Ranking Frames in Nationalistic Discourses and the Disintegration of a Security Community
The Case of Sino-Japan Relations
Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Social Science (MSocSci)
By
NAKAKO HATTORI
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Spring 2017
Supervisor: Dr. Chiara Ruffa
Map: China, Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea
(Source: BBC 2014)
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ABSTRACT
Conventional theories about security communities expect that if a region yields high levels of socio- economic interdependence, regional stability is achieved. What we observe in the East Asia region since the 2000s contradict to the theoretical expectations. The aim of this thesis is to explain this empirical puzzle. Security community theory is insufficient for two reasons: first, pre-existing security community may become weaker; and, second, nationalism may influence the level of integration.
Building on frame theory, the thesis addresses the question: under what conditions do nationalistic discourses influence the integration level of a security community? I argue when elites’ discourses about foreign relations include ranking frames, they have a deteriorating effect on the integration level of a security community. Ranking frames make the elites’ agenda more competitive towards the other member of the security community and trigger an othering process in a country. With a theory development purpose, I conduct a structured focused comparison of the Sino-Japan relations at two time periods: 1978-82 and 2008-12. Focusing on the political elites’ discourses in Japan, I investigate a systematically developed dataset. My findings suggest that the nationalist discourses containing ranking frames may plausibly explain the process of disintegration of a security community.
Key Words
Security community disintegration, ranking frames, nationalistic discourses, China, Japan
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To the memory of Yoichi Hattori (1974-2009)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the generous advice and support from the people around me. My sincerest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Chiara Ruffa, for her invaluable advice in all the right places. To Francesca, I thank you for friendship brightening my life in Uppsala. To Nina, Katie, Annette, Rebecca, Mieke, Benedikt, Peter, Paul, Toru, Naoko, Wada san, George, Mette, Helen, Emma, and Ola, I would like to express my appreciation for taking the time to read and valuable comments on earlier versions of this draft. Special thanks also go to Kristen, for kind cares and powerful supports whenever I am in need in the last two years. My parents deserve special attention for giving me the courage to pursue my dreams.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EU European Union
DP Democratic Party FG Flying Geese
GDP Gross Domestic Product IR International Relations LDP Liberal Democratic Party
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry MoF Ministry of Finance
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoJ Ministry of Justice
ND Nationalistic Discourse
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development SC Security Community
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SIT Social Identity Theory
UNCTAD United Nations Trade and Development UNSC United Nations Security Council
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ... iv
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ... 2
1. INTRODUCTION ... 3
2. RESEARCH OVERVIEW ... 7
2.1 Overlooked Disintegration of a Security Community ... 7
2.2 Explaining Disintegration ... 10
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 16
3.1 Definitions and Hypothesis ... 16
3.2 Causal Mechanism ... 17
4. RESEARCH DESIGN ... 20
4.1 Case Selection ... 20
4.2 Analytical Methods and Data Sources ... 21
4.3 Operationalization ... 23
5. EMPIRICS ... 26
5.1 Levels of Security Community Integration... 26
5.2 Nationalistic Discourses with Different Frames ... 36
6. COMPARING NOW AND THEN ... 50
6.1 Synthesizing Frames and Levels of a SC Integration ... 50
6.2 Why the Type of Frames Matters ... 51
6.3 Alternative Explanations ... 53
6.4 Limitations and Potential Biases ... 55
7. CONCLUSION ... 57
REFERENCES ... 60
APPENDIX ... 65
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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Map: China, Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea
Figure 1: Integration and Disintegration ... 10
Figure 2: Causal Mechanism ... 18
Figure 3: Share of Sino-Japanese Trade in Each Other’s Total Trade (1978-1982) 26 Figure 4: Sino-Japanese Societal Contacts (1978-1982) ... 27
Figure 5: Japanese Public Feelings toward China (1978-1982) ... 31
Figure 6: Share of Sino-Japanese Trade in Each Other’s Total Trade (2008-2012) 32 Figure 7: Sino-Japanese Societal Contacts (2008-2012) ... 33
Figure 8: The Numbers of Chinese Vessels Identified in Japan’s ... 34
Figure 9: Japanese Public Feelings toward China (2008-2012) ... 36
Table 1: Prime Ministers at the Studied Time ... 22
Table 2: Observable Indicators for DV and IDV ... 25
Table 3: Share of Japan’s Official Flows of China’s Economy (1978-1982) ... 30
Table 4: Share of Japan’s Official Flows of China’s Economic Growth (2008-2012) ... 35
Table 5: List of Selected Terms for Outlining Frames in the Discourses (52 terms) ... 37
Table 6: Comparison of Most Frequently Used Terms in Japan’s China Discourses (1978-1982 and 2008-2012) ... 38
Table 7: Table: Summary Findings based on Two-cycle Coding Process ... 40
Table 8: Summary of Findings ... 52
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, the East Asia region has enjoyed political stability and economic growth (Tønnesson 2009). China and Japan, two neighboring countries that once fought a full-scale war for years (1937-1945), have grown as regional economic superpowers and enjoy a durable peace. Thousands of private firms’ investment and rapidly growing numbers of mutual visitors suggest that high degree of connectivity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, hereinafter MoFA 2016). Yet, the recent frictions between Beijing and Tokyo raise doubts about how solid such a connection is and how sustainable the East Asian Peace will be in the future. There are skirmishes over the islets in the East China Sea, fewer occasions of top leaders’ official visits, and a series of public protests and hateful speeches between the countries. Some observers label as a “new Cold War”, or the most dangerous problem in Asia (Tiezzi 2014; Brown 2016).
Why do countries, despite high levels of mutual interdependence, start to alienate each other? Conventional theories relying on interdependence are not adequate to explain this empirical puzzle. Notably, scholars of security community theory have so far mainly focused on the positive courses of a pluralistic political integration (Deutsch 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998; Acharya 2014). The theory posits that interdependence has a pacifying effect and assumes that a “we-feeling” (Deutsch 1957,36) among people across borders should emerge as a consequence. A security community is free from the fear of interstate wars due to sufficient trust stemming from interdependence and the belief that mutual disputes shall be settled without resorting to violence. However, existing studies do not address the possibility that a security community may become weaker or even disintegrate with the exception of some recent studies (Kochut 2016; Risse 2013). As its first contribution of this paper, I participate in this debate by tackling this underresearched topic: determinants of disintegration of a security community.
To develop a theory on determinants of disintegration, I borrow insights from a socio-psychological perspective, as there is the second research gap. In early studies, the concept of nationalism is explicitly avoided as a supposed cause of integration/disintegration (Deutsch 1956, 19). The notion of transnational collective identity, as opposed to national identity, is however usually acknowledged as an asset of a security community, although rarely the object of analysis (Risse 2003). When studying
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the disintegration of a security community, one of its most plausible determinants could precisely be nationalism. Classical studies on nationalism point out the segmenting effects that nationalism has on society due to its principle of self-determination, which can lead to a radical break with the existing orders (Kedourie 1960). Scholars argue that discourses1 of political elites influence significantly a formation of national identity via institutional representations as well as mass-communications (Anderson 2006). But nationalistic discourses are not all the same as we see different patterns of nationalism within a region (Tønnesson 2016). Frames are, according to Goffman’s seminal definition,
“schemata of interpretation” which enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large (cited by Benford and Snow 2000, 21). Scholars of frames investigate different types of frames and their functions in determining a direction of individuals’ behaviors. Building on frame theory, I identify and develop the concept of “ranking frames” within nationalistic discourses that can cause a decline in support for political integration. Ranking frames are the frames which enhance people’s interpretations about their relative status based on hierarchical orders. Ranking frames can be transmitted through various types of political communications, such as debates, statements, legal documents, and other institutional decisions.
My thesis has a theory development goal and contributes to fill these two research gaps of security community theory. The study addresses the question: under what conditions do nationalistic discourses influence the integration level of a security community? I argue that if nationalistic discourses of political elites contain ranking frames, this would negatively influence the pre-existing integration level of a security community, even if high levels of interdependence are given. I suggest two steps of causal mechanism: agenda-setting and othering. First, ranking frames make the elites’ agenda more competitive towards the other member of the security community. Second, ranking frames, transmitted through institutions, may trigger an othering process both at elite and citizens’ levels.
In designing this research, I select Sino-Japan relations as the security
1I define discourses as accounts which are explicitly spoken and, or written in this paper.
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community under study. This is, in other words, a “deviant” case (Gerring 2007, 89) from general scopes of the theory. The case selection is done for several reasons. First, in case of Asia, bilateral relations have been a basic unit of security alliance rather than a multilateral one in the post-World War II era (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Second, the Sino-Japan relations satisfy basic conditions of being a security community which are given theoretically: compliance to the principle of non-violence in resolving mutual disputes and dense connections. The series of recent political frictions contradict to theoretical expectations. According to Gerring, the deviant case analysis is effective when the research objective is to “probe for new-but as yet unspecified-explanations” (2007, 106). By investigating this case, the thesis contributes to uncover a new explanatory variable.
Methodologically, I conduct a structured focused comparison (SFC) of the Sino- Japan relations at two points of time: 1978-1982 (time one) and 2008-2012 (time two). I also apply techniques of content analysis for scrutinizing discourses with different frames in a systematic way.2 For assessing the integration level of a security community, I study ranges of socio-economic statistics about the relations. On the other hand, for analyzing the nationalistic discourses, I focus on those at the side of Japan only. This specific scope makes the study more concentrated and thorough with a systematically developed dataset.
I develop an original dataset based on the archives of the National Diet Library (Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku Sistem).
My case comparison provides supports for the suggested hypothesis: when the nationalistic discourses include ranking frames, the level of integration of a security community is likely to decline. I detect that ranking frames are dominant in Time two while not in Time one. The between-case comparison suggests that ranking frames of nationalistic discourses are crucial as a determinant of deteriorating security community.
The comparison between the discourses on the contested Diaoyu-Senkaku islands at the times support for the suggested mechanism with relative importance.
2In the research design, I also discuss the developed theory would not fall into a tautological trap between the variables. My solution for this is to separate both variables: I therefore decide to set the outcomes (levels of a security integration) as objectively observable phenomena, while the supposed causes as ideational factors entailing only discourses (ranking frames).
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The next chapter introduces the research overview including two major strands of theories which I build on to develop my own theory. This is followed by Chapter III on the theoretical framework. Chapter IV explains the research design and methodological decisions. Chapter V presents the main findings from the empirical evidence using the variable-based comparison. In Chapter VI, I argue comparative analysis, additional explanations and limitations of this paper. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the conclusion of the thesis.
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2. RESEARCH OVERVIEW
In preparation for developing my theory, I overview scholarship on disintegration of a security community as well as state identity in the existing literature.
2.1 Overlooked Disintegration of a Security Community
The concept of security community was coined by Karl Deutsch (1957). If sovereign states are united through mutual institutions, frequent economic transactions and social learning, the member states would not fear large scale violence, such as war between themselves and the other state(s) and need not make preparations for it. This is because the security community members would hold mutual trust on non-violent resolutions of conflicts rather than resorting to violence. How is such an expectation developed? Adler and Barnett (1998) took a closer look on both process and structure to reach mutual trust and sympathy of a “sense of community”, or also called “we-feeling” (Deutsch 1956, 36).
A security community is constructed through combined economic, political, and social development: “technological developments and economic forces transformed the international environment and made possible different forms of communication and identification previously unavailable, unimagined, and sometimes undesired” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 32). A pluralistic political integration is not merely an agreement but rather a persistent social process continuing until all members reach a “we-feeling”. The shared norms enforce all the properties of security community integration: collective identity, institution and interdependence. Where integration is successful, and the set of norms enhances these three elements of a security community.
The relations between socio-economic transnational interdependence and peace in the post-World War II East Asia attract scholars from different research fields as well as practitioners (Gartzke 2007; Tønneson 2015). The East Asia Peace studies point out that the idea of “make money and no war” motivated the political elites in the post-conflict transition for transnational cooperation through chains of commerce and productions rather than a resumption of conflicts, which eventually result in a durable peace in the region after 1979 (Tønneson 2015). For these peaceful transitions to happen, the studies underline the roles of post-war Japan in the region. Aside from being the regional top donor of official development assistance (hereinafter ODA), Japanese development
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economists advocate the industrialization-regional peace models. For example, the flying geese (FG) model, originally coined by Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s, states a classic claim about the catching-up process of latecomer economics through international divisions of labor (Kojima 2000, 382). The FG model of development gained wider publicity in the 1980s in the international development community through advocative efforts by Okita Saburo, an economist-turned minister (Okita 1985).
In the existing literature, however, a pessimistic scenario of a security community is so far under researched: deterioration of a pluralistic political integration.
Deutsch originally proposes that both objective and subjective indicators are necessary to assess a threshold of integration (1957,31). As objective indicators, tangible commitments and resource allocations for preparation for the possibility of a war against other groups are listed, while inter-subjective narratives shown by political leaders and influential people, and the people’s beliefs or skepticism over a long period of time are his proposal for subjective indicators (Deutsh 1957, 31-35). In the post-cold war era, security community theory has been reworked by several scholars (Adler and Barnett 1998;
Acharya 2014). However, security community scholars in earlier studies assume integration process in a linear model (Acharya 2014). As Adler and Barnett argue, “once integration has been reached, the length of time over which it persists may contribute to its consolidation” (Adler and Barnett 1998, 35).
In more recent studies, several scholars have called for research on “the probable existence of a threshold of conflict beyond which the “we-ness” constitutive of the community dissolves” (Risse 2003). NATO was a textbook example of a security community, but in the post 9/11, even the world’s most powerful alliances start to experience political rears among the member states over the world security issues.
Political divides among NATO member states prompted scholastic debates whether or not the Atlantic alliance is disintegrated (Cox 2005; Pouliot 2006; Risse 2004; Koschut 2016).
Pouliot refutes Cox’s claims that theoretically NATO has not yet disintegrated. According to Pouliot, observing political confrontations does not mean a disintegration of NATO but rather it means in a mending process within the alive political integration (2006). This he reasons because the presence of a security community is self-evident , “so long as the non-violent settlement of disputes remains the self-evident practice among diplomats, the
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security community constitutes a social reality to be reckoned with” (Pouliot 2006, 124).
Pouliot’s account addresses the doubts raised by Cox clearly based on theoretical perspectives. Yet it reveals an empirical question of security community theory: how do we measure various levels of disintegration/integration prior to the outbreak of war.
Koschut’s study is the first to investigate disintegration directly by introducing norms and norm order of a security community (Koschut 2016). The proposed conceptual framework contributes to the gradual transformation from integration to disintegration in comparable manners. Koschut, unlike Pouliot, assumes disintegration would start long before the breakout of war; he proposes that in-between integration and disintegration, there are three stages: dysfunction, decline, and denial. Which if all fulfilled will result in disintegration of the security community (Koschut 2016). He argues that security community is a norm community (Koschut 2016). Disintegration in transition is a demise of the existing security community’s norms and replacement by some new set of norms (Koschut 2016, 74). The norms of a security community include: norm of common values, norm of multilateral practice, and the norm of meaningful communication (Koschut 2016).
He conducts chronological process tracing of two disintegration cases: post-9/11 NATO and the German Confederation. Disintegration is evaluated based on the levels of how strongly the security community’s norms are uphold. When a security community rests at any of these three stages in transition, the status is evaluated as “unsuccessful disintegration,” (Koschut 2016, 165-240) such as NATO in the era of War on Terrorism as an example. On the other hand, the breakout of physical warfare among the member states is a typical example of “successful disintegration” as the case of the German Confederation shown in the study (Koschut 2016, 93-164).
I develop the following figure (Figure 1) to bridge the different approaches in the existing arguments about the concepts of integration and disintegration in security community theory. A security community’s integration as far as both of an absence of violence and expectation of peaceful change are observed, and if both are rejected, there is a disintegration. However, the conditions and patterns of the in-between zones are under researched, and this paper targets this zone.
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Figure 1: Integration and Disintegration
Building on Koschut’s work, my study differentiates from his approaches in two points.
First, I do not follow his broad definitions of disintegration and instead, instead I label the interested status as deterioration of integration for simplicity. Second, I focus on collective identity, particularly nationalism, instead of considering shared norms of a security community. Koschut’s theory on disintegration as the demise of shared norms of a security community fall short in addressing several questions: among the discursive norms, why some norms survive and others do not? In other words, under which conditions of ideational elements such deterioration may happen? I delve into the elements which are relatively easier to measure and observable in a country.
2.2 Explaining Disintegration
In parallel to the lack of studies on disintegration, the concept of collective identity has paid little attention to the security community literature. As Deutsch himself states, early studies intentionally avoid arguing for nationalism as a cause of transnational (dis)integration (1957, 19). To contribute to fill these gaps of security community theory, I summarize the major arguments and theoretical concepts relevant to my theory in this section.
Question of Transnational Collective Identity
In the security community literature, a “we-feeling” is atop asset of transnational political integration but the theory is weak at explaining why such a sense of belonging can be generated and maintained across borders. Adler and Barnett (1998) argue that collective identity of a security community is based on mutual trust which is formulated through
Absence of phsycial violence
Expectation of peaceful change (Necessary Condition) (Sufficient Condition)
Integration Yes Yes
No No
Disintegration
Levels of disintegration (Koschut 2016)
A threshold of integration
A threshold of disintegration
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process and structure. The structural mechanism enable a security community:
“technological developments and economic forces transformed the international environment and made possible different forms of communication and identification previously unavailable, unimagined, and sometimes undesired” (Adler and Barnett 1998:
32). Thus, a pluralistic political integration does not merely mean political elites’ signing an agreement but rather a persistent social process continuing until all members yield the collective identity of a security community. Risse (2003) develops a theoretical framework to assess the level of integration in a systematic way by using three key concepts of the theory: collective identity, institution and interdependence. In his assessment of the collective identity between Americans and Europeans, he briefly concludes that it is less evident to detect a widening gap in the overall world views and public feelings (Risse 2003, 179-181). Other scholars who study security communities outside the North-Atlantic alliances, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter ASEAN), suggest the complexity and the far-different settings of non- European states in formulating a united identity based on common values despite the variety of different cultures (Acharya 2014).
Nationalism and State Identity Studies
Considering the relations between a state identity and integration, classic literature on nationalism provides insights. Nationalism studies reveal potential dangers of a radical break with previous traditions and a pursuit for a new political dynamic due to its principle of self-determination. According to Kedourie (1960), nationalistic activisms can develop a tendency towards extremism and violence whilst lacking in respect for tradition and the preceding orders. Scholars of nationalism argue that nationalism is a social construction.
Anthropologist Benedict Anderson famously defines the nation as “an imagined political community and imagined as inherently and sovereign” (Anderson 2006, 6).
Since the 1990s, scholars of International Relations (IR), applying a constructivist approach, start to consider the associations between state identities and national security policies (Berger 1998; Hagström and Gustafsson 2015). Several studies investigate Japan as a case study to analyze the relations between state identity and national security policy (Singh 2016; Hagström and Hanssen 2016; Gustafsson 2016;
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Hagström and Gustafsson 2015, 2). In earlier studies of this strand, scholars were more interested in the normative aspect of state identities based on assumptions that a state identity is formulated by a set of norms for example, legal documents, and institutional regulations (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015, 4). The pacifying effects of the Japan’s 1945 Constitution3 are often mentioned as a textbook example in relation to a state-identity formation (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015, 4). Berger (1998) points out that political cultures of anti-militarism were formulated in both post-war Germany and Japan through several institutional factors.
Since the 2000s, these normative approaches start to be questioned. While Japan’s 1945 constitution remains unchanged, Japan’s national security policies shifted radically toward an international expansionism (Singh 2016). Singh (2016) explains that Japan’s new move toward international expansionism as combined consequences of institutional reforms and ideational changes (Singh 2016, 610). In the 1990s, a series of administrative reforms in Japan centralized the national security regimes and also facilitated “the realization of vision/interests motivated by the international-state identity”
(Singh 2016, 608).
Other scholars extend the theory of state identity transformation by applying a relational approach (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015; Hagström and Hanssen 2016;
Gustafsson 2016). In these recent studies, associations between state identity formation (transformation) and relative status with foreign countries are investigated more closely.
Their approach differentiates from the normative approach in that a state identity formation (or transformation) evolves through inter-subjective dynamics based on both internal and external developments. Hagström and Gustafsson argue that state identities are formulated “at the intersection between sameness and differences” (2015, 5;
Hagström and Gustafsson 2015; Hagström and Hanssen 2016; Gustafsson 2016). In these studies, associations between state identity formation (transformation) in referring to
3 Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Japan Constitution).
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foreign countries’ moves are investigated. The routinized acknowledgements of each other’s existing identity are important as this very reciprocity stabilizes the relations (Gustafsson 2016). Therefore, a change/crisis of state-identity means a breakage of this reciprocal relations. This self-identity is never formulated alone but rather enhanced through recognitions by others. The formation of self-identity is related to acknowledgements from the others. Analyzing the discourses about peace stated by Japanese lawmakers in the Diet, Hagström and Hanssen (2016) detect the re-articulation of Japan’s peace identity in the 2000s as a change of state identity (Hagström and Hanssen 2016). Gustafsson argues that the Sino-Japan relations deteriorated in the 2000s because reciprocal recognitions of the set of identities, which were once agreed upon, did not function any more (Gustafsson 2016, 613).
To further develop an explanatory model of relational state identity, Hagström and Gustafsson (2015) propose a layered model of identity. State identity is constituted of three layers based on levels of institutionalization in society: least, middle, and most sediment. With this model, they suggest that a state identity is not composed of a single and static element but several layers which appear to the surface and vanish over time (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015). As to Japan’s state identity, “the most sediment layer of Japanese identity construction is an understanding of Japan’s position in hierarchical terms where Japan is constructed through its differentiation from others” (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015, 8). From the abovementioned state identity studies on Japan, two findings are relevant for the purpose of this thesis: relational approach and hierarchical orders.
In sum, in nationalism studies, associations between state identity and foreign relations are identified. From the recent state identity studies on Japan, two points are relevant to the purpose of this thesis: relational approach and hierarchical orders.
The studies agree that certain radical transformations to Japan’s state identity occurred around the 2000s, and that these changes are seemingly significantly associated with changes in foreign relations. On the other hand, different explanations have been proposed regarding causal explanations of Japan’s changes over state identity without a consensus. Singh (2016) stresses the significance of domestic administrative reforms, while Hagström and Hanssen (2015) highlight growing divides between the self-images
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and others’ recognitions. Gustafsson (2016) proposes that an increased anxiety may cause a three-step mechanism: an opportunity windows of domestic actors to frame a self- identity as obsolete; loss of differentiation (exceptional/different) from the position with other; and loss of status. These studies suggest that the role of state identities should be considered in foreign relations. Empirically, they provide rich details about the drastic changes in Japan’s state identity and security policies.
Frame Theory and Othering Process
The state identity studies suggest that the effects of identity formations on foreign relations are plausible. However, the literature does not provide an explanation about the internal mechanism how an identity formation can result in a societal divide. To consider this point, I rely on two key concepts based on socio-psychological studies: frame theory and the othering process.
Frames are important potential determinants of an individuals’ word choices, setting an agenda, and preferences. Goffman denotes frames as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label”
occurrences within their life space and the world at large (cited by Benford and Snow 2000, 21). The potential functions of framing reside in its agenda setting power as also described as three different tasks: i.e., diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (Ben and Snow 2000, 6). Researchers of frame studies investigate a common pattern of interpretations manifested through various formats of communication. Discourses are explicitly spoken and/or written accounts. Frames are differentiated from discourses; if frames are embedded in discourses, and the orientations of interpretations given by the frames are transmitted through various types of political communication.
Social Identity Theory(SIT) would provide more insights about internal mechanism to cause social divisions. According to SIT, collective identity functions ambivalently, sometimes enables societal integration, but also constrains in the other cases. Perceptions about self and other are necessarily related. Studies on discrimination against outgroups reveal that both outgroup attitudes and ingroup affiliation should be considered as necessary steps leading to categorization and development of social identity of a group (Tajfel 1974). More specifically put, the major principles can be observed
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throughout such steps: the intergroup accentuation (assimilation within category boundaries), in-group favoritism, and social competition (and not comparison). The othering process is driven by the internal mechanism among the in-group members: the more sense of belonging to the intergroup, the more the people behave against the out group in aggressive and exclusive manners, and both behaviors are co-related. In other words, the more attached the in-group people are (either willingly or not), the more differentiation from the outgroup is likely to happen, which may further evolve competitive attitudes. In recent studies, David and Bar-Tal (2009) pioneer to apply the concept of social collective identity to the political integration at the state and regional levels. Although admitting certain theoretical vagueness remained,4 the authors propose the application of collective identity at different levels.
In summary, I identify the research gaps in conventional theories about security communities in two points: first, pre-existing security community may become weaker;
and, second, nationalism may influence the level of integration. To fill these gaps, I visit strands of studies to identify a possible explanatory variable. Building on frame theory and the concept of othering process, I develop a theory of disintegration focusing on the effects of frames in nationalistic discourses. In the next chapter, I propose the concept of ranking frames within an overall theoretical framework.
4 “(I)t is impossible, of course, to analyze the identification of an individual with a small group, or even the collective identity of small groups, in the same manner that the collective identities of macro societies, such as nations, are analyzed” (David and Bar-Tal 2009, 357).
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Political elites’ commentary on foreign relations in most cases contain nationalistic discourses. Some nationalistic discourses facilitate transnational contacts and interdependence, but others can hamper relations. This leads to the research question:
under what conditions do nationalistic discourses influence the integration level of a security community? To address this research question, this section outlines my theoretical framework.
3.1 Definitions and Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: Deterioration of Security Community Integration
The security community is one facet of international political integration among the sovereign states, connected through mutual institutions, interdependence and collective identity. I propose that a threshold of disintegration is conditioned by two observations, a presence of warfare and a lack of mutual trust to avoid violent resolutions of a dispute.
This study is interested in the transitional stages led to disintegration; put another way, the deterioration of the integration levels of a security community. I attempt to detect the conditions that cause deterioration, where a security community has not yet experienced a war, but at the same time come to expect less for peaceful dispute resolutions:
integration is neither firmly established but has not lead to complete disintegration.
Independent Variable: Nationalistic Discourses including Ranking Frames
To detect conditions determining the level of integration, I study nationalistic discourses by political elites with different frames. I propose here the concept of ranking frames.
Discourses and frames are important concepts when scholars study contents not only their meanings but also the way how they are transmitted. Both are essential elements as reference points for decision-making by ordinary people. I define discourses as explicit accounts, identified in written and spoken formats, while I define frames, following Goffman, as “schemata of interpretation” that facilitate individuals to identify, perceive and make an assessment toward occurrences in society (Benford and Snow 2000, 21).
Ranking frames are the frames providing interpretations about relative status of self based on hierarchical orders. The layered model of a state identity proposed by Hagström and
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Gustafsson (2015) suggest that elements about hierarchical orders can compose a state identity. Therefore, I define my independent variable, or nationalistic discourses including ranking frames, as: written or spoken accounts about foreign relations containing frames describing the relational status of self in hierarchical orders. I hypothesize that when ranking frames are dominant in nationalistic discourses, they can be significant predictors of a lower level of integration. Ranking frames within nationalistic discourses can be diffused through institutional decisions and political communications, which create a wide range of propagations against the out-country and its members. The unit of analysis of this research is at a country level. I summarize my hypothesis as:
”When nationalistic discourses include ranking frames,
the level of integration of a security community is likely to decline.”
3.2 Causal Mechanism
I propose two steps of mechanism to link ranking frames within nationalistic discourses and deterioration: agenda setting and othering process. First, the mechanism is caused by frames’ power of an agenda setting. Frames potentially contain an agenda setting (and changing) power. Frames identify what is a problem (diagnostic), indicate possible solutions (prognostic), and advocate specific actions/behaviors (motivational) (Ben and Snow 2000, 6). Frames are more likely to influence decisions and behaviors by political entrepreneurs, including political elites and high-rank officers. When ranking frames become dominant in discourses about foreign relations, political agenda are determined by the scope of ranking frames due to the basic functions of frames. Frames function to facilitate people to re-interpret realities in accordance to the scopes. Ranking frames enhance viewpoints that the world is based on hierarchical orders. If ranking frames are dominant in elites’ discourses, the choices of words, setting priorities of political agenda, and other decisions would be affected by the scope.
The second mechanism, the othering process, evolves along with two principles of motivations: in-group affiliation and outgroup competition (Tajfel 1974). These internal elements drive members of in-group to othering process and both are related each other. People escalate competition towards the out-group (outgroup competition) rather
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to contribute, or increase the intensity of ingroup affiliations (Tajfel 1974, 67). Given this outgroup-ingroup sequence of attitudes and behaviors, in-between cleavages can increase swiftly. Othering process accentuates in-group prudence in comparison to out-groups.
The group membership, for individuals, increases the in-group esteem and enhances the in-group favoritism. Incoming information is filtered in favor of the in-groups, creating bias exaggerating the superiorities of the in-group while downplaying the values of outgroups.
The two steps of mechanism in combination decrease supports for security community in a country. First, ranking frames make the elites’ agenda more competitive towards the other member of the security community. The frames facilitate top political leaders to identify and represent a policy agenda in competitive and aggressive manners through various channels of political communication. Given ranking frames widely shared by the political elites, high-rank officers may also become discouraged to maintain the existing level of integration against the dominant frames. Second, ranking frames trigger an othering process in a country. If the frames are transmitted through political communication and institutional decisions, the othering process is enhanced at both levels of elites and citizens. This escalates negative public feelings toward the out-group and to decrease support for a security community.
Figure 2: Causal Mechanism
This study covers bilateral relations as a case of security communities. The majority of security community studies deal with multilateral ones, such as NATO, EU, and ASEAN, but this study is interested in bilateral relations in the East Asian region. Since the evaluation of security communities under these conditions are limited, this research may contribute to fill this niche. The focus of discourse analysis is only at the side of Japan.
(+) Nationalistic Discourses including Ranking
Frames
Agenda Setting + Othering
(-) Integraion Level of A Security
Community
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This approach may introduce some limitations to my analysis on one hand but enables it in-depth and thorough within the scope. I do not juxtapose the both sides of the relations, China and Japan as shown in Gustafsson (2016). Instead, I apply a relational perspective by assessing my explanatory variable, ranking frames. Still, this study has much in common with relational identity constructivists’ arguments. Gaining insights from their close attentions to relational natures of collective identity formation (transformation), my ranking frames are tested as a marker of Japan’s self-recognition as relative status in comparison to the others.
Based on theoretical framework as aforementioned, I move to describe and justify the research design in the next chapter. I explain about case selection and the rationales, analytical methods, data sources, and operationalization.
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 4.1 Case Selection
The population of my case is security communities at different integration levels. I select Sino-Japan relations as the security community of under study. The case selection is conducted based on both theoretical and empirical reasons, which I explain as follows.
First, I posit that bilateral relations are a security community even though they are rare for the conventional studies of a security community. Empirically, in post-World War II Asia, bilateral relations are preferred as a unit of security community than a multilateral alliance (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Scholars explain that this is caused by the U.S. regional security strategies, which have conventionally preferred bilateral military alliances rather than built a multilateral alliance such as comparable to NATO (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). There is also methodological benefit to focus on bilateral relations. The basic approach of my research is a heuristic theory building, where new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanism are identified inductively rather than deductively (George and Bennet 2005, 75). A study on bilateral relations would provide a basic model by controlling the number of countries as possible, whose study findings could be applicable for multilateral ones.
Second, I argue that the Sino-Japan relations are a security community, and particularly a “deviant” case from general scopes of security community theory. I explain about my reasoning as follows. The Sino-Japan relations satisfy basic conditions of being a security community which are given theoretically. A security community may exist if the member states reach a consensus of “no shooting but a talk” for mutual dispute resolution. The Sino-Japan relations satisfy conditions of being a security community such as holding a consensus about peaceful dispute resolutions and also socio-economic dense connections. Conventional theories about security communities expect that if a region yields high levels of socio-economic interdependence, regional stability is achieved. In other words, from theoretical expectations, the relations should be the last to show signs of disintegration. In contrast, we have observed in the relations that political frictions have increased significantly since the 2000s. The deviant case analysis is effective when the research objective is to “probe for new-but as yet unspecified- explanations” (Gerring 2007, 106). By investigating this case, the thesis contributes to
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uncover a new explanatory variable. Given these conditions, I justify my case selection of the Sino-Japan relations as a deviant case of security community.
For comparison, I conduct a within-case analysis of the Sino-Japan relations. I refer to the controlled case of different outcomes, or Mill’s method of difference based on literature search: the 1978-82 as time one and the 2008-12 as time two. The case control method is effective to investigate a specific independent variable as a causal factor of differences in outcomes. The limited numbers of samples might limit a comparability while avoiding a systematic error. Though it is nearly impossible to control all the variables and detect a perfectly “matching” case to compare one to the others, the comparative method remains widely applied in many qualitative studies (Powner 2015, 105). The selection of time points is based on same duration from a diplomatic achievement in the studied relations: I take 5 years of period for each case from the year of any high-level diplomatic milestone: that are, the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty5 (time one) and the 2008 mutual joint declaration6 (time two), respectively. Each case at two points in time represents a variation in dependent variables respectively, showing negative outcome (higher level of integration) and positive one (lower level of integration), respectively.
4.2 Analytical Methods and Data Sources
I apply a structured focused comparison (SFC) as an overall design as a general study design, and content analysis techniques for investigating discourses with different frames.
I conduct a within-case analysis of the Sino-Japan relations comparing at two points of time: 1978-1982 (time one) and 2008-12 (time two). The benefit of choosing a SFC for an overall design is because it enables a systematic data collection and analysis of the targeted cases in line with a pre-established set of questions (Powner 2015, 105). For the independent variable, I apply content analysis so that I can obtain better and in-depth
5Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. (Signed on August 12,1978). For English translation, see (MoFA 2017a).
6Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” (Issued on May 7, 2008). For English translation, see (MoFA 2017b).
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understandings about different frames of nationalistic discourses and functions. I focus on frames within the nationalistic discourses at the side of Japan in particular. This specific scope makes the study more concentrated and thorough with a systematically developed dataset.
As for data, I use both primary and secondary data. For assessing integration levels, I refer to various socio-economic statistics, trade volumes, public opinion polls, social contacts and so forth. For nationalistic discourses analysis, I develop an original dataset based on the archives of the National Diet Library, called Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku Sistem (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2017).
First, to overview the nationalistic discourses with different frames, I develop a list of key terms. Based on my literature search, I select an initial set of dozens of candidate words which I suppose to be stated often in discourses about relations between China and Japan. Then I check the actual frequencies of initial word set by counting based on the search engine of the archives (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2017). I repeat test counting of candidate terms until the list cover sufficient variations of words in terms of the numbers of being mentioned. As a result, I obtain the list of 52 terms whose number of being mentioned cover from zero to 458 times. Given this wide coverage of mentioned frequencies, I claim validity of the obtained dataset. The total number of mentioned times are 4,103 times in Time one while 3,174 times in Time two. Out of the selected 52 terms, the top twelve terms are mentioned more than 100 at least.
Another data set that I build contains the nationalistic discourses by all the reining prime ministers (hereinafter PM) of the studied time. Using the same data base of National Diet, I first extract their remarks mentioning the Sino-Japan relations over the targeted periods. The statistics of the obtained data-set are: the total numbers of obtained remarks are 51 sections, approximately 14,000 letters (in Japanese) for Time one and 75 sections of 20,000 letters (in Japanese) for Time two. The number of studied prime ministers amounts for ten in total: four for Time one and six for Time two respectively.
Out of the total of ten years studied, Liberal Democratic Party (hereinafter LDP) reins the administrations for more than seven years; while Time two includes the brief period of Democratic party (hereinafter DP) in power for 2 years and 8 months.
Table 1: Prime Ministers at the Studied Time
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Time 1 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
PM’s Name
Fukuda(T) Ohira Ohira/
Suzuki
Suzuki Nakasone
Time 2 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
PM’s name
Fukuda(Y)/A so
Aso / Hatoyama
Hatoyama Kan/
Noda
Noda/
Abe
For content analysis of the discourse dataset, I apply a second-cycle of coding (Sardaña 2009, 3). Each step of process has an objective. In the first cycle process, I detect significant terms/phrases among the actual language found in data by using in-vivo coding (Sardaña 2009, 74). Then I apply focused coding at the second cycle process in order to search terms/phrases that are relevant to varieties of frames found among the sample contents. Due to the heuristic, and cyclical nature of coding, a researcher is able to obtain links “from the data to the idea, and from the idea to all the data pertaining to that idea” (Richards and Morse 2007, 137; Sardaña 2009, 74). My personal background as a Japan-born Japanese strengthens in-depth understanding of the contexts of the research topic. My language skills in Japanese and English yield accessibility to data in both languages and comparability. For limitations and potential biases, I will argue in Chapter IV.
As secondary sources, I consult the research results by IR scholars and historians, and other historical documents accessible in English and/or Japanese. Studies from socio- historical perspectives supplement the conventional sources on security policies and diplomacies.
4.3 Operationalization
Security Community Disintegration
Building on Koschut’s argument (2016), I presume that security community integration and disintegration should be seen as variations in a spectrum. Yet I differentiate from his labelling to include all the stages of disintegration; I instead simply treat the stages in transition between integration and disintegration as variations of deteriorated integration.
I presume that security community integration and disintegration are variations in a spectrum. Until passing a threshold of violent conflict, the paper posits patterns of
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deteriorated integration. To operationalize the disintegration level, I apply Risse’s framework using the three elements of a security community: common institutions based on norms regulating the relationship, economic interdependence grounded in common material interests, and collective identity based on common values (Risse 2003, 2).
For institutions, the observable indicators are the quality of diplomatic relations:
provisions and arrangements of mutual treaties, frequencies of timely communications and consultations. As indicators of interdependence, statistics of economic transactions and social interactions are valuable. The measurement of collective identity may be most challenging task among the three elements. To this point, I refer to the results of public opinion polls asking about the prioritized values, sentiments and opinions both against the other countries and the own one. Specifically, the questions will be investigated to each case:
1. To what extent are mutual institutions fabricated?
How frequently is communication provided?
In which trends (growing/descending) are the diplomatic communication opportunities over the period?
What are the fundamentals of mutual treaties/agreements in effect?
2. To what extent is socio-economic interdependence developed?
How large is the scale of economic transactions?
How big is the scale of people’s mobilities between the countries?
3. How well is ‘we-feeling’ is formulated?
What are public feelings toward the out-country?
Nationalistic Discourses Including Ranking Frames
Discourses of the political elites, if delivered in highly diplomatic settings, tend to cover up any aggressive orientations. Their intentions might be covered up and less clear for researchers without assessing the contexts given. In this regard, one of the strength of content analysis (whether discourses/frames) is to consider not only what messages are delivered but also how they are delivered. There are possibilities that, over time and space, similar nationalistic discourses can appear in diverse types of frames. Other than ranking frames that I am interested in, possible frames that can be closely connected to
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nationalistic discourses would be: romantic frames, resistance frames, liberal democratic frames and so forth.
To operationalize the independent variable, the observable indicators of discourses and frames would include: presence/frequencies of nationalistic discourses with different frames, contents and tasks. More specifically, the questions are investigated to each case:
1. What type of frames do nationalistic discourses (ND) contain?
Are there ND including ranking frames?
What types of frames do the discourses contain?
Is the ND including ranking frames dominant in comparison to the ND with the other types of frames?
2. What are the contents of the ND with different frames?
What are the contents of each ND with different frames?
What are the functions of each frame?
For illustration, the below table summarizes the main observable indicators to be questioned for dependent variables and independent variables, respectively.
Table 2: Observable Indicators for DV and IDV DV: Integration Level of a Security Community
Institution Interdependence Collective Identity Observable
Indicators
-Mutual
treaties/agreements;
-Frequencies of diplomatic
meetings/agreement
-Scales of economic transactions (Foreign Direct Investment /Trade)
-Social interactions (People’s mobilities)
-Positive/Negative sentiments toward the outgroups
IV: Nationalistic Discourses with Ranking Frames
Types of the frames Contents of the frames Functions of the frames Observable
Indicators
-Frequently used terms in the nationalistic discourses
-Messages and
implications of each phrase
-Diagnostic/Prognostic/
Motivating
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5. EMPIRICS
In accordance to the set of questions built for my study focus, I present the main results.
The findings will be exhibited in the variable-based structure. First, I report crucial values indicating the integration levels of each period’s security community in line with the three elements of interest: institutions, interdependence, and collective identity. The presentation about the nationalistic discourses with different frames follows for Time one and Time two respectively.
5.1 Levels of Security Community Integration
Time One (1978-1982) Honeymoon after the Peace and Friendship Treaty
During this period, there are few systematic statistics to indicate the level of socio- economic interdependence, such as foreign firms’ operations in China is publicized in English/Japanese sources. Yet, as to the trade volumes, the total values of bilateral trades increased from US$5 billion in 1978 to US$8.9 billion in 1982, with drops from the preceding two years’ higher achievements: that are, US$9.4 billion of 1980 and US$10.4 billion of 1980, respectively (Ministry of Finance, hereinafter MoF 2017). The graph below shows the annual changes in the shares of bilateral trade in respective Japanese and Chinese total trade during the time period. In contrast to the almost negligible rate of Japan’s official flows in Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter GDP) shown in the previous section, these figures demonstrate considerable shares of bilateral trades for China, indicating at more than 20 % in every year.
Figure 3: Share of Sino-Japanese Trade in Each Other’s Total Trade (1978-1982)
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(Sources: UNCTAD 2017; MoF 2017).
Statistics on societal contacts are also hard to access. I develop the graph below (Figure 4) to assess the civil visitors of both countries during this time period, based on the two sources. According to Japan Ministry of Justice (hereinafter MoJ), the number of mutual visitors shows upward trends in general, while Japanese visitors are far more than Chinese visitors during this time.
Figure 4: Sino-Japanese Societal Contacts (1978-1982)
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(Sources: MoJ 2017; He 2009, 203).
Diplomatic and mutual institutions are developed steadily after signing the 1972 Joint Communique and the following diplomatic normalization.7 The series of mutual accords concluded in various fields: aviation, trade, shipping, fisheries and trademark (Embassy of Japan in China 2017). In 1978, the both parties finally agreed to sign the Friendship and Peace Treaty. The Treaty, signed by both countries’ foreign ministers, consists of five articles (MoFA 2017a). Article I reads the general principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, quality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence and the principles of UN Charter (Article I), “they shall in their mutual relations wattle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.” It also declares each country is “opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony” (Article II). As to the expiration, Article V provides that the Treaty shall remain in force for ten years; thereafter, either party may terminate “by giving one year’s written notice to the other Contracting Party.” Since 1972 until the early 1980s, the series of agreements and treaties were concluded with covering cultural exchange,
7Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic China (September 29, 1972). For English translation of the whole communique, see (MoFA 2017c).
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cooperation on scientific and technology, migratory bird treaty, taxation, nuclear technology for peace, and investment protection (Embassy of Japan in China 2017).
Though relations were generally amicable during this period, mutual disagreements did exist in the bilateral relations. Controversies were even recognized publicly. For example, in April 1978, just months before the signing of the Treaty, an incident occurred whereby more than 100 Chinese fishery vessels sailed to the contested water zone (Diaoyu/Senkaku islands) for fishing operations. In following, a group of Japanese political activists landed one of the islands and attempted to build a lighthouse.
Several historians point out that the Chinese President Deng Xiaoping, during press conferences on his official visit to Japan, stated that the dispute shall be “shelved” for a resolution by future generations (Nakauchi 2010, 24; Ni Zimin 2013). Japan MoFA remains reticent about the question of whether this “shelving” decision was one-sided or in agreement, Ni Zimin uncovered in confidential diplomatic meeting record as to the top meeting between Fukuda and Deng Ziaoping in Japan that the Japanese prime minister thanked the Chinese President for his proposal of leaving the disputes of Diaoyudai islands “the wiser next generation” (2013). In another incident in 1979, Japan launched a heliport construction plan on the islands, which was eventually called off at China’s request for cancellation (Nakauchi 2010).
Topics about the past war-legacies are addressed selectively. Not all the war issues were addressed as subjects. As such, the issues of Japanese war displaced orphans were praised as a diplomatic success of this time. Homecoming arrangements for hundreds of China-grown Japanese orphans, who became displaced at the end of war, attracted political attentions, which resulted in the joint investigations upon Japan’s requests.
In 1979, the Ohira administration (1978-1980) launched ODA to China, as the first state’s financial support from the West to the reformist China. Ohira was serving PM Tanaka (1972-1974) as the foreign minister and attended the negotiation table with China’s Chou En-lai in 1972. Ohira personally held a deep “guilty conscience” for the destructive damages on China caused by imperial Japan during the Sino-Japanese war (Hattori 2011). Therefore, China’s dismissal of the war compensation claim strongly motivated him to commence Japan’s official financial/technical supports (Hattori 2011).
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The development projects financed large-scale infrastructures (roads, railways, seaports, airports, power stations, and medical facilities) and the technical cooperation and training.
The following table (Table 3) summarizes the annual growth of the economy in both countries (in GDP, in million USD). The reformist China’s economic growth rate during this period was 8.3 % on average (in real GDP growth rate; based on the National Bureau of Statistics cited by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, hereinafter METI 2009, 57), while Japan experienced sustainable economic growth at the rate of 4.0 % (in real GDP) until the middle of 1980 (METI 2013, 4). In comparison to this enormous scale of economic growth, the shares of Japan’s official flows in China’s were not significant share, reaching below 1.00 %.
Table 3: Share of Japan’s Official Flows of China’s Economy (1978-1982) (in Million USD/Real GDP/Current Prices)
(Source: OECD 2017)
As to collective identity, the results of annual opinion polls (N=3,0000; Japan Cabinet Office 2017), this period demonstrates positive results of Japanese Public feelings toward Chinese: higher levels of sympathy and lower antipathy as shown in the graph (Figure 5).
The sympathy scores constantly mark higher than the first year’s standard of 62.1%
throughout the period, while the antipathy scores gradually decline from 25.6% in 1978 to 19.2% in 1982. Even in 1981, when Japanese feelings’ China turns to the worst in the given time, the year’s sympathetic respondents are more than triple of the antipathetic ones.
Japan's GDP 1,008,392 1,049,579 1,099,693 1,215,509 1,129,895 China's GDP 218,502 263,685 306,165 289,571 283,922 Japan to China Total Official
flows(ODA+OOF) .. 3 408 28 369
Japan's OF Share of China's GDP 0.00% 0.02% 0.09% 0.31% 0.04%
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
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Figure 5: Japanese Public Feelings toward China (1978-1982)
(Source: Japan Cabinet Office 2017)
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Time Two (2008-12) Less Timely Communication Seeking for Strategic Relations Several statistics document the high level of socio-economic interdependence in the private sector throughout the period. The number of Japanese firms operating in China is 22,790 (in 2011), which is the top among the other foreign companies, surpassing the number of American firms (20,855). The values of total bilateral trades expand constantly from US$266.4 billion in 2008 to US$333.7 in 2012, reaching its peak of US$ 345.0 billion in 2011 (MoFA 2013). The below graph (Figure 6) illustrates the shares of the Sino-Japanese trade in each other’s total trade, and indicates considerable levels over the period.
Figure 6: Share of Sino-Japanese Trade in Each Other’s Total Trade (2008-2012)
(Sources: UNCTAD STAT 2017; MoF 2017).
The levels of social contacts are evidently high. More than 340 twin-town relationships are reported (MoFA 2013). Nearly five million Chinese and Japanese on average travel across the border during the period. The graph (Figure 7) below shows the annual shifts with the breakdowns by nationality: while the outbound populations (from Japan to China) are larger than the inbound (China to Japan).
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Figure 7: Sino-Japanese Societal Contacts (2008-2012)
(Source: MoJ 2017)
In contrast, diplomatic achievements of this period become less obvious. Both countries managed to uphold the traditions of top-level mutual calls annually,8 but the fruits of diplomacy become less visible in the forms of new agreements or chances for negotiation.
Official bilateral talks were not set except those short-time meetings arranged as byproducts of the summit diplomacy. Chances for joint announcements were scarce except for the joint statement on “Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” issued in 2008 (MoFA 2017b). Other than this achievement, statements in this period tend to take a unilateral format.
An absence of timely communication became more apparent when the series of disputes and protests over the contested Diaoyu-Senkaku islands and its surrounding areas.9 The Noda administration decided to nationalize the islands by purchasing the areas from the Japanese private owner, in attempting to handle the series of
8 The occurrences of mutual visits decline: from five times in 2008 (by China’s President Hu Jintao and PM Wen Jiabao, and two Japan’s PMs, Fukuda and Aso respectively), twice in 2009 (by PM Aso and PM Xi Jinping); twice in 2010 (by President Wen Jiabao); twice in 2011 (President Wen Jiabao and PM Noda), once in 2012 (PM Noda) (MoFA 2013).
9 In August 2012, a group of activists, first from Hong Kong and then Japan, reached the islands respectively as demonstration.
