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Master’s Thesis, 60 ECTS!
Social-ecological Resilience for Sustainable Development Master’s programme 2015/17, 120 ECTS
How traders and their institutional arrangements influence the social- ecological sustainability of small-scale
fisheries
The case of a seafood supply chain in Baja California Sur, Mexico
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Blanca González García-Mon
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!!Stockholm!Resilience!Centre!
!!!!Research!for!Biosphere!Stewardship!and!Innovation!
The uncertain air that magnified some things and blotted out others hung over the whole Gulf so that all sights were unreal and vision could not be trusted: so that sea and land had the sharp clarities and the vagueness of a dream.
(…) There was no certainty in seeing, no proof that what you saw was there or was not there. And the people of the Gulf expected all places were that way, and it was not strange to them.
The Pearl, John Steinbeck
ABSTRACT'
The production of Small-Scale Fisheries (SSFs) satisfies seafood demand and is an important contributor to people’s livelihoods around the world. The disconnection between supply and demand can influence sustainability of SSFs by decreasing actors’ ability to respond to environmental and market changes. In developing contexts, such as many Mexican fishing communities, fishers and traders (fish buyers) establish self-governing instructional arrangements that connect local fish production with demand across scales. This thesis studies the mediating role of traders’ institutional arrangements for the social-ecological (SES) sustainability of a supply chain. A mixed-method approach is applied to a study case in Baja California Sur, Mexico, that includes interviews, surveys, participant observation and a multi-level network analysis. This thesis develops an analytical framework that combines empirical observations with network structures of the supply chain. It is used to identify and quantify self-governing institutions; show social-ecological interdependencies; and hypothesize their sustainability outcomes. The results reveal various types of traders, with different functions in the supply chain. Overall, the structural composition of the supply chain could enhance SES sustainability. I argue that traders’ self-governing institutional arrangements have potential to promote SES sustainability by increasing adaptive capacity.
However, this can threaten long-term sustainability if overexploitation is promoted. Traders’
incentives might be key to achieving or impeding sustainability. This investigation contributes to understanding the role of traders in SSF supply chains and yields insights for future research and sustainability interventions. It presents an analytical framework to study sustainability in supply chains from a relational perspective.
SUPERVISOR:
Örjan Bodin
(Stockholm Resilience Center)
CO-SUPERVISORS:
Xavier Basurto and Mateja Nenadovic
(Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke University)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“La Caixa” banking foundation has funded my education in this two-year masters program through the international grant for postgraduacte studies in Europe 2015.
La Obra social “La Caixa” ha hecho posible mi formación en este master durante dos años a través de la Beca de estudios de posgrado en Europa 2015.
Esta tesis tampoco sería posible sin aquellas personas que colaboraron con mi investigación en Baja California Sur. Muchas gracias a todas las personas que compartieron su tiempo y su conocimiento conmigo en pláticas o entrevistas, y en especial a aquellas que me hicieron sentir una más compartiendo su día a día. Además al equipo de Niparajá: Amy, Tomás, Melisa, Salvador, Ollin, gracias por vuestro trabajo, generosidad y paciencia. A José Alberto, Mario y compañeros/as, gracias por mostrarme la realidad bajacaliforniana.
Thanks to all that have helped me during this two-years master programme in Sweden. To those who have made my education at SRC possible and to those that have encouraged me to follow my ideas and keep improving at every step. Especial thanks to Miriam, Cornelia and my supervisors, who have been essential in this process, and to the MAREA project team.
And thanks to…
Thanks to the Holmies, for sticking together in this rollercoaster ride, and to all who have given me warmth in Sweden. Thanks to all my international friends for being close in the distance. Gracias a mis amigas de España, por “skypes” y reencuentros. En especial, gracias Kathryn, Jana, José, Güis, por vuestro tiempo.
Gracias a mi familia, por su apoyo e inspiración. Papá, mamá, sigo construyendo sobre vuestros cimientos.
Och tack, Marc, för att vara där, för att vara den du är.
TABLE'OF'CONTENTS'
ABSTRACT'...'ii!
1.'INTRODUCTION'...'1!
Aim!...!2!
2.'STUDY'CASE:'Southern'Corredor,'Baja'California'Sur,'México'...'3!
2.1.'Social'characteristics'of'Southern'Corredor'...'4!
2.2.'Coastal'and'marine'ecosystem'of"El'Corredor'...'5!
3.'THEORETICAL'BACKGROUND'...'6!
Theoretical-framework:-The-supply-chain-as-a-social7ecological-system!...!6!
Analytical-framework:-The-supply-chain-as-a-web-of-interactions!...!9!
4.'METHODS'...'9!
4.1.'Data'collection'and'qualitative'analysis'...'10!
4.2.'MultiUlevel'network'analysis'...'11!
Characterization-of-the-network-in-Southern-Corredor!...!11!
Network-analysis!...!12!
4.3.'Ecological'description'...'13!
5.'RESULTS'AND'DISCUSSION'...'14!
5.1.'Diversity'of'institutional'arrangements'in'the'supply'chain'...'14!
Disentangling-traders-in-the-supply-chain!...!14!
Quantifying-self7governing-institutional-arrangements!...!17!
Understanding-the-variety-of-exchange-relationships!...!20!
5.2.'From'finfish'fishery'to'seafood'demand'...'21!
5.3.'Sustainability'of'the'supply'chain'through'a'network'perspective'...'24!
5.4.'Adaptive'capacity'for'and'against'sustainability'U'' hypotheses'from'two'standpoints'...'27!
Hypothesis-1!...!27!
Hypothesis-2!...!29!
6.'CONCLUSION:'Beyond'the'supply'chain'...'30!
7.'LITERATURE'CITED'...'31!
APPENDIX'I.'Qualitative'methods'for'data'collection'and'analysis'...'38!
APPENDIX'II.'Definition'and'analysis'of'the'network'...'42!
APPENDIX'III.'Ecological'description'...'48!
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ACRONYMS'
BCS:!Baja!California!Sur!
CONAPESCA:!Mexican!national!commission!for!fisheries!and!aquaculture!(Comisión- Nacional-de-Acuacultura-y-Pesca)!
CPR:!Common!Pool!Resources!
ERGM:!Exponential!Random!Graph!Modeling!
FAO:!Food!and!Agriculture!Organization!of!the!United!Nations.!
PCs:'PatronPClient!arrangements!
SC:'Southern!Corredor!!
SES:'SocialPEcological!Systems' SSFs:'SmallPScale!Fisheries'
1.'INTRODUCTION'
Demand of fish products is increasing around the world, especially in developing countries (FAO 2016). Seafood is a nutritious food that is improving the world’s diets and represents 20% of animal protein consumption (FAO 2016). At the same time, fisheries’
overexploitation (Worm et al. 2009, Watson et al. 2013) will affect our capacity to meet this demand and guarantee food security (Godfray et al. 2010). The current challenge is to promote sustainable food production systems to meet the increasing demand and guarantee healthy diets (Rockström et al. 2016). Sustainable fisheries pose a special challenge, because fisheries have often been a well-documented example of the tragedy of the commons that leads to overexploitation of marine resources (Basurto and Ostrom 2009). Overexploitation can be increased by status quo of ocean ecosystem’s governance (Beddington et al. 2007, Maury et al. 2013).
Small-Scale Fisheries (SSFs) are production systems that provide half of the global seafood catches, mainly for direct human consumption (FAO 2015). SSFs are diverse, decentralized, dynamic, and are essential for livelihoods and employment around the world (Finkbeiner 2015). In developing countries, they can be important contributors to dietary intake of fishing households and populations purchasing in local markets (Kawarazuka 2010). Moreover, SSFs are said to have higher social and ecological sustainability outcomes than large-scale industrial fisheries (Jacquet and Pauly 2008, Kolding et al. 2014). Still SSFs face particular challenges. Among the major concerns are: marginalization, often associated with physical remoteness and lack of political power (Salas et al. 2007, Jacquet and Pauly 2008); poverty (Kolding et al. 2014); lack of infrastructure (Jacquet and Pauly 2008); and difficulty of maintaining fishing livelihoods coupled with fisheries collapse (Salas et al. 2007). Thus, ecosystem conservation is also important for SSFs (Kolding et al. 2014), but the complexity of its multi-species fisheries often drives the lack of biological assessments and management programs (Díaz-Uribe et al. 2007).
Moreover, SSFs’ vulnerability is increasing due to influence of global processes such as climate change or globalization (Kolding et al. 2014, Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015). Local systems are increasingly interconnected with cross-scale dynamics that can threaten their sustainability (Folke et al. 2016). Trade is an important driver of these dynamics in SSFs (Crona et al. 2015a). The disconnection that exists between local ecosystems that determine fish supply and market demand could promote fisheries overexploitation (Crona et al.
2015b). For instance, different markets can put pressure on SSFs and intensify the tragedy of
the commons (Berkes et al. 2006, Reddy et al. 2013, Thryresson et al. 2013; Crona et al.
2015a).
Traders (often called fish buyers or middlemen) mediate in the supply-demand disconnection (Crona et al. 2010), and globalization will increase their influence on SSFs (Basurto et al.
2013). Stakeholders working for sustainability of SSFs highlight the need to acknowledge traders’ role in overcoming their current barriers (Van Holt and Weisman 2016). However, traders are not generally included in fisheries research or management (Crona et al. 2010).
In SSFs of the developing world, communities usually face the above-mentioned challenges by creating self-governing institutions (Kolding et al. 2014). Self-governing institutions are norms and rules guiding people’s behavior (North 1990), where many rules and norms have been made and adapted over time by the actors themselves (Ostrom 1999). Traders can be a reduced number of actors that engage in these self-governing institutional arrangements (Basurto et al. 2013). Their function becomes more important when formal authorities are weak (Basurto et al. 2013), and central governments often have difficulties in managing SSFs (Kolding et al. 2014). In this context, fisheries governance and co-management combine government regulations with other institutional arrangements aiming to achieve sustainability (Mahon et al. 2008, Kolding et al. 2014). Hence, self-governing institutions have a key influence on the sustainability of SSFs, and this thesis focuses on the role of traders therein.
Aim--
This research uncovers some of the social dynamics that influence sustainability of SSFs, with an emphasis on traders’ institutional arrangements across the supply chain. It aims to understand the mediating role of self-governing institutional arrangements for the social- ecological sustainability of a supply chain by answering two research questions:
i) What characterizes traders’ self-governing institutional arrangements in a Small Scale Fishery supply chain?
ii) How do traders and their self-governing institutional arrangements interact with the ecosystem and affect sustainability of Small Scale Fisheries?
To this end, I studied the case of a SSF supply chain in Baja California Sur, Mexico. I developed an analytical framework from a network perspective, grounded in the theoretical background of institutions and social-ecological resilience. I first analyze the institutional component (sections 5.1) and the social-ecological interconnections of the supply chain
2.'STUDY'CASE:'SOUTHERN'CORREDOR,'BAJA'CALIFORNIA'SUR,'MÉXICO'
Mexico’s seafood consumption is increasing (CONAPESCA 2013), following the international trend. It is the sixteenth wild-fish producer of the world (FAO 2016). Most fish production is used nationally (CONAPESCA 2013) and Mexican SSFs supply most of the national fish consumption (CONAPESCA 2008). Baja California Sur (BCS) is the third most important state for fisheries, producing 9% of the seafood volume in Mexico (CONAPESCA 2013). It is located in Baja California Peninsula, between the Gulf of California (East coast) and the Pacific (West coast). Almost 99% of BCS’s fishing boats belong to SSFs, as only thirteen large-scale boats operate (CONAPESCA 2013). Fishing activities have been a decisive element of the social development of the state, which is related to the highly productive marine and coastal ecosystems that surround it (Cortés Ortíz et al. 2006).
In this context, Mexican seafood production has stagnated, most fisheries are at maximum exploitation levels, and 22.5% are overexploited (CONAPESCA 2010). Global and National fisheries governance is essential to guarantee national fish availability (FAO 2013). Fisheries management in Mexico builds on a property-rights system aiming to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Basurto et al. 2012). Fishing permits over specific fisheries are the main management tool (Cinti et al. 2010). Permits were only granted to cooperatives until 1992, when individuals could also become permit-holders – locally named “permisionarios” – (Cinti et al. 2010, Basurto et al. 2013). Most of these permit-holders are traders that employ independent fishers through self-governing institutional arrangements (Cinti et al. 2010, Basurto et al. 2013). Hence, the supply chain is overlapped with the management and governance system. On the other hand, private initiatives and an active civil society are trying to promote sustainability in seafood supply chains (e.g. Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014, Micheli et al. 2014).
Therefore Mexico constitutes an interesting setting to understand the interplay between traders, self-governing institutions and supply chain sustainability. This thesis studied Southern Corredor region (thereafter SC), in BCS. It analyzed the supply chain of finfish in SC and the commercialization of fish products in La Paz city (figure 1). La Paz is the state’s capital and the biggest commercialization center (Tovar Lee et al. 2015). It supplies seafood to local, national and international markets.
2.1.'Social'characteristics'of'Southern'Corredor'' El Corredor is a region with
thirteen fishing communities along 150km of coastline, between Loreto Bay and La Paz Bay (Niparajá 2010). The region’s fishing communities are spatially divided: the southern communities are connected to La Paz city and belong to La Paz municipality, whereas the northern communities are connected either to Ciudad Constitución or Loreto Bay and belong to other municipalities (figure 1). Moreover, fishing grounds and some fishing practices are characteristic of either northern or southern Corredor region (Niparajá 2010).
This study focuses on SC, the southern region.
SC comprises nine fishing communities, where 95 fishers and 56 fishing boats were registered in 2016 (Niparajá, unpublished data). SC communities have been identified as highly under-developed, depending on La Paz as commercial and services-providing center (Tovar Lee et al. 2015). The nine communities studied have different degrees of remoteness (Basurto et al. 2013). Seven communities have only maritime connection (Basurto et al.
2013), and most of them sell their catch in San Evaristo, the biggest fishing community (figure 1). San Evaristo is connected to La Paz by a deteriorated unpaved road. Two remaining communities are situated within La Paz Bay, and connected to La Paz city through an unpaved road in better state (figure 1, El Portugués and Punta Coyote).
SC fishing is a SSF system where fishers use hooks, nets or traps employing “pangas”, seven
Figure 1. Fishing communities of El Corredor and their connection to the cities (Baja Califronia Sur, Mexico). The location of the study case is shown in red, comprising fishing communities in SC and trade of its finfish fishery products in La Paz city. Modified from Basurto et al. (2013).
different fisheries: finfish (bony fish), clams and/or elasmobranches (sharks and rays). This thesis studies the finfish fishery supply chain. Most fishers exclusively target the finfish fishery, as they do not have fishing rights for other fisheries. However, one must note that commercialization of elasmobranches and bony fish is highly overlapping. Most fishers and traders targeting elasmobranches also target bony fish when they cannot enter the shark fishery. The commercialization of the clam fishery is independent. Only a few fishers from SC, operating in La Paz Bay, target both clams and finfish fisheries.
2.2.'Coastal'and'marine'ecosystem'of"El'Corredor"'
El Corredor is situated between two Marine Protected Areas in the Central-Western region of the Gulf of California: Loreto Bay and Espiritu Santo Island. It is located in an area considered a priority for conservation within the Gulf of California (Arriaga et al. 1998, Anadón et al. 2011). Recent research demonstrates the region’s importance for ecological connectivity between the protected areas and for maintenance of fisheries resources (A.
Munguia, unpublished manuscript). This highlights its significance for the sustainability of regional marine and fisheries systems.
Spatial and temporal variability of the Gulf of California have a great influence on fishing activities. SC’s ecosystems of fishing importance are mainly rocky islands adjacent to the coastline and seamounts (Niparajá 2011). In the neighboring La Paz Bay, sandy bottoms prevail (Díaz-Uribe et al. 2007). In other respects, the Gulf of California experiences great inter-annual variability associated with El Niño Southern Oscillation and Pacific Decadal Oscillation (Lluch-Cota et al. 2010). It has a marked seasonality, influenced by wind and oceanographic patterns (Lluch-Cota et al. 2010). SC is defined by a two-season cycle formed by a warm (June-November) and a cold (December to May) season (Díaz-Uribe et al. 2007).
Between November and February, fishing is limited due to strong winds (Sievanen 2014).
Species’ availability for fishing, regarding their location and harvesting season, is also affected by species’ behavioral changes during their life cycle (Erisman et al. 2010).
3.'THEORETICAL'BACKGROUND'
Theoretical-framework:-The-supply-chain-as-a-social7ecological-system-
The social system is dependent on the structure and function of ecosystems, creating an interconnected Social-Ecological System (SES) (Berkes 2011). The theoretical framework structuring this research conceptualizes a seafood supply chain as a SES (figure 2). A supply chain is understood as an instituted process of interaction between humans and the environment based on empirical economy (Polanyi 1957). Process implies analyzing changes of material elements (i.e. fish units) in location and/or in appropriation by social actors (Polanyi 1957).
Figure 2. Conceptual framework: the supply chain as a Social- Ecological System. Supply-demand flow of fish is channelized by relationships among fishers and traders. Self-governing institutions mediate the connection between the ecosystem and beneficiaries in the social system (i.e. fishers, traders, and consumers conceptualized in different types of demand). By mediating in this interconnection, the different social actors and
Two different types of social actors, fishers and traders, connect ecosystem’s supply with different types of demand. The term “trader” is used here in a broad sense meaning actors that distribute seafood to different market demands. Exchange-based relationships between these actors (figure 2) are analyzed using the concept of self-governing institutional arrangements (North 1990, Ostrom 1999). Self-governing institutions in this SSF system are defined as: relationships where participants in the supply chain establish agreements related to fishing production and/or commercialization, while monitoring and enforcing their commitment to each other without resorting to external authorities (modified from Basurto et al. 2013:2).
In SSFs, fishers can organize into two broad categories of self-governing institutions: fishing cooperatives, if fishers associate into a jointly owned enterprise; and noncooperative arrangements (Basurto et al. 2013). Noncooperative arrangements between fishers and traders, often named Patron-Client relationships (thereafter PCs), have been described in SSFs around the world (e.g. Platteau and Abraham 1987, Merlijn 1989, Johnson et al. 2010, Crona et al. 2010, Basurto et al. 2013, Miñarro et al. 2016). However, the nature of PCs varies across different contexts, and traders (i.e. patrons) can play diverse roles (Platteau and Abraham 1987, Ferrol-Shulte at al. 2014). For example, traders can provide fishing rights, marketing services, credits, fishing equipment and/or other financial assistance; in exchange for labor, fish and/or money (Merlijn 1989, Basurto et al. 2013, Ferrol-Shulte et al. 2014, Miñarro et al. 2016). In addition to fisher-trader arrangements, informal agreements can be established among other participants in the supply chain. Economic sociology shows how exchange interactions are associated with social relationships and processes (Granovetter and Swedberg 2011). Partners involved in exchanging goods, such as traders, can create normative relationships that guide their behavior (Bagozzi 1975, Lusch and Brown 1996).
Therefore, exchange relationships among traders can also be considered self-governing institutional arrangements.
Self-governing institutional arrangements mediate between supply, demand and their feedbacks (figure 2), and influence SES sustainability (Basurto and Coleman 2010, Crona et al. 2015a, Lindkvist et al. 2017). For example, it has been suggested that fisher-trader arrangements impede sustainability. Traders can disconnect fishers from ecosystem dynamics and promote harmful fishing behaviors (e.g. Crona et al. 2010, Johnson et al. 2010, Miñarro et al. 2016, Nascimeto et al. 2017). By channeling seafood demand, traders could enhance ecosystem changes reducing the capacity of ecosystems to provide fishery resources (Biggs
et al. 2012, Thyresson et al. 2013). Still traders might be needed to face the uncertainty that characterizes SSFs (Platteau and Abraham 1987). They are embedded in a system of complex relationships and can have key functions in connecting supply and demand to maintain livelihood security (Drury O’Neill and Crona 2017). It is still unclear how diverse types of traders’ self-governing institutional arrangements affect sustainability in the supply chain (e.g. Ferrol-Shulte et al. 2014). For instance, sustainability outcomes may depend on particular characteristics of the governing system and the ecosystem (Mahon et al. 2008, Reddy et al. 2013, Leslie et al. 2015, Crona et al. 2015a).
This thesis analyzes SES sustainability following SES resilience concepts. I define SES sustainability as: actors’ adaptive capacity, within diverse institutional arrangements, to respond to ecosystem and market changes, while maintaining ecosystem structure and function. This implies analyzing adaptive capacity, which is part of resilience (Folke et al.
2010). That is, analyzing actors’ capacity to adjust responses to changing external drivers and internal processes, and remain within critical thresholds (Folke et al. 2010). The capacity of institutional arrangements to deal with complex SES dynamics is enhanced when social and ecological scales are aligned (Wilson 2006, Cumming et al. 2006), which is named social- ecological fit (Folke et al. 2007). It is therefore assumed that SES fit facilitates adaptive capacity to deal with ecosystem dynamics and avoid overexploitation (Cumming et al. 2006), and thus facilitates maintaining ecosystem structure and function. This thesis applies the concept of SES fit to analyze how traders and self-governing institutions deal with the social- ecological interconnections of the supply chain. It looks upon adaptability and ecological sustainability, acknowledging that other dimensions (e.g. equity, poverty) should be included in future research for an integral understanding of sustainability. One must note that adaptability alone does not imply sustainability (Mahon et al. 2008).
The conceptual framework adopted here (figure 2) is operationalized through a network perspective. This gives rise to a novel analytical framework to study diverse patterns of relationships among actors and between actors and the environment. Interpretation of these patterns follows the concepts guiding this thesis: self-governing institutional arrangements and SES sustainability with a focus on adaptability.
Analytical-framework:-The-supply-chain-as-a-web-of-interactions-
A network perspective is a relational approach (Wasserman and Faust 1994). It is used here to analyze relationships between the different social and ecological entities of a supply chain.
Relationships are conceptualized as linkages between entities (i.e. nodes), revealing patterns defined as structure (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Network structure can be associated with processes and specific outcomes (Bodin and Crona 2009). For example, measures of networks are used to evaluate policy outcomes (Lubell et al. 2011). In ecological systems, network structures can show species’ function in ecosystems and reveal ecological outcomes (Stouffer et al. 2012). In SES networks, structures can be associated with conservation and sustainability outcomes (Bodin and Tengö 2012). In this thesis, fish flow through a supply chain creates interactions that yield network structures. The structures represent exchange- based institutional relationships and can be linked to SES sustainability outcomes.
This thesis adopts a multi-level network approach, where levels refer to the different units of analysis and each level corresponds to an aggregation of different actors (Lazega and Snijders 2016). Three levels were considered: i) traders that sell in the city; ii) fishers that sell in the local communities; and iii) fish units targeted by fishers. The network captures exchange relationships between and within levels. However, the fisher-to-trader interaction captures the interdependency between two different levels of agency (Lazega and Snijders 2016). Both fisher’s and trader’s agency can influence access to fish units. This interdependency drives the assumption of a direct connection between traders and fish units. Hence, trader-to-fish relationships are conceptualized as a two-level SES network. See section 4.2 for a detailed description of this methodological approach.
4.'METHODS'
A mixed-methods approach was used applying qualitative and quantitative methods. First, I combined semi-structured interviews, participatory observation and surveys, to map stakeholders and their relationships. This provided an in-depth understanding of relationships and dynamics of the supply chain. Then, I used a multi-level network methodology to analyze structures and patterns within the supply chain. In addition, I used secondary data to characterize the finfish fishery and examine ecological sustainability.
4.1.'Data'collection'and'qualitative'analysis'
To map the finfish fishery supply chain, the data collection methodology targeted all stakeholders commercializing species fished in SC, from the fishing communities to La Paz city. Both a top-down and a bottom-up approach were used to map all relevant stakeholders and identify their trading relationships and their interconnection with different fish species.
On the one hand, I selected key informants with an extensive knowledge on the local commercialization system and then used a snowballing sampling technique, to identify the social entities in La Paz that commercialize fish from SC (Reed et al. 2009). On the other hand, I used a survey conducted to SC fishers in June-July 2016. The survey asked 52 fishers from the region to whom they sell their catch. This was used to identify traders at the first selling point and their relationship with fishers. It is estimated that the survey sample represents 70-75% of the fishing boats that operate in the fishing communities. 28 entities were finally identified as participants of SC’s supply chain, besides fishers. There was a high overlap between entities identified through the bottom-up and top-down approaches, suggesting that the most important stakeholders have been included (see appendix I).
23 of these entities were contacted applying two types of qualitative methods: 17 semi- structured interviews, and short-term participant observation methods. The characteristics of the interviews varied, ranging from 10-minute phone interviews to 1.5-hour in-person interviews, depending on interviewee’s availability and context. The participant observation targeted entities that comprise multiple actors, such as the municipal markets, and the fishing communities. These methods aimed to add information about the relationships among traders and between fishers and traders, and about their relationship with concrete fish species and the system dynamics. All information was captured in field notes or transcripts. This data was coded to build and validate the network and obtain trader’s attributes (section 4.2), and to characterize fish units. The coding process was based on content analysis (Bernard 2006).
The data was also coded to provide an in-depth understanding of the system, which allow for the interpretation of the network structures based on social and social-ecological processes.
This followed a grounded-theory approach (Bernard 2006). Appendix I provides a full description of the qualitative methods and their application to different entities.
4.2.'MultiUlevel'network'analysis''
The supply chain can be divided into two interrelated networks: the social network that comprises fishers and traders; and the social-ecological network that includes traders and fish units. The networks were analyzed to understand self-governing institutional arrangements, and how the different components influence SES sustainability.
Characterization-of-the-network-in-Southern-Corredor-
23 traders were contacted (section 4.1) and included for the network analysis, which is estimated to represent 81% of the traders of the supply chain. 21 traders (74%) provided information about trader-to-trader relationships. Trader-to-trader relationships were established from the interviews and participant observation methods, by coding them into two categories: “infrequent relationships”, which occur occasionally or less than once a month;
and “regular relationships”, which occur weekly, monthly, or during a specific season.
Fishers identified fisher-to-trader relationships through the survey method that was verified with participatory observation and the interview methods (section 4.1). These links were assumed to be regular relationships, unless the fisher specified to have an infrequent relationship. 43 fishers were finally included, those representing different fishing boats participating in the finfish fishery. In addition, the survey was used to characterize fisher’s attributes and to establish the connections between fishers and fish units. Fishers showed to be connected to 15 fish units defined as the most important (see appendix II). The trader-to- fish network was created merging the fisher-to-fish links with the fisher-to-trader network.
The trader’s connection to fish units assumes that the most important species for a fisher are also important for the trader attached. This may only hold true when fishers are strongly attached to one trader.
This network characterization presupposes several limitations. First, it does not capture all horizontal interactions within fisher and fish unit levels. Information about other types of social interactions was included through qualitative description. The ecological network developed includes trophic interactions based on secondary data (section 4.3). It does not consider other interactions between species that may be important. Hence, it is a first approximation to exemplify the utility of this interdisciplinary approach. Second, following the stakeholder mapping (appendix I), some trading entities are not captured in the analysis (e.g. fish shops). See appendix II for a full description of the network generation procedure and more information about representativeness and limitations of the network data.
Network-analysis-
Two different approaches to network analysis helped answer the research questions: a topological analysis of the supply chain; and an analysis of the structural signatures of the network (hereafter motifs, also called building blocks or structural configurations).
The topological analysis is used to study how trade interactions as a whole affect the structure of the supply chain (Webb and Bodin 2008). This facilitated the conceptual description of the supply chain. It shows how individual actors contribute to the network structure (Wasserman and Faust 1994). This was used to identify the importance and function of different entities in the supply chain. Importance was quantified through degree centrality measures and defined as the most active entities, or those involved in the most direct relationships with other entities (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Hence, importance is based on the total number of relationships (degree), but also on the choices of each entity to sell to other entities (outdegree) and on the number of entities that choose to sell a given entity (indegree) (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
The motif-based analysis is used to identify and define the micro-structures that form the network, and to reveal social and social-ecological patterns of interdependencies (Bodin and Tengö 2012). A wide range of theories from different fields can inform the interpretation of the motifs to link them to concrete outcomes (figure 3), assuming potential processes that can be related to the network structure (Bodin and Tengö 2012). Social motifs have been applied to other multi-level systems (e.g. McAllister et al. 2015, Wang et al. 2016). In this thesis, social motifs were identified and interpreted through the theoretical background of self- governing institutions. The analysis of SES motifs follow the classificatory framework developed by Bodin and Tengö (2012) and later applied to several study cases (e.g. Bodin et al. 2014, Guerrero et al. 2015, Bodin et al. 2016). This classification was adapted to account for a SSF supply chain context, based on SES sustainability and resilience concepts (e.g.
Folke et al. 2007, Biggs et al. 2012) and insights from empirical economy (e.g. Hakanson and Snehota 1995). Motif identification and interpretation was also informed by the qualitative methods conducted in this thesis. Hence empirically based knowledge helped associate social motifs with self-governing institutional arrangements and SES motifs with their sustainability outcomes. This generates informed hypotheses (Bodin and Tengö 2012) to answer the research questions guiding this thesis. However, causality cannot be inferred from this method alone (Bodin and Tengö 2012).
Figure 3. Examples of network motifs: a) and b) are SES motifs interpreted as (mis)fit and Common Pool Resource (CPR) management success/failure by Bodin and Tengö (2012) and Bodin et al. (2014); c) and d) are social motifs interpreted as collaboration across scales or within scales by McAllister et al. (2015). Circles indicate social actors; squares indicate natural resources; and diamonds indicate committees or working groups.
The analytical procedure relied on a frequency analysis of the motifs, which was tested against a null model of random networks (Bodin and Tengö 2012). Motifs can appear more or less frequently than in random networks, showing the structural composition of the empirical network (Bodin and Tengö 2012). The procedure has empirical and theoretical limitations that could be improved with alternative tools such as Exponential Random Graph Modeling (ERGM) (Bodin et al. 2016, Wang et al. 2016). Bodin et al. (2016) discuss the two analytical procedures and conclude that there is significant agreement between them.
Therefore, frequency analysis was selected as a simpler starting point for this thesis. ERGM would allow researchers to test pre-defined hypotheses with statistical significance in future studies (Lazega and Snijders 2016).
4.3.'Ecological'description'
Information regarding species was acquired from peer-reviewed publications that include study cases comprising fishing areas associated with SC. Data from Diaz-Uribe et al. (2007) were used to characterize the ecological network and species ecological attributes. Existing databases compiling fishing and ecological information in the region were analyzed to understand local exploitation trends. The databases were provided by Niparajá (local NGO).
See appendix III for a detailed description.
5.'RESULTS'AND'DISCUSSION'
Following the theoretical and analytical frameworks, I first describe traders and their self- governing institutional arrangements (question i). Second, I show the interactions between the social and ecological systems (question ii) by describing the supply-demand flow of the finfish fishery and the SES structures. SES sustainability is finally related to the traders and institutional arrangements (question ii).
5.1.'Diversity'of'institutional'arrangements'in'the'supply'chain'
Disentangling-traders-in-the-supply-chain-
Figure 4 shows the multi-level social network of fishers, traders, and their fish-trading relationships. The structural and qualitative analysis of this network yielded different types of traders, defined according to their function in the network and general attributes, which will be explained subsequently.
Figure 4: Fishers and traders’ network. The network shows fisher-to-trader and trader-to-trader relationships.
Size represents indegree centrality. Color indicates different types of actors: fishers (yellow); entrepreneur fishers (orange); patrons (red); intermediaries (brown); municipal markets (green). Shape represent the fishing rights of each entity: permit-holder (up-triangle); worker under other’s permits (down-triangle); cooperative (square); no permit (circle); un-known (diamond). For fishers who work under other’s permits, the permit- holder can be the connected trader, or another fisher or community member. Fishers without fishing permits have not been captured in this study. Red links represent infrequent relationships and black links regular
Four different types of traders were identified according to their connection with the fishers level, and if they are individual enterprises or market places (figures 4 and 5): 1) Entrepreneur fishers (orange); 2) Patrons (red); 3) Intermediaries (brown); and 4) Municipal Markets (green). Firstly, entrepreneur fishers own a truck and transport and sell fish in the city, besides fishing. They actively move across the two levels of analysis. Patrons and intermediaries are both fish-trading enterprises whose main activity is trading fish in the city. Patrons move across levels, as they collect fish in the first point of commercialization (i.e. beach) establishing relationships with fishers. Here, intermediaries only show relationships with other traders. The Municipal Markets are places that gather between four and seven fish shops and are considered reference points in the local fish commercialization system.
In addition, traders differ in their degree, indegree and outdegree centralities within the trader’s network. Based on these measures, three functions that traders have in the city’s supply chain were found (table 1): buyers, mainly receiving fish (high indegree centrality);
suppliers, mainly selling fish (high outdegree centrality); or exchangers, both buying and selling fish (similar indegree and outdegree measures).
Figure 5 summarizes the links observed in the trader’s network. It represents traders according to the categories of traders suggested in this thesis, which combine the type of trader and their function in the city’s supply chain (table 1). Intermediaries can be exchangers or have the function of buyers. Those who have the exchanger’s function are patrons elsewhere in Southern Baja California (outside the study case) and were included as patron- exchangers. Through this supply chain, ecosystems satisfy three different types of market demand that are described in section 5.2 (figure 6).
Table 1: Trader types associated with their function in the trader-to-trader network. The mean centrality measures, and the standard deviation (σ) of traders’ degree centrality, were calculated per trader type and function. N: number of traders. *In brackets is the number of traders with complete information that were included in the calculations. See appendix II for the full table.
Patrons that are exchangers tend to have more connections in the city supply chain than other traders (degree centrality, table 1). The importance of each exchanger varies (σ, table 1), and there might be a few actors with great importance in this supply chain (see appendix II).
Exchangers usually have a warehouse in the city, where fresh fish can be processed (e.g.
filleting), but not all exchangers own a warehouse. All exchangers except one are permit- holders (figure 4), and identify themselves as seafood producers besides being traders. They have fishers working for them in one or more communities in Southern Baja California.
These permit-holders have several fishing permits that allow them to exploit more than one
Figure 5: Conceptual map of the supply chain. The five types of traders identified (based on the network analysis) establish exchange relationships with other traders and satisfy three different types of demand. Exchangers and suppliers establish direct relationships with fishers or with the ecosystem. They also trade fish with other traders in the supply chain. In addition to the fish shops of the municipal markets, traders can own a fish shop and/or establish relationships with fish shops outside the Municipal Markets. Arrows show the fish flow: dotted lines, fishing; blue, trading across levels; black, flows in the trader’s network and their market connections; and red, infrequent relationships. Family ties can motivate infrequent relationships between fish shops of different municipal markets and between entrepreneur fishers and other suppliers.
having fishing rights in the whole state of Southern Baja California. This allows many to
“move” their permits or “their fishers” to different fishing communities or fishing camps depending on the season. Thus they produce a higher volume and they might have more flexibility regarding where and when they enter different fisheries.
Suppliers show different characteristics than exchangers (table 1 and figure 5). Suppliers land or receive fish in the fishing communities and sell in the city within one or two days, as they do not usually have a high storage capacity or freezing facilities. Most of them mainly trade fish from the study case. They can or cannot have fishing permits. Entrepreneur fishers tend to have fewer connections in the supply chain than other traders (table 1).
Regarding buyers, the three municipal markets in the city receive fish and sell it on the local market, mainly to local consumers. Some fish shops of the municipal markets are also suppliers to regional hotels and/or restaurants or local supermarkets, thus selling larger amounts on a regular or occasional basis. Table 1 shows that municipal markets are among the most important trading entities in this supply chain. Intermediaries usually specialize in satisfying a concrete type of demand. Two send fish to the international market, and two to the regional and/or national markets. It must be noted that two intermediaries are on the edge of the network (figure 4), and their role might not be fully captured in this supply chain because their connections with the SC region are scarce (see appendix II).
Following this breakdown of traders in the supply chain, the quantitative and qualitative analyses yield additional insights regarding the exchange relationships shown in figures 4 and 5. It quantifies and examines the diverse institutional arrangements across the supply chain.
Quantifying-self7governing-institutional-arrangements-
The exchange relationships between fishers and traders (figure 4) allow the empirical and theoretical identification of social motifs that will be the basis for the quantitative analysis (table 2). The motifs are described and interpreted based on qualitative insights resulting from interviews and participatory observation methods (table 2, empirical observations).
Most fishers in this study case can be permit-holders, but some are cooperative members or work under the permit of a permit-holder (figures 5 and 6). Cooperative members reported making decisions individually, and figure 4 shows how they can occupy positions in the network likewise other fishers. This type of cooperatives that are not “cooperatively managed” are common in the Mexican context (Cinti et al. 2010). Thus the cooperative motif
(table 2a) is not considered for further analysis, even though it has been found elsewhere in Mexico (e.g. Basurto et al. 2013, Lindkvist et al. 2017).
Fisher-trader relationships can create three types of structures related to noncooperative institutional arrangements (table 2b, c and d): Patron-Clients (PCs), sharing fishers, and freelance fishers. The supply chain is characterized by Patron-Client structures (figure 4 and table 2b), which resemble structures found elsewhere (e.g. Basurto et al. 2013, Lindkvist et al. 2017, Crona and Bodin 2010). There is a mutual commitment where traders can yield important functions for fishers (table 2b). Patrons have been defined as permit-holders (e.g.
Basurto et al. 2013), but not all traders linked to fishers are permit-holders, nor do all fishers attached to a permit-holder work under his/her permit (figure 4).
In addition to the PCs structure, some fishers sell to two or more traders (table 2c and d).
These are less attached to any particular trader, like the “multi-source clients” structure reported by Crona and Bodin (2010). Fishers selling to two traders (i.e. sharing fishers) maintain commitments with one or both (table 2c). They could be less reliable from the trader’s perspective needing to establish more than one relationship (Lindkvist et al. 2017). In general, traders seem to avoid sharing fishers (table 2c). However, when sharing fishers, traders tend to exchange fish with each other (table 2c), suggesting certain coordination between them. In other respects, freelancers (table 2d) are not constrained to sell to any trader, but they can establish informal arrangements with several traders. Only entrepreneur fishers take the role of freelancers in this empirical network (see figure 4). Entrepreneur fishers have been considered traders in all other analyses of this thesis.
Two motifs relate to the trader-to-trader network, which is interdependent with the fisher-to- trader network. “Fishers-traders coordination” refers to relationships between traders that are connected to fishers (table 2e); and “horizontal connectivity” to relationships between traders in the city (table 2f). Suppliers and exchangers that do not share fishers can exchange fish, but there is not a strong tendency to do so (table 2e). Regarding traders’ relationships in the city, the supply chain seems to enhance horizontal relationships between traders (table 2f).
network (red line in the histogram).Mean is the mean number of motifs that would be expected in the baseline model. If the observed number of motifs deviates significantly from the mean they are overrepresented (+) or underrepresented (-). For this motif-based analysis, entrepreneur fishers are considered fishers. The
“freelancers” structure is not quantified because entrepreneur fishers and their links might be underrepresented in this supply chain (see appendix I and II for data limitations).
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The exchange relationships mapped in this supply chain are traders’ self-governing institutional arrangements as previously suggested. The relationships mapped can be regular or infrequent (figure 4 and 5), but not discrete transactions. The qualitative methods reveal that infrequent relationships usually occur in the event of scarcity (higher demand than supply) or saturation (higher supply than demand), as compared to regular activity. In general, “each supplier has its buyers”, and vice versa. Most sellers prioritize not to
“struggle” when selecting an exchange partner, and unreliable or new partners can be disregarded. This can drive their engagement in institutional arrangements, as traders would reduce their daily transaction cost (North 1990).
The analysis of the institutional arrangements shows a highly connected system with numerous horizontal interactions (table 2). Suppliers do not only sell to buyers, which satisfy the final demand. Instead, the results show multiple relationships between similar and different types of traders (figure 5). As the theory foresees, relationships between traders are embedded in social processes (Bagozzi 1975, Lusch and Brown 1996, Granovetter and Swedberg 2011). Processes such as trust, reliability, reciprocity and dependence could be important factors influencing self-governing institutional arrangements, both between traders and between fishers and traders (see table 2, empirical observations). Moreover, some traders (i.e. exchangers) can provide assistance through infrequent relationships and promote dependency relationships (table 2), which might increase their power in the supply chain.
These processes promote stability in traders’ relationships, which can be a mechanism to deal with uncertainty (Lusch and Brown 1996), as it is discussed in section 5.4. However, traders can also consider the highest bidder, and some prefer not to establish stable commitments (table 2).
Overall, this data provides a first overview on the variety of traders’ relationships, opening the door for future research. Limitations on the interviewee’s availability and responses, and the lack of previous knowledge on the system of traders (appendix I), prevented the acquisition of more detailed information. For instance, this study could not estimate the frequency of trader’s engagement in each type of relationship or any other quantitative measure. One must note that this research is limited to exchange-based relationships.
Relationships could also be driven by other social characteristics, processes or structures
The Mexican fisheries management system could be related to the diversity of traders and institutional arrangements. Fishers are usually deprived of fishing rights because permits tend to accumulate in a few powerful individuals (Cinti et al. 2010, Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015).
Most exchangers hold several fishing permits. Thus, exchangers can control property rights often operating at a regional scale, acquiring power over production choices (Campling et al.
2012). This reinforces their role as patrons that facilitate fishing access to fishers (Cinti et al.
2010). From the opposite position, granting fishing permits to fishers could facilitate the emergence of “freelancers” or entrepreneur fishers. However, this thesis shows that property rights alone do not define the actor’s engagement in the diverse non-cooperative self- governing institutional arrangements. Some patrons (usually suppliers) do not hold fishing permits, and fishers with individual or cooperative property rights still engage in PCs. The social and ecological outcomes of providing property rights to traders and/or fishers should be further studied. More emphasis would be needed in the role of cooperative arrangements as compared to the institutional arrangements studied in this thesis. For instance, the lack of well-functioning cooperatives is a limitation of this study case.
5.2.$From$finfish$fishery$to$seafood$demand$
This section aims to understand how the ecological dimension is related to the social component of the supply chain. This will be important for interpreting the implications for ecosystem sustainability and adaptive capacity in the following sections.
Table 3 summarizes the social and ecological characteristics of the fish units identified in this supply chain. Finfish fishery aggregates several bony fish species. However, the species can have diverse contributions to the structure and function of the ecosystem (Bellwood et al.
2004, Stouffer et al. 2012). Species can play different roles in the markets (Crona et al. 2010), and fulfill different functions for fishers and traders.
Figure 6 shows how fish units are connected to different types of demand, and places fish units in the ecosystem according to their habitat (table 3). Different demands are defined based on the type of species demanded and purchase capacity. It is assumed that international demand has the highest purchase capacity and local demand the lowest. In this context, fishers and traders classify species into three categories depending on their market value (table 3, market role): “first-class”, the highest-value species; “second-class”, lower-value species but important for the local, national, and tourist demands; and “third-class” lower-
value species that are mainly commercialized in the local market. International and tourist demands are connected to higher trophic level species whereas lower trophic level species are sold in the local markets (figure 6 and table 3). This is by no means a new finding, as it has been found in other supply chains around the world (Thyresson et al. 2013). Besides the trophic level, seamount species are mainly fished for higher-value markets (figure 6). Hence, pressure from diverse types of seafood demand is differentially distributed across different fish units (Crona et al. 2010, Thyresson et al. 2013).
Table 3. Social and ecological characterization of SC’s finfish fishery. Ecological characteristics obtained from Díaz-Uribe et al. (2007).
Market role obtained from the qualitative research methods. Social-ecological importance of each fish unit is defined by its importance for fishers and traders based on the SES network analysis (degree centrality). Impact on populations is estimated through fish size (length) measures. Size trends indicate the increase, decrease or stability (=) in the mean length of fish landed. Positive (+) juveniles in catch indicate that most individuals landed (since 2009) are below or close to the mean size at first maturity. Size estimates were calculated from datasets from the local NGO Niparajá. Speckled flounder was not considered in network analyses due to lack of data. See appendix III for a more detailed description. ND: No Data.
In addition, traders can substitute species to satisfy customer’s demand. Pacific creoleofish, grunt, diverse groupers (e.g. Epinephelus spp., Paralabrax spp.), and ocean whitefish can all be sold as filets of small groupers to satisfy the local or tourist demand. Startstudded grouper and leopard grouper can be sold as grouper filets, but with higher prices than small groupers.
Filets of big groupers as such are often sold to restaurants and hotels, usually targeting the tourist demand (figure 6). If fresh fish is not available, hotels and restaurants can sell frozen products and even import fish such as tilapia and basa from international markets. These two species represent about 40% of Mexican seafood imports (CONAPESCA 2013). This process
Figure 6: Fish flow to final markets. The local ecosystem provides different fish units that reach market demand through the supply chain, from the fishing communities to the city. The diagram shows 10 fish units defined by fishing importance. All snappers have been united into one name and groupers include all other groupers not specified. Fish units have different roles in the ecosystem, here related to their habitat (white), and in the supply chain related to their end-market. Markets also receive different fish species from national and international scales, which could also be mediated by traders (not shown in the figure for simplicity). Arrows represent fish flow: black, to principal end-markets;
and red, to occasional end-markets.
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of species substitution is an ordinary practice on a global scale that impedes local overexploitation signals to reach consumer demand (Crona et al. 2015b).
Patrons and entrepreneur fishers are usually at the first point of commercialization, transport fish units, and distribute them in the city (figure 6). The social-ecological network that will be analyzed subsequently assumes a direct link between these traders and fish units. This assumes that traders influence fisher’s decision-making regarding what to fish. The qualitative analysis highlights that traders demand particular species, but they are constrained by species temporal and spatial availability for fishing. In general, traders were found to influence what species are fished. Traders inform fishers about the market price of particular species. Patrons can command fishers not to fish certain species based on market demand.
The dominance of PCs structures (table 2) suggests a high influence of traders in fisher’s decision-making, because traders reported selecting “good fishers” (e.g. those who fish the best species according to trader’s preferences) and can facilitate access to fishing equipment.
This aligns with findings by Lindkvist et al. (2017) regarding fisher-trader arrangements, where fishers engaged in a PC arrangement would be more reliable. Yet, fishers selling to two traders were also found (table 2), and some fishers were said to base their decisions on individual preferences regarding fishing techniques and gear availability. The extent of trader’s influence on fishers remains unclear and should be the focus of future research. A deeper understanding of this process would make the interpretation of the subsequent analysis more complete.
5.3.$Sustainability$of$the$supply$chain$through$a$network$perspective$$
SES motifs were identified, informed by empirical observations and existing literature, to hypothesize their implications for SES sustainability. The resulting framework (table 4) suggests how different patterns of ecosystem access; trader’s connectivity and social- ecological interdependencies may influence sustainability.
Table 4. SES motifs and their sustainability implications. The motifs identified in this study are classified in three groups related to the process being analyzed: ecosystem access, trader connectivity or social-ecological interdependencies. Examples describing sustainability implications have been obtained through qualitative research methods, and related to relevant literature, theory and sustainability concepts.
Table 5 shows the frequency analysis of the main SES motifs. Fish units tend to be targeted by many traders, but this tendency is not strong (motif “a”). Thus, there are few fish units that can be considered keystone resources. At the same time, there is a strong tendency to access diverse resources (motif “b”). This diversification strategy occurs through “multiple shared access” of fish units (motif “c”). Trader’s connectivity pattern points to a high presence of buffering structures, which dominates over structures where traders that share a fish unit do not exchange fish (motif “d”). Market distributors would be expected in any supply chain (motif “e”), but buffering structures would not need to be overrepresented in a supply chain connected mainly vertically (i.e. from supplier to buyer to consumer). Finally, the analysis suggests a tendency to suppress misfit (or mismatch) structures and promote structures indicating SES fit (motif “f”). These structures should be understood in the context of trader’s high tendency to establish PCs with fishers (table 2).
Table 5. Results of the frequency analysis of the main SES motifs. Histogram represents the frequency distribution of motifs expected in 1000 random networks (baseline model). Nº of motifs obtained from the empirical SES network is highlighted in red. Thin red line indicates when the number of motifs observed is outside the histogram range, which suggests an exceptional deviation from the mean. Mean is the mean number of motifs that would be expected in the baseline model. “+” or “–“ in the standard deviation (σ) indicates when the observed number of motifs deviates significantly from the mean.
5.4.$Adaptive$capacity$for$and$against$sustainability$@$hypotheses$from$two$
standpoints$
The supply chain shows patterns of interdependencies between and among the social and the ecological subsystems. These interdependencies are captured through the analytical framework suggested based on a network perspective. This study analyzes network structures that characterize a supply chain, and elucidates two hypotheses with implications for Small- Scale Fisheries sustainability. Yet, I acknowledge that any SES structure can yield more than one single outcome or measure to assess SES sustainability (Bodin and Tengö 2012).
Moreover, SES sustainability should be discussed and agreed upon based on a common set of desired outcomes, including diverse types of knowledge (Cornell et al. 2013).
Hypothesis+1:+Non9cooperative+self9governing+institutional+arrangements+
enhance+adaptive+capacity+in+a+SSF+supply+chain+and+can+promote+SES+
sustainability+
The Gulf of California ecosystem suffers great inter-annual and seasonal variations (Díaz- Uribe et al. 2007, Luch-Cota et al. 2010). The impact of fishing pressure might even vary depending on the environmentally driven fluctuations (Luch-Cota et al. 2010). In SSFs as such, adaptive capacity in both fisheries and market systems may be essential for responding to environmental variability (Mahon et al. 2008). Relationships are established among traders, and between fishers and traders, to provide responses in an uncertain and variable context (Platteau and Abraham 1987, Lusch and Brown 1996).
This thesis looks into the system of traders and finds horizontal and vertical patterns of interactions. The diverse institutional relationships from the fishing sites to the city create an adaptive network that links supply and demand across scales. Diversification, buffering, and social-ecological fit structures (tables 4 and 5) indicate the high adaptive capacity of the trader’s network. Local institutional arrangements alone cannot always deal with drivers at higher scales such the pressure from distant markets (Crona et al. 2015a, Brondizio et al.
2009). The system of traders includes within and across-level self-governing institutional arrangements. It can address the functional interdependencies of ecosystems – and social systems – that operate at diverse scales (Brondizio et al. 2009).
This study evidences that traders collaborate, more than being engaged in occasional economic transactions. Collaboration refers to entities working together (Kooiman and Bavink 2013). Several types of institutional arrangements mediate this collaboration across
