Are we our brains?

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Are we our brains?

A philosophical analysis

By: Job Budé

Master’s Thesis, 15 ECTS

Master’s Program in Cognitive Science, 60 ECTS Spring term 2020

Supervisor: Christian Löw

2 Abstract

In this thesis, the research question is: are we numerically identical to our brains? My answer to this question will be that we are identical to a psychological conscious entity, instead of a physical brain.

In order to answer the research question, several theories on personal identity are investigated.

Firstly, personal identity is introduced and different theories on what humans are discussed.

Secondly, several answers to the persistence question will be given. This question asks what it takes for someone to persist from one moment to another. Thirdly, arguments for identifying persons with their brains will be given as well as objections to these arguments. Here, the focus will be on Nagel and Parfit’s discussion whether we are our brains. Fourthly, arguments against identifying persons with their brains will be discussed as well as objections to those arguments. Arguments for why we are something else then a brain are presented in this section. Animalism and Parfit’s embodied person view will be debated and objections discussed. And finally, I will discuss all the relevant positions and elaborate on my own answer to the research question.

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1. Are we our brains?

Are we a brain or do we have a brain? In this thesis, this question is examined and several theories regarding brains will be discussed. Whether we are a brain is part of the bigger question of what we as humans are. The domain of personal identity is one of the areas in which this question is debated.

At the very least, the brain seems crucial in explaining human behaviour. Human behaviour is closely tied to your memories, which are stored in the brain. A change in brain configuration can result in a change of behaviour. So, the brain is pivotal in the personality of humans. The question remains whether or not we are our brain. Several theories of what humans are will be discussed in this thesis. In the first section, the debate of personal identity and different answers to what we are will be introduced. In the second section, arguments for identifying persons with their brains will be discussed, as well as objections against the brain view. Here, I will discuss Nagel’s take on the brain view and arguments for it. The arguments will be evaluated and the most important objections to it debated. The third section will entail several arguments for why we are not our brains and

objections to these arguments. In this section, arguments for animalism and objections to it will be discussed, as well as Parfit’s view on personal identity and objections to it. Finally, I will conclude the discussion by providing a probable answer to the research question in relation to the theories discussed.

2. Phineas Gage and personal identity

One of the most famous cases in psychology and sciences investigating the mind is the one of Phineas Gage. Phineas Gage was a railroad worker, who had a horrible accident in 1848. After setting a charge for blowing away rocks, Gage was distracted by his men. He turned his head into the blast zone and an iron rod was driven through his frontal lobe. To everyone’s surprise, Gage survived the unfortunate sequence of events, but his brain was damaged in several parts, which led to a change in his personality. After the accident, it seemed that Gage, who was a reasonable man before, had forgotten his ethical values. People in his surroundings claimed that Gage had become crueller and took no responsibility for his actions anymore. The difference was so notable, that some even reported that the man after the accident was no longer Phineas Gage. Even though Gage remembered wat happened to him, his actions after the accident were so distinct that people started to see him as a different person. Pre-accident Phineas seemed to be too different from post- accident Phineas for people to regard the two as the same person. Due to a lack of certain

magnitude of similarity, Gage’s identity relation does not hold. This identity relation is a crucial aspect of personal identity. The people in Gage’s surroundings did not recognize him being the same person, because his personal identity changed too much, as a result of damage to his brain.¹ This seems to indicate that personal identity is brought about by the continuance of the brain. The concept of personal identity will be discussed in more detail the next section, because it is relevant for answering the main question of this thesis.

The Phineas Gage case raises questions about personal identity. In this thesis, I consider the question: Are we our brains? This question encompasses several aspects. The first is the concept of

‘we’. We have to consider what ‘we’ are, i.e. what are humans? What humans are is a big part of the debate on personal identity. Personal identity can be defined as the concept you develop about yourself as opposed to the concept you develop about other things. It encloses who you are as a person, as well as all of the thoughts and memories that you have about your own identity. Personal identity theorists ask what we are and what it takes for us to persist. Hence, personal identity deals

1 Tobia (2015) states this in the beginning of his essay

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with philosophical questions that arise about ourselves by virtue of us being people. This contrasts with questions about ourselves that arise by virtue of us being living things, conscious beings, material objects, or the like.Personal identity encloses the construct of sameness, i.e. the identity of humans.When discussing personal identity, the notion of numerical identity has to be understood to define sameness. When two things are identical it means they are the same. Numerical identity is the kind of identity that is held between a thing and itself absolutely. When the thing and itself are one and the same, they can never come apart from each other. When something is numerically identical to itself, it counts as one thing, instead of two. Numerical identity is the relation everything has to itself and to nothing else. Some theorists (Parfit, Olson) claim that personal identity is not a matter of numerical identity. Therefore, instead of an all-or-nothing relation, they claim that personal identity is a matter of degree. When personal identity is regarded as a matter of degree, it allows for a change in personality. Parfit and Olson’s theories will be discussed in more detail in section 4 of this text.

Another notion that needs to be understood is identity through time. This involves the so-called persistence question. It can be defined as: What does it take for an entity to persist from one moment to another? If x exists at one time and y exists at another time, under what circumstances can you conclude that x is y? If x turns out to be y, x persisted through time and x and y are

numerically identical to each other. In the case of personal identity the persistence question asks what it takes for a human to persist from one time to another. To persist through time it is necessary that someone who existed at a certain time pertains enough of the same features, to be regarded as the same person, at a different time. In Phineas Gage’s situation, pre-accident Gage is not

numerically identical to post-accident Gage and there is no persistence between the two, because the features he had after the accident differ too much from the features he had beforehand.

Because of The change in his physical brain and ultimately his behaviour caused his friends to no longer recognise the man they thought they knew. The two different Phineas Gages cannot be regarded as the same person because the difference between them became too big, according to people from his surroundings. Even though the person Phineas Gage survived the accident, his identity relation did not hold between the two events. This raises the question: What are the necessary conditions for someone’s identity to continue to exist?

2.1 Answers to the persistence question

Answers to the persistence question can be divided into four main groups: brute-physical views, psychological-continuity views, narrativism and anticriterialism. All of these views will be briefly introduced in this section, while brute-physical view and psychological views are also discussed in more depth in the next sections. The first group, brute physical views, hold that physical continuity is necessary for one to persist. Brute physical views usually deploy some version of the physical

criterion of personal identity. This criterion holds that enough of the same physical body has to persist for you to continue to exist as well. You are identical to a physical body, or at least a part of it.

You are that past or future being which possesses of your body. The view that we are identical to our brains is an example of a brute-physical view. The brain view states that there is a physical organ, which produces thought and you are numerically identical to it. Nagel (1986), for instance, claims that we persist if the brain persists and that we are numerically identical to the brain. Furthermore, the brain also seems to be the most important part of the physical body for personal identity. Every other part of the body is expendable and replaceable, without resulting in a change in identity, except for the brain. When the brain gets altered or replaced it will have a huge impact on the

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identity of that person. Therefore, some regard the brain to be of crucial importance for personal identity.

The second group of views that addresses the persistence question are psychological-continuity views, which hold that some psychological relation is necessary for one to persist. Here, a continued existence of a psychological entity is required for someone to continue to exist. Psychological views hold that humans are numerically identical to some sort of psychological entity or consciousness instead of some physical relation. In psychological views, the physical criterion is substituted by the psychological criterion, which holds that the continued existence of a purely mental entity is

sufficient for personal identity. You are that future being which inherits its mental features from who you are now and you were that past being whose mental features you already have inherited. An example of a psychological-continuity view is the Lockean view. Locke (1960) claims that: “a human is a person, a conscious intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different time and places.”² (Locke, 1960, p341) In a Lockean sense, personhood is defined by sufficient psychological continuity between two thinking entities. Parfit’s (2012) interpretation of a Lockean person is that: “if some future person would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, which implies, enough of the same brain, this person would be me.”³ (Parfit, 2012, p7). Psychological views do not necessarily have to exclude brute-physical views. It could be the case that both forms of continuity are required for someone to persist. Both brute physical views and psychological views try to answer the question what makes us human. Some apprehension of this question is required, before trying to answer the question whether we are our brain, or merely possess a brain.

The third type of answer that can be given to the persistence question comes from narrativism.

Narrativism is the view which holds that persistence is about the stories we tell ourselves. We generally understand our own lives in terms of a narrative. This means there is an agent, capable of performing different actions, and we identify with this person. You are a past or future being if its narrative agrees with who you are now. This is a view Schechtman (1996) defends. This answer to the persistence question will not be further elaborated in this text.

The fourth and final answer to the persistence question is given by anticriterialism. Anticriterialism states that there might not be any persistence necessary for identity to hold. Physical and mental continuity can be evidence for personal identity, but they do not guarantee it and are not always required. Of all of the four views mentioned above, anticriterialism is the poorest understood and least popular. Merricks (1998) is an advocate of this view. In this thesis, the focus will be on the brute-physical and psychological continuity views, in order to answer the question whether we are our brains.

3. Arguments for identifying persons with their brains and objections to it

The view that we are a brain is a version of a brute-physical view. Brute physical views claim that the answer to the persistence question has to involve some sort of physical continuity. In brute physical views it is often assumed that you are a physical body, or at least a part of it. Brute-physicalists take the physical part of the body to be the most important one. The existence of non-physical entities

2 Locke (1960) states this on page 341

3 Parfit (2012) discusses Locke on page 7

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such as a soul is irrelevant for brute-physicalists when discussing personal identity. Brute physical views imply physicalism but not necessarily materialism. According to materialism, everything that exists is materialistic and can be directly observed. Materialism was a popular view in science until the discovery of several non-material forces, like gravity. While gravity is not materialistic, it is physical, as its existence can be demonstrated. These discoveries gave rise to physicalism, a nuanced version of materialism that includes non-material but physical phenomena. Everything that is materialistic is physical as well, but not all that is physical has to be materialistic.

Brute-physicalists believe that if you lose too much of your original physical body, you can also lose your personal identity. The physical criterion states that the continued existence of enough of the same body is sufficient for personal identity. A nuanced version of the physical criterion is the brain criterion. The brain criterion holds that instead of continued existence of the whole body, only enough of the same brain has to persist. The view that persons are identical to their brains is therefore a version of a brute-physical view. The brain also seems to be the most important part of the physical body for personal identity. The information about my personality is stored in the brain.

You could lose almost every part of your body without resulting in a change in personal identity.

However, when you lose your brain or if it stops working, your personality is also lost. If you imagine a case where the brain would be transplanted, the usual intuition is that you would go with your transplanted brain and leave an empty body behind. Does this mean that we are numerically identical to the brain? The head transplant thought experiment will be discussed more in depth in the objection against animalism in section 4. Nagel (1986), who is a brute physicalist, does believe that we are numerically identical to our brains. Parfit (1984), holds on to a psychological account of personal identity and objects to Nagel’s theory. In the following section, Nagel’s (1986) and Parfit’s (1984) debate whether the brain view is a good fit for personal identity will be discussed and evaluated.

3.1 Brain view according to Nagel

Nagel (1986) defends the view that we are a brain and hence adheres the brain view. The argument that Nagel deploys consists of three parts. The first part of Nagel’s argument is that we are identical to a physical part of our body that is capable of thinking. Nagel (1986) distinguishes between two worlds, a mental and a physical world. The mind inhabits the mental world, while the body is a part of the physical world. Mental events are hard to explain physically and vice versa, however, Nagel (1986) believes the two distinct worlds have to be fitted together. He claims that the brain is the best solution we have for bridging the gap between the mental world and the physical world. Nagel (1986) believes that: “a true conception of the mental world, however much objectivity it attains, must admit the mind’s irreducibly subjective character.” (Nagel, 1986, p25) We still have to fit the mentality of the mind into the same universe with that physical world, which can be described in accordance with the physical conception of objectivity (Nagel, 1986). Our bodies are physical entities with physical parts, like the central nervous system. This is the same for the bodies of all other organisms capable of mental activity. Nagel (1986) claims that our understanding of the physical reality is quite objective, however, the physical world also gives rise to mental elements like a mind, that have a subjective point of view, a wide range of experiences and mental capacities. These mental capabilities cannot be explained by psychophysical reduction alone, so how can they be properly explained? One possible answer someone might give to this question is that the physical parts cannot give rise to a mind and something else has to be added. This something else is the immaterial bearer of mental properties, for example the soul, which consists of different parts than the physical body. Nagel (1986) finds that, however dualism of the mind and body is conceivable, it

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is also implausible. According to Nagel, there are better alternatives than dualism because the relation between the mental and the physical is more intimate than dualism can account for. One of the most important objections to dualism is that it postulates an additional, non-physical substance without explaining how it can support subjective mental states where the brain cannot. From the conclusion that mental and physical events are not the same, it does not follow that the existence of mental events can be explained simply by conceiving of a type of substance whose sole function is to provide those events with a medium (Nagel, 1986).⁴

Moving to the second part of the argument, Nagel discusses essential properties. Every objects has essential properties, without these properties, the objects could not exist. Nagel (1986) claims that properties are essential because of the meaning of our words. A square, for instance, essentially has four sides as property. On the contrary, it is not possible to conceive of a square with three sides instead of four. Then, Nagel (1986) makes a comparison between personal identity and gold. The term gold is applicable without knowing what it really is. You can understand that it refers to a shiny metal without knowing its chemical formula. The prescientific idea of gold includes a blank space that is later filled in by empirical discoveries about its true nature. Currently, Nagel (1986) claims, there is a blank space in personal identity that might, in time, be filled by empirical discoveries. I can refer to myself without knowing what I really am.

The combination of these two parts brings us to the final part of Nagel’s argument. According to Nagel (1986), empirical discoveries about personal identity have to settle the subjective-objective gap. These discoveries have to be something that has further objective essential features than included in the psychological concept itself and has objective persistence as a necessary condition for personal identity. Scientific discoveries that have characteristics like above can add information to the psychological concept and elucidate unclarities about personal identity. By filling in the blank space of the concept of personal identity with the brain, subjectivity and objectivity can be

connected. Nagel (1986) continues that the brain is an objective physical organ which produces subjective experience. The persisting entity that I am in the objective order underlies the subjective continuities of that mental life I call mine. The brain is the core of my identity because it is the bearer of my subjective mental states and the cause of their continuity. The brain is the only part of the objective physical body whose destruction I probably will not survive, therefore, continuity of the brain is essential to my identity. According to Nagel (1986), one of the conditions that personal identity should meet is that identity is something in which the flow of consciousness that I have takes place. The idea of personal identity would be an illusion, if there were no such thing, but this is not the case. The idea of personal identity is not an illusion and the brain is the best option we have for bridging the gap between subjectivity and objectivity and filling in the blank space in personal identity.⁵

The parts in Nagel’s argument are that for one, the two different worlds of subjectivity and objectivity have to be fitted together. There has to be something that can bridge the gap between them. The second premise is that there is a blank space in personal identity that we need to empirically discover about. Right now, our knowledge about it is limited. The third part that Nagel (1986) states is that the empirical discoveries about personal identity have to settle the gap between the subjective and objective. These discoveries should uncover some subjective truth about the psychological concept of the self, while also simultaneously unravel the objective entity that I am numerically identical to. Following these premises, Nagel (1986) comes to the above mentioned

4 Nagel (1986) discusses this in pages 28 and 29

5 In pages 40-45, Nagel (1986) discusses empirical discoveries and blank spaces.

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conclusion that the brain is the best option to bridge the subjective-objective gap, as it can account for a combination of a subjective mind as well as an objective physical part of the body. According to Nagel (1986), more knowledge of the brain could also be that discovery about personal identity that we are currently missing. If we do turn out to be numerically identical to our brains, then the gap between subjectivity and objectivity automatically disappears, according to Nagel. Nagel’s (1986) argument is non-deductive as it provides a plausible but not necessary answer to his premises. In his view, the brain is the best possible answer to the problems that are presented, however it is not the only answer that is possible. It does not follow logically from the premises that the brain has to necessarily be that unknown item in personal identity which also bridges the subjective-objective gap. According to Nagel (1986) the brain is just the best option we have now. Nagel’s argument is plausible because it provides a clear answer to philosophical problems that have existed since antiquity. Therefore, the implication of the argument should at least be taken seriously. In the next section, Parfit’s objection to Nagel’s view in particular will be discussed.

3.2 Parfit’s objection to Nagel’s brain view.

Parfit (1984) formulates several explicit objections to Nagel’s brain view. According to Parfit (1984), two of Nagel’s arguments in defence of the brain view appeal to a view about meaning and

reference.⁶ The first objection that Parfit formulates involves Nagel’s notion of essential properties.

All objects have essential properties that define it. According to Nagel, these properties are essential because of the meaning of our words. Parfit (1984) agrees with Nagel on the one hand, but also claims that some essential properties exist because we discover facts about what we are referring to.⁷ In the case of a triangle, Parfit (1984) would agree with Nagel that it is an essential property of a triangle to necessarily have three sides. If it would have less or more sides, it would no longer be a triangle, simply because of the meaning of our words. However, Parfit then goes on to state that some essential properties exist regardless of our words, rather, they exist because we empirically discover these properties. According to Parfit, we have discovered that the atomic number 79 is an essential property of gold, but this has never been part of the meaning of the word ‘gold’. It is possible to conceive of a substance similar to gold, which we can call gold, but which has a different atomic number. Therefore, the essential properties of gold do not depend on the meaning of words.

However, the fact that essential properties do not depend on the meaning of words is not

indispensable for Nagel’s argument. Therefore, this objection from Parfit is not a very strong one.

The second objection from Parfit to Nagel applies to our use of the word ‘I’. When someone uses the word ‘I’, his intended referent is himself. The term ‘I’ refers to the subject of my experiences, or the person who has these experiences. Nagel states that: “what I am is whatever in fact makes it possible for the person Thomas Nagel to identify himself and his mental states.” (Nagel, 1984, p470) What I am explains the psychological continuity of my mental life. If certain states of the brain underlie the mental capacity of psychological continuity, then, according to Nagel (1986) that brain in those states is what I am. Nagel also believes that there is nothing else, other than the brain, which could be the subject of my experiences. Parfit (1984) starts his argument by stating that persons, what he believes to be the subject of my experiences, are not separately existing entities.

The existence of a person involves the existence of his physical body, his brain and the occurrence of mental states. However, a person is an entity that has a body, a brain and experiences, instead of an entity that is identical to the brain, like Nagel claims. Then, Parfit (1984) states that an attempted

6 Parfit (1984) states this on page 469

7 Parfit (1984) disagrees with Nagel on page 468

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reference might fail. It might be the case that an object fits some of our beliefs about a certain intended referent. But this might not be enough reason to actually make this the object we are referring to. It is very plausible that we also have other beliefs about our intended referent, which would be false when applied to that specific object. Parfit (1984) states that ‘I’ does refer to the subject of my experiences, a person, but not to the brain.⁸ Parfit (1984) adds that the brain does not have most of the properties that matter when discussing personal identity.⁹ For instance, it does not have a continued existence that is all or nothing, nor is it indivisible. When we use the word ‘I’, the brain is not similar to what we believe to be our intended referent. Therefore, when we use the term

‘I’ we are in fact not referring to our brains, but to ourselves. Parfit’s objection is an important one as it highlights what we are actually referring to when discussing personal identity. However, if a person is the subject of my experience, this does not necessarily imply that we could not be our brains. Nagel, for instance, could reply that what Parfit regards as a person, which is the subject of my experiences, is in fact numerically identical to the physical brain. It just depends on what you regard to be the subject of your experiences. Parfit claims a person is the subject, while Nagel states that it is the brain.

Now we turn to the third and final objection from Parfit to Nagel. Nagel and Parfit both agree that personal identity relies on psychological and physical continuity. On Nagel’s view, what really matters for persisting is personal identity and the continued existence of his brain. Parfit argues that in order for you to persist, what matters is psychological continuity and connectedness instead of personal identity and the existence of the brain. Psychological connectedness is the holding of direct psychological connections, while psychological continuity resides in overlapping chains of these connections. According to Parfit (1984), person X and Y are numerically identical to one another if there are direct memory connections between them. If person X can remember an experience person Y had 20 years ago, they are the same person. The continuation of memory result in psychological continuity. Parfit (1984) claims that psychological connectedness holds over time to reduced degrees. However, the continued existence of our physical brain is not a matter of degree and consequently not what matters for personal identity, according to Parfit (1984).¹⁰ Brain cells get replaced gradually, just like every other physical cell. At one point in your life, all the brain cells you once had, will be replaced with new ones. In this sense there is no continued existence of the same brain, but you are still you. Now, imagine instead of gradual replacement, the whole brain is being replicated at once. Do you still remain you, or does your personal identity change as well? To show why continued existence of the brain is not what matters, Parfit discusses the Case one & Case two thought experiment and compares two ways of replacing brain cells.

Case one & Case two. Imagine that someone needs surgery because his brain cells have a defect, which could be fatal. A surgeon is able to replace all the brain cells in two different ways. In case one, the surgeon performs a hundred operations. In each of these, the surgeon removes a hundredth part of his brain and replaces it with a replica. In case two, the surgeon removes all the parts of his brain and then inserts all of their replicas (Parfit, 1984).¹¹

8 Parfit (1984) formulates his objection on page 471

9 Parfit (1984) makes this claim on page 473

10 Parfit (1984) claims this on page 470

11 The Case One & Case two thought experiment is introduced on page 474 by Parfit (1984)

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In case one, each new part of the brain is joined to the rest of the brain, similar to gradual replacement. This allows for each new part to become a part of the brain. In case two however, because each new part is not joined to the rest of the brain, they do not count as parts of the original brain. Therefore, the original brain ceases to exist. Nagel claims that what matters is personal identity and I am my brain. Parfit claims that on Nagel’s view, case one would result in life while case two would result in death. However, the difference between the two cases is so small that such distinct results are hard to believe. In both cases, the person’s brain will be composed of the same new components, the only difference is the way these components are inserted. According to Parfit (1984), case one will be just as good as ordinary survival, while case two will be nearly as bad as ordinary death of identity. If the difference between case one and two does not really matter, there are two alternatives: either identity is not what matters, or I am not my brain. Parfit (1984) claims that the first alternative, identity is not what matters, is supported by an imaginary case of a split brain. Here, two people each have the half of your original brain. Your relation to each of the resulting people contains everything that would be needed for ordinary survival. The two resulting people share the same memories and are psychologically continuous with you. Your brain continues to exist and now instead of one life, it supports two.According to Parfit (1984), your relation to each resulting person is what matters, instead of personal identity.¹² Your relation to the two people resides in psychological continuity, with any cause, according to Parfit. The cause of psychological continuity, which Nagel believes to be the brain, is of less importance for Parfit, because the psychological continuity is already expressed in the relation you have to the resulting persons.

Furthermore, Parfit (1984) does not agree that his fate depends on the small difference between Case one and Case two and he claims that these cases suggests that I am not my brain.¹³ This third objection from Parfit to Nagel is the strongest one against the brain view. It shows why it is problematic for personal identity if we would be our brains. Our identity is not divisible, while the physical brain is. If you start removing parts of the brain, at what point would the person stop being himself? These questions are difficult to answer if we would be our brains, therefore, Parfit denies this possibility. In the next section, Nagel’s reply to this objection will be discussed, specifically as a reaction to split-brain patients.

3.3 Nagel on split-brain patients.

Parfit (1984) utilizes the example of split-brain patients as an argument to show why personal identity does not really matter, but psychological continuity does. However, what really does happen when the brain would get split is not clear. Can you regard the minds of the resulting persons as the same as the mind that existed before the operation? Are the resulting people psychologically continuous with the person that existed before the operation? According to Nagel (1971), a single mind has immediate access to its own conscious states and experiences. When a single person has two visual impressions, he can compare the two different experiences. Nagel believes the

experiences of a single person takes place in an experientially connected domain. Different conscious states are characterized by a certain internal coherence, where a unity of consciousness exists. Nagel (1971) hypothesizes that the hypothetical split-brain people have two minds, as a result of their brains being split. We can only imagine what it is like to be one of these individuals, but not both at the same time, because we only have access to one connected mind. Following the

hypothesis that split-brain people do have multiple minds, Nagel (1971) questions what the origin of

12 Parfit (1984), page 476

13 Parfit (1984) on page 477

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this second mind is. Have the two minds always existed, in coherence with each other, until the brain was split and each mind went with its associated half of the brain? Or is there usually only one mind and the second mind only arises when the brain gets split in half?¹⁴ Nagel claims that in favor of the view that the two minds have always existed, it can be argued that each side of the brain seems to produce its own experiences. These experiences are connected with one another but not with the experiences of the opposing side. The two halves of the brain share a body, a midbrain and a spinal cord, but their higher cognitive functions are independent of each other. According to Nagel (1971), the real difficulty of accepting the two-minds hypothesis resides in the reasons for thinking we are usually dealing with one mind. In ordinary circumstances, when the brain is not being split, the two halves function normally. When a person experiences something, there is a unity of the two minds that results in one experience. There are no left or right part of the brain experiences, you just perceive them as one. Nagel (1971) states that in ordinary situations, we can ascribe all experiences to the same person with only one mind. Nagel continues that it would be weird to suggest that we actually have two minds, just because of some of the peculiarities about how the integration is achieved in hypothetical split-brain patients.¹⁵

The two-minds hypothesis is problematic because it cannot explain why we usually regard the two minds as one. Therefore, Nagel (1971) suggests that the second mind is brought into existence when the brain gets split. However, Nagel claims that this solution is not plausible either. Firstly, he states that the hypothesis is completely ad hoc, as it proposes to explain one change in terms of another without suggesting any explanation of the second. Nothing in the experiment is expected to produce a fundamental internal change in the patient. The existence of a second mind is so unusual, Nagel (1971) claims, that it would have to be explained by something more than its explanatory

convenience.¹⁶ Secondly, Nagel (1971) states that the behavioral evidence would not even be explained by the hypothesis, because the patients integrated responses and dissociated responses are not clearly separated in time. Dissociation arises when the integrated, direct, functions of consciousness are disrupted. The patient is functioning largely as if he is a single individual, the two halves of his brain cooperate, except in regard to those special inputs that reach them separately.¹⁷ For these reasons, Nagel (1971) claims that the hypothesis that the second mind comes into existence when the brain gets split is also not a realistic option. According to Nagel (1971), the fundamental problem in trying to understand a second mind in mentalistic terms resides in that we take ourselves to be paradigms of psychological unity.¹⁸ Because we only have one mind, we are unable to imagine what it would be like if we had two. Because Nagel (1971) believes the two minds hypothesis is implausible, he does not agree with Parfit (1984) that when the brain gets split, the resulting people would be psychologically continuous with the person that existed before the operation. In addition, Nagel (1971) also denies Parfit’s (1984) objection that we are not our brains, because Nagel believes the objection is derived from an imaginary and implausible case. On Nagel’s (1971) view, hypothetical split-brain cases hold no real ground and the brain is still the best solution we have for bridging the gap between the subjective and objective and filling in the blank space in the personal identity debate. It is true that we do not yet know what would happen to someone in the split-brain case. Therefore, everything that is derived from the imaginary case will remain speculative until we develop the right technologies. However, if you think of split-brain cases as a thought experiment, like Parfit does, several implications still hold. For instance, it shows why personal identity and physical continuity do not really matter for persisting, but psychological continuity and connectedness do. In addition, split-brain cases show that I am not my brain because

14 Nagel (1971) introduces this dilemma on page 403

15 Nagel (1971) on the two-minds hypothesis, page 407

16 Nagel (1971) explains this on page 408

17 Nagel (1971), on page 408

18 Nagel (1971) claims this on page 410

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when the brain is divided, difficulties arise about its nature. Therefore, it would be problematic for personal identity if we would be our brains. In the next section, alternatives to the brain view will be discussed and evaluated.

4. Arguments against identifying persons with their brains and objections to it

In the previous section, Nagel and Parfit’s discussion whether it is plausible that we are our brains has been debated. Now, we turn to more general arguments against the brain view and alternatives to it. Firstly, animalism and objections to animalism will be discussed, secondly, Lockean personhood and Parfit’s own view regarding personal identity will be debated as well as objections to Parfit.

Similar to the brain view, animalism is a version of brute physical views. Animalists claim that physical continuity is what matters for persisting. Where animalists differ from brain theorists is that according to animalists, instead of the brain, you are numerically identical to your whole physical body. Olson (2015) makes the objection against the brain view that: “if the brain view were true, we would be a three pound, yellowish-pink organ located entirely within your skull.”¹⁹ (Olson, 2015, p30) It seems counter-intuitive to think of ourselves that way. The brain might be the most important part of the body for personal identity, but the rest of the physical body is still a part of you. Olson (2015) adds that the conclusion that the brain is capable of thinking leads to problems, as it would mean that there are two thinkers. If anything thinks your thoughts in the strictest sense, you do. If your brain thinks now and you think as well, there are two thinkers thinking the same thought. Olson (2015) argues that if the brain would not think, there would not be too many thinkers, but the mental capacity of the brain would be lost. This means that the brain would be a mere brute organ, no more sentient than a kidney (Olson, 2015).²⁰ So either the brain thinks, and there are two thinkers, or it does not think and it has no mental abilities, only you do.

4.1 Animalism

Animalists claim that you are identical to the physical body of a human animal. According to animalists, there is a certain human organism, and that organism is you. There is numerical identity between the animal and you, you and it are exactly the same. Animalism does not state that you are constituted by an animal, that would mean that you and the animal could come apart and there would be no numerical identity in that situation. Olson (2003) states that the reason that animalism is unpopular is because traditionally, the question of personal identity does not revolve around what we are, but rather what it takes for us to persist. Claims about persistence, however, do not tell us what metaphysical fundamental properties we have or what we are made out of. The most popular solution to the persistence question is some sort of psychological continuity, thus ruling out us being physical animals. The continuity of a human animal resides in physical continuity rather than

psychological. Olson states that: “each human animal starts out as an unthinking embryo and may end up as an unthinking vegetable”. (Olson, 2003, p329) Therefore, no psychological continuity is required for the persistence of a human animal.²¹ On Olson’s view, when we think about personal identity, we should not only focus on how we persist but also on what we are made out of.

The logical argument that Olson (2003) gives in favour of animalism is as follows: (1) There is a human animal sitting in your chair. (2) The human animal in your chair is thinking. (3) You are the thinking being sitting in your chair. Conclusion: you are the human animal sitting in your chair.²²

19 Olson (2015) makes this objection on page 30

20 Olson (2015), page 33

21 Olson (2003) states this on page 329

22 Olson (2003) introduces the argument on page 331

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Olson’s (2003) argument is deductive as its conclusion derives naturally from the premises. If you accept the premises, the argument is rather convincing. However, the premises can be objected in several ways and then, the conclusion can be denied. As the argument has three premises, there are three ways of objecting to them.

Imagine denying the first premise that there is a human animal in your chair. Perhaps there are no human animals at all, this would mean that there would probably be no human animal in your chair as well. If human animals do not exist, then the existence of other organisms is also questionable.

The problem that arises when denying the existence of animals all together, is that you also rule out several alternatives of what we might be if we are not human animals (Olson, 2003).²³ If there are no animals, there is nothing that is constituted by an animal and there are also no spatial or temporal parts of animals. Spatial parts are parts that take up space and have different properties, like the physical parts of bodies. Opposed to spatial parts are temporal parts which exist at a certain time instead of at a certain place. Because it is hard to defend the position that nothing at all is constituted by animals, Olson believes that denying the first premise is not logical.

The second way of objecting to the thinking human animal argument is denying the option that human animals can think. You can think but the animal cannot. If that animal cannot think, then no human animal can think. This would mean that no single animal could think at all (Olson, 2003). The claim then becomes that organisms, as well as human animals, are no more sentient than trees.

Olson (2003) states that this is a rather absurd claim and you would have to explain why animals do not use their brains to think. According to Olson (2003), the denial of the second premise of the argument would inevitably lead to the conclusion that only non-organisms could be capable of mental properties. Those who deny that animals can think, deny that any material object could.

However, simply denying that material objects could think, does not explain why it would not be able to. From this point on, there are two options. One could claim that you are an immaterial substance, which is capable of mental properties. On the other hand, one could claim that you are still a material object, just not an animal. Olson (2003) claims that both solutions are problematic and therefore, denying the second premise is not reasonable.

If you agree with the first two premises of the argument, that there is a human animal in your chair and it is capable of thinking, it would logically follow that you are numerically identical to this human animal. Olson (2003) claims that if you assume that the animal is capable of thinking and you are not, it would inevitably lead to an illogical conclusion. If someone thinks your thoughts in the strictest sense, you do. According to Olson (2003), denying the conclusion is only possible if you assume that you are not the only thinker.²⁴ The argument states that there are two entities capable of thinking, the human animal and you. Although you and the animal share several psychological qualities, you do not necessarily have to be numerically identical to the animal. Objecting to the conclusion would mean that while we used to think there was only one thinker, there are now two.

This leads to problems because it is impossible to find out which of the two thinkers you are, according to Olson (2003). The human animal has the same mental qualities as you, it thinks the same thoughts as you. You might falsely believe you are a person, while you are actually the human animal. There are no means to distinguish between one or the other. Therefore, animalists conclude that instead of too many thinkers, there is only one, you and the human animal are numerically identical to one another.

23 Olson (2003) on the objections to the argument, page 333

24 Olson (2003) claims this on page 332

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4.2 Head transplant thought experiment

One of the strongest objections that can be made against animalism comes from an imaginary case where my brain would be transplanted. The transplant intuition is that I would go with my

transplanted brain and leave an empty body behind. According to animalists, the brain is merely the organ of the physical body which produces thought. Therefore, animalists would assume that you would not go with your transplanted brain, but just lose a part of your body, similar to a liver transplant. The thought experiment as formulated by Parfit (2012):

Brain Transplant. Imagine a case about a transplanted brain, where my body is fatally diseased, as is another patient’s brain. Since we have, between us, only one good brain and body, surgeons will bring these together. My head is successfully grafted onto the rest of the other patient’s brainless body (Parfit, 2012).²⁵

Even if you do not accept the implication that we are our brains, this objection is a very serious problem for animalism. Intuitively, the brain seems to be the most important part of the physical body for personal identity. Your identity seems to coincide with the brain because when you lose the brain, your identity will also be lost. Animalists have to explain why you would not go with your transplanted brain and what the result would be for your personal identity. Olson (2015) claims that the person who wakes up after the surgery will not be me. According to Olson (2015), when you suppose we are animals, it entails that the transplant intuition is false.²⁶ If we were animals, we would not go with our transplanted brains because no animal would go with its transplanted brain.

The organism simply loses an organ and the result is an empty head. According to Olson (2015) we actually are animals and this is exactly what would happen in a case of a brain transplant. It could be the case, however, that the brain contains what matters for personal identity. Olson (2015) denies this and claims that it is also never possible that someone else contains what matters for personal identity for you.²⁷ According to Olson (2015) it would be absurd if the fact that the person who got your transplanted brain would have what matters in identity for you and thus convince us to believe that he would be you. Therefore, Olson (2015) does not accept the transplant intuition that we would go with our transplanted brains and holds on to his view that we are animals. The brain transplant thought experiment shows why it would be problematic if we were animals. In his reply to the thought experiment, Olson already postulates that we are animals. If you assume that we are animals, the transplant intuition does not hold. Merely postulating that we are animals, however, does not show why we are animals and why the transplant intuition is false. It only shows that if you accept that we are animals, the transplant intuition does not hold. Therefore, Olson’s reply to the brain transplant thought experiment is not a very strong one.

4.3 Lockean Personhood

The brain view that has been discussed, as well as animalism, are all examples of brute-physical views. We now turn to psychological-continuity views which provide arguments against the

conception that persons are identifiable with their brains. The brain view is rather unpopular among psychological view theorists, as psychological views hold that humans are numerically identical to some sort of conscious psychological entity, instead of a physical brain. According to psychological views, we persist from one time to another if the conscious entity remains the same. Instead of the

25 Parfit (2012) introduces the head transplant thought experiment on page 9.

26 Olson (2015) objects to the transplant intuition on page 24

27 Olson (2015) on page 343

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physical criterion, psychological theorists assume the psychological criterion to be true. The psychological criterion for personal identity states that the continued existence of a purely mental entity is sufficient for personal identity. Psychological views hold that our personal identity resides in psychological continuity of this mental entity. However, in every person’s life, there are also phases of psychological discontinuity. For instance, there is a phase where you are an embryo unable to think, there is no psychological continuity between you and the embryo you once were. Does this mean that the embryo was not really you, or did you only come to be once you started to think?

Consider cases about memory loss, where someone cannot remember who he is. There is no psychological continuity in this situation, does this mean their identity does not hold? In the following sections, Locke (1960) and Parfit’s (1973, 2012) views regarding personal identity will be discussed and their arguments for why we are a psychological entity instead of our physical not our brains will be given as well as objections to Parfit’s arguments.

What we mean by consciousness can be arbitrary and unclear as there is still much to be discovered about it. We do not know if consciousness is physical or not or if certain animals possess it.

Psychological views take consciousness to be the most important part of the psyche for personal identity. All of the mental features that define you are combined in your consciousness. You persist if your consciousness persists as well. In psychological views, consciousness usually refers to Lockean personhood. How Locke defines personhood is crucial when discussing psychological qualities and personal identity. Locke (1960) defines personhood as: “a property of a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.”²⁸ (Locke, 1960, p331) Thus, consciousness is at the core of personhood because it is inseparable from thinking. Locke (1960) claims that personal identity consists in the sameness of the thinking being, consciousness that can distinguish between itself and other thinking entities. The identity of a person reaches as far as his consciousness can be extended to any past experience.

Locke came up with the following thought experiment that shows the importance of consciousness for personal identity.

Prince & Cobbler. Imagine a case of two people, a prince and a cobbler, who switch consciousness with each other. When the consciousness of the prince enters the body of the cobbler, everyone would agree that he would be the same person as the prince, although maybe not the same man. Everyone would recognize him as being a cobbler, because the consciousness moved to the cobbler’s body. Similarly, the cobbler’s consciousness moves to the prince’s body and although there is psychological continuity in consciousness of the cobbler, he will have the looks of the prince and people will regard him as such (Locke, 1960).²⁹

According to Locke (1960), the thought experiment about the prince and the cobbler shows that when discussing personal identity, consciousness of a person is what matters. Looks can be deceiving but consciousness really captures who someone is. When psychological theorists discuss Lockean personhood, they refer to the consciousness of a person. If the consciousness of some past or future being is continuous with my consciousness right now, I am numerically identical with that person. Therefore, Lockean personhood implies a view that contrasts with the conception that we are our physical brain.

28 Locke (1960), on page 331

29 In pages 341 and 342, Locke (1960) discusses the prince and the cobbler.

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4.4 Embodied person view

An example of a psychological view that utilizes Locke’s description of personhood is Parfit’s (1973) embodied person view, which will now be discussed. Parfit starts the personal identity discussion by making a distinction between the simple view and complex views.³⁰ Parfit (1982) asks whether the fact of personal identity consists in certain other facts or is given by a “further fact”. The complex view states that personal identity is given by certain other facts. These facts resemble psychological continuity of memory and character, which in turn rest upon bodily continuity. Contrarily, the simple view states that personal identity does not just consist in these continuities, but rather, is given by a distinct “further fact”. A “further fact” can be defined as a fact that holds completely and is regarded as independent of physical and psychological continuity (Parfit, 1982).³¹

Complex views about personal identity involve physical or psychological continuity, or both. All the physical and psychological views that have thus far been discussed, are examples of complex views.

Simple views, on the other hand, hold that identity is a deep further fact. The simple view consists of two conditions about personal identity. The first one, the all-or-nothing condition, states that nothing can be me, unless it determines a definite answer to the question whether any experience is mine or not. This condition holds that my identity corresponds with me completely or not at all. The second, one-on-one condition, excludes the possibility that two experiences which are mine occur in subjects not identical with each other. This condition states that there is no possibility for my

identity to be divided over two distinct entities. Proposers of the simple view have defended that the two conditions have to be met, in order to talk about personal identity effectively. On the other hand, complex views are views about physical and psychological continuity. According to complex views, the facts about personal identity are no further facts. They are dependent of the more specific facts and they are matters of degree. The all-or-nothing and one-on-one conditions are not met in complex views. If someone changes his view from simple to complex, the following happens.

He decides that a certain fact is in its nature less deep and sometimes holds to reduced degrees instead of holding completely. Changing from a simple to a complex view about personal identity may lead to weakened principles while also giving it a new scope. Parfit (1973) claims that even though we might dismiss of the simple view on the surface, on a deeper level we assume it to be true when talking about personal identity.³²

Views about psychological continuity and brute physical views are both examples of complex views.

Parfit (2012) claims that when you try to conceive of a combination of a brute-physical view with a psychological view, such as animalism and Lockean personhood, it inevitably leads to the too many thinkers dilemma: Whenever a Lockean person thinks a thought, the human animal also thinks the same thought. Every thought then has two distinct thinkers. If there are two conscious beings thinking all my thoughts, how could I know which one I am?³³ The own thinker principle states that if there are two thinkers thinking your thoughts, you are the one that thinks on its own. This means that the thinking is not done for you, by something else. Parfit (2012) states that the human animal’s thinking is done for it by something else, namely the part whose physical basis is the cerebrum.

Therefore, according to Parfit, animalism does not satisfy the own thinker principle. Closely related to the too many thinkers problem is the thinking parts problem. This problem charges that if you are a thinking being, there is no reason to deny that instead of the whole organism your personal identity corresponds only with the conscious, thinking and controlling part of a human being. You

30 Parfit (1973), page 138

31 Parfit (1982) discusses the “further fact” on page 227

32 Parfit (1973), claims this on page 140

33 Parfit (2012) introduces this dilemma on page 7

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might just be the brain of an animal, instead of its whole physical body. In dealing with the thinking parts problem, Parfit (2012) supposes that you are numerically identical to the conscious, thinking and controlling part of a human being. According to Parfit, you are identical to that part which does the thinking. You persist through time if the thinking part continues to exist. This theory is called the embodied part view. Just like your body has a part that digests food, the stomach, and a part that can smell, the nose, it also consists of a part that thinks. This raises the question, however, what part actually does the thinking. According to Parfit (2012), humans think by having an embodied

conscious part. You are numerically identical to the thinking, conscious and controlling part of a human being. This embodied parts view avoids the too many thinkers problem, as there is just one thinking part. This conscious part is embodied in the head which is the most essential part of the physical body, you can lose everything but your head and still be you. Continued existence of the brain is necessary for the existence of consciousness, but this does not mean that we are numerically identical to the brain. This conscious part meets the own thinker principle as it can think on its own and its thinking is not done for it by something else. Embodied consciousness can also be regarded as a Lockean person, as it meets the requirements for Lockean personhood. Therefore, according to Parfit (2012), we are not the human animal or its brain, but this conscious thinking being, a Lockean embodied person, embodied in the brain.³⁴

The argument that Parfit (2012) gives in favour of his embodied person view is non-deductive. The embodied part view is attractive because it avoids the too many thinkers dilemma, as it consists of only one thinker. It provides a plausible answer in dealing with the thinking parts problem because consciousness does think on its own. However, it is not the only answer that can be given to the problem. Instead of consciousness, which Parfit claims is embedded in the brain, you could also claim that the brain produces consciousness and thinks itself. The brain supports the own thinker principle as its thinking is not done for it by something else. Furthermore, in order to perceive consciousness as something that is fundamentally different from the physical brain, you already have to assume that consciousness is not physical itself. If you do not take this assumption to be true and believe that consciousness is a part of the physical brain, you can argue that a change in the configuration of the brain will always result in a change in consciousness and ultimately, personality.

However, even brute physicalists will agree that the physical brain does not have the exact same properties that psychological consciousness does. Therefore, even if consciousness turns out to be physical, it cannot be regarded as numerically identical to the brain. Parfit (2012) holds that the properties which coincide with consciousness align better with the values that we have when discussing personal identity than properties which coincide with the physical brain. Therefore, we are this conscious thinking being, embedded in the brain.

4.5 Olson’s objection to Parfit

Olson (2015) objects to Parfit’s (2012) embodied person view. Olson (2015) claims that the thinking part of the body has to at least include some of the physical brain. A hand or a finger cannot produce thought. However, the thinking part could be the entire brain, the head, or the upper part of the body and there is no way to distinguish between them. Furthermore, Olson (2015) denies Parfit’s (2012) notion that an animal cannot think on its own. According to Olson (2015), Parfit holds on to a certain thinking-subject minimalistic principle which states that a true thinker has to be made up of only the objects directly involved in his thinking.³⁵ Humans have superfluous parts, not involved in

34 On pages 14-18, Parfit (2012) discusses the too many thinkers problem

35 Olson (2015) objects to Parfit on page 48

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thinking, which are of no importance for personal identity. Parfit also deploys a narrow criterion which states that if some future person would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, namely enough of the same brain, this person would be me. Olson claims that this narrow criterion is not complete because it does not tell us when we become persons. Therefore, Olson (2015) states that the minimalistic principle which Parfit (2012) holds on to is incompatible with the view that we are essentially thinking beings and his own narrow criterion.

Olson (2015) claims that if you take the thinking-subject minimalistic principle and substitute thinking for walking, the walking part of the animal can be found. This part is distinct from the thinking part, since the things involved in walking will not be similar to those involved in thinking.

This is the same for activities such as eating, sleeping and talking. All these parts will be distinct from one another. This would imply that whatever we think of as one being, actually consists of many parts that each only do one thing. I, the thinking part, would then only be able to think and not exhibit any other behaviour, such as walking or sleeping. I would then consist of many beings, each participating in one activity. A human would then not have one nonderivative general thinker within, but rather a crowd of narrow specialists. This implication would be absurd and incompatible with Parfit’s embodied part view, according to Olson (2015).³⁶ This objection from Olson is not very powerful because all the activities that Olson describes, such as walking or sleeping, are irrelevant for personal identity. The reason why Parfit particularly takes the thinking part of humans as the basis for personal identity is because that part really captures who you are. We might consist of different superfluous parts, but these are of little importance for personal identity.

The narrow criterion that Parfit (2012) deploys is that if some future person would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, namely enough of the same brain, this person would be me. If some future person would neither be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, nor have enough of the same brain, this person would not be me. In all other cases, there would be no answer to the question whether some future person would be me.³⁷ According to Olson (2015), the narrow criterion speaks only of what it takes for a future person to be me.³⁸ It contains nothing regarding future non-people, or past ones.

Furthermore, the narrow criterion only tells us what it takes for someone to persist as a person, but not what it takes to persist in general. Therefore, Olson (2015) claims that you could replace future person with future being. If Parfit (2012) did mean to tell us what it takes for someone to persist as a person, his narrow criterion would be incomplete, according to Olson (2015). The criterion is

compatible with any claim about what sort of thing I could come to be, as long as I was not a person then. In addition, the narrow criterion does not state when we become persons. Therefore, Olson (2015) claims that the minimalistic principle is incompatible with the narrow criterion and the view that we are essentially thinking beings is false. This implication could be problematic for Parfit’s theory as it posits that Parfit’s notion of what persons are is incomplete or too broad. The narrow criterion allows for the existence of non-persons and other entities. However, you can assume that the narrow criterion that Parfit deploys does only involve the existence of persons. When discussing personal identity it is reasonable that you think of the properties that belong to a person instead of some other entity, even if this is not explicitly stated. It would make no sense to randomly discuss the existence of non-persons, in the debate of personal identity. Therefore, when you assume that

36 Olson (2015) discusses Parfit’s principles on page 49

37 Parfit (2012) introduces his criterion on page 11

38 Olson (2015), on page 50

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the narrow criterion does involve the existence of persons, Olson’s criticism that the minimalistic principle is incompatible with Parfit’s narrow criterion does not hold.

5. Discussion

The view that we are our brains is a position in the debate of personal identity. When discussing personal identity, a distinction can be made between physical and psychological continuity. Physical continuity resides in continued existence of a physical substance, such as a body. Nagel defends the view that we are only the thinking part of the body, the physical brain. Parfit formulated several objections to this, stating that personal identity is not really what matters for persisting and we are not our brains. Nagel’s reply was that the split-brain cases that Parfit discusses are imaginary, and therefore no real implications can be derived from them. Another version of brute-physicalism, animalism, takes you to be numerically identical to your whole body. You are a human animal which is capable of thinking. The strongest objection to animalism comes from the brain transplant thought experiment. Olson denies the objection against animalism and claims that our intuitions are wrong when we think about what would happen in such a situation. As opposed to physical continuity, psychological continuity consists of continued existence of a psychological entity, such as

consciousness. Lockean personhood is described as the consciousness of a person. Parfit believes that we are numerically identical to a conscious entity, which is embodied in the brain. Olson objects to this and claims that the minimalistic principle which Parfit holds on to is inconsistent with other elements of his theory.

The brain is often regarded as the most important part of the physical body. Information about what kind of person you are is stored in the brain, as well as all of your memories. There is still a lot to be discovered about the brain and ourselves. Nagel’s view is interesting because it takes this part of the body, the brain, to also capture your personal identity. However, there are several objections that would make it problematic if we turn out to be our brains. Firstly, it depends on whether you regard physical continuity to be more important then psychological continuity. Locke would state that if a being wakes up tomorrow with all of my memories and consciousness I have now, but nothing of the same brain, that person would still be me. Second, Parfit’s split-brain persons based objection raises questions about special cases where the brain would be divided. Because the brain is physical, it is also divisible. However, we do not feel our identity is divisible, therefore, it would entail a

contradiction if we are numerically identical to our brains. This would mean that we are divisible on the one hand, while not being divisible on the other. Moreover, if someone would be a brain, and you started removing very small parts of its brain, it would be very difficult to pinpoint at what point he stops being himself. Similarly, animalism is also problematic, as it ignores most intuition we have about personal identity, such as the transplant intuition. Psychological continuity does meet these intuitions, therefore, psychological theorists believe that a psychological account can better capture what we mean by personal identity. Parfit’s theory is reasonable because it combines physical and psychological continuity. We are consciousness, imbedded in the brain. Continued existence of consciousness is reliant on the continued existence of the brain. This consciousness can be regarded as a Lockean person, a thinking intelligent being, who thinks on its own and for its own. Embodied consciousness also dodges the too many thinkers problem and would be the best solution to the thinking parts problem.

To this day, consciousness remains one of the biggest mysteries in philosophy. We do not know if it is physical or not, if certain animals have it, or if computers could develop it. I feel that the more we come to know about consciousness, the more we learn about ourselves. Humans have an organ that