Bachelor Thesis in Peace and Development Studies
Understanding State Fragility through the Actor-Network Theory: A Case Study of Post-Colonial Sudan
Author: Tove Sternehäll Supervisor: Ludwig Gelot Semester: Spring 2016 Thesis Seminar: August 2016 Department: School of Social Sciences
Course Code: 2FU32E
Abstract
Despite the broad discourse on fragile states and the threat they pose to the contemporary world order, the literature on the subject does to a large extent ignore the material factors behind the causes of state fragility. Scholars and organizations in the field have almost exclusively adopted the Social Contract Theory (SCT) in order to explain state fragility as a problem caused by social factors. This study broadens the discourse by applying SCT as well as the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) on the case study of Sudan, in order to do a deductive theory testing of the added value of each theory. The results of this study show that while the Social Contract Theory does explain many factors behind state fragility, the application of the Actor-Network Theory adds to this by also incorporating the networks between the social and material determinants in societies. This research contributes to the debate on fragile states by adding to the scarce research on the materiality of fragility through the use of the Actor- Network Theory. The positive results of this thesis encourage future use of this theory in the field as it has the potential to give new insights in how to deal with fragile states.
Keywords: fragile states; Actor-Network Theory; Social Contract Theory;
infrastructure of rule
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT………...i
TABLE OF CONTENTS………...ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……….iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………...v
1. Introduction ________________________________________________________ 1 1.1 Research Problem ... 1
1.2 Research Objective ... 3
1.3 Research Question ... 3
1.4 Methodology ... 3
1.5 Structure of the Thesis ... 3
2. Conceptual Framework _______________________________________________ 5 2.1 Defining State Fragility ... 5
2.2 Core Principles of Fragility ... 7
2.2.1 State Authority ________________________________________________ 7 2.2.2 State Legitimacy ______________________________________________ 8 2.2.3 State Capacity ________________________________________________ 9 2.3 Chapter Summary ... 10
3. Analytical Framework _______________________________________________ 11 3.1 Social Contract Theory ... 11
3.2 Actor-Network Theory ... 12
3.3 Comparison of the Theories ... 14
3.4 Chapter Summary ... 15
4. Methodological Framework __________________________________________ 16 4.1 Limitations and Delimitations ... 16
4.2 Methods ... 17
4.2.1 Qualitative Methods __________________________________________ 17 4.2.2 Case Studies _________________________________________________ 17 4.2.3 Data Collection ______________________________________________ 18 5. Findings ___________________________________________________________ 20 5.1 Background to the Case Study ... 21
5.2 State Authority ... 22
5.2.1 Rule of Law _________________________________________________ 22 5.2.2 Monopoly of Violence _________________________________________ 23 5.2.3 Controlled Economy __________________________________________ 24 5.3 State Legitimacy ... 24 5.3.1 Democratization _____________________________________________ 24 5.3.2 Domestic and International Support ______________________________ 25
5.4 State Capacity ... 27 5.5 Chapter Summary ... 27
6. Analysis Chapter ___________________________________________________ 28 6.1 State Authority in Sudan ... 28 6.1.1 Social Contract Theory ________________________________________ 28 6.1.2 Actor-Network Theory _________________________________________ 29 6.2 State Legitimacy in Sudan ... 30 6.2.1 Social Contract Theory ________________________________________ 30 6.2.2 Actor-Network Theory _________________________________________ 31 6.3 State Capacity in Sudan ... 32 6.3.1 Social Contract Theory ________________________________________ 32 6.3.2 Actor-Network Theory _________________________________________ 33 6.4 Discussion ... 33 7. Conclusion _________________________________________________________ 36 References ___________________________________________________________ 39
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my supervisor Ludwig Gelot for his support and guidance during this thesis.
List of Abbreviation
ANT DRC R2P SCT UN UNDP
Actor-Network Theory
Democratic Republic of Congo Responsibility to Protect Social Contract Theory United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
1. Introduction
1.1 Research Problem
The world has as a result of the technological advancements over the last decades become more globalized, tying together every country across the globe. One of the main challenges to the contemporary world order are, due to this, the problems caused by unstable sovereign states (Demir & Varlik, 2015, 40). These states are often referred to as fragile, which means that the government of a state is unable to keep the country stable in one way or another. There are a number of levels of fragility discussed within the social science discourse, including ‘weak’, ‘failing’, ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states (Di John, 2010). The latter two represent the end stage of fragility, which means that the government has lost authority over the state, or in other words, that the country is left in what can be described as an anarchical state (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014). While it is a well-researched field, there is no general agreement on what characterizes each of these stages of fragility (ibid). There is, however, a wide consensus that these states pose a great threat to their citizens, neighbouring countries as well as the international community at large (Sandler, 2014; Roy & Crane, 2015; Demir & Varlik, 2015).
Some of the major problems that cause and are caused by fragile states include global poverty, refugee flows, the spread of civil wars and terrorism (ibid). In many states that are experiencing a high level of fragility, oppression of marginalized groups is not uncommon, often as a result of ethnic, cultural or religious differences (Demir & Varlik, 2015). This can lead to a mobilization of rebel groups, with violent uprisings, civil wars and the creation of terrorist networks as a result (ibid). These generally leads to humanitarian crises, such as refugee flows and an increased poverty due to a weakened social security sector in the state (ibid). In turn, global poverty poses a big challenge for the international community, as it is both a humanitarian issue as well as a driver for the poor to seek informal ways to make a living, which may include joining rebel groups and terrorist networks (Roy & Crane, 2015). Meanwhile, terrorism has over the last three decades shifted focus from being a form of military warfare to targeting civilians (Sandler, 2014). Together with civil wars, terrorism is one of the biggest drivers of refugee flows, which is not only a humanitarian problem for those who are forced to risk their lives to escape certain death, but also causes problems for other countries that
do not have the capacity to take them in (Global Terrorism Index, 2015; United Nations, 2016; UNHCR, 2016).
The international community has since the Second World War worked together to end conflicts and support regimes in fragile states in order to stabilize affected regions (Ayers, 2012, 579). The driving force behind this has been the growing interdependency between all states, the increased risk of the spread of violence, as well as a deeper sense of global humanitarianism (Ibid; Demir & Varlik, 2015, 40). The common approach of foreign intervention has during this time focused on peacebuilding, peacekeeping and state-building, where global actors step in to end conflicts and support the structuring of crucial institutions that will strengthen the economic, social, and political sectors of a country (Ingram, 2010). Despite the best efforts from the global community, a large number of former African colonies are still in some state of fragility. A significant amount of them have reached the status of collapsed or failed – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan to mention a few (Fund for Peace, 2015).
One popular idea regarding the causes behind state fragility is the concept of Good and Bad Governance. The theory behind these concepts is that a state needs strong institutions to achieve and to maintain stability, with fragility being a direct consequence of faulty institutions, i.e. Bad Governance (ibid, 564). Advocators for this theory claims that functioning institutions are crucial for the government to receive the support of its citizens (Rawls, 1993; Peter, 2016; Zartman, 1995). Meanwhile, opponents points to the lack of results from the many years of application, as one of the main focuses of foreign intervention in fragile states has been on creating functioning institutions (Larémont, 2005, 2; Hameiri, 2007; Rothkopf, 2012).
While some scholars aim their critique towards the general concept of state fragility or towards the failed attempts to stabilize these states through the building of institutions, Peer Schouten (2013) points toward a faulty theory behind the causes of it. He claims that the foreign intervention in these countries may be misdirecting their state-building attempts (ibid). Schouten further proposes that the commonly used Social Contract Theory (SCT) should be exchanged for the Actor-Network Theory (ANT), a well- established theory which has not previously been used in the field of fragile states
(ibid). In his research, Schouten discusses the applicability, strengths and flaws of both theories by applying them onto a case study of DRC. This research aims to add to his research by testing whether the same results can be found when applying these theories onto a different fragile state. This thesis will also add to Schouten’s study by structuring the research around the Core Principles of Fragility, a concept which will be introduced in the Conceptual Framework chapter.
1.2 Research Objective
The possibility that the theory most commonly used to explain state fragility is flawed has despite promising results in Schouten’s (2013) work to a high extent been ignored.
This is the starting point of this research. In order to understand how to deal with these states, which pose a threat to so many people and even to other states, it is important to understand why and how states become fragile or fail. This piece of research will hence build on Schouten’s study, where it will test what added value the ANT shows in a fragile state through a case study. This will be done by applying the SCT and the ANT to the Core Principles of Fragility, in order to compare their explanatory value. The aim is to contribute to the discourse on state fragility by expanding the use of the Actor- Network Theory within the field, since there is still a gap in the research on the subject.
1.3 Research Question
Does the ANT provide a complimentary framework for the study of the core principles behind state fragility in Sudan?
1.4 Methodology
In order to answer these research questions, this thesis will adopt a deductive theory testing methodology using a qualitative case study of Sudan between the years 1955 – 1972.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This chapter has introduced the research problem, objective and question of the study.
The second chapter consists of a literature review on the topic, including some important conceptualizations relevant for this research. In the third chapter, the analytical frameworks chosen are discussed in more details. The fourth chapter
introduces the methodology and methods of the study as well as a consideration regarding data collection. Chapter five consists of a short introduction into the case study before providing the findings of the research, followed by an analysis of these findings in the sixth chapter. The final chapter outlines the conclusions that can be drawn from the study, as well as answers the research questions. It also makes recommendations for further research.
2. Conceptual Framework
This chapter discusses the literature on the subject of fragile states, going into the different definitions of fragility as well as the criticism of the discourse. It also introduces a couple of key concepts including the Core Principles of Fragility that will guide the research through the following chapters.
2.1 Defining State Fragility
In order to discuss what makes a state fragile, it is important to discuss what defines a state. Within this research, the definition of a ‘sovereign state’ is influenced by Di John (2010, 13) and can be defined as a state that possesses authoritative power for the government, which carries legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and international actors, as well as the capacity to provide basic services for the citizens of the country.
The concept of ‘state failure’ came up during the 1990s, and meant that the state was
“utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community”
(Helman & Ratner, 1993 cited in Di John, 2010, 13). The following decade, failure was the main concept used in the discourse of unstable states, but over the years the concept of ‘fragile states’ has gotten more attention, with its advantage of containing different levels of instability (Di John, 2010). State failure is, however, still used as a sub-level of fragility, and represents, together with ‘collapsed state,’ the end stage of state fragility.
The definitions of these stage are not universal, and each author on the subject has their own definition of ‘weak’, ‘failing’, ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states.
One definition of fragile states is the one influenced by a Machiavellian and Weberian view (ibid), which argues that a ‘monopoly of violence’ is crucial for a state to function, with the loss of this being equal to failure or fragility (ibid, 13). It also includes the view that fragility is caused by the state’s inability to provide basic functions for its citizens (ibid). Rotberg (2002) focuses his research on failed states, and explains that failure may arise within a number of dimensions throughout society, such as economic performance, the security sector and the quality of the political representation in the state. His point is that in most cases, fragility might show in one or a few of these dimensions, or as in Somalia, in all of them simultaneously (ibid).
One popular Western idea on what causes state fragility is the concept of good governance. This has within the development field been used as a synonym for a state that is run through a number of institutions and policies based on democratic values.
Smith (2007, 5) describes it as a “government that is democratically organized within a democratic political culture and with efficient administrative organizations.” Instituting such policies into post-conflict states has been a main focus of the international community for decades (ibid). The idea is that a state needs ‘good governance’ to be able to become a stable and functioning member of the global arena. Bad governance, on the other hand, will create an environment where civil wars are likely to repeat themselves due to a lack of legitimacy shown by the government (ibid). Examples of this brought forth by Smith is the absence of government accountability, lack of access to the political arena for the population, as well as inadequate transparency shown by the elites. This concept has met criticism in regards to the narrow focus on administrative reforms which overlooks social structures that can play a crucial part in stabilizing or de-stabilizing a state (Doornbos, 2001).
Another idea of fragility is Rothkopf’s (2012) claim that all states could be defined as fragile, and that our current ranking is highly affected by the westernized view of what fragility and stability is. Rothkopf’s critique of the fragile states discourse touches upon the idea that the concept of state fragility is a neo-colonial tool used by the West to force their values onto, mainly, former colonies (Ayers, 2012). From this point of view, former colonial masters and current global powers are using programs such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to violate other states’ sovereignty (ibid). Another set of critique is aimed at the definition of state fragility in terms of state capacity, which is based on the fact that many donor countries involved with foreign intervention uses definitions that ignores the political nature of states (Larémont, 2005, 2). This is due to the fact that when state-reconstruction is focused on building social and political institutions from a technical and ‘objective’ point of view, it often results in structures that overlooks the social and political struggles that may exist in society (Hameiri, 2007). As a result of this critique, development agencies have since 2011 included
‘legitimate politics’ as a part of their state-building programs (Larémont, 2005, 2).
In this thesis, state fragility will be determined by the capability of the government to keep the state functioning and stable, which is measured through what in this thesis will be known as the Core Principles of Fragility. These are introduced in the section below.
2.2 Core Principles of Fragility
Within this thesis, the concept of the Core Principles of Fragility has been developed in order to structure the research. These principles are a combination of popular ideas of scholars within the discourse, which provides a broad perspective of political, structural and cultural issues within a state (Di John, 2010; Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014;
Lambach et al, 2015; Rothkopf, 2012).
These principles will be helpful when analyzing the added explanatory value of the two theories. Therefore, they will be the main focus of the findings chapter and provide the structure for the analysis, where they will be discussed through the lenses of the ANT and SCT. The connection between these principles and the theories will be developed in the analytical framework chapter.
2.2.1 State Authority
The key concepts that will determine the authoritative power of the government within this research will be the economic stability of the state, the monopoly of violence held by the government, as well as the level of function of the rule of law in the country (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014). Keeping the informal economic sector small is important for the government to gain tax revenues, which in most states are important for the state economy. One common problem in fragile states is corruption, which in some cases increases the informal sector and hurts the legitimacy of the state. In extreme cases – such as the DRC under Mobutu – it destroys the formal economy completely in favor of a client-patron society where corruption is implemented throughout the state in order to keep the population under control (Schouten, 2013).
Corruption can cause protests, which may turn into revolutions or civil wars, as was the case during the Arab Spring in 2013 (Byun & Hollander, 2015).
A governmental monopoly of violence is important in order for the state to compel internal order or protect the population against internal or external threats (Miner &
Trauschweizer, 2014, 6). In countries where the state lacks a monopoly of violence, the
number of civilian casualties is often high, as it is common for the population to fall victim to fights between rebel groups and the state (ibid). Civilians may in these cases be prone to seek protection from informal groups in society, often in the form of traditional communities based on ethnic or religious grounds (ibid). The rule of law is, in functioning states, able to control violence and crimes between citizens as well as within the government – if a government official breaks the law in the country, he will be prosecuted (ibid). In fragile states, however, corruption usually exists in one way or the other, making it hard to get rid of elites who are acting against the rules and laws set up by them (Schouten, 2013). Laws can also be changed in order to give the ruling elite more power while making them impervious to any action that may be taken against them (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).
2.2.2 State Legitimacy
According to the Core Principles of Fragility, the legitimacy of the state is the second area that requires careful scrutiny. In order to discuss political legitimacy, a definition of the concept is needed. Within this research, a normative definition founded by Rawls (1993, 137) will be used, which states that:
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason
In other words, a political body needs to be accepted by the population and follow a common rule of law that has been agreed upon by the citizens of a state in order to be legitimate. If this is not the case, the population have no obligation to comply with the rules and decisions set up by the judiciary institutions in the state (Peter, 2016). In order to study the legitimacy of a fragile state, this thesis will look at the level of democracy in the country from a domestic and international perspective (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6). When grading the fragility of a country, the level of democracy can be measured through basic democratic ideas such as free and fair elections, transparency of the government or freedom of the press (ibid).
From a domestic point of view, these freedoms are important for the population – flawed or unfair elections decreases the trust in the government while driving
marginalized groups to seek protection or representation from informal communities (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6). Furthermore, many fragile states are suffering from ethnic or religious divides, where the government will give certain groups an advantage over the others, which creates friction that often leads to protests and/or violence (ibid).
Being accepted by the international community is equally crucial for a state, as it opens up the possibility of trade agreements, financial aid and monetary unions, among other things (Zaum, 2012). In order to get international support, a state needs to be able to uphold a certain level of democracy, including a government chosen by the population and freedom of press, as well as respecting human rights (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).
2.2.3 State Capacity
According to the Core Principles of Fragility, the last principle to be defined involves the government’s capacity to provide basic services such as human development and infrastructure throughout the country (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014). These two concepts are chosen as the key indicators of state capacity in an effort to cover as much information as possible while keeping the study delimited to the essentials. They should, therefore, be interpreted as indicators of broader state development projects.
Human development will represent the state capacity to provide its citizens with social services, such as health care and education, which aims to increase the quality of life of the population. Infrastructure, on the other hand, will include technical state services, such as the access to electricity, sewage and water systems, roads, machines and technology. These material services indicate, much like human development does, the quality of life that a state is able to provide for its citizens. Infrastructure also plays a part in the capacity for important industries to function properly, as well as the capability of a state to control its territory (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).
Related to infrastructure is the management of land and resources, which is an essential part of state capacity as it indicates the productivity and efficiency of the state (Gerard et al, 2015). Regarding human development, the education system is a good indicator of the stability or fragility of a country. In states where the literacy and school enrollment rate is low, and the drop-out rate is high, the population is often poor and the productivity of the country low (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6). This means that
there is a lack of educated individuals that can take on important jobs and projects, for example within the government or financial institutions, which is needed in a functioning state (Weiss, 2012). Another consequence is that services such as education are only provided for the elites, which increases the patrimonialism of the country while large groups have to rely on informal communities to provide this for them, which in turn causes a larger divide between groups (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).
2.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter has gone through a number of definitions of state fragility, including a discussion of the criticism of the discourse, followed by an introduction to the Core Principles of Fragility that will be the basis of this thesis. What these principles means in the light of each theory will be outlined in chapter three, which will also introduce both theories in depth.
3. Analytical Framework
Within the field of fragile states, the Social Contract Theory has been the leading theoretical framework and has been applied by leading international organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as authors across the field (Leonard
& Samantar, 2011; Rothkopf, 2012; Zartman, 1995; Gros, 1996; Hall, 2013; Ingram, 2010). Meanwhile, the Actor-Network Theory was first introduced to the field by Peer Schouten in 2013, when it was brought in to challenge the applicability of the SCT. In his research, the author claimed that the narrow focus on the social aspects within the SCT left out some important material factors of state fragility (ibid). This chapter will define these theories in order to pinpoint the similarities and differences, as well as their relation to each of the three Core Principles of Fragility.
3.1 Social Contract Theory
The first theory to be tested within this research is the Social Contract Theory, which was introduced by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (Friend, 2013). It has since then been adopted by a number of influential philosophers, including John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls (ibid). The Social Contract influenced by Hobbes is dominating the fragile states discourse, which is why it is one of the theories that will be tested within this research (ibid). The main idea behind the SCT is that originally, humans lived in a ‘State of Nature’ or ‘State of War,’ an anarchical system of survival of the fittest (Ake, 1997, 464). Within such a state lived rational individuals, which due to the lack of social structures would be in constant fear of losing their livelihoods or even their lives to other individuals (Friend, 2016). It would, however, be possible to escape the State of Nature by entering into a ‘Social Contract’ with others. The idea of the Social Contract is that individuals can agree to give up some of their sovereignty to a governing body which dictates rules for all participants of the contract, with the threat of exclusion for those who break it (ibid). According to Hobbes’ perspective, humans are exclusively self-interested and reasonable. Hence, in order for an individual to be willing to submit themselves to a political authority in a civil society, being a member of the society have to benefit the individual more than leaving it would (ibid). The Social Contract consists of two initial agreements between all individuals within the society; the surrender of some rights they previously held against each other; and the collective election of a governing body to gain authority over all participants (Friend,
2016). The establishment of rules and laws that are enforced by the government is a crucial part of the Social Contract, as all individuals within the society have to abide by them (ibid). The threat of punishment for breaking these laws is supposed to keep all members of the society under control, as long as the punishment is not worse than returning to the State of Nature (ibid).
The use of the Social Contract within the discourse of fragile states has been focused on faulty institutions of a society, a direct consequence of ‘bad governance’ in the state (Schouten, 2013, 564). The concept of ‘bad governance’ can be defined as governmental policies which fails to keep the country stable in terms of internal order or control of the borders (ibid). The popularity of this theory over the years have meant that foreign intervention in the form of state-building and peacebuilding have focused exhausted resources on building institutions (ibid). The issue with these have been the aim to enable a reinstatement of the Social Contract in states where the population has been unwilling to subject themselves to it due to political, cultural or religious colonial legacies (ibid).
The Core Principles of Fragility can be found in SCT through the legitimacy problem under ‘bad governance’ (ibid). In this instance, the government makes one bad decision after another, leading to the break-down of government-owned institutions which are responsible for keeping the state under control (ibid). The lack of functioning institutions in a country diminishes the support for the government, which is a crucial part of the state legitimacy (Rawls, 1993; Peter, 2016; Zartman, 1995). This in turn results in a broken Social Contract, with a return to the State of Nature (ibid). Bad governance is also a factor in the authority held by the government – in a state without stable security, economic or judicial institutions, the territory and the population cannot be controlled fully (Di John, 2010). A state’s capacity to provide can be seen through the stability of human development institution, such as the educational and health care sector, as well as the constructions of infrastructure such as roads, electricity and plumbing (Leonard & Samantar, 2011).
3.2 Actor-Network Theory
The challenging theory, the Actor-Network Theory, was initially developed by Bruno Latour in his research on processes and networks that were active between humans and
non-human agents in laboratories, but has since been applied to a number of different fields (Durepos & Mills, 2011). The concept of ‘non-human agents’ represents the inanimate objects that have an impact on structures and relationships between individuals, such as technology, roads, machines and other types of infrastructure (Durepos & Mills, 2011). Within the ANT, the difference between human and non- human agents is ignored in an attempt to look at the interactions between them from a point of view where neither carries more agency than the other (ibid, 707). Latour (1986, 273) defines society as something that is not a purely social relationship between individuals, but rather is a number of socio-material entanglements between humans and non-humans.
Socio-material entanglements are the relationships between social and material factors, such as the relationship between students and their course literature or between a chef and his kitchen supplies. Without the material factor, the human agent is not able to perform as well as he could have. In the case of fragile states, it can be the relationship between the military and their access to weapons, roads and technology that makes it possible for them to monitor and control large areas. It can also be the relationship between citizens and the media, where the access to different sources of information will affect the capacity for them to make informed decisions. These relationships form networks between all human and non-human actors across the globe. The basis of the ANT is, within the fragile states discourse, to understand how these networks are working for or against stability within the affected state.
In other words, the main idea of the Actor-Network Theory is to shed light on the networks between the ‘hidden’ agents that are affecting the development of whichever field it is applied to, as Schouten (2013, 573) states it:
The gap between juridical and empirical sovereignty implicit in state failure can be largely accounted for by the absence of the technical infrastructure of rule that makes it possible to stabilize social relations. This sensitivity to socio-material relations rather than social relations alone offers an utterly different description of what matters in state failure and what accounts for differences in governmental power.
The technical infrastructure of rule mentioned above refers to the aspects of the state apparatuses which are responsible for controlling the territory and population, and ones extracting resources (ibid, 573). Examples of these are roads, bridges and railroads, as well as more specific institutions for mining and land cultivation (ibid). After the wave of de-colonization in Africa during the era around the 1960s, technical infrastructure of rule were left behind in the form of systems of colonial exploitation of the land and people (ibid). This is one reason to why the governments of newly found states broke down or sold off parts of these apparatuses (ibid).
A stable state is, hence, according to the ANT highly dependent on the socio-material entanglements between human and non-human agents (Durepos & Mills, 2011). On the subject of fragile states, these entanglements are responsible for the capability of the government to hold legitimate elections, in the sense that technology and security needs to be present throughout the territory in order to achieve this (Peter, 2016). The education and knowledge of the population also plays a part here, as it affects their capacity to make an informed decision in their election of a governmental body (ibid).
Furthermore, the networks of infrastructure in the country are crucial for the government to exercise authority across the territory – without roads, technology and other communications, the government has limited capacity to assert the monopoly of violence or the rule of law throughout the state (Di John, 2010; Schouten, 2013). The impact of these networks on the capacity to provide is apparent in the management of land and resources. While infrastructure together with knowledge and experience are critical for the establishment of stable institutions and a functioning economic sector, other non-human agents such as electricity, running water and sewage systems affects the human development in the country (Schouten, 2013).
3.3 Comparison of the Theories
While the Social Contract Theory is connected to the Core Principles of Fragility mainly through the faulty governance of institutions, the Actor-Network Theory is more interested in the impact of the technical infrastructure of rule, which is responsible for making the institutions work (Schouten, 2013, 560). In other words, the main difference between the two theories is their perception of the importance of the social relations vis- à-vis the socio-material entanglements in the country (ibid).
While both theories cover the Core Principles of Fragility, they do target different causes behind the fragility of them. Within the SCT, the human factor is a determinant for how well the institutions connected to the Core Principles are managed, where a faulty institution is a direct consequence of bad governance and/or an unwillingness of the population to enter into the Social Contract. The ANT, on the other hand, chooses to look at the underlying socio-material factors causing the fragility of the institutions and state apparatuses. A main point of this theory is that colonial legacies and the lack of functioning infrastructure have a substantial influence over the capacity of state officials to create and sustain functioning state institutions (ibid, 573).
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has introduced the two theories that are the main focus of this study. It has included their background and general use as well as their place in the discourse on fragile states. Conceptualizations of human development, good governance and socio- material entanglements are made in order to clarify the different approaches taken by each theory. Furthermore, connections have been drawn between these concepts, theories and the Core Principles of Fragility in order to establish how each theory explains the underlying causes of fragility. In doing this, it is clear that both theories do cover all Core Principles, although they are focused on different aspects of the causes behind failure. The chapter also differentiates the two approaches by comparing them to each other.
In the findings chapter, the case study will be examined through the Core Principles of Fragility, onto which the theories will be applied in the analysis chapter. Hence, understanding the theories and their connection to the Core Principles is a crucial part of this study.
4. Methodological Framework
In this chapter, the methodology and methods of the research will be outlined. As the aim of this research is to find out whether the ANT has any added value in explaining why states become fragile, it will be done through a deductive theory-oriented case study.
4.1 Limitations and Delimitations
This thesis will be conducted through a case study of Sudan, which is justified by Sudan’s high ranking as a fragile state (Fund for Peace, 2015). Sudan became independent in 1956, and has been in a state of civil war and fragility ever since, with the exception of the eleven year period of unstable peace between the North and the South starting in 1972 (UNDP, 2016). The timeline of the case study will be limited to the first civil war, which started prior to independence in 1955 and ended in 1972 (ibid).
This is due to the fact that this research aims to look at how Sudan became fragile and what kept it in this state, and hence will focus on the years following independence, when the government of the newly sovereign state established the institutions and structures that would guide the country for the coming decades. The decision not to cover the second civil war and the separation of the country is made to make the research more focused and detailed, which is justified since the main objective of the research is to test the theories rather than discuss the history of Sudan.
One limitation of this research is that as a desk study, it relies on secondary sources, which makes it dependent on data collected by other authors on the subject. While state fragility is a well-documented field and there is plenty of literature on the instability in Sudan since independence, there might be a limited access to information and data which is needed to test the theories. This will be handled through a deeper look into a handful of the available literature on the subject and if needed, a delimitation of the Core Principles looked at in the research. Another limitation worth to consider is that
‘one size does not fit all,’ meaning that the results of this research is only applicable on the case study at hand during the timeframe chosen for it. It may, however, encourage further research into other fragile states.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Qualitative Methods
This research will be conducted through qualitative methods, which is an umbrella term for methods that are often focused on taking a deep look into one or more cases from which it draws conclusions (Danermark et al, 1997, 158). While most qualitative studies uses an inductive theory-generating method, they can also be done as a deductive study (ibid). A deductive study starts with an established theory, and is generally aimed at developing the theory by replicating the research with new variables (ibid, 83). While deductive methods are quantitative in nature (Neergaard & Ulhøi, 2007, 9), they can also favorably be used to test theories qualitatively through theory-oriented case studies (George & Bennett, 2005, 111; Danermark et al, 1997, 83).
4.2.2 Case Studies
Case studies can be done by looking into anything from smaller groups to institutions or whole communities, and are advantageous for a number of different reasons; it enables the author to focus on a particular phenomenon; it allows the author to get a detailed description of the case at hand by a wide arrangement of variables; it gives the reader a deep understanding of the phenomenon it studies; and it has a tendency to be theory- generating by allowing the author to draw generalizable conclusions from it (Danermark et al, 1997, 158). The choice of using a case study in this research is appropriate as it makes it possible to apply the theories onto a real case, which will give an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the theories in this particular case (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, 39; George & Bennett, 2005, 111).
One important consideration when choosing a case lies in the delimitation of the study, both through the factors observed in the case as well as the timeline of the observation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, 38). In this research project, the case study will be of Sudan, the factors observed are the three Core Principles of Fragility, and the timeframe is between the years of the first civil war, 1955 – 1972. The choice of country can be justified by its status as one of the most fragile countries in the world, and its long record of holding this position (Fund for Peace, 2015). The decision to use this
particular timeframe is the focus on how Sudan became a sovereign state – and how it ended up as a fragile state – which coincides with the start of the first civil war in 1955 (UNDP, 2016). The conflict accelerated the pending independence which became reality in 1956, and ended after 14 years when the first peace agreement was signed (ibid). During the years between 1955 and 1972 the colonial structures that had been able to keep the colony stable for decades deteriorated completely, leaving Sudan in a state of utter fragility (Fund for Peace, 2015). This research project aims to explain how this was possible through the application of the SCT and the ANT.
Another important consideration in the choice of case for a theory testing study is the relevance of the case for one or several of the theories, as the choice of case can change the outcome of the research (George & Bennett, 2005). As the SCT has been applied to fragile states to a much larger extent than the ANT, it has the advantage of being an established theory in the field. However, neither theory has a greater connection to the case than the other. Furthermore – as is mentioned above – the Core Principles of Fragility, which are outlined in the literature review, will be the basis of the case study.
The authoritative power structures controlled by the government will be studied through looking at the stability of the economic and judicial institutions as well as the occurrence of violence perpetrated by non-government actors in the country. The legitimacy of the government will be examined by the level of human rights and democracy of the country, with a focus on the division between ethnic and religious groups. Lastly, the access to human development through health care and education will together with the access to infrastructure determine to what level the government is capable of providing basic services for the population.
4.2.3 Data Collection
The choice of data collection for this thesis is mainly researcher-generated books and documents, but also public records from renowned international organizations. The use of the former is advantageous as these contain a high level of quality, while the latter may give new insights into a phenomenon due to its broader focus (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, 173). The use of secondary sources limits the findings of the research to data that is already available within the discourse, but as the aim is to compare the applicability of the Actor-Network Theory and the Social Contract Theory on a fragile state, new and groundbreaking data is not necessary as long as it is correct. When using secondary
sources, it is important to remember to look out for biases in the information available, since the perspective of the authors might shape the results of the research (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2015, 16).
5. Findings
This chapter will start out by looking into the background of the case study, focusing on the colonial history of the country before bringing up the findings that will be analyzed in chapter six. It will focus on the period between 1955 – 1972, starting one year before Sudan became independent, and ending as the first civil war ended (UNDP, 2016). The aim of this chapter is to locate the underlying reasons as to why Sudan went straight from being a functioning colony to becoming a fragile state – a state that is still, 60 years and a separation later, in a deep state of fragility (Fund for Peace, 2015). In order to do this, the findings and analysis chapters will be structured around the Core Principles of Fragility, where each principle will be addressed in a sub-chapter.
Sudan is a country of hundreds of rivaling identities, political affiliations and ethnic groups (UNDP, 2016). Four major groups in the country are Muslim-Arabs, Non- Muslim Arabs, Christian Africans, and Non-Christian Africans – each group consisting of different ethnicities and some of religious differences (Natsios, 2012, 10). Since Sudan became sovereign in 1965, four major civil wars have taken place within the territory; the first and second civil wars of Sudan between the North and South; the Darfur civil war between Muslim-Arabs and non-Muslims in the Darfur region; and the South Sudan civil war, which broke out between two major ethnic groups after the South gained independence from the North in 2011 (UNDP, 2016; Natsios, 2012).
There is, in other words, a large diversity within these groups, and the conflicts of the country have not been simply two-sided.
This research focuses on the structures of the state during the first civil war, and in order to discuss what happened during these 17 years, two generalized groups will be discussed at length – the Muslim-Arabs from the North and the Christian Africans from the South. Although this thesis will separate the groups geographically, supporters of the South lived in the North, and vice versa, not to mention the other different identities belonging to each side (Natsios, 2012, 10). Hence, when discussing the ‘Northerners’
and the ‘Southerners’ throughout the following chapters, the former term will represent the group of Muslim-Arabs that was generally living in the North – although exceptions existed – and supporting the government. The term ‘Southerners’ will in this text include mainly Africans with roots in the Southern parts of the territory, but also people
of other identities and minorities from throughout the rural countryside who have been marginalized or oppressed by the colonial and later Sudanese regimes.
Figure 1. Sudan at independence, with the disputed border to what is now known as South Sudan marked out (Nations Online, 2016)
5.1 Background to the Case Study
Sudan has historically been a diverse territory where people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural identities have been able to live side by side in peace with a
majority of Arab-Muslims in the North, and a mix of Africans identifying as Christians or as a member of a traditional religion in the South (UNDP, 2016; Johnson, 2003, 3).
Sudan’s history of colonization began in 1821 when it came under control by Ottoman- Egyptian Mohammad Ali, and the impact on the population was disastrous (Collins, 1976, 4). High taxes and an expansion of the slave trade in the South escalated the divide between Northerners and Southerners in the territory (Johnson, 2003, 5). Another cause behind the divide was based on religion, as the state provided structural benefits for Muslims over other religious groups inside the controlled territory (ibid). The colony was under Egyptian rule until the early 1880s, when England colonized Egypt and assumed control over the territory (Collins, 1976, 5). The 85 years leading up to independence in 1956 were characterized by violence, oppression and exploitation in the South by Egyptian officers and troops, which furthered the divide between different groups (Johnson, 2003, 10).
Throughout colonial times, Christian missionaries were welcomed by the colonial officers stationed in the South, while their Northern counterparts pushed the population to a unified identity based on Muslim values (Johnson, 2003, 14). While developing a functioning society in the North, the administration in the South focused on keeping the authoritative power in the simplest and cheapest ways – the objective was not to develop a society with free thinkers, but to have them raise cheap labor and future soldiers for the Egyptian army (Johnson, 2003, 11, 16).
5.2 State Authority
This sub-chapter will discuss state authority in Sudan during this time-frame, through three main ideas within the principle: the rule of law; the monopoly of violence; and the state’s control of the economy.
5.2.1 Rule of Law
After the declaration of independence was signed in January of 1956, Sudan met two major obstacles in crafting a permanent constitution: whether it should be based on secular or Islamic values, and the question of federalism (Badri, 2014). One major issue when working towards independence was that the South wanted self-determination in return for supporting the North (ibid). This was a result of the unfair treatment of the South over the previous centuries, which they feared would continue under a centralized
government dominated by Northerners. On the other hand, the Northerners feared that federalism might lead to a future separation of the country, which they strongly objected to (Johnson, 2003, 30). This, combined with the fact that there were at the time of independence no concrete plan on how to transform the state into a federal system, made it impossible for the two sides to come to an agreement. (ibid)
While the new state faced problems over the question of how it should be structured, some smaller institutions managed to blossom during the 16 years following independence (Massoud, 2014). One of these were the judicial system, which due to the weak government were able to accumulate impressive power and autonomy in the state, with a stronger hold on the Northern parts as the South was still hard to access (ibid).
The strength of this particular institution can be credited to the small size and ideological unity that the judiciary system was defined by (Sachs, 2014, 93).
5.2.2 Monopoly of Violence
Already before independence, violent riots and uprisings occurred between the Northerners and Southerners, which were met by violent reprisals by Anglo-Egyptian troops (Natsios, 2012, 41). In the summer of 1955, an unorganized mutiny broke out in the South as a result of increased tensions between groups (ibid). This led to the killing of a large number of Northern officers, administrators and workers along with their families by rebellious soldiers and police forces (Johnson, 2003, 28).
This unorganized mutiny in the South marked the start of the first civil war, which over time managed to unite and put substantial pressure on the government (Natsios, 2012, 41). The government replied with a military campaign to catch rebels, which escalated into the burning of villages and attacks aimed at highly educated Southern leaders (Johnson, 2003, 28). These acts of violence further fueled the resistance, and spontaneous riots and mass-killings continued from both sides of the conflict (Natsios, 2012, 45).
One example of this happened in 1964, and was later to be known as ‘Black Friday,’
during which Southern supporters in the Northern capital Khartoum heard rumors that a Southern minister had been assassinated during a business trip to the south (ibid). This lead to a violent race riot breaking out in Khartoum, with Africans killing any Arab they
could find until the military was sent in to restore order. When the Southern minister arrived to Khartoum, hundreds of people laid dead in the streets (ibid).
5.2.3 Controlled Economy
Following independence, Sudan’s economy was relying on the agriculture and livestock sectors, as they had not found the oil that is currently providing a majority of the revenue for the state (UNDP, 2016). These sectors were highly unstable due to the sensitivity to weather and climate changes as well as the conflicts that were raging throughout the country during these years (Johnson, 2003, 32). Another important factor affecting the economic stability of the country was the dependency of the global demand of for example cotton – Sudan’s largest export product – which caused fluctuations in the revenue collected by the state (ibid). In 1958, the economic mismanagement by the democratically elected government led to a successful military coup in which a Northern general took over power (Natsios, 2012, 47). The new government did, however, lack effective economic policies, and their economic institutions faced the same challenges as the previous government had (ibid). This instability combined with political repression caused demonstrations throughout the country, which led to the reinstatement of civilian rule in 1964 (Salih, 1990). The following years were characterized by a struggle for power between elite groups with no major efforts to strengthen the economy by implementing new economic policies (ibid).
5.3 State Legitimacy
State legitimacy will be discussed here through the democratization of the country as well as the domestic and international support for the government.
5.3.1 Democratization
At independence, the departing colonial powers had appointed a presidency council existing of Northern elites to hold power until the first democratic elections (Badri, 2014; Natsios, 2012, 40). This group of elites had good ties with the Egyptian government, and had during the colonization enjoyed certain privileges (ibid). As they were put in place, 790 out of the 800 administrative positions throughout the country were given to Northerners (ibid). When the first democratic elections were held in 1956, they were a top-down movement led by the presidency council, and were contested by the leaders of the South (Natsios, 2012, 40; Johnson, 2003, 26).
The first coalition government of the country consisted of two major Islamic parties, and they were elected even though there were no consensus on what to incorporate into the new constitution (Natsios, 2012, 42). Their rule only lasted two years, as the weak economic performance of the country led to a military coup (ibid). For six years Sudan was governed by a military dictatorship, until 1964 when mass demonstrations by civilians under the name ‘October Revolution’ took place. As a result, the military peacefully turned power over to a civilian coalition government in order to spare human lives (ibid, 45-46). Over the following four years a number of weak and ineffective civilian governments followed, all with similar policies aimed at uniting the country (ibid).
As the diversity of the country led to conflicts between groups, the Muslim-Arab regimes established policies in order to gather the whole population under Arabism and Islam – and they were open to the use of force in order to do so (Leach, 2013, 41). For the government, the notion of federalism represented a failure to create an inclusive identity to unite the country under (ibid). Parliamentary policies showed to be unable to unite the country, which led to Northern contempt for its weakness while the South found the system to be generally illegitimate and unrepresentative (ibid, 42). Pushing the limits of the democratic values found in Sudan became the Northern policy in order to force their agenda onto the population, while at the same time fighting the voices calling for federalism (ibid). This debilitation of the democratic system led the country towards a neo-patrimonial state, where personal relationships and favors replaced main parts of the democratic institution (ibid, 93).
5.3.2 Domestic and International Support
Ethnicity in Sudan was created, strengthened and politicized by the colonial state- building in order to know who to favor, and these structures continued after the departure of the colonial powers (Sørbø & Ahmed, 2013, 9). Nationalism and identity are closely intertwined, and the colonial efforts to create a division between ethnicities and the encouragement of diversification of religion in the South through indigenous religious practices became major obstacles to the unification of the Sudanese people in the post-independence era (Larémont, 2005, 43). The small unifying movement that existed at the time of independence can be stated to be anti-British rather than pro-
