1 Department of Government
Bachelor thesis in Political Science, 15 credits Spring 2018
Between transparency and propaganda
A study of the Israeli Defense Forces’ use of Twitter during the 2018 Gaza protests
Author: David Hallerby Pages: 37
Supervisor: Ludvig Norman Word count: 11566
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Abstract
This essay aims at studying the use of social media by states and state actors. More specifically, the study is exploring how the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are using their official Twitter account @IDFSpokesperson in relation to the 2018 Gaza protests. The study is utilizing a quantitative content analysis as well as a framing analysis for the analysis of the Twitter account and is having a theoretical base in framing theory. The findings suggest that there is a problem when democratic states use social media – there is a fine line between being transparent and disseminating propaganda.
Keywords: Social media, IDF, Twitter, Framing theory, Gaza protests
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Table of content
1. Introduction………..…4
1.1. Question and aim……….….…5
1.2. Outline of paper………6
2. Background………...…7
2.1. Gaza Protests 2018………7
3. Previous research……….8
4. Theoretical framework………14
5. Methodology……….…15
5.1. Quantitative content analysis………..…16
5.2. Framing analysis………..17
6. Material………18
6.1. Limitations in material………20
7. Analysis………21
7.1. IDF Twitter account in numbers………21
7.2. Framing of the 2018 Gaza protests………26
8. Conclusion………...33
9. References………...36
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1. Introduction
Political use of social media is a relatively new phenomenon since social media itself is relatively new. With the creation and development of social media, it has become increasingly simpler to organize large groups of people for all kinds of causes.1 A famous example of social media’s ability to impact politics is the role it played in the Arab Spring of 2011. In this case, social media was both praised as well as blamed for the quickly organized uprisings across the Arab world. It was largely argued that this was one of the first times in history where the speed and effectiveness of social media were demonstrated and its ability to use this speed and effectiveness to mobilize large groups of people.2
States and other political groups have been quick to take advantage of this fact to rally people for their cause and to use it as a platform for spreading information. The use of social media by states and armed forces in general but especially in relation to conflict situations is increasing but its impact has not been given enough scholarly attention. The role of social media in relation to conflict is beginning to catch the interest of the scientific world but there is still much work to be done. There are today thousands of so called ‘new media’ outlets, found on blogs, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and numerous other Internet channels. It is not only the rise of ‘citizen journalism’ such as in the case of the Arab Spring that radically has changed the media landscape surrounding the conflict, also state actors have understood the value of social media and they are now free to disseminate their own content directly to their audience.3
Against the background of stately use of social media in relation to conflict, this paper will study how the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is using its official Twitter account
@IDFSpokesperson in relation to events tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is more than a century old which makes it one of the oldest conflicts of today as well as one of the most well-known to an international audience. Since the beginning of the conflict it has been extensively covered by media. With the advent of social media, it is now not only covered by the traditional news media but on numerous of
1 : Dimitrakopoulou, D. (2015). INFOCORE Definitions: “Social Media”.
2 Brown, Heather & Guskin, Emilie & Mitchell, Amy. The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings. 2012.
3 Banham, Cynthia. Legitimising war in a changing media landscape, 606.
5 various platforms found on the Internet. The most recent escalation in the conflict is the Gaza border protests that started on the 30th of March 2018 and that are scheduled to end on the 15th of May the same year.4 These protests will be the foundation for this study as it will be used as a case analysis. A more detailed overview of the protests will be presented in the following sections of this paper.
An important disclaimer that I would like to add is that throughout this study, I will use the words ‘protests’ and ‘protesters’ to describe the events. I have chosen these words simply because they are most frequently used by newspapers and other independent media such as Haaretz, LA Times and New York Times.567 As I will be studying the use of words of the IDF, this is of importance to clarify beforehand.
1.1 Question and aim
The purpose of this paper is to study how the IDF, which is one of the main actors involved in the 2018 Gaza protests, is utilizing its Twitter account and how they are framing the events through both a quantitative content analysis and a framing analysis. The study is best understood as a part of the scientific field of ‘political communication’ which is an interdisciplinary field combining political science and communications.
The research is mainly relevant out of three aspects: timeliness, as a contribution to a growing field of research and the possible implications that states’ use of social media might have. As the Gaza border protests are happening during the period in which this study is made, it is a relevant and interesting topic of research and it is important to conduct research on current events. It is also, to my knowledge, the first study made on this specific topic given the fact that they are happening as we speak: thus, it could also serve as a foundation for future research. Secondly, the research on social media impact on conflict is a relatively new and
4 Haaretz. What is Palestinian ’Land Day’ and Why is Israel Worried? March 29, 2018.
5 Kubovich, Yaniv. Israel to Top Court: Gaza Protests Are State of War, Human Rights Law Doesn’t Apply.
Haaretz. 3 May 2018.
6 Tarnopolsky and Abu Alouf. 15 Palestinians Killed by Israeli Fire as Gaza Border Protests builds. LA Times. 30 March 2018.
7 NYT editorial board. Israel Courts Catastrophe in Gaza Protests. New York Times. 2 April 2018.
6 ever-growing field of research and it is likely that its importance will grow for every year following the increase of social media users around the world. There has been considerable research made about social media impact on popular uprising, social movements and mobilization. However, the research relating to stately and military use of social media is currently underdeveloped. This study’s main goal is to contribute to this field of research through an in-depth case analysis. Thirdly, it is important to explore the effects that state use of social media might have and the implications it might bring for accountability and
credibility for democratic states.
Given the relative scarcity of research material so far about social media use by states, this study will have a clear inductive and empirical approach. By relating and contextualizing with the help of the previous research available, this study will at best be able to say something about how social media is used by states through the empirical findings that was discovered when studying the IDF use of Twitter. A more modest ambition is to create an understanding of how the IDF is using their Twitter account in conflict related situations. The main focus is to shed light over the specific case of the conflict between Israel and Palestine and especially over the recent events along the Gaza border from a social media perspective.
Given the above stated research goals, the following research question will be used for this study:
How are the IDF using their Twitter account during the 2018 Gaza protests and how are they framing the events?
1.2 Outline of the paper
As said earlier, the 2018 Gaza protests are happening right now (spring of 2018), which leads me to think that not everyone is aware about what they are and why they are happening.
Therefore, the first part of this paper will give a brief background of the protests to provide context that would be of relevance for the study. Following the background, I will present the relevant parts of the previous research available so far on state use of social media. The theoretical framework for this study is then presented, based on the framing theory. The
7 methodological basis of the empirical study will then be explained: a combination between quantitative content analysis and framing analysis, followed by a review of the material used for it. With all these parts in place, the analysis will follow in order to answer our initial research question. Finally, I will summarize and discuss the findings in the conclusion and give suggestions on future research.
2. Background
The history of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians spans over a hundred years and there are endless of things that could be said about it. Within the framework of a bachelor thesis it is not possible to record the whole history of the conflict even if it could have been of importance given the conflict’s complexity. Thus, this part will focus solely on the event that is being studied here which is the 2018 Gaza border protests. However, there will be brief historic explanations, which are necessary in order to understand the reasons behind the protests. As always with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there are many narratives and ways to understand the conflict. I will try to be as factual and neutral as possible when giving the background of the protests.
2.1 The 2018 Gaza border protests
The 2018 Gaza Protests are a set of protests that began on March 30 on the so called ‘Land Day’ and that are scheduled to end on May 15 on what is called ‘Nakba Day’. The protests are being held on the Gaza strip, a few hundred meters from the border to Israel. Tens of
thousands of Palestinians are attending and the protests are believed to be endorsed and supported by Hamas.8 The protests are attended by a smaller number of protestors every day during this period but with a significant increase every Friday when thousands of people join the protests by the border which have resulted in clashes between the IDF and Palestinian protestors. As of the 3rd of May 2018, 45 Palestinians have been reported killed in the protests and another 5000 injured. No Israeli casualties have been reported so far.9
8 Halbfinger, David M. Hamas Sees Gaza Protests as Peaceful – and as a ‘Deadly Weapon’. New York Times, April 15 2018.
9 Kubovich. Israel to Top Court: Gaza Protests Are State of War, Human Rights Law Doesn’t Apply. Haaretz.
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‘Land day’ commemorates events on the 30th of March 1976, when Israeli authorities expropriated Arab-owned land in northern Israel and six Israeli Arabs were shot dead.10
‘Nakba Day’ is a commemoration of what the Palestinians call the ‘Nakba’, which means disaster in Arabic. The Nakba Day is commemorated on May 15, one day after the Israeli Independence Day which is taking place on May 14. It is called the disaster since hundreds of thousands of Palestinians either fled or were expelled from their homes as the result of the Israeli War of Independence that took place from 1947-1949 and the main event in this war, being the Israeli declaration of independence on the 14th of May 1948. The circumstances regarding the Palestinian exodus is a hot topic of debate – extensive research has been made on the subject but there are no clear answers. The most controversial issues regarding the events are how many people that actually left Israel and especially whether they left
voluntarily as an escape from the raging war or if they were forcibly evicted from their homes by Israeli soldiers. Israeli historian Benny Morris and Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi have both dedicated much of their lives to the research of the Palestinian exodus.1112
The protests are called ‘The Great March of Return’ by the Palestinians and the purpose of the protests are to demand the right of return to Palestinians that previously lived in Israel but either fled or were expelled since the conflict started. The right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel are one of the so called ‘permanent status issues’ that were declared in the Oslo Accords from 1993. Other examples of these issues are the status of Jerusalem,
settlements and borders.13 It is estimated that there are around 5.1 million registered refugees and their descendants from the 1948 Palestinian exodus, of which 1.2 million live in the Gaza Strip.14
10 Haaretz. What is Palestinian ’Land Day’ and Why is Israel Worried? March 29, 2018.
11 Morris, Benny (2003). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12 Khalidi, Walid (Ed.) (1992). All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies.
13 The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Declaration of Principles. September 13, 1993.
14 UNRWA. UNWRA in figures as of 1 Jan 2015.
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3. Previous research
The research field of social media and specifically its usage by states and organizations is equally interesting and complex. It contributes to our common understanding of how states are using social media and public diplomacy during times of heightened conflict. Previous research on the use of social media by state actors have mainly focused on the use of social media by authoritarian states.15 Cynthia Banham, however, is trying to redirect the focus to the use of social media of democratic states in her 2013 study Legitimising War in a
Changing Media Landscape. Democratic states are using social media in more subtle ways as a tool to shape their own narrative and to legitimize their own actions. This need for states to influence through social media is more urgent in times of conflict or war and is thus
frequently used by state militaries and defense departments.16
Luke Justin Heemsbergen and Simon Lundgren conducted a study in 2014 where they analyzed the use of social media during wartime. This study was published in Australian Journal of International Affairs under the name: The power of precision air strikes and social media feeds in the 2012 Israel-Hamas conflict: ’targeting transparency’.17 Heemsbergen and Lundgren puts emphasis on the aim that states hold as producers of social media content, and more specifically on the relationship between transparency and propaganda. They bring forward the importance of this linkage, as seen in the following quote:
”In times of conflict, this (states’ use of social media) conflation becomes most visible, highlighting the problematic nature of assuming that social media transparently create emancipatory voices and outcomes against the state’s need
to control the narrative.”18
The current situation where sovereign states use social media as a tool of spreading
information during times of conflict creates a discrepancy between openness (transparency) and disinformative opinion building (propaganda).19 In short, it creates an open window for
15 Banham, Cynthia. Legitimising war in a changing media landscape, 606.
16 Banham, Cynthia, 605.
17 Luke Justin Heemsbergen & Simon Lindgren (2014) The power of precision
air strikes and social media feeds in the 2012 Israel–Hamas conflict: ‘targeting transparency’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68:5, 569-591
18 Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 574.
19 Hood, C. 2010. “Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward
10 the audience to look through, only they might not see what is objective facts but rather the constructed picture the state in question wants to communicate. The window of transparency becomes the very frame that holds it in place. As Heemsbergen and Lundgren put it:
“In short, these themes suggest that transparency is both a target for state
communications to achieve and becomes targeted by those weary of propaganda: the fog of war gives way to the digital smog of social media.”20
Heemsbergen and Lundgren suggests, similarly to Banham, that there is a void in the academic research when it comes to states, and particularly democratic ones, creating social media content in order to enhance specific objectives connected to policies during wartime or/and times of heightened conflict.21 However, some studies have been conducted on adjacent subjects, more focused on aggressive actions - state use of cyber operations through social media - such as the studies of informative-warfare during the Arab spring22 and more generally the use of information by states to influence public opinion of other nations, such as Troll-accounts spreading fake news in an attempt to force the outcome of national elections.23
The decline of traditional media and growing importance of digital platforms as a forum for political communication has allowed for states to broaden their perspectives on how to reach out with political messages. The versatile nature of social media has created a political forum which is greatly diversified, enabling states to use a wide array of alternatives to frame their narrative and legitimizing their own actions.24 Probably the most important quality of social media that states and militaries are taking advantage of is the ability to directly communicate with the public. No longer do they have to go through the traditional news media to deliver their messages, but can today instead directly reach their target audiences through social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This means that states can become their own news producers without having to deal with interference or interpretation by the news
media.25 This has several implications. Banham argues that the greatest implication is the lack
Couple?” West European Politics 33 (5): 989–1009.
20 Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 570.
21 Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 574.
22 van Niekerk, Pillay, & Maharaj. The Arab Spring| Analyzing the Role of ICTs in the Tunisian and Egyptian Unrest from an Information Warfare Perspective.
23 Bârsan. Military Trolls, Public Distractions and The Cyber. p.17
24 Banham, 606
25 Ibid, 609.
11 of scrutiny. Since states previously were dependent on traditional news media to convey messages and that the news media were reporting on events relatively independently, at least in democratic states, there was a natural in-built system of checking the states behavior and actions. Virtually every action that a state took and every statement they did had to go through journalists and news agencies in order to reach the public. With the decline of these old medias, states can do this without being scrutinized by external actors.26 This, in combination with what was previously said about social media offering vast amounts of platforms where to communicate and disseminate information very rapidly and effectively, could have a negative effect on democracy.27 There is a danger to the fact that states have the ability to legitimize their actions with their own choice of narrative without any checks. There is a risk that this could lead to social medias as a platform for propaganda.28
Many states have started utilizing social media as a way of directly communicating with the public. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office calls it ‘digital diplomacy’ and the USA calls it ’21st Century Statecraft’.29 Also Australia has stated interest in developing its use of social media for defensive and military purposes. The Australian Department of Defence published an extensive report called Review of Social Media and Defence in 2011, where they among other things stated that “…social media can also be used in an official capacity to:
deliver a message directly to the public without journalistic interpretation or bias;
communicate directly, in a more genuine and human tone, with the public, interest groups, families and potential recruits; share information quickly across many platforms to reach a large audience; enlighten audiences that do not normally follow news in traditional print and broadcast media”.30
26 Ibid, 612.
27 Ibid, 618.
28 Banham, 612.
29 Ibid, 615.
30 George Patterson Y & R. 2011. Review of Social Media and Defence. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 148.
12 Israel is one of the world leading states when it comes to utilizing social media in conflict situations. Banham states that:
“Israel has proven to be the most innovative and pioneering user of digital new media technologies among democratic states. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has used them extensively in two recent conflicts in Gaza with Hamas as a means to sell its war narrative
directly to its citizens.”31
States all over the world are monitoring Israel’s use of social media in conflict situations.
Israel’s use of social media during the Gaza campaigns was described as ‘very powerful’ by the Australian Defence Force’s director general of public affairs, Brigadier Alison Creagh and
she did not rule out the possibility of using similar technologies in the future.32
Israel has been using social media in conflict situations for the last 10 years.33 A major influencing event was the 2006 Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah. In this war, Hezbollah made frequent use of social media and blogs and managed to skillfully influence the public opinion in their own favor through various ‘Information Operations’ (IO).34 They managed, in a much faster way than Israel, to spread information about the conflict from their own point of view and to shape the narrative of it. Although Israel was stronger militarily, Hezbollah claimed victory in this war and this was much thanks to their ability to shape the narrative of the conflict to the international audience.35 Israel learned a hard lesson from this war and it was after this that they themselves started to develop their social media services.36 Following this war, Israel set up the Winograd Commission.37 The aim of the commission was to review the perceived Israeli shortcomings on the battlefield as well as in their public image throughout the war. The commission led to the creation of the National Information Directorate, whose aim was to “…direct and coordinate in the information sphere so that the relevant bodies present a unified, clear and consistent message and so that the various
31 Banham, 615.
32 Ibid, 617
33 Shakarian, Paulo, et al. Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A Multidiciplinary Approach, 39.
34 Sharkarian et al, 35.
35 Ibid, 35.
36 Ibid, 38.
37 Caldwell W, Murphy D, Menning A. Learning to leverage new media: the Israeli defense forces in recent conflicts, 6.
13 government spokespersons speak with a single voice. The directorate will initiate information campaigns and programs, host events, etc.”38
In 2008 Israel launched its first military campaign against Gaza called ‘Operation Cast Lead’.
Israel banned journalists from entering the Gaza strip during this war and held an
unprecedented Twitter press conference instead of a regular one.39 Hundreds of both Israeli and Palestinian Facebook groups were created and the IDF set up its own YouTube channel where they uploaded footage from airstrikes in Gaza.40 Banham argues that “By transmitting its own dehumanized images - and preventing the traditional media from obtaining any of their own more graphic material - the Israeli military sought to retain greater control over public support for its war.”41
In 2012 Israel launched its second Gaza campaign named ‘Operation Pillar of Defense’. This war was dubbed a ‘Twitter War’.42 During this campaign, both Israel and Hamas used Twitter and other social media to denigrate the other side and to promote their own narrative of the conflict. Israel even announce the launch of the campaign on Twitter and it quickly evolved into a parallel battlefield, next to the real one.43 Thomas Zeitzoff found in his 2018 study Does Social Media Influence Conflict? Evidence from the 2012 Gaza Conflict that actors engaged in conflict are very perceptive to public opinion on social media.44 By studying the relationship between Twitter and conflict intensity, he found that Israel was very responsive to changes in public opinion online and that their actions were dependent on Twitter support.
“It also shows how states engaged in conflict are harnessing social media to sway perceptions and communicate to international audiences. Particularly for Israel, public support via social media affected its use of Twitter and its decisions to escalate its conflict intensity.”45
38 Caldwell W, Murphy D, Menning A, 7.
39 Banham, 615.
40 Sharkarian, 39.
41 Banham, 616.
42 Sutter, John D. Will Twitter war become the new norm? CNN. 19 November 2012.
43 Banham, 616.
44 Zeitzoff, Does Social Media Influence Conflict? Evidence from the 2012 Gaza Conflict, 48.
45 Zeitzoff, 48.
14 The previous research shows us that there is a fine line between transparency and propaganda when states are utilizing social media and that this potential danger could be even more present in times of heightened conflict. Before the advent of social media, states were routinely checked and scrutinized by the news media but today this has changed drastically.
Most democratic states today are using social media as a tool to disseminate information about themselves and to conduct public diplomacy. States now have the ability to directly communicate with their target audience, drastically changing the way conflict is reported on.
Israel is a leading country when it comes to using social media and this is demonstrated by their use of it in several conflicts during the 21st century. The importance of social media in conflict situations is further demonstrated by Zeitzoff’s findings of how social media had the ability to alter the conflict intensity in ‘Operation Pillar of Defense’ in 2012 between Israel and Hamas.
4. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework in this study will be based on framing theory. Robert Entman, who is a leading scholar in this field, is arguing that framing essentially involves two aspects:
selection and salience. He describes these as:
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.46 This selection and salience can be made both consciously and subconsciously and will affect the receiver based both on the current framing used and previous conceptions of the
receiver.47 Depending on which frames are used for the specific purpose, the receiver will interpret the information differently. Framing as a theory has bridging qualities, which makes the possibilities of using framing as a theory many, stretching over many different
disciplinary fields. Framing can help bridge many different fields: quantitative and qualitative, empirical and interpretative, psychological and sociological and academic and professional.48
46 Entman, 1993. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 52.
47 Entman, 1993. 53.
48 Reese, The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited, 148.
15 Alison Novak and Ernest Hakenan discusses framing theory and its application to social media in their article published in Encyclopedia of social media and politics. They emphasize that framing is a process of “selecting, organizing and editing information for distribution through a medium”. Furthermore, they write that framing theory is important in the era of social media because information on these platforms are presented in a way that influences public opinion and people’s knowledge. Although framing theory was initially connected to news media the idea has now expanded to include the information distributed by social networks and media users.49
The role of lexical choices has a prominent position within framing theory. The use of words is an important aspect of how an event is being framed and subsequently how the frame is interpreted by the receiver.50 Entman also stresses the importance of words in frames:
“A frame repeatedly invokes the same objects and traits, using identical or synonymous words and symbols in a series of similar communications that are concentrated in time. These frames
function to promote an interpretation of a problematic situation or actor and (implicit or explicit) support of a desirable response, often along with a moral judgment that provides an
emotional charge.”51
As Entman discusses, a frame is the result of the repeated use of certain words and narratives over time through which the content is interpreted. The frame creates a sort of narrative which becomes the conceptualized idea and image of a certain story or phenomenon. In conclusion, framing is a useful theoretical approach when assessing what is being said and how it is being portrayed.
5. Methodology
This essay will use two methodological frameworks in order to answer my initial research question. The first research method I will use is a quantitative content analysis. This method is frequently used in both political science and communications and the word quantitative is of importance here – this method is useful when analyzing a larger number of analysis objects as
49 Novak & Hakenan. Framing theory and social media. pp. 545
50 Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse, 62.
51 Entman et al. Nature, Sources, and Effects of News Framing. Handbook of Journalism studies, 177.
16 it can be used to create measurable results.52 The second method chosen is a framing analysis.
This method is useful when looking at what frames that are used in a certain content. This method is also frequently used in the fields of political science and communications. A more thorough explanation of the methods chosen will follow here.
5.1 Quantitative content analysis
The ability to measure is of essence when conducting a quantitative content analysis. The method is useful when looking for general trends and categories and to be able to draw
conclusions from larger quantities of research material.53 That it is a content analysis indicates that it is studying the content found in different sorts of material – it could be written material, oral material or material based on images or motion pictures. The important aspect is not the exact manifestation of the material, rather the content that the material is holding.54 For the first part of my analysis, a quantitative content analysis will provide the framework required in order to go through with the analysis. I have a fairly large amount of research material for the first part of the analysis (n=163, which will be presented in the next section) which makes quantitative content analysis an adequate method to use. Moreover, the purpose of this part of the analysis is to detect general trends and to be able to give an overview of how the IDF used its Twitter account during this period of time. The quantitative content analysis will allow me to count, measure and sort the material into measurable categories. This method has been the subject of critique, mostly saying that it is hard to draw any useful conclusions when you convert content into numbers and that it is sometimes a too “mechanical” approach.55 This study, however, will combine the quantitative content analysis with a more in-depth framing analysis in order to further study the actual meaning of the content analyzed.
For the quantitative analysis, I will look at four different aspects of the material and ask my material four different questions: How many tweets were made? How often did they post and when? How much infographic material was used? How much likes and retweets did the posts generate? These questions will be asked in order to get a general overview of the material and
52 Esaiasson et al. Metodpraktikan, 197-198.
53 Esaiasson et al, 197.
54 Ibid, 197.
55 Ibid, 198.
17 the IDF’s use of Twitter during this period. All of these questions will have a clear approach:
the relation between posts relating to the Gaza protests and the posts not related to them.
5.2 Framing analysis
Framing analysis is a sort of implementation of the framing theory. Reese argues that framing analysis is a useful tool when trying to locate meanings and narratives in various materials: “It has been a major step forward in the empirical tradition to appreciate that there are features that, when taken together, tell a larger tale than the manifest story. The framing project opens up more room for interpretation, captures a more dynamic process of negotiating meaning, and highlights the relationships within discourse.”56 Thus, a frame can be identified from analyzing series of material and look at specific characteristics such as words and
descriptions.
Novak and Hakenan credits Robert Entman as an important figure in the research of framing analysis. They agree with his studies on the subject when it comes to analyzing the way information is framed: “A researcher can consider the way frames are build, such as the types of language, tone and evidence used to convey information.”57 Entman also argues that
framing analysis have four main pillars. First, it is important for researchers to identify frames within a communicated message. Second, one can look at the institutional conditions that produce these frames. Third, there is a value in looking at how the audience interacts with these frames and finally researchers can gain insight by looking at how frames affect public opinion or policy. 58
In order to investigate how the IDF are framing the Gaza protests, I am proposing an
analytical framework in which three general categories are used to analyze the material. With the IDF tweets as a basis I am conducting a systematic study over how Israel is controlling their narrative and legitimizes their actions during the Gaza protests. This is done by utilizing
56 Reese, Stephen D. The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited, 152.
57 Novak, A. & Hakenan, E. Framing theory and social media, 545.
58 Entman. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. p. 51-58
18 framing analysis as a way to bring forward underlying messages and strategies of political communication.
The main approach of the framing analysis has been to expose the material to some essential questions. In what ways are the protests described? What actors are brought forward as perpetrators and/or participants? And how are the actions of both the protesters and the IDF described? These are the analytical categories which my study is built on. To further illustrate this framework, I have operationalized these questions in to more generic categories named;
Naming of the protests, Actors of the protests, Actions of the protesters and finally Actions of the IDF. The specific choice of these four categories has emerged inductively from the material during the analysis and is based on the concept of framing theory, as framing theory becomes essential when assessing underlying meanings. To frame is to bring forward some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them visible in communicated messages. This is done by suggesting some specific problem descriptions, etiologies and moral/normative values. 59 In order to investigate how the IDF are using Twitter to control the narrative we need to ask how they are framing the problem at hand. As for the question of what actors and actions that are described, this becomes important when looking at how states are legitimizing their own behavior, more specifically the actions of the Israeli military, both for the domestic and the international audience.
6. Material
This paper will study the IDF’s official Twitter account. The account is called
@IDFSpokesperson and has around 884.000 followers.60 The choice of Twitter over any other social media platform (the IDF also has for example a Facebook account and a YouTube account) is motivated according to the type of posts found on Twitter. After reviewing the IDF accounts on various platforms, I found that the IDF Twitter account is the one using most up to date posts about what is happening in Gaza. These brief updates on current events are mixed in with infographic videos and images, which are also found on their Facebook page.
This mix of updates and infographic material made Twitter the best choice to study. The time frame that is being used is five weeks of tweets: from the 30th of March to the 3rd of May. I
59 Strömbäck,. Makt, Medier Och Samhälle: En Introduktion Till Politisk Kommunikation. p. 53
60 Twitter. https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson. 2018.
19 decided to choose the time frame according to weeks instead of for example one month, since the protests are largely organized around weeks. Every Friday each week usually sees a spike in protesters attending as well as general intensity of the protests. The 30th of March was the starting day of the protests, which was a Friday.
I retrieved all of my material from the @IDFSpokesperson Twitter account. I also used a Google Chrome extension called ‘Kwitty’, which allows for a briefer overview of all tweets on an account during a certain time frame. I used Kwitty to organize the material and get a general overview and I used the official Twitter website to go through the material in a more thorough way. The total amount of tweets made by the IDF during the time frame March 30 to May 3 were 163. These 163 tweets will form the material for the following analysis.
The first, quantitative part of the study will include all tweets made during the period but will focus on the IDF’s tweets that are relating to the Gaza protests. This choice is made in order to give a more general overview of how the IDF used it’s Twitter account during this time frame and to provide with a contextual background. I believe that by including the remainder of the tweets, the ability to draw conclusions on the IDF behavior will increase. It will,
however, have a sharp focus on the tweets relating to the Gaza protests. Since this entire study is focusing on how states and militaries are using social medias in war and conflict, this seems like the most logical thing to do.
The more in-depth framing part of the study will entirely exclude all tweets not relating to the Gaza protests. This section of the study is meant to give a more detailed analysis of how the IDF uses its Twitter account in relation to the Gaza protests and to assess the actual content found in the tweets. Therefore, it makes sense to only use material related specifically to that.
A main difference from the previous part is that I organized the material according to threads.
Twitter has a function where it is possible to publish several connected posts in a row called
‘threads’. A central feature of Twitter is the limitation of 140 characters per post and because of this they created the thread function. Twitter explain the thread function on their webpage like this: “Sometimes we need more than one Tweet to express ourselves. A thread on Twitter is a series of connected Tweets from one person. With a thread you can provide
20 additional context, an update, or an extended point by connecting multiple Tweets
together.”61 Several threads were found on IDF’s Twitter account. For the quantitative analysis, I looked at every tweet one by one in order to count likes, retweets, use of images and other general information. For this section where the framing of the posts is in focus, I will consider one thread as one object of analysis since viewing every tweet one by one will lose a lot of the meaning of the content. Some of the tweets were not connected in a thread and was therefore counted as one object of analysis. This systematization of all the tweets generated 62 analysis objects from the initial 103 tweets retrieved about the Gaza protests.
6.1 Limitations in material
The choice of not including Twitter posts from the Palestinian side of the conflict is
complicated and has been made with much consideration. Firstly, the Gaza protests are not organized by one party only, they are rather made up by a network of activists and groups.
Although a lot of evidence seem to point in the direction that Hamas is participating to a large extent in the protests, they are not officially organizing them. From what I have found on Twitter, there are several Twitter users and accounts writing about the protests. Among these, the Great Return March (@GreatReturnMa)62 account seems to be the official account.
However, they only have around 3000 followers, which makes it questionable how much influence they actually have. The official English Hamas account @HamasInfoEn63 has around 76.000 followers and could have contributed to a greater understanding of how the two sides are using Twitter in the context of the protests. However, given the facts that Hamas is not the official organizer of the protests, its relatively few followers and, once again, the limitations of a thesis on a bachelor’s level, made me do the choice of focusing solely on the IDF Twitter account. Furthermore, the study is focusing mainly on stately actors and their use of social media. Hamas could be considered somewhat of an official actor since they are both a political party and a militant group, but they are labeled a terrorist organization by many countries and they lack the qualifications for being a state, which makes it logical to exclude them from the study.
61 Twitter. https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/create-a-thread. 2018
62 Twitter. https://twitter.com/GreatReturnMa. 2018.
63 Twitter. https://twitter.com/hamasinfoen. 2018
21 The protests are scheduled to end on the 15th of May. Due to the fact that this study is being conducted in the midst of the protests, I will not be able to cover the entire period of the protests. This inability to cover the whole scope of the protests is indeed one of the flaws of the study. There are also predictions that the final protests on the 15th of May will be of greater magnitude than the previous ones, which would have been of interest for this study.
The relevance of the research could still be motivated by the recency of the protests and the fact that it will be able to cover the majority of the time in which they are taking place.
Therefore, this study will cover the first five weeks of the protests.
7. Analysis
7.1 IDF Twitter account in numbers
In order to give an overview over how the IDF used its Twitter account in relation to the Gaza protests, I will firstly provide material that are of a descriptive quantitative nature. This will hopefully create an understanding of the general picture: the number of tweets made, which periods during the protests that were more frequently covered, to what extent the IDF used infographic material and a measurement of likes and retweets found in the tweets.
As mentioned earlier, there were a total of 163 tweets during the five-week period between the 30th of March and the 3rd of May. Out of these 163 tweets, 60 were addressing topics other than the Gaza protests. This leaves us with 103 tweets that were related to the Gaza protests.
That is 63,2% of the total number of tweets. Thus, the majority of tweets during this period were related to the Gaza protests which suggests that these events were the primary topic for the IDF during this time frame and were important for them to address. On average, the IDF posted 4,6 times a day and during this five-week period they posted on average 2,9 times a day about the Gaza protests. On a few days there were zero tweets and on some days the tweets numbered almost one tweet every two hours. The day with the highest number of tweets was on the 30th of March, which was also the initial day of the Gaza protests. On this day only, 17 tweets were posted. To get a better understanding of the frequency of tweets, I analyzed the whole material according to the dates on which the tweets were posted. From studying the frequency of tweets week by week the following was found:
22 Graph 1. IDF tweets week by week.
The frequency of all tweets combined (blue bars) during the five-week period did not follow a specific pattern. It seems like the odd one out among these is the last week which showed a decrease in tweets posted (see Graph 1). In the first four weeks the total number of tweets posted were more or less the same with some minor fluctuations. By contrast, when it comes to the tweets relating to the Gaza protests specifically (orange bars), a clear pattern could be identified. The number of tweets were gradually decreasing for every week that passed, with the first week having 36 tweets about the Gaza protests and the fourth and fifth week only 12 each. Perhaps the most spectacular finding was the weekly percentage of tweets about the Gaza protests. In the first week, the IDF posted 36 tweets in total, and a 100% of them were relating to the Gaza protests. On the second week, 25 out of 30 tweets or 83,3% were about Gaza. The third and fourth week saw the lowest percentage of tweets relating to Gaza, with 42,9% and 34,3% respectively. On the fifth and last week, the percentage grew again to 60%, which is similar to the average amount of tweets relating to the protests during the whole period (63,2%). These findings seem to indicate that the IDF’s interest in tweeting about the Gaza protests were diminishing as the weeks went by. Whether this is due to a general decrease in the intensity of the protests or a result of the initial novelty of the protests, or a combination of both, is not clear. It should be noted that during week 3, which saw the highest number of total tweets of all weeks studied, both Yom haAtzmaut (Israeli Independence Day according to the Hebrew calendar) and Yom haZikaron (Memorial Day for the fallen soldiers of Israel and victims of terror) took place. Both of these are national holidays of great
importance in Israeli society and they are both strongly linked to the military. Thus, these two
36
30
42
35
20 36
25
18
12 12
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Week 1 Week2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5
IDF tweets week by week
Total number of tweets that week Tweets relating to the Gaza protests
23 events constituted a large part of the tweets for that week and could explain the large number of overall tweets and the relatively low number of Gaza-related tweets.
Images, videos and other graphic content are important aspects of social media in general and also on Twitter. They can be powerful tools to create and foster a certain narrative and to amplify the messages that are intended to be delivered to the audience. This section will study how much of the content that contains an image or a video. The research found that the IDF makes frequent use of images and videos in their Twitter feed. Of the tweets relating to the Gaza protests, 45% included an image or a video. Of the tweets relating to other content than Gaza, 62% contained an image or video. It seems as if the content about the protests
contained less graphics than the content unrelated to Gaza. This would be assumed to be due to the many brief live updates about the Gaza protests which often did not include an image or a video.
Graph 2. Percentage of images or videos in tweets relating to the Gaza protests Graph 3. Percentage of images or videos in tweets unrelated to Gaza protests
One of the key features on social media is the ability of the targeted audience to directly interact with the producers of the delivered content. On Twitter, users have the possibility to like, comment and retweet the posts uploaded. The ’like’ function on Twitter could act as a measurement of how popular a specific post is. It is not in any way an absolute measurement of popularity – but it is a unique way of measuring popularity on specific posts, especially compared to traditional news media outlets which lacks this function. Similarly, the function
45%
55%
Percentage of images or videos in tweets relating to the Gaza protests
Image or video Only text
62%
38%
Percentage of images or videos in tweets unrelated to Gaza protests
Image or video Only text
24 of retweeting could act as a measurement of dissemination. This effect could be said to be more direct – even though I will not be able measure the exact spread of the posts, it can give a clue on how much circulation the posts are having. Retweets are also of certain interest because when someone retweets a post, it will show on their feed as well. Hence, retweeting material is more of a statement than to like a post. I chose to exclude the comment function of Twitter – the comments require a more qualitative approach to understand what they mean and this is not possible to do within the scope of this study. For this section, I studied the average number of likes and retweets of all posts. I divided the material into three categories:
videos; images and posts containing only text. I further studied the posts relating to the Gaza protests separately from the rest of the material. I systematically collected and calculated the average number of likes and retweets found in the posts and the results are presented in the three graphs found below.
Graph 4. Videos – average likes and retweets.
1101
754 864
325
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Likes Retweets
Videos - average likes and retweets
Related to Gaza protests Other
25 Graph 5. Images – average likes and retweets.
Graph 6. Text – average likes and retweets
Three main conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the posts relating to the Gaza protests generated significantly higher numbers of likes and retweets, regardless of use of graphics or not. This indicates that for the audience following the IDF Twitter account, these posts were of greater interest than the rest of the material. Second, the difference in retweets
1107
833 713
280
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Likes Retweets
Images - average likes and retweets
Related to Gaza protests Other
453
201 288
106
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Likes Retweets
Text - average likes and retweets
Related to Gaza protests Other
26 between the two categories were even higher than the difference in likes. Posts relating to Gaza videos got on average 132% more retweets; images got 197,5% more retweets and texts got 89,6% more retweets compared to other posts. This is an indication that the tweets relating to the Gaza protests were spread to a much greater extent than the other posts. It is further an indication that people found it more important to show the content on their own feed. Third, the findings show that videos and images got significantly more likes and retweets than posts containing only text. This further reinforces the findings of the previous section that the use of images and videos is a powerful tool to strengthen and spread a certain message.
7.2 Framing of the 2018 Gaza protests
The first part of the analysis has brought us the most basic facts about the IDF’s use of Twitter and unveiled some of the general trends of the account during this period. To be able to answer the second part of my question of how the IDF are framing the events, we need to dig deeper into the material in order to investigate more specifically what is posted about the protests. From studying all 62 analysis objects that were made about the Gaza protests through a framing analysis, I will try to systematically sort the material and unpack what content is posted and what the general trends are. As mentioned in the methodological chapter, I will organize the material according to these four categories.
- Naming of the protests - Actors of the protests - Action of the protesters - Action of the IDF
By looking at how the IDF is referring to the protests and the protesters, we could draw conclusions on how the actors participating in the Gaza protests are portrayed. By looking at what actions are mentioned in the tweets, i.e what is reported on from the Gaza protests, we can both see what kind of incidents that are tweeted about and also what these incidents are called. We can also see how they are framing their own behavior in relation to how they frame the protesters behavior.
27 With this analytical framework, I sent the material through a second round of coding. I
studied every analysis object (tweet/thread) which could be either an infographic image or video, or a text and looked specifically for words and contexts relating to the categories mentioned. For the purpose of getting a general sense of what is mentioned, the tweets were double coded. That is, every tweet could contain several actors and several actions. If an actor or action reoccurred in the same tweet however, it was not double counted but counted just as one occurrence.
Category Indicator Occurrence Naming of the protests Riot (violent)
Riots/Terror in disguise Terror (activity)
“Peaceful protests”
33 23 9 5 Actors of the protests Hamas
Terrorists Palestinians Suspects Rioters Gazans
38 19 11 7 7 1 Action of the protesters Damaging infrastructure
Infiltrating (into Israel) Using explosive devices Burning tires
Throwing firebombs Rock throwing Attacking/assaulting Sending kites with flaming objects
Sending their kids to the front line
17 16 10 10 8 7 4 4
3
Action of the IDF Protecting (civilians, borders, infrastructure)
Responding (In response…) Using riot dispersal means
16
12 7
28 Action of the IDF (cont.) Firing in accordance to rules of
engagement Thwarting
Targeting military targets Sending leaflets with warnings Apprehending
Defending Neutralizing
6
6 3 2 2 2 1
For the category ‘naming of the protests’ there was a clear pattern. The protests were either called ”riots” (often in combination with ”violent”) or some form of terror activity. It was never described as protests, and the purpose of the protests were not mentioned either. It was also often referred to as terror activities in disguise, i.e that the protests or riots were nothing else than terrorism. One example of this was the use of the phrase “peaceful protests” marked by quotation marks. This signals that the general idea, that these are large scale protests for or against something, is false and that it is in fact violent riots or even terror activity. To
illustrate this, I will provide examples:
In the tweet above, the IDF says that the events along the Gaza border are not peaceful protests, since firebombs are being used in it. Below is another tweet on the same theme
29 saying that the protests are in fact violent riots, used to cover the true intentions of terror attacks.
An infographic video posted on the 4th of April states in the first few seconds that “This is not a protest. This is terror”, followed by footage from the Gaza border where masses of people are burning tires and running towards the border security fence holding the Palestinian flag.
The overall impression of the protests is that they are violent riots or terror activities and that in a lot of cases these protests are not what they seem. It seems like if the IDF is trying to show that they are exposing the true nature of the protests by delegitimizing them and calling them either very violent or that they are not what they seem to be.
The main actors described from the protests are several. The by far most common actor is Hamas, followed by terrorists and only third Palestinians. This portrayal further reinforces the sense that these protests are in fact not protests but rather a Hamas led riot or terror activity. In a lot of posts, Hamas is explicitly blamed and held responsible for everything that is
happening along the Gaza-Israel border in manners such as in this tweet:
As seen in this tweet, Hamas is not only held accountable for the protests, they are also accused of using their own civilians for the purposes of terror. This is a recurring feature when Hamas is addressed. The IDF blames Hamas for exploiting their own population and on some occasions, the IDF even addresses the Gaza civilians specifically, urging them to see
30 through the lies of Hamas and stay away from the protests such as in the tweet below. Hamas is also named together with “terror” in a great majority of the Hamas-related tweets.
From looking at the overall use of words when talking about the main actors, there is a clear sign of dehumanization and legitimization efforts. For example, in a majority of the tweets containing “terrorist” or “suspect”, actions of the IDF is mentioned in the same tweet. This seems to be a recurring feature and it is plausible that it is used to legitimize the IDF actions and dehumanize the other side. It is easier to accept the IDF use of force when they are encountering suspects and terrorists.
When describing what is happening at the protests, there is a wide variety of actions tweeted about. Most of them share a common feature: the use of violence and weapons. The protesters are described as hurling rocks, throwing firebombs, burning tires and damaging the security fence separating Gaza and Israel. This creates and image of the protests to be very violent and almost out of control. Another very common behavior described is repeated attempts of infiltration into Israel such as this tweet:
The common description of infiltration and infiltration attempts create a sense of impending threat by repeatedly mentioning that the terrorists and Hamas are trying to infiltrate Israel in order to commit acts of terror. This threat scenario is also legitimizing the actions of the IDF:
no state would possibly allow for masses of people to storm into their country in order to wreak havoc and harm their civilians. To enhance the reality of the threat, tweets like this can be found:
31 By showing the proximity of the events along the Gaza border to Israeli towns, the IDF
further creates an image of immediate threat that needs to be dealt with.
The IDF is not only tweeting about the protests and the protesters. They are also frequently describing their own behavior in the context of the protests. When doing so, the two most common ways of describing their actions is that they are “protecting” and “responding”. In many tweets, they state that the IDF stands strong and will protect the Israeli civilians, borders and infrastructure from being harmed. The need for protection is suggesting that there is something or someone to be protected from. The protesters are thus indirectly being painted as a direct threat to Israeli civilians, which we could also see more directly when the
IDFSpokesperson described the events that took place along the border and the actors involved as violent or as terrorists. In many tweets, the IDF is “responding” to something.
Very few tweets were found where the IDF is described as performing an action first. The majority of tweets describing IDF actions is in fact rather reactions to something that has happened. This tweet illustrates the responding actions of the IDF:
32 The first action described is Palestinians rioting along the border. The IDF is responding to these riots by using riot dispersal means and firing in accordance with the rules of
engagement. That the IDF is using riot dispersal methods is frequently mentioned.
Furthermore, in almost every tweet saying that the IDF is using force, it is also added that they are firing or operating in accordance with the rules of engagement. Judging by the large number of tweets indicating that the IDF is responding to something, the IDF creates an image that they are not the ones who started and that they are only reacting to something because they were forced to. By adding that they are operating in accordance with rules of engagement brings further justification to the IDF actions. By saying that the soldiers are protecting its civilians from being harmed by terrorists and violent rioters also legitimize the IDF’s actions.
To conclude the analysis, we can detect some major trends in what is being reported by the IDF from the Gaza border protests. By studying all of the analysis objects through the lens of these four categories and the words that are used for every one of these categories, the
following are my main findings. First, the protests are not described at all as protests but as violent riots or terrorist actions. There is no mentioning at all about the purpose of the protests in any tweet analyzed. By not mentioning the purpose of the protests, the IDF legitimizes their own actions because it makes the protests look irrational. A lot of times, attention is also given to the claim that the protests are used as a smoke screen for terrorist actions and violent rioting. The protesters are also mainly described as violent or as suspects. Second, Hamas is given a great deal of space in the tweets. Judging from the number of references to Hamas in relation to the protests, it seems that they are the key actor involved. Hamas is also accused of exploiting their own civilians, using the riots as an excuse for using terror and that they alone are responsible for anything that happens along the border. Third, a clear threat scenario is being emphasized. The many infiltrations, the extensive use of violence and the frequent use of the word ‘terrorist’ paints a picture where the only thing standing in the way between the
33 violent riots and Israel is the IDF. They are protecting Israeli civilians by using reasonable methods and responding according to the rules of engagement. This scenario, where the IDF is only responding and protecting, gives the audience the impression that the actions of the IDF are legitimate and just.
8. Conclusion
The analysis has revealed several clues on how the IDF are using their Twitter account and how they are framing the events related to the 2018 Gaza border protests. The first part of the analysis revealed some of the basic knowledge on how they are using Twitter in relation to the Gaza protests. First of all, it was evident that the Gaza protests were more frequently reported on than other events not relating to the protests. This strengthens the assumptions of the importance of using social media in conflict related situations, such as has been stipulated in previous research. The overall frequency of tweets relating to the Gaza protests also
seemed to diminish as the weeks went by, possibly as a result of the initial novelty of the news. This finding however, would have benefitted from a comparing analysis of conflict intensity during the protests to assess whether this was correlated – however, this was not possible within the framework of this thesis. The first part of the analysis also showed that the IDF is frequently using infographic images and videos in their use of Twitter. Interestingly, the use of infographics was less in posts related to the Gaza protests which could be explained with the many short, text-based up to date notifications that were posted about the Gaza protests. From studying the amount of likes and retweets on IDF tweets, it demonstrated that the border protests were of great interest for the audience. The ability for a state actor, such as the IDF, to directly communicate with their audience seem to be of relevance in this case.
Especially the posts containing a video or an image seemed to generate a significantly high amount of likes and retweets, showing that the audience is highly receptive to the IDF’s use of social media, reassuring the idea that social media is a vital tool for directly communicating with a targeted audience. The proportionally higher number of retweets relating to the Gaza protests in comparison to other posts also shows that state use of social media during times of heightened conflict is of certain interest. Overall, the IDF used its Twitter account to
frequently report on the events happening along the Gaza border, using infographics as well as text-based tweets in order to disseminate information about what is happening at the border where the IDF is operating.
