Environmental migration in the South
Pacific
A frame analysis of policies in Australia and New Zealand
Author: Julia Thelin Supervisor: Per Adman Word count: 11 971 Spring Semester 2020 Bachelor’s Thesis, 15 credits Political Science, C
Department of Government Uppsala University
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 2
Aim and Research question ... 3
“Rising seas, apocalyptic storms, prolonged droughts, scorching temperatures, rampant wildfires, disappearing biodiversity on land and in oceans - sadly I can go on. These are impacts that no one, no country can escape.
These threaten global security and stability and jeopardize the prosperity of all peoples. Where I come from, that threat is not distant, it is our reality”.
- HON. DR. OMAR FIGUEROA on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island Developing states
Introduction
Global warming is likely to reach 1.5 °C within the next ten to thirty years if anthropogenic emissions continue at their current rate. The effects of global warming on human systems and lives are not equal, but rather depend on geographic location, levels of development and capability for adaptation and mitigation (IPCC, 2018:1). Climate change is a global challenge, but it manifests in different ways around the world. One potentially disastrous effect is the rise of sea levels. Small Island Developing States’ (SIDS) contributions to the climate change emergency are very small, yet they are disproportionately vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 2005:5). In SID countries, cyclones have already left several thousand residents without homes. The World Bank has also predicted that rising sea levels will cause the pacific atoll of Bikenibeu, which is home to 6500 people, to disappear under the surface by 2050 (World Bank, 2017).
In poorer regions of the world, climate change is already driving environmental migration and displacement, with the lion’s share of such movement happening within countries. However, in the case of many island states in the South Pacific, where the highest point is very close to the sea level, internal migration is not a sustainable solution. In the long run, cross-border migration is therefore likely to become necessary. Previous studies on migration patterns show that international migration usually follows pre-existing paths. In the case of several smaller island states, those paths lead to Australia and New Zealand (Brown 2008).
debates in migrant-sending countries, knowledge of how migrant-receiving countries perceive environmental migration is insufficient. As such, this thesis hopes to further investigate and address this knowledge gap, as the issue of environmental migration is likely to become more prominent in the coming years. Although the discussion on the nature of environmental migration is still rather new, it can be argued that policy on the issue matter, as policy plays an essential role in shaping migration processes (Gemenne 2009:20). Despite the fact that international human mobility is a global phenomenon, it is primarily regulated in national policy. This is in contrast to other global issues, such as climate change, where international policymaking is more common (Sassen 2005:43). As already argued, relocation for environmental reasons may be the only viable option for many individuals in Small Developing Island states. This inevitably raises the question of where the population should go, and who is responsible for welcoming them.
Aim and Research question
The aim of this study is to investigate how the issue of environmental migration is framed in national policy and government official statements in Australia and New Zealand. A deductive frame analysis will be performed with the frames stemming from the conceptualisation of environmental migration frames by Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015). They have developed four frames; environmental migrants as either victims, security threats, adaptive agents or political
subjects. Previous research has primarily focused on media, international actors and leaders in
affected countries. National policy in migrant-receiving countries, however, remains under investigated. Therefore, this thesis seeks to explore what perceptions of environmental
migration exist in Australia and New Zealand.In order to examine this, current policy papers
The research question this thesis aims to answer is:
How is the issue of environmental migration represented in policy papers and government statements in Australia and New Zealand?
In addition to the main question, the following hypotheses grounded in presented empirics have been created specifically for this study.
H.1Australian policy is expected to frame environmental migrants as victims. H.2 New Zealand policy is expected to frame environmental migrants as agents. H.3 Both countries will mainly frame permanent environmental migration as a burden.
Background
Given that environmental migration is an emerging issue, especially across borders, there are still not many reliable studies on the size of the phenomena. While there is little controversy left regarding the fact that environmental conditions affect human migration to some extent, exactly how and how much is less certain (McLeman, 2012:600). Several difficulties are associated with measuring environmental migration since economic, social or political factors most often are contributing factors as well. Although, migration due to climate change must not be as clear as leaving land that will go under water, it might also be migration due to loss of income possibilities as an effect of environmental changes (McLeman 2013:601). At present, most environmental migration occurs within states or within regions, however, international migration is expected to increase as climate change effects are likely to become more evident (McLeman 2013:603). However, the focus of this essay is not to measure the impact of climate change nor determine what is classified as migration due to climate change, instead the assumption is made that it is a given issue. With environmental migration being such a heterogenic form of migration but also a growing phenomenon, various perceptions, arguments and rhetoric exist.
Although there is mostly consensus regarding the fact that climate change plays a part in the displacement of people, views differ regarding to what extent one can isolate the connection between the two and thereby exclude other factors. Sceptics argues there is not much sense in conceptualising environmental migration apart from the already existing categories, while alarmists strongly see need for a conceptualisation and acknowledgement of the issue (Gemenne, 2009:147). However, a commonly used working definition in current studies is one by the International Organisation of Migration. They have proposed the following definition: “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” (IOM, 2007).
Previous research
Historical perspectives on environmental migration
In From ‘fearing’ to ‘empowering’ climate refugees: Governing climate-induced migration in
the name of resilience, Methmann & Oels (2015) describes how the view of environmental
migration has transformed from being primarily seen as a security threat to being viewed upon as a strategy to achieve resilience. They say climate refugees were seen as a problem to national
security and sovereign power, referring to researchers such as Myers (2005),who stated “there
could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration, and by sea-level rise and
coastal flooding”.It was first and foremost seen by scholars as a problem that originated in the
global south and was a threat to the order in the global north (Methmann & Oels, 2015:56). During the 1990s many scholars grew sceptical towards the deterministic way of thinking that was put forward by earlier scholars and they also questioned the linkage between climate change and violent conflict and migration as a causal connection. Parallel to this development, focus shifted from sovereignty to intervention for humanitarian reasons. Lastly, UNDP released a report enhancing the importance of human security rather than state security, something that had implications on development policy and introduced the concept of vulnerability into the debate on climate change. By mapping out “vulnerable” communities, discourse changed into focusing on the need to save climate refugees and constructing a legal framework for this type of refugees (Methmann & Oels, 2015:57).
A Pacific Island perspective on environmental migration
In the article ‘We do not want to leave our land’: Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations
resist the category of ‘climate refugees, the authors find that there is a discrepancy between
how the leaders of affected countries and other actors in the international community view environmental migration (McNamara & Gibson 2008). The authors carefully question the given assumptions underlying the concept of “climate refugees” that climate change will result in mass population movements and displacement (McNamara & Gibson 2008:476). When interviewing several pacific ambassadors, it becomes clear that they don’t believe permanent migration is a viable strategy but would much rather focus on mitigation. At the core of the issue is the debate about climate justice and who should be taking responsibility. Furthermore, they find that, at least in the eye of the ambassadors, people in affected countries are unwilling to move (MacNamara & Gibson 2008:479).
The view on cause and problem regarding climate change was found to be similar between Pacific ambassadors and reports from media and NGOs but the future scenarios were differing. The ambassadors thought the most important actions to be reducing global emissions and focus on mitigation efforts rather than viewing migration as the only final option. This approach is said to partly stem from nationalism and pride in culture but is also an expression of discontent over geopolitical injustice since Pacific small island states have contributed very little to the problem yet are most affected (McNamara & Gibson 2008:481).
Theoretical Framework
Framing environmental migration
The different trends presented by Methmann and Oels (2015) are further conceptualised as different frames and developed by Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) in the article Being(s) framed:
The means and ends of framing environmental migrants. In this study, the authors seek to
how underlying beliefs, assumptions and worldviews shape the framing by various actors. The authors have developed four frames; environmental migrants as either victims, security threats,
adaptive agents or political subjects.
Environmental migrants as victims
In International Non-Governmental Organisations and the media, environmental migrants have often been framed as a “a symbolic human face of environmental change and disasters in terms of helplessness and passivity, in need of ‘saving’”. (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:109). The victim framing is mostly used either to encourage policy action, raise awareness or to increase media sales. This framing constructs external humanitarian and/or financial aid as a necessity, and to some extent neglects the perspective of those affected by climate change (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:109). The over-simplistic representation of affected communities’ vulnerability arguably reproduces the construction of countries in the global North as experts, in contrast to the construction of countries in the global South as weak and incapable. Thus, victim framing tends to overlook the perspective of affected individuals, and often leads to a disregard of local differences, cultures and abilities.
Environmental migrants as security threats
To some extent, the framing of environmental migrants as security threats relies on the picture of the previous framing in its dystopian matter. In this framing, climate-induced migration is depicted as a threat, both on a global and a national level. For example, in 2015, former American Secretary of State John Kerry characterised the rapid increase of “climate refugees” as a security risk to the United States. This framing is primarily found in messages from think-tanks based in well-resourced countries in the global North, but also in the global South, where worries over scarce resources have led some to argue that environmental migration should be addressed by the military. Such arguments have led to security-related defence policies in response to migration. As in the case of victim framing, the framing of environmental migrants as security threats makes a clear distinction between “us” and “them”, and, between “citizen” and “foreigner” (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:110).
Environmental migrants as adaptive agents
adaptation. Rather than seeing environmental migration as negative effect of climate change, it is seen as part of the solution in adapting to a changing world (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:111). This framing grew especially strong during the Conference Of the Parties 15 (COP15) in Copenhagen 2009, where it was amplified by researchers and International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in reports on climate change adaption to the summit.
One of the most prominent advocates for this framing is Anote Tong, the former president of Kiribati, who introduced the “Migration with dignity” policy. The policy focused on improving the skill level of the I-Kiribati population in order to increase their “attractiveness” to receiving countries. The aim of this policy was twofold, as it intended both to establish I-Kiribati1
communities in other countries and also to increase remittances to the families staying on the atolls. It has been criticised as overly positive and failing to account for those who wish to stay and build a resilient lifestyle in their home country. Furthermore, large outflows in sending-countries can potentially make vulnerable communities even more vulnerable, due to a decrease in local labour supply and revenue flows. Furthermore, remittances seem to be only efficient in helping individual households while it has very little effect on a community-level (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:111).
Environmental migrants as political subjects
The framing of environmental migrants as political subjects is more recently developed than the three previously outlined. It is mainly associated with research fields in political ecology, critical economy and post-colonial theory, but also with some NGOs and local communities. The focus of this framing is on migrants’ potential for self-determination, empowerment and historical control of resources. The framing of migrants as political subjects assumes that those most affected by climate change are limited in their choice to stay or leave, as a consequence of unequal power relations. In this sense, they are also potentially in a position to challenge current socio-economic systems and environmental policies (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:111). Furthermore, scholars within this frame are critical towards the adaptive agent framing because of its simplistic way of overlooking local cultures and solutions, and its absence of bottom-up policies. Since the political subjects frame is a rather new approach, it has not yet received much criticism. Although in development studies generally there are challenges associated with
producing Northern ideas on good governance and democracy in different contexts without taking local differences and traditions into account (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:112).
A dimension of Victim/Agent and Resource/Burden
In terms of environmental migration, different actors tend to have contrasting views on the position of those affected by climate change. In the article ‘We do not want to leave our land’:
Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of ‘climate refugee’ by
McNamara and Gibson (2008), this becomes particularly clear. When discussing climate change, the matter of responsibility cannot be avoided. Clearly, the issue is a global challenge with unequal impacts and no direct correlation between causing the problem and facing the effects. Thus, the role of environmental migrants is an object of discussion in the political conversation, in terms of how those most affected by this global injustice should be included on the global arena, and, viewed by the states responsible for the vast share of contributions to global emissions. From this discussion, it is possible to identify contrasting views in the four frames developed by Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015). The adaptive agent frame is considered a reaction to the pessimism and alarmism present in both the victim and security threat frame (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:112). However, the adaptive agents frame has in its turn received criticism from scholars within the political subjects frame for disregarding institutional and political realities and for not taking consideration of differences in experiences and local contexts (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:113).
Furthermore, drawing from the theory behind the frames, I will argue that another dividing line exist between the security threat frame and the adaptive agents frame, in terms of their contrasting view of environmental migrants as either a resource or burden. The relation between the adaptive agent frame and the view of environmental migrants as a resource is maybe more intuitive, as it stems from the assumption that environmental migrants are desired in receiving countries (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:112). If this frame exists in receiving countries’ government policy, migration is likely characterised as a positive opportunity for the country. In contrast, if environmental migration is associated with crime or instability, in line with the security threat frame, it is likely to be viewed as a burden.
These divergences will be taken into consideration in the analysis and further developed in a later discussion section.
Research design
MethodologyThe thesis is a systematic case-study examining current policy documents as well as relevant news articles in order to answer the question of how receiving countries frame environmental migration. This will be achieved through a qualitative text analysis with a base in the theoretical frames presented in the theory section. In contrast to quantitative research, studies using a qualitative method are aiming to find and understand the meaning and processes behind actions and gain deeper knowledge of an issue. Qualitative method rests on the assumption that actors act towards other actors and that no phenomena have a given meaning but is rather constructed in certain social contexts (Esaiasson et al., 2017:211). For this study, I have chosen a qualitative content analysis in order to gain deeper understanding of how the issue is presented by asking questions on “how” instead of “how many”. This was deemed more relevant when analysing policy, as my aim is to capture depth, nuance and ambiguity. A quantitative method would perhaps suit better if my aim was to identify public perception on migration.
investigation2 (Esaiasson et al., 2017:213) and is commonly used to clarify ideas behind text
and systematically highlight different aspects, by assorting complex content in more manageable and distinct compartments. This type of analysis assumes that a societal phenomenon exists without a given meaning and therefore can be presented in various ways, which, in turn, has implications for what type of policy is produced. This approach focuses mainly on the conscious framings performed by certain actors and less on the deeper motivations and thoughts of those actors. It intends to identify what underlying ideas, representations or values are dominant in a certain context and in what ways frames adapt depending on in what context it is presented (Esaiasson et al., 2017:218).
While various definitions of the term “frame” exists, this thesis will follow the popular definition put forward by researcher Robert Entman (1993:52). The definition goes: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”
To achieve a higher degree of validity, the thesis will not only follow Entman’s definition of the term, but also his operationalisation of a frame, which he identifies as “…manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements.” (Entman, 1993:52).
The purpose of this thesis is not to investigate the effects of frames, nor is it to investigate how or why these frames are constructed. The objective is rather to analyse what frames exist in contemporary reporting and policymaking on the issue of environmental migration. To perform the analysis, dividing lines are drawn from the theory behind the frames.
This study will mainly be using a deductive approach which means I will use already defined and operationalised frames when conducting the analysis (Esaiasson et al., 2017:224). The frames identified by Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) function as the theoretical framework and will be used as a point of departure for the analysis. In order to break down the theory to an operational level, the following questions were developed, based on elements that were
identified as important in the article which this study is mainly based upon. Each frame will be measured by questions asked to the material, found in Figure 1 below.
Environmental migrants as victims
Q1) Are affected populations described as vulnerable?
Q2) Is environmental migration described with words synonymous to problem, disaster or refugees? Q3) Is financial aid suggested as a policy solution?
Environmental migrants as security threats
Q1) Is migration portrayed in a negative way?
Q2) Is environmental migration described with words synonymous to threat, danger or challenge? Q3) Is border protection suggested as a policy solution?
Environmental migrants as adaptive agents
Q1) Is climate induced migration portrayed in a positive way?
Q2) Is environmental migration described with words synonymous to adaptation or solution? Q3) Are labour migration schemes suggested as a policy solution?
Environmental migrants as political subjects
Q1) Are regional and local solutions emphasized in policy on climate change adaption?
Q2) Is environmental migration described with words synonymous to participation or bottom up perspective? Q3) Is self-determination emphasized in policy solutions?
Figure 1. Operationalisations.
political subject frame is based on the premise that affected countries should have the right to decide for themselves, especially as their contributions to the climate emergency are so small. For example, the framing of environmental migrants as political subjects exists in policy solutions which focus on building resilience based on the needs and perspectives of those affected, but also on reducing domestic emissions.
When developing these questions, I made my own interpretations of the theoretical frames, in order to operationalise them in a way that was appropriate for the chosen material. It is critical that the operationalisation is consistent with theoretical definitions, to achieve high validity. To avoid systematic errors when investigating the material, this congruence is crucial. With the purpose of achieving high validity, I have thoroughly investigated the research by Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) to see what examples and quotes they have used in order to categorise actors according to different frames. Another strategy to achieve validity is to work cumulatively, since it facilitates the possibility to compare results against other similar studies (Esaiasson 2017:61).
Selection of cases
Frames are adaptive to the context in which they are presented and, as such, actors use frames in different ways depending on the context. Studies on the framing of climate-induced mobility has mainly focused on heavily affected Island states, media and the international community. In contrast, governments and policy papers are under investigated. As already argued, the majority of research has been concentrated on severely affected states. The governments of these states have also become increasingly outspoken in international contexts. In the article by Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015), Kiribatis’ former president is presented as an ideal-type for the
adaptive agent frame, while the current President emphasises the importance of resilience and
stronger mitigation efforts from big emission countries. In this thesis, I will therefore take a step towards investigating whether this view of environmental migrants as participating actors is shared between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries.
environmental migration is happening within countries from rural societies to urban areas, or at least within regions. In the future, however, poor infrastructure and the increasing threat of environmental risks could serve as a driver for international migration. In this case, the next natural path of migration is Pacific Rim countries such as New Zealand, Australia and the US. Both New Zealand and Australia have existing migration mechanisms aimed at Pacific Island states in place and are geographically close to many of those islands expected to be most affected. Although human mobility is not new to the pacific people, the culture and tradition of moving in purpose of trade and social connections remains at the heart of many societies in the Pacific Islands (Barnett & McMichael, 2018:342). For several years, both Australia and New Zealand have had seasonal migrant worker schemes in place aimed at Pacific Islanders. In 2015 Australia launched the ‘Pacific Microstates’ – Northern Australia initiative, that yearly provides up to 50 multi-year work visas directed at some of the most affected island states. In New Zealand, a similar program – the Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy – has been in place since 2007 (Bedford et al., 2017:4). There are already existing routes in form of social connections in the pacific region. Remittances from those working within the scope of these programs can be an important part of the economy for several smaller island states (Barnett & McMichael, 2018:347). This type of temporary migration is planned and mainly available to those with relatively strong economic and social resources in a community. Temporary human mobility is a significant part of what that is usually categorized under the term environmental migration and is often seen as a way to improve resilience in affected countries. It is also often beneficial for the receiving countries, and trends show a general shift from the human capital model of immigration toward meeting more specific needs in the domestic labor market (Akbari & MacDonald 2014:808).
2009:107). However, the country resettles less refugees relative to Australia, with a new increase in the refugee quota New Zealand will now be accepting half as many people per capita. While also rather restrictive in policy, the approach towards refugees does not seem to rely as much on deterrence (Australian Associated Press 2018).
New Zealand became the first country in the world to have a case of “climate refugees” tested in court. The case was dismissed but the government started an investigation regarding implementing a new visa category aimed at people displaced from climate change effects (Anderson, 2017). The plans for a new ‘climate refugee’ visa was thus retracted after Pacific Islands officials expressed the disinclination of their people to become framed as refugees. Due to their ambitious agenda, New Zealand was considered a fitting choice to investigate policy views on environmental migration, especially as it is an attractive country for migrants. The New Zealand government under the leadership of prime minister Jacinda Ardern has received attention for being more progressive in policies regarding climate change (Mcdonald, 2019). Meanwhile neighbouring Australia and Prime minister Scott Morrison have been criticized in international media for their handling of climate change (Doherty, 2017). Shortly after the election in 2019, a long-disputed opening of a new coal mine in Queensland was given a final approval by the re-elected Morrison government. This action caused widespread demonstrations based on a desire to move away from Australia’s dependence on fossil fuels and anger against Morrisons approach to climate change (BBC, 2019).
Both countries were therefore selected as cases in this thesis. They are similar in culture and have a close relationship in many regards, but one would potentially expect their approaches to environmental migration to differ. They are, as previously mentioned, both migrant-receiving countries for pacific migrants due to social networks, colonial legacies and geographical proximity. Furthermore, they do not have the same acute state of vulnerability to climate change effects as other smaller island states in the region (Campbell & Warrick 2014:20).
On the basis of these empirics, the following hypotheses can be constructed to further develop the analysis:
It should also be noted that both countries were able to provide the material needed in English to perform this study which was also a factor to why they were strategically chosen. Naturally this does not mean that other actors in the region are of less importance or interest, but rather it was a question of practicality. Restricting the study to only two countries was a necessary delimitation as expanding the study would demand time outside the scope of this thesis.
Selection of material
The purpose of this study is to examine how environmental migration is framed in two specific cases, Australia and New Zealand. I decided to use both public policy papers and statements from government officials found in media for the analysis. Policy papers were deemed suitable in order to receive a first-hand perspective on environmental migration. Initially, the most recent strategic leading papers on foreign affairs where examined. I chose to analyse the current policies as this is an actual issue that is likely to become even more important in time. It is therefore perhaps more likely that the issue is given more attention in prevailing policies than in older documents, rather than that the view of climate migration has changed in itself. I therefore decided that it would be more interesting to analyse two fairly similar countries rather than one country’s policy over time.
Two similar documents were chosen, the Foreign Policy White Paper for Australia and a Strategic Intentions paper for New Zealand. These documents were selected because they were both give an overview on climate change and migration in several policy areas. Comparability between the cases were of great importance in the selection of material and was allowed to guide the process. The Australian white paper for Foreign Affairs was considerably more extensive and contained significantly more material to analyse than the New Zealand ditto. Due to the Australian document being much longer, a second policy document from New Zealand was selected for analysis. It is worth noting that it was not a general policy on foreign affairs as the others, but a Cabinet Paper from the Office of the minister of Foreign Affairs named Pacific
climate change-related displacement and migration: A New Zealand action plan. It would have
analyse what is published, which might have the implication that the material is somewhat skewed, which potentially could lower the security of the results.
To summarise, three policy documents was analysed, two shorter texts from New Zealand and one longer from Australia. All of them include policies on migration and climate change, however the investigated issue is the focus of only one document which could possibly affect the results. This should be kept in mind when analysing results and drawing conclusions. Ideally, the material analysis would explore immigration policy, however, the public immigration programme for Australia had not been updated since 2010 and the words *climate* or *environmental* were non-existent. Subsequently, it was deemed as a poor basis for analysing the issue specific to this thesis. Given more time and resources, I would have extended the material to achieve a strengthened foundation for analysis.
However, these types of documents are rather concise and leaves limited space to “read between the lines” as the content is not that rich or exhaustive. To be able to analyse more illustrative views on the issue, statements from qualified media was used to complement the public policy material. The analysis of the policy papers is still the major part of the analysis and media statements should be seen as complementary to this. In searching for public statements, publication sources where selected thoroughly to be recognised and diverse to minimise the risk of bias. The selection of statements in media was limited to the time that the examined policies have been in effect, this was decided to reach the current framing of the problem by government. As environmental migration is an emerging issue, current policies, including political messages by government officials, were deemed most relevant.
Reliability
interpretation of the quoted paragraphs I hope to bring clarity in how frames have been categorized in this study.
In addition to this, it is important to discuss that more statements have of course been made concerning migration in relation to climate change in both countries and the material analysed in this study reflects only a selection of such statements. It is possible that a different selection of material, would yield different findings. I have tried to counter this effect by triangulating sources and making sure that the statements I analyse are supported in several sources.
Analysis
In this section, the empirical results of this study are both presented and analysed. The analysis is divided after the frames and will be analysed according to the analytical framework. Examples of how frames were identified will be provided, mostly in the form of quotes from the analysed material, and later discussed.
Australia
Victims
The victim framing is maybe the least explicitly evident frame but can be seen when aid is suggested as solution to the problem. It could also possibly be argued that the victim frame is more implicitly present as there are very few suggestions to take further responsibility for mitigating emissions, but instead aiming aid to pacific islands in order for them to better handle natural disasters and reducing their emissions. By giving aid to developing countries to better handle climate change related events, that countries like Australia are primarily responsible for causing, the role of affected people as active actors is less considered. This reasoning becomes visible in sentences such as the following:
Moreover, it is acknowledged that small island states in the region will be heavily affected in the long run and subsequently expected to lead to an increased need for international disaster relief. It is further said that Australia have good resources for transitioning to low-emissions model, but parallel to this the importance of the exportation of coal is mentioned (p. 33). This was interpreted as within the victim frame as the focus lies on donating and minimising damages caused from expected natural disasters, while focusing less on what Australia can do to prevent these disasters from happening in the long run by making bigger efforts on cutting domestic emissions. This can be argued to expose an us-them perspective on climate change impacts for which scholars within the victim frame have been criticised. The same line of reasoning, although in a more extreme form, was put forward by deputy prime minister Michael McCormack in response to a question asked by a climate activist at a business function, when he was acting as prime minister while Scott Morrison attended the Pacific Islands Forum in Tuvalu. He said:
“I also get a little bit annoyed when we have people in those sorts of countries pointing the finger at Australia and say we should be shutting down all our resources sector so that, you know, they will continue to survive. They will continue to survive, there’s no question they’ll continue to survive and they’ll continue to survive on large aid assistance from Australia” (Smee, 2019).
The statement received a lot of both internal and external criticism but might reveal something about the tone in the Australian discussion on climate change impacts in the Pacific. McCormack later apologised and said he was trying to emphasise the importance of Pacific Islanders coming to Australia on the seasonal labour scheme. Saying “But the fact is we’ll always be great friends of the Pacific Islands, and certainly, we rely on the Pacific Islands, we rely on them, largely.” (Roberts, 2019).
Security threat
“Even so, globalisation and technological change, including the reach and vulnerabilities of the internet, state fragility, and environmental stresses, will at times amplify a range of threats to Australia’s people, borders, economy and infrastructure.” (p. 6)
Furthermore, the frame became visible as it was emphasised that environmental stresses in the future increase irregular migration that will “continue to present challenges”. On several occasions, irregular migration due to climate change was associated with people smugglers and crime which reveals a rather negative view of environmental migration. Irregular migration in general was framed as a security threat to the country both for pure security but also for the country’s economy, implying it is a burden rather than a resource. There is no ground for assuming an entirely different view regarding climate-induced irregular migration, hence, the view is assumed to apply to environmental migration as well. The policy paper suggests four responses to this issue, with the first one being “continue to protect our borders to prevent irregular people movement to Australia.” (p. 72). Thereby all of the questions used to operationalise the security frame found answers in the document. Effects exacerbated by climate change and population growth, such as scarcity of essential resources, are emphasised as challenges in terms of obstructed prosperity and displacement of populations (p.94). When mentioning natural disasters, focus is put on humanitarian aid and the wish to support people as close to their home as possible rather than receiving displaced people as a strategy to protect the country’s borders (p.72, p.92).
Adaptive agents
The frame of environmental migrants as adaptive agents was also quite visible, this came forward almost exclusively through labour-oriented policies. Much weight was put on skilled migration rather than speaking in terms of refugees or migration for humanitarian reasons. This line of reasoning is well represented in the chapter on climate change in the following quote:
“In the Pacific, Australia recognises that new approaches will be necessary. Our support will focus on three priorities: promoting economic cooperation and greater integration within the Pacific and also with the Australian and New
Zealand economies, including through labour mobility […] and strengthening
This frame is further shown when mentioning the mutual benefits of labour migration, “Participation in these programs benefits seasonal workers and their communities and supports economic growth in the Pacific and Timor–Leste” (p.102). In this quote, one type of human mobility from climate change affected countries are viewed as positive, and thereby corresponding to the first operationalisation question from the adaptive agents frame.
The third question associated to the victim frame is, as previously mentioned, whether aid is a prominent solution regarding climate change and sustainability in the Pacific. Although this is often a sign of the victim frame, it can be interpreted in different ways depending on what issues the aid is aimed at. However, Australia have decided on several loans and aid to Pacific Islands with the intent of easing labour mobility to Australia by strengthening education and infrastructure. An example of this is when Prime minister Scott Morrison in a press conference pledged $250 million for Solomon Islands (Dziedzic, 2019.) In this case, aid is rather interpreted as being in line with the adaptive agent frame, since the aim is expected to work as improving the skills of Pacific Islanders in order for them to come to Australia to work and subsequently strengthen the country’s economy.
Political subjects
Self-determination and regionally adapted policies are significant for the political subjects frame and has often been used by Pacific leaders wanting to stay in their home countries. This approach is found in the policy document in paragraphs like the one below:
“In particular, Australia will engage the Pacific’s outside partners to encourage them to work in a manner that strengthens cooperation, builds more sustainable and resilient economies and maintains stability. We will encourage responsible lending to the region and adherence to the priorities identified by regional governments and the Pacific Islands Forum.” (p.100).
In the both public policy papers and statements made by Australian government officials, all frames were used. However, some approaches were found to be more commonly used than others. Overall, the most commonly used frame was the security threat frame, as border security was emphasized in practically every section. The adaptive agents frame was also quite prominent in the analysis of statements from the Prime minister. The remaining frames were less salient. However, statements published in media showed a more prominent use of the victim frame, and thereby consolidating the representation of the environmental migrant as someone in need of saving.
New Zealand
As previously mentioned, the white paper for New Zealand’s foreign affairs is significantly shorter than the Australian equivalent. While still highly relevant, the document was not in itself sufficient for a meaningful analysis, which is why two policy documents were used for the analysis. The New Zealand action Plan for pacific climate change-related displacement and migration is different from the other policy documents in that it is a proposal from the Office of Foreign Affairs regarding the specific issue of environmental migration. Because of this, a bigger quantity of frames could be found since the entire paper is treating the investigated issue specifically.
Victims
The victim frame was less salient in the New Zealand policy documents, however as previously mentioned the current government received a lot of international attention when they were investigating the possibility to expand their visa program to include a specific ‘climate refugee’ visa in 2017. That plan was rather quickly dropped after consultations from Pacific leaders saying their people did not want to see that as a policy response to the issue at this state, but rather focus on emission cuts and building resilience. This swift in approach was quite evident in the policy papers as the importance of empowerment and self-determination of the affected states was consequently highlighted. However, traces of using the victim frame were found in the Action Plan in the following paragraph:
where it could represent a threat to state viability. Emotive elements and lack of representative dialogue on these issues to date have made climate migration a politicised and sensitive issue.” (p. 4).
This could possibly be interpreted as conveying some tendencies of using the victim frame since it illustrates the affected countries as less knowing, implying they are in need of external help to be able to figure out responses to climate change. The victim frame is enhanced by using phrases as “overwhelmingly complex”, as this could be interpreted as exposing a view of countries in the global south as victims in need of saving through ‘northern expertise’. Although, directly after this the perspectives of small island countries leaders are emphasised and thereby using the political subjects frame, showing a rather complex framing of the issue.
Security threat
The security threat frame was traced from the Strategic intentions paper in the following paragraph “In this increasingly volatile environment New Zealand needs to actively protect its own security interests. We have a direct interest in contributing to, and helping to shape, a stable and secure Asia-Pacific region, and in supporting a stable and secure South Pacific.”(p. 17) This is stated in an episode on security and was interpreted as relevant on environmental migration since ‘international threats’ are consistently referring to climate change throughout the document. Additionally, the last sentence shows that focus is on building resilience in the South Pacific in order for populations to stay in their respective countries. However, the tone is quite soft and rather optimistic, in contrast to statements from Australian government policy where the risks with environmental migration, and migration in general are more heavily emphasized.
In an article regarding environmental migration, Minister of Defence Ron Mark mentions that there are risks regarding migration due to problems following uprooting of people and their culture, showing that the security threat frame is used also in New Zealand. Mark stated that “New Zealand can’t divorce itself from its responsibilities in the Pacific. And we can’t divorce ourself from the security risks that arise from climate change.” (Walters, 2019).
foreigner. Instead, the opposite can be seen in the statement by minister Mark, where emphasis is put on the view that New Zealand is a part of the Pacific in terms of responsibility. Further on he says that the best way to deal with this security risk is to plan ahead to achieve organized migration, which would then rather reflect the adaptive agent frame. Environmental migration is somewhat seen as a security risk but if handled properly, it does not have to become one.
Adaptive agent
One of the objectives presented in the White Paper for Foreign Affairs is to improve “knowledge, skills and basic education” in the Pacific. Objectives such as these are in line with the adaptive agent frame. These are policies that facilitate planned migration. The text also brings attention to the financial gain of migration from the pacific.
The adaptive agent frame also became rather prominent in mentioning especially affected countries such as Kiribati and Tuvalu. Although emphasis is put on building resilience, in accordance with those who wish to stay in their countries, it is also said to be necessary to plan for cross-border environmental migration. The creation of sustainable and functioning migration pathways is here interpreted as seeing environmental migration as a necessary step in climate adaption and a viable path to sustainable livelihood. Hence, it is somewhat the opposite of the view of migrants as ‘climate refugee’. In analysing the documents, sentences like the following found in the Action Plan, were identified: “If necessary, climate migration should be a planned, coordinated process. It should involve choice and reflect the resilience of Pacific peoples who have been adapting to and resettling in new environments for centuries.” (p. 10). Furthermore, the frame is found in a proposal in the action plan suggesting that New Zealand could explore the possibility to create a more comprehensive, regional response to both internal and intra-regional environmental migration through the Pacific Islands Forum (p.10).
Political subject
2.1 “Honour Pacific Island Leaders’ recognition of “the importance of retaining the Pacific’s social and cultural identity, and the desire of Pacific peoples to continue to live in their own countries, where possible.
2.2 Respect and uphold Pacific Island countries’ sovereignty and the right to self-determination.
2.3 Encourage transparent, inclusive dialogue on Pacific climate migration domestically, regionally and internationally, advocating for Pacific priorities;
2.3.1 Internationally, recommend that any solution be led and owned by those countries most significantly impacted, with support from partners; and
2.3.2 In the regional context, advocate for a Pacific-led response through the pacific Islands Forum as the preeminent regional body” (p. 9).
Several actions pushing for advancing international climate initiatives were also proposed, while also highlighting the importance of pacific island leaders receiving influence within international and regional politics. This resonates well with the view of environmental migrants as actors having a say in the political process, however not leaving them to alone carry the heavy load of adaptation. Focus lies rather on mitigation and taking further action. Furthermore, this frame is found in a section called “Pacific perspectives” that puts attention to the political will of affected countries (p. 4). The mere existence of this section is interpreted as recognising the importance of regional and local solutions.
Like in the Australian case, all frames were used in New Zealand policy. However, in contrast to Australia, the security threat frame was uncommon and instead the political subject and adaptive agent frame were used frequently. The other two frames were barely visible, and much emphasis was put on Pacific island self-determination. In the White paper on Foreign Affairs, the distribution of frames was more even and overall less occurring. While the intention of this study is not to compare documents within one country, it can be important to weigh the importance of them. In this case, I deem the results from the action plan as perhaps a bit more eloquent since it was more comprehensive and can therefore be expected to better represent the New Zealand policy on environmental migration.
Summarising Discussion
countries in the region. The results indicate that all frames were used but their occurrence was fairly different between the two countries.
In his operationalization of a frame, Entman (1993) states that a frame is manifested through a presence or absence of specific information. Everything even remotely related to the issue that is not included in policy could subsequently be deemed as a manifestation of a certain frame, which opens up to a lot of different interpretations. A potential challenge in the analysis is then to decide what should be considered relevant. In the light of this problem, it is beneficial to discover issues or perspectives left out by contrasting policy between the two cases. The absence of an Australian action plan like the one in New Zealand could possibly be seen as not only a question regarding material, but also as a result in itself. The lack of such a policy plan may witness of a view on environmental migration as less acute and, accordingly a view on affected people as migrants instead of refugees. The existence of the New Zealand cabinet paper on an action plan for ‘climate change-related displacement and migration’ shows the government’s ambition to become world leaders on climate change (p.1). This engagement perhaps shows that the government is taking responsibility for climate justice and can thereby possibly be interpreted as adopting an approach aligning with the political subject frame since it shows taking action in order to protect the livelihood of people living in pacific small islands. Generally speaking, the more policies aimed at taking action on climate change, the more in line with the political subject frame a governments' actions can be said to be, since that is what the pacific leaders demand from the global community and big emitters.
Overall, the victim frame was never the most salient frame but were found in both cases, however it was more visible in Australia as more focus was put on foreign aid to development and states were often described as vulnerable. In the case of New Zealand, the victim frame was less salient but occurred in a few places, although within a context of other frames as well. But first and foremost, self-determination and the importance of including and listening to pacific island leaders and solutions were very prominent. This view of environmental migrants as active agents was not as common in the Australian case. This analysis shows that in the case of Australia, environmental migrants tends to be viewed more as victims while in New Zealand instead rather seen as agents. This is in line with the first hypotheses constructed for this study;
The security threat frame was rather significant in the Australian case, irregular migration was several times linked to environmental changes and seen as a threat to the country’s border. It was considerably less salient in the case of New Zealand and although it occurred on a few occasions, the tone was softer. The adaptive agent frame was fairly frequently used in both cases, however more salient in New Zealand policy. It was evident that seasonal labour-migration from the Pacific was seen as an efficient way to build resilience in pacific island states while also gaining from it domestically. This type of temporary migration was seen as an opportunity for both parties to prosper and accordingly, environmental migration was here seen as a resource. In contrast to this, irregular migration caused by climate change was seen as a threat to Australia’s border, while it was played down in New Zealand. In Australian policy papers, environmental migration was connected to risks such as crime and instability, but also seen as posing a threat to the country’s economy and future prosperity, thus implying that permanent migration is framed as a burden. The last hypothesis, both countries will mainly
frame permanent environmental migration as a burden, finds support in this result in the case
of Australia, but less so in the case of New Zealand. However, this was not an entirely clear difference, which shows in the figure below. The countries have a lot in common in framing of environmental migration and should not be viewed as antagonists.
In order to further explain this dimension of the analysis and present its results, the countries’ approaches are presented in figure 2 below.
Figure 2. A spectrum of Resource/Burden and Victim/Agent.
on migration climate change has, or is expected to have, and that it will be a challenge. The security frame was used in the two cases but differed in tone and how often it was used. In contrast to this negative view, environmental migration was also seen in a positive way in terms of temporary labour migration. All the frames were used in both cases, suggesting approaches are a bit ambiguous to environmental framing and no significantly dominant mutual frame can therefore be said to exist, although common tendencies were found. With the theory as departure point, knowing it having categorised several actors as within different frames, I expected there would be more significant frames for each country. Instead, the analysis showed that all the frames were used in the same case but in different magnitude. This is argued to further strengthen the use of the dimension portrayed in the figure above, to better be able to compare cases against each other. Perhaps this could be useful also for future research.
Concluding remarks
environmental migrants as agents while the results on the burden/resource spectrum was more twofold. Moreover, it gave a somewhat more composed representation of the countries approach to environmental migration.
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