Department of Political Science

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Department of Political Science

US Foreign Policy toward Iraq’s and Syria’s Kurds

A qualitative case study of the 2014 Sieges of Sinjar and Kobani, examining the effects of ideology on state to non-state actor relations.

Dwayne Thompson

Independent research paper, 15 credits Political Science III (30 credits)

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US Foreign Policy toward Iraq’s and Syria’s Kurds

A qualitative case study of the 2014 Sieges of Sinjar and Kobani, examining the effects of ideology on state to non-state actor relations.

Dwayne Thompson

Abstract

Whereas the 2014 “Islamic State” siege of Sinjar led to an American military and humanitarian intervention in only four days, the US did not militarily intervene in the siege of Kobani until after six months. Relatedly, empirical data concerning affected non-state actors, specifically the Kurds of Iraq and Syria illustrate similar divergences pertaining to US foreign policy. Whereas Iraq’s Kurds and the KRG have an established institutionalized relationship with Washington, Syria’s Kurds and the PYD have had a relatively limited relationship historically - these divergences are quite perplexing. This dissertation will follow Mark Haas’ theoretical approach concerning his assumptions that ideological distance between states have a profound effect on a leaders’ threat perception, and in turn their foreign policymaking in international relations (Haas, 2012). This dissertation refines this interstate approach and examines this notion of ideological distance, inter alia, in state to non-state actor relationships and interactions. Particularly, it will scrutinize an apparent divergence in American foreign policy relating to non-state actors in the context of the “Islamic State” group’s respective 2014 sieges of Sinjar in de facto Iraq-Kurdistan, as well the sieges of Kobani in de facto Syria-Kurdistan. Following Haas’ theoretical approach, a case study employing process tracing of the respective official statements of the American Administration suggests ideological consideration as a contributing factor to said US divergence. The study contributes to a greater understanding of state to non-state actor relations; an area in International Relations where further research is needed.

Keywords

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List of Abbreviations

IS - Islamic State

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant US - United States

KRG - Kurdistan Regional Government PKK - Kurdistan Workers’ Party

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1. Introduction

Since early 2014, the international community has been captivated with the territorial advances of the Islamic State (IS) organization, primarily centred in Syria and Iraq. The group, also known as ISIS or ISIL and broadly considered a terrorist organization, has brutalized and gruesomely murdered those that do not comply with their violent and extremist worldviews. Given that IS presently controls a contiguous territory that stretches over a thousand miles across Syria and Iraq, administering the civil lives of around eight million people (Saltman, Winter, & Nawaz, 2014), some observers consider their methods a new phenomenon in international Islamist-motivated terrorism.

Developments in 2014, both in Syria and Iraq have incited international governments into action against IS and its self-proclaimed caliph (leader), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Most notably, IS’ offensive advances in the northern regions of both countries has driven large numbers of Kurds from their homes, in one instance, over 100,000 Kurds in northern Syria were forced to flee into Turkey seeking refuge (Myre, 2014). In this particular incident, IS jihadists were able to capture the city of Kobani without initially any external international intervention and in the process reportedly slaughtered several thousand people - a large majority were Kurds (Salih, 2014). In this particular IS offensive, the US officially intervened after several months in September after international pressure to save the besieged city bordering Turkey, although earlier reports had indicated the militants attempted to siege the city in March by seizing a strategic bridge and clashing with local Kurdish forces (Hawar News Agency, 2014).

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6 Similarly, empirical research consisting of primary and secondary data conducted by both Marianna Charountaki (2011) and Mohammed Shareef (2014) suggests that Washington has had different foreign policies towards different Kurdish actors. Charountaki’s research provides a detailed examination and analysis of US-Kurdish relations and their interactions in domestic, regional, and international politics. While Shareef’s research investigates the Iraqi Kurds and US foreign policy, his research highlights four distinct stages of political interactions between these actors, covering the Presidencies from Kennedy to Obama. Both studies suggest that American policy-makers in the past and present have strategically worked more closely with Iraqi Kurds as opposed to other Kurdish regional actors. In Turkey, for instance, they label the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization because of their decades-long war with the Turkish government (Kenner, 2014). Meanwhile, in Syria the Kurdish political institution and its military wing – respectively known as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) have links to the PKK, which inherently places these actors in an adversarial position to the US given this purported affiliation.

Contemporary events involving IS’ unprecedented insurgency methods and territorial gains at the time of writing in both the Iraqi Kurdish regions and Syrian Kurdish areas seemingly has had diametrically different US foreign policy reactions and outcomes. Additionally, US-Kurdish relations empirically also illustrate analogous divergences and policy variances. This behaviour is quite perplexing. This dissertation sets out to explain this variation in US policy towards Kurds; therefore, the research question that will guide this essay will be presented below.

1.1 Research Question, study’s aim, and contribution

This paper focuses on recent events and developments, particularly, it will focus on IS’ sieges of the cities of Sinjar in Iraq, and Kobani in Syria that illustrate said US foreign policy divergences. Consequently, it will concentrate on the current US administration’s foreign policy with respect to militarily intervening to support Kurds in these stated IS offensives, respectively; hence, the research question guiding this dissertation is: Which factors can explain

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7 Moreover, given the lack of theoretical approaches in the literature regarding relations between a great power and non-state actors this essay will employ Mark Haas’ constructivist approach, as it seemed most promising in examining these relations. Therefore, this essay seeks to investigate, through operationalizing the theoretical arguments outlined in The Clash of

Ideologies (Haas, 2012) with the intention of explaining diverging US foreign policy outcomes

on ideological grounds. Particularly, the notion concerning, “politicians’ international relations will largely be a product of how other states’ domestic institution and principles relate to their own.” Therefore, following Haas, the objective is to determine ideologies systematic effects on outcomes, in other words in what ways different ideologies in the varying Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq incline the Obama Administration to either support or not support key security policies and outcomes - focusing mainly on IS’ rapid encroachment on the above stated Kurdish regions.

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1.2 Disposition

This essay will be structured as follows. Firstly, with a presentation of the theoretical framework that underpins the analysis, principally guided by Haas’ assumptions concerning ideology and the conditions whereby it can have a profound effect on a leaders’ foreign policymaking in international relations. Additionally, other relevant works from the scholarship and alliance theories from the literature will be presented and described. The proceeding section will present the essay’s design, methodology, materials, and limitations. Subsequently, the empirical section will provide a historical overview of Kurds in both Iraq and Syria, simultaneously describing this relationship in the context of US foreign policy in order to provide breadth and the framework necessary for one to analyze contemporary events. Next, the empirical section will explore the origins of the IS organization. Thereafter, Haas’ theoretical framework will be concurrently employed and analyzed; his state-centric assumptions will be refined to include state to non-state interactions. The final section will present the essay’s findings regarding the US administrations’ divergence in foreign policy outcomes in the Sinjar and Kobani contexts, as well as closing remarks relating to the research question and hypothesis will be discussed.

2. Theory and literature overview

In view of the stated assumptions and consideration of the empirical material illustrating an informal alliance between select Kurdish groups and the US historically, it is vital that the essay examines the literature on alliances. Thus, the paper will now proceed in describing the origins of alliances and its four major sources; succeeding it will delve further in the central positions of Haas – a necessary starting point in order to ascertain divergent state foreign policies. Therefore, the body of literature on the origins of alliances repeatedly points to four prominent explanations that incline states to sustain a security cooperation.

Firstly, to balance a common international danger, second, advancing offensive international objectives, third, countering an internal threat, and fourth, to advance and protect common ideological values. Regarding the latter, as Stephen Walt describes in Origins of Alliances:

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9 is inherently good, then protecting states with similar systems must be considered good as well (Walt, 1990, p. 34).

Additionally, the literature reveals the major sources of alliances are identified in balance-of-threat and balance-of-power theories. Both are realist approaches, according to the former, as Walt proclaims, states ally against the greatest threats in the international sphere – “threat” defined as “a mixture of aggregate power, offensive capabilities, geographical position, and aggressive intentions.” Meanwhile according to the latter, states form alliances in order to balance against the most powerful states (as cited in Haas, 2012, p.17). Realists also maintain that combining power capabilities provides balancing of mutual threats to security.

The proceeding paragraphs will now expand on the central assertions of Haas, and describe how they contribute and refine the previously mentioned theories. That said, in general, he examines the effects of ideological distances and polarity on leaders’ foreign policies. Arguably, there perhaps exist a synergy between his claims and balance-of-threat theory, assuming states did assess aggressive intentions by ideological differences. However, Walt notably downplays ideologies relevance to alliance formation; therein lies Haas’ key contribution. Therefore, since one might use the term “ideology” antithetically, for clarity and consistency, the paper will follow the definition noted in the literature - Walt (1996), Owen (2010), and Haas (2005, 2012) define it as a:

leaders’ preferences for ordering the political world, both domestically and internationally….are the specific, often idiosyncratic, political principles and goals that leaders both value most highly and use to legitimate their claim to rule. Different ideological beliefs constitute the major differences that separate different political parties or groups from one another (as cited in Haas, 2012, pp 3-4).

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10 in that states dedicated to similar ideological principles tend to ally, whereas, alliances among ideological enemies are statistically rather uncommon (Haas, 2012, pp 18).

In addition, according to Haas, the Middle East today comprises three prominent ideological groups, including liberals, secular authoritarians, and Islamic fundamentalists; as such, he describes the region as ideologically multi-polar. Therefore, the term multipolarity consists of “a system divided into three or more prominent ideological groups.” While it is argued that, overall barriers to alliances are higher in ideological multi-polar systems compared to bi-polar systems; Haas suggests that alliances are paradoxically more prevalent during the former periods. A central reason he maintains, includes the notion that important common interests are more likely present in these circumstances than in bipolarity – this inherently generates extra incentives for ideological rivals to align (Haas, 2012, pp. 21-22).

Furthermore, although states or actors may arguably prefer alliances with ideological allies - such an ally may not exist or adequately powerful during bipolarity, thus multipolarity facilitates coalitions between perceived enemies. According to Haas, “leaders of ideological groups A and B, despite their major differences, can agree that ideological group C is an enemy.” This shared enmity, consequently pushes A and B into an alliance based on the notion that, “the ideological enemy of my ideological enemy is my friend” (Haas, 2012, p. 22).

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11 Accordingly, in the context of this study at hand, this essay will operationalize the previously described assumptions to state and non-state actor interactions in the empirical section; concerning ideology and the conditions necessary for ideological enemies to align. The proceeding section will now describe the design of the essay and outline its chosen methodology; applicable materials will be also be described as well.

3. Methodology, hypothesis, and material

Since the subject under exploration requires awareness of regional, international, and Kurdish affairs as well as US foreign policy relating to the group specifically, several methodologies were employed. Furthermore, through a historical account of the scholarship, the paper explores the central events that marked the US-Kurdish strategic relationship to ascertain ideologies systematic effects on diverging policy outcomes.

This essay will be comprised of a qualitative study, employing a hypothesis-generating case study of the Islamic States’ assault on the cities of Kobani and Sinjar in Syria and Iraq respectively. A case study was deemed most appropriate since as Levy indicates, they can “sharpen existing hypotheses in any research strategy” (Levy, 2008, pp. 3-5). He also argued it is suitable to explain cases that do not fit a particular theory or assumption with a purpose of theory refinement. Specifically, as previously mentioned the aim is to refine Haas’ assumptions concerning interstate relations. Therefore, operationalizing a hypothesis-generating case study will enable refined hypotheses and assumptions, encompassing both state and non-state actor relationships.

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12 clear policy differences. (Haas, 2012, pp. 62-63)” Employing this method should reveal higher levels of cooperation in perceived liberal non-state actor groups as opposed to perceived ones that are more illiberal. Regarding longitudinal, Haas suggests, “if political ideologies are a critical determinant of leaders’ foreign policies, major changes in either ideological distances or polarity should be followed by important shifts in policies. (Haas, 2012, pp. 62-63)” Therefore, employing this method in this context should reveal that the timing of the US administration foreign policy corresponds with either funding, support (military, humanitarian, etc.), or a formal relationship when non-state actors shift towards perceived liberal principles or initiatives. Lastly, according to some researchers, process tracing “has a competitive advantage in the empirical analysis of decision making at the individual, small group, and organizational levels, including the analysis of leaders’ perceptions, judgements, preferences…” Similarly, it argued to be useful in the empirical analyses of various complex causation (Levy, 2008, pp. 11-12). These sentiments are seemingly supported by Haas, he states “this method tries to get inside actors’ heads by examining private and public source material…that explain why leaders make the choices they do (Haas, 2012, p. 63).”

The aforementioned summary in the previous section outlining Haas’ central assertions as well as the essay’s methodology, a hypothesis-generating case study, leads to the study’s hypothesis, which will be tested in the empirical analysis section.

The study’s hypothesis reads: the greater the ideological differences dividing actors’ leaders,

the more likely they are to see one another as potential threats to international and domestic interests. Conversely, the greater the ideological similarities uniting policy-makers, the more likely they are to see one another as supports to international and domestic interests.

Accordingly, the essay argues that ideological considerations and/or distance impacts leaders’ perception of threat and consequent foreign policies outcomes in state to non-state actor relations. The essay will test the accuracy of this hypothesis in the empirical analysis section by exploring US-Kurdish relations during IS’ siege of Sinjar of Iraqi Kurds, and of Syrian Kurds in the siege of Kobani.

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13 military reports, as well as material located on official US websites, mainly from the White House and State department. The paper also relies on prominent secondary sources, most notably Middle Eastern and Western correspondents, scholarly works including articles and journals on the topic from well-regarded researchers. These scholars have analyzed primary, secondary material and have collected material relating to ideology and provided an empirical account of US-Kurdish relations.

4. Limitations

This essay is written with the understanding that current events in the studied region as well as interventionism is very fluid in nature since the present situation on the ground is constantly changing. However, at the time of writing, US-led forces joined forces on a range of military efforts to degrade the military capacity of IS. As such, since it unknown at present what the long-term outcomes will be, the focus here will therefore be conceptual, drawing upon historical analyses, and the stated theoretical framework as well to investigate the reasoning behind an apparent US reluctance in the studied case. Additionally, the proposed case study design as stated will be a hypothesis-generating case study. While some argue one cannot generalize on the basis of a single-case study, therefore, as a result it cannot contribute to scientific development. Meanwhile, according to others such as Flyvbjerg (2006), indicate this is a common misunderstanding, stating, “that knowledge cannot be formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field…” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). That being said, it is acknowledged here that future case studies involving similar cases of state to non-state actors need to be carried out to assess the explanatory power of the broaden theoretical approach. The dissertation, however, aims to contribute to theory development and provide an accumulation of knowledge on state to non-state actor interactions and foreign policy outcomes.

5. Background

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14 stages of interaction. Additionally, it will examine changes in this relationship from one that could be described as covert in nature initially, to eventually an official one in 2005, with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. However, because of space and time constraints, the focus will particularly be on significant international and regional events that illustrate US political involvement in the studied region. The study period was derived based on empirical data, which indicate that the period from 1945 to 1969 as the first signs of indirect political involvement and economic interference by the United States in the Middle East Region (Charountaki, 2011, p. 255). Firstly, this section will describe briefly the origins of Kurdish claims for self-determination, referred to by some scholars as the “Kurdish issue.” Secondly, it will then explore the US relationship with the Kurds of Iraq, thirdly, Syria’s Kurds, and fourthly, it will examine the origins of the Islamic State organization.

5.1 Historical Overview of the Kurdish Issue

After the separation of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence by the victorious powers of World War I, including France, Russia, and Britain - Kurdish statehood questions gained prevalence. Notably, the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1915 divided the Middle Eastern region into respective spheres and provided Great Powers administrative control. As there have been Kurdish inhabitants of the same territory for 4000 years, Britain initially viewed the group as an existing nation requiring statehood. However, at the post-War conference, the initial decision to create a Kurdish state was reversed because of fears concerning the viability of the newly formed Iraqi state, given the northern location of its oilfields – in the Kurdish populated region. Other reasons concerned regional balance of power considerations, as well as Kurdish disunity between the varying regional groups.

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15 Syrian Arab Republic…the Kurds do not constitute a grouping, since they are found throughout the country and form part of the fabric of Syrian society” (Charountaki, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, according to Charountaki (2011), the Kurdish question in Syria demonstrates the manipulation of the group by the state, since they have reportedly been used as a “Trojan Horse” against Turkey. For example, since the end of 1990s, reports have indicated that Syria has used the PKK to undermine Turkey’s political role in the region, as well as instigate internal conflicts concerning Turkey’s “Kurdish issue,” termed the “PKK problem” or “South East Problem” (Charountaki, 2011, pp. 5-6). As the above-described section illustrates the “Kurdish issue” is multifaceted, and inherently demonstrates that historical aspects can have implications on US-Kurdish relations; accordingly, the following section will shed light on this.

5.2 Kurds of Iraq and US foreign policy

With the general decline of the British Empire and European Great Power predominance, the United States gradually from the 1940s gained influence in the Middle East. Owing to the Kurds possessing a substantial ethnicity in the region in general, as well as sizeable minority in Iraq in particular; the US started to show interests in Iraq`s Kurds and thereafter they became a regional player. According to the empirical research conducted by Mohammed Shareef (2014), one of the earliest documented sign of such interest came in an anti-communism memo sent by the first US ambassador to Baghdad, David Crocker, on April 1950. The memo was specifically directed to Iraqi Kurds, and it was sent as “an effort to fill the gap in the democratic information activity countering Soviet propaganda to the Kurds” (Shareef, 2014, p. 136). One can argue this example illustrates that US interest in the Iraqi Kurds during this period arose because of geopolitical considerations, in an attempt to eliminate, and/or counter Soviet influence.

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16 and Islamists tendencies in that era. However, according to a 1972 declassified US memo, Washington refuted these overtures on numerous occasions, maintaining their position of only supporting human rights (providing humanitarian aid, without material support), and not Kurdish nationalism (Shareef, 2014, pp. 137-139).

Moreover, the leaked Pike House Committee hearings revealed the first documented and confirmed evidence of covert US support for Iraqi Kurds occurred July 1972. According to this report, on a visit to Tehran, the Shah of Iran requested that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger provide support to Kurds. This twenty-two hour visit concluded with Washington’s covert material support (supplies and weapons) for the Kurdish movement in Iraq, and in doing so, they commenced their first official documented relationship (Shareef, 2014, pp. 140-142). Significantly, the Pike Report quoted CIA memos, in one it described the Kurds as “a uniquely useful tool for weakening (our ally’s enemy’s) potential for international adventurism” (Shareef, 2014, p. 141). Therefore, it can be argued, this suggests a covert relationship was established primarily to advance American and Iranian interests, not specifically the “Kurdish issue” per se.

In the proceeding period, Kurds gained no significant political recognition despite being subjected to various atrocities, including chemical weapons by the Iraqi government. Notably, shortly after the notorious, Halabja gas attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan; Kurdish overtures to Washington, to gain material support and autonomy, failed to produce a favorable response and outcome (Shareef, 2014, pp. 144-146). Bearing in mind, the Reagan Administration at that time considered the Iraqi regime as an ally in order to counter revolutionary Iran – consequently, Washington’s unfavorable policies, could be explained again by geopolitical considerations.

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17 Markedly, this event eventually enabled the establishment of the KRG, as well as a Kurdish de facto autonomous region in Northern Iraq. However, it should be noted the empirical data suggests it was a “reluctant intervention”; according to Kurdish claims, it was a British and French initiative that was forced upon Washington. In a 2008 interview, Qubad Talabani, the KRG deputy Prime Minister, contends that Operation Provide Comfort, resulting in Iraqi Kurdish autonomy; was not the intended outcome of Washington. Talabani suggests the operation was solely for humanitarian reasons and nothing more (Shareef, 2014, pp. 147-150). Meanwhile, others maintain that the operation was less about humanitarianism and more about politics, specifically its implementation of No-Fly zones. Some say that this was directed at Saddam Hussain’s government, as an US containment policy of a regional power since Washington no longer trusted Baghdad. Given that the US seemingly had attempted to contain the Iraqi regime using the latter methods - the administration began to view Erbil as an expedient actor against Baghdad. Similarly as in the period before (1972-1975), American pro-Kurdish sentiments became prevalent for a second time, which then culminated in the KRG’s first official visit to Washington on October 7, 1991.

In the context of the progression of US-Kurdish relations, according to Talabani (current KRG deputy Prime Minister); the period from 1991 to 1998 consisted of US humanitarian operations, including a containment policy of Saddam, whereas from 1998 to 2003 a US public policy of regime change in Iraq facilitated sharp increases in cooperation, assistance, and support between Washington and Erbil. Additionally, he also described relations between the actors as more “steady,” consisting of gradual improvements from 2003 to 2014 (Shareef, 2014, p. 182). Lastly, in terms of the Kurdish issue, as described in the previous sections, Washington’s present position consists of a “one Iraq” policy, preferring federalism and ethnic pluralism.

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18 has met with American presidents (President Bush and Obama) on seven occasions demonstrating that Washington perceives Iraq’s Kurds as a valuable regional asset.

5.3 Kurds of Syria and US foreign policy

Given the Syrian regimes’ nationalistic character, minority groups are not recognized as well as claims for territorial or political autonomy. Coupling with “ethic nationalism” and a policy described as “Arabization,” has resulted in the public use of the Kurdish language being banned (allowed in 2001 and overturned again in 2003), villages renamed, and political rights suppressed (Charountaki, 2011, p. 49). These authoritarian polices along with the overall domination of the Alawite sect within the Ba’th party, resulted in Syria’s Kurds remaining relatively obscure regionally and internationally - particularly as it pertains to US policy-makers. Moreover, as the group also constitutes the second smallest Kurdish community in the region after Lebanon, it inevitably affects how they are perceived regarding the existence of a Kurdish issue within Syria, as well as implementation of US foreign policies.

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19 Alternatively, others maintain that a limited American diplomatic relationship with the Syrian regime, accounts for the limited US engagement of the Kurdish cause in Syria (Charountaki, 2011, pp. 51, 231-232). Charountaki’s examination of US-Kurdish relations provides some support to this notion, as the findings suggested that prevailing domestic politics of Syria and Iraq, combined with the US foreign relations between those respective countries, in turn has shaped US-Kurdish relations and the status of Kurds in each country of residence differently. In particular, the Syrian regimes’ hard-core nationalist policies together with US regional interests (i.e., a policy of regime change in Iraq and the Kurdish role as a central actor for Iraqi balance of power following Gulf War III), affected the possibility of analogous US foreign policy outcomes in Syria contra Iraqi Kurds and the KRG. As a result, Washington has only formally engaged Iraqi Kurds, which as mentioned, facilitated an institutionalized relationship in 2005 with the KRG.

The ensuing section will provide background and examine the origins of IS, reviewing its ideological and structural roots in order to better understand the mechanism which has allowed the group to develop into the terrorist organization we presently see today. Understanding the group’s origins will in turn provide knowledge required to understand the complexities of the studied actor relations and foreign policy outcomes as in relates to perceived threat, ideological consideration, and distance.

5.4 Origins of the Islamic State

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20 While AQI did not last, shortly before al-Zarqawi’s death, he established, along with the leaders of other Iraqi jihadist groups, Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSM). Soon after MSM’s formation and al-Zarqawi’s passing, his successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, carried on the trajectory that his predecessor had been following and, in October 2006, it was announced that the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) had been formed of the MSM coalition. Most notably, al-Muhajir used this as an opportunity to solidify a symbolic shift away from al-Qaeda by pledging allegiance not to bin Laden, as his predecessors had, but to the emir (leader) of ISI, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi).

Moreover, in contrast to previous jihadists groups, namely al-Qaeda, IS has devoted most of its efforts to state building - calling on Muslims across the world to come to it, rather than set up “sleeper cells” in their home countries. Additionally, not only does IS lay claim to a contiguous territory that stretches over a thousand miles across Syria and Iraq, but also it has established within this terrain a “caliphate,” the first real de facto jihadist territory. IS’ declaration of the reestablishment of the caliphate is unprecedented (announced June 2014). Some have suggested that its state building efforts – particularly, its attempts at governance, social service provision, media, and outreach – are likely to become a new model for current and future jihadist movements, as there are indications their methods have worked as a means of consolidating control in unstable political environments.

Tellingly, whereas al-Qaeda and its affiliates tend to stay underground in the areas it controls, IS has overtly declared sovereignty over a territory with the explicit aim of expansion. Some argue this marks a “re-imagination of global jihad,” one which has seen the mass migration of Muslims to the caliphate (Saltman, Winter, & Nawaz, 2014). Furthermore, according to a CIA spokesperson, as of September 2014, the group comprises 20,000 to 31,500 fighters. In addition, US official reports indicate that as many as 16,000 foreign fighters from 90 countries have travelled to the region, including more than 1,000 Europeans, and more than 100 US citizens, with approximately 12 Americans believed to be fighting there as of September 2014 (Katzman, Blanchard, Humud, Margesson, & Weed, 2014).

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21 direct threat to US interests in the Middle East in particular. Moreover, according to the then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen in September 2014, the group poses “a direct and significant threat to us—and to Iraqi and Syrian civilians—in the region and potentially to us here at home.” Olsen further said, “we have no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the U.S.,” and highlighted potential threats posed by foreign fighters with Western passports (Olsen, 2014). However, at the time of writing it remains unclear if the group poses a significant direct threat to US homeland security. Despite this uncertainly, it can be strongly argued that their current trajectory lends itself to the assumption that domestic terrorist assaults are plausible and/or imminent given the recent extremist inspired attacks on western democracies in Ottawa, and Paris; both US allies. Relatedly, audio statements released in 2014 substantiate this assumption. In the statements, Al Baghdadi, IS’ leader explicitly threatened the United States, stating:

O soldiers of the Islamic State, continue to harvest the soldiers. Erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere. Light the Earth with fire…O Allah, deal with America and its allies. O Allah, harshen your grip on them...Deal them the worst of defeats they will ever suffer. Divide their gatherings, split their body, dismember them completely and make us raid them and not them raid us…Soon, you will be in direct conflict—God permitting—against your will (as cited in The Huffington Post, 2014).

6. Empirical analysis and discussion

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22 The analysis will begin with an examination of the events of the studied sieges respectively, it will outline a chronology of relevant events, as well the connecting official foreign policy statements released by the White House and/or State department regarding the American position and/or response. Moreover, the analysis will then examine the ideological principles of Kurdish political institutions in Iraq and Syria in order to identify their core ideological tenets, particularly Iraq’s KRG and Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) respectively.

6.1 Siege of Sinjar

On the morning of August 3, 2014 IS forces advanced into and captured the northwestern Iraqi city of Sinjar, home to a large community of Yazidis, who are Kurdish speakers and considered apostates by the Sunni extremist group (Arango, 2014). In the aftermath of the attack, according to Vian Dakhil, the MP representing the Yazidi minority group in Iraq’s parliament: 70 Yazidi children died, women killed or sold into slavery, and 500 men “slaughtered.” The lawmaker also suggested that the group attempted to “exterminate” the Yazidis, stating that, “similar to the fate of every other Iraqi, my people are being killed. The Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, Turkmen, Shabak people have been killed - and now the Yazidi people are being killed.” (Smith-Spark, 2014). Seeking refuge from brutal attacks, several thousand Yazidis fled into the mountains of Sinjar where they later became encircled and trapped by IS militants.

The Kurds along with several human rights groups, including Amnesty International and UNICEF appealed for support from the United States (Smith-Spark, 2014). Subsequently, on August 7, US President, Barack Obama authorized military operations consisting of targeted airstrikes to protect American personnel, as well as a humanitarian campaign to assist thousands of Iraqi civilians fleeing the extremist group and trapped on Mount Sinjar without food and water. In the speech, Obama first alluded to a statement from June 2014 where he indicated that America would be prepared to take targeted military action in Iraq against the IS group “if and when” they deemed the situation necessary. Then eventually, suggesting his intention to protect American interests in Iraqi Kurdistan, the president stated:

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advance on Erbil, I’ve directed our military to take targeted strikes against ISIL terrorist convoys should they move toward the city (Obama, President Obama Makes a Statement on the Crisis in Iraq, 2014).

Likewise, the humanitarian objective to assist trapped civilians threatened with purported acts of genocide, Obama stated:

we’ve begun operations to help save Iraqi civilians stranded on the mountain [Mount Sinjar]…and these terrorists have been especially barbaric towards religious minorities, including Christian and Yazidis…I’ve, therefore, authorized targeted airstrikes, if necessary, to help forces in Iraq as they fight to break the siege of Mount Sinjar and protect the civilians trapped there. Already, American aircraft have begun conducting humanitarian airdrops of food and water to help these desperate men, women and children survive. (Obama, President Obama Makes a Statement on the Crisis in Iraq, 2014).

Eventually, on August 14, president Obama declared that US warplanes and Kurdish forces on the ground had broken the siege of Sinjar.

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We want to develop our relations with our neighbors based on mutual respect, understanding, and benefits. Thanks to our leadership, we have been able to prove to our neighbors that we have no intention whatsoever to harm their interests…Having relations according to international norms and conventions is something that we welcome (Bakir, 2013).

This provides some support to the notion of ideological similarities with the US as well as other perceived liberal democratic state actors. Generally, as stated, the KRG possesses several key liberal tendencies; firstly, they exhibit strong alliances with democracies and maintain relatively good relations with their neighbours as illustrated above. Particularly, their policy of maintaining good diplomatic ties through continuous dialogue and exchanges is a central international norm in liberal democracies. Secondly, the current democratically elected coalition government, led by Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and President Masoud Barzani is pluralistic, including several political parties (i.e., KDP and PUK parties), reflecting the diversity of the region’s constituency. Third, 26 countries have a diplomatic presence in Erbil, with Canada and China recently announcing plans to establish diplomatic missions. Multinational bodies, including the EU, UN, and ICRC also have offices in the region. Additionally, the KRG’s presence abroad has also grown significantly since 2007. The actor currently has representative offices in 14 countries all of which are US allies; excluding Russia and Iran (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2014).

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Article 14 provides linguistic freedoms for citizens to be educated in their respective mother tongues. The article states: “This Constitution guarantees the right of the citizens of the

Kurdistan Region to educate their children in their mother tongue…in the government's educational institutions and in accordance with pedagogical guidelines” (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2009). Similarly as is the American constitution, this doctrine suggests that the KRG guarantees the principles of multiculturalism and religious freedoms.

Furthermore, the KRG’s ideology, in sum, can be described as one that affords freedom of religion at the individual level; meanwhile their leaders’ appear committed to state secularism and liberalism. Therefore, one can convincingly argue that a significant diplomatic presence both regionally and internationally, cooperation with key US regional allies (i.e., Turkey), alliances with liberal democracies, and the aforementioned constitutional initiatives demonstrate the KRG’s strong commitment to liberal democratic standards and norms - exemplifying significant ideological similarities between Erbil and Washington. The claims of apparent ideological similarities between the two actors are corroborated further by some of Obama’s discourses illustrating solidarity and closeness with a perceived American ally. Notably, in an August 2014 interview with a New York Times columnist, the president when questioned about his decision to use military force to protect refugees from ISIL in Iraqi-Kurdistan, categorized the region as an “island of decency.” He then suggests the region should be protected and preserved, adding that Iraq’s Kurds system of tolerance and inclusiveness should be replicated; Obama stated:

The Kurdish region is functional the way we would like to see. It is tolerant of other sects and other religions in a way that we would like to see elsewhere. So we do think it’s important to make sure that that space is protected… (Friedman, 2014).

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We do have a strategic interest in pushing back ISIL. We’re not going to let them create some caliphate through Syria and Iraq, but we can only do that if we know that we’ve got partners on the ground who are capable of filling the void (Friedman, 2014).

Additionally, to support the argument further, the president in another August 2014 address indicated that he would provide support to forces deemed “moderate,” strongly suggesting that ideological calculations are a key factor in the administration’s threat perception of actors and subsequent foreign policymaking strategies. Regarding bolstering said moderate, partner forces, President Obama explicitly declared, “we can and should support moderate forces who can bring stability to Iraq.” He then later implicitly affirmed, “we’ll continue to work with our friends and allies to help refugees get the shelter and food and water they so desperately need, and to help Iraqis push back against ISIL” (Obama, Statement by the President on ISIL, 2014). It is therefore argued here that the US administration perceives apparent moderate actors as possessing key liberal democratic tenets. Pointedly, in September 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry appeared before a congressional hearing and provided insight into the Obama administrations’ classification criterion when denoting “moderate forces.” When questioned by a US senator regarding the opposition force in the Syrian Civil War, the Secretary indicated:

The opposition has increasingly become more defined by its moderation, more defined by the breadth of its membership and more defined by its adherence to some, you know, democratic process and to an all-inclusive, minority-protecting constitution, which will be broad-based and secular with respect to the future of Syria. And that's very critical (The Washington Post, 2013).

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advance on Kobani. The section will also illustrate some convergences as well as some divergences pertaining to the US administrations’ response to this incident.

6.2 Siege of Kobani

According to local news sources, on March 13, 2014 IS militants seized a strategic bridge on the Euphrates River in Kobani in hopes of expanding their territorial gains in Western Kurdistan (Syria). Successively, a few days later on March 17 it was reported that Syria’s Kurdish military wing, the YPG (People's Defense Units) mobilized to defend the city; later they purported to have killed 40 IS fighters during that clash (Hawar News Agency, 2014). To prevent further advancement and the city from ultimately falling to the militants, the actor called on greater Kurdistan to mobilize - reportedly resulting in only some of the varying Kurdish groups providing concrete support. Regarding the strategic importance of Kobani, according to Zuhad Kobani, a prominent political actor of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria’s Kurdish region, the fall of the city will provide strategic superiority to ISIS and make Rojava, their de facto capital city as of November 2013 more vulnerable. He further explained, “as the town of Kobani was the first place Kurds took over on July 19, 2012, it has a psychological significance. If ISIS succeeds in capturing Kobani, then the Jazeera and Afrin cantons [districts of Syrian Kurdistan] will be vulnerable. Morale will plummet” (Tastekin, 2014). Moreover, concerning American regional interests, since Kobani shares a border with Turkey, the implications of the city falling to extremists is far-reaching regionally and geopolitically.

As the siege and clashes continued throughout the ensuing months, Islamic State militants launched intense offensives, reportedly displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds in Turkey according to most accounts. Finally, in a September 10 statement, President Obama authorized military operations consisting of targeted airstrikes to “degrade and destroy” IS insurgents in both Syria and Iraq; outlining the administrations’ foreign policy objective, he stated:

Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy…we have ramped up our

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So this is our strategy…America will be joined by a broad coalition of partners. Already, allies are flying planes with us over Iraq; sending arms and assistance to Iraqi security forces and the Syrian opposition; sharing intelligence; and providing billions of dollars in humanitarian aid. (Obama, Statement by the President on ISIL, 2014)

According to the Pentagon, the administration conducted their first strikes against IS targets in the besieged city on September 27, destroying two armored vehicles. Despite the relative small scale of this initial attack, it symbolically demonstrated Washington’s commitment of finally militarily assisting Kurdish, YPG forces in Kobani after approximately 6 months of unanswered bombardment and advances from the group (Sanger & Barnard, 2014).

While the US administration and its coalition, consisting of western states and prominent moderate Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE have prevented the total capture of Kobani with intensive airstrikes and airdrops of supplies and weaponry to perceived relative moderate Kurdish defenders on the ground. The siege of Kobani remained unbroken and clashes on the ground between Kurdish forces and extremists were ongoing until it was ultimately broken after being ousted on January 26, 2015. Notwithstanding the total 10 month long (March 2014 – January 2015) offensive from IS militants, Kurdish fighters raised their flag on a hill that once flew the group’s infamous black banner, signifying victory, and the culmination to a four-month long coalition battle (Baldor, Fraser, & Janssen, 2015).

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Additionally, according to some accounts, 20 percentage of YPD fighters, are women (Dettmer, 2013); relative to other actors in the region, illustrates progressive equality and social inclusion initiatives.

While the KRG in Iraq can be traced back several decades ago, the PYD was founded in 2003, only declaring its political programme in 2005. Conceivably, this can be credited to the Syrian regimes’ “ethnic nationalism” and “Arabization” polices, coupled with successive authoritarian governments, as described in the empirical section above. Therefore, one can arguably attribute the relative slow formation of Syria’s Kurdish political institutions to these aforementioned regime polices. Relatedly, against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war, the PYD declared the creation of its autonomous government on November 2013. However, despite their affirmation of moderate, liberal democratic initiatives highlighted above, others continually point to their close affiliation to Turkey’s Kurdish political actor, the PKK; considered by the US State department, Turkey, and other allies, including the EU, NATO a terrorist organization. Some maintain that the actor (PKK) ideologically subscribes to Marxism as well as Communism. According to the groups’ leader, Abdullah Ocalan, its ideology entails “Democratic Confederation,” which he describes as “a non-state political administration or democracy without a state,” in other words a democratic system of people without a state. Ocalan proposed this governing model as an alternative to the pre-existent western models of nation-states and capitalism (Ocalan, 2011, pp. 32-44). Therefore, given that PYD leaders have acknowledged to an ideological affinity, as well as describing Ocalan, as an ideological leader – inherent fundamental ideological differences between Washington and Syria’s Kurds are undeniably apparent. Prominently, a November 2013 discourse of Salih Muslim Muhammad, a PYD political leader, speaking in the context of establishing relations with Turkey and the Syrian Civil War, refers to Turkey’s Kurds as “brothers,” implicitly corroborating the above notion of political and ideological affinity, stating:

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While it should be noted, the leader has been ambiguous in other discourses and interviews concerning the above notion, in a 2012 telephone interview, however, Reuters purported Muhammad explicitly confirmed the concept of ideological affinity (Coles, 2012).

This analysis, hence, illustrates that US foreign policy concerning Syria’s Kurds, and a subsequent relative delayed military campaign to suppress IS’ assault on Kobani can to some extent, intrinsically traced to an alliance with Turkey. Ankara’s staunch initial apprehension to the American-led coalitions’ bolstering of the PYD militarily because of a perceived affiliation with an adversary and terrorist organization provides credence to this notion. Similarly, the PYD leadership’s aforementioned statements reveals political and ideological affinity to an adversarial group, providing additional explanatory factors to Ankara’s apprehension, and in turn Washington’s reluctance to intervene in this siege.

As such, concerning US foreign policymaking, as Haas’ theoretical approach projected ideological considerations are also ostensible in the US-led intervention in Kobani. Markedly, president Obama not only alluded to it in the above-described speech in the Iraqi context but also in the Syrian context as well, stating:

With respect to the situation on the ground in Syria, we will not be placing U.S. ground troops to try to control the areas that are part of the conflict inside of Syria…We are going to have to find effective partners on the ground to push back ISIL. And the moderate coalition there is one that we can work with (Obama, Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, 2014).

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Moreover, as the hypothesis predicted - perceived ideological differences led to an initial reluctance to intervene in Kobani. However, given the stated American, September 2014 strategy of degrading and defeating ISIL in Iraq and Syria - ideological distance and similarities vis-à-vis Syria’s Kurds (PYD-YPG) relative moderate ideological positon contra other actors, resulted in them eventually being supported, and their forces bolstered by an American-led intervention. Conclusively, as the aforementioned empirical evidence suggests, the US administration perceives and denotes moderate forces as possessing democratic leaning positions, thus when the administration refers to moderate forces as previously revealed in Secretary Kerry’s statements, one can then infer that a given actor possesses the latter described tenets; suggesting ideological distance considerations in policymaking. Furthermore, during a December 2014 counter-ISIL meeting, Kerry remarked, “our coalition does not summon hate, but rather the courage to build a future that is based on shared interests, shared values, and a shared faith in one another (Kerry, 2014),” providing further support to the dissertation’s latter notion of ideological distance.

This essay will now proceed to its final section, where conclusions regarding the divergent US administrations’ foreign policy outcomes in the Sinjar and Kobani contexts are explored; as well, closing remarks pertaining to the stated research question and hypothesis will be discussed.

7. Conclusion

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32 supports to their international and domestic interests. Additionally, it argued that leaders’ threat perceptions play a significant role in foreign policy outcomes in state to non-state actor relations. The essay tested the accuracy of the stated hypothesis empirically by exploring US-Kurdish relations and eventual foreign policy outcomes during the Islamic States’ sieges of Sinjar and Kobani, affecting Iraqi, Syrian Kurdish groups respectively.

Firstly, in answering the research question, it can argued convincingly that the analysis has produced strong indications of ideological considerations in foreign policymaking in state to non-state actor relationships and interactions in the studied cases. Tellingly, the findings suggests that perceived ideological distance and differences between the US administration and Kurds in Syria led to its initial reluctance to support and intervene in the siege of Kobani. Whereas perceived ideological similarities resulted conversely in an immediate commitment from the administration to bolster “moderate” forces as well apparent “friends and allies” in the case of Sinjar.

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33 provides a supplementary explanation to America’s divergence in this particular circumstance. Notably, some may argue and revert to other internal factors in Syria including the regimes’ nationalistic and Arabization policies as contributing factors to the lack of a formal or direct US policy towards Syria’s Kurds (Charountaki, 2011). However, an analysis of contemporary cases and successive related series of events, coupled with the stated empirics of US-Kurdish relations suggests a pattern of ideological consideration as a significant contributing factor in the formation and eventual divergence in US foreign policy towards the studied actors in particular.

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Stockholms Universitet/Stockholm University SE-106 91 Stockholm

Department of Political Science