DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
A MORE OR LESS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL UNION
European integration in the case of the European Development Fund
Jonas Bjärnstedt
Thesis: 15 hp
Program: European studies programme
Level: First Cycle
Semester/year: At/2016
Supervisor: Ann-Kristin Jonasson Examiner:
Report no:
Word Count: 10 999
Abstract
Is the community Intergovernmental or Supranational? The question has perplexed EU- researchers since the dawn of the European Coal and Steel Community. This thesis answers the question in one specific case, namely the European Development Fund. It started as a trade project with the overseas countries and territories, and it has since developed into the EU’s and member states fund for the ACP countries. Funded by the member states on a voluntary budget and outside of the EU financial framework, it could be the poster child for an intergovernmental institution. With the help of an analytical framework and previous theories, I examine the case. This is done with the help of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and an analytical framework with two ideal types that points at important markers. In the end, I illustrate how hard it is to pin a simple label such as intergovernmental or supranational on the European Development Fund.
Thesis: 15hp
Program: European sciences program
Level: First Cycle
Semester: At/2016
Supervisor: Ann-Kristin Jonasson Examiner:
Report no:
Keywords: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism, European Development Fund, EDF,
intergovernmentalism, supranationalism
Sökord: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunktionalism, Europeiska Utvecklingsfonden, EUF, mellanstatlighet, överstatlighet
Word count: 10 999
Contents
Abstract...ii
1 The integration of development aid...1
2 Theory and Previous Research...4
2.1 Integration theory...4
2.1.1 Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance...4
2.1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism...6
2.2 Previous research...9
2.2.2 An attempt to measure intergovernmentalism...9
2.2.1 The European Development Fund...11
2.3 Analytical framework...13
3 Purpose and research question...15
4 Method...16
4.1 Material...17
5 Results...19
5.1 Who makes the decisions?...19
5.2 In what ways are decisions made?...21
5.3 Is power delegated or surrendered?...22
5.4 Why does the EDF exist?...23
6 Conclusion...25
6.1 Final discussion and suggestions for further research...25
Reference list...27
List of tables
Table 3.1 Analytical framework 14 Table 5.1 Who makes the decisions? 19
Table 5.2 In what ways are decisions made? 21 Table 5.3 Is power delegated or surrendered? 22
Table 5.4 Whose interests does the institution represent? 23 Table 6.1 Analytical framework, answered 25
1 The integration of development aid
The integration of member states in the EU has long been a subject of debate. Some claim that the EU is just a collection of member states negotiating with each other (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 69) and yet others claim that the EU institutions will take over decision-making from the national institutions in the member states (Stone Sweet &
Sandholtz, 1998, p 4). Integration theory is often used to try to make sense of how the EU works (Diez & Wiener, 2009, p 4), but more than integration theory, there is also a need for understanding how the institutions and member states in the EU work together (or does not work together). By studying the inner workings of the EU, a researcher’s findings can strengthen one theory and weaken another. So far, no theory has been proven enough to be the only theory in the field, even though they wax and wane in popularity as time goes by. It is far beyond me or indeed any one researcher to examine the integration in the entirety of the EU, it is far more plausible to select a part of the EU and examine the level of integration. The selected case for this study is the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF is an interesting case in many ways. First, it is an area that does not receive as much interest as other parts of the EU, even in the context of aid research or research on the EU foreign policy.
The EDF is sometimes touched upon in research as an example of an intergovernmental entity among the EU institutions (Commission, 2016; D'Alfonso, 2014, p 1; Molenaers &
Nijs, 2011, p 415), or introduced as a small part in a much larger puzzle (Tannous, 2013). I posit that the EDF is interesting enough in itself to examine as an example of European integration and that the question is not as simple as just claiming that the EDF is intergovernmental or supranational in nature.
The EDF is a special case among EU instruments in many ways. It reminds more of one of the many aid projects that states have started around the globe, which conduct their aid in much the same way as the EDF does (Schneider & Urpelainen, 2014). The EDF is an EU instrument which is controlled by the EDF-Committee, together with the Council of the European Union (The Council). The EDF is a fund wherein the Member States pools their resources to fund the EU – ACP foreign aid programme. The purpose of the EDF is to coordinate, program and decide upon the amount of funds in the EU aid to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. The difference between the funds the EDF receives
and the money that the EU spend on other developmental aid programmes is that the EDF is outside of the EU’s financial rules, since it is outside of the EU budget. There have been attempts by the Commission to include the EDF in the budget, and some member states have lent their support to the suggestions, but it has not yet happened. It is also the only EU instrument whose contribution key is not in line with the regular EU budget contribution key.
The financing of the EDF is voluntary for the member states but based on a contribution key.
The purpose of the EDF is to be the main mechanism that handles the aid to the ACP as well as the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). The aid is meant to further democratic development and to eradicate poverty (COM(2016)486, p 5). The EDF is placed under the Directorate General (DG) of Development and Cooperation (Devco), which is a supranational entity under the Commission. It is at the same time positioned under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS is a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These are institutions that were formalised with the treaty of Lisbon. The EDF also has a close relationship with the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s long term, non-profit lending institution. The shareholders in the EIB are the member states, which means that the member states are the ones that sets the policy goals for the EIB and oversee the board of governors and the board of directors. (OJ L 201, 2010).
The EDF has been a part of EU aid since the treaty of Rome. The treaty contained parts about the member states and their relations to their current and former colonies. The member state that pushed the most for this inclusion was France (Arts, 2004, p 102). The EDF then gradually expanded to incorporate more recipients of aid. When the United Kingdom entered the EU, it brought with it the remnants of its former empire, which enlarged the sphere of interest. The EDF has since evolved into an instrument that oversees aid to the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) and the Overseas countries and territories (OCT) (Carbone, 2007, p 31 - 32). OCT are the countries and territories that have historical ties with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Europaid, 2016).
In the beginning, and on to the 1980s, there were two opinions on how to use the fund. There was France and Belgium who pressed on the issue of strategic links between the member states and their former colonies, and Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,
along with Denmark, who focused on poverty eradication. The Yaoundé Conventions who were in place from 1963 to 1975, which concentrated on the former colonies and mainly on trade were a victory for France and Belgium, who favoured a regionalist approach. It was followed by the Lomé Convention which was in effect 1975 - 2000, a treaty that was hailed as a modern example of North-South cooperation. Lomé accommodated both views, and integrated the former British colonies in the fund (Carbone, 2007, p 31 - 32).
The Lomé Convention included right to aid, meaning that the recipients had a right to aid for five years, with no requirements of performance. It also included export privileges as certain goods from ACP countries could enter the EU at a lower or no tariff. The emphasis of the Lomé was on partnership. Several cooperation institutions were initiated, and to support dialogue, the EU and ACP created institutions tasked with supporting the partnership (Carbone, 2007, p 32). There were attempts to expand the EDF further with the Lomé, and include other countries in need of aid, for example Bhutan. The suggestion was made by member states without close ties to former colonies, but the suggestion did not pass (Arts, 2004, p 103). In 2000, the Cotonou Agreement supplanted the Lomé Convention. Where the Lomé had expanded on the Yaoundé, the Cotonou expanded on the Lomé. It expanded on the conditions of aid, and on the trade agreements. The EDF is an evolving entity, and has changed over the years since the treaty of Rome. The current EDF is the 11th, which started in March 2015, when it followed the 10th EDF, which ended in December 2013. In the 11th EDF, the donor key of the member states are brought further in line with the contribution to the EU budget (Commission, 2016).
2 Theory and Previous Research
There are multiple theories that can be used to explain my question. I am going to limit myself to integration theory. While there are other theories that can explain parts of the question, the theories I use, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance, try to explain all parts of integration. Other theories are more useful for taking on specific parts of the problem.
2.1 Integration theory
A helpful way to understand how the EU works is to use different integration theories. They are a way to explain how, if, or when, integration happens. No theory of integration has so far been able to explain all aspects of integration, but some have a larger following than others and some have endured, albeit changed with the times, for a long time. Not all theories of integration are relevant to this thesis, but I describe the ones I use to analyse the decision- making progress in the EDF below.
2.1.1 Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance
Neofunctionalism was the first theory designed to understand European integration. It was pioneered in the late 1950’s and early 60’s by Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, who developed the theory to understand two new institutions: The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (ECC). At first, the theory seemed to be able to explain European integration, but after large setbacks, the theory was declared obsolete by Haas himself in the 70’s. The theory has since had a resurgence, with the increased integration at the end of the 20th century (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p 45). An important part of the neofunctionalist theory is the concept of “spillover”, or the “spillover effect”. Spillover is a concept that reminds of path dependency, in that previous decisions decide what ways are possible to proceed on. With spillover, integration begets integration.
Ernst Haas, one of the pioneers of the neofunctionalist theory talked about spillover and how it happened almost as soon as the ECSC had formed (Haas, 1958, p 292). He even went so far as to say that the member states accepted spillover integration even though it might not be beneficial in the long term (Haas, 1958, p 297). His reasoning for the spillover was that some
sectors of the member states were interdependent on such a level that it was impossible to integrate some sectors and have other parts left out of integration. Thus the integration for a common market would lead to integration of other policies, such as welfare systems (Haas, 1958, p 382 - 383).
Neofunctionalism has over time been heavily criticised, both from neofunctionalists themselves and from intergovernmentalists. One of the most heavily criticised parts of neofunctionalism is the power of prediction it claimed to have. The problem with the predictions was that they did not come to pass. With the criticism it got, neofunctionalism fell out of favour for a while, but has since had a resurgence, through the rise of the theory of Supranational Governance, a theory spearheaded by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (Bache, George, & Bulmer, 2011, p 14). This theory can be seen as a counter point to Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in the same way that Intergovernmentalism was an answer to Neofunctionalism. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998, p 5) argues that the bargaining process that Liberal Intergovernmentalism claims is a proof of intergovernmentalism over supranationalism is instead just a small part in the increasing level of supranationalism in the EU. This is achieved by spillover effect that forces the member states to bargain on areas where the supranational entity, in this case the Commission, deems it necessary. If one system becomes integrated, this will lead to bargaining over integration in other systems, whether the member states wants it or not. In this part of their theory, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz agree with the earlier Neofunctionalists that member states become reactive, rather than pro-active actors (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p 6 - 7). The Supranational Governance theory uses two diametrically opposed ideal types in its analysis, a purely intergovernmental one and a purely supranational one. The intergovernmental ideal type is one where the heads of member states negotiate with each other, based on preferences and bargaining power. The Supranational ideal type is where central institution has power over policy in the member states. To explain the perceived move towards supranationalism, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz use the term Institutionalization. Institutions here are being explained as the regulations and institutionalization as the process in which these regulations are applied to the member states, both by political institutions and by the European Court of Justice (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p 16 - 17). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz do not outright dismiss the claims of Moravcsik, they do agree that there is an element of intergovernmentalism in the workings of the EU, but press their point that instead of member states delegating power to the EU of their own free
will, actors like the commission actively work to increase their own power and to move decisions from the member states to their own sphere of influence (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p 25 - 26).
2.1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism
The first version of the Intergovernmentalism theory was made by Stanley Hoffmann (1964), as a response to Haas Neofunctionalism. Liberal Intergovernmentalism continues in the same direction to explain integration that Intergovernmentalism set out on.
Hoffman argued that the spillover effect was not as prevalent as it had been assumed in Neofunctionalism. He also argues that the member states at the time, “the Six” (Hoffmann, 1964, p 88) had a much easier time agreeing on policies that eliminated obstacles to mobility and trade, than they did on issues concerning policies already in place (Hoffmann, 1964).
Hoffman describes de Gaulle as a leading opponent against supranationalism and a champion of intergovernmentalism, and in this he was proved right in the “empty chair crisis”. France withdrew its member of the Commission in 1965 – 66. De Gaulle’s protest succeeded, and led to unanimity voting on important issues, through the Luxembourg compromise (Council, 2015). Hoffman places integration on a scale balanced by diversity. In a diverse union, the effects of a spillover effect can only be limited to level the member states wants it to stop at, in the areas that member states want to keep control, they will. The member states simply would not want to surrender the ability to make their own decisions, even though the outcome might not be what the member state expects (Hoffmann, 1966). Hoffman goes on to argue that there can be no unanimous European will, since there is no European people. The problems of the member states are more suited to be handled by local governments and civil servants, than by a supranational entity (Hoffmann, 1966). In his continued critique against functionalism, Hoffman argues that the creation of the European Union is not possible in the ways we are used to states being created, a state that creates a people or a people that creates a state. Hoffman goes on by saying that the only way to integrate is to wait until the member states are ready. The member states would not let it go any further (Hoffmann, 1966).
As is the case with Hoffman’s Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism critiques functionalist theories and the spillover effect. Moravcsik argues that even though the EU is
sui generis, an actor of a kind that the world has never seen before, it does not need a unique theory (Moravcsik, 1993). His critique continues by examining the predictions made by the neo-functionalists, which have not come to bear, or at least not in the way that the neo- functionalists described it would happen. Liberal Intergovernmentalism is inspired by international relation theory and more precisely liberal theory. It assumes that states have interests, and those interests are relevant. Moravcsik claims that one is unable to understand the interests of a member state unless one also understands that member state’s domestic politics. This is a step away from some theories in international relations that treats states as having fixed preferences. The theory further states that the member states negotiate based on their preferences. So, it is a chain that starts in the member state, where public opinion, NGO’s and party politics forms the preferences of the state, which then decides what stance it will take in the multilateral negotiations in the EU (Moravcsik, 1993).
Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a framework that tries to explain European integration by combining multiple theories, and claims that it can be used to explain both decision-making at the very top of the EU and elements of the day-to-day decisions that are made. Liberal Intergovernmentalism claims that what one need to understand integration is three things.
Preferences, bargaining and institutions. If we look at these three things in turn, we are able to see how Liberal Intergovernmentalism explains integration (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 67).
While using Liberal Intergovernmentalism, two things must be assumed. The first is that states are actors, and the second that they are rational actors. Treating the member states as actors means that it is the member states themselves that bring about the desired goals by negotiating and bargaining in an intergovernmental setting. Liberal Intergovernmentalism rejects the thought that a supranational entity is the actor that makes and enforces the political decisions in the EU. Treating the states as rational actors is a premise of agency. What it means is that states decide on actions not by random chance, or dictated by a fixed set of preferences, but rather by choosing a path that is well thought out and adapted to the current circumstances. Hence, international agreements are the result of states that agree to cooperate based on their national preferences, and tries to maximise the gain based on, again, national preferences (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 68)
To make this work in a setting like the EU, states need to do this in three stages. First the states need to define what their preferences are, which is followed by bargaining to reach a collective agreement that the nations can agree on. When a course is agreed on, the member states can collectively set up an institution that can guarantee those outcomes, or change an already existing institution. Each of these three stages are separate from the others and each of them are explained by a different theory (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 69).
In the case of the national preferences, it seems to Moravcsik that there are some factors that are more important than others. Most important is economic globalization, with geopolitical and economic factors behind it. What the economic and geopolitical goals are, differ from state to state, but they are a result of internal politics. Sometimes integration will be in the interest of a state and sometimes it will not, it all depends on what preferences the state has at that moment. Since the EU member states rarely have the same preferences, there is a need for bargaining to commence. The bargaining might not be able to reach a consensus, but all states desire to have as good deal as possible, and not to accept a deal that is suboptimal to them. Here, the bargaining power of the actors is important. For example, a state that does not care overly much about the outcome or does not mind the status quo have a better bargaining position than a state that have a preferred outcome which changes the current policies. Liberal Intergovernmentalism further claims that there is no need for an outside force such as the Commission to lead or suggest all policy decisions, the member states have enough interests to bring issues forth by themselves (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 71)
The creation of institutions by the member states is rationalised by the need for institutions to lower transaction costs in negotiations, and to lessen what uncertainty there might be about other member states future attitudes and inclinations. With an institution, there are rules in place for the ongoing negotiations of further policy. Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues that these institutions are a pooling of sovereignty and not a surrender of power, even though the member states might choose to delegate a significant amount of power to certain institutions.
The reasoning for this is that even though member states might delegate power, the member states are still the ones that enforces and enacts most EU policy (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 72 - 73).
2.2 Previous research
2.2.2 An attempt to measure intergovernmentalism
Helen Sjursen (2011) has written an article where she examines the level of intergovernmentalism in the CFSP/CSDP. In it, she designs a framework to help her draw her conclusions. Sjursens framework consists of four pillars:
1. The nature of the actors involved.
2. The procedures through which decisions are made.
3. The scope and type of powers that are delegated.
4. The raison d'être of the co-operative endeavour.
(Sjursen, 2011, p 1080)
The first pillars assume that in an intergovernmental system, the member states make the decisions. Sjursen (2011) finds that in the CFSP/CSDP, the answer might not be as simple and dichotomic a question of member states versus commission. While there are other actors, namely NGOs and private companies to name a few, the EU intergovernmental institutions can not be overlooked. Sjursen argues that the intergovernmental institutions themselves might erode the assertion of Liberal Intergovernmentalism that the member states are the only actors in EU foreign policy. The problem with defining who makes the decisions, is the EU institutions created to help the Commission and the creation of the EEAS. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is composed of member state ambassadors and is stationed in Brussels, where its role is to deliver opinions on CFSP/CSDP to the Council or High Representative at their request, or unprompted, if they feel the need. They also monitor policy implementation and have a responsibility if there is a crisis where the EU might need to respond (OJ C 326, 2012a). The PSC, along with other working groups, have managed to gain a certain amount of autonomy from the institutions they are supposed to serve. They are no longer a support function, but can come up with policy suggestions on their own. Based on these observations, Sjursen draws two conclusions. That there is a shift in decision-making from the capitals to Brussels, and that the power of the member states has splintered, with their envoys in Brussels having a possibility to steer the CFSP/CSDP in the direction they desire. The problem with this is deciding who is responsible. Sjursen (2011) also notes that it can be hard to separate the decisions made within the CFSP/CSDP from decisions made in other parts of the EU machinery. This, along with joint supranational and intergovernmental
efforts makes it hard to pin down if decisions are actually taken by the member states or if some other institution is part of the decision-making. Sjursens conclusion is that it is hard to see who actually decides in all matters (Sjursen, 2011)
The second pillar is about the structure of decision-making. If a member state is unable to use veto to stop a policy with which it agrees, by, for example instituting some sort of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), this would not be truly intergovernmental. Sjursen (2011) finds that there is less and less use of the veto in the CFSP/CSPD, and more consensus-seeking.
Consensus-seeking does not mean that the veto does not play in at all, it might very well have a place in negotiations, but member states have been noted to accept suboptimal bargains instead of using their veto. Another reason that the veto does not see much use might be because member states might not have a position in a question. Instead of changing their position, they develop a position instead. In EU negotiations with the International Labour Organizations Maritime Convention, Sjursen found that some states adopted a common policy that ran counter to their own economic interests. This puts pressure on Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory, which claims that nations bargain partially based on their economic interests (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p 71). In her article, Sjursen is not sure if the decline in veto use is a trend, but notes that it causes trouble in the questions of intergovernmentalism in the CFSP/CSPD (Sjursen, 2011)
The third pillar describers how the member states don’t surrender power, only delegates it, if the institution is to be intergovernmental. If the member states were to surrender power, it would not be intergovernmental, but instead a supranational actor. The third pillar also assumes that the delegated power can be revoked or renegotiated. It is noted in the article that there is no precedent in the EU of states trying to take back power that is delegated.
Delegation might be seen as having an end date, but that is not the case with the EU. Power is delegated to the institutions, who then uses that power. The CFSP is supposed to be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council, who should act unanimously (OJ C 326, 2012a, Article 24). This is a general delegation of power from the member states to the EU, and Sjursen (2011) questions the probability that this delegation could be revoked at all.
Rather, the generalized delegation opens up the possibility for the institutions mentioned in pillar one, foremost EEAS and PSC, who are now more autonomous than before, to start up initiatives. The conclusion becomes that there are two separate but intermixed foreign policy
systems in place in the Union, that of the EU and that of the member states. Sjursen also mentions that the veto might hinder the member states taking back power that has been delegated, what with decisions in the Council having to be unanimous (Sjursen, 2011).
The fourth pillar is about the purpose of the intergovernmental collaboration. If it is an intergovernmental structure, it should be there to serve the member states and assist them. If the intergovernmental entity places importance on things that the member states do not, or have differing values, it cannot be truly intergovernmental, per the fourth pillar. The institutions of the EU have pushed for a creation of European interests and European values.
There is also, in the treaties, the thought of the EU as an individual actor is developed in the Treaty of European Union, where, for example, it says that: “Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene.” (OJ C 326, 2012a, Article 32). If this, along with the European interests and values, means that the Union does have its own agenda, and places importance on things that the member states does not, it is not intergovernmental, according to Sjursens framework (Sjursen, 2011).
2.2.1 The European Development Fund
Previous research on the EDF so far includes, among other things, how partisan heterogeneity affects international cooperation (Schneider & Urpelainen, 2014), the end result of EU foreign aid (Dimier, 2006), or analyses of the EU-ACP agreements (Hurt, 2003). While these themes primarily deal with the external part of EU aid, there is precious little research that looks at the internal politics and policies (Carbone, 2007, p 1). One researcher that has written about it is Maurizio Carbone. On the development decision-making policy, he points out article 180 in the Maastricht treaty which stipulates that member states should coordinate their policies with each other. The second part of the article states that the Commission can take initiative to promote coordination between the member states (Carbone, 2007, p 48). Carbone investigates the interaction between the Commission and the Member States, how the decisions are made and how it is possible for the Commission to take on its role as leader (Carbone, 2007, p 3).
The decision-making process in the development policy area differs quite a bit from the regular decision-making process. The major roles in the development area are played by the Commission, via DG Development (Devco after the Lisbon treaty) and the Council. DG Development handles initiatives both with the EDF and the EU regional funds. At the time
that Carbone wrote his book, there was another DG, DG Relex which handled external relations. This DG is now part of the EEAS, along with parts of DG Development (OJ L 201, 2010, p 39 - 40). These two DGs were criticised by the member states when they existed, due to having different views on how to handle aid, Relex being more political and DG Development concentrating on poverty reduction (Carbone, 2007, p 48). This led to the EU’s development policy being fractured and not as focused as it needed to be to be effective.
Carbone describes the decision-making process before the Lisbon treaty as follows: DG Development would prepare a proposal, which would be sent out to concerned DGs for consultation if they have a stake in the matter. The proposal would then be forwarded to the (now) 28 members of the Commission. Adopted by the Commission, the matter would then go on to the Council, to be examined by the Development Working Group. Their purpose is to provide their opinion on the proposal. The examined proposal would then be sent to the COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives, which prepares the agenda for the Council. This is not the case with all issues that are considered by the Council, but seeing agreements concerning aid can be politically sensitive, it was often the case with proposals from DG Development. Then, depending on the current presidency of the Council, the proposal would gain a different priority. After the Council, the final decision would belong with the now dismantled entity GAERC, the General Affairs & External Relations Council. In the case where a decision could not be reached at GAERC, it would end up in the European Council, to be discussed by the heads of state of the member states (Carbone, 2007, p 51).With the treaty of Lisbon, the Union adopted the CFSP and the Common the Defensive and Security Policy (CSDP). This led to the creation of a new branch in the intergovernmental part of the EU government: The EEAS – European External Action Service. The EEAS is supposed to be an autonomous body, separate both from the Council and the Commission, and with a mandate to act on its own to reach its objectives (OJ L 201, 2010). The leader of the EEAS is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, usually shortened to High Representative. The High Representative is the head of the CSDP and CFSP, as well as holding the post of Vice President of the Commission. This has led to the High Representative being stretched quite thin and not being able to take part in her role in the Commission as much as is expected (European Court of Auditors, 2014).
With the establishment of the EEAS, there was a great reshuffling of Commission staff into this supposed intergovernmental institution. Except for some staff with more administrative duties, all of DG Relex was assigned to the EEAS. From DG Development, two directorates were moved to the EEAS, Directorate D, and E, who handled most of the ACP states. Along with these, the staff responsible for aid programming were shifted to be under the EEAS instead of the Commission (OJ L 201, 2010). This led to a merging of EuropeAid and DG Development to form the new DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, called Devco.
This merger strengthened the position of the DG and added a new entity to consider when programming EU aid (Tannous, 2013). With the DG’s being split up and the personnel brought into the EEAS, its staff has been skewed towards Commission staff, but the goal is that the staff should be 1/3 Commission staff, 1/3 Council staff and 1/3 from the member states diplomatic services (Merket, 2012; Tannous, 2013). This makes it hard to classify the EEAS as an agent of either the member states, the Council, the Commission or the High Representative.
2.3 Analytical framework
The research by Sjursen helps me design an analytical matrix, based on her framework. By using the specifications for each pillar, it is reworked into four questions and two possible answers to each question, one intergovernmental and one supranational.
To design my questions, I used the four pillars and constructed dichotomic answers to the questions, the answer is either in the intergovernmental column or the supranational column.
What this provides me is two ideal types, one intergovernmental and one supranational. Ideal types are a useful method to use in this case, as I want to examine if the EDF is more intergovernmental or more supranational. The intergovernmental ideal type is built on Moravcsik’s theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (2009) and the supranational is built on Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’ (1998) theory of supranational governance. This is reminiscent of the ideal types in Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’ supranational governance, but they place more importance with the European Court of Justice, which does not figure in the EDF decision- making process (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p 8-10). While using ideal types, it is useful to use polar opposites such as Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Supranational Governance. It is then possible to describe an occurrence within the instrument that I examine as more
intergovernmental, or more supranational (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, & Wängnerud, 2012, p 141).
For question one, ‘Who makes the decisions’, the answers are easy to define. Either the member states have the final say in matters of the EDF, or it is not in any way intergovernmental.
For the second question, ‘In what ways are decisions made’, the answers were quite easy to come by as well, since Sjursen (2011) claims that a situation where the member states have no veto power and instead have to decide via majority vote or some sort of QMV cannot be entirely intergovernmental.
For question three, ‘Is power delegated or surrendered’, the answers are right there in the question, if the power is surrendered, then the EDF cannot be an intergovernmental instrument.
The fourth question. ‘Why does the intergovernmental entity exist’ or, what is the raison d’être of the intergovernmental effort? This question is not as straight forward as the three questions that came before it. It is more a question of whose interests the entity serves, which can be harder to find a way to describe with the dichotomic answers. This question had to go through several rounds of reworking before I could find a question and answers that really fit together and could answer the question I wanted to answer. In the end, the answers ended up member states for intergovernmental and Union for supranational interests.
Table 2.1 Analytical framework
Questions: Intergovernmental Supranational
Who makes the decisions? Member states EU-institutions
In what ways are decisions made? Unanimity (Veto) QMV (No formal veto) Is power delegated or
surrendered?
Power is delegated Power is surrendered Whose interests does the EDF
represent?
Member states Union
3 Purpose and research question
The EDF is, as previously stated, seen by most observers as an intergovernmental instrument, rather than a supranational EU instrument. This is presumably because the EDF was intergovernmental from the start. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse if it can still be considered an intergovernmental instrument or if there has been a spillover effect. The study has three hypotheses, with different conclusions for each outcome.
1. The EDF is purely intergovernmental 2. The EDF is purely supranational
3. The EDF is a mix between intergovernmental and supranational
If the EDF is purely intergovernmental, it corroborates the previously mentioned assumptions.
If that is the case, then that is a point for Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in that it is proof that it has not been integrated into the EU, but has instead remained intergovernmental and mostly free from supranational influence.
If it on the other hand is purely supranational, then the researchers and documents that describe it as intergovernmental has its assumptions falsified and would have to adapt their view on the EDF accordingly. It also lends credibility to the theory that there is a spillover effect that forces integration within EU institutions and instruments.
A mix between intergovernmental and supranational allows much the same conclusions as the purely supranational outcome. With previous research describing the EDF as intergovernmental, a mix between intergovernmental and supranational would point towards a spillover effect that has increased integration in the EU.
The purpose and research question of this thesis is therefore: Which of the integration theories Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism/Supranational Governance best explains the current state of the European Development Fund?
4 Method
To find the answer to my question, I go through official EU documentation, asking the questions as put forth in my analytical framework. The official documentation should be able to answer the questions asked. This method will answer how policy states that the decision- making process occurs, how decisions are made, if the power is delegated and who the EDF represents.
Who makes the decisions? For the first question, I peruse the official documentation and find out how the chain of decisions is implemented concerning the EDF. This should be described, hopefully in some detail, to avoid confusion and conflict between the institutions. To be able to answer the question, I need to find out what institutions are a part of the process and who has the final say in matters concerning the EDF.
In what ways are decisions made? The second question is similar to the first question, I once again read the official documentation and see how decisions are made. To answer the question, the policy documents need to be clear on what sort of decision-making methods are to be used in the case of the EDF. Is there a possibility for the use of veto, or does the policy stipulates the use of QMV?
Is power delegated or surrendered? The third question is answered by reading the texts I have available and establish in which cases of the EDF the member states have delegated power.
This is done by finding out where other institutions have power over the EDF. This question is somewhat interconnected to the question about veto versus QMV, in that I find who makes the decisions in the same paragraphs.
Whose interests does the EDF represent? In the question of representation of interests, I use the policy documents and find out if the documents refer to the member states interests or if they refer to the EU, or the Commission or some other entity. If the interests pursued are European or the Union’s interests, then the member states are not the entities whose interests are being put to the front of the issue. In this case, the member states interests cannot be European interests, since I see the member states as such a diverse grouping of actors with diverse interests.
.
4.1 Material
The material that is be used to answer these questions is official documentation from the European Union. To be more specific, I use documents from the Official Journal (OJ), and mostly from series L, the part of the OJ with EU legislation. There are a few documents from the C section of the OJ, the Treaty on European Union (OJ C 326, 2012a), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 326, 2012b) and Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus (OJ C 46, 2006). The legislative texts I am going to use are the ones pertaining to the case of the control of the EDF. These are the following: Council decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 2010), INTERNAL AGREEMENT between the representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period of 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies (OJ L 210, 2013), COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund (OJ L 58, 2015), COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/355 of 2 March 2015 adopting the rules and procedures of the European Development Fund Committee (OJ L 61, 2015), Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020 (Devco, 2012) and the Agreement amending for the second time the partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and the Pacific group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 (OJ L 287, 2010) The process of finding the documentation has consisted of two kinds of sources. Some documents are commonly referred to in previous research. This is mainly the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. The other way I have found documents that deal with the decision-making process concerning the EDF, is
following the paper trail. The EU documentation is helpful in this regard, seeing as how they reference all the legislation that pertain to a certain case. I found the Internal agreement (OJ L 210, 2013) on the website of DG Devco, and in that document was references to OJ L 201, 2010. By searching Eur-lex, the EU legislative database for 11th EDF regulations and applying filters for council documents, I found Council Regulation 2015/322 which referenced to OJ L 210, 2010 again. By searching for “European Development Fund Committee” on Eur-lex, I found Council decision 2015/355, which in turn then referenced to OJ L 210, 2013 and Council regulation 2015/322 in OJ L 58, 2015. Finding that my references were going in circles, I decided that I had enough information to form an understanding of the decision- making process.
While it is always useful to have source critisism while reading EU documentation, since the text in the policy documents does not always correlate with reality, the purpose of this thesis is to analýse the contents of the policy documents and specific policies. Therefore, the possible discrepancy between policy documents and the actual decision-making does not apply to this specific study.
5 Results
5.1 Who makes the decisions?
Table 5.1 Who makes the decisions?
Intergovernmental Supranational Who makes the decisions? Member states Commission
In the treaty of the European Union, articles 210 stipulates, rather vaguely, that:
“Article 210
(ex article 180 TEC)
“1. In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes.”
(OJ C 326 2012b, p 142)
The article says that the members and the Union should coordinate their efforts, but does not say anything binding. This could be anything from informal meetings over a cup of coffee in Brussels to implementing their aid programmes through formal institutions. There is a second part to article 180 though:
“2. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the coordination referred to in paragraph 1.”
(OJ C 326, 2012b, p 142) This tells us that the member states have delegated a right of initiative to the Commission, but it does not say who actually makes the decisions. For EU aid and development projects within EU financial framework, it is clear in the treaty, article 209, that the ordinary legislative procedure is the way that decisions are made (OJ C 326, 2012b). In the ordinary legislative procedure, that Commission suggests a policy, and the Council and the European Parliament both must agree for the policy to pass.
This is contrasted by the CDSP and CFSP, where decisions are made by the Council and the European Council, usually unanimously (Merket, 2012).
In the case of the EDF and its funds, the European Parliament is completely excluded from the decision-making process, as the EDF is outside of the regular EU financial regulation.
This leaves the Commission and Council as the probable decision-makers, if there is a procedure similar to the regular decision-making process in the EU.
According to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 Title IV, Article 14 (OJ L 58, 2015, p 11 - 12), the EDF Committee shall provide its opinion to the Commission on the programming and allocation of funds and the implementation of the EDF. This is described more specifically under the responsibilities of the EDF Committee:
“2. The EDF Committee's tasks shall cover the responsibilities laid down in Titles II and III of this Regulation:
(a) programming of Union aid under the 11th EDF and programming reviews focusing in particular on country, regional and intra-ACP strategies; and
(b) monitoring the implementation and evaluation of Union aid, covering amongst others
the impact of assistance on the reduction of poverty, sectoral aspects, cross-cutting issues, the functioning of field-level coordination with Member States and other donors and progress on the aid effectiveness principles referred to in Article 2.
(OJ L58, 2015, p 11)
This means that the Committee shall provide its opinion on the EU’s ACP aid programme, its implementation, and its follow-up. The Commission is not able to act unless the Committee provides its opinion, except during special circumstances, which will be outlined below. The Commission can decide to suspend programmes which the Committee is positive to, but according to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322, this is limited to budget support programmes. In this case, the Commission has to inform the Committee in advance. (OJ L 58, 2015, p 12). When the Commission calls upon the Committee to provide its opinion on the EDF, the Commission presents the Committee with a draft, which it then debates and provides its opinion on. The Commission sets the timetable for when they need the Committees opinions. After the Committee has debated the issue, the Commission takes action based on their opinion (OJ L 58, 2015, p 12).
If the Commission makes a decision after receiving the opinion of the Committee that is not in accordance with the Committees opinion, the Commission must tell the Council.
When the Council receives notice that the Commission’s decision is not in accordance to the opinion of the Committee, they have the option to, with QMV, decide if they want to follow the Commissions course of action, or if they prefer the opinion of the Committee (OJ L 58, 2015, p 12).
The special circumstances mentioned above, are defined in Article 7(4) and Article 9(4) in the Council Regulation (EU) 2015-322. If a crisis is deemed urgent enough, either by
“immediate threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights or fundamental freedoms” (OJ L 58, 2015, p 9 Article 7(4)) or “crises, natural or man-made disasters or immediate threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights or fundamental freedoms” (OJ L 58, 2015, p 10 Article 9(4)), the Commission can act. If any of these criteria are met, the Commission can disburse from the EDF without consulting the opinion of the Committee. The Committee has to be consulted within a fortnight, and if the Committee disagrees with the Commission’s decision, it is repealed (OJ L 58, 2015, p 12)
The decision-making in this case is fairly straight-forward. The Commission has the right of proposal, but if the Committee disagrees with the choices or programmes that the Commission does, the Council can overturn the decisions. The decisions are instead via bargaining between the member states. Looking at the analysis scheme, this would put the decision-making power in the hands of the member states, since both the Committee and the Council are composed of delegates from the member states.
5.2 In what ways are decisions made?
Table 5.2 In what ways are decisions made?
Intergovernmental Supranational In what ways are decisions
made?
Unanimity (Veto) QMV (No formal veto)
The EDF committee is comprised of representatives from each member state. Each member state has a weighted number of votes, based on its monetary contributions to the EDF. The
committee has 1000 votes all in all. A qualified majority with 721 votes from at least 14 member states is needed for the committee to act, whilst a blocking majority should consist of at least 280 votes (OJ L 210, 2013, p 6). The Council, who can overturn the decisions of the Commission, have to use the same QMV system as the Committee when they vote on a motion that did not pass the Committee, per Article 14, paragraph 3 of regulation 2015/322 (OJ L 58, 2015). Hence, not even the Council has the option of using a veto in this process.
This places the EDF as more Supranational than intergovernmental in the analytical framework.
5.3 Is power delegated or surrendered?
Table 5.3 Is power delegated or surrendered?
Intergovernmental Supranational Is power delegated or
surrendered?
Power is delegated Power is surrendered
The question of who the power is delegated to is not entirely easy to answer. It would be easy to say that the member states have delegated the right of proposal of programmes to the Commission, as stated in Regulation 2015/322 Article 14 (OJ L 58, 2015). This would mean that the Commission with the support of DG Devco makes all the suggestions on what to do with the EDF. But even though it states that the Commission is the institution that submits the suggested programming papers to the Committee, it does not end there. In the very same regulation, Article 20, it states that the regulation is in accordance with Decision 2010/427/EU. This is the Council decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 2010). The EEAS is, as previously mentioned, of staff from the Commission, Council and member states, and as such is not entirely part of any one institution except the CFSP/CSDP. In Article 9, part 2 of the Decision, the High Representative is delegated the responsibility to “ensure overall political coordination of the Unions external action. . . . through the following external assistance instruments”. One of those instruments is the EDF. Paragraph 3 and 4 sheds more light on what exactly the EEAS is supposed to do within the EU development programmes. Paragraph
3 stipulates that it shall “contribute to the programming and management cycle”, while paragraph 4 is concerning the EDF directly and states that:
“any proposals, including those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents referred to in paragraph 3 shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall be submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission.”
(OJ L 201, 2010, p 37).
So, although the Commission heads up the preparatory work of the aid programming through DG Devco, the member states, through their diplomatic corps in the EEAS actually have a say in the programming. In essence, the Commission programs via DG Devco, and the Council has their say in the programming via EEAS, but DG Devco develops the programs together with EEAS and programs the Annual Action Programmes. In the end, the proposal has to go through the Commission, as delegated to them by the member states
Since no one has tried to take this power back, that we know of, we can assume that the power is delegated. This makes it more intergovernmental than supranational.
5.4 Why does the EDF exist?
Table 5.4 Whose interests does the institution represent?
Intergovernmental Supranational Whose interests does the
institution represent?
Member states Union
Here, it is useful to remember that the first time the Union tried to spread its influence outside of Europe was with the treaty of Rome (Olsen, 2005, p 127). There, the member states agreed upon special rules for the OCT concerning trade, for the furthering of their development, both economic and social (OJ C 340, 1997, Article 182). This was then, as we now know, formalised with the treaties of Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou. Then, it was at the behest of the member states. While reading the current documentation, it becomes clear that there is more focus on the EU than on the member states. In the Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 (OJ L 58, 2015), there is an overweight to Union interests. In Article 2, part 3, it states that “The Union shall promote a multilateral approach to global challenges and shall cooperate with
Member States and partner bodies that respect.” Here, the EU is the acting party and the Member States are supposed to follow the EU that guides the way. This is the general way of phrasing in the regulation. The Union shall promote; “effective cooperation with partner countries” (Art 2 part 5), “the implementation of bilateral regional and multilateral cooperation and dialogue” (Art 2 part 6) and “south-south cooperation” (Art 2 part 6). When the Member States are mentioned in Article 2, it is frequently as a collective entity that is supposed to follow along with the EU’s decisions and coordinate and help in any way possible. The Cotonou agreement, an agreement between the ACP countries, and the
“European Community and its member states” (OJ L 287, 2010, p 3). In the document, it becomes clear that the agreement is much more of a community effort than the effort of a single member states, which makes sense, since it is an EU agreement. It is a huge success for the coordination of development aid which is championed by the Commission. The same lop- sidedness towards EU over the member states is apparent in more documentation, such as the programming instructions (Devco, 2012). It could be argued that since the Committee and the Council are the ones that make the decisions, based on the proposals of the Commission, that the endeavour is an intergovernmental one, but that is not what is presented in the documents.
This, then, does not seem like an institution that puts the interests of the member states above those of the EU. This does make sense when one read Article 24 paragraph 2 in the Treaty of European Union, which states that there should be convergence between the member states, under at common policy defined by the EU (OJ C 326, 2012a). This leaves less space for individual member states to follow their own path in foreign policy questions where the EU is involved. In the case of the EDF then, I place the raison d'être as more of a supranational one.
6 Conclusion
The member states make the decisions, but they do it without the power of the veto. The member states have not surrendered their power, but instead delegated it. Per the policy documents, the EDF serves the interests of the Union, rather than the interest of the member states.
Table 6.1 Analytical framework, answered
Questions: Intergovernmental Supranational
Who makes the decisions? Member states EU-institutions
In what ways are decisions made? Unanimity (Veto) QMV (No formal veto) Is power delegated or
surrendered?
Power is delegated Power is surrendered Whose interests does the
institution represent?
Member states Union
Looking at the table above, two indicators (Who makes the decisions, is power delegated or surrendered) support the intergovernmental hypothesis, while the other two, (In what ways are decisions made, whose interests does the institution represent) support the supranational thesis. With this result, I can reject hypothesis 1, that the EDF is purely intergovernmental and hypothesis 2, that the EDF is purely supranational. The results corroborate hypothesis 3 – these results indicate that the EDF is a mix between an intergovernmental and supranational EU instrument. As discussed in chapter 3, this indicates that there has been a spillover effect, meaning that the EDF is integrated, with or without the conscious will of the member states.
The increased integration can be seen in the earlier mentioned coordination principle set forth in the Maastricht treaty which gives the Commission the initiative, and the reliance on QMV instead of veto for the individual member states.
Is it possible to answer the research question: Which of the integration theories Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism/Supranational Governance best explains the current state of the European Development Fund?
The results indicate that the Neofunctionalist/Supranational Governance theories best explain the current state of the EDF. Compared to previous descriptions of the EDF as
intergovernmental, these results indicate that there is a supranational element to it. Liberal Intergovernmentalism still cannot be discarded outright as a theory, since there remain elements of intergovernmentalism in the decision-making and the delegation instead of surrendering of power.
6.1 Final discussion and suggestions for further research
Looking at the analytical framework, two questions are answered as intergovernmental, the questions about decision-making and delegation. Worth noting is that those are answered as intergovernmental with slight reservations. Without a case that tests the possibility to withdraw delegated power from the Commission, we do not know what the answer to something like this would be. With the first question, the lingering doubt is power, agency and what is their raison d'être? This thesis does not try to answer those questions, that is for further research to answer.
Compared with the previous research on the decision-making process in the EDF, there have been a significant change. The programming is no longer exclusive to the Commission and its institutions, but has been split between the new DG Devco and the EEAS. This could be an argument for more intergovernmental power in the programming of the EDF, but is it really?
As Sjursen (2011) argues in her article, there are some question marks left here. Notably with the institutions created to support the Council, and the EDF Committee itself. Just as the Policy and Security Committee, the EDF Committee is a collection of diplomats from the member countries, and the EEAS is a merging of Council, Commission, and member state personnel. The Committee might not have the policy power that the PSC has, but the problem for intergovernmental theory is the same: The balance of power shifts away from the capitals of Europe, and instead concentrates to comparatively few square feet in the north-western parts of Europe. The more decisions that are made in Brussels, the further the balance is shifted.
In the fashion the questions are worded and the way that the framework describes the problems, the two questions that are answered as supranational, the veto question and the purpose of the EDF, are much less ambiguous. With the veto, it is simple to find out what
type of decision-making process is stipulated for each policy in the official documentation.
Concerning the representation of interests, it would be interesting to see research into the wording of the policy documents, who has the final say and when the union or the community supersedes the interests of the member states. It might just be an easy way to collect the interests of the member states, or it can be a result of European integration.
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998, p 7) notes that it is hard to put simple labels as intergovernmental or supranational on the EU institutions. After writing this thesis, I can somewhat agree with them. Jolyon Howorth (2012) wrote an article about decision-making in CSDP, and he cannot decide if it is a case of intergovernmental supranationalism or supranational intergovernmentalism. It is not hard to understand his confusion; the lines are blurred. Trying to find a perfect example of intergovernmentalism in the EU might be a futile attempt. The bargaining part of Liberal Intergovernmentalism is no longer only between the member states, but when the question reaches Brussels, it involves the EU institutions as well (Olsen, 2005, p 126). Liberal Intergovernmentalism assumes that the states are the actors, but as increasingly more institutions crop up, the states are no longer the only actors with an interest. It is easy to point to the Commission as an actor that tries to gain more power on the expense of the member states, but as Sjursen (2011) argues, if the institutions themselves have interests that might not align perfectly with the capitals, the balance once again changes. To label the EU as sui generis is not an overstatement.
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