Author: Signe Wolf
Political Science, Advanced Course C Department of Government
Uppsala University Fall semester 2016 Supervisor: Leif Lewin Word count: 12 894
Democracy’s venality:
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Abstract
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Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1 Purpose and research question ... 6
1.2 Delimitation ... 6
2. Theoretical framework ... 7
2.1 Corruption ... 7
2.2 Democracy ... 8
2.3 Corruption in a democracy ... 9
2.4 Corruption in democratic domains ... 11
3. Methodology ... 15 3.1 Case studies ... 15 3.2 Design ... 15 3.3 Variables ... 16 3.4 Case selections ... 16 3.5 Material ... 18 4. Empirical findings ... 19
4.1 Democracy in Swedish aid ... 19
4.2 Botswana ... 22
4.3 Benin ... 25
4.4 The Gambia ... 28
5. Analysis and comparison ... 31
5.1 Executive functions ... 31 5.2 Judicial functions ... 31 5.3 Legislative functions ... 32 5.4 Public Sphere ... 33 5.5 Civil Society ... 33 5.6 Market ... 33
6. Conclusions and discussion ... 34
6.1 Conclusions ... 34
6.2 Discussion ... 35
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1. Introduction
Democracy has been, and still is, an important value for Sweden. Democracy promotion has been part of the development aid and foreign policy in Sweden since the start of Swedish
development policies in 1962.1 During the last decades democracy aid has increased greatly, both
in economic aid numbers and the focus of democracy promotion in foreign and development policies, for Sweden and many other European countries.2 Sweden have been recognized as one
of the European states most committed to democracy promotion.3 Democracy and human rights
have in recent years been the single largest category in Swedish aid and amounted in 2014 to around 5,6 billion SEK.4
To study democracy has been an important occupation within the political sciences field, in Sweden and abroad, and several academic researchers have participated to build up an inclusive research base containing theories and tools to analyze democratic government. For example the discussion if it is possible to export democracy and how to do it can have relevance in this field. Even the question of how citizens in a state can by themselves put pressure on the political elite to move toward a democratic process.
In order to introduce democracy we need to identify central obstacles and how they work. Understanding this will help in the democratization processes and can be used to develop the aid and democracy currently active right now.
In the study of democratization many theories are circulating. To democratize it is important to clarify necessary conditions, agents and procedures of change, and obstacles. One obstacle that is both relevant and problematic in contemporary societies is corruption. It is therefore interesting to study this phenomenon in relation to foreign aid.
Corruption is on several international organizations list of phenomena to eliminate. It is regarded as a threat to many values and outcomes that in the end can alter the working of the political system in many parts of the world. The international monetary fund (IMF) addresses the problem
1 Bertil Odén. Biståndets Idéhistoria: från Marshallhjälp till millenniemål. (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2006.), 65-66 2Richard Youngs, Trends in Democracy Assistance: What has Europe been doing?, Journal of Democracy Vol. 19, no. 2
(2008): 160-161
3 Richard Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, (Madrid: FRIDE, 2006), 185 4Sida, Demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter, updated 15 september 2015, accessed 15 november 2016,
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of corruption as urgent since it damages inclusive economic growth and exists as a problem to deal with in all states, developed or developing.5
The problem has also been raised within the foreign aid sector. To give economic aid to a country where corruption, more or less, is institutionalized will probably not fulfil the objective. The risk is that the aid gets in the wrong hands and does not reach its purpose with the aid. Donor states that are suspecting corruption in the receiving state does in some cases pause the aid to mark against corruption.6
Professor Bo Rothstein shows in his researches that a democratic governance in itself is not sufficient to create welfare for the population. For human welfare to be improved it also is necessary that corruption is checked and public administration efficient.78 Corruption is
therefore shown to be an important condition in the formation of a society.
Other political scientist have studied how implementation of democracy can reduce corruption in a state. There is a strong body of research that shows an empirical correlation between
democracy and lower degree of corruption. But researchers are not united in which direction the connection goes. There are even some researchers that argue that it is irrelevant to point out the direction between the two because the degree of corruption is a dimension of democracy.9
In Rothstein’s study of quality of government he argues against the idea that democracy necessarily will lead to a high quality of government. Democracy and political equality on the input side can and do lead to low quality of government. There are plenty examples of voters supporting corrupt politicians. The importance, according to Rothstein, in what should count as quality of government is the outcome, which can be negatively correlated with democracy.10
Even though corruption and quality of government does not fully work as opposites, this study assumes that democracy does not necessarily reduce corruption. It will on the other hand, primarily study the reversed correlation of corruption weakening democracy.
5 International Monetary Fund. Corruption: Costs and Mitigating Strategies, May 2016, accessed 30 November 2016, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1605.pdf
6 Sida, Vårt arbete mot korruption, updated 7 March 2016, accessed 30 November 2016,
http://www.sida.se/Svenska/sa-arbetar-vi/Arbetssatt-och-metod/Vart-arbete-mot-korruption/
7 Bo Rothstein, Mest korrupta är de länder som nyligen demokratiserats, DN.se, 16 december 2013, accessed 8 december 2016, http://www.dn.se/debatt/mest-korrupta-ar-de-lander-som-nyligen-demokratiserats/
8 Bo Rothstein, The Quality of government: Corruption, Social Trust and Inequality in International Perspective, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 47-51.
9 Rudebeck, Lars, Graden av korruption är en dimension av demokrati, DN.se, 19 december 2013, accessed 8 december 2016, http://www.dn.se/debatt/graden-av-korruption-ar-en-dimension-av-demokrati/
6 1.1 Purpose and research question
The purpose of this study is to look closer at, how and if corruption is an obstacle to democracy. When looking closer at this, the study will focus on six domains of a democratic society that is pointed out by Mark E. Warren. It will give a deeper understanding of how corruption works. To pursue this, this study will have the following research question: How does democracy differ
depending on the receiving states degree of corruption?
1.2 Delimitation
This study is limited to study three cases of states in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. This study is focused on the region of Sub-Saharan Africa because the region is interesting in the way that it receives a big part of the western democracy aid.11 It therefore also becomes a relevant region to
study.
This study is also limited in time, and studies the conditions during 2015. It is a relevant and close time that will tell us how the situation is today.
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2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Corruption
Corruption is a phenomenon in society that has been discussed and defined by philosophers and political scientists for decades. Thucydides complained on men in Athens that were ridden by ambition, envy, greed, and lust for power that they became oblivious to the values of justice, honor, mercy, and common laws.12
Corruption existed already in the early modern republicanism and was described by Machiavelli. He understood it primarily as a moral condition, measured by distance between people´s
collective character and moral standards of everyday conduct as defined by their Christian context. Decades later Rousseau instead thought corruption was the centerpiece of a
philosophical anthropology that tracked the corrosion of a natural moral empathy among humans and the emergence of a bourgeois egoism.13 Both these definitions are broad and focused on
individual character which is complicated when we study the institutional engineering. To limit political corruption requires standards of conduct specific enough to indict specific behaviors. 14
Latter thinkers as Carl Friedrich has defined political corruption not only as a behavior that deviates from the norm in the context but as a deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense.15
According to Mark E. Warren all meanings of political corruption share the following basic propositions16:
A. An individual or a group of individuals is entrusted with collective decisions or actions. B. Common norms exist regulating the ways individuals and groups use their power over
collective decisions or actions.
C. An individual or group breaks with the norms.
D. Breaking with the norms normally benefits the individual or group and harms to the collectivity.17
12 Mark E. Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?, American Journal of Political Science Vol. 48, no. 2
(2004), 339 13 Ibid, 329 14 Ibid, 329
15 Carl Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective, In Political Corruption: A Handbook, edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. Levine, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989, 15. 16 Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?, 332
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The corruption index that covers the most is Transparency International’s Corruption
perceptions index (CPI). The CPI is a perception of the extent of corruption within the state’s public sector. It is based on the perspectives of business people and country experts. The index is a result of several perceptions within administrative and political corruption that will give an accurately as possible picture of the state’s degree of corruption.18
This corruption index has several advantages, it is often used in studies, it is based from an outside view and is therefore not bias, and covers a great part of the world’s countries during several years to simplify for future studies, regional comparison or comparison over time. Disadvantages with the CPI also exists. It only studies corruption within the state’s public sector and when studying corruption in the whole society it only covers a part.
2.2 Democracy
The definitions of democracy are several and are a well discussed question within the field of democracy. The word democracy derives from the Greek words “demos” (people) and “kratos” (rule) which together creates the meaning of “rule by the people”.19 To specify what this means in
a narrower definition has resulted in some minimal definitions containing basic conditions and other more maximal and utopian definitions containing elements from the whole society. For politics scientist Joseph Schumpeter democracy is primary a way to select the political leadership. Focusing on the process and legitimacy of the representing.20
Maybe the most famous thinker within democracy theory is Robert Dahl. His concept of democracy is more complex and contains more element than just the process of selection. He describes democracy as an ideal and constructs an obtainable concept of democracy that he calls polyarchy.21 Polyarchy is distinguished as a political order with seven institutions, which must
exist for a government to be classified as a polyarchy. These institutions are 1. Elected officials, 2. Free and fair elections, 3. Inclusive suffrage, 4. Right to run for office, 5. Freedom of expression, 6. Alternative information, and 7. Associational autonomy.22
18 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015: Technical Methodology Note, accessed 1 December 2016,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
19 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its critics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 3 20 Ian Shapiro, Democracy’s value, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4 21 Dahl, Democracy and its critics, 218-219
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In Dahl’s democracy, one of the foundations of modern democracy is the logic of political equality.23 That individuals should, in a democracy, have an equal opportunity to influence
collective matters. The individuals should be treated equal and inclusive in the political order. In the operationalization of democracy the study will use the Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) democracy index. It is not only based on the basics of electoral processes but have a broader view on democracy as a system that penetrate the whole state, from the individuals participation to the function of the governmental institutions. The index is constructed around five democratic categories, electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The index produce a score and from the score categories in four categories, full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regime, and authoritarian.24
Advantages of this measure of democracy is its ability to compare between states and democratic categories. The disadvantage is its narrow description which needs to be complemented by more descriptive democracy research.
2.3 Corruption in a democracy
Warren argues that neither of the earlier definitions of corruption is sufficient to perceive corruption in a democratic system.25
To do that we need to look into the corruption of norm-creating processes in the democratic center. To focus not only on the behavior but on the integrity and see that integrity can vary when people are politically appointed. We need not only to focus on the behavior of the individual but also on the institutions and their functions. Political corruption in a democracy is not only existing in the state’s public sector. Thomson, for example, identifies the domain of democracy as coexisting with the government, as democracy today is decentralized and based upon several organizations within the country. Because democracy is not only the functions of the state and government, we need to include that corruption involves the mistrust, mutual suspicion and greed that undermine peoples’ capacities to associate and harms social capital.26
Warren argues that the general norm of democracy is empowered inclusion and therefore corruption would be a form of duplicitous exclusion. As democracies have institutional differences the meaning of empowered inclusion differ dependent on domain.27
23 Dahl, Democracy and its critics, 30-33
24The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015, accessed 14 December 2016,
http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf
25 Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?, 330 26 Ibid, 331
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In contemporary democracies it is not only public officials that are entrusted with collective power, so the conception of corruption, in proposition A above(an individual or a group of individuals is entrusted with collective decisions or actions) should thus expand to anyone in a position to make use of collective powers.28 In B (common norms exist regulating the ways
individuals and groups use their power over collective decisions or actions) the norm of democracy, empowered inclusion, should lead to the second-order norm of process, that a political system should maximize the rule by and for the people. According to C (an individual or group breaks with the norms) this would mean that the norm broken is inclusion in collective decisions of all affected. Although all form of corruption means exclusion, not all exclusion is necessarily corruption. In this way corruption include hypocrisy, so corruption is duplicitous exclusion. Corruption within a democracy is about actions taken out of the public view and therefore excluding the people who have the rights to be included. In D (breaking with the norms normally benefits the individual or group and harms to the collectivity) the corruption needs to gain the people included and harm some of the people excluded. Even though the gain can be easy to detect, harms are more difficult to identify. But the harms to democratic norms and values are clearer, because exclusion and duplicity of justification is itself harming the democratic process.29
So, political corruption of a democracy is a violation of the norm of equal inclusion of all affected by a collective decision. From the above discussion three conditions are necessary to complement the definition of corruption to make it more suitable for the study of corruption in democracy:
a) Exclusion
b) A duplicity condition with the regard to the norm of inclusion that is both recognized and violated by the corrupt.
c) A benefit/harm condition with regard to the consequences of exclusion: the exclusion normally benefits those included within a relationship and harms at least some of those excluded.30
Exclusion that do not fulfill the other two conditions are not corruption, but may be
undemocratic. 31 An example of this is that individuals in a society do not have the permission to
vote in national elections because of their age or lack of citizenship. With this conception of corruption we will be able to study what corruption means in a democracy and what damages
28 Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?, 332 29 Ibid, 334
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from corruption that can be related to democratic norms.32 This means we can use it as a tool to
study how it will work as an obstacle to a democracy. 2.4 Corruption in democratic domains
From the ideas of political corruption and democracy Mark Warren has formed a model of how political corruption takes different forms within a democratic society and what the harms to democracy are.33 Because it is based on the way a democratic state is constructed it is only
applicable to states that are constructed with democratic institutions. So the analysis of domains can be used in the study of states that are not defined as democratic but are in a transition towards democracy or at least is constructed in the same way of separation of power. Democratic systems can look at different ways and systemize the work through different
institutions and organizations. Warren argues to systemize the state into three different functions, the executive, judicial and legislative. He also adds three other relevant domains for a democracy, public sphere, civil society, and the market.34
2.4.1 Executive functions
The executive functions have a passive mode of inclusion, consisting mainly in a trust that officials will abide by the goals and rules that have been legitimately decided within the more political of domains. Trust is an appropriate mode of inclusion in this domain because executive functions are relatively settled as the consequence of political processes that have produced enough consensus to support binding goals. When people do not have a collective agent they can trust with executive decisions because they are effectively disempowered, it will harm the
democracy.35
2.4.2 Judicial functions
The judicial functions have its norms of inclusion in civil rights and liberties, equal standing, equal protection, access to counsel, even handed prosecutors, and that the police functions of executive branch are under judicial control and oversight. The norms are mainly procedural. Judicial institutions have relatively clear functions and expectations, however when truth is unknown advocacy and argumentation are the best way of approximating a true and fair
outcome. This harms the democracy since rule of law becomes less certain, damaging legal rights, and the equality of individuals. The decision will without a fair determination become illegitimate which dilutes not only the culture of law but as well the democratic idea of fair procedures to
32 Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?,, 332 33 Ibid, 334
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settle conflicts. The exclusion is when private gains are more important than fairness and argument.36
2.4.3 Legislative functions
The legislative functions includes people through their votes for representatives in competitive elections as wells as communications and deliberations created through associations, letter writing, demonstrations and other ways of forming opinions and interests to representatives. Therefore the object of corruption is these representative linkages.37 Examples can be buying or
selling of votes in elections or a legislative process.
But the legitimacy of outcomes depends on the justification resulting from the deliberate process. Trust in a representative is earned when the reasons the representative gives for a political
opinion are the reasons that motivated it. The representatives needs to be fair, independent and accountable. Corruption in legislative functions are challenges of inclusive public deliberation such as secrecy in decision making and duplicity in speech. That would signify that the influences are improper or illegitimate and voices or arguments are excluded for reasons that could not be justified in public. It will harm the democracy when representative linkages are damaged and weakens the relationship between deliberation and decision making.38
2.4.4 Public sphere
Inclusion in the public sphere is necessary for all other democratic forms of inclusion. The influences in the public sphere have its means of symbolic and discursive forces, through narratives, collective interpretations of facts, and by deliberations about right and wrong. Elements of public discourse will enable people to create concepts of interests and values and connect them to political actions. The people are pursuing their “discursive force”, which in a democracy should be the dominant force of public spheres to guide, limit, correct and legitimate the state and market. Corruption is here not of rightness or truth but what matters are
deliberative processes, political participation and the inclusion of all affected by collective matters.39
Even though we cannot prevent corruption of speech and duplicity, a society can counteract the consequences by a deliberative and critical approach. Corruption in the public sphere harms democracy by damaging the relationship between public judgments and collective decisions.40
36 Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?, 335 and 337 37 Ibid, 337
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2.4.5 Civil society
The civil society, a domain of associations, depends upon horizontal trust and reciprocity. From these qualities associations provide individuals with means for representation and alternatives to state-centered collective action, and resources for resistance. These are democratic functions of associations. Norms of inclusion are hard to apply directly on associations through membership, but applicable in three other senses. Among the varieties of associative possible, that exclusions should not combine with resources in a way that it enables the associations to externalize costs onto other who lacks the resources, and that memberships should overlap sufficiently so the civil society does not only consist of mutually exclusive and segmented associations.41
Trust and reciprocity can be distinguished between generalized and particularized versions. People with generalized trust and reciprocity are more able to form and join associations, and more likely to join associations that cross groups and generations because they have an idea that they want to help people with the idea that if they should need help in the future someone will help them. On the other hand, people with particularized trust and reciprocity will demand a favor in return and will tend toward exclusive exchanges in associations.42
Generalized trust seems to be good for democracy because it leads to inclusiveness within the civil society. Particularized trust tends to harm democracy since it can reinforce social
segmentation. Particularized reciprocity is not necessarily negative for democracy. It is the particularized rather than the generalized trust and reciprocity that corrupt forms of associations build on when they function to secure an associations hold over power or money and the exclusivity of the bond serves the interests of those within the relationship and damage those excluded.43
A corrupt civil society will harm democracy extensively. It will include loss of capacity for non-state collective action, loss of capacity for disciplining and guiding the non-state, and loss of the generative capacities of democracy in favor of a zero-sum-game between competing and mutually suspicious groups. 44
2.4.6 Market
Democratic functions of market can be support for democratization of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes by pluralizing the sources of economic power. In the same time competition
41 Warren, What does corruption mean in a democracy?, 339
42 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the collapse and revival of American community, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 22-24
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provide incentives for corrupt officials to limit their takes. Dynamics of exclusion are in every capitalist market, profit-seeking business will try to externalize the costs onto others and internalize benefits. This exclusion may be undemocratic but not necessary corrupt. Market exclusion becomes corrupt when it seeks to use economic power to influence democratic processes and agencies of collective action.45
Economist Adam Smith recognized that no capitalist has an interest in the health of capitalism but everyone have an interest in transforming profit-seeking into rent-seeking. Therefore powerful actors are motivated to affect the rules of competition gain access to government contracts. Corruption in the market will harm the democracy when equally distributed rights and powers are for sale because then the ethics of democratic equality is undermined. When agents in the state sell their regulatory and monopoly powers, they use the powers that belong to the people to increase the powers of economic elites.46
2.4.7 Conclusion
The study will analyze how corruption affects democracy within these six domains. For each of these six areas, the analysis will answer if corruption is present or not, and if the democracy is affected in the way that this study’s theoretical framework is describing it. The three first domains are found within the state and public sector, these are covered up by the Transparency CPI. The other three domains are not necessarily fully covered by that index but have to be complemented by measures from Quality of Government and other economic analysis.
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3. Methodology
3.1 Case studies
A Case study was during a long time characterized as small-n studies in contrast to the large-N statistical studies. With this approach the differences of the studies are in number of cases studied, which misses the advantages the different techniques have.47 Case studies have an
advantage in their potential for achieving high conceptual validity, their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses, their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases, and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.48
The strength with using case studies when covering causality lies in the two cause criteria: time order and causal mechanism.49 This study focuses on if and how corruption harms democracy.
Therefore focus on the causality is necessary.
To undertake a good case study which can contribute to future comparison or orderly cumulation the study needs to be structured and focused. A study is structured in the way that the researcher compose a framework of questions to the cases to guide and standardize data collection. That will make systematic comparison and cumulating of the cases results possible. It is focused in the sense that it only deals with certain aspects of the cases examined.50 In this study the theoretical
framework will serve as tool for comparison.
Because case studies only study a small amount of cases it is important how cases are selected. To use a random selection can create a case selection bias with this small amount and to be able to generalize a strategic selection is necessary.51
3.2 Design
This study is designed with cases which have variation in the independent variable and are constant in other relevant variables. This in accordance with Mill’s logic in “method of difference”. Even though this study does not on forehand (ex-ante) look at the dependent variable, it follows Mill’s logic in the selection of cases.
47 Ibid, 17 48 Ibid, 19
49 Jan Teorell and Torsten Svensson, Att fråga och att svara: samhällsvetenskaplig metod, (Stockholm: Liber, 2007), 225 50 George and Bennet, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, 67-72
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Critics of this logic are problematizing the deterministic thinking behind it. Deterministic explanations indicates necessarily conditions. Probabilistic explanations on the other way have more modest claims, if variable X occurs the probability that Y should occur increases. Most social science theories are probabilistic because many phenomenon are a combination of several factors. Case studies with only a small amount of cases have a problem with handling
probabilistic explanations.52 It is only when a study is investigated systematical over many cases
we can be sure that the causality exists. This creates a generalization problem for this study.53
The goals of research are to generalize the results to broader populations. In this case the sub-population is states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Generalization to cases not studied is always problematic in the way that they can vary from the cases studied.54 In a deterministic view, the
cases studied would be able to give a result to generalize toward the population. With a probabilistic view the claims of generalization becomes more modest.
3.3 Variables
The study uses the theory that corruption is an obstacle to democracy. The independent variable of the study is corruption and the dependent variable is democracy. Since the study is
theoretically controlled the importance is to select cases. 3.4 Case selections
This study will investigate three cases of states that receives democracy aid from Sweden. In the selection of cases I have focused on states that are similar in economic growth and level of conflict, but differ in their degree of corruption. This in agreement with the rhetoric of John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference” design.
The reason I have chosen economic growth and stability as constant variables derives from the widespread research on democracy and its covariations. Economic growth is seen as an essential condition for a well-functioning society. Therefore it is not astounding that it has been argued to be the main reason for democratic development.55 This is for example the argument in Lipset’s
modernization theory,56 but other researcher considers the relationship to be conversed and argue
that the consequence for democracy is economic prosperity.57 The variable economic growth is
measured in an average of gross domestic product (GDP) growth the latest ten years and data is
52 Esaiasson et. al., Metodpraktikan, 121-122 53 Ibid, 168
54 George and Bennet, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, 110
55 Sven Oskarsson and Sten Widmalm (ed.), Myt eller verklighet: om samband mellan demokrati och ekonomisk tillväxt. 2. Uppl. (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2014), 12
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collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).58 In table 1 level of growth in each state
is portrayed.
Conflict and instability in a state can affect the process towards democracy. Without the basic necessities that is challenged during conflicts it can be hard to fight for other rights. On the contrary a conflict may lead to a rapid democratic development as a solution and a way to contain stability. Either way, the variables of both economic growth and conflict should be important variables to isolate the study and to give it a trustworthy result.
To measure conflict and instability the variable collects data from Global Peace Index. To define peace is hard, the index does instead measure the absence of violence or fear of violence, often described as negative peace. In measuring the negative peace GPI use three domains of
peacefulness, 1. Ongoing domestic and international conflict, 2. Level of harmony or discord within a nation, 3. Indicators that are related to the link between a country’s level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness.59
Within this three domains the GDI research team measures among other; the impact of terror, violent crimes, political instability etc. All together the total degree of peace is summed up in a number between 1 and 5, with 1 as the most peaceful and 5 as the least peaceful.60 As seen in
table 1 the cases selected all have a higher degree of peace.
It is of course impossible to have three states that are totally alike in all conditions and because of that the result will not be completely isolated from all other factors. But as argued above, the study is isolated from two of the most influenced reasons to democratic development.
For the study to get a result that is interesting I have chosen to study cases that have a variation in the independent variable with a possibility to vary in the dependent. With a variation in the independent variable we will be able to see if it will lead to a variation in the dependent variable. It also satisfy the counterfactual condition, because we study states with both high and low degree of corruption.
The counterfactual condition is constructed on the idea that we want to compare our result with the result if the independent variable were the opposite. If we do that, we see how the
independent variable will affect the dependent variable.61 Because the variable corruption is not
58 Valentina Pasquali, Countries with Highest GDP Growth 2015, Global Finance, 1 November 2015, accessed 1 December 2016, https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/countries-highest-gdp-growth
59 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2015, accessed 1 December 2016,
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf 60 Ibid
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dichotomous but a gradation the opposition must be the ends of the scale. Therefore two of the cases are from the endpoints, The Gambia with a high degree of corruption and Botswana with a low degree of corruption. The third case, Benin, is in the middle of the scale. As showed in table 1 the variable corruption is the one that vary the most, while the other two are relatively constant.
Table 1 CPI 201562 Average GDP Growth63 Global Peace Index64
Botswana 63 4,5 1,60
Benin 37 4,4 1,96
The Gambia 28 4,5 2,09
3.5 Material
In the analysis of the cases the study will use material from Quality of Government Institute that has a database with collected measures within the subject. Materials will also be collected from Freedom House, which is an institute that measures freedom and democracy among nations in the world.
When studying the effects within the market domain, materials are collected from three sources that analyses economics and financial institutions because Freedom House and Quality of Government Institute does not fully study the market domain. The three sources have different authors but are about the same economic matters which makes them comparable. The sources are from 2014 and 2015 which can create a validity issue. However, neither of the countries have experienced any dramatic economical change during the period, the measures should therefore be correct.
All materials are secondhand sources and have already been selected and analyzed by the sources used. The sample of information is thereby limited and a consequence of the institutes selection priorities and research purpose. Country reports from Freedom House measures one year back, so the country reports used are written in 2016 but describes happenings in 2015.
62 Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, accessed 1 December 2016, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
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4. Empirical findings
4.1 Democracy in Swedish aid
In the Swedish bill 1962:100 the groundwork for Swedish aid was settled. The bill pointed out different goals for the Swedish aid, one of these were to promote democracy in developing countries. Since then the goals have changed and new goals have been added. But democracy has remained in the center for Swedish foreign aid.65
Today, the Swedish aid is based on a policy published 2003 called Politics for global development (PGU) were the strategies for global development should permeate through all agencies working with international matters.66 With this policy Sweden became one of the first countries with a
coherent politics for global development.67 In PGU the goals were replaced by eight main
features of the development work were democracy and good governance is one main feature.68
4.1.1. Democracy promotion policies
Even though democracy promotion has been a central theme of Swedish development, the view on democracy promotion has changed over time and governments. The first formal strategy on democracy assistance was drawn up by SIDA in 1993.69 In the 90s the significance of democracy
gained increased interest in the development work internationally and in Sweden as a part of the promotion of democracy in the world, especially in the eastern European countries at the ending of the Cold war.70
During the 1970s Sweden highlighted power- and participation problems and underlined the importance with public participation. This resulted in projects to create dialogue in the
development countries and to discuss the local power relations.71 Another relevant program was
the Swedish humanitarian aid which supported organizations fighting against political oppression for example in South Africa.72 During the 1980s the aid was redirected in greater extent to public
administration as an effect of the whole aid sector shifting from demarcated projects to reforms
65 Odén, Biståndets Idéhistoria, 171. 66 Ibid, 134-135
67 Prop. 2002/03:122. Sveriges politik för global utveckling, (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet), 8 68 Ibid, 22
69 Youngs, (ed.) Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, 184 70 Odén, Biståndets Idéhistoria, 108 and 121.
71 Skr. 1997/98:76, Demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter i Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete, (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet), 43-44
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and institution building.73 Therefore the subsequent democracy aid had its ground in the
humanitarian aid, the management assistance and an immersed dialogue.74
When the first formal strategy came into operation in 1993 it resulted in a tighter and more restricted aid policy. This led to that some states receiving aid but had problems with their institutional quality within the state got withdrawn economic funds.75
It was replaced in 1997 with a new development strategy that created a pivotal development in Swedish democracy promotion policy. The strategy had its ground in the direct questioning of the principle of non-interference and was a shift in the understanding of the concept of
sovereignty. The strategy moved away from the earlier notion about absolute sovereignty being invested in states towards it flowing from the rights of individuals.76 It was described as a right of
individuals to influence the society they live in and to do that democracy is necessary.77
With democracy as an aim, or a step on the way, the government letter from 1997 mentions the emergence of a democratic culture, democratic institutions, a juridical system and a lively civil society with free and independent media as key elements to create real democracy.78 The focus on
democratic culture is another example of putting the democratic actors in the center of the democratic process. This seems to be an element emphasized in 1997.
From these key elements the government letter identifies following central areas to work within: assistance to implementation of elections and election observation, assistance to political parties, assistance to the parliamentary work, assistance to the juridical system, assistance to public administration, assistance to local democracy and decentralization, assistance to support for human rights, support to women’s rights and participation, support to children and young people’s rights, support for handicapped people’s rights, to democratic individual organizations, and to free and independent media.79
An important part of the democratic culture is described as the attitude against corruption. This because of the view that corruption erodes democracy and complicates the democratization process.80 Corruption can exist in a state before a democratization process starts and remain
73 Skr. 1997/98:76, 44 74 Ibid, 44
75 Kaa Eneberg, Utbredd korruption kan frysa bistånd. DN.se, 20 October 1993. Accessed 19 December 2016. http://www.dn.se/arkiv/politik/utbredd-korruption-kan-frysa-bistand/
76 Youngs, (ed.) Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, 185 77 Skr. 1997/98:76, 4
21
during the transition to democracy, which in some countries can create a distrust to the new political system when the old problems remain unsolved or are not addressed by government policy.81
The document lifts economic liberalization and market economy with competition as a basis to break down power structures and counteract corruption. But to protect the society from new economic undemocratic power structures the transition should go through a social market
economy.82 With this as a basis the most important solution presented, is to work for openness in
the public institutions and for individuals to claim their rights.83
After the election in 2006 the new government with Gunilla Carlsson as minister of International Development Cooperation came with a new policy to renew the democracy aid. The purpose was to tighten the requirements and remodel the democracy aid to focus more on the measures to promote democracy.84 Within the remodeling of democracy aid the government pushed for
bigger demand of evaluation in accordance with the model of result driven development.85
In the new document the perspective with rights in center was expanded and formed four
principles to incuse the work with democracy aid: participation, non-discrimination, transparency, and responsibility and accountability. This demonstrate the increased focus on the individuals in the receiving countries.86
With this starting point the document advocates a shift in the democracy aid to put more focus on, and include a greater aid, to support democratization processes and democratic agents of change. This includes support to political parties, human rights defenders, the civil society, active advocacy organizations and actors in the cultural society.87
In the earlier document the importance of adapting aid to local circumstances are mentioned, but in the declaration 2008 the different conditions and which channels to use are structured and evolved to clarify the measures for democracy promotion.88 They divide receiving states into five
categories: authoritarian states, conflict and post-conflict states, fragile democracies in the beginning of democratization, stagnated democratizations, and, new democracies on the way to
81 Skr. 1997/98:76, 20 and 28 82 Ibid, 28
83 Ibid, 31
84 Gunilla Carlsson, Nu lägger vi om hela vårt demokratibistånd, DN.se, 27 september 2008, accessed 15 november 2016,
http://www.dn.se/arkiv/debatt/nu-lagger-vi-om-hela-vart-demokratibistand/
85 Skr. 1997/98:76, 79
86 Skr. 2008/98:11, Frihet från förtryck, (Stockholm: Regeringskansliet), 9 87 Ibid, 10
22
consolidate. Within the group of authoritarian states they present two categories: where state to state cooperation is not possible or desirable, and where there are room to contribute to change through long term development cooperation.89
The instruments to promote democracy varies in the different types of receiving states. Where state to state cooperation is not possible or desirable aid goes to support the civil society and media. For states that are in its beginning of becoming democracies support to institutions and electoral processes are desirable and for states that have come further in the transition more extensive support to the civil society, institutions and audit systems are submitted.90
The picture of corruption builds on the previous declaration but problematizes the way Swedish aid could be connected to corruption. If Swedish companies are involved in or accused of corruption the Swedish possibilities to affect states with anticorruption policy is diminished. Another instrument to fight corruption presented, is support to free and independent media.91
4.1.2 Conclusion
A consistent aspect in the documents are the depiction of democracy both as an aim in itself and an instrument for the development work.92 To be able to take part in the own society is seen as a
human right, and when people are able to do that, it will result in better conditions for the people and function as a foundation for further development.93
Overall in the Swedish democracy promotion there is a strong focus on human rights and a rights perspective for the individuals.94 Another central theme is corruption and which states Swedish
aid should be working within. Central instruments in the Swedish democracy promotion is the work for a free and independent media.95 Sweden also demonstrated itself more willing than
other European donors to explore new approaches to democracy assistance and to broaden its standard range of political aid projects.96
4.2 Botswana
In 2014 Botswana held its 11th general election the ruling party Botswana Democratic Party
(BDP) won most seats in parliament and the president Khama was reelected.97 Botswana is 89 Skr. 2008/09:11, 47-64 90 Ibid, 47-64 91 Ibid, 33 92 Ibid, 6 93 Skr. 2008/09:11, 6
94 Youngs, (ed.) Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, 186 95Youngs, Trends in Democracy Assistance: What has Europe been doing?, 167. 96 Youngs, (ed.) Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, 206 97Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana, accessed 15 December 2016,
23
ranked in place 28 of 167 states in The Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) democracy index, with an overall score on 7,87 on a 10-grade scale. The EIU places Botswana in the upper part of the category flawed democracies, which is the second best category right below democracy.98
4.2.1 Executive functions
An anticorruption body with special powers of investigation, arrest, search and seizure, are working with problems of corruption in the executive sector. The body generally boasts a high conviction rate. But there are almost no restrictions on private business activities of public servants, and political ties often play a role in awarding government’s jobs and tenders.99 In 2015
it was discovered that members of parliament secretly had approved significant salary increases for themselves.100 Overall, in 72% of the cases the executive branch do not use public office for
private gain.101
The public trust in Botswana is relatively high, the average Botswanan citizen rates it over the middle. Compared with other states it is a high rate.102 The functioning of government is rated as
high.103
4.2.2 Judicial functions
Courts in Botswana are generally considered to be fair and free of direct political interference, though the system has problems with staffing shortages and backlogs of cases. Trials are usually public, and the accused have right to be provided with attorneys. Civil cases can sometimes be tried in customary courts where the defendant has not got the right to have legal counsel.104 Some
occasional reports of police abuse are to find where the police obtain evidence or confessions.105
The amount of bribes in the judicial sectors are small and 80% of the cases the public office is not used for private gains.106 The judicial sector is largely independent, only rarely its decisions are
subordinated to political authorities or influenced by corruption. The judiciary is institutionally differentiated, but in a smaller amount restricted by insufficient territorial or functional
98The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015, accessed 14 December 2016,
http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf
99Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana 100 Ibid
101 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, accessed 19 December 2016,
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata, Executive branch do not use Public office for Private gain
102 Ibid, Public trust
103The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015 104Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana
105Ibid
24
operability.107 The institutional quality in the legal sector is high and the institutions works overall
well.108
4.2.3 Legislative functions
The ruling party has been the same since independence, but the elections are considered to be free and fair. Botswana does not have a freedom of information law, and critics accuse the government of excessive secrecy.109 Bribery or usage of public office for private gains are not
common in the legislative sectors, and occurs only in a minority of cases.110
The deliberative process in the state is not so good compared with states in the western world.111
4.2.4 Public sphere
Botswana have a free and vigorous press. But a Penal Code also exist, that proscribes that the publication of articles likely to cause disaffection or hostility towards the president is a criminal offence. In 2014 an article about a car accident due to speeding with the president was leaked and the authors behind it were captured by the police. Academic freedom, however, is generally respected.112
State owned outlets dominate the local broadcast media, for example television and radio, and these media provides inadequate access to the opposition and government critics. There are no restrictions of internet access, but internet rarely exists outside the cities.113 The political
participation in Botswana is relatively high for the region.114
However, reports of increasing electronic surveillance, rogue intelligence agents, and lack of proper oversight mechanisms for spy agencies have contributed to a growing climate of suspicion and have been reported as dampening the private discussion.115
4.2.5 Civil society
The constitutional rights of assembly and association are generally respected within the
government, and nongovernmental organizations, which for example works with human rights,
107 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Independent judiciary 108 Ibid, Absolute legal institutional quality
109Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana
110 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Judicial Branch do not use Public office for Private gain
111 Ibid, Deliberative democracy
112Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana 113Ibid
25
can openly operate without harassment.116 Not only constitutional but also in the practice the
rights of association and assembly are unrestricted for individuals.117 A democratic political
culture exist and is rated as high in Botswana.118
The right to form independent labor unions is permitted. But rights to go out in strike and bargain collectively are dependent on which type of service the workers render.119
4.2.6 Market
In 2011 the government of Botswana set up a Competition Authority to deal with
anticompetitive practices in the economy and help to give the country a more competitive and dynamic industry structure. The Competition authority has been executing its mandate according to the values of transparency, professionalism, integrity and teamwork. Among the tasks for the authority are the fighting against corruption and to foster diversification.120
The authority has made inroads into the policy sphere and influenced a number of laws and policies. Laws that may facilitate anticompetitive behavior among competitors or may be
discriminatory have been changed to favor a more open and competitive market.121 An event was
that a company owned by the secretary general of the ruling party won a 40 million pula contract without any measures of competition or open tender.122
The economic institutional quality in Botswana is relatively high, on the quality of government measure it is valued as 0,72 on a scale from 0 to 1.123
4.3 Benin
Benin have had a couple of free and fair elections since the country started democratization in 1991. In recent years tensions from unusual political strife has affected the state, but calmed down after the elections in 2015 and the declaration by President Boni Yayi that he would not try to seek a third term as president. Benin is ranked in place 87 of 167 states in The Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) democracy index, with an overall score on 5,72 on a 10-grade scale. The
116Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana
117 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Association/assembly rights 118The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015
119Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana
120 Thula Kaira, Botswana: Competition Authority, Global competition review, 22 December 2015, accessed 16 December 2016, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/chapter/1066966/botswana-competition-authority
121 Ibid
122Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Botswana
26
EIU places Benin in the category hybrid regime, which is the second worst category on the democracy scale.124
4.3.1 Executive functions
After president Yayi came to power he worked to strengthen the anticorruption work in the public state. He did, for example, enact a number of measures to combat graft and audited 60 state-run companies. But Corruptions continues to be a problem in the state. In 2013 the National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANLC) was created. The ANLC has the ability to examine complaints, recommend measures, and pass cases to the courts, but lacks the enforcement authority. It is an organ that is in a developing process. Absence of authority in the
anticorruption body has resulted in that few officials facing corruption charges have been subject to thorough investigations or disciplinary action.125 Officeholders who break the law and engage
in corruption are not prosecuted adequately under the law but does occasionally attract adverse publicity.126
There is no evidence that a specific ethnic group is overrepresented within the government agencies, several minority ethnic groups are represented.127 The constitution in Benin does not
include provision for meritocratic recruitment of civil servants.128 However, the recruitment is
open in the sense that executives are chosen with elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and elections.129
The public trust in Benin has been increasing but has continued to be weak. The average
Beninese rates the trust below middle and describes it as low, which indicates a scattered mistrust within the country.130 The functionality of government is in the middle, not high neither
distinctive low.131
124The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015
125Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Benin, accessed 15 December 2016,
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/benin
126 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Prosecution of Office Abuse 127Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Benin
128 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Meritocratic Recruitment of Civil Servants Mentioned in Constitution
129 Ibid, Openness of Executive Recruitment 130 Ibid, Public trust
27
4.3.2 Judicial functions
The judicial independence is generally respected by the executive branch. The problem is that courts are highly inefficient and susceptible to corruption, probably due to their lack of funding.132
The judiciary is limitedly independent, occasionally its decisions are subordinated to political authorities or influence by corruption. The institutionally differentiation is partially restricted by insufficient territorial or functional operability.133134
4.3.3 Legislative functions
The elections to legislator organs have been deemed free and fair, with only smaller issues like some delays in poll openings and shortages of materials. In 2015 one event occurred where security forces used tear gas to violently disperse a demonstration against police harassment of an opposition politician. This was followed by the consequences that all public protests were banned during the following month.135
The transparency and freedom of information in Benin is not very open. Information is not needed to be publicized to the citizens and the process towards legislative decisions are hard to follow from the outside.136
4.3.4 Public Sphere
Freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and largely respected in practice. The printed media have pluralism of opinion and viewpoints. Internet media exist and are free. A problem exists in that most media outlets receive direct financial support from politicians and few are considered to be completely political independent.137 The political participation in Benin
is low.138
4.3.5 Civil Society
The right and freedom of association and assembly rights are unrestricted for individuals and independent political or civic groups.139 They are generally respected, and requirements for
permits and registration are not usually enforced. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operate freely in Benin. The constitution includes the right to organize and join labor unions, but
132Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Benin
133 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Independent Judiciary 134 Ibid, Judicial independence
135Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Benin
136 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Information Transparency 137Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Benin
138The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015
28
are in practice in some sectors restricted in their ability to collective bargaining. An event where a march to protest unpaid social security benefits was prevented by the police.140 A democratic
political culture exist but are not widespread.141
4.3.6 Market
In Benin there is a Directorate for Competition and the Fight Against Fraud, which works with combatting unfair competition. The directorate has implemented a number of activities like campaigns and supply of information to help both companies and the public sector to raise competition.142
The economic institutional quality in Benin is not so high, on the quality of government measure it is valued as 0,43 on a scale from 0 to 1.143
4.4 The Gambia
In The Gambia the government’s repression of opposition leaders and journalists have continued and intensifying in the run-up to presidential elections in 2016. In the last ten years, several coups have been launched against the President Jammeh.144 The Gambia is ranked in place 143 of 167
states in The Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) democracy index, with an overall score on 2,97 on a 10-grade scale. The EIU categories The Gambia in the category authoritarian, which is the category that is on the bottom of the democracy scale.145
4.4.1 Executive functions
In the government, important positions are being held by members of the ethnic minority group Jola, that is the same group as the president belongs to.146
That government operations in general is not transparent together and official corruption remains a serious problem. Reports of state officials participating in illegal affairs are numerous. An anticorruption commission was formally established under 2012 and the president told the parliament in 2015 that it would soon be fully operational. It has sentenced a couple of security officials for corruption.147
140Freedom House, Country Report 2016: Benin
141The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015
142 OECD. Fighting corruption and promoting competition: Benin. Accessed 16 December 2016.
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2014)1&docLa nguage=En
143 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Absolute economic institutional quality 144Freedom House. Country Report 2016: Gambia, accessed 16 December 2016,
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/gambia
145The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015 146Freedom House. Country Report 2016: Gambia
29
As studied by the quality of government institute the public trust seems to be relatively high in The Gambia. The rating is over the middle and approximately in the same level as the public trust in Botswana.148 However, the functionality of government is low.149
4.4.2 Judicial functions
According to the constitution The Gambia should have an independent judiciary but in practice the president can and do select and dismiss judges after own premises. During 2015 the president forced three Supreme Court judges to resign, because they did not judge according to his
opinion. In the judicial system customary law and Sharia are recognized with regard to personal status and family matters. Another problem is the impunity for the country’s security.150 The
quality of the institutions is also low and has an inefficient working pace.151
4.4.3 Legislative functions
The president is not freely elected and exercises most of the control over decision making. Six of the seven opposition parties boycotted the latest election because of electoral processes. The ruling party Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) won most of the seats in parliament.152. Because of limited freedoms of speech the state is also characterized by
secrecy.153
There is no freedom of information, which hinders the possibility to find out how the legislative decisions are made.154The Gambia also have a very low amount of democratic deliberation in the
state, the citizens are not taking part in the legislature.155
4.4.4 Public Sphere
The freedom of expression is limited in the sense that there are criminal penalties for use of the internet to criticize government officials and providing “false information” to a public servant.156
Freedom of the press is strictly restricted. Laws makes it possible for the authorities to silence media and harass independent media and journalists. In the latest years the country has witnessed several cases of violence against journalists that have been critical to the government. It is not legal to own a television station but a small number of private newspaper and radio stations are
148 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Public trust 149The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015
150Freedom House. Country Report 2016: Gambia
151 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Absolute legal institutional quality 152Freedom House. Country Report 2016: Gambia
153 Ibid
154 Quality of Government Institute, QoG Standard Data version Jan16, Information Transparency 155 Ibid, Deliberative democracy
30
operating. On the internet many political websites are blocked. Academic freedom is limited and open and free private discussions are limited in the state by fears of government surveillance and retaliation.157 The citizens of The Gambia are not part of the political arena and the political
participation is low.158
4.4.5 Civil Society
Legally the right and freedom of assembly and associations exists but are in practice constrained by the state. NGOs working in the country face the constant threat of judicial reprisals and a climate of fear hinders workers from forming unions or bargain for wages.159 Even though, a
democratic political culture do exist, although it is not high.160
4.4.6 Market
In The Gambia there is many state-owned enterprises operating in several economic sectors. Lately the financial sector has gradually expanded and benefited from increased competition. Still, concerns remains about the freedom of businesses and their ability to compete on same
grounds.161
The economic institutional quality in The Gambia is acceptable, on the quality of government measure it is valued as 0,5 on a scale from 0 to 1.162
157Freedom House. Country Report 2016: Gambia
158The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015 159 Ibid
160Ibid
161 Heritage, Index of Economic Freedom: Gambia, accessed 16 December 2016,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/gambia
31
5. Analysis and comparison
The overall correlation between corruption and democracy in the measures of EIU democracy index strengthens the theory of corruption as obstacle to democracy. Botswana with the lowest degree of corruption is the state with highest democracy rating, The Gambia with the highest degree of corruption have the lowest democracy rating, and Benin in between on both variables. The three states shows variation and are all categorized in different categories.
5.1 Executive functions
In the executive domain corruption is more common in undemocratic states. A correlation between the extent of corruption and functioning of government is also to be observed, indicating that executive efficiency is harmed by corruption.
In Botswana an anticorruption body works with several authorities, and it will probably lead to a lower existence of corrupt behavior. The executive branches are handling main problems of corruption, which will strengthen the public trust. However the system is not yet fully functional, and corruption occur for example in recruitment. The low amount of corruption has probably lead to the high public trust that exists.
In Benin citizens have reasons for public mistrust against the government and executive sectors. Corruption is existing and although they are investigating corruption officially it may not
necessarily lead to extensive consequences or improvement. Which is probably why the public trust is low.
In The Gambia corruption is well spread for example in recruitment and illegal affairs of state officials. An anticorruption body is installed and has sentenced people for corruption. However, with the high report amount, and only a few sentenced, it has not proven to be a successful operation. Considering the amount of corruption the citizens have a relatively high public trust, almost in the same level as Botswana.
In Botswana and Benin the rate of public trust follows the problems with corruption, and would therefore show a correlation between the two. The relationship does however not meet the results in The Gambia which indicates that the relationship is not universal. Democracy in the executive domain differ in the exclusiveness of equal treatment and functionality, but only to some extent in public trust.
5.2 Judicial functions
