Colonial injustices were not in conflict with international law or norms, making it difficult for victims to argue that they were wronged (ibid). The colonial powers were not acting defiantly, they were rather typical examples of what was valued by dominant Western states (ibid). One response to this issue is that reparations for historic injustices like colonialism are in a position to be dealt with by the states that contributed to ensuring the existence of colonialism, that is, the international community and the most dominant states (Lu 2011: 269). The complexity of some injustices makes it difficult to determine who are the responsible agents (Lu 2011: 270). More troubling is it once discovering how class and gender were a central part of how perpetrators could continue their harmful acts, eventually enabling further wrongdoing (Lu 2011: 272). Injustices that originate from class and gender discrimination are widely known and should be examined further with respect to desert-claims.
6.2 Arguments against Inherited Responsibility to Afford Reparations for Past Injustices 6.2.1 The Non-identity Problem
The non-identity problem is the issue of whether or not a past injustice can impose harm and suffering for currently living people since they most likely would not have existed had events been otherwise. If events have led to people’s very existence how can it then be justified to claim reparations for an injustice? The non-identity problem does not support the idea that descendants of victims of injustices have any claims for reparations. Only the original victims can perhaps make such a claim.
Fundamentally, the non-identity problem concerns the possibility of whether the fertilization of eggs would be the same had events been otherwise (Sher 2005: 183). Furthermore, the parents may not have met, neither would their actions have been the same (ibid). It is thus most likely that the descendants would be other individuals had things not turned out the way they did (Sher 2005: 184). The problem arises if a person hence does not deserve compensation because they would not have existed (Sher 1981: 7). Then almost nobody would deserve reparations, and people would not have the same kind of responsibility to past and present generations (ibid). Waldron also considers the non-identity problem arguing that events can have a say with regards to who exists at a
later time (Waldron 1992: 10). We would have to determine whether the descendants of victims would have been born regardless of the injustice, to be able to assert whether they have valid claims for reparations (Waldron 1992: 7).
Comparing whether it is better to exist or not to exist, then existence would undermine non-existence. This could eventually mean that we do not have responsibilities to anyone. However, the non-identity problem applies most strongly to descendants of victims, since it is easier to conclude that the original victims would exist either way. Indeed, being alive and having lived through injustice is most likely better than not existing at all. But the argument does not consider the effects of wrongdoings, which can ultimately limit a person’s opportunities. The non-identity problem can be overcome by the argument that society is continuous from the time of the injustice (Tan 2008: 453). Since it is not individuals independently who are responsible, but the nation as a community, the nation’s identity can be said to be responsible even after several years have gone by (ibid). Certainly, currently living people of the nation would then have to take on additional responsibilities. However, members of communities are responsible for many of the nation’s outcomes they have not contributed to, and they also have duties to their community that ought to be fulfilled (ibid). Therefore, when acknowledging that members of communities share many other obligations in an effort to promote justice, it is reasonable to state that inherited obligations are among these duties (ibid).
6.2.2 Superseding Historic Injustice
Justice and change in circumstances are connected (Waldron 1992: 20). Waldron’s argument of superseding historic injustice is widely used and assessed in the scholarly debate on claims for reparations for past injustices. The main argument is that time eventually leads to changes in circumstances leading to the possibility that claims for reparations are no longer valid. This is appropriate to consider to some extent, yet it is important to note the weaknesses. One of them is that time is applied in the argument as being ancient, that is, the events in question occurred several generations ago or even longer, and there is no one alive today who can recollect the events. Hence, nobody is truly affected by it. It can be inappropriate to remedy an injustice when the circumstances have changed rapidly, therefore, it is argued that the current state of affairs supersedes the injustices (Waldron 1992: 25).
The idea that the past can be changed should not be dismissed, as that would be the same as stating that we are unaware that people live full lives and that communities exist independently of generations (Waldron 1992: 7). People make plans for the future and their descendants (ibid). It can accordingly be argued that what happened in the past can impact descendants’ lives because their predecessors were not able to offer what they ought to have been able to (ibid). However, we cannot be sure what decisions and choices people would have made (Waldron 1992: 10). A rational choice assumption is, that had the injustice not taken place, the descendants of the victims would be better off (Waldron 1992: 12). Similarly, the descendants of the perpetrators would likely be worse off (ibid). Nonetheless, as long as we are unaware of what the original victims would have chosen or desired, we cannot reasonably know, what ought to happen. We cannot simply assume based on rational choice assumptions (Waldron 1992: 15). As visible by statutes of limitations, rights can fade over time (Waldron 1992: 16). Certain wrongs can be less worth correcting if too much time has passed (ibid). An act that was determined an injustice, can be superseded if there is a change in circumstances. Justice would prevail because the new circumstances outweigh the past injustice (Waldron 1992: 24). It is not that time supersedes injustices, rather it is that justice and injustice have to be responsive to changes (ibid).
Waldron’s argument is primarily referred to by examples of land-rights and similar ancient injustices. It is worth considering cases where there are still victims who are alive and determine whether the injustice can then be superseded. “The present circumstances are the ones that are real: it is in the actual world that people starve or are hurt or degraded if the demands of justice in relation to their circumstances are not met. Justice, we say, is a matter of great importance. But the importance to be accorded it is relative to what may actually happen if justice is not done, not to what might have happened if injustice in the past had been avoided” (Waldron 1992: 27). People, institutions, and circumstances that were present during the past injustice are indifferent from the people, institutions, and circumstances prevailing today (Waldron 1992: 158-159). That may be a reasonable assumption, however, is the argument reasonable? When scrutinizing colonialism it becomes visible that the injustices at the time were grounded in structural processes supported by a large part of the international community (Lu 2011). The individuals may be different, but the institutions and circumstances are perhaps not. The international
community is not inherently different than it was 50 years ago. As long as there are still peoples who are struggling to establish their political independent nations in the aftermath of colonialism, then the argument of changes in circumstances and institutions cannot be reasonably met. Until the international community takes responsibility for the structural injustices of colonialism and its effects on a large number of world citizens, then it remains rational to argue that, certainly, it is in the present world that people starve and are hurt, but how can we be sure that it is not due to past injustices that have not been corrected?
Reparations for past injustices do not have restitutive value and can therefore not be achieved in a way that is appropriate considering the injustice (Vernon 2003). Yet, when applying Miller’s fifth claim for reparations it is apparent that reparations can better a person’s life if they have been negatively affected by a historic injustice. However, some obligations can arise from past injustices (Vernon 2003: 542). It is widely believed that injustices from the past demand long-lasting obligations for the perpetrators and claims for the victims (ibid). Reparational claims such as monetary compensation, issuing apologies, etc. are justified as an attempt to correct past wrongs (Vernon 2003: 543). But these acts cannot be considered restitutive. Instead, they are unconvincing and unjustified (ibid). Apologies are, for example, future-oriented meaning that they are not given to deceased victims, only to live ones, their descendants, and the community (ibid). This implies that reparations do not have value, because their purpose to achieve justice can never be fulfilled. However, it has not been considered that communities also benefit greatly from inter alia apologies or national remembrance days. Furthermore, it is not considered that there may be cases where the descendants of the original victims suffer due to the injustice and that it can hence be of value to afford reparations to lift them above a certain threshold. The overall argument presented by Vernon mainly emphasises that the injustice itself cannot be corrected or undone. Though, that is not the purpose of reparations. The purpose is rather to reconcile a broken relationship and ensure that no person suffers due to past events.
6.2.3 Infeasibility
It is claimed by some that affording reparations for past injustices is not justice but merely an imperfect version of it. This is because justice can never be truly achieved for those who have suffered harm in the past. If victims are afforded reparations, it would not tell
the whole truth about the wrongdoings, which in many cases, is important for reconciliation. Furthermore, many victims of past injustices do not desire monetary compensation. What they desire is to be acknowledged, and having some officials apologizing and taking responsibility in saying that the injustice was wrong. The number of victims often also has a say in the claims that justice cannot be achieved. Injustices like slavery and genocide have affected such a large scale of people that it is impossible to comprehend, and likewise impossible to award justice to all the affected agents. Additionally, the financial issues that reparations can entail for nations mean that the distribution among citizens can become unequal if justice is distributed to a certain group of people while not others. However, monetary compensation is not always sufficient to show the harm that an injustice has inflicted, which is probably why monetary compensation is not the reparation that most victims seek.
Many people have suffered from injustice and almost every event in history has benefited or harmed someone (Sher 1981: 5). Distribution of justice will then be difficult to determine if almost everyone is affected by some unjust event (ibid). Even though repairing a past injustice does not provide true justice or equitable distribution of justice, it would nevertheless be better than it is now (Sher 1981: 5). Another way to acknowledge that justice cannot be achieved by reparations is to start over and redistribute justice in a more egalitarian way (ibid). “Compensation is the restoration of a good or level of well-being which someone would have enjoyed if he had not been adversely affected by another’s wrong act” (Sher 1981: 6). Sher additionally states that ancient wrongs make it impossible to determine the validity of claims to compensation (1981: 7). However, as the argument is grounded in ancient wrongs and not historic wrongs, it can still be claimed that affording reparations for historic injustices are valid and possible.
A society is not just as long as individuals are prevented from getting what they deserve (Sher 1987: 209). But affording reparations are often in conflict with other demands of justice (Sher 1987: 210). The lack of distributive resources may be a reason as to why some people lack certain abilities. Victims who suffered from past injustice and are now living a life where they are lesser off may experience poor access to resources like healthcare and employment opportunities. People should be awarded a sufficient amount of goods making them able to live an equal decent life (Nussbaum 2006: 292). Moreover, there is a difference between what a person is free to have and what she de facto has (Sen
