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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Environmental Science and Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci

Global adaptation governance: Explaining the governance responses of international organizations to new issue linkages

Dellmuth Lisa Mariaa, Gustafsson Maria-Thereseb,*, Kural Ecea

a Department of Economic History and International Relations, Stockholm University, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

b Department of Political Science, Stockholm University Maria-Therese, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

A R T I C L E I N F O Keywords:

Global adaptation governance Governance responses International organizations Problem complexity Institutional fragmentation Resource availability

A B S T R A C T

Climate change adaptation is increasingly perceived as a global and interconnected policy challenge among practitioners and academics, making localized solutions insufficient. In parallel to this trend, a growing number of international organizations that do not have climate as their core mandates link adaptation to various issue areas, such as energy, health, and conflict resolution. Yet we still know little about how and why international organizations respond to adaptation challenges. This article develops an innovative theoretical framework to understand the factors that influence the governance responses of international organizations to adaptation challenges in the context of their respective issue areas. Our analysis reveals that there are three main and interrelated factors influencing international governance responses: problem complexity, institutional frag- mentation, and fiscal pressures. We examine our framework by drawing on of two sources of data: first, a yearly large-n dataset at the level of fourteen international organizations from 2007 to 2017 created on the basis of official documents; and second, in-depth case studies of three UN agencies central in addressing three prominent issue linkages: climate-conflict, climate-health, and climate-migration. We conclude by sketching broader im- plications for the theory and practice of global adaptation governance.

1. Introduction

Human adaptation to climate change and variability, which has long been understood as a highly localized issue (Dolšak and Prakash, 2018), is increasingly conceptualized as a global (including transna- tional) policy challenge (Benzie and Persson, 2019). Pressing global problems requiring adaptation include climate-related health issues associated with heatwaves or infectious diseases (Watts et al., 2018), disruptions in the global food supply chain (Benzie and Persson, 2019), and climate impacts acting as a threat multiplier for social and political conflict (Von Uexkull et al., 2016) as well as for population displace- ment (Biermann and Boas, 2010a). These problems highlight the threat of major climate change.

Reducing this threat requires global solutions, which has led inter- national organizations (IOs) to increasingly address adaptation over the last two decades (Dellmuth et al., 2018; Khan and Roberts, 2013;

Persson, 2019; Schipper, 2007; Van Asselt et al., 2005). This funda- mental shift is reflected in the Paris Agreement, which broadened the focus of UN Climate Change policies from dealing mostly with mitiga- tion to recognizing adaptation as a global challenge (Article 7 of the Paris Agreement). Adaptation funding, albeit still insufficient, has

increased significantly through the establishment of a number of new multilateral funds over the past decade (Hall, 2017).

The emerging global adaptation governance landscape yields op- portunities for different interpretations of the concept. It also opens up new possibilities for IOs in different issue areas that have historically not been related to climate, health, food, or migration to engage in adaptation governance (Hall, 2017; Persson, 2019). Indeed, a large number of IOs with mandates in different issue areas, such as the In- ternational Organization for Migration (IOM), UN Environment, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the World Health Orga- nization (WHO), have responded to adaptation challenges in recent decades. Governance responses of IOs to climate risks comprise an array of different types of behavioral, discursive, and institutional activities or decisions in relation to adaptation challenges (Conca, 2015;

Dellmuth et al., 2018; Hall, 2016; Mason, 2014; Scott and Ku, 2018).

However, the bulk of the adaptation literature still tends to focus on local and national adaptation (e.g. Rauken et al., 2015; Smit and Wandel, 2006) and mainstreaming adaptation into sectoral policies and development planning (Ayers et al., 2014; England et al., 2018; Kok and de Coninck, 2007). At the global level, an emerging and burgeoning literature (Persson, 2019) has started examining how adaptation is

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.07.027

Received 3 March 2020; Received in revised form 26 June 2020; Accepted 27 July 2020

Corresponding author.

E-mail address: gustafsson@statsvet.su.se (G. Maria-Therese).

1462-9011/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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funded (Ciplet et al., 2015; Hall, 2017; Pickering et al., 2017) and understood across actors and issue areas (e.g. Birkmann and Von Teichman, 2010a, Birkmann and Von Teichman, 2010b; Conca, 2015;

Dupont, 2015; Khan and Roberts, 2013; Persson and Dzebo, 2019). Our study contributes new knowledge to this literature about the factors shaping IO governance responses to adaptation challenges in different issue areas.

Furthermore, global environmental governance research has en- hanced our understanding of ongoing structural change in international environmental institutions. Among the many features of the social order in which global environmental governance is situated, including ideas prevailing in specific policy communities, structural power, or institu- tional change, previous research in this tradition has particularly highlighted institutional change. Numerous studies have analyzed the shift from state-centered modes of governance to increasingly complex and polycentric governance landscapes (Abbott et al., 2016; Andonova et al., 2009). Institutional fragmentation research is mainly pre- occupied with the dynamics and sources of fragmentation (Zelli, 2011;

Zelli and van Asselt, 2013). Thus, we know little about how this frag- mentation affects the governance responses of IOs in different issue areas (Biermann et al., 2010) – a central focus in our study.

These omissions are striking. IOs, most of which were created in the post-war era and which constitute the backbone of global governance, are significant for transboundary problem-solving. They make rules and attach consequences to compliance or failure to comply with them, provide information, set standards, and diffuse norms and values (Ege, 2017; Martin and Simmons, 2012; Tosun and Peters, 2018). IOs ex- ercise growing authority in an increasing range of issue areas, including adaptation. For example, UN agencies are addressing climate vulner- ability in post-conflict areas (Mason, 2014), and the European Union (EU) is encouraging its members to integrate climate and energy policy in order to secure a global leadership role for the union (Dupont, 2015).

How and why IOs in different issue areas address adaptation is critical for building global resilience to climate change. However, there is also a risk that adaptation will become a new strategic playing field, which could have adverse impacts on already vulnerable groups (e.g. Sovacool et al., 2015).

This paper asks how and why IOs respond to adaptation challenges.

To uncover the sources of IO governance responses, we develop a theoretical framework. Empirically, our analysis is based on a quanti- tative mapping of the governance responses of fourteen IOs, com- plemented by in-depth case studies of three IOs within the UN system (UN Environment, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and WHO). These IOs govern adaptation within the context of three pro- minent issue linkages: climate–conflict, climate–health, and climate–- migration. Our findings underline the importance of problem com- plexity, harmful conflictive fragmentation, and resource availability in shaping IO governance responses to adaptation. By way of conclusion, we sketch broader implications for the theory and practice of global environmental and adaptation governance.

2. A theoretical framework on the sources of IO governance responses

We now develop our privileged explanation for IO governance re- sponses to adaptation. We suggest that these activities and decisions are rooted in systematic differences related to problem complexity, in- stitutional fragmentation, and financial resources. Our theoretical fra- mework explains how and why these three factors should drive di- vergences in IO adaptation governance responses. The three factors pertain to the structural circumstances shaping IO governance re- sponses by transforming ideas and preferences among IO bureaucrats into action (see also Ege, 2017).

Thus, while focusing on structural sources of IO adaptation re- sponses, we discuss how IO bureaucrats will perceive these features and

be shaped by them, e.g. in the sense of autonomy from state oversight, enabling them to engage in adaptation governance. The general logic is to move from structural sources to how perceptions within IOs, speci- fically to how staff in IO secretariats perceive and react to structural change when seeking to address adaptation challenges. To develop this logic, we draw inspiration from a burgeoning literature on the au- tonomy (e.g. Ege, 2017), influence (e.g. (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2013), and conditions for mission creep (e.g. Littoz-Monnet, 2017) of international secretariats, and on previous scholarship on global en- vironmental governance (e.g. Zelli and van Asselt, 2013).

It should be immediately underlined that the three sources identi- fied will likely interact in shaping governance responses. For instance, institutional fragmentation may lead to greater organizational compe- tition over financial resources. Fragmentation may also exacerbate problem complexity as actors seek to address new issue linkages. Such potential interactions notwithstanding, these sources of IO governance responses are analytically distinct. We discuss each of them in turn.

2.1. Problem complexity

Climate change adaptation is a highly complex problem that spans across time, space and issue areas, with important implications for normative issues such as justice and equity (Adger et al., 2017, 2005;

Underdal, 2010). Problem complexity refers to the degree to which a policy issue is framed and discussed in different ways, and the degree to which it is difficult to analyze and address (Keohane and Victor, 2011).

The long time frames between adaptation measures and their effects often create uncertainties with regard to which short- and long-term policies are most effective (cf. Underdal, 2010). Several studies in the adaptation literature have outlined the challenges of measuring vul- nerability, which makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of different interventions (e.g. Adger, 2006). More generally, it is often hard to distinguish between reducing vulnerability to climate risks and promoting sustainable development more broadly (e.g. Persson and Remling, 2014). Moreover, climate impacts span a wide range of human activities, requiring coordination across these different domains (Underdal, 2010). Finally, recent studies have demonstrated that in a globalized world, climate impacts are manifest on a global scale, compounding complexity and making the measurement of exposure to climate impacts more difficult (Hedlund et al., 2018).

We expect problem complexity with regard to a given issue linkage to undermine IO governance responses to adress adaptation. IOs will be aware of increased uncertainty around the effects of their actions and rhetoric on adaptation problems. At the same time, they tend to lack crucial information about the likely effects of alternative adaptation measures and potential reactions from their constituents. IO bureau- crats working in the secretariats of the IOs have been shown to have few incentives to participate in adaptation governance if adaptation is framed as “decision-making under uncertainty” (Wise et al., 2014).

Indeed, as policymaking involves making choices in a context of im- perfect knowledge, risks, and tight time frames, domestic policymakers and international bureaucrats tend to prefer robust evidence on issue linkages (Wardekker et al., 2008).

To overcome informational gaps, IOs require relevant resources. We distinguish between financial and human resources. For instance, in the area of security, the personnel of an IO is crucial to its capacity to re- store peace (Lundgren, 2017). IOs working in global health must posses scientific knowledge and afford costly medicines to combat diseases (Brown et al., 2006). Generally, IOs are known to increasingly exchange information for access: private actors such as international NGOs and individual experts help IOs overcome informational asymmetries and enable the implementation of international environmental policy ob- jectives in exchange for access to the inner workings of the organization (Biermann and Boas, 2012; Newell et al., 2012; Tallberg et al., 2018).

Indeed, it has been shown that entrepreneurial bureaucrats can succeed

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in mission creep in unexpected issue areas through the strategic usage of scientific expertise, when there is no policy deadlock among states (Littoz-Monnet, 2017). Thus, to develop their governance responses, IOs need to strengthen their expertise and reduce knowledge un- certainty.

2.2. Institutional fragmentation

In a state of fragmentation, numerous unlinked or weakly linked institutions tackle problems in the same issue area (Keohane and Victor, 2011). The study of institutional fragmentation is firmly anchored in global environmental governance (Zelli and van Asselt, 2013), which fits into a broader sociological institutionalist tradition that con- ceptualizes IOs as both being shaped by and shaping institutional en- vironments (e.g. Barnett and Coleman, 2005).

International actors that seek to advocate new issue linkages must overcome institutional fragmentation that varies by degree and type based on institutional links and norm conflicts. In a situation of “co- operative fragmentation,” an issue area is addressed by different in- stitutions and decision-making procedures that are loosely integrated, and the relationship between the norms and principles of these in- stitutions is ambiguous. Under “conflictive fragmentation,” an issue area is characterized by relatively unconnected or hardly connected institutions, different, rather unrelated decision-making procedures, as well as conflicting sets of principles, norms and rules (Biermann et al., 2010b).

IO bureaucrats might ascribe fragmentation to dynamics at both domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, a typical challenge is the strong fragmentation between policy communities (Anguelovski et al., 2014; Tosun and Leininger, 2017), such as between the environmental ministries in charge of developing national adapta- tion planning and other policy communities. Moreover, there is often fragmentation and tensions between policy communities at different levels of domestic government (Dolšak and Prakash, 2018; Di Gregorio et al., 2019). Such fragmentation can limit the knowledge of IO bu- reaucrats about domestic needs and dilute the effects of global rules in relation to particular issue linkages, implying that collaboration with member states’ representatives on linking adaptation to other issue areas can be costly, particularly in cases of conflictive fragmentation when norm conflicts arise.

At the international level, IOs’ governance responses can be shaped by conflictive fragmentation if powerful member states prefer not to integrate climate into specific issue areas. For instance, there is a high level of conflictive fragmentation between the branches in the UN system that deal with environmental and security issues (Conca, 2015), which may hinder IO bureaucrats to turn ideas about addressing adaptation into actions. In sum, IO responses to adaptation challenges are expected to be more likely in contexts of cooperative fragmentation compared to conflictive fragmentation.

2.3. Financial resource availability

Financial resource availability in the complex global environmental regime can bolster IO responses to adaptation in different issue areas (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). IOs are resource-dependent actors that require material resources and a degree of predictability regarding the implications of venturing into new issue areas (Hall, 2017; Littoz- Monnet, 2017; Tallberg et al., 2018). On the one hand, IOs’ mandates seek to advance the public interest. International bureaucrats are not tied to specific electoral constituencies and typically perceive them- selves as impartial experts, pursuing collective aims rather than stra- tegic, particularlistic ones (Barnett and Coleman, 2005; Biermann and

Siebenhüner, 2009). On the other hand, IOs operate in an institutional environment characterized by uncertainty, and must adapt to funding availability, be it in pursuit of strategic self-interested goals or nor- mative aims (Bauer et al., 2013; Tallberg et al., 2018). Material in- centives are also often drivers in power struggles over problem for- mulation and policymaking related to adaptation (Dolšak and Prakash, 2018; Sovacool and Linnér, 2015).

We expect funding availability to affect IOs’ governance responses to adaptation in two ways. First, internal financial resources may be insufficient for IO bureaucrats to create and organize knowledge, for example through the commissioning of reports, organizing events with experts, or funding of fieldwork, about issue linkages and their effects.

Second, IOs in the global environmental regime complex compete with new types of organizations, such as private transnational regulatory organizations, over funding (Abbott et al., 2016). Still, with regard to new issue linkages such as climate–health and climate–migration, it is a challenge that the majority of adaptation funding is dedicated to agri- culture, food, and water management (Persson and Remling, 2014). To address adaptation challenges, IOs need to convince funding entities to recognize a broader understanding of what adaptation means in these contexts, which provides IO bureaucrats with incentives to use the term

“adaptation” strategically (Hall, 2017).

IO bureaucrats will thus seek to secure adaptation funding, as this makes them less dependent on state oversight. This may lead to stra- tegic fundraising behavior in which adaptation governance is not pri- marily motivated by the needs of the most vulnerable groups. In order for IOs to develop governance responses, it is important to increase their access to adaptation funding in ways that are responsive to local and national needs.

3. Methods

To examine our theoretical framework, we combine quantitative and qualitative document analysis, comparative in-depth case studies, and semi-structured interviews. To examine how IOs in different issue areas respond to adaptation challenges, we constructed a unique quantitative dataset on the climate adaptation activities of fourteen IOs.

The core mandates of thirteen of these organizations are not in climate change, but they all belong to sectors that have been identified as cri- tical to adaptation (see Appendix Table A1). All of these IOs have en- gaged in mission creep in adaptation governance (Bird et al., 2017;

Dupont, 2015; Hall, 2016; Tosun and Peters, 2018; World Bank, 2018).

In addition, we also select UN Environment’s work on the climate- conflict linkage. In contrast to UNSC that has seen some debate but limited actions on this linkage (Scott and Ku, 2018), UN Environment has played a significant role in responding to climate-conflict chal- lenges. Using official IO documents (i.e., annual reports, briefings,

Table A1

Issue areas critical to climate change adaptation.

Sectors References

Food & agriculture Biermann and Boas, 2010; Parry et al., 2004.

Health Persson, 2019.

Development Ayers and Huq, 2009; Gupta and van der Grijp (2010).

Migration Dellmuth et al., 2018; Hall, 2016; Opitz Sapleton et al., 2017.

Security & conflict Dellmuth et al., 2018; Persson, 2019.

Disaster risk reduction Birkmann and Von Teichman, 2010a, Birkmann and Von Teichman, 2010b; Schipper et al., 2016.

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project overviews) for the period 1997–2017, we created a yearly da- taset with information about five different types of climate adaptation responses adopted by the fourteen IOs.1

To address the second question on the factors shaping the adapta- tion responses of IOs, we selected three agencies in the UN – the hub in global adaptation governance – that have addressed issue linkages critical to adaptation (cf. Biermann and Boas, 2010b). While there are several important issue linkages with climate adaptation, we select three that have received enormous attention over the past decade: WHO in the area of climate–health risks, UN Environment in the area of cli- mate–conflict risks, and UNHCR for climate–migration risks.

The analysis of these cases of IOs is based on a qualitative document analysis and 39 semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats in these three organizations, domestic policymakers, and non-state actor re- presentatives.2 The purpose of the interviews was to gather information about how international bureaucrats interpret the linkages between adaptation and their respective issue areas, and to identify and explain the central factors shaping the governance responses of IOs to these issue linkages.

4. Mapping IO responses to adaptation challenges

Before analyzing the sources of IO governance responses to adap- tation challenges, this section begins by examining how and to what extent the fourteen selected IOs have addressed adaptation in different issue areas. This analysis will also set the stage for the in-depth analysis of the responses of the three UN agencies in the ensuing section.

We analyze governance responses during the twenty years from 1997 to 2017 by presenting averages for two decades, 1997–2007 and 2008–2017 (Fig. 1), as there were extremely few adaptation responses before 2007, whereas adaptation responses varied much more in almost all IOs from 2008.3 This descriptive analysis generates two key findings.

First, we observe an increase in governance responses of all

organizations. During the period 1997–2007, average governance re- sponses amounted to almost ten per IO, whereas this number had risen to 72 on average per IO during the period 2008–2017 (Fig. 1). For example, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction responded most often to adaptation issues among the compared organizations, and the World Food Programme (WFP) only very rarely. Previous case study literature provides useful insights to make sense of these patterns. The EU has been portrayed as taking several actions to become a global leader in integrating adaptation into issue areas such as energy (Dupont, 2015) and security (De Jong and Schunz, 2012). The UNSC is known to face clear member state resistance (Conca et al., 2017) and other obstacles preventing it from addressing adaptation (Cousins, 2013). Prior studies have also found that the IOM has integrated adaptation goals more forcefully into migration governance than UNHCR (Hall, 2016).

Second, the increase in responses in the period 2008–2017 when compared to the period 1997–2007 was due to an increase in rhetorical actions. Indeed, the proportion of rhetorical actions (including de- clarations, statements, and reports) to all types of responses rose from 26 to 38 percent (Fig. 2), while there was a relative decline in the number of responses involving own funding (from 11 to 7 percent of all responses), institution building (from 13 to 6 percent), and projects or programs (from 51 to 50 percent). Yet while the average amounts of funding provided by these organizations for adaptation have decreased, the rhetoric on the need to address adaptation problems has intensified.

This result is striking, given that we examined UN agencies, major re- gional organizations, and the World Bank, which together control the bulk of financial resources available for multilateral cooperation.

To examine the ways in which IOs engage in adaptation governance in more depth, we draw from our qualitative document and interview material for UN Environment, UNHCR, and WHO (see Appendix C).

There is substantial variation in terms of how these three UN agencies govern adaptation (see also Appendix Fig. A2).

We begin by discussing WHO. The climate–health linkage is ac- cepted across national policymakers, IO bureaucrats, and non-state actors working within and in relation to WHO (e.g. Interview 31 & 35).

Moreover, adaptation is one of the top priorities indicated in the WHO work plan adopted in 2015 (WHO, 2015). In 1990, WHO published the first report on the topic (WHO, 1990), and has ever since continued to lay the scientific foundation for a wide array of climate–health risks (WHO, 2015, 2014a,b; WMO and WHO, 2015). In 2008, climate–health risks were incorporated into WHO’s official mandate (WHO, 2008) and Fig. 1. Total number of IO governace re- sponses to adaptation from 1997-2017. Notes:

Governance responses are distinct instances of responses in the following categories: declara- tions and frameworks; funding or fund crea- tion; institution building such as the formation of new working groups, task forces, depart- ments, initiatives, and public-private partner- ships; official statements; projects and pro- grams; and reports (Appendix A).

1These response types were coded inductively on the basis of the IO docu- ments. For an extensive discussion of the data collection and coding of the five types, see Appendix A.

2See Appendix B and C for a complete list of interviewees and a discussion of the sampling strategy, coding, analysis, and validity of the interview and document data.

3See Appendix Fig. A1 that shows yearly change in adaptation responses.

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further integrated through regional committee resolutions and action plans (WHO, 2009a). WHO’s aspiration to assume leadership in this area has, however, been hampered by insufficient funding.

Unlike the two other IOs examined here, UN Environment’s man- date includes climate adaptation, and it has sought to integrate peace and conflict issues in their work on adaptation (UN Environment, 2015). However, the climate–conflict linkage has not been a priority and remains controversial within the organization (e.g. Interview 1, 6 &

14). In 2009, a small team within UN Environment started to collect data on the climate–conflict linkage, but were unable to generate robust scientific evidence on the issue linkage. Based on this setback, and the high degree of conflictive fragmentation and insufficient funding, the team decided not to prioritize the linkage. In 2015, a new opportunity arose to lead a relatively large Climate Security program funded by the European Commission (Interview 1). However, due to shortfalls in technical expertise on climate–conflict linkage, the agency remains heavily dependent on NGOs to implement the program.

Multiple actors working within UNHCR contest the climate–migra- tion linkage, as it is perceived to be outside its core mandate to protect refugees (e.g. Interview 39). Even so, UNHCR began to address the linkage in 2008, when the High Commissioner at the time, António Guterres, published the first policy paper that concluded that the mi- gratory impacts of climate change would fall under the organization’s mandate (Guterres, 2009). However, member states strongly opposed the High Commissioner’s view, which led to the decision to primarily deal with the climate–migration issue through external collaborations (Jakobsson, 2018; UNHCR, 2014). Since 2018, UNHCR has been in- volved in projects to adapt refugee camps to climate change (Interview 9). However, although a small number of officials within the organi- zation were highly influential in bringing global visibility to the issue linkage, it has not become accepted and prioritized within the organi- zation as a whole.

How can this variation in the extent to which and the ways in which IOs address adaptation be explained? We argue that the variation in governance responses across IOs is the result of different contextual conditions, but that the crucial sources are threefold. The ensuing section discusses each source in turn based on our interview and qua- litative document analysis.

5. Sources of IO responses to climate adaptation 5.1. Problem complexity

The perceived complexity of adaptation has clearly affected gov- ernance responses in the three UN agencies studied in depth. Within WHO, the complexity of the climate–health linkage is perceived to be low; our respondents did not highlight it as an obstacle to developing responses to adaptation problems (Interview 31, see also Interviews 21 and 29). However, the strong evidence base for climate–health risks is the result of the research and advocacy of a relatively small group of WHO officials since the early 1990s (e.g. Interview 28 & 35). Another respondent emphasized that when WHO started to work on the linkage, there was significant uncertainty about climate-related health risks (Interview 27). Health-related climate impacts were only briefly men- tioned in the first IPCC report in 1990, but WHO officials saw it as an opportunity to engage with a high-profile issue and therefore published its own preliminary assessment on climate change’s health impacts in the same year (Interview 21). WHO had already gained a foothold in the IPCC when the second assessment report was published in 1996; it included an entire chapter on human health. By taking an active role in providing global and national policymakers with information about the issue linkage, WHO has over a period of almost 40 years gradually in- creased its leadership on the climate–health issue linkage. Hence, this case illustrates that problem complexity is far from static: it is shaped by IO bureaucrats’ sustained engagement in knowledge production.

UN Environment has a high degree of problem complexity that re- duced IO officials’ incentives and ability to push for addressing clima- te–conflict risks, and increased its dependence on experts and nonstate actors reducing knowledge uncertainty. In 2009, UN Environment was requested to carry out a study to identify the links between climate change, migration, and conflict in the Sahel region, with the purpose to develop policy recommendations. However, the lack of adequate and reliable data was identified as a major limitation (UN Environment, 2011). There were also difficulties associated with defining what cli- mate–conflict risks meant in practice (Interview 1, 6 and 8). Indeed, the issue linkage remains contested (e.g. Buhaug et al., 2014; Hsiang et al., 2013; Gustafsson, 2016). For instance, the negative framing of climate change as a security issue had been a political strategy to justify forceful Fig. 2. IO governance response types in percent of all adaptation responses. Notes: Governance responses are distinct instances of responses in the categories described in Appendix A.

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climate mitigation actions, rather than address security concerns through adaptation activities (Interview 6). According to one of the project’s coordinators, problem complexity and associated knowledge uncertainty were the main reasons behind the decision not to take a leading role in pushing for the issue linkage in 2011 (Interview 1).

Hence, this case well illustrates how problem complexity can constrain IOs’ adaptation responses.

Finally, within UNHCR, problem complexity is highlighted as a constraint, albeit not the most significant one for developing govern- ance responses to adaptation challenges (Interview 39). To be sure, the climate–migration linkage is portrayed as complicated and complex, with presumably indirect effects that require further research (Interviews 9, 36 and 37). UNHCR staff working on climate and mi- gration acknowledged the impact of climate change on human mobility in general, but suggested that the interplay with other factors such as disasters and conflict makes the linkage complex (Interview 9). To re- duce knowledge uncertainty, UNHCR has collaborated extensively with non-state actors and academics to produce empirical evidence on the link between climate change and migration, and the mechanisms through which it affects human security (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2017; UNHCR, 2014).

In sum, the results suggest that in order to push for an issue linkage, IOs must present robust evidence of the linkage and could usefully expand and deepen the fruitful collaborations nurtured over the past decades between scientists, non-state actors, and IO bureaucrats, to generate relevant knowledge.

5.2. Fragmentation

The three IOs differed in the extent to which they experienced co- operative and conflictive fragmentation within their respective issue areas. WHO bureaucrats highlighted that throughout the 1990s, the IPCC and UN Climate Change (former UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) regarded the climate–health linkage as a relatively insignificant aspect of adaptation. They critized that until today, health has not been recognized as a sector within such me- chanisms (Interviews 7 and 31). The level of institutional fragmentation at global and national levels implies that health professionals do not participate in national adaptation planning processes, and therefore cannot ensure that health components are adequately addressed (Interview 31). WHO officials have made substantial efforts to facilitate coordination between the health and climate communities by trans- lating the guidelines and trying to ensure that health practitioners are represented in national adaptation planning (Interview 31; WHO, 2019).

WHO has engaged in global advocacy campaigns to create aware- ness of the importance of integrating health into international climate negotiations and national adaptation (WHO, 2018, 2016, 2014a). Since 2009, when member states failed to reach an official UN agreement in Copenhagen, WHO supported the negotiations by raising awareness of the devastating health consequences of climate change. It adopted a positive narrative of co-benefits, in which reducing greenhouse gas emissions would produce major public health and economic benefits (WHO, 2009a, b). The positive narrative of the co-benefits for bridging health and climate actions was an important strategy to create accep- tance of the linkage within WHO and the health community. The same strategy has been used to justify the introduction of health components into climate decision-making and resource allocation (Interviews 31, 7).

WHO’s ability to bridge health and climate adaptation is partially due to cooperative fragmentation.

In UN Environment, however, the weak institutional linkages be- tween climate adaptation and security institutions are underpinned by conflicting ideas and framings of how and in which venue climate and conflict issues should be debated (Conca, 2015; Hardt, 2017). Attempts

to link climate and conflict are therefore likely to be contested, as il- lustrated by the controversies that have ensued when the topic was debated in the UNSC (UN, 2007).

This conflictive fragmentation of climate and conflict at the global level is also reflected at the domestic level. The governments of Sudan and Nepal have criticized UN Environment’s involvement in the poli- tically sensitive security domain. In response to such criticism, the agency has increasingly collaborated with the environmental agencies in the host countries (Interviews 8, 10 and 11). Consequently, to in- crease its relevance and to pre-empt opposition from host governments, UN Environment has increasingly depoliticized climate security activ- ities and presented itself as a technical expert in the area of conflict- sensitive adaptation (Interview 3).

Similar to UN Environment, UNHCR has experienced the conflictive type of fragmentation. UNHCR faced low levels of support and a backlash from member states and IO officials that perceived the cli- mate–migration linkage to be outside the organization’s refugee man- date. As one interviewee explained, “climate is not necessarily at the heart of refugee response” (Interview 39). Contestation about the cli- mate–migration link arose at UNHCR Executive Committee and min- isterial meetings in 2011. The majority of member states continued to veto UNHCR’s attempts to take responsibility for climate-induced mi- gration and develop a framework (UNHCR, 2011). Following this set- back, António Guterres, in his role as High Commissioner, continued to advocate for UNHCR’s responsibility to engage in climate-induced mi- gration in international events such as the Rio +20 conference in 2012.

In sum, our analysis shows that conflictive fragmentation in which weak institutional linkages were accompanied by conflicting norms prevented both UN Environment and UNHRC from effectively addres- sing their respective issue linkages. Yet in situations with more co- operative forms of fragmentation, as in the case of WHO, IOs could play an important role in bridging policy communities at both global and domestic levels by highlighting synergies and creating acceptance of new issue linkages among national policymakers and IO bureaucrats.

5.3. Resource availability

There is clear evidence that resource availability – such as knowl- edge, information, time, money, staff, and authority – is a vital de- terminant of governance responses to climate risks. Among different types of resources, monetary resources are central. It is well known in global governance that the increasing earmarking of IOs’ financial re- sources increases their financial insecurity and leaves them less room to innovate (Graham, 2015; OECD, 2018). Moreover, very little external funding for IO adaptation responses is available compared to mitigation (Pickering et al., 2017). However, funders such as the Global En- vironment Facility (GEF), the main financial mechanism of UN Climate Change, or private actors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Founda- tion, have increasingly pledged to fund adaptation (Hall, 2017).

For the health community, the Paris Agreement represented a fun- damental shift because it increased both the focus on adaptation and the recognition of health issues within the international climate nego- tiations. For instance, the Executive Secretary of UN Climate Change, Christina Figueres, referred to the Paris Agreement as a “global public health agreement” (WHO, 2014b). The agreement was seen as an im- portant opportunity for WHO to access adaptation funding (Interview 7;

WHO, 2016, 2018). However, according to a senior employee, there is a

“complete disconnect between the importance that UNFCCC says it places on health and the adaptation funding coming to health” (Inter- view 31). It is notable that more than half of the Nationally Determined Contributions identify health as a priority, yet health remains the smallest budgetary component of the Green Climate Fund (GCF, 2018).

WHO officials criticized the narrow environmental approach to climate adaptation, and the fact that major adaptation funds do not recognize

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the health sector (Interviews 7 and 31). WHO still implements adap- tation projects, mainly through bilateral funding and partnerships with accredited organizations, but limited funding is perceived as under- mining WHO’s ambitions to assume leadership in the climate–health linkage (WHO, 2019; Interviews 31 and 28).

Similarly, UN Environment cannot apply for funding for climate–- conflict projects through adaptation funds (GCF, 2018), and donors are generally unwilling to fund projects at the intersection of different issue areas. Funding is thus a major constraint to address climate–conflict risks (Interviews 1 and 5). Interestingly, bureaucrats within UN En- vironment have been less proactive than their counterparts within WHO in raising funds for adaptation responses. The EU’s decision to fund the Climate Security project can be interpreted as an outcome of sustained lobbying for the climate–conflict linkage by the think tank Adelphi (Interview 6). This funding opportunity encouraged UN En- vironment to decide to reinitiate its climate–conflict work in 2015. As one of the coordinators of the project described: “We never wanted to take the political lead, but I’d say that the market pulled us into it”

(Interview 1).

In the process of implementing the Climate Security project, UN Environment has increasingly tried to approach the adaptation com- munity by, for instance, offering expertise on how to mainstream con- flict sensitivity into climate adaptation projects (Interview 11; UN Environment, 2015). According to one official such attempt to “create a space for it [climate-conflict issues] in existing climate change adap- tation products” is mainly due to the lack of funding for climate-conflict activities (Interview 8).

Finally, UNHCR is not accredited by the major adaptation funds such as GCF and GEF to receive adaptation financing. Yet this does not hinder the organization from carrying out adaptation projects in col- laboration with other agencies such as UN Environment (Interview 9).

UNHCR has called for more adaptation funding to minimize the risk of forced climate migration (UNHCR, 2016). Still, resource availability is not highlighted as a principal constraint for UNHCR to develop re- sponses to address climate-migration risks.

6. Discussion

As the foregoing part of this analysis has indicated, three main challenges confront the expansion of IOs’ adaptation responses: pro- blem complexity, conflictive fragmentation, and resource limitations.

These three challenges combine in specific ways in each of the three IOs (Table 1). The main difference in outcomes is that WHO made sig- nificant and sustained attempts to obtain access to adaptation funding, while the other two organizations took a less active stance and parti- cipated in collaborative efforts rather than taking the lead. Our results suggest that the main reason is that WHO significantly reduced knowledge uncertainty about the climate–health linkage and faced cooperative fragmentation, in contrast to the other two organizations.

In UN Environment and UNHCR, adaptation responses were more

temporary and reliant on other actors’ expertise as well as political leadership.

Our findings yield three broader implications for the theory and practice of global environmental and adaptation governance. First, while previous global environmental governance studies have focused on the prospects of polycentric bottom-up forms of governance (Ostrom, 2010), we join those that are more skeptical (e.g. Zelli et al., 2010). Our findings are clear evidence that conflictive fragmentation hindered adaptation responses in two of the UN agencies studied here.

In this context, alliances with academics, civil society groups, and IOs were crucial for enabling adaptation governance responses outside the core mandates of the organizations.

Moreover, IO bureaucrats often anticipate conflictive fragmenta- tion, which tends to reduce their incentives to engage in adaptation.

Cooperative fragmentation, by contrast, helps adaptation responses.

WHO bureaucrats managed to overcome institutional fragmentation when such attempts are preceded by efforts to reduce problem com- plexity and create awareness and political acceptance of the issue linkage.

Second, previous studies have described the emerging global adaptation governance as weak, contested, and ambiguous (Hall, 2017;

Persson, 2019), but adaptation scholars have largely overlooked the role of IOs as agents in shaping how adaptation is framed and governed at the global level (for notable exceptions, see Conca, 2015; Dellmuth et al., 2018; Hall, 2016). Our comparisons across IOs and issue areas have highlighted the structural factors that IOs need to overcome in order to develop effective adaptation governance responses. Still, this is a new research field, and future studies should further examine the extent to which the identified patterns of adaptation linkages can be found in a larger number of IOs and issue areas, and which are the most appropriate institutional arrangements for dealing with different issue linkages. Moreover, while we have privileged the study of how struc- tural circumstances are perceived by IO bureaucrats and thereby shape governance responses to adaptation, we have not focused in-depth on intra-organizational processes. This limitation simultaneously high- lights a fruitful avenue for future research on how IO bureaucrats na- vigate complex structural circumstances and specific intra-organiza- tional processes (see also Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). For instance, IOs differ widely in terms of autonomy that may have im- plications for the IOs’ opportunities to engage in new issue linkages (Ege, 2017). We consider theories on international secretariats (e.g., Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009; Tosun and Peters, 2018) to offer valuable insights that can help to advance this research agenda.

Third and finally, our results have important implications for on- going discussions about the values that underpin adaptation responses, such as inclusiveness, legitimacy, and justice (cf. Adger et al., 2017).

Since exposure and the ability to cope with climate change is highly context dependent, national and local needs, interests, and knowledge should be considered when responding to new issue linkages in global adaptation governance. Whereas national policymakers have played an

Table 1

Combination of the three key factors shaping IO adaptation responses.

WHO UN Environment UNHCR

Problem complexity Low High High

Fragmentation Cooperative fragmentation Conflictive fragmentation Conflictive fragmentation

Financial resources Limited Existing, but unpredictable Limited

IO governance

responses Sustained responses mainly focused on knowledge production and implementation of adaptation programs. Strong internal support and integration of adaptation in core mandate

Temporary responses mainly focused on knowledge production until 2015. After 2015 main focus on implementation of adaptation programs. Weak internal support and dependence on external expertise

Temporary responses mainly focused on declarations, knowledge production, and institution-building with external actors. Weak internal support hampered attempts to integration of adaptation in core mandate

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important role in defining the problem and solution to climate-health risks, the climate-conflict linkage was, at least initially, primarily pro- moted by a few European national governments and non-state actors.

Our findings suggest that there is a risk – in an era of increasing fiscal pressures – that adaptation will become a new strategic playing field in global governance (see also Sovacool and Linnér, 2015). As adaptation becomes increasingly diversified and addressed by a number of new actors, it is more important than ever that IOs take leadership in pro- moting inclusive, legitimate, and just adaptation policies.

Funding statement

This work was supported by the Glocalizing Climate Governance (GlocalClim) project funded by Formas under grant number2018- 01705, and Mistra Geopolitics – Navigating towards a Secure and Sustainable Future, funded by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research (Mistra) under grant number 2016/11 #5.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors report no declarations of interest.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of ESG in 2019, the 60th Annual Convention of ISA, 2019, the Global and Regional Governance research seminar, and the higher research seminar at the Department of Economic History and International Relations at Stockholm University. We want to express warm thanks to the participants of these seminars for close reading and useful com- ments. We also thank the Executive Director at UN Environment, UNHCR High Commissioner, and WHO Director General, as well as our interview respondents in and working in relation to these three orga- nizations for generously sharing their insights on adaptation.

Appendix A. Quantitative document analysis: Coding of international organization governance responses

The quantitative dataset captures the governance responses of fourteen international organizations (IOs) to climate change adaptation chal- lenges. Governance responses of IOs are understood as an array of different types of behavioral, discursive, and institutional activities or decisions in relation to adaptation challenges. Table A1 lists the issue areas relevant to adaptation that we identified through desk research and interviews carried out in 2017 (Appendix B).

The document analysis consisted of three steps. First, IOs’ annual reports, and where necessary, supplementary formal IO documents (e.g., strategy documents and activity overviews) were collected. Second, we analyzed each of these 332 documents via qualitative and quantitative text analysis using the MAXQDA software, applying the search terms “climate” and “climate change”. Third, we read text segments that include keywords related to climate to detect if they referred to adaptation. We constructed the dataset inductively by identifying five different types of adaptation responses based on IOs’ self-reported actions in the official documents (Table A2).

Using annual reports as a primary data source implies some caveats. Annual reports reflect IO activities prioritized and publicitized by IOs for the purpose of reporting and public communication. Thus, some adaptation-related practices could be omitted, especially the adaptation responses prior to 2007, as IOs have sought to prioritize their issue-linkages with adaptation especially after 2007 (Fig. A1). However, annual reports also come with the unique advantage that they constitute the most encompassing source for coding adaptation responses of IOs that yields comparable data across

Table A2

Types of governance responses included in the dataset.

Types Description of activities and practices

Declarations and statements Official statements

Publication of reports The publication of overview reports

Fund or fund creation Allocations and establishment of funds

Projects and programs Operations, projects, vocational trainings, and educational programs.

Institution building Formation of working groups, task forces, departments, initiatives, and public–private partnerships.

Fig. A1. Sum of Governance Responses across 14 IOs, 1997- 2017. Notes: The figure refers to the total number of govern- nace responses by the European Union (EU), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRRR), UN Environment, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank (WB), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

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organizations. Given the caveates, we conducted extensive reliability and validity tests. To begin with, two coders conducted the document analysis independently from each other. In total, 35 percent of the documents were coded by both coders, and we arrived at a satisfactory level of intercoder reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha=0.79). Moreover, the validity of the coding scheme was tested by applying it to various documents published in different years (1997–2017), and across IOs in pilot codings. All documents are available online or from the authors upon request.

In Table A2, we present five different types of responses included in the dataset. We inductively identified these response types. We started by distinguishing a large number of governance responses, which we then reduced based on the frequency with which responses occurred in the annual reports and other official documents.

Appendix B. List and numbering of qualitative interviews

1) Interview with high-level policymaker, UN Environment, 20 October 2017.

2) Interview with mid-level policymaker, UN Environment, 2 January 2018.

3) Interview with program manager in Sudan, UN Environment, 15 February 2016.

4) Interview with practitioner working on global climate security governance (with a particular focus on the UNSC and EU), E3G, 29 September 2017.

5) Interview with mid-level policymaker, UN Environment, 21 September 2017.

6) Interview with mid-level policymaker working on climate change adaptation and conflict, UN Environment, 15 October 2018.

7) Interview with mid-level policymaker with a focus on climate change and health, WHO, 18 October 2018.

8) Interview with senior manager in Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch, UN Environment, 19 October 2018.

9) Interview with mid-level policymaker, UNHCR, 19 October 2018.

10) Interview with program manager in Sudan, UN Environment, 23 October 2018.

11) Interview with practitioner working on global climate security governance (with a particular focus on UN Environment), Adelphi, 23 October 2018.

12) Interview with mid-level policymaker, UNHCR, 23 October 2018.

13) Interview with consultant to UNHCR with a focus on climate change adaptation and migration, 24 October 2018.

14) Interview with mid-level policymaker with a focus on climate change and security, UN Environment, 24 October 2018.

15) Interview with senior manager in climate change and health, WHO, 24 October 2018.

16) Interview with state actor with a focus on climate change adaptation funding, Federal Environment Agency, Germany, 25 October 2018.

17) Interview with practitioner working on global climate change adaptation governance, Stockholm Environment Institute, 26 October 2018.

18) Interview with senior- and mid-level policymakers focusing on climate change adaptation funding, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 26 October 2018.

19) Interview with senior practitioners at the Center for Climate and Security, 30 October 2018.

20) Interview with mid-level policymaker, UN Environment, 1 November 2018.

21) Interview with researcher working on climate change and migration (with a focus on UNHCR), 1 November 2018.

22) Interview with mid-level policymaker, UN Environment, 1 November 2018.

Fig. A2. Percentage of Different Types of Adaptation Activities Organized across UNHCR, WHO and UN Environment, 1997-2017.

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