Preventing or redirecting violence: A study on violence against United Nations peacekeeping operations in the presence of other third-party military operatons

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PREVENTING OR REDIRECTING VIOLENCE

A STUDY ON VIOLENCE AGAINST UNITED NATIONS PEACKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF OTHER

THIRD-PARTY MILITARY OPERATIONS

Daniel Forslund Master's Thesis

Autumn 2020

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Lisa Hultman

Word Count: 21639

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Abstract

United nations peacekeeping is a contentious issue. What is mostly agreed on though, is that the brave men and women around the world risking their lives in peacekeeping missions around the world deserve the best security and protection the international community can offer.

However, little research has been focused on the reasons behind violence against peacekeepers.

This thesis theorizes that the presence of a third-party military operation that threatens the operational capabilities of rebel groups has the potential to cause an increase in rebel violence against a United Nations Peacekeeping operation in the same conflict. Through examining conflict dynamics in the cases of Mali and the Central African Republic utilizing of a structured, focused comparison, the hypothesized relationship and causal explanations were put to the test. The expectation was that in Mali, the high levels of violence would be explained by the effectiveness of the French counterinsurgency operation in the country. In the Central African Republic, the contrary was expected. However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed.

Due to some rather large caveats and limitations, the research gap could not be satisfied.

Nonetheless, the study creates plenty for avenues of future research, and opportunities to learn from the challenges encountered.

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Acknowledgements

This thesis came awfully close to never being finished. Thus, I owe several people a lot of gratitude for helping me getting here. First, I want to thank my supervisor, Lisa Hultman, for getting me on the right track and some invaluable pointers on how to go ahead with the research process. I also want to thank my friends, for continuously believing in me when not even I did.

And finally, I want to thank my Family, who have supported me without hesitation throughout this journey. Thank you.

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1. Introduction

Peacekeepers have always been at risk of becoming the target of physical violence and attacks as they are deployed to conflict zones around the world. United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to become one of the primary conflict management tools at the disposal of the international community (Sandler 2017). However, the nature of conflicts has dramatically changed since the first armed peacekeeping operation was deployed in 1956 and have become ever more complex and challenging. Consequently, UN peacekeeping operations have had to adapt over time, continually facing new challenges to all parts of their operation, including the security and protection of the peacekeeping personnel (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2019; Conley and Langholtz 2014; Sloan 2014).

The 2017 independent report “Improving security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business” (Cruz 2017) sheds light on the ever-growing challenges faced by the United Nations in its peacekeeping operations. The report reviews what the author identifies as a worrying increase in fatalities and injuries to uniformed personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations from 2013 to 2017. It discusses and analyses possible causes and solutions to what the report calls a number of fatalities that “go beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk”, calling for action to improve the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel.

The use of UN peacekeeping operations as a tool for not only conflict resolution but also for other tasks such as the protection of civilians in conflict environments has become increasingly common over the years. As a consequence, political discussion on issues like what role UN peacekeeping should play in conflicts has also gained traction. One recurring topic over the years has been the reluctance of western countries to contribute troops to missions deemed dangerous, presumably fearing for the safety of their troops and the risk of potential backlash at home (Tardy 2011). The positioning of UN peacekeeping operations in ongoing armed conflicts is another contested topic, where some argue that UN peacekeeping is not suited to operate in such environments (Karlsrud 2015; Tardy 2011).

With so much political discussion on topics closely related to the safety and protection of UN peacekeeping personnel, it would be no stretch to assume that academic research interest would be growing accordingly. However, this is not the case. The broader topic of UN peacekeeping operations has enjoyed a moderate amount of academic research interest over the years, with most research focusing on either the evolution of peacekeeping operations

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throughout history or the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations (Fortna and Howard 2008; Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova 2016). Meanwhile, the specific topic of violence against peacekeepers, under what circumstances it occurs and what motivates it, remains severely underresearched (Duursma 2019).

It is indeed only during the last decade that a small amount of academic research has attempted to shed some light on this phenomenon (Duursma 2019; Lindberg Bromley 2017).

It seems clear then that in order to gain insight into the motivations behind violence against peacekeepers, it is essential to examine the internal dynamics of the conflicts in which it occurs.

Research has shown that rebel groups experiencing battlefield losses against the government have incentives to target peacekeepers and as a result, are more likely to do so (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). Another factor that may cause UN peacekeepers to become targets of violence is if the peacekeeping operations are seen as part of the conflict rather than as an impartial third-party, which can happen through several mechanisms.

This thesis aims to contribute to the growing field of research on violence against peacekeepers and more specifically, the causes behind this phenomenon. An argument will be made, that some of the mechanisms that cause peacekeepers to become targets of coercive force can be triggered by the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict or area. Consequently, offering explanations to high levels of violence against peacekeepers.

The research question guiding the research process is:

How do third-party military operations operating in the same conflict as a United Nations peacekeeping operation impact rebel violence against the United Nations peacekeeping operation?

In order to provide an answer to the question posed, a theoretical argument is formulated and applied to a selection of cases, utilising the method of structured-focused comparison.

The thesis is structured as follows: First, a general overview of the research field on violence against peacekeepers, as well as peacekeeping as a whole is provided. Second, building on previous research, a theoretical argument is formulated, followed by a presentation of the research methods and case-selection. Subsequently, the cases are introduced and analysed, leading up to a final discussion that critically examines the results in the context of the research field as a whole.

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2. Previous literature

The transformation of UN peacekeeping from so-called traditional and monitoring peacekeeping operations into the increasingly complicated multidimensional missions we see deployed today has spawned plenty of research on peacekeeping in general, and over the last few years, also specifically around the topic of violence against peacekeepers. This research is of the utmost importance for several reasons. Duursma (2019) argues that one of the main reasons behind the obstruction and intimidation of peacekeepers is that the armed actors perpetuating the obstruction of peacekeepers are trying to make space for themselves to carry out attacks and violence against civilians. As one of the central parts of the mandate for most peacekeeping operations deployed today is the protection of civilians, including monitoring of human rights in conflict areas, the importance of finding a deeper understanding of the reasoning and driving factors behind this behaviour cannot be overstated. This section of the thesis will explore and present previous research around violence against peacekeepers and connected research, leading up to identifying and explaining the research gap that this thesis aims to fill.

Increase in fatalities among UN peacekeepers

While the notion that violence against UN peacekeepers has become more prevalent over the last couple of decades is without a doubt something to be taken seriously, it is also essential to look at the numbers presented to substantiate that claim. Beyond the policy reports and statistical numbers shown on the issue, there has also been some academic research taking a closer look at the aforementioned statistics (Henke 2016; Cruz 2017; United Nations 2020b;

Rogers and Kennedy 2014). In the 2017 independent report “Improving the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers”, Cruz (2017) quotes a consistent rise in fatalities of among UN peacekeeping personnel between the years 2013 and 2017. Moreover, not only did the total amount of fatalities among UN peacekeepers rise, but the report highlights a steep rise in fatalities resulting from malicious acts. The report quotes a total of 195 fatalities due to malicious acts during the four years between 2013 and 2017 and stresses that when put in perspective with the all-time total number of 943, the trend is a definite increase over the norm (Cruz 2017). The numbers in the years since the publishing of the report seem to be following the same trend. The year 2017 went on to become the deadliest in terms of fatalities due to malicious acts since 1994. The following years of 2018 and 2019, however, show an apparent decrease in such fatalities. Nonetheless, the numbers are still clearly higher than the all-time

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average of 15 fatalities per year due to malicious acts, resulting in the total number of fatalities of this nature amounting to a staggering 1048 (United Nations 2020b; Cruz 2017).

When looking at the numbers presented, it is tempting to conclude that peacekeeping has become more dangerous and more peacekeepers are dying due to malicious acts than ever before. The picture is not quite as clear-cut as that, however. Multiple scholarly articles have, with the help of statistical analysis, looked closer at the fatality-rates for UN peacekeeping over time. Rogers and Kennedy (2014) analyse the fatality data for UN peacekeepers, explicitly looking at the number of fatalities due to malicious acts. The data used is from between the years 1948 and 2012, with a more specific focus on the period between 2003 and 2012. The research concludes that the perceived spike in fatalities caused by malicious acts is somewhat misleading, demonstrating that when the malicious act fatality numbers are put in relation to the total number of peacekeepers deployed, no apparent percentage increase can be seen in the decade before 2012. Henke (2016) performs a similar statistical analysis in her paper “Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analysing Trends in UN Fatalities”. The conclusions drawn are similar to what is suggested by Rogers and Kennedy (2014). The statistical analysis performed for the period 1990 to 2011, accounting for the total number of peacekeepers deployed, shows a steep decreasing trend for not only the total fatality ratios but also in fatalities due to accidents and fatalities due to malicious acts.

The one category where an increase is found is fatalities due to illness. Therefore it is suggested that the notion that more peacekeepers die due to malicious acts, or overall for that matter, is misleading (Henke 2016). However, it is also stressed that assessing the risks of modern peacekeeping solely based on historical trends is not desirable, but further analysis into specific factors is needed.

So, the numbers are non-conclusive. On the one hand, the discussion about the perceived increase in the dangerousness of UN peacekeeping operations over the past decades seems to suggest that peacekeeping operations are increasing in danger as a result of the direction mandates have evolved (Cruz 2017; Henke 2016; van der Lijn and Smit 2015; BBC News 2015; Kugel 2014). On the other hand, statistical analyses show that in fact, there has been no significant trend-increase in total peacekeeper fatalities between 1990 and 2011. The same goes for fatalities caused by malicious acts and controlling for the total amount of peacekeepers deployed only further reinforces these results (Henke 2016; Rogers and Kennedy 2014; van der Lijn and Smit 2015).

There are, however, some important observations and takeaways one can make based

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perspective is essential. It may very well be the case that peacekeeping operations today are statistically safer than they have been in the past. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that 2017 was the deadliest year since 1993 in UN peacekeeping when looking at fatalities caused by malicious acts, and the years before and after were not far off. Arguably, more peacekeepers deployed should not necessarily mean more fatalities. It is also important to mention that the data used in most statistical analyses on fatalities in UN peacekeeping ends just before the increase in deadliness that is discussed in the report by Cruz (2017). It can also be somewhat misleading to look at statistics from the period between 1990 to 2011. The reason being that the extraordinarily deadly operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the Balkans (UNPROFOR) in the mid- the 1990s clearly explain a large part of why the trend in fatalities seems to be decreasing overall (United Nations 2020b; United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020b; Henke 2016). Lindberg Bromley (2017) also highlights another possible explanation as to why the trend for fatalities from malicious acts might be declining. Namely, it might very well be the case that peacekeepers have become better equipped to deal with violent attacks. As such, they may be increasingly targeted, without this altering the fatality statistics in any meaningful way.

Beyond numbers

In order to paint an accurate picture of what is known about violence against United Nations peacekeepers, one needs to look beyond fatality statistics and historical comparisons. The best way to solve a problem is often to find and address the underlying causes of the issue at hand.

As previously mentioned, research interest in violence against peacekeepers and the factors behind it has slowly grown over the past decade (Lindberg Bromley 2017; Duursma 2019).

Among the earlier scholarly contributions aiming to shed some light on what causes peacekeepers to become the targets of violent attacks, Salverda (2013) finds that rebel groups of with a relatively high military capacity are statistically more likely to engage in violence against peacekeepers. The proposed theoretical explanation is that when the rebel groups are weaker than their main adversary, the government, they may benefit from a peacekeeping operation that makes it more difficult for the government to force the rebels into total defeat through military mean. Vice-versa, if a rebel group perceives itself to be capable of potentially driving the government to concessions through the use of military power, having a peacekeeping mission separating the warring parties might be disadvantageous to this stronger rebel group. The main objective of the rebel group would, in the latter case be to

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discourage peacekeepers from intervening in the activities of said group or even provoke the total withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation (Salverda 2013).

Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016) argue that rebel groups that experience losses on the battlefield or other military setbacks in their central conflict with the government may have incentives to resort to violence against peacekeepers. The theoretical argument is based on rebels employing a bargaining strategy and offsetting military losses. The base premise is that when in armed conflict, the rebels and the government find themselves in a bargaining situation where the goal is to settle an agreement through the use of force. When the rebels face military losses, this causes a loss in bargaining power following the loss in coercive capacity but also increases the risk of losing civilian support or even the threat of fragmentation inside the rebel groups. As a result, the rebels might turn to violence against peacekeepers. There are multiple objectives for this behaviour. Mainly, rebels strive to prevent the peacekeepers from stabilising the conflict at an unfavourable status quo and also more broadly disrupt any peace processes, but also to demonstrate their capacity to the government.

The results of the statistical analysis offer support to the theoretical argument made (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016).

Most of the research discussed until now is based on data on peacekeeper fatalities.

However, as previously mentioned, the fatality statistics available do not always tell the whole story (Lindberg Bromley 2017; Henke 2016). More specifically, as a natural consequence of the fatality data becoming more readily available over the last few years, when looking at research about violence against peacekeepers, the focus on fatalities is clear (Lindberg Bromley 2017; Duursma 2019). Duursma (2019) takes a slightly different approach not explicitly looking at violence against peacekeepers, but obstruction and threats against peacekeepers. The argument is that intimidation and obstruction of peacekeepers are used strategically and serves the purpose of preventing them from fulfilling their mandate. In practice, this means that the goal of the rebel groups making use of intimidation tactics is to deny peacekeepers access to areas where violence against civilians is used as a tactic. This denial of movement effectively hinders peacekeepers from preventing this violence or gather intelligence on civilian targeting and other human rights abuses. One important takeaway from the study at hand is that direct physical violence against is not the only form of resistance peacekeepers face in conflict areas.

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Evolution of UN peacekeeping operations

As previously mentioned, one of the leading research interests and topics of discussions concerning peacekeeping is the evolution that modern UN peacekeeping has gone through over the last decades (Fortna and Howard 2008). Since both the mandate and type of modern UN peacekeeping operations are critical for the theoretical argument of this thesis, it is imperative to provide an overview of the main points of discussion.

Since the end of the cold war three decades ago, conflicts around the world have evolved in both type and prevalence, with the number of civil conflicts skyrocketing and the number of traditional interstate conflicts steadily declining (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2019). In this rapidly changing world, with large numbers of increasingly complex civil conflicts emerging, UN peacekeeping operations have also had to evolve rapidly.

After the failures of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia, the need for reform of UN peacekeeping doctrine became apparent, as political opinion around the world mostly began to question the effectivity of and turned against the practice of UN peacekeeping (Fortna and Howard 2008; Hunt 2017). The ‘Brahimi Report’, published in 2000 was one cornerstone of this peacekeeping doctrine reform, among other things, it reinterpreted the principle of ‘minimum use of force’ to permit the use of force in defence of the mandate and the peacekeeping operation itself (United Nations 2000; Hunt 2017; Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova 2016). In 2009 the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’ further reinforced the possibilities of UN peacekeepers to make use of force. This development of the doctrine still entails the use of force by UN peacekeepers at a tactical level and the defence of the operation mandate and in self-defence. However, ‘defence of the mandate’ has since, become all but synonymous with protection of civilians, neutralising potential ‘spoilers’ that might disrupt peace proceedings and also ensuring the freedom of movement for peacekeepers (Hunt 2017;

United Nations 2008a). The Capstone doctrine also identified the main activities of modern UN peacekeeping operations, namely: peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, including for example sizeable humanitarian components. It established that linking these activities together is critical to achieving peace and security in today’s world. This push for deeper integration of different objectives in peacekeeping operations has resulted in the so-called ‘multidimensional’ operations (United Nations 2008a;

United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020a).

The protection of civilians is an intrinsic part of modern UN peacekeeping operations.

In fact, over 95 per cent of all peacekeepers deployed today have a mandate for the protection

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of civilians (United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020a; United Nations 2015b). As preventing violence against civilians and monitoring human rights has emerged as arguably one of the top priorities of current UN peacekeeping operations, there is a broad conception that this priority has contributed extensively to the evolution towards a peacekeeping-doctrine that is more permitting towards the use of force (Hunt 2017; Sloan 2014). Indeed, for example, MINUSMA’s mandate: “Authorizes MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.” and “Requests MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture”(United Nations 2020d, 7), with one of the main objectives of the mandate being the protection of civilians (United Nations 2020d). It is, however, essential to recognize that while the focus on the protection of civilians may very well be a factor heavily influencing the necessity of the use of force in UN peacekeeping, it is certainly not the sole reason behind this trend.

UN peacekeeping has also become increasingly coercive in its approach to bringing stability to ongoing conflicts. As mentioned above, UN peacekeeping operations are also often authorized to ‘use all necessary means” to fulfil other parts of their mandate. Such activities could be, for example, conducting joint offensive military operations together with the armed forces of the host country government. An example of such authorisation is the ‘United Nations Force Intervention Brigade’ authorised and established in early 2013 under MONUC, with the primary objective of “neutralising armed groups” aiming at “reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security“ (Sloan 2014; Cammaert and Blyth 2013;

United Nations 2013a, 7).

Identifying a research gap

Given what the previous research discussed has taught us about violence against peacekeepers it is quite clear that the conditions in which peacekeepers face violence and the reasoning behind said violence are still a somewhat young topic of research, where many avenues remain unexplored.

There is also the fact that most studies conducted on the subject of violence against peacekeepers and the mechanisms behind it are large-N studies in the form of statistical analyses. This type of research is, of course, essential because it creates a basis for further research into the subject. However, statistical analyses have clear limitations in that the results mainly show trends and covariation. While this previous research has provided knowledge which shows that violence or threats against peacekeepers are more prevalent in specific

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environments where certain variables are present, it cannot look deeper into the proposed theoretical link between said variables and the outcome (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; Salverda 2013; Duursma 2019).

In order to get to the causal mechanisms between violence against peacekeepers and proposed causes, there is a need for more qualitative studies on the subject. While there are examples of case-studies on violence against peacekeepers, these studies are few and far between (Lindberg Bromley 2017).

As a result of the relatively mild scientific interest in the phenomenon of violence and other coercive behaviour against peacekeepers, many possible variables that might help us gain a better understanding of this behaviour remain unresearched. One such variable that has been largely overlooked by the current literature is the fact that UN peacekeeping operations often are not necessarily the only third-party military operations working within a given conflict environment. In fact, over the last few decades, UN peacekeeping operations working alongside other allied third-party military operations have been abundant. Some examples are:

MONUC was operational in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the same time as the European Unions ‘Operation Artemis’ in 2013; between 2014 and 2016 MINUSCA and France’s ‘Operation Sangaris’ were simultaneously active in the Central African Republic;

UNAMSIL and the British ‘Operation Palliser’ in Sierra Leone in the year 2000 and on a smaller scale even afterwards (Ucko 2016; United Nations 2009; 2015a; Hémez 2016;

Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace 2004; United Nations 2010; Howard 2019).

While the degree and type of cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and other allied military operations naturally vary a lot, such cooperation has undoubtedly been present in many mission contexts over the years. There is also a distinct lack of research touching upon the different forms this cooperation takes, not to mention what it means for the UN peacekeeping operations.

This thesis aims to examine the potential consequences of the cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and allied military operations. Specifically, the implication for the overall dynamic between insurgent groups and peacekeepers and violence against peacekeepers. Therefore, a theoretical framework that firstly, looks closer at the forms the cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and independent third-party military operations can take. Secondly, it examines how this might affect the dynamics between the UN operations and local rebel groups. Thus, it will provide further insight into the subject and undoubtedly benefit the research field as a whole.

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3. Theoretical framework

After having provided an overview of the existing research on the topic in the section above, the following section aims to construct a theoretical framework. The objective of this section is not only to explain why the research question How does the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation impact the level of rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation is interesting, but also to present a theoretical framework which will be able to provide an answer to the research question asked.

In other words, the goal is to build a link between the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation and violence directed at UN peacekeeping operations by rebels, explaining why, and how, the prior might affect the former.

Then, the objective of the hypothesis is to predict how the aforementioned effect might look once the theory is applied to the problem. In the following section concepts of the theory will be clearly defined. Then the different stages of the theoretical argument will be clearly defined and linking these together, will form a clear, logical and comprehensive theory.

Concepts and definitions

In order to be able to construct a robust theoretical argument effectively, it is essential, to begin with clearly defining some core concepts and variables used in it.

One of the essential issues to be discussed is the fact that this thesis will be concerned with United Nation peacekeeping operations exclusively. The United Nations is far from the only actor in the field of peacekeeping, with multiple other multinational organisations and even independent nations conducting peacekeeping operations. With NATO, The African Union and even The European Union being some of the international organisations that have engaged in peacekeeping over the last few decades (Gowan and Johnstone 2007; Barht Eide 2001; Bara and Hultman 2020). However, the UN remains arguably the most important actor in peacekeeping throughout history and today, as many of the non-UN peacekeeping operations deployed and operating under other organisations nonetheless act on a UN Security Council mandate (United Nations 2013b; Tardy 2019). There are multiple reasons as to why this thesis is concerned explicitly with UN peacekeeping operations. First, the issue of lethality in peacekeeping operations and much of the research on the topic is concerned explicitly with UN peacekeeping (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; van der Lijn and Dundon 2014).

Second, the vast majority of research conducted on peacekeeping is explicitly concerned with UN peacekeeping, meaning that most of the background knowledge that this thesis is relying

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on is only directly applicable to UN peacekeeping. Considering this, whenever the word peacekeeping is used in this thesis, it is to be seen as synonymous to United Nations peacekeeping, if nothing else is specified.

As the presence of conflict is a prerequisite condition for the theory, the term conflict also needs defining. A conflict is in this thesis defined as an armed conflict between two or more actors, concerning territory or governmental control.

Another important concept that needs defining and clarification is violence. In the context of this thesis, violence means the inflicting of physical harm on another party (Merriam-Webster dictionary 2020).

One of the main components of the theoretical argument of this thesis is the third-party military operation. In the context of this thesis, third-party military operation is defined as a military operation which is not a UN peacekeeping operation. It has primarily combat-oriented objectives in a conflict and is not one of the primary conflict parties.

Rebel group is also one crucial concept for the theoretical argument and empirics of this thesis and must, as such, be defined. In the context of this thesis, by ‘rebel group’ is meant a non-governmental armed actor participating in a conflict, which is hostile towards the government of the country.

Constructing a theoretical chain

3.2.1. UN peacekeeping as a fighting force – risks and rewards

The major driving factor behind the theoretical argument of this thesis is that the presence of an allied military operation in the same conflict area as a UN peacekeeping operation will affect how the conflict parties view the peacekeeping operation and consequently alter their behaviour towards said operation. There are multiple reasons as to why this might be the case.

First, as mentioned in the review of previous research on peacekeeping, some scholars have been concerned with the increasingly offensive and militarily robust stance that UN peacekeeping operations have moved towards over the last few decades. This concern stems from the notion that UN peacekeeping operations are ill-suited for carrying more offensive military tasks and operations (Howard and Dayal 2018; Howard 2019; Karlsrud 2015). In other words, the fear is that UN peacekeeping operations cannot handle what according to both scholars and others, is more akin to peace-enforcement tasks rather than peacekeeping. The reasoning as to why the UN is not suited to handle these tasks is complex. Karlsrud (2015)

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highlights some of these concerns, arguing that there is a significant difference between UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice. While UN peacekeeping doctrine has evolved towards adopting a more lenient stance in terms the willingness to use offensive military capability and coercive force as a whole, in practice, it seems to many that even the operations in Mali and the Central African Republic which are regarded among the most military capable operations are not equipped to implement their mandates effectively (Hunt 2017).

The arguments against UN peacekeeping operations increasingly being positioned as robust military actors and utilising offensive military tactics are many. It is not only the iconic blue helmets and white-painted vehicles designed for the sole purpose of attracting attention that pose a challenge to the fighting capacity of UN peacekeeping operations. Some arguments suggest that it is the organisational nature of UN peacekeeping operations that severely impedes the effectiveness of said operations as a fighting military force. The fact that UN peacekeeping operations are by nature decentralised has a clear detrimental impact on the ability of the operations to conduct complex military operations. Even though the troops serving in a UN peacekeeping operation are technically subordinated the UN military operational chain of command, and thus not acting under their national command, there are many examples of troops being reluctant to act on UN commands (United Nations 2008b; Karlsrud 2015).

Furthermore, the very heterogeneous nature of the uniformed personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations in terms of nationality presents significant challenges on its own.

Language barriers between troops, differences in military culture, discrepancies in the quality of training and equipment are only a few of the challenges that are inherent to the structure of most UN peacekeeping operations and impede their effectiveness as a fighting force (Howard 2019; Karlsrud 2015).

As a consequence of the UN peacekeeping operations arguably not being suited to engage in combat operations, some scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that the increased militarization and increased tactical use of force may lead to some unintended consequences and outcomes.

The most immediate consequence argued to result from peacekeeping operations relying too heavily on forcible measures to fulfil their mandate, is an increase in one-sided violence and collateral civilian fatalities (Howard 2019; Cammaert and Blyth 2013; Hunt 2017). There are plenty of examples of peacekeepers using a forcible approach to further mission objectives and causing the civilian population being targeted as a result (Hunt 2017;

Howard 2019).

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Some scholars have also argued that another effect of UN peacekeeping operations turning to more combat-oriented is the loss of impartiality. Impartiality is one of the three basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping. It is seen as a crucial requirement to ensure the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2008a). It also enables the UN to ensure accountability for the use of force in conflicts. Furthermore, the impartiality of UN peacekeeping missions lends peacekeepers protection under international law because they are not considered a party to the conflict as long as they do not take part in direct hostilities (ICRC 2020). In practice, peacekeepers are also less likely to become targets of violence if they do not present an immediate military threat to the position of the conflict parties (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). However, for example, in the case of the UN Force Intervention Brigade established under MONUSCO in 2013, the UN went out to directly neutralize by military force, specific parties in the conflict at hand, effectively becoming a party to the conflict. Consequently, the impartiality of the UN operation has been called into question (Lamont and Skeppström 2013; Karlsrud 2015).

3.2.2. UN peacekeeping and allied military operations

As mentioned above, UN peacekeeping operations and allied military operations operating in the same conflict scene is far from a rare occurrence. UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, ONUCI in Cote d'Ivoire, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and MINUSMA in Mali are examples of the UN operating alongside allied military operations (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019).

How and to what extent these UN peacekeeping operations and allied military operations have cooperated in different conflict settings have significantly varied over the years. Howard (2019) briefly discusses the prevalence of this cooperation between what is called ‘ad hoc’ military interventions and UN peacekeeping operations. The general conclusion is that this type of cooperation has resulted in varying degrees of success in terms of the UN peacekeeping mission being able to fulfil its mandate or a conflict zone. There is little mention of what might explain this variation in success, but ineffective coordination between the operation is pinpointed as one potential variable in cases with less success (Howard 2019;

Fortna and Howard 2008).

This thesis will attempt to prove that the presence of an allied military operation in the same conflict area as a UN peacekeeping operation has potential to severely impact the amount of violence directed at the personnel of said peacekeeping operation by rebels. The theory will

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attempt to make the argument that the severity of said effect largely depends on the capacity of the military operation to effectively threaten the operations of the rebels as well as the amount and form of cooperation between the UN operation and said military operation.

3.2.3. Causal mechanism

This section will provide a detailed walkthrough of the different stages in the proposed causal mechanism theorized to explain the proposed effect of the independent variable on the outcome in the dependent variable.

The starting point of the theoretical argument is a combination of a handful of different factors. First and foremost, the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in a conflict. The other main component is the presence of a second third-party military operation in the same conflict that is not part of the UN peacekeeping operation. As the theoretical argument relies heavily on the interplay between the UN operation and the allied third-party operation, it is important to specify what is meant by “the same conflict” in the context of this study. There are multiple ways one could define this concept, depending on the kind of mechanisms examined. One way would be to specify a particular geographical area, such as a country where all the actors are present—alternatively specifying a certain kind of interplay between the missions and the same conflict actors. However, as will be explained shortly, this study is concerned with mechanisms that rely on the interplay and relation between the main parties to the conflict and the UN peacekeeping mission and the military operations. Especially the relations between the non-government or rebel side of the conflict and the two external parties are of interest. As such, there is a need for a distinction which combines the two. The most crucial distinction is that both the UN peacekeeping operation and the military operation must operate in the same geographical area as the main conflict parties. The cooperation between a UN peacekeeping operation and a third-party military operation in the same conflict space can look completely different depending on the specific conflict at hand. The theoretical argument of this thesis strives to make is that this cooperation has the potential to ultimately lead to an increase in rebel violence levelled against peacekeepers.

The mechanism connecting the independent variable to the dependent variable will be presented as split up into two parts that are not mutually exclusive, but rather only reinforce the effect of the other.

The first one of these two theoretical pathways follows the theoretical logic proposed by Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley (2016). The central main is that when rebel groups

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face military losses and a superior opposition on the battlefield, their behaviour will be impacted in several ways. The whole premise is based on the conflict at hand being understood as a bargaining situation in which parties try to settle an agreement through the use of force.

The nature of such a bargaining process is that the beliefs of the parties about their own strength and capabilities as well as the overall balance of power between the parties are what governs their willingness to either sustain armed conflict or make concessions. As a consequence, this means that it is in the interest of all parties to the conflict to hide their own real capacity from the enemy and conversely, find out as much as possible about the military capacity of their enemies. However, the parties also have the incentive to through signalling convince their adversaries that their own capacity and resolve to keep fighting is high.

One of the most reliable sources of information about the enemy’s capacity and resolve is battlefield outcomes; this is because these outcomes are often quite concrete and difficult to falsify. Not only do battlefield losses serve as a clear signal to a group’s adversaries about the military capacity and resolve of said group, but they also have a direct negative effect on the actual fighting capacity and resolve of the group. Multiple factors are contributing to this reduction in fighting capacity and resolve. Perhaps the most direct factor is that military setbacks have a depleting impact on the resource base of a group, both in terms of material resources and manpower (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; Wood 2014).

Furthermore, rebel groups, which often rely heavily on civilian support in their area of operations, also face the risk of losing civilian support following poor battlefield performance as civilians are generally reluctant to support the seemingly losing side in a conflict (Lyall 2009). Finally, losses suffered on the battlefield by rebels also have the potential to cause fragmentation inside a rebel group. This fragmentation may destabilize the rebel group, which further impedes its ability to conduct military operations and solicit civilian support. (Christia 2012; Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). These factors combine to suggest that rebel groups are put in a position where if they are facing an adversary which is militarily superior and thus likely to inflict heavy losses to the rebel group in direct combat, the rebel groups might turn to softer targets such as for example civilians or United Nations peacekeepers. Summarizing what has been said: when rebels cannot stand up to an adversary with means of direct military confrontation, they will look for other, more unconventional ways of showing strength and resolve, including shifting targets and attacking relatively softer targets such as UN peacekeepers (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; Hultman 2007).

According to Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016), this violence towards peacekeepers serves two primary purposes. First, it serves as an attempt to prevent the

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peacekeepers from freezing the conflict at a point where the rebel side is at an unfavourable bargaining disadvantage. Second, they are an attempt to offset the previously mentioned mechanisms of fragmentation and loss of civilian support by showing successful battlefield results and signalling resolve to the enemies of the group. Furthermore, attacking international actors or other third parties may also serve the purpose of discouraging these parties from becoming further involved in the conflict as this may appear too costly.

It is the latter of these two suggested rationales behind rebel targeting of peacekeepers that is of high interest in the context of this study. While Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016) argue that specifically battlefield losses, are the catalyst for the mechanisms described above. This study argues that there is no absolute need for battlefield losses in order to trigger the mechanisms described. Even the threat of said battlefield losses or the presence of a superior enemy is enough to cause the same behaviour. There is no conceivable reason as to why rebel groups would not be able to identify an adversary that it is unable to directly match on the battlefield, even without first suffering large losses on the battlefield. This is evident from prior experience from conflicts where rebels have elected to make use of irregular tactics and unconventional warfare rather than face their opponents on the battlefield (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Bueno de Mesquita 2013).

This is not too much of a stretch from the theoretical argument originally outlined by Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley (2016). Nevertheless, it is important to specify why it fits the premise of this thesis. Only the presence of a peacekeeping mission is generally no reason for rebel groups to take military action against the said mission. This is because peacekeepers seldom mount a direct challenge to rebel groups on the battlefield. This is not the case for other third-party dedicated military operations. This is because military operations of this kind are generally designed to be able to engage in and sustain direct combat, hence a situation arises where rebel groups find themselves in the exact situation described earlier.

Unable to stand up to a stronger adversary in terms of direct military confrontation, the rebel groups then resort to the targeting of other less militarily capable entities, such as UN peacekeeping missions.

Naturally, not all rebel groups are the same, and it is essential to discuss how this may influence the theoretical proposition of this thesis. Some existing literature on rebel capacity and violence against third-party personnel such as peacekeepers suggests that rebel groups that are relatively weak compared to the government they are fighting, are more likely to favour the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict. Conversely, rebel groups that are

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deployment of a peacekeeping mission. This is because as was briefly mentioned earlier, stronger rebel groups see the peacekeeping operation as an obstacle to their struggle against the government. Weaker groups, on the other hand, may see the presence of peacekeepers as an advantage as the peacekeepers would act as a buffer between them and their relatively stronger foes. According to this view, groups that are weakened by battlefield losses would be expected to cease hostilities rather than target peacekeepers (Salverda 2013; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013).

However, according to Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016), this does not apply for rebel groups that chose to sustain their armed campaigns even in the presence of a peacekeeping force. This is because when these groups suffer losses on the battlefield, they might draw the conclusion that the peacekeeping force does not offer sufficient protection towards facing losses against the government, or in the case of this study, the other third-party military operation. Furthermore, as the rebel group faces an opponent it cannot match on the battlefield, and maybe even suffers military losses in the presence of a peacekeeping operation, this has the potential to empower so-called hardliners in rebel groups, which may gain from making use of non-conventional warfare and attacks against softer targets because these actions may paint the whole group as extremist and hard to deal with. The reason hardliners in these groups would benefit from this, is because this makes it increasingly difficult for moderate proponents in said groups to possibly cede hostilities and adopt a more lenient stance towards third party interventions such as UN peacekeeping (Kydd and Walter 2002).

The second part of the theoretical argument driving this thesis revolves around the concept of the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation tainting the perceived impartiality of the UN peacekeeping operation and thus making it a target of violence. Previous research shows that UN peacekeeping in Africa has historically sided against rebel groups and with the government in the overwhelming majority of cases where bias can be detected (Benson and Kathman 2014). This at least partly lies in the fact that host-country government consent is often required for a UN peacekeeping mission to deploy, causing rebels to more often than not perceive the peacekeeping force as aligning with the government. This perceived bias is further amplified when considering that the rebel groups that sustain their military operations even after the deployment of peacekeeping operations are likely to feel that peacekeepers impede on their ability to do so.

In some cases, rebel groups may also suffer losses in direct combat with peacekeepers as a result of direct collaboration between peacekeeping forces and the government. In cases like this, and in the light of what has been previously discussed it seems only logical that rebels

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might have increased incentives to try to weaken the presence of the peacekeeping force with the aim of strengthening their own position in the conflict (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016).

When applying this knowledge to a context where the rebel groups active during the presence of a peacekeeping mission only strengthens the theoretical premise of this study.

Considering a situation where the rebel groups are not only fighting the government but also face the threat of a third-party military operation, the effects described above should only be amplified. This is because not only is there a distinct possibility that the objectives of said third- party military operation may explicitly or implicitly involve direct hostility towards the rebel groups. A non-UN third-party military intervention operating in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation is also highly likely to directly cooperate with said UN peacekeeping operation in some way (Hellquist and Sandman 2020). This direct cooperation would naturally reinforce the picture of the UN peacekeeping operation as biased towards the direct adversaries of the rebel groups. As a result, there is a high chance that rebel groups perceive UN peacekeeping operations active in the same conflict as another third-party military operation as biased, increasing the likelihood of the UN mission to become a target for violence.

In summary, then. The presence of an allied military operation which threatens the operations of rebel groups in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation will increase the amount of violence directed at the UN operation by the rebel groups. This is because the rebel groups are not able to stand up to the dedicated military operation on the battlefield and may even sustain losses on the battlefield from combat with the operation. As a consequence, the rebel groups are threatened by diminishing material resources and internal structural problems. In order to amend these issues and signal strength, the rebel groups will resort to attacking softer targets such as the UN peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, as the military operation, which is a direct opponent to the rebel groups, often shares some type of direct cooperation with the UN peacekeeping operation. Rebel groups may perceive the UN peacekeeping operation as biased and aligning with their direct enemy, further increasing the motivation for the rebels to mount attacks against peacekeepers. As such, the hypothesis proposed is:

An allied third-party military operation threatening the operations of rebel groups in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation will increase rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation.

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Figure 1 – Suggested Causal Mechanism

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4. Research design and case selection

The purpose of the following section is to outline the specific method used and other research design decisions made in order to be able to correctly answer the research question with the help of the theoretical proposition laid out in the previous section. This includes the main method of analysis utilised, the operationalisation of theoretical concepts and variables, as well as discussion on case selection, sources and data collection. Finally, a clear overview of the empirical analysis will be provided.

Research method

In order to be able to test the hypothesis thoroughly, this thesis makes use of a qualitative comparative research design. The choice of a small-N qualitative research design is motivated by the nature of the theoretical puzzle and research question of this thesis. A qualitative design seems to be the best fit for properly examine the causal mechanism proposed by the theory, as the hope is to be able to provide a richer analysis of the observation than for example more extensive statistical approaches would. As such, the method of “structured, focused comparison” (Powner 2014, 129) has been selected. The method of structured, focused comparison provides a good balance between the validity of statistical studies and the rich detail provided by more intimate case studies. The method itself provides a clear research path that can be divided into a couple of distinct stages. The first stage of the process entails formulating a set of clear questions corresponding to the research objective. These questions serve to examine the phenomena detailed by the proposed theoretical framework in an unbiased and clear way. The second stage is to pose these questions to all the selected cased. This results in very structured and easy to follow results to be analysed. Combined with a strict and precise case selection strategy, this approach should result in good comparability between the cases.

Furthermore, the well-structured nature of this process ensures that the study also remains focused on the phenomena of interest. Hence the name structured focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005).

Operationalisation

One of the most challenging tasks in the research process is the operationalisation of the variables and concepts relevant to the thesis. Simply put, operationalisation is the process of

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making concepts and variables measurable by assigning them attributes and measurable indicators.

The independent variable of this study is a third-party military operation threatening the operational capacity of rebel groups in a conflict. As often is the case when researching the behaviour and inner workings of rebel groups, this introduces a handful of challenges regarding data availability. While having access to the internal communication of rebel groups to get a look at the intentions and workings of said groups would be ideal, it is self-evident why this is not possible for this or most other studies for that matter. Instead, it is necessary to develop alternative ways to deduce whether rebel groups perceive that the presence of the third- party military operation is impeding on the ability of the group to conduct and sustain military operations.

One way that one could possibly get information about the position and intentions of a rebel group is by looking at the public messaging of the group and especially that of its leadership. This kind of information has the potential to be extremely useful but also needs to be taken with a grain of salt. This is because, even though public messaging and statements about the intentions of the group and on its stance towards the third-party military operation might give some insight on otherwise black-boxed information, it is important to take into consideration that it is often in the interest of rebel groups to misrepresent or overrepresent their intentions and capacity (Fearon 1994; Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016).

This is exacerbated by the precarious position the rebel groups in question are presumed to find themselves in when facing a militarily superior foe as suggested by the theoretical argument of this thesis. Nonetheless, this information is far from useless. When combined with other information, public signalling from a group could in-fact be immensely helpful.

Another way of gathering information about the intentions of a rebel group and what situation the group perceives itself to be in is to simply look at the nature of the military engagements the group is participating in. Following the theoretical argument proposed, rebel groups would be expected to sway away from direct military confrontations with the third- party military operation. This does not mean that rebel groups will not mount any armed opposition to the third-party military operation. Still, they might utilise more unconventional warfare rather than engage in direct large-scale combat.

An additional indicator of the independent variable for this study is rebel groups suffering significant losses on the battlefield to the third-party military operation. Losses like these are an explicit, almost impossible to falsify example of the independent variable having the effect proposed by the theory.

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As for the dependent variable, which is the amount of rebel violence levelled against the UN peacekeeping operation in the area, there are multiple considerations to be made. One would be tempted to only look at numbers of peacekeeper fatalities due to malicious acts, as this data is readily available from the United Nations. However, the theoretical argument states that rebel groups that are not able to match their main adversary on the battlefield will resort to attacks against a softer target such as UN peacekeepers. This means that all attacks against the UN peacekeeping mission in the conflict are not necessarily relevant to this analysis. It is thus necessary to examine and take into account which rebel groups are perpetrating the attacks against peacekeepers. This is to ensure that only the attacks committed by groups that have been affected by the third-party military operation are seen as indicators, as stated by the theoretical argument. However, it is not necessarily the case that the exact same rebel group that commit an attack against UN peacekeepers must have been in direct contact with the third- party military operation. This is highly dependent on the specific case, but it is not uncommon for rebel groups to form alliances and cooperate (Gade et al. 2019). Consequently, this must be examined on a case-to-case basis.

Additionally, an argument can be made for the fact that if a rebel group commits violence against a UN peacekeeping operation in a strategic manner, with the motivation of offsetting their losses through showing strength and resolve as outlined in the theoretical proposition, they are likely to publicly claim responsibility for said violence (Abrahms and Conrad 2017).

Since this study is not only concerned with a covariation between the independent and the dependent variable, but also with the causal mechanism proposed by the theoretical argument of the thesis, it is also important to examine factors that might strengthen this argument. The cooperation between the third-party military operation and the UN peacekeeping operation is one of these indicators. This indicator should be relatively easy to measure or observe. Official statements of cooperation by the parties are a clear indicator of cooperation. Furthermore, activities such as joint military operations or logistical support are also clearly observable indicators of cooperation. Moreover, the language used by rebel groups about the UN peacekeeping operation might indicate whether the rebel group regards the UN operation to be an enemy party in the conflict.

Finally, there is one more decision to be made, which is of the utmost importance to the execution of the research design. Conflicts can be very long-lasting and modern peacekeeping operations tend to follow suit, with some operations active today stretching back over multiple

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cases over an extended period of time, the scope of this project prevents such an approach.

Instead, a period of one year will be examined for both cases. A one-year period is suitable because it provides enough time for data availability to be good while still being focused enough to allow for more in-depth analysis and discussion of the findings in each case. This will also be further discussed at a later stage.

Questions

Based on the operationalisations and indicators identified above. The following set of questions have been formulated to be applied to the cases selected in order to identify indicators to support the proposed hypothesis:

Independent variable – third-party military operation threatening the operational capacity of rebel groups in a conflict.

1. What objectives do the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active publicly state/display?

2. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active significantly altered their military operations? How?

3. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active suffered battlefield losses to the third-party military operation?

Dependent variable – Rebel violence against UN peacekeeping operation.

1. Are there attacks on the UN Peacekeeping operation? If so, which rebel groups are perpetrating these attacks?

2. Do rebel groups claim responsibility for the attacks?

Causal mechanism

1. Is there cooperation between the UN peacekeeping operation and the third-party military operation? Is this cooperation observable from the outside?

2. Do the rebel groups in the area of the third-party military operation use language or otherwise communicate that suggests they see the UN peacekeeping operation as an enemy in the conflict?

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Case selection

One of the main challenges of a qualitative comparative case design is the selection of comparative and representative cases. The importance of a good case selection cannot be understated when it comes to producing accurate and reliable results. The first step in a good case selection is determining the population of interest. This means setting parameters from inside which the cases are chosen. Considering the theoretical argument presented and the objectives of this study the following section will outline the population of interest, present and discuss the case selection strategy employed and finally present the case selection.

The population of interest for this study has been restricted to conflicts where both a UN peacekeeping operation and a second third-party military operation are active during the same time period. A further prerequisite for cases is that there still must be a degree of ongoing conflict in the area, even in the presence of the UN peacekeeping operation and third-party military operation.

The most common way of conducting a comparative research design is to compare two or more cases and through variations in variables be able to deduce knowledge about each case.

In the case of this study, the cases have been selected by using Mills method of difference which entails selecting cases that are as similar as possible to each other on as many variables as possible while differing on either the independent or dependent variable. As such, the researcher should be able to draw conclusions based on the outcome of the unknown variable (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe 2010; Powner 2014). The cases have been selected based on variation in the dependent variable, that is the amount of rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping mission. The hope is thus, to be able to track the outcome of the dependent variable back to the variation in the independent variable with the help of the indicators outlined in the research design section.

Even though a population of interest has already been defined, it is still of utmost importance for the validity and generalisability of the results of the study to make an attempt to choose cases which are similar on factors such as geographical location, which can impact a large number of variables. The cases for this study have both been selected from the continent of Africa. Although it is more than a stretch to assume similarity between two countries or conflicts just because they are both located on the world’s second-largest continent, this definitely has its perks when it comes to keeping variables constant across cases. Firstly, although Africa is the most ethnically and culturally diverse continent on earth, many of the countries in contemporary Africa share a relatively similar recent history (Green 2013).

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Namely, the colonialization of all but the whole continent of Africa in the late 19^th century to the mid-to-late 20^th century has left somewhat similar cultural and societal remnants in many countries across the continent. Examples of this would be that many of the former French colonies in Africa suffering from challenges with developmental efforts, or the development of legal structures akin to those of European countries (Njoh 2000; Rios and Dobkin 1968;

Joireman 2001). Again, this may be an extensive generalisation. However, it is nonetheless within reason to make the argument that this will result in a more similar case selection than if the geographical factor was to be disregarded entirely (Austin 2010).

It is also essential to consider the objectives and mandates of both the UN peacekeeping operations and the third-party military operations in both cases. It is of utmost importance for the comparability of the cases that the mandated of the UN missions do not differ substantially from each other in key areas that may impact their relations with the rebel groups in the conflict at hand. An example of this would be one of the operations having a mandate for the protection of civilians, while the other one does not. This would mean that the mission with a mandate for the protection of civilians is far less limited in its ability to make use of armed force towards rebels or by denial of movement or other means disrupt the operations rebel groups that rely heavily on civilian support (United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020a;

Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019).

Additionally, only cases where the third-party military operation has distinct objectives which position them as adversaries to rebel groups in the conflict will be considered, as this will ensure that there is an equal chance for the independent variable to activate. Suppose one of the third-party military operations where to be aligned in a way which puts them on the side of the rebels; this should not trigger the causal mechanism proposed by the theory and as such.

In that case, it cannot have an effect on the dependent variable.

Based on the case population of interest and considering the abovementioned factors, two cases have been selected: The conflict in the Central African Republic in the year 2016 and the conflict in Mali in 2016. The time period of one year is chosen because it ensures a necessary data availability as some information and statistics of interest may only be categorized by year. It also ensures a long enough period for events to unfold in the chosen cases. The reason as to why the time period is not more extensive is that considering the scope of the research process, a more extended time period may have a negative impact on the depth and quality of the analysis. The reasons for selecting specifically the year 2016 for both cases are to keep as many factors as possible constant, for example, military doctrine and weaponry change considerably over time, and these factors may impact the outcomes. 2016 was also a

Preventing or redirecting violence: A study on violence against United Nations peacekeeping operations in the presence of other third-party military operatons