The Enemy of My Enemy is
My Agent
A Case Study on the Effects of Soft Power in Preventing and
Facilitating One-Sided Violence in Internal Conflicts
Joakim Ydebäck
Bachelor’s ThesisDepartment of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University
Autumn 2020
Abstract
The internationalisation of conflicts has made the study of the effects of external support a prominent subfield within peace and conflict studies. How supporting states affect conflict strategies and changes the conflict dynamic has been the prime concern of this thesis. I have argued that when a government actor is supported by an external state with high soft power, in the form of political and economic capital, the government is less inclined to use one-sided violence as a conflict strategy. By using the principal- agent theory as a model to explain the relationship between the supporter and the supported state, I have found support for my argument. The government of the Central African Republic has conducted low levels of one-sided violence when supported by the soft power France. The government of South Sudan, on the other hand, has conducted high levels of one-sided violence when supported by the non-soft power Uganda. By coming to this conclusion, this paper has introduced soft power as an important concept in peace and conflict studies while also helping to elucidate the role of external supporters in conflict strategies. Future research should develop on the findings in this thesis by controlling for other possible explanations to why one-sided violence decreases depending on the characteristics of the support and include a greater number of cases.
Keywords: soft power; one-sided violence; external support; colonialism; internal conflict;
Central African Republic; South Sudan
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Figures and Tables
4Glossary
5Introduction
7Research Puzzle 8
Purpose and Research Question 10
Theoretical Considerations
10Literature Review 10
Independent Variable 12
Dependent Variable 13
Control Variables 14
Theory and Hypothesis 14
Research Design
17Methodology 17
Scope Conditions 19
Operationalisation 20
Case Selection 22
Material and Data 24
Source Criticism 25
Empirics and Analysis
26Case 1: Central African Republic – France 26
Case 2: South Sudan – Uganda 30
Results and Analysis 35
Conclusion
40List of References
42Appendix A
49Appendix B
50Figures and Tables
Figure 1.
Possible relationship between independent variable and dependent variable 14Figure 2.
Representation of the principal-agent theory 15Figure 3.
Expected relationship and the causal mechanism for H1 17Table 1.
Case selection and control variables 23Table 2.
Results of independent variable and dependent variable 35Table 3.
Occurrences of one-sided violence in Central African Republic (2011-2019) 50Table 4.
Occurrences of one-sided violence in South Sudan (2011-2019) 51Glossary
AEF Abbreviation of French Equatorial Africa (fr. Afrique-Équatoriale
française), a collective name for the central African territories colonised by France.
anti-Balaka A radical Christian insurgent group in the Central African Republic
which opposes the Muslim community and Séléka. Anti-Balaka stands
for “anti-machete”.
CAR Abbreviation of Central African Republic.
Dinka The largest ethnic tribe in South Sudan.
EAC Abbreviation of East African Community, a free trade organisation in
eastern Africa. Member states are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
Françafrique A term which symbolises the French foreign policies in and relationship
with African states and mainly former colonies on the African continent.
Many French and African leaders have upheld this relationship in order to
establish a two-way street of support and favours.
IGAD Abbreviation of Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a trade
bloc between East African states which is involved with the peace process
in South Sudan.
LRA Abbreviation of Lord’s Resistance Army, a radically Christian rebel group
which operates in the border regions between the Central African
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Uganda.
MINUSCA Abbreviation of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (fr. Mission
multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique), the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic.
Nuer The second largest ethnic tribe in South Sudan.
pré carré A French term which can be translated into backyard. It has sometimes
been the way in which French policy makers and citizens have referred to
Séléka A radical Muslim insurgent group in the Central African Republic which opposes the government and the Christian community. Séléka means “coalition” in the local Sango language.
SPLA Abbreviation of South Sudan’s Liberation Army. It was founded as a guerilla group which fought for the independence of South Sudan but now serves as the country’s national army.
UNMISS Abbreviation of United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the UN
peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.
UCDP Abbreviation of Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
Introduction
No conflict is an island. A characteristic of modern warfare (that is, conflicts after the Cold War-era) is the internationalisation of conflicts. Internal conflicts, whereby there is a territorial or governmental incompatibility between a government actor and an insurgent military group, often have a spill-over effect on neighbouring states or the actors receive support and condemnation from the international community. External actors have also been, if not crucial then at least, a key part of democratisation projects after the Cold War (Grimm and Weiffen, 2018: 258). The internationalisation of conflicts poses an increasing threat to international security (Aydin, 2010: 47), considering external actors’ failure to prevent violence. Most research has dealt solely with domestic factors that may explain conflict onset and conflict duration, while a minority of studies contradict earlier research by also looking at transnational factors (Gleditsch, 2007: 305-306). This underlines the importance of studying the effects of external support in internal conflicts. It matters what the support is, who the supporting actors are and why the support is given (Pickering and Kisangani, 2013: 259-260; Roberts, 2019: 380-381). Consequently, a subfield within peace and conflict studies concerns the effects of external support of which extensive research has been conducted in recent years.
What is interesting regarding the effects of external support is the different types of support. Like Gleditsch (2007: 296) argues, states intervene using either direct or indirect measures of support. This entails either direct military intervention and economic sanctions or indirect covert support. We also know that conflicts in which the warring parties receive some sort of foreign support will last longer and less often end in negotiated settlements (Blach-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). Considering these findings, it is relevant to add to this growing body of research. This study focuses on the effects of soft power intervention. The term soft power was coined by researcher Joseph S. Nye Jr. and entails, in short, the cultural and political capital which a state possesses and which it can use to make other states do as it wants (Nye, 2004). Specifically, this thesis concerns the influence of far stronger states on weaker states which are currently entangled in internal conflict.
In this thesis, I argue that the influence of politically influential states will make a government of a developing state less inclined to use one-sided violence as a form of warfare, an argument I particularly base on Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014). I conduct a case study comparing two states where one-sided violence has been low, namely the Central African Republic, and one where one-sided violence has been high, namely South Sudan. I find that states which have high soft power considering political capital and a mostly frictionless relationship with the government it supports, is usually better at preventing one-sided violence and civilian casualties. This thesis contributes to the research field by introducing the soft power aspect in the subfield studying the effects of external support, in the hopes of understanding how and why external democratic states support and succeed in influencing conflict strategies in internal conflicts. I conduct a qualitative study also in order to understand the intrinsic components of the reasoning behind decision- making and the impact of economic and political capital.
I first review previous research and literature about the effects of external support within peace and conflict studies in order to discern possible research gaps. Then, I present the independent variable and the dependent variable and account for their causal relationship. The theoretical framework, based on previous research, is explained in detail, as well as the research design and method which guides this study. I then present the results and subsequently analyse my findings by applying the theoretical framework. Lastly, I make a general conclusion and explain how the findings of this study may be further developed in future research.
Research Puzzle
money and guns, tend to prefer continued fighting rather than a settled negotiation. Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) is one of few articles which discusses the relationship between external support and civilian targeting. They conclude that external sponsorship results in more civilian atrocities but if the supporter is a democratic state, such atrocities are generally diminished, considering the presence of influential human rights lobbies in those states. This underlines the importance of certain cultural and political capital in decision-making. The intrinsic function of how democracies enact restraints on the rebels they support, using qualitative case studies, is something they wish would be further researched.
While extensive research on this particular aspect of external support may have effects on what political decisions are made, it also means that other aspects of external support are overlooked. Specifically, few studies, except for Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014), focus on the implications external support has on one-sided violence and civilian casualties, especially not regarding how soft power intervention influences government decisions about attacks on civilian targets. Few studies also discuss the dynamic between former colonial powers and colonies, which this paper aims to discuss in short. Neo-colonialism is the term for modern interventions by Western states in non-Western states. Such modern interventions have courses of action which reminds oneself of soft power approaches: “Western states have control over ideas, information and communication, and Western concepts such as progress, civilization and modernity shape the non-European world” (Darby and Paolini, 1994: 387). Gegout (2018: 57) writes that this relationship is linked to the historical coloniser-colonised relationship. Consequently, more time has to be devoted to the dynamic between states and especially in relation to real-life implications such as civilian casualties in internal conflicts.
third-party deliberately becomes involved in an internal conflict, it also becomes responsible for decisions and policies stemming from the support.
Purpose and Research Question
A key goal of this thesis is to contribute to the growing subfield on external support within peace and conflict studies. The purpose is to attain an understanding of the political influence an external supporter has on the government party in an internal conflict, especially when it comes to the use of one-sided violence. Since previous research has failed to address this particular role of soft power of external support, there is a hope that this thesis may shed light on this issue. By drawing on studies concerning soft power and its role in political decision-making, we may further understand why some government actors choose to use one-sided violence as a conflict strategy and why some do not. With most focus on the role of soft power, we may further theorise about the purpose and effects of external support in internal conflicts.
The research question which will guide this study is: How does foreign influence on the government actor in the form of soft power affect the use of one-sided violence?
Theoretical Considerations
Literature Review
when battling much weaker adversaries. When they fail to acquire their own independent goals, they tend to withdraw their support and leave a power vacuum in which some areas become ungoverned (Sullivan, 2007).
Other studies also focus on the conflict termination and the quality of state-building after a civil war. Sullivan and Karreth (2015) write that external support to an actor only increases the likelihood of said actor winning if the opponent is better equipped. An already powerful party does not benefit from external support since increased military capabilities does not necessarily increase the chances of negotiated settlements. Colaresi (2014) concludes that if the winning actor in an internal conflict has received support from a rival external actor during the conflict, they have less incentive to support democratisation of the political structure. Karlén (2017) argues that the occurrence of external support during a conflict will make renewed fighting more likely post-conflict since the same actors will expect external support again.
Some scholars underline the importance of transnational ethnic ties and conclude that when there is an occurrence of an ethnic diaspora in another state, the state in question is more likely to intervene (Austvoll, 2012; Bove and Böhmelt, 2019). This may be relevant for former colonial powers, as a large part of their immigrants come from former colonies (Collste, 2012). Likewise, studies have shown that, when there is no ethnic kinship, a foreign supporter is more likely to withdraw its support when the costs are too high (Karlén, 2019). Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) also underline the importance of ties between actors in different states as a catalyst for intervention.
soft power as coined by Nye (2004), considering the influence developed states have over developing states. Regan and Aydin (2006) contradict the notion that military intervention would shorten the conflict duration and they propose that diplomacy and other forms of “soft” intervention is crucial in understanding conflict duration and dynamics. Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014) discuss the supported rebels’ use of one-sided violence and conclude that democratic supporters are more likely to restrain the actors they support and thus make one-sided violence less likely. How soft power ties in to this conclusion, is an aspect which would be interesting to develop further.
Independent Variable
As the literature concerning these topics is vast and often complex, there is a need to define the key concepts in order to be able to measure them properly and to discern their causal relationship. Previous research has been consulted in order to find the main perceptions and definitions used by scholars within this field.
The independent variable, to which this study devotes the most time and effort, is the concept of
intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interest.” Soft power is rather a way to persuade someone by making one’s ideals and goals attractive and desirable.
Another way to look at soft power is through the previously mentioned linkage. Levitsky and Way (2005) write that leverage is only possible when it is combined with linkages to another country, almost always Western countries. There are several different types of linkages but economic linkage (investment and assistance with and by a Western country), geopolitical linkage (political ties and alliances with Western-led organisations) and, finally, social linkage (e.g. tourism or transnational ethnic communities) serve as the most prominent concerning the dynamic between developed and developing state (ibid.: 22-23). Linkages may be closely related to soft power as a concept, considering they both explain different ways in which states may influence other states. Both concepts concern persuasion and covert rather than direct intervention. I therefore draw upon the main points from Nye as well as Levitsky and Way to define soft power as: the use of a foreign intervener of its political and economic capital in order to influence the government actor in an internal conflict. Specifically, I will look at soft power as political capital, or concerning values, and whether or not a government will mimic its democratic supporter when it comes to certain ideals.
Dependent Variable
casualties as part of collateral damage when the purpose was not to kill civilians specifically (Eck and Hultman, 2007: 235). Considering this thesis’ scope conditions (see section Scope Conditions), I also exclude one-sided violence conducted by any armed group other than the government actor. While one-sided violence is initiated by both actors, it is the reasoning behind such attacks conducted by the government actor that is relevant in order to establish the effect of soft power support. There are, of course, other types of one-sided violence, such as violence that leads to physical and psychological injuries rather than casualties. However, by specifically looking at battle-related deaths, the variable will be easier to grasp and measure.
Control Variables
It is important to control for other variables which may interfere with this study’s independent and dependent variables and which may also explain variation in the dependent variable (Kellstedt and Whitten, 2018: 78). There is a general consensus among scholars that something that may explain government instigated one-sided violence against civilians is either (1) the structural conditions of the state or (2) political gains to be made from one-sided violence (Demeritt, 2009). When selecting cases, they need to have a similar political structure and the same goals with one-sided violence in order for those variables not interfering. It is also preferable if each case has a similar number of battle-related deaths, so as to easily show how the cases are comparable in regards to conflict intensity. This, however, does not necessarily affect how many have died as part of one-sided violence.
Theory and Hypothesis
my theoretical framework on the article by Salehyan, Siroky and Wood (2014), in which they use a principal-agent approach to explain why democratic supporters of rebel groups often manage to hinder one-sided violence. The principal-agent approach (or problem, as it is often viewed) is a theory within political science and economics in which a principal offers funding or support to an agent. However, the principal and agent have different goals with the cooperation and there may appear a schism between them considering the actions of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). An interesting aspect of this theory is that if an agent has several principals, they are less inclined to follow the demands of the principals since it is difficult to know who should enact sanctions on the agent (Nielson and Tierney, 2003).
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004: 11). They are all used for leverage but with different results. Secondly, and equally critical for the success of intervention, is the intervened state’s linkage to the West. Without a doubt, issues such as colonial history constitute such a linkage which may, in turn, give external actors as well as former colonial powers the leverage they need to affect conflict outcomes (Levitsky and Way, 2005: 33).
In this thesis, the principal is understood as a foreign intervener which supports the government actor. The agent is the government in an internal conflict which makes decisions on the progress of the conflict with the passive support of the foreign intervener. The foreign intervener supports the government but only with certain demands. The principal-agent theory is a theory whereby each actor is rational and, based on their self-interest, will act in a way which is deemed the most profitable for themselves (Eisenhardt, 1989). This means that the intervener and the government actor each have individual goals and, since they have chosen to cooperate, they view the cooperation as a viable tool to reach their goal. If the government actor is rational, it would choose to act in a way which would further guarantee said support. One may question why a democratic supporter would entail fewer instances of one-sided violence. However, since a democratic state, which has signed and ratified conventions against human rights abuses etc., wants to uphold its own international reputation, it may influence the government which it supports and therefore decrease the use of one-sided violence. In contrast, a non-democratic supporter would care less about the use of one-sided violence due to its already wounded international reputation. These differences signify how both principal and agent have self-interests and act accordingly to achieve multiple objectives.
This theoretical framework will hopefully help in understanding and answering the research question: How does foreign influence on the government actor in the form of soft power affect the use of one-sided violence? This leads us to this study’s hypothesis:
H1: As a foreign intervener’s soft power is high, the occurrence of one-side violence instigated by the government is low.
Research Design
Methodology
taking into consideration how a phenomenon is influenced by the context within which it is situated.” Since this study uses an already established theory to attempt to explain other implications of said theory, this is a theory-testing study.
In order to illuminate variation across cases, I have chosen to use Mill’s Method of Difference. The method entails that the cases which one compares should be comparable concerning different factors which may explain the variation. Only one of the factors should vary across the cases and that factor may therefore explain why the outcome of each case is different (Brancati, 2018: 200ff). When selecting cases, I have specifically looked at the variation in outcome, namely the variation of one-sided violence in each case. Furthermore, I subsequently selected the cases based on who the foreign intervener was, without knowing the variation in soft power in advance. I will also conduct a structured focused comparison. By using such a method, I will be able to properly examine and scrutinise the intrinsic properties of each case. When posing the same questions to each case and, in a structured manner, evaluate the answers, the cases will be treated the same. In this way, the subsequent analysis does not deviate from the objectives of this paper and therefore achieves high validity (George, 1979).
The following questions will be posed to the respective cases:
a. What is the historical connection between the external supporter and the supported state? b. What are the current political and economic exchanges between the two states?
c. What conflict-related measures has the external supporter implemented?
d. What occurrences have there been of one-sided violence during the time that the government actor received external support?
and economically, which may elucidate their current relationship and one state’s influence over the other. The third question is supposed to explain if and how the supporter has openly intervened using soft power measures during the current conflict, showing that their cooperation with the supported actor is still valuable during wartime. The last question specifically regards the dependent variable one-sided violence with the purpose to discuss the use of one-sided violence within this specific question. The answers to these questions will be fully discussed at the end of this thesis (see section Results and Analysis). The point of establishing clear questions, each concerning specific areas of the research objective, is to be able to apply the research design on all relevant cases. The structured focused comparison as an analytic tool has been chosen so as to achieve high reliability, whereby other scholars may use the same set of questions to apply them on other cases as well. One also achieves high validity since the questions are simplistic enough to be able to grasp the relevant information which is needed to answer the research question.
The prime units of analysis are the agents, namely the government actor which is fighting an internal conflict and is supported by an external state. The external states are also important units to analyse, but only when related to the agents that they support. We may simplify it by saying that the states and particularly their behaviour are analysed. While data concerning the occurrences of one-sided violence during different periods of time will be presented, it is merely to illustrate the changing trend which may show us how the behaviour of a state changes when being affected by the influence of supporting states. The focus is not on a particular rebel group, since the unit of interest is the government actor. A government may face multiple challengers but their use of one-sided violence should not change particularly considering how many insurgent groups they fight.
Scope Conditions
study primarily relies. Likewise, the UCDP codes battle-related deaths one year at a time and most recently updated datasets have been coded up until 2019. The second case is the civil conflict in South Sudan, a state which did not exist until its independence from Sudan in 2011. This also serves as a viable reason for why the starting year of this study is 2011.
An objective of a thesis of this kind is to find common patterns which may explain the variation in the dependent variable; that is, to generalise across all similar cases (Brancati, 2018: 335). One of the main objectives of this study is to better understand the dynamics between the intervener and the intervened. I intend to generalise about cases concerning internal conflicts where the government actor is supported by an external actor which possesses overall high levels of soft power. That is, the government cooperates politically and economically with a state which according to McClory (2019) is a high-ranking soft power. This means that the overall methodology of this thesis may only be applied to cases concerning internal conflicts where the government has a significant external supporter.
Operationalisation
This thesis strives for high reliability and high validity with the purpose of establishing an operationalisation which measures the variables in a representative way. By standardising a way to measure the variables, others may use the same method and apply it in other cases. The purpose of the first operationalisation is written so as to clearly define what constitutes soft power concerning political and economic influence, with a set of questions which may be applied to all similar cases. The second operationalisation, with its more clear-cut definition, is applicable to all cases where the government actor is the perpetrator of civilian casualties.
soft power in conflicts. Out of the different measurements, the Engagement sub-index is deemed to be the most viable in order to measure economic influence and opportunity to invest in foreign economies. Engagement entails not only a country’s participation in the international community but also development aid as a form of economic power (Treverton and Jones, 2005). The
Government-sub index is also relevant considering that we are looking at the attractiveness of values and a country’s agency in the common international community grants it high soft power. I intend to mix these parameters and concretise them by looking specifically at the dichotomous cooperation between two states. It is important to differentiate between using political and economic power in a coercive way and using them to influence the “improvement” of a state. Measures such as economic embargoes and political sanctions should be deemed as more related to hard power. Hard power is coercive power. Soft power, on the other hand, is persuasive power (Wilson, 2008: 114), which is more characterised by economic investments and political persuasion. There are other components of the concept of soft power. However, since politics and economics is more directly tied to the across-state cooperation and is significantly easier to measure than, for example, cultural and educational exchanges, these two components have been preferred.
The dependent variable one-sided violence is easier to measure considering that I have based the definition on the UCDP’s definition of 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (Eck, Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 2004: 136). However, the scale of a conflict and the general severity of the skirmishes also affect how many are killed. This does not tell us anything about what decisions are made based on a state’s soft power attraction of another state. Instead, I am looking at the percentage of those killed in civilian targeting that were killed by the government actor. This gives a better understanding of how much the casualties vary considering which actor we are looking at. The portion of those killed will also be assessed from Very Low to Very High. The division will be as follows: Very Low: 0 –20%; Low: 21 –40%; Intermediate: 41 –60%; High: 61 –80%; Very High: 81–100%. While I am aware that there are other types of one-sided violence which does not
Case Selection
The annual report The Soft Power 30, ranks the most powerful states based on their political, cultural and moral capital (McClory, 2019). In 2019, the same report deemed France to be the top soft power in the world citing mainly that “[France] has a vast diplomatic network, and is unrivalled in its membership of multilateral and international organisations” (ibid.: 39). According to DeVore (2019: 173), the Fifth French Republic is the second most active intervenor after the United States. France is also very close with its former colonies and other francophone states. France has also managed to maintain its impact on culture and policies even after it lost its status as an empire (Nye, 2004: 76-77). Its cooperation with former colonies has been a way for France to further increase its power of influence and create a network of cooperation often referred to as
Françafrique, or in France as their pré carré (Erforth, 2020: 15). The country also maintains a military presence in Africa, not only in the Overseas France territories Réunion and Mayotte, but also in Djibouti, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal (Ministère de la Défense, 2016). 1 Last but not
least, France is a vigorous intervener in conflicts and often tends to meddle in the domestic affairs of its former colonies (Gegout, 2018: 135f; Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011). Therefore, I argue that looking at French intervention in internal conflicts in Africa is both relevant and examples are highly available. The first case will thus concern the French intervention in the Central African Republic. The CAR has experienced several internal conflicts in the past decades, with a significant peak in 2013, but relatively low levels of deaths the following years (UCDP, 2019a). From 2011 to 2019, the government in the CAR was the perpetrator of 1,428 civilian casualties, which constitute 20.1% of the overall civilian casualties in the conflict. This means that the number of civilians killed by the government is Low, albeit a lot of civilians were still victims of the government’s actions.
In the second case, the purpose is to look at a modern conflict in which the main supporting foreign power is not a Western democratic power. By establishing this difference, one may discern the dynamics between different kinds of states. While an international actor and former colonial power may want to intervene in order to uphold some sort of international reputation and
economic ties with the former colony, other types of states may have different goals. A neighbouring state which intervenes in an internal conflict may want to do so in order to establish sustainable cross-border relations and acquire regional dominance. One such example concerns Ugandan intervention in South Sudan. South Sudan achieved independence from Sudan in 2011 and since then has been entangled in an internal conflict across ethnic lines (UCDP, 2019b). Uganda and South Sudan have had economic cooperation since the latter’s independence and South Sudan has become the state which imports the most Ugandan merchandise (Rolandsen, Sagmo and Nicolaisen, 2015). Both states are members of the East African Community (EAC), a free trade organisation comprising several East African states. Likewise, Uganda has also intervened militarily in the current South Sudanese internal conflict (BBC, 2014). Since the beginning of the conflict, the government of South Sudan has been the perpetrator of 1,799 civilian casualties, according to the UCDP, which constitute 68.6% of all civilian casualties during the period between 2011 and 2019. This entails a High level of one-sided violence caused by the government actor.
comes to Z1, as is understood from Table 1, in each case the one-sided violence as instigated by the government actor has mostly been due to punishment of civilians who they believe may sympathise with rebels (UCDP, 2019f; UCDP, 2019g). We may interpret their actions as a form of deterrence, with the purpose of scaring civilians from supporting and hiding rebels. They also have similar political and societal structures, as represented by Z2. The CAR is a semi-presidential republic with a president as the head of state, accompanied by a separate prime minister who leads the day-to-day governmental work. Despite periodic attempts at democratic reform, the CAR struggles with electoral irregularities and many regions remain ungoverned by the government (Freedom House, 2020). South Sudan established itself as a federal presidential republic where the president is directly elected by the voters and subsequently acts as head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and negotiator in international contexts (Henneberg, 2013). Lastly, the UCDP has reported a similar number of overall battle-related deaths, with both reaching over 11,000, which is represented by Z3 in Table 1.
Material and Data
The basis for the data on soft power is primarily taken from the annual report The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power published by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy and Portland (McClory, 2019). They base their ranking on a state’s capital regarding enterprise, culture, digital development, government, engagement and, lastly, education. Considering their elaborate reporting on states’ soft power output and input, as well as containing contributions by qualified researchers within this field, I have deemed this source as useful for the purpose of this study.
When it comes to assessing one-sided violence as perpetrated by the government actor, I primarily consult the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. In the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset 20.1
(UCDP, 2020), they account for all reported cases of one-sided violence from 1989-2019. This is further complemented by Petterson and Öberg (2020), in which they review the trends of one-sided violence.
The material concerning the behaviour of former colonial powers in former colonies, I particularly consult Gegout (2018) in which the Eurocentric and neo-colonial perspective on intervention in Africa is discussed. I also consult The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa (Karbo and Virk, 2018) in which there is a vast collection of journal articles concerning Western intervention as well as state-building in Africa. In these sources, France and the United Kingdom are particularly dealt with as they are two of the primary intervening states in Africa. Furthermore, case-specific literature like Mehler (2020) and Turse (2016) have also been consulted in order to fully grasp the cases of which this paper studies.
Source Criticism
The danger as a Western European to write about the varied intrinsic components of African states and especially about the colonial history and effects on the present day quality of a state, is that one often relies on the reports and studies of other Western Europeans. That is, one relies on sources that have the perspective of an outsider. Most scientific journal articles which have been consulted and relied on are written by scholars in Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. This creates a clear bias of sources and measures have been taken to minimise it. The collection of articles on intervention in Africa which can be found in The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa (2018) has been compiled by scholars from Tony Karbo and Kudrat Virk, who are based in Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa respectively. I have also been careful to use first-hand information about the milieu and different events within the cases. For example, while Nick Turse (2016) is an American journalist, his book is based on his own experiences of and interviews from the conflict in South Sudan. Such sources have been consulted, still with the awareness that such types of texts may be slightly anecdotal and biased. However, the main objective of gathering empirical information about the cases is to understand what decisions have been the catalysts of conflict and these sources may still contribute to that objective.
Empirics and Analysis
Case 1: Central African Republic – France
The Central African Republic must have hosted one of the highest number of peace missions (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017). Since its independence from France, the CAR has experienced multiple rebellions and shifts in power. For the most part, the conflicts have had incompatibilities over government, often with ethnic and religious characteristics (UCDP, 2019c). In 2012, parts of the Muslim minority in the country opposed President Françoise Bozizé and his corrupt and nepotistic government. An armed insurgent group known as Séléka (meaning “coalition” in Sango, one of the official languages in the CAR) emerged and initiated a rebellion against the government. The rebellion was successful and President Bozizé was ousted and had to flee to neighbouring Cameroon. Séléka’s leader Michel Djotodia subsequently became the country’s first Muslim president. However, his rule was short as Séléka split into multiple factions and saw increasing in-fighting. Meanwhile, a new radically Christian militia known as anti-Balaka emerged in order to oppose the Muslim government. The armed conflict remains unsolved and the country has seen over 11,000 dead since 2011 (UCDP, 2019c).
a. What is the historical connection between the external supporter and the supported state?
colonised (ibid.: 431f). This may explain the still active cooperation between France and the CAR. Following the CAR’s independence, it established a military cooperation with its former colonial power (Erforth, 2020: 19-20). As will be later explained, the CAR has favoured further cooperation with France within a number of fields in order to develop its economic and political standing. Whether it has made the CAR a more stable state remains to be discussed.
The historical connection between the Central African Republic and France is important to understand in order to discern current and future policies and actions. An interesting fact which preceded the official French intervention in the CAR is the plea by President Bozizé for French assistance to handle the Séléka rebellion. Instead of turning to the African Union or the United Nations, the chances that France would be engaged and obliged to help were greater (Erforth, 2020: 22; Melly and Darracq, 2013: 3). This may imply that bilateral cooperation is more easily handled and preferred when it comes to domestic crises. Especially when the state asking for assistance is significantly weaker than its supporter.
b. What are the current political and economic exchanges between the two states?
l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, 2019). The scarce investments in the CAR may be explained by its economic standards. The country remains one of the world’s poorest and its constantly re-emerging crises never allow the economy to recover properly (World Bank, 2019; AfDB, 2020).
The French-Central African relationship may be interpreted as the best example of what the French call Françafrique (Glock, 2017: 32). France has had an interest in the CAR from its independence to the present day. As it appears, the Central African leaders remain as long as France allows them. Likewise, France takes an interest in who governs the CAR and seems to care very little who the current president is as long as the elected official will continue to cooperate with France (Gegout, 2018: 164ff). One clear example is the French support of the self-proclaimed emperor of the CAR, Jean-Bédel Bokassa until his murderous tactics and inability to handle any of his country’s problems led to a French invasion and reinstatement of the former president David Dacko (Faes and Smith, 2000). Similarly, the first Muslim president Michel Djotodia was deposed since he failed to hinder further inter-religious violence (UCDP, 2019a).
c. What conflict-related measures has the external supporter implemented?
France ended their official military operation in 2016 after having achieved some of its objectives. However, French soldiers remain as part of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSCA. 2 The
former French president François Hollande pleaded to his European colleagues that France could not be the sole European country that takes an interest in the Central African Republic and he subsequently insisted on an EU-led military intervention (Gegout, 2018: 169f). This may be viewed as a change in French foreign policy. Instead of acting as a single actor in Africa, the EU should take charge while still being somewhat dominated by France.
d. What occurrences have there been of one-sided violence during the time that the government actor received external support?
One-sided violence has occurred ongoing since the start of the time period in 2011. 3 For the most
part, it is insurgent groups that are responsible for the majority of killings and not the government. The use of one-sided violence in the Central African Republic peaked in 2013, the same year that the conflict between the government and the Séléka rebellion began. The government was responsible for about 50% of civilian casualties this year. 4 However, in subsequent years the
government has been responsible for only a few civilian deaths. In 2017 and 2018, none of the battle-related civilian casualties were perpetrated by the Central African government (UCDP, 2019c).
The main attacks against civilians have been due to fighting between different factions of rebel groups. When Séléka leader Michel Djotodia became president, he disbanded the movement since they had acquired their goal. However, due to the poor leadership of Djotodia and his subsequent resignation, a group known as ex-Séléka emerged and continued the fight. The continued violence 2 It may be important here to point out that the peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic was one of the
missions in which UN soldiers of predominantly French origin allegedly sexually abused locals (Laville, 2015; Dearden, 2016). These events may have decreased France’s and the UN’s credibility as intervening actors. However, it is unclear how much it damaged the relationship between France and the government in the CAR, and whether or not it could affect the results of this study.
3 For a detailed description of one-sided violence trends in the Central African Republic, consult Appendix B.
4 One may also point out that during 2013, the UCDP regarded Séléka as the government of the Central African
was now more categorised by inter-ethnic and inter-religious fighting between different types of militias, rather than fighting for control over the government (UCDP, 2019c). The radically Christian militia known as anti-Balaka have also perpetrated a lot of non-state violence, mainly in the form of fear mongering in order to control areas which are moderately controlled by the government. Among other things, there have been reports of anti-Balaka militias burning so-called “witches” alive in order to instill fear in civilians (Esslemont, 2015). The same group has split into smaller fractions and still constitute the biggest threat to domestic security and stability in the Central African Republic. Anti-Balaka was loyal to the former President Bozizé and openly opposed the Muslim government. When France and its allies made sure that the Muslim President Djotodia resigned and was once again replaced by a Christian president, anti-Balaka still continued to carry out revenge attacks on the Muslim minority. Among other things, there have reports of lynchings against Muslim civilians and other similar abuses (Vircoulon and Lesueur, 2014; UCDP, 2019d).
Case 2: South Sudan – Uganda
The conflict in South Sudan officially ended in 2020 when President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar came to an agreement to form a coalition government (BBC, 2020). The future progression of peace in South Sudan will be interesting to follow.
a. What is the historical connection between the external supporter and the supported state?
The relationship between South Sudan and Uganda spans further back in history than the former’s independence. During the middle of the last century, when calls for independence echoed throughout the British colonies, South Sudanese civilians relocated to Uganda for educational purposes. Sometimes, when fighting broke out between the South Sudanese and the Sudanese government in Khartoum, many fled to Uganda for refuge. Ugandans also fled to South Sudan during troublesome periods of its history. Uganda openly supported the South Sudanese rebel group SPLA, which fought for independence against the government in Khartoum. In fact, the government in Kampala and the government in Khartoum have always had a frosty relationship and Uganda’s support of South Sudan is only one aspect of their rivalry (Rolandsen, Sagmo and Nicolaisen, 2015).
South Sudan and Uganda have also had a common enemy in the radically Christian LRA movement, which terrorises their common border (Ingerstad, 2012: 26ff). Multilateral efforts have been made in order to hinder the escalation of LRA’s presence in the area, mostly involving South Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These three states initiated a joint military operation in 2008 and managed to severely damage the LRA (ibid.: 25). However, it led to several occurrences of civilian casualties as the LRA wanted to avenge their killed soldiers. The South Sudan–Uganda cooperation has not always been smooth. During the offensive against the LRA, Ugandan troops were accused of attacking civilians in South Sudanese territories, whereupon Ugandan troops were asked to withdraw (Mulumba, 2008).
the Nuer rebels. Their ambiguous relationship and ongoing border disputes may make one question whether Ugandan support to South Sudan is mainly due to concerns for the South Sudanese people or due to concerns over Ugandan influence in the East African region.
b. What are the current political and economic exchanges between the two states?
South Sudan and Uganda have cooperated economically since before South Sudan achieved independence in 2011. Rolandsen, Sagmo and Nicolaisen (2015) have compiled an extensive review over the cooperation between South Sudan and Uganda and how it has developed.
The economy of South Sudan is very underdeveloped and has relied mostly on oil-revenue, meaning that the foundation of their economy is very unstable. The oil crisis in 2014 as well as the internal conflict has damaged and exhausted the South Sudanese economy which has been solely dependent on oil during the civil war (Refugee Law Project, 2014). At the beginning of the conflict, Ugandan salesmen and traders fled South Sudan but returned as the conflict stabilised. Considering South Sudan’s richness of natural resources and, particularly, oil, investments have been made in the recent two years since the stabilisation of the conflict (Goodrich, 2020). However, since South Sudan is a rentier state whose economy’s sole basis for existence is the revenue from oil, its economy remains shaky. In 2005, South Sudan and Uganda facilitated their economic cooperation and South Sudan received millions in oil revenue. However, since it did not have a formal economic system, there was nothing that could absorb it (Rolandsen, Sagmo and Nicolaisen, 2015).
state closer to Uganda. Considering their shared border, Uganda wants to keep South Sudanese rebels out of Uganda while also being able to allow trade to flow unhindered. It is a difficult balance since it aims to strengthen the South Sudanese government in order to (like all neighbouring states) hinder the possibility that South Sudan will lose its central governance and thus be locally governed by different warlords (ibid.).
c. What conflict-related measures has the external supporter implemented?
At the beginning of the conflict in 2013, Uganda was asked by the South Sudanese government to intervene in an effort to protect the airport in Juba and help Ugandan citizens to flee back to their home country. However, according to Rolandsen, Sagmo and Nicolaisen (2015) Uganda also actively bombed rebel groups, something that was condoned by neighbouring states. As the conflict intensity lessened following the immediate peak at the start of the conflict, Uganda has diverted its focus from military intervention to diplomatic intervention. It is a delegate of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African trade bloc which was active in the South Sudanese peace process. However, Uganda has not been a central member state which deals with the negotiations between the warring parties in South Sudan, because of the critique it received due to its initial military involvement (International Crisis Group, 2016: 8, 10). Uganda’s ambiguous ambitions in South Sudan has made it a difficult factor in the peace process. As ICG reported in 2016, one of the reasons that Uganda intervened militarily is due to its long lasting political conflict with the Sudanese government. Rebel leader Riek Machar received support from Sudan and Uganda feared that Sudanese influence in South Sudan would weaken Uganda’s agency in the region (ibid.: 4). The UK-based organisation Conflict Armament Research (2018) reported that weapons imported from EU weapon suppliers to the Ugandan army ended up in the hands of non-state actors in South Sudan. It has not been clear whether or not these weapons were supplied to rebels on purpose. This has raised concerns that Uganda has been supporting both the government and the rebels in South Sudan, as a way to both sell weapons and control the course of the conflict. However, it has been contradicted by the government in Kampala (van Eyssen and Gitta, 2018).
The relationship between South Sudan and Uganda remains ambiguous. In October 2020, after the end of the conflict, there were reports of skirmishes between government forces at the South Sudan–Uganda border which resulted in the deaths of a few national soldiers (Ajak and Muhumuza, 2020).
d. What occurrences have there been of one-sided violence during the time that the government actor received external support?
The government of South Sudan is a significant perpetrator of one-sided violence in the conflict. 5
One-sided violence has occurred even before the conflict began. In 2012, one year before the conflict erupted, the government of South Sudan had killed 65 civilians, according to the UCDP (2019g). The government is overall responsible for the killing of 1,799 civilians from 2011 to 2019, with a significant peak in 2013 when 580 civilians died. Most killings are directly linked to the civil conflict and the method has been used as a way to punish those who may sympathise with the rebels. One-sided violence is used to deter civilians from supporting groupings that oppose the government actor. As is illustrated by Table 3, the government of South Sudan is the main perpetrator of the occurrences of one-sided violence. According to different human rights groups, both sides have initiated widespread violence but the government is clearly the largest perpetrator. In some instances government troops have erased whole villages that may have sided with the enemy and atrocities have been committed against individuals and families (O’Grady, 2018). Similar accounts are made in the book by Turse (2016). The conflict is characterised by a sense of revenge against the other ethnic group. While the newly formed South Sudanese state aimed for ethnic inclusion, the Dinka tribe almost fully dominated the national army at the beginning of the conflict. According to sources that Turse interviews, the sheer tribalism in the South Sudanese civil war, and the habit of speaking about us and them may be the starting point of a genocide. Another source also claims that President Kiir is wholly dependent on its foreign supporters, one of them being Uganda, and without them he would not be able to keep the civil war going (ibid.: 76ff).
Results and Analysis
One lesson to be learned from the research of modern conflict dynamics is that one cannot ignore the internationalisation of conflicts and the importance of external support of domestic actors. As the empirics have shown, both the government in the Central African Republic and the government in South Sudan has welcomed and subsequently thrived on the support of other states. The principal-agent theory has provided a framework which helps understand the dynamic between external supporter and domestic government. In each case, France and Uganda (serving as principals) have offered their support to the government actors in the CAR and South Sudan respectively, while providing said support with independent goals. As is evident from the empirical material, France has offered support in order to maintain its influence in Africa, mainly its former colonies, which may explain why France specifically has chosen to involve itself with the conflict. Uganda’s argument for involving itself with the South Sudanese civil war is to prevent a power vacuum in the region and preventing the spill-over of violence across borders, but may also be viewed as a way to establish dominance over the East African region while furthering its rivalry with Sudan. The main concern of this thesis has been whether or not soft power and linkages may explain why some governments use one-sided violence as a form of deterrence and why some do not. While the principal and the agent in both cases seem to have cooperated politically and economically to some extent, the relationship between France and the CAR has been consistently strong. South Sudan and Uganda have cooperated but their relationship has often been strained, with the recent border disputes as one example (Ajaka and Muhumuza, 2020).
bilateral relations and political and economic cooperation, said government is more likely to refrain from using one-sided violence as a form of warfare. Therefore, one may find support for H1: As a foreign intervener’s soft power is high, the occurrence of one-side violence instigated by the government is low. Table 2 shows the results of this case-study and the variation between cases.
Considering the intimate cooperation between the Central African Republic and France, we may discuss the importance of linkages, especially as a remnant of a colonial past (Levitsky and Way, 2005: 23). The CAR may want to uphold its good relationship with France since it may draw international attention to an area in the centre of the African continent which is categorically overlooked by media and policymakers alike. With an ally like France, the CAR is able to make their voices heard in both the European Union and in the UN Security Council. Likewise, France is of course not unaware of its influence in its former colonies. Rather, it is an integral part of its foreign policies. France has abandoned its former goal of grandeur which it sought after World War II. Instead, France has attempted to stay relevant as a foreign actor through its power of influence. It bases its influence on, among other things, its permanent seat in the UN Security Council, its status as a nuclear and economic power as well as the positive global perception of French culture and values (Erforth, 2020: 13). This directly ties in with how Nye (2004) defines soft power, and the French government is aware of it. France, as a principal, has established a structure of influence in which the Central African regime sees its relationship with France useful for its own influence globally.
France’s historical establishment of military cooperation with its former colonies can be viewed from a soft power perspective as well. While France itself has not been significantly threatened militarily, such an establishment granted France an unmatched influence in the francophone African states. This ambition to establish military cooperation with other actors may also be seen in their policies today. While France has decreased its presence in Africa, a dream project of current French President Emmanuel Macron is to establish a proper military alliance within the framework of the European Union (Barigazzi, 2019). In the military operations conducted by the European Union, France has often been imagined as the dominant member state (Erforth, 2020: 22).
The principal-agent theory has provided a framework for understanding the relationship between the Central African Republic and France. A reason behind the decrease in one-sided violence in 2013 may be the French intervention and political pressure, as their military intervention Operation Sangaris began this year and as they once again took an interest in the situation in the Central African Republic. However, it is once again worth noting that during this year the government was considered the same as the rebel group Séléka, as their leader Djotodia ascended to the presidency (UCDP, 2019c). France had supported his predecessor Bozizé. Still, the fact that Djotodia was forced to resign the following year, the same time as France got involved in the conflict, may show how France has an unmatched influence over the political progress in the country. This is true even when the governance changes. If we were to apply the theoretical framework on this event, the principal did not choose to support the new regime in the CAR and the agent therefore did not survive, as it is dependent on the support from the principal.
Uganda’s participation and interest in the conflict in South Sudan can be viewed from a different perspective. Instead of wanting to achieve international credibility, or rather maintaining it, Uganda appears to aim for regional dominance. Since Uganda and South Sudan are members of the same regional organisations there is a natural will to cooperate between the states. However, since Uganda has not experienced widespread armed conflict during the last decade, like South Sudan has, it gives them the opportunity to aid its partner states in order to strengthen its influence in the region. Considering South Sudan's often vulnerable societal structure and lack of stable governance, it is the perfect state in which to invest, which Uganda has done (Rolandsen, Sagmo and Nicolaisen, 2015). When applying the theoretical framework, we can conclude that Uganda acts as a principal with its own self interests and offers support to South Sudan in order to obtain regional dominance. At the same time, South Sudan, as the agent, accepts said support because they are in need of assistance to oppose the Nuer rebels and acts in order to maintain this fragile support. In this relationship, both principal and agent maintain the relationship as long as they find the need for it.
power, at least not in global terms (McClory, 2019). Rather, the state is often vilified internationally for its authoritarian structure and especially its persisting discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals (Burke and Okiror, 2019). This may indicate why one-sided violence has been categorically used by the government actor. Uganda, as it has itself not respected certain human rights, has not influenced South Sudan to refrain from using such methods to achieve its objectives in the conflict. The relationship between Uganda and South Sudan cannot be compared to the mostly frictionless relationship between France and the Central African Republic either, especially not considering the aforementioned border disputes in 2020. While 2020 was not part of the time period of interest, it may still be relevant to discuss considering the sudden change in the conflict and South Sudan’s relationship with Uganda. This incident may elucidate how the cooperation between Uganda and South Sudan was all but stable and that South Sudan has little use of Uganda in peace time.
