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Exploring Misfit

Submitted for the Master in Social- Ecological Resilience for

Sustainable Development STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY

STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE CENTRE

Supervisor: Wiebren Boonstra Co-supervisors:

Jonas Hentati-Sundberg Andrew Merrie

Presented by Jessica SPIJKERS

2014-2015

A case study of the northeast Atlantic mackerel

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Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Wiebren Boonstra, my supervisor, for his guidance and useful critiques. The time he dedicated to giving me advice, assistance and constructive recommendations has been very much appreciated.

Secondly, I thank Andrew Merrie and Jonas Hentati-Sundberg, my co-supervisors, for the valuable and insightful suggestions they made throughout the development of my thesis. They have been essential to its progression.

Thirdly, I want to articulate my thankfulness for the funding made available by the Nordic Centre for Research on Marine Ecosystems and Resources under Climate Change (NorMER), without which this thesis would not have been possible.

Furthermore, I would like to voice my appreciation for the time and expertise the interviewees were willing to dedicate to me.

Finally, I wish to thank my parents for their support and encouragement throughout my studies.

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Abstract

The pressure of a growing and developing global human society creates environmental stresses that require collaborative management. Sudden and dramatic ecological changes can, however, impede such management by making social arrangements out of alignment with the ecosystem they were designed to manage. In sustainability science that failure is often referred to as a ‘misfit’.

This thesis aims to add to our understanding of misfit by investigating what sparks misfits, and which causal mechanisms cause them to persist. To do that, a case study is used in which the geographical distribution shift of a marine species has produced a misfit, and a long-standing international conflict between stakeholders: the mackerel case. Since 2007 the northeast Atlantic mackerel stock started migrating and spawning towards more northern and western regions of the Nordic Seas, progressively going as far as Icelandic and south Greenlandic waters in the west. A misfit developed and endured because Iceland has not been included in the de facto management of the stock until this day. ‘Process-tracing’ is used to explain this outcome, i.e. to uncover the causal mechanisms behind the endurance of the misfit. The results show that the misfit persisted despite stakeholders recognizing its existence and making efforts to resolve it. The case study shows that an interaction of barriers to re-fitting, such as ‘absence of authority’, ‘politicization of scientific results’, ‘lack of trust’ etc., came into play at different points in time. Moreover, the results also demonstrate that misfit is dynamical, as it can enlarge or reduce through time. Some of the causal mechanisms that this study uncovered resonate with the literature on social-ecological misfit focusing on local and regional scales. Other causal mechanisms that were identified so far remained under-theorized in the literature. These mechanisms contributing to its endurance seem to be typical for misfits on international scales, i.e. absence of authority, interstate politics and influence of power imbalances (where powerful (coalitions of) actors are able to resist changes).

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1. Introduction

In the current geological epoch, the Anthropocene, our planet is fundamentally shaped by human activities (Rockström et al. 2009). The pressure of a growing and developing global human society creates environmental stresses that due to their complexity are difficult to anticipate and govern (Galaz 2014). The complexity of governing Social-Ecological Systems (SES) gets exacerbated when dealing with extreme uncertainty and rapid change to the point where it can hamper a collaboration between stakeholders (Ostrom 2008). Collaborative management of natural resources gets particularly impeded when ecological changes occur that make social institutions out of alignment with the changed structural and dynamic ecologies of those resources (Galaz et al. 2008). In sustainability science this incapacity is often referred to as a ‘misfit’ or ‘problem of fit’ (Folke et al. 1998; Olsson et al. 2007; Galaz et al. 2008).

In the existing literature misfit is mostly a qualitative concept describing a static condition. There is a need to complement that existing literature with, firstly, in-depth case studies going beyond treating misfit as a static condition by providing knowledge of the causal mechanisms that cause misfit to persist (Galaz et al. 2008; Cumming 2006), and, secondly, with case studies on misfits occurring on an international scale (Galaz et al. 2008; Young 2013). The general aim of this thesis is to address those knowledge gaps by investigating, on an international scale, how misfits come about and why they persist.

The general theoretical research question of this thesis then becomes:

 How can the existence and persistence of misfit be explained?

To achieve this general aim this investigation follows a case study design. The choice for a case study resonates with the effort to uncover causal mechanisms of the origin and persistence of social-ecological misfit. The intensive study of a single case can contribute to a better understanding of the complex causality underlying misfits generally. The case selected for this purpose is the abrupt and rapid change in the distribution of the northeast Atlantic mackerel stock after 2007. The stock shifted its area of distribution into Icelandic waters, which was not included in the management of the stock, and the stock became overexploited. Moreover, there has been an absence of an internationally agreed management plan until the time of writing.

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There are two reasons for selecting the mackerel case. Firstly, distribution shifts of marine species are prime examples of global ecological changes that have produced misfits in recent years.

Secondly, it is expected that shifting distributions of marine species (and the conflict it can generate) will become more plentiful in the future due to processes of climate changes (EFARO 2012; Jansen et al. 2012).

The case study specific research questions then become:

 How did misfit come about within the SES of the northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery?

 Why did misfit endure within the SES of the northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery?

Next to its general aim, this thesis also has the empirical aim to gain insights into the problem areas specific to the dispute over the mackerel stock. This knowledge can be useful in developing strategies for resolving this dispute, in order to deliver stability and long-term access to the stock.

2. The concept of social-ecological misfit

In the thesis, I draw on concepts provided by the analytical framework of Adaptive Governance (AG). AG is an interdisciplinary field of research with the goal of developing new governance concepts that can handle the complexity and unpredictability of dynamic SES (Carl Folke et al.

2005b; Termeer, Dewulf, and van Lieshout 2010; Olsson et al. 2007). The thesis is structured around and aims to add to the concept of ‘misfit’ as employed in AG literature and uses AG as an analytical framework to analyze the persistence of misfit.

AG has used the notion of scales to analyze the linkages between social and ecological systems.

A concept used to draw attention to cross-scale issues is ‘misfit’. Within the literature on AG, then, misfit (also referred to as ‘mismatch’ or the ‘problem of fit’) is a concept that addresses the governance dimension of ecosystem management and the social factors that enable such management (Olsson et al. 2007). In the literature, misfit in time and/or space is discussed most, yet other types of misfits between scales are identified as well (e.g. between the scales at which knowledge is produced) (Termeer, Dewulf, and van Lieshout 2010).

In essence, the concept draws attention to the degree of compatibility between ecosystems and institutional arrangements created to manage human activities affecting these systems (Young 2002). When that compatibility is lacking, the “institutional jurisdiction [is] unable to cope with actors or drivers external or internal and important for maintaining the ecosystem(s) or process(es)

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affected by the institution” (Galaz et al. 2008, pp. 150). Galaz et al. (2008) further explored the concept by suggesting different forms and effects of misfit (Table 1).

Table 1: Types of misfits and definitions. Source: Galaz et al. 2008, pp. 150 – 153.

Type Definition

Spatial Institutional jurisdiction too small or too large to cover or affect the areal extent of the ecosystem(s) subject to the institution.

Institutional jurisdiction unable to cope with actors or drivers external or internal and important for maintaining the ecosystem(s) or process(es) affected by the institution; e.g., institutional arrangements can be ‘‘too large’’ when providing centrally defined ‘‘blueprints’’ that ignore existing local biophysical circumstances.

Temporal Institution formed too early or too late to cause desired ecosystem effect(s).

Institution (and possibly the actor interaction it entails) produces decisions that assume a shorter or longer time span than those embedded in the biophysical system(s) affected; and/or social response is too fast, too slow, too short, or too long compared to the time taken for biophysical processes involved.

Threshold behavior

Institution does not recognize, leads to, or is unable to avoid abrupt shift(s) in biophysical systems.

Institution provides for inadequate response to contingencies (e.g., lack of rules for action in extreme conditions) or reduces variation in biophysical systems (e.g., by removing response diversity, whole functional groups of species, or trophic levels; and/or by adding anthropogenic stress such as pollution).

Institutions fails to respond adequately or at all to disturbances that could have been buffered or that helped to revitalize the system before. Leads to practically irreversible biophysical shifts.

Cascading effects

Institution is unable to buffer, or trigger further effects between or among biophysical and/or social and economic systems.

Institutional response is misdirected, nonexistent, inadequate, or wrongly timed so as to propagate or allow the propagation of biophysical change(s) that entail(s) further causative changes along temporal and/or spatial scales.

Within the field of AG, literature on misfit has focused mainly on theoretical contributions pertaining to processes causing misfits, consequences of misfits or further theoretical typologies of misfits (Galaz et al. 2008; Cumming 2006; Cumming et al. 2013). Apart from those contributions, there are also case studies that address how we can detect misfits, or how we can analyze or improve the degree of functional fit between a set of institutions and an ecosystem (Bergsten, Galafassi, and Bodin 2014; Ekstrom and Young 2009; Ernstson et al. 2010; Olsson et al. 2007).

Although many valuable contributions have thus been made to the concept of misfit, numerous researchers argue that case studies on how misfits are dealt with and how they are able to endure

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remain a research frontier (Cumming 2006; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Galaz et al. 2008).

Although some explorative work has been done, more case studies are required studying how people respond to misfits and what challenges they face when trying to resolve misfits. Moreover, much of the existing in-depth case studies focus on misfits on local (urban) to regional management scales, whilst case studies on misfits on an international playing field remain untouched (though more theoretical contributions have been made in (Young (2008)). It is those research gaps this thesis aims to contribute to.

The contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of how misfits come about and why they persist, takes form in two steps. In the result section, I describe how misfit came about, how stakeholders responded to it and which dynamics helped or inhibited its resolution in the case study (descriptive section). In the discussion section, I further analyze the identified dynamics and categorize them into more general barriers to ‘re-fitting’ that can be relevant in other case studies on misfit as well (analytical section). In order to do that, I again draw on the analytical framework provided by AG by using governance concepts applied in AG (Galaz et al. 2008; Olsson et al.

2007; Gupta et al. 2010).

3. Methodology

3.1 Methodological approach

The main method for my case study research is ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’. Process- tracing is a tool used when one wants to gain more understanding of the nature of causal relationships as it attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes.

Process-tracing seeks to make within-case inferences about the presence/absence of causal mechanisms in single case studies (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Explaining-outcome process- tracing is a type of process-tracing with the primary ambition to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak of other potential cases of the phenomenon (Beach and Pedersen 2013). This type of process-tracing performs a heuristic function, where it generates new variables or hypotheses on the basis of sequences of events observed inductively in case studies (George and Bennett 2005). In practical terms this inductive reasoning means working backward from the outcome by sifting through the evidence in an

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attempt to uncover a plausible sufficient causal mechanism that produced the outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

In the thesis, I use the approach both to develop interview questions as well as to analyze the data.

For the interviews, the tool is used to design questions inquiring about the causal mechanisms at play during the mackerel dispute which explain the persistence of misfit. In the analysis of the data, the tool is used to create a timeline in which I trace the causal mechanisms producing the observed outcomes of the misfit.

3.2 Data sources

To execute the explaining-outcome process-tracing, I carry out semi-structured interviews with experts from the Coastal States (i.e. Norway, Faroe Islands, Iceland and the European Union (EU)) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The pool of interviewed experts consists of politicians, civil servants, scientists and stakeholders within the industry from all the Coastal States. In total, the utilized data sources from 26 interviews, ranging in length from 30 minutes to 3 hours. The interview questions were adapted to each interviewee according to their field of expertise, but generally aimed at understanding the social, political and ecological factors sustaining the misfit. Those interviews represent the core data of this thesis, as they have provided me with critical insights into the difficulties that marked the decision-making process as well as the ecological dynamics of the mackerel stock.

Additionally, I perform an in-depth review of the literature to get an understanding of the historical and current developments within the case. The analyzed literature includes a varying set of publications: books, peer-reviewed academic journals, articles, dissertations, Coastal States’

agreements, ICES reports, and relevant websites.

4. Misfit within the studied SES

4.1 Background description of the studied SES

The stocks that straddle in the international waters of the Northeast Atlantic are multi-laterally managed by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), where the contracting parties - the EU, Norway, Iceland, Russia and Denmark (on behalf of the Faroe Islands and Greenland) - negotiate the division of fishing resources in international waters. When a resource is found in the national waters of a contracting party (defined as a 200 mile Exclusive Economic

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Zone (EEZ)), the party is a ‘Coastal State’ for that resource and has the right to harvest it in their EEZ. The management of the straddling stocks in the Northeast Atlantic is therefore a two-tier process: Coastal States agree on shares and management plans before bringing the matter to NEAFC to cover fisheries in waters outside national jurisdiction (Figure 1) (Vanderzwaag 2010).

Figure 1: Structure for deciding on management measures and allocations with respect to straddling stocks

The institutional framework that stipulates obligations for Coastal States is made up of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) of 1995 (Cox 2009). The framework imposes cooperation to ensure proper conservation management and prevention of over-exploitation of living marine resources. Some guidance as to how Coastal States should allocate fishing quotas is also provided by that framework.

The regulatory area of NEAFC consists of the North-East Atlantic Ocean, the Barents and Norwegian Seas and the Arctic Ocean (Figure 2).

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7 Figure 2: International NEAFC waters in orange, Coastal State waters in blue. Source: NEAFC website

In this thesis, I focus on the management of the northeast Atlantic mackerel (scomber scombrus, Linnaeus 1758), a highly migratory, dynamic and widely distributed pelagic fish species. The northeast Atlantic mackerel stock has attracted international attention due the conflict it induced between the EU, Norway, Faroe Islands and Iceland, who are the responsible Coastal States for the management of the stock. The conflict started after the stock migrated and spawned farther towards northern and western regions of the Nordic Seas and surrounding coastal and oceanic waters in 2007 (Nøttestad, Utne, et al., 2014). The area of migration has progressively gone as far as Icelandic and south Greenlandic waters in the west and as far north as Spitzbergen (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014). The observed distributional changes may reflect changes in food availability and may be linked to increased water temperature, and/or increased stock size; yet the precise relationships remain unclear. Furthermore, the question remains as to whether these distribution changes are permanent or temporary (ICES 2014a).

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4.2 Defining misfit within the studied SES

The distribution changes described induced a spatial misfit within the SES of northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery (spatial misfit as defined by Galaz et al. 2008). Because the mackerel had never been recorded as abundantly in Icelandic (and later Greenlandic) waters before 2007, it was not included in the institutional jurisdiction of the stock. Due to the sudden presence of a large amount of mackerel in Icelandic waters it became paramount, however, to include them.

This spatial misfit can only be solved by having all states in the existing institutional jurisdiction which have the mackerel in their EEZ. Only then would the jurisdiction cover the areal extent of the resource subject to the institution (Galaz et al. 2008). The process of a de facto integration of states into the management of the stock has three steps (Figure 3):

1. Awarding the state in question observer status to the Coastal State meetings within NEAFC;

2. Recognizing the state in question as being a Coastal State within NEAFC;

3. Including the state in question in the Coastal States’ agreements in which they can take part in decision-making on the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota allocations.

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9 Figure 3: Levels of integration in the institutional jurisdiction of the SES, relevant to states with the resource in their EEZ

Thus, if all states with the mackerel in their EEZ reach level 3 of institutional integration, the governance scale would fit with the ecological scale. As the mackerel shifted its distribution into Icelandic waters in 2007, this in practice meant integrating Iceland within the existing institution.

Until the time of writing, Iceland has not been fully integrated and, consequently, there still remains a spatial misfit. Nonetheless, the Coastal States have attempted to integrate Iceland.

The result section is structured according to the States’ progress in reaching the three levels indicated in figure 3 (and indicated with the large brackets in figure 5):

- 5.1.1: The process of reaching level one of re-fitting the SES (2008) - 5.1.2: The process of reaching level two of ‘re-fitting’ (2010)

- 5.1.3: Enlarged misfit: the Faroe Islands steps out of the Coastal States’ agreements (2010)

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- 5.1.4: Struggle towards level 3 of ‘re-fitting’ (2010-2014)

- 5.1.5: Failed opportunity towards complete re-fitting of the SES (March 2014) - 5.1.6: Lost momentum after the opportunity and near-future prospects

A visual summary of that ‘re-fitting process’ can be found in figure 4.

5. Case study results: the origin and persistence of the mackerel misfit

To understand how the mackerel misfit came into existence and why it endured we need to look at the socio-political and ecological dynamics that have influenced the states inclination to cooperate (Bergsten et al. 2014). Those dynamics are presented on a timeline (Figure 5). The dynamics are indicated in the form of bars. Yellow bars are dynamics with a predominantly negative influence on cooperation; purple bars have a predominantly positive influence on

Figure 4: Re-fitting process throughout time with respect to the levels of integration within the institutional jurisdiction. NO: Norway;

EU: European Union; FO: Faroe Islands; IS: Iceland; Gr: Greenland.

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cooperation. The opaqueness of the bar indicates their level of influence (more opaque is higher influence). Also represented on that timeline are the socio-political and ecological outcomes of the misfit. They are indicated through red teardrops and are either social, ecological, or both. Lastly, I indicate ecological triggers that caused the shift in the ecosystem and that bring about certain identified dynamics on the timeline with green arrows. The description of all those components is to be found in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Timeline with dynamics, outcomes and triggers. Yellow bars: dynamics against cooperation; purple bars: dynamics towards cooperation; green arrows: triggers; red teardrops: outcomes.

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12 Table 2: Description of the components of the timeline

Category Label Approx.

time period

Explanation

Dynamic 1 Socio-political

Differing

views on

UNCLOS &

UNFSA guidelines

Constant UNCLOS and UNFSA provide the legal framework for the management of the SES (e.g. when one is a Coastal State), and guidance as to how one should allocate fishing quotas, e.g. Article 7 and Article 11 of UNFSA (see appendix 1).

Faroe Islands feels sidelined

in CS

agreements

1999- 2010

General feeling that had been building since the start of the mackerel agreements in 1999, which was that the Faroe Islands was seen as a negligible player within the Coastal State setup.

Icelandic request to become Coastal State not accepted

1999- 2010

Iceland requested to become Coastal State for the mackerel since 1999, yet was not accepted until 2010.

Southern component dispute

Unsure of start - 2010

EU declared that the Coastal States’ agreement only applies to the Northern area of the stock, and established an additional TAC for the Southern component (see appendix 2). This was solved with the ten-year agreement.

EU sanction threats

2010- 2013

EU threatened to sanction Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The EU adopted a Regulation whereby the Commission may take restrictive measures against a country allowing ‘non-sustainable fishing’ in 2012.

Outcome 8 Socio-political

EU sanctions Faroe Islands

2013, August

EU sanctions the Faroese on the quota they set for the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock, which also targeted mackerel (see appendix 3). The EU lifted the ban in August 2014. (Council of the EU and European Parliament 2012) Dynamic 6

Socio-political

EU/Iceland accession talks

2010- 2015

Iceland applied as a candidate for accession to the EU in July 2009, and the talks formally opened on the 27^th of July 2010. In September 2013 Iceland suspends the accession talks and in March 2015 Iceland formally withdraws its application.

Commissioner Damanaki

2010- 2014

Maria Damanaki becomes European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Her term ended in November 2014.

Interests in Greenlandic fishery

End 2013

– now Especially Iceland had expressed great interest in the new Greenlandic mackerel fishery, catching a large amount of the Greenlandic mackerel quota as part of an international agreement amongst both countries.

Source of later uncertainty Ecological

Black landings 2002 - 2005

From approximately January 2002 until March 2005, a total of 17 Scottish fishermen were involved in illegally landing nearly £63 million worth of atlanto Scandian herring and northeast Atlantic mackerel, in excess of their EU quota (see appendix 4) (BBC News 2012)

Trigger 1 Ecological

Shift into Icelandic waters

2006 - now

Since around 2007 the mackerel extended its summer feeding distribution and spawning towards north and west, including the Icelandic area. There has also been an extension of the spawning season, with an earlier start of the spawning activity (see appendix 5) (ICES 2014a)

Outcomes 1 & 2 Ecological

2007 &

2008

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Dynamic 9 Ecological

Contrasting responses 1

2007 - now

After trigger 1, uncertainty pertaining to the longevity of the observed changes came about, as the question remains as to whether or not these distribution changes are permanent or temporary (ICES 2014a).

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13 Dynamic 10

Ecological

2009 - now

From approximately 2009, scientists increasingly realized that the abundance of the stock was underestimated, yet to which extent is contended. The sources for this uncertainty were the black landings and the outcomes of surveys designed to estimate the abundance of the stock (see appendix 7).

As a result, ICES did a benchmark exercise (February 2014) where they altered the assessment model used for giving advice on the stock (see appendix 8).

2011 - now

From approximately early 2011 more conclusive data indicated that the abundance of the stock and its distribution into new waters could have an effect on other (marine) species. The precise effects are uncertain.

Iceland: the mackerel gains around 43% of their body weight in Icelandic waters and that it can thus be expected to have measurable impacts on the ecosystem (Óskarsson et al., 2012).

Norway: possibility that mackerel exerts a competition pressure on herring in years of delayed peak in production, causing herring to shift diet and/or distribution area (Langøy et al., 2012).

2013 - now

Surveys showed that mackerel weight-at-age was decreasing (see appendix 9). Some scientists argued that this was a result of density-dependent effects (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014). That hypothesis entails that there are too many mackerel for the amount of food available. ICES reported that it is a plausible explanatory hypothesis, yet that other possibilities should not be excluded (ICES WKPELA 2014).

Trigger 2 Ecological

Shift into Greenlandic waters

2011 Westward expansion in the summer distribution of mackerel progressively went as far west as southeast Greenlandic waters.

In 2011, catches were first reported in Greenlandic waters (ICES 2013a) Outcome 3

Socio-political Ecological

2009 Iceland sets a unilateral quota

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Outcome 4 Socio-political Ecological

2010 No agreement

Faroe Islands pulls out of the agreement

Unilateral quotas (Iceland and the Faroe Islands) Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6) Outcomes 5,6,7

2011 2012 2013

No agreement

Unilateral quotas (Iceland and the Faroe Islands) Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6) Outcome 9

2014 No agreement

 three party deal between Norway, the EU and the Faroe Islands Unilateral quota (Iceland)

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6) Outcome 10

Socio-political Ecological

2015 No agreement

Unilateral quota (Iceland)

Expected overexploitation of the stock (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

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14 Figure 6: Overexploitation of the stock with respect to ICES advice, 2007-2015

*: Preliminary estimation by ICES for 2014;

**: Intended catch set by Coastal States in the agreement for 2015;

***: Updated advice after benchmark

See appendix 6 for more information & ICES data sources

5.1 The process of reaching level one of re-fitting the SES: Iceland becomes observer (2008)

The starting point of the timeline presented in figure 5 is chosen as 1999 because it was in that year we see the first dynamics arising that influenced cooperation levels between the nation states.

That year was also the year that the management of mackerel fishing started within NEAFC, when it was agreed that the EU, Norway and Faroe Islands would be Coastal States for the stock (EU and Norway had bilateral agreements with other parties from 1997-1999) (Hoydal 2014).

The misfit between the governance and ecological scale of the mackerel started in approximately 2007 (see appendix 5). This can be observed in the statistics of Icelandic mackerel catches. In 2006, Iceland caught 4.222 tons of mackerel from a total actual catch of 481 276 tons. In 2007 they fished 36 706 tons (out of 586.206 tons) and in 2008 that increased to 112 286 tons (out of 623 165 tons) (ICES 2010a). The stock started to become overexploited in 2007 (Figure 6). The increase in

509000 456000 578000 572000 646000 639000

542000

1011000***

906000 586206 623165

737969 875515 946661 892353 931732

1400000*

1054000**

TONNES OF MACKEREL

2007-2015

OVEREXPLOITATION WITH RESPECT TO ICES ADVICE

ICES advice Actual catch

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Icelandic catches incited the Coastal States to take action in 2008, and they granted Iceland observer status at the negotiation meetings (level 1 of re-fitting). This is indicated with the blue bracket in figure 5.

Having observer status meant that Iceland could not make agreements with other Coastal States.

The Icelanders were highly dissatisfied with that position because they had requested to become a Coastal State since 1999 (Table 2, dynamic 3). That dissatisfaction is illustrated in the quote below:

“So we were invited as an observer. And we had discussed here at home “okay as an observer, we are not recognized as a Coastal State”; but we decided we will go and we will discuss (…) We were not allowed to be at the heads’ meeting. In the beginning I remember they decided not to let us have an opening statement. And we said “we leave if we are not allowed to do that”” (Icelandic civil servant).

5.2 The process of reaching level two of ‘re-fitting’: Iceland awarded Coastal State status (2010)

Iceland was awarded Coastal State status in March 2010, thus the second level in ‘re-fitting’ the institutional jurisdiction to the ecological area of the mackerel was reached. This is indicated with a pink bracket in figure 5. The process for Iceland to become an accepted Coastal State was long, to the frustration of Iceland. The process was troublesome due to several dynamics.

The first dynamic that made reaching level 2 hard was the institutional framework (Table 2, dynamic 1). The guidelines provided by the framework in which the Coastal States operate to make decisions on who is eligible to become a Coastal State are vague. Neither UNCLOS nor the UNFSA give clear instructions on when a state is allowed to obtain Coastal State status (see appendix 1). As is illustrated by the quote, the vague guidelines led to differing views between the Coastal States on whether or not Iceland could obtain Coastal State status:

“The EU is the one who’s said it’s nonsense not to acknowledge that they’re a Soastal State. We said that very early on. And it took ages to convince the other two” (EU civil servant).

There were several reasons why some Coastal States hesitated to give Iceland Coastal State status, such as for example the limited experience of the Icelandic mackerel fishery; the absence of their

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participation in research; and even the general doubt whether there was actual mackerel in Icelandic waters or if it was herring that they had misreported.

Besides the differing views on the guidelines, the second dynamic that made reaching level 2 difficult was the uncertainty pertaining to the longevity of the mackerel migration (Table 2, dynamic 9). Although there is no scientist that can indicate with certainty whether the shift is permanent or transient, some Coastal States based their decisions more on the possibility that the stock might shift back to its original core area. Therefore they hesitated in awarding Iceland Coastal State status:

“They [Norway] have been quite open about their view that this is only a temporary thing and I guess that’s one of the things that’s driving their policy that they’re not going to give in and give us a piece of something that we won’t have a piece of in the future” (Representative of the Icelandic fishing industry).

A third dynamic that complicated the obtainment of level 2 was the disagreement over the southern component (table 2, dynamic 4). Disagreement over the southern component culminated when Norway and the Faroe Islands decided to take action against the EU by establishing corresponding quotas within the northern component of the stock in 2009. This dynamic negatively influenced the attainment of level two because it, especially for Norway, drew political attention away from the Icelandic requests to become a Coastal State. That is illustrated in the following quote:

“[In] the beginning, we did not have time for Iceland. Norway and the EU were in the middle of a big fight, one of our many fights, it was too much for us (…) Not being a Coastal State, Norway wasn’t interested in that at all” (Norwegian civil servant).

5.3 Enlarged misfit: the Faroe Islands steps out of the Coastal States’

agreements (2010)

With Iceland granted Coastal State status in 2010, it had the responsibility together with the other Coastal States of making an agreement on the sharing of the mackerel stock. That has until the time of writing never materialized. Contrarily, from 2009 until March 2014, the Faroe Islands stepped out of the Coastal States’ agreements. That action enlarged the spatial misfit: with both Iceland and the Faroe Islands setting unilateral quota (i.e. catch limitations set without prior negotiation with other states), the fit between the institutional and ecological scale was even worse.

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The fact that the Faroese stepped out in 2010 and set their own quota was partially the outcome of the dynamic that had been building since the start of the mackerel agreements in 1999. As depicted in the following quote, the Faroe Islands felt as a negligible player within the agreements, being somewhat squeezed into an arrangement dominated by the EU and Norway (Table 2, dynamic 2):

“There had long been a dissatisfaction with the way in which that three party arrangement worked in practice. Basically it started as a bilateral thing between Norway and the EU and the sense was that we were kind of there as an irritation on the side, a ‘throw them some crumbs and keep them happy’ kind of thing” (Faroese civil servant).

The feeling that the Faroe Islands was deserved a bigger share was intensified due to the distribution shift of the stock, as there was much more mackerel in their EEZ than before. The sentiment then was that their share did not reflect that change:

“When we pulled out it was much more fundamental. It was the fact that there was just so much more mackerel in our waters and our share was way too small” (Faroese civil servant).

The decision of the Faroe Islands to set a unilateral quota was also indirectly spurred on by the unilateral quotas set by Iceland:

“[Icelandic fishing] had been going on a few years and it was obvious that this was going to eventually lead to the necessity to bring Iceland into the equation (…) Would this not be an opportunity for us to obviously say “well we have to redesign this allocation from the beginning”?” (Faroese civil servant).

5.4 Struggle towards level 3 of ‘re-fitting’: trying to make an agreement with all Coastal States (2010-2014)

From 2010 onwards, the Coastal States negotiated with one another to come to an agreement on how to manage and share the mackerel stock. Until March 2014, all negotiations were unsuccessful in their outcomes. This is demonstrated by the unilateral quotas set by Iceland and the Faroe Islands during that time (Table 2, outcomes 4, 5, 6, 7).

The first dynamic obstructing an agreement amongst all parties was the threat of the EU to take sanctions against Iceland and the Faroe Islands because of their unilateral quota-approach (Table

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2, dynamic 5). In 2013, the EU sanctioned the Faroese on the quota they set for the Atlanto- Scandian herring stock. Because of the way the Regulation functioned, the sanction on herring targeted the mackerel as well. The threat of sanctions towards the Faroe Islands and Iceland had a negative influence on the cooperation between the two countries, with the Faroe Islands condemning the EU’s actions to be “inappropriate conduct in international cooperation”

(Undercurrentnews 2014).

Besides the threat of sanctions, there were other dynamics that made it troublesome to reach an agreement. Firstly, there were differing views on the allocation principles stipulated in UNCLOS

& UNFSA (table 2, dynamic 1). Neither UNCLOS nor UNFSA provide clear guidance on allocation principles (see appendix 1). In practice, the result is that Coastal States can argue as they wish for any principle to be the most important one. As can be anticipated, that is whatever principle the Coastal State deems as most fair or plays most to its benefit. I derived from the interviews that Norway is of the opinion that mackerel allocations should mainly be based on zonal attachment (share in the overall quota should be equal to the share of the stock in a State’s EEZ).

Other principles were considered to be legitimate only up to a certain extent. The other Coastal States, however, seemed to hold that it is important to consider other factors to a greater extent (such as ‘dependency on the fishery’), though which principles and to which extent still differed among them. The fact that the States can argue for different principles to be the base of the sharing arrangement makes it problematic to agree.

Besides the sanction threats and the differing views on allocation principles, there were three ecological dynamics that undermined cooperation. All three are instances in which Coastal States disagreed on what line of action to take in the management of the stock, because they had

‘contrasting responses’ to scientific observations. The first dynamic was that, from approximately 2009, scientists increasingly realized that they underestimated the abundance of the stock (Table 2, dynamic 10). However, beliefs differed as to the extent to which it was being underestimated.

The reason for that were the diverging outcomes of surveys designed to estimate the abundance of the stock, i.e. the egg survey and the trawl survey (Table 3). The trawl surveys, performed by Norway and since 2009 by Iceland and the Faroe Islands, indicated a larger SSB than the egg surveys. The egg surveys were performed by Norway and the EU, but from 2014 onwards are performed only by the EU as Norway stepped out.

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19 Table 3: Difference in SSB estimation between the egg and trawl survey and the SSB reported by ICES; pre- and post- benchmark assessment. Magnitude of numbers = million tonnes. Data sources: Nøttestad, Utne, et al., 2014; Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al., 2014; ICES, 2014d. More detailed information in appendix 7

2004 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Trawl survey SSB estimates ² Not

included in assessme nt

1.25 4.52 2.45 4.56 7.87 8.98

Egg survey SSB estimates ¹ before

benchmark

2.75 3.65 4.29 / / 5.57 /

Egg survey estimates after benchmark

3.17 3.97 4.84 / / 5.03 /

1 Egg survey only done triennially (North Sea component one year later). Here: combined western and southern components 2 “Swept area biomass was not estimated for the years 2008 and 2009 due to poor horizontal coverage in 2008, sub-optimal pelagic

trawling aimed at Atlantic salmon in 2008 and 2009,and too varying and poorly coordinated survey for the different vessels in 2009” (Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al. 2014).

Even though there was agreement amongst the Coastal States after the updated ICES advice (see appendix 8) that the stock size had indeed been underestimated, the extent to which it was underestimated remained a matter of contention due to the different outcomes of the surveys. The validity and rigorousness of the surveys as a whole became a disputed matter. As illustrated by the following quote, the Coastal States leaning more towards the outcomes of the egg survey (mainly the EU) point out the flaws within the trawl survey and its outcomes, and vice versa:

“So what these people have done is that they have developed an approach, which has a certain legitimacy, but can never replace true science (…) Which is the egg survey (…) So the northern trawl survey has been used by these people in a political manner which has nothing to do with science” (EU civil servant).

The influence of the disputed stock abundance on the Coastal State negotiations is that those Coastal State relying more on the results of the trawl survey (Norway) believe there is a much bigger stock and thus want a higher TAC. The other Coastal States, mainly Iceland, do not agree with a TAC as high as Norway suggested during the Coastal State meetings of 2014 (see appendix 10).

The second ecological dynamic that impeded an agreement came into play from approximately early 2011. More conclusive data indicated that the high abundance of the stock and its distribution

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into new waters could have effects on other (marine) species within some of the Coastal States’

ecosystems (Table 2, dynamic 11) (see appendix 11). In 2012, Icelandic scientists reported on the high amount of energy the stock was taking up from the marine ecosystem and the effects of that.

That became one of the reasons behind Iceland asking for a specific share of the stock in the Coastal State meetings. The EU and Norway, however, were sceptic about the legitimacy behind this argument and are not of the opinion that this affects the sharing arrangements:

“Iceland made their own version about weight gain, it’s quite interesting, but it’s only Iceland who’s doing it. And I remembered we looked at it and it’s interesting but it doesn’t change the relative sharing at all because Iceland seems to think that the only place where fish gain weight is Icelandic waters” (Norwegian civil servant).

About a year later, research grew on the possibility of the Atlanto-Scandian herring being outcompeted for food by the mackerel within Norwegian waters (Norway owns about 60 percent of the herring quota). Many interviewees pinpointed this as an additional reason why Norway asked for a higher TAC during the meetings: with herring being scarce, and recovery for the stock not yet in sight, the Norwegian processing industry allegedly needs raw material:

“The pressure from the fishing industry that is actually fishing much less than they need for the time. I mean they have 57 percent of the Norwegian spring spawning herring and the quota has been going down on average during the last ten years by twenty percent a year, due to bad recruitment (…) But they will not continue to sustain any fishery when, when it, if it continues like this (…) They need mackerel, they need blue whiting, they need whatever else” (Icelandic marine scientist).

A third ecological dynamic over which management responses differ is the ‘density-dependent growth hypothesis’ (Table 2, dynamic 12). ICES recognizes the plausibility of that hypothesis, but does not exclude other possibilities. The scientists from different Coastal States, however, have diverging views on the validity of the hypothesis. Some Norwegian scientists are convinced of its strength and therefore endorse a higher fishing pressure than what ICES is recommending:

“So there’s too much mackerel compared to the food available in their waters [=density-dependent growth hypothesis]. That’s our starting point. And when you have such a position, then it’s the opposite medicine of what ICES is recommending.

ICES is recommending that (…) we have to be more conservative, and fish less because

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the fish is growing less (…) The medicine is actually the opposite, we should fish more to compensate” (Norwegian marine scientist).

The belief in this hypothesis provided another incentive for Norway to request a higher TAC in the meetings.

In sum, we can say that the three ecological dynamics (Table 2, dynamic 10, 11, 12) hindered the Coastal States in agreeing on the collective management of the stock. This was largely due to those dynamics causing scientific contention (e.g. over the surveys and their outcomes) and because the States differed in managerial responses. As illustrated in the quote, Norway wanted a higher TAC which the other States do not agree with to the same extent (and even see it as a dangerous approach):

“So based on all those different inputs, we make our bets, and I think our bet will be that we want a higher F [fishing mortality, leads to higher TAC]” (Norwegian civil servant).

The last reason why the Coastal States struggled to reach level 3 of re-fitting the SES was due to the ‘Greenlandic issue’ (Table 2, dynamic 8). This issue came into play around mid-2013 and concerns the deal that had been made between Greenland and Iceland. As the mackerel catches in Greenlandic waters surged, some other Coastal States wanted to take part in its fishery. It was mainly Icelandic interests in the fishery that would pose a problem from the perspective of Norway and the EU, who would not accept that Iceland caught a Greenlandic quota on top of their own.

Iceland, however, was unwilling to give up their participation in the fishery, so the ‘Greenlandic issue’ is ongoing.

Besides the ecological and socio-political dynamics hindering cooperation amongst the States, there were two socio-political dynamics that pushed towards cooperation. Firstly, an important driving force for the EU to get Iceland into an agreement were the accession negotiations between Iceland and the EU (table 2, dynamic 6) (see appendix 12). The mackerel dispute was seen from the EU perspective as a hindering block to the accession talks. The dispute polluted the accession negotiations up to such an extent that the ‘fisheries chapter’ of the accession negotiations was never opened. For that reason, the EU made great efforts to resolve the mackerel dispute, as illustrated by the following quote:

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“For Damanaki [EU Commissioner] back then this was a highly political thing and for Damanaki it was the most politically useful to have the mackerel issue resolved before the start of negotiations (…) And why was that? There were a lot of Member States who were totally steadfast against this approach of opening the chapter while we had a problem with the Icelanders (…) They saw the accession negations as an opportunity to offer an incentive to the Iceland side to an agreement with us”

(Representative of EU Commission, DG Mare).

Notably, although this dynamic predominantly pushed towards cooperation, my interviews have shown that it also partially worked against cooperation within Iceland and possibly even Norway, although the validity and extent of that claim is hard to assess.

The second socio-political driving force towards cooperation was the determination of Maria Damanaki (table 2, dynamic 7). Damanaki became heavily involved in the mackerel negotiations, which is an unusual occurrence on its own, as the discussions are usually conducted solely by the negotiation teams. Damanaki has been identified by many interviewees as a main driving force towards a deal between all Coastal States:

“Damanaki was very, and DG MARE was very open after many years of a different kind of approach (…) Damanaki’s stance was quite transformative, because until then there was not a strong push from EU side to put them on board (…) I think the EU’s thinking was quite reactive and slow. The game changer was Damanaki’s approach”

(Representative of EU Commission, DG Mare).

It was largely due to these two push factors, in combination with the updated ICES advice that allowed for a higher catch, that in March 2014 an opportunity for an agreement among all Coastal States arised. Almost all interviewees agreed that this time period offered all the elements for the Coastal States to come to an international agreement, yet the opportunity was not taken, and momentum was lost.

5.5 Failed opportunity towards complete re-fitting of the SES (March 2014)

The opportunity towards level 3 of re-fitting is indicated by the dotted yellow bracket in figure 5.

It was in the Coastal State meeting of March 2014 (Edinburgh) that an agreement including all Coastal States seemed in reach. The EU and Iceland had agreed to the informal deal a few months

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earlier that Iceland would get 11.9 percent of the mackerel stock and, even though Norway was not informed of this percentage, that arrangement seemed (at least to the Icelanders) like a ‘done deal’. Nonetheless, the deal would never materialize. In fact, Iceland was not taken on board in any form within an agreement amongst all Coastal States. There were three overarching reasons for why that happened. Two of those reasons I have discussed previously, i.e. the Greenlandic issue and the three instances of contrasting responses to what is happening in the ecosystem.

Besides those reasons, many interviewees indicated the importance of a third reason: Norway’s outrage over the informal deal the EU struck with Iceland.

The reason for Iceland believing that they would be able to attain this 11.9 percent was because Damanaki allegedly assured them that she would be able to get Norway on board for this arrangement. That is however not how it played out, as Norway was taken aback and not pleased with this deal being brokered without their involvement:

“In Edinburgh (…) it’s fair to say we were really close to reaching an agreement.

Before Iceland and EU had bilaterally reached an understanding (…) the famous 11.9 (…) then things played out very differently, not only very differently, the Norwegians came very upset how then Iceland and not least the EU approached the issue and how they played it. Eventually I think the Norwegian position almost became so that they said “11.9, never! Maybe 12!”. My point is, 11.9, it is never going to happen. Because of the exact way the figure came about” (Icelandic civil servant).

The near outrage Norway felt when learning about the deal made between Iceland and the EU, is illustrated by the following quote:

“Damanaki or EU commission chose to stab Norway in the back. It’s as simple as that (…) But the way how [the EU] did it, probably annoyed people at every level; from the industry representatives, civil service and politicians (…) The strategy was discussed at high political levels (Norwegian civil servant).

Eventually it seemed that the difference between the 11.9 and the percentage Norway could agree upon was a difference of only a few decimal points. Nonetheless, the deal made without Norway’s involvement strongly contributing to an atmosphere of distrust. Thus, in the end, the Coastal States were not able to come to an agreement on an Icelandic share of the stock. From the interviews I can derive that the Coastal States blame one another for being too inflexible at that stage.

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Iceland was not taken along into an agreement, but the other Coastal States did make an agreement in March on the long-term management of the stock (2015-2018). The agreement is an interesting one, due to the strong Norwegian imprint on it (Norway was able to push for a higher TAC, allow the Faroe Islands a bigger share and ‘fence in’ Iceland) (see appendix 13). That agreement thus means that the Coastal States did manage to diminish the enlarged misfit that existed from 2009 to 2014.

5.6 Lost momentum after the opportunity and near-future prospects

With Damanaki’s term officially ending in November 2014, and Iceland formally withdrawing its application to become a Member State of the EU in March 2015, many interviewees argue that there is currently a lack of drive to include Iceland in the Coastal States’ sharing arrangements.

Moreover, the contrasting responses States have to what is going on in the ecosystem continue to pose problems between the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands in the negotiations. The current problems stem from advice ICES gave on the long term management of the stock in February 2015, which became and still is a source of contention between the Coastal States. This contention is the result of diverging opinions on which scenario should be chosen as the base for the advice: the

‘permanent’ versus the ‘temporary’ scenario (see appendix 14). In practice that means that Norway is again pushing for a higher TAC than the other States are willing to accept. For this reason, the States failed to come to an agreement for the management of the stock in March 2015, with new negotiations to continue in October 2015.

6. Discussion

6.1 Analysis of the results: understanding the persistence of social-ecological misfit

From the results of the case study, we can conclude that the endurance of the spatial misfit the result of both social and ecological dynamics that negatively influence the Coastal States’ ability to cooperate and come to agreement over the management of the stock. In a next step, then, I present more general barriers to re-fitting based on the dynamics found in the case study that could be relevant to other case studies as well. Those barriers can enhance one another, and the sum of their existence and interactions create the non-cooperative outcomes observed in the case study (i.e. no agreements with all Coastal States) (Figure 7).

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25 Figure 7: General barriers to re-fitting and their causes. Blue arrow: barrier enhances another barrier

6.1.1 Weak international institutional framework: lack of legitimacy and absence of authority

The first general explanation for the persistence of misfit is the weak institutional framework in place for management measures and allocation of fishing opportunities (dynamic 1). Neither UNCLOS nor the UNFSA provide any clear guidance on allocation principles or processes.

Consequently, there are differing views among the Coastal States on how the principles should be weighed against one another for the mackerel stock. Moreover, there is no agreement on how to calculate specific principles either. Furthermore, it is noticeable that Coastal States shift their perception on how the principles should be weighted according to their own interests in the stock under consideration, as is illustrated by the following quote:

“We have criteria for sharing, we have it in the UN agreement, but people don’t follow it, people only adhere to it when it suits them. For instance zonal attachment, only when it’s interesting (…) EU couldn’t care less about zonal attachment when it comes to mackerel” (Norwegian civil servant).

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Due to the lack of clearly defined guidelines, Coastal States somewhat ‘pick and choose’ their own criteria for sharing, oftentimes lacking legitimacy from the perspective of other Coastal States. The vague nature of the institutional framework thus causes a ‘legitimacy deficit’ where, due to the lack of objective sharing principles, agreed allocations are the result of incessant bargaining. As visualized in figure 7, the legitimacy deficit also contributes to distrust, as Coastal States suspect each other of picking certain principles subjectively to promote self-interest instead of objectively to promote fair-sharing.

Besides the vague nature of the institutional framework, it is the lack of authority within the governing structure of the SES that makes re-fitting the scales difficult. Of course, this is an issue quite particular to misfits on an international scale, as in international society there is no central government capable of making binding decisions about the common good (Young 2002). As visualized in figure 7, the absence of authority allows for dominant actor-networks to form (regimes). It also contributes to distrust and allows more for politicization of science as there is no authority to settle disputes.

Gupta et al. (2010) have also discussed the importance of the AG concepts of ‘authority’ and

‘legitimacy’ in collaborative governance.

6.1.2 Complexities of a dramatically changed ecosystem: scientific uncertainties allow for polarization and politicization

In the case study, there were a number of dynamics that pushed against an agreement due to contrasting responses to what is going on in the ecosystem (dynamics 9, 10, 11, 12). Those contrasting responses were able to form due to the absence of scientific certainty on the observed ecosystem dynamics. Uncertainty always characterizes SES and is therefore not necessarily an unexpected factor to scientists informing policy-makers. However, the shift of the mackerel was so abrupt and of such a magnitude that science inevitably lagged behind on several fronts, i.e. with respect to: a) the effect of the changed distribution pattern and higher abundance of the mackerel on other species; b) the specific drivers and longevity of the shift; and c) the abundance of the stock. All these instances of scientific uncertainty due to the abruptness and magnitude of the ecological shift allowed for decision-makers to delegitimize, misuse, or ignore ecological information (Polasky et al. 2011).