What Can We Learn from Hobbes?: An Interpretative Approach to Contemporary Citizenship Deprivation Practices

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What Can We Learn from Hobbes?

An Interpretative Approach to Contemporary Citizenship Deprivation Practices

Helena Färdig

Master Thesis in Political Theory Department of Government Uppsala University

Supervisor: Jonas Hultin Rosenberg Word count: 14317

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Abstract

Deprivation of citizenship is currently used in democratic states to combat international terrorism and constitutes ‘the securitisation of citizenship’. The usage of which is often justified by states as assuring national security. Among scholars, there seem to be a conflict between a perspective of rights and security, where critics usually come from the former. Can citizenship deprivation be justified from a security perspective as a counter-terrorism tool?

That question is asked in this thesis. By conducting an interpretative analysis of Hobbes, the question is assessed from a security perspective and the answer is not clear cut. The research shows that even when practices are investigated through a lens of security, they are

problematic as they currently stand.

Key words: Hobbes, deprivation of citizenship, revocation of citizenship, denationalisation, security, protection

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1. Introduction

Since the fall of the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, there has been much debate in the media regarding the possible threat returning citizen fighters pose to their countries and how to combat that threat. It is a sensitive issue and the public debate can be fierce. The case of Shamima Begum in particular, has sparked debate. She was a British national, who joined the terror organisation as a minor and now 19 years old she wanted to return to Britain with her unborn child. Instead the British government revoked her citizenship and subsequently made her stateless. Her child later died in a camp in the middle East, less than three weeks old.

(BBC News, 2019). The United Kingdom is only one of the democratic countries using the legislation of citizenship deprivation for national security reasons in the fight against

terrorism. Discussions in other countries regarding instating such legislation are ongoing. This trend shows no signs of slowing down. Since 9/11 there has been an increasing move towards the ‘securitisation of citizenship’(Macklin, 2015). The ‘War on Terror’ seems to pose a real crisis among democratic states, which seem to struggle to find a balance between, on the one hand their identifying values of openness, inclusion, freedom of speech and human rights and on the other hand the fight against terrorism. A problem that often includes calls for greater state powers, exclusion, punishments and control. In today’s societal debate, national security and state protection seem to be more important than ever. In the literature, there appears to be a conflict between a rights-based perspective on the one hand and a security perspective on the other. The critical voices often come from a perspective of rights, whereas the proponents hold the state’s right to security. This idea of national security and the importance of state protection is not new. Thomas Hobbes, of many regarded as one of the pioneers of sovereign state theory, enforces the idea of the state as protection and the subsequent need to protect the state. Although much time has passed since Hobbes wrote his main works, “Leviathan”, almost 370 years ago, I argue that his thoughts on the state still are relevant. By looking at contemporary citizenship practices from a Hobbesian perspective of security I argue that practices are not so simple to justify as one might initially think.

Hobbes security focused theory of the state is founded on a contractual aspect of creation.

Men enter a covenant with each other to create a great power, a Leviathan, to protect them from the state of nature, essentially from each other. The covenant between men and

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2 sovereign is hence foundational in the creation of state power. For the state to act as a

protector of men, men need to give up their ‘natural right to all things’ and transfer this right to the sovereign, for him to act as protector of them all. Since every man in the state of nature has a right to do whatever necessary to ensure his own survival, life in the natural condition, is a perpetual state of war with every man against every man coupled with concomitant

insecurity of life and property. To escape these treacherous conditions man created the commonwealth, the state, and a representative of this new entity; the sovereign, to protect them all (Hobbes, 2012).

Hobbes definition of a common-wealth is;

“One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence. And he that carryeth this person is called SOVEREIGNE and said to have Sovereigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBIECT.” (Hobbes, 2012, pp 260, 262)

The sovereign’s, legitimacy lies in the protection of the commonwealth, both of threats from the outside as well as the inside. As soon as the sovereign no longer offers protection men need to do whatever necessary to assure their own survival, a reversion to the state of nature (Ibid).

Arguably, state security is one of vital importance to Hobbes, since without it the sovereign loses his legitimacy. The theory is also based on principles of justice, the rule of law, and for the good of the people. The sovereign state does not exist as an entity in its own right, but as an entity that serves to protect the people within it, i e. Hobbes’ commonwealth serves the purpose to protect itself from harm only to continue to serve and protect the population within.

Skinner (2008, pp 347f) says that Hobbes’ commonwealth and social contract highlights a fictional theory of the state. Where the state is compared to a fictional person, personified by the sovereign. Skinner holds that this fictional theory is a means to judge the actions of the government and hence the legitimacy of government. According to Skinner’s interpretation, actions undertaken by government are deemed right if two conditions are met. Firstly, they need to be carried out by a sovereign. Secondly, they need to aim to protect the life, health and safety of the ‘person of the state’. In other words, actions are legitimate if they aim to

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3 protect the common good or public interest of the subjects i.e. the state, not just in the present but in perpetuity.

The interesting connection between Hobbesian protection of the state and contemporary citizenship deprivation is that the latter is usually justified as a necessary measure for the preservation of national security (Bauböck & Paskalev, 2015). By using Hobbes’ national security, or state protection outlook we can gain new insights and perspectives to a debate that is stirring up many emotions. Assessing current phenomena through a Hobbesian perspective is nothing new (see for example; Lloyd, 1958 2013) and gives us different perspectives to apply on contemporary matters. Citizenship deprivation practices are very contentious issues and raises strong feelings among many, even many scholary writers. States are very good at justifying political actions in one way or another to achieve a certain objective. If our focus is national security in the question of combating international terrorism, what can we learn from Hobbes? By looking at contemporary practices of citizenship deprivation through a

Hobbesian perspective a different platform regarding state security can be gained, which we can add to the debate.

So far there has been one study relating Hobbes to issues of deprivation of citizenship, in which Jaede (2016) is discussing the Hobbesian sovereign’s power to decide on the inclusion and exclusion of citizens as a contribution to the Hobbes-literature. However, I argue that Jaede’s analysis of Hobbes right of exclusion of subjects is too simple. This thesis will draw on Jaede’s thinking but in contrast aims to use Hobbes to normatively analyse the use of current citizenship deprivation practices, hoping to add something to the present-day debate.

The question this thesis aims to answer is;

Can citizenship deprivation be justified from a security perspective as a counter-terrorism measure?

By looking at contemporary citizenship deprivation from a Hobbesian perpective that arguably ultimately is about protection, we will see that the answer is not as straight forward as some might have us believe. The main aim is hence; to normatively assess the usage of citizenship deprivation as a tool from a security perspective. Hobbes will be used as an analytical tool. To be able to draw conclusions I will first go through the current debate regarding the securitisation of citizenship. Secondly, I will give current examples of practices

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4 used. To understand the contentiousness of the issues involved I will, thirdly, highlight why citizenship itself matters in the contemporary world. Fourthly, an interpretative approach of Hobbes view of current citizenship deprivation practices will be undertaken. Lastly, I will conclude, that even when applying a security focus on the contemporary practices,

justification of such usage is highly problematic. Hence, the increasing securitisation of citizenship that has given rise to a conflict between rights and security, has shown to be sticky even from a purely security-based perspective.

1.2 Definitions and limitations

To be able to answer the question posed, some clarifications are needed. Firstly, what I mean with deprivation, is the involuntary loss of citizenship. In the literature there are a few terms that scholars are using interchangeably. These are primarily deprivation and revocation of citizenship, expatriation and denationalisation. This thesis will use these terms

interchangeably.

There are other legal ways a person can lose their citizenship, for example of fraud relating to the application process and by acquiring a different citizenship elsewhere, those types of voluntary or involuntary losses of citizenship will not be discussed in this thesis. This thesis will only discuss the involuntary loss of citizenship in relation to national security concerns, i.e. the use of citizenship deprivation as a counter-terrorism tool.

Hobbes does not use the term citizen. I will however for analytical reasons use his term subject interchangeably with the modern term citizen, to be able to effectively apply Hobbes’

thoughts on the modern day. Even though Hobbes’ understanding of legal citizenship cannot be directly translated to the modern equivalent I argue that for the purpose of this study it serves as a valid comparison

1.3 Methodological concerns

As previously shown, I argue that Hobbes’ theory of the state represents a clear security focus and therefore the usage of Hobbes’ work will serve as an analytical tool to analyse citizenship deprivation practices from a security perspective. Due to the limits of scope and time, I will only analyse Hobbes’ main work “Leviathan” to find points of discussion in relation to contemporary practices of citizenship deprivation.

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5 To understand what we can learn from Hobbes, an interpretative approach is fitting, and I will follow guidelines established by Blau (2017). When writing within the field of political theory there is a problem with a lack of methodological reference points. Blau has tried to overcome this by writing the first guide;” Methods in Analytical Political Theory” (2017) in how to write texts in political theory and what to consider on a methodological level. The book tries to give the reader an introduction to how writers usually compose their texts within the field.

This thesis will draw on some of Blau’s (2017) methodological considerations in interpreting texts as well as using the common technique of using quotations to highlight Hobbes’ writings and hence my own interpretation of it. There is always a risk of certain subjectivity when conducting interpretative research. However, by following the guidelines and using the

quotations as reference points I hope to minimize subjective interpretation of Hobbes’ original works. By using the 2012 edition of ‘Leviathan’ edited by Noel Malcom, which includes a critical reading and contextual analysis of the work, I have built on already existing contextual analysis.

1.3.1 An interpretative approach

Blau (2017, pp 246-265) tries to establish good practice when one conducts an interpretative approach. He argues that in the field of analytical political theory, there is a lack of

methodological writings. However, when interpreting a text or an author there are many useful guidelines one can use to avoid pitfalls and conduct good analyses. All historical texts can be read in different ways by different people and there is never a definitive answer to how we should interpret an author or ideas by that author. But we can try to be as aware of our own biases as we can by looking at our own analytical perspective. We should read texts both contextually and philosophically, i.e. both what the author states but also what the ideas mean in a lager, philosophical sense. Contextualists, like Skinner, tend to put more focus on the empirical part of reading texts (interpreting what the author is trying to say) than the philosophical part (what the ideas mean philosophically) but Blau argue that both are important and that we arguably always do both even though we do not explicitly state it. To clarify, Blau uses the word empirical in a textual analytical sense, i.e to analyse what the author is trying to tell us.

By also doing a wide and careful reading of the text, we can minimise the risk of

misconstruing what an author is trying to convey. With this Blau claims that we should not take lines written by the author out of their textual context. For example, by reading Leviathan

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6 widely, I’ve tried to make sense of Hobbes work in a broader sense. What is the larger point he tries to make?

Blau (ibid, p 262ff) tells us to ‘embrace uncertainty’. He argues that by always

acknowledging the subjectivity of our interpretations we embrace the uncertainty of them.

This does not mean that we are not sure about our interpretations. It simply means that we are confident about our readings but do not state them as facts. Therefore, by being humble in the interpretation and by always departing from myself when drawing conclusions, I try to not overstate what Hobbes would think in a particular matter.

Blau (ibid) also talks about triangulation of interpretation. By looking into other scholars’

interpretation, we can see if our ideas have merit. Hence the drawing on Jaede’s (2016) interpretation of what Hobbes thinks about the inclusion and exclusion of citizens in this thesis serves that purpose.

The next section considers briefly first; what some people call the securitisation of citizenship and second, normative scholarly arguments regarding current expatriation practices. Going through the current debate is vital before we can investigate what we can learn from Hobbes in this respect.

2. Deprivation of citizenship as ‘securitisation of citizenship’

Macklin (2015, p 1f) states that since 9/11, there has been an increase in what she calls the

‘securitisation of citizenship’, where deprivation of citizenship is used as a tool for the state to rid themselves of unwanted citizens. This is nothing new and something that has been in the state’s arsenal for a long time. However, the practice has gotten a new lease of life since the

‘war on terror’ as a tool in fighting home-grown terrorists (not necessarily convicted).

Different legal schemes operate in differing ways and some states display more legal constraints to deprivation than others.

The practice of citizenship deprivation is often justified by states as assuring national security and protecting citizens or the common good. The literature regarding contemporary practices

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7 of citizenship revocation as a counter-terrorism tool is a small but growing one. Scholars have assessed it in relation to violations of human rights and questionable legality according to international law and EU law (see for example Zedner, 2016; Cloots, 2017; Macklin, 2014, 2015; Mantu 2015) and as a radicalisation of citizenship and the creation of the ‘citizen’s other’ (see for example Choudhury, 2017). Other scholars have focused on the potential moral justification of revocation policies (see Barry and Ferracioli, 2016). There have also been studies made of a comparative nature of different regimes (see for example Wood, 2015; Lavi 2010). Deprivation is a contentious issue and has given rise to a heated debate even among academics. Apart from these studies, the normative discussion in the current literature can be seen to fall into three main categories.

2.1 The argument of Security

Some scholars argue for deprivation and claim that by acting in ways contrary to state wishes terrorists have already forsaken their citizenship and that it is within the state’s right to protect itself from disloyal citizens. Schuck (2015, 9ff) holds that the most important duty for a state is to protects its people. For this reason, he argues that states should have the power to deprive citizens of their citizenship. He also says that this practice must be limited to the most

extreme, malicious cases where specific conduct can be extensively proved, and it should not be used for ‘mere malignant thoughts’. Schuck sees no hinderance to use citizenship

deprivation if these conditions are met, since the individual have manifested that he/she is at war with the nation. By revoking the person’s citizenship, the state might make it harder for him/her to succeed in that war. Schuck asks the question; “Should the individual’s interest in maintaining that connection, which (by my definition, embedded in the preconditions listed above) can only be tactical and cynical, utterly and categorially outweigh the nation’s interest in protecting those for whom it bears a sacred trust?” (Schuck, 2015, p 9). Hence, he argues that citizens who attack their state, already have made a choice of allegiance and any interest that person shows in keeping his/her citizenship is only to be able to advance the war embarked on.

Joppke (2015, p 11ff; 2016, p741ff) argues that international terrorists already have forsaken their citizenship by being disloyal to the state. He says that their actions are meant to be war and should not be viewed as inherently criminal. By committing actions against civilian citizens international terrorists have renounced their citizenship. And why not take away a citizenship they wish to destroy anyway. He also questions why states should stop at

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8 statelessness. Joppke argues that in principle, deprivation of citizenship is the right response to terrorism. Hailbronner (2015, p 23ff) holds that democratic states have well established institutions that can protect human rights and make sure the law is not overstepped. But there needs to be special checks in place to ensure that deprivation practices are used properly without abuse of power and not arbitrairly. According to Hailbronner, ‘it is a matter of political expediency’ for countries to work out if there is a practical value in the deprivation of citizenship of individuals that are engaged in international terrorism. In Joppke’s view, for liberal states, it is mainly the problem of inequality before the law, in terms of how it affects mono- and dual-nationals differently, that is the biggest hurdle. But by not utilizing

deprivation of citizenships of terrorists, we will only continuously allow the terrorists to

“…abuse the citizenship they despise.” (Joppke, 2016, p 746).

A common denominator seen among those scholars in favour of citizenship deprivation is that it is, in principle, the right punishment for disloyalty. They have, however, also stated that certain conditions need to be met if democratic countries should go down this path.

2.2 The question of efficacy

One of the main criticisms raised among scholars relates to the effectiveness of citizenship deprivation as a counter-terrorism tool. One apprehension is that using denationalization as a counter-terrorism strategy transfers, rather than reduces, risk for the states involved. It might even enable people to engage in activities that are a threat to security depending on the

country they are sent back to (Macklin 2015, p 5f). Cohen (2016, p 258) states that apart from being highly undemocratic, denationalisation may also be an ineffective way for states to assure national security. There is no guarantee that a person will not continue to contribute to threats against national security outside the state. Paskalev (2015, p 15ff) is of the opinion that it makes more sense from a security objective to prosecute international terrorists and put them in prison, rather than to let them roam free somewhere in the Middle East.

Bauböck (2015, p 29) claims that this transfer of threats to the rest of the world is a denial of responsibility of homegrown terrorism and a negation of responsibility towards others outside the state. By depriving a suspected/prosecuted terrorist of his/her citizenship, states not only deny responsibility of home-grown terrorism and radicalisation, but they also shift the future

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9 responsibility on to another state. He further argues that it is more of a symbolic defence of liberal values than an effective tool in the protection against terrorism.

Hence, one problem democracies face in this question is related to public opinion. Spiro (2015, pp 7f) holds that governments must be seen to do something about the citizens that are disloyal to the nation. He says that in theory, expatriation could be used to demark the

boundaries of membership and solidarity with the nation, however he is also unsure of its efficacy. The denationalization of citizens therefore, is what he calls ‘a security-related theatre’ to please voters.

2.3 The argument of incompatibility with democratic values/rights

The question on some scholars’ lips is whether liberal democracies that denationalise are compromising the very value of democracy, and if deprivation of citizenship as a counter- terror measure indeed is compatible with democracy. Lenard (2018, pp 104ff) argue it is not.

She means that one of the justifying arguments, that denationalisation protects democracy, is insufficient, and that denationalisation is unjustifiable in democratic states. It is not clear if denationalisation offers democracies any increased protection and that revocation of citizenship is inconsistent with the principles of just punishment in democratic states. To imprison wrongdoers is a more apt punishment and it is more in line with democratic values where the possible rehabilitation of criminals is an inherent principle in the justice system.

This point is also made by Cohen (2016, p 255f) who argues that denationalisation is a permanent punishment that represents ‘civil death’, comparable to life imprisonment without parole and the death penalty, both of which are not so frequently used in democratic states.

The idea of democracy is founded on a belief in human change and a “…nonstatic,

developmental conception of human character…”, which means that decisions made must be revisable every so often. Hence, she claims that this non-permanent human outlook of

democratic theory makes permanent punishments fundamentally undemocratic, if one accepts the developmental conception of democracy.

There are many scholars who struggle with the practice of treating dual-nationals differently to mono-nationals. This is often a necessary feature of contemporary practices of citizenship revocation, since there are international commitments on avoiding statelessness. Many

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10 questions if it goes against the democratic right of equal treatment. Lenard (2018; 2016, pp 271ff) holds that the justifying argument that dual-nationality is a privilege not a right, is severely flawed since democratic theory depends on a principle of fundamental right to citizenship. She argues that two premises prohibit deprivation laws in democratic countries.

The first principle is that everyone is entitled the status of citizenship and the second is that the rights that are attached to citizenship are inherently equal. This makes practices

undemocratic. Allowing for statelessness violates the first premise and treating citizens

unequally by only allowing denationalisation of dual-nationals, the second. Macklin (2014, pp 51ff) argues that contemporary citizenship revocation practices in Canada creates

dichotomous citizen categories. The citizen terrorist becomes an enemy and hence the treatment of such a person differs. Instead of being a right-bearing subject the terrorist is not and hence becomes an alien from within. Macklin claims that the traitor of the past has become the terrorist of today with one difference. Exile as punishment of a traitor made more sense since one could banish him to his country of allegiance. The citizen terrorist is on the contrary everyone’s enemy and whatever actions that made him unworthy of Canadian citizenship will presumably make him unworthy of citizenship elsewhere too.

Gibney (2013a, pp 651ff, 657) asks whether denationalisation practices can be compatible with liberal principles and concludes that liberals have reason to worry. The three main liberal reservations regard; fears it might lead to statelessness; that it is invidious and demoting some as second-class citizens and finally; that it might be arbitrary. The potential invidious nature of citizenship deprivation can be circumvented by arguing that dual-nationality is a privilege and by treating them differently equates the playing-field rather than distorts it. However, this is not so straight forward and by treating birth-right citizens differently to naturalised citizens one could argue for practices being invidious. Gibney says that the United Kingdom has tried to bring its practice in line with liberal principles by limiting statelessness and making it possible to denationalise native born citizens if they hold a second nationality, practices can however be said to be used arbitrarily (Note: the UK later extended deprivation laws to

permitting statelessness in some cases where the person could obtain citizenship elsewhere, as we shall see in the next section).

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11 Some writers also argue that deprivation of citizenship is a ‘slippery slope’, where

governments have pieced holes into the solidity of citizenship that could ultimately lead to other holes. Gibney (2015, p 39ff) argues that even though there might be cases where revocation of citizenship is valid, it is a very risky strategy for a government to opt for. He argues that when deprivation of citizenship in the UK was brought back as a strategy it was used very sparingly by the government. But when another right-wing government came into office, the bill was amended twice and increasing discretionary power given to the Home Secretary. This has meant that something that was intended to be used in one way now can be used in a different way, at much discretion by the government. Hence, it is a dangerous and slippery approach by states to give certain governments so much power without so little constraint. In effect, the usage of the bill, depends greatly on who is in power at a given time.

3. Examples of contemporary citizenship deprivation practices in democratic states

United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are some

democracies that have strengthened state powers to include revocation of citizenship in recent years. The subsequent legal practices concerning citizenship deprivation are on a spectrum and constellations differ greatly. The UK’s legal regimen is arguably the most controversial since it is possible to render someone stateless if the Home Secretary has good reason to believe that the person can acquire citizenship elsewhere (BNA, 2014). It is worth noting that one of the largest democracies, the United States, has not enforced such a legal measure in the fight against terrorism. Cloots (2017, p 60) states that the main reason for this is that it is forbidden by the Eight Amendment of the constitution. To use denationalisation in a punitive way is seen as a cruel and unusual punishment. In Poland it is also not legally possible to revoke an adult citizen’s citizenship involuntarily (Bauböck & Paskalev, 2015, p 102f). Cloots (2017, p 61f) also argue that the German constitution pose an obstacle for deprivation of citizenship. Perhaps not surprising, the German constitution after the Second World War includes a clause of protection against such involuntary loss of citizenship. This to protect German citizens of such abuse again and to prevent citizenship from becoming a tool for exclusion.

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12 The practices can largely be separated into two categories. On the one hand, legal systems that use citizenship revocation as part of other punishments, where the person has been convicted of a terror related crime. On the other hand, legal systems where citizenship revocation is used preventatively to assure national security. Although this categorisation has been questioned by Fargues (2017) who argues that when comparing the French and the UK’s systems of

citizenship deprivation, they are more similar than at first glance. The way they have been used indicate that both systems display similar strategies to deprivation of unwanted citizens as removal of danger. Therefore, the French system can also be said to show signs of having a preventative rationale in the way it has been used. For our purposes here though, I will keep the categories for ease of understanding the main differences between different legal regimes regarding deprivation of citizenship. I will go deeper into two current examples of revocation schemes, Canada and United Kingdom. The reason for this is that these two regimes have been subject to much debate among scholars.

3.1 Citizenship deprivation as punishment

The purpose here is not to give an extensive review of all legal regimens available, but to paint a more general picture and to show a variety of existing regimes. The legal regimens concerning citizenship deprivation that fall under this category are most of the democracies practising such arrangements, the common denominator being that it takes a criminal conviction by a court of law and that denationalisation is used in conjunction with it. Cloots (2017, p 81) argues that Belgium has one of the most stringent punitive laws in connection to deprivation, where a deprivation order can only be issued in connection with a criminal conviction by a criminal court requested by the public prosecutor.

Fargues (2017, p 987f) states that deprivation of citizenship in France was made possible in 1996, after a terrorist attack in a Paris metro station. It became a possible complement to the then legal judgements of terrorist offences, only applicable to naturalised citizens. In a separate counter-terrorism bill in 2006, deprivation of naturalised citizens was made even easier by issuing a time limit on actions committed by that person from 15 years before to 15 years after the citizenship has been obtained. For it to be applicable, it still needs to be judged by a court that the actions are in accordance with article 25 (which largely means terrorist offences, acting against the vital interest of France or participating or aiding armed groups against the interest of France (Code Civil, section 3, article 25)).

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13 3.1.1 Canada and Bill C-24

Macklin (2014, p 20ff) argues that the Canadian revoking regime is strictly punitive when it comes to loss of nationality as a reply to a terrorism offence. The Bill C-24 was passed in 2014 and serves as amendments to the existing Citizenship Act, giving larger executive power to denationalise both birth-right (dual nationals) and naturalised citizens. However, to be able to use the law, the subject must be found guilty of a criminal offence with a minimum

sentence (usually). Although, the subject does not have to be found guilty of terrorism offences in Canada. It is enough to be sentenced by a court in another country for a crime in that country. When the deprivation order has been set up, the Minister must send the order in writing to the person affected with the grounds for revocation. The person has then the right to respond and make submissions in writing before a deadline decided by the Minister. The person is not, however, entitled to an oral hearing. Dual-nationals by birth or naturalisation can also lose their Canadian citizenship if the government has ‘reasonable grounds to believe’

that the person is serving in an armed force or is a member of an organised armed group that is engaged in armed conflict with Canada. To be able to lose one’s citizenship on these

grounds a person does not need to be convicted in a trial, it’s enough to be judged by a federal court and the decision has immediate effect. All decisions regarding citizenship deprivation can be done retrospectively. This means that a person who was sentenced for terror related offences before the law came in to effect can now also be deprived of his/her citizenship.

When a citizenship deprivation order has taken effect, one is also faced by an immediate deportation order since the person’s legal status is now of a foreign national. Mackin (ibid, p 28) argues that for this reason, the Canadian citizen deprivation regime illustrates a revival of exile as punishment, or a ‘return to banishment’. This can be compared to if one is deprived of one’s citizenship because of fraud or misrepresentation (without terror related charges), then one’s status is demoted to a permanent resident status. Although there are constraints on statelessness, the burden of proof rests on the individual. Macklin argues that this in effect can lead to statelessness if the person in question cannot prove that he/she is not a member of any other country, even if this is the case.

3.2 Citizenship deprivation as prevention

The United Kingdom has one of the most controversial legal regimes of citizenship revocation in democratic states and the only one of the regimes that is preventative in the categorical sense.

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14 Cloots (2017, p 81) argues that the principal purpose with the United Kingdom’s citizenship revocation laws is not to punish those who have been convicted of terror related crimes but to preventatively remove those deemed to pose a threat to national security. Hence, the action is to prevent terrorist offences from occurring on national soil rather than attach the punishment of citizenship revocation with another offence punished by a court of law.

3.2.1 The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002

Gibney (2013a, pp 653f) states that the ability of stripping citizens of their citizenship is not a new law in the United Kingdom, but it has been used sparingly since 1949 (it has existed since the First World War). Formerly, the law was only applicable to naturalised citizens and there were constraints to protect people against statelessness. In the wake of 9/11 the

government proposed changes in terms of increasing denationalisation powers and the

‘Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act’ was passed in 2002, which saw three major changes. The first one was a set single standard of the “Secretary state ’thinks that’ an individual’s holding citizenship is “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests” of the United Kingdom” (ibid, 653). The second change was regarding whom the law is applicable to.

Instead of only being applicable to naturalised citizens it was now also possible to strip a citizen by birth of his/her citizenship. With the reservation of the third change, that the person was not left stateless. With these new powers the person deprived of his/her citizenship was also given an automatic right of appeal in court. However, in cases related to national security the court that would be handling the appeal would be the Special Immigration court that is not bound by the same rules of transparency and evidence (ibid).

In 2006, as a response to the London bombings, an amendment to the Act was passed. It greatly increased the power of the executive and the Secretary of State could now issue a deprivation order if “…the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.” (Wood, 2015, p 244). This amendment of the law also made sure to state that the Secretary of State should not deprive somebody of their nationality if there was reasonable ground to believe that would render the person stateless. This was, however, changed in 2014 to even allow for statelessness in certain circumstances if three conditions were met. Firstly, if the person is a naturalised citizen. Secondly, if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is ‘conducive to the public good’ and thirdly, if the Secretary of State ‘has reasonable grounds’ to believe that the person will be able to attain a citizenship elsewhere (ibid).

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15 As seen, the literature is very divided and the fight against terrorism stir up strong feelings even within the scholarly debate. The next section will illustrate what is at stake for individuals involved and why citizenship matters in the contemporary world.

4.

Why does citizenship matter?

One can pose the question of why deprivation of citizenship is such a contentious issue. To be able to effectively discuss contemporary citizenship deprivation, it is important to look at citizenship itself and why it matters in the contemporary world. Hence what is at stake for the individuals involved.

4.1 Different dimensions of citizenship

The answer to what citizenship entails and hence what will be lost, will differ depending on what dimension or conception one has of citizenship itself. Linda Bosniak (2000) outlines four common discourses or dimensions of citizenship; as legal status; as rights; as political activity and as identity/solidarity.

(1)A legal status: According to Bosniak (2000, p 456) one of the most commonly found ideas of citizenship in the scholarly literature, is the legal matter of formal recognition and “to be a citizen is to «possess the legal status of a citizen»”. Seen in this way, the meaning of

citizenship puts the focus on status, an official membership in a political community. She argues that much of the debate have circulated around the acquiring of citizenship status for birth right and naturalised citizens. Hence there has been relatively little space devoted to the loss of citizenship in the wider literature.

Joppke (2007, pp 38ff) argues that between the two common practices, jus solis (birth right citizenship is based on territory) and jus sanguinis (birth right citizenship is based on blood ties), there has been a trend in the last half century to increasingly favour jus soli. There have also been substantial changes in who can access citizenship and states have moved towards a much more open policy and liberalised citizenship acquisition by for example removing racial and sexual barriers. This has meant an increasing diversification of the citizenry along ethnic, religious and racial lines.

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16 There has also been much discussion regarding the having or not having of dual and multiple citizenships and if citizenship really should be an exclusive status. The differences in

standpoints between scholars usually boil down to how much value one awards to legal status itself. The common denominator being that citizenship status is tied to the nation-state where the “bond of membership and allegiance that citizenship status represents is understood to be established with, or in relation to, the national political community.” (Bosniak, 2000, p 457).

Citizenship is also then seen as a matter for domestic law (ibid).

States have however, increasingly embraced the concept of dual citizenship status over the past 50 years and relatively few European countries are currently opposed to such

arrangements (Joppke, 2007, p 38ff).

(2) Citizenship as rights: That citizenship entails rights is not disputed. There are definite advantages of being a citizen. It is one of the dimensions of citizenship most frequently discussed in the citizenship literature. Hanna Arendt’s (1951/2004) famous expression ‘right to have rights’ stem from her own experiences as a Jew in the second World War, where her native country Germany denationalised German Jews and subsequently detached themselves from them. This in turn made the atrocities faced by the Jews possible. Because now stateless, they had no one who had an obligation to uphold their rights. Arendt states famously that the universal rights of man no longer were enforceable when people had no state to protect them and uphold them. Even states that were built on the very idea of universal human rights could not guarantee them for the countless stateless peoples in Europe in the 30s and 40s. She argues that:

“The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were supposed to be independent of governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.” (Arendt, 1951/2004, pp 291- 292).

Although very critical to the concept of the nation-state, Arendt argues that in the current political climate a person without a state or a citizenship is more likely to become somebody else’s problem. whose rights can easily be violated or denied (ibid).

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17 Bosniak (2000, pp 466f ) claims that although states seem to be at the centre when looking at citizenship through the ‘enjoyment of rights’ lens, there have been advances of human rights regimes. They have been set up through multiple multilateral agreements that transcends the jurisdiction of individual states. She argues that some scholars go so far as to claim that this is the start of a ‘citizenship-beyond-the-nation’, as sort of post national form of rights-based citizenship based on the human rights regime. Bosniak however, remains unsure if citizenship is becoming transnationalised and questions how much protection the human right regimes really can offer the individual. She means that the rights are only available through such regimes because the states grant them that power, hence they are not ‘self-executing’. One can therefore problematise how much protection an individual can expect from human right regimes and international treaties on the reduction of statelessness and if they are an effective complement or substitute to the rights incorporated into citizenships.

Benhabib (2004, p 162f, 168) notes that although the human rights doctrine has gained

considerable status since the Second World War, citizenship is still important for protection of rights. She argues that this can be seen for example, in the light of the quasi criminalisation of refugees and asylum seekers, whose human rights are limited and curtailed. Refugees and asylum seekers right to movement, employment and association are limited and they are at mercy with the sovereign state, that offers them a temporary place to call home.

(3) A mode of political participation and activity: Political theorists often associate citizenship with active political engagement, hence a political conception of citizenship (Bosniak, 2000, pp 470ff). This dimension of what citizenship entails echoes Hanna Arends aspiration of what some political scientists would say her coin phrase ‘the right to have rights’ mean, a right to claim rights. Näsström (2014) has put the argument forward that Arendt’s use of the phrase normatively relates more to current democratic rights than political rights. She argues that what Arendt described happened during the second world war is not just important in relation to the loss of citizenship and protection by the government, but also the loss of the right to be a part of a political entity and the right to make one’s voice heard and listened to. That it’s only by being able to speak out and protest about ills, people can change their predicament and exclusion (ibid, p 547ff). This reading of Arendt is especially interesting when looking at democracies who denationalise citizens. We can question if the rights are only available to those who support democratic values, or values associated with current democracies.

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18 (4) Citizenship as identity/solidarity: When we discuss the importance of citizenship there is also the dimension of our view of ourselves in conjunction to each other. As one of the less tangible conceptions, citizenship is as much about our sentiment of ‘who we are as a

collective’ as it is about how it’s constituted in our legal and political spaces. Bosniak (2000, pp 479ff) argues that this psychological dimension of what citizenship entails has the function of awakening senses of belonging and hence ‘the felt aspects of community membership’. She says that much of the scholarly literature focusing on this aspect of citizenship equates

identity/solidarity with the collective, to identity/solidarity to the nation-state. There are, however, also critical voices of such a presumption. Some writers Bosniak, argues, holds that in modern democratic nation-states, people often have and maintain a larger

connection/identification to certain cultural and social groups within the nation-state rather than with the larger citizenry.

4.2 A move towards a conception of citizenship as a privilege?

Within the debate concerning citizenship there are also discussions regarding the type of bond citizenship represents and how that bond can be defined, primarily if citizenship is a privilege or a right (see for example Macklin and Bauböck 2015; Lavi 2010; Lavi 2011). Some argue that there has been a substantial shift and that there are exclusionary consequences and infringement on rights as a result. Joppke (2007) argues that citizenship is changing in three dimensions. Access to citizenship status have been liberalized and there has been a reduction of social rights in favour of minority rights. Citizenship identities are also becoming more universalistic where multicultural states’ efforts to create more centripetal identities with unity and integration campaigns are limited. This is what he calls ‘the lightning of citizenship’. He states that a re-nationalisation trend regarding citizenship is gaining substantial ground in the wake of Islamic terrorism. It has grown from a relatively small nationalist call to a large national open campaign, which is revoking prior trends to de-ethnizing and liberalising access to citizenship (Joppke, 2010, p 14).

Fargues (2017) argues that the recent revival of citizenship deprivation practices is an illustration of renationalisation of citizenship. It indicates a move by states towards a

‘thickening’ of citizenship. A way to reassert the importance of national citizenship as a

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19 privilege that can be taken back and to strengthen the national identity of the citizenry. Sykes (2016) argues that in the light of ‘the war on terror’ there has been a substantial shift towards a conception of citizenship as a privilege not a right, especially in the UK. This loyalty-based conception of citizenship has then been used as a justification to put limits on access to

political life for some, rather than as an alternative to liberal discourses (advocating individual rights for all). Two supposedly competing conceptions of citizenship are hence used

simultaneously to justify the exclusion of unwanted or bad citizens. This has in effect meant that the state can keep the idea of liberal discourses for the ‘acceptable citizens’. Joppke (2007, p 44ff) also argues that the unity of the universalistic identities in plural societies are a paradox and the liberalisation of societies have become the dividing factor. He claims that instead of identity discourses being about the nation, they are more about values. Liberal states are for liberals only. Hence, liberal values become a tool for exclusion. This is something also observed by Gibney (2013b, p 652ff) who concludes that in the U.K., liberalism has always been present regarding decisions relating to deprivation of citizenship and has served the purpose of justifying change. He argues that it at times, has served as a mere façade, rather than actual reason, and the result has been characteristically illiberal.

There has also been attempts to understand wider social consequences of the securitisation of citizenship. Kaya (2017) finds that countries that use citizenship deprivation practices

(applicable to part of the citizenry where naturalised citizens enjoy a less secure status), display higher anti-immigrant attitudes and in particular, anti-Muslim attitudes.

4.3 The undesirability of statelessness

Citizenship matters greatly in our world. Apart from the potential of ‘cutting of genuine links’(Bauböck and Paskalev, 2015) the dimensions above illustrate the potential gravity of deprivation of citizenship as a punitive or preventative measure. Hence, the loss of citizenship can have substantial consequences for the individual. Even when one has a citizenship one can be vulnerable to infringement of one’s rights.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees talk about effective and ineffective nationality, and of de facto statelessness. Being stateless or de facto stateless is to be vulnerable and every person should have a right to protection by at least one state. Many states do not provide any security and protection and there are many people in the world today that live in statelessness or what looks like statelessness. Citizenship is an important marker of security for people who are outside its territorial boundaries and a state is expected to send

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20 counsel to help a person imprisoned abroad. Stateless people have no one to turn to and no one who has an obligation to fight for or uphold their rights (Kerber, 2007, pp 11ff). Kerber (ibid, p 31) argues that the “….stateless are the citizen’s other. The stateless serve the state by embodying its absence, by providing frightening models of the vulnerability of those who lack sufficient awe of the state. The stateless serve the state by signaling who will not be entitled to its protection, and throwing fear into the rest of us.”

Hence, to be statelessness is to be vulnerable and by looking back at history we can see the fear is real.

In the second world war, statelessness became a way to commit atrocities. Snyder (2015, pp 84f) writes that statelessness created an opportunity for violence and theft. He argues that by distancing the Jewish population from their state, the Nazis could now do whatever they pleased with them and no one could or had an obligation to intervene.

Today, the plight of the Rohingya, is an illustration of what abuses are possible. Even a well- developed human rights regime could not stop violations on Myanmar’s soil.

To summarise this section, it is argued that in spite of efforts to advance international human rights regimes, citizenship still plays a large role in our world for many different reasons.

Hence, to deprive someone of their citizenship is no small matter. It is a permanent measure and can have grave consequences, not at least for those who are left stateless or de-facto stateless.

The next section will explore contemporary expatriation schemes from a Hobbesian security perspective.

5.

A Hobbesian perspective on contemporary deprivation practices

What would Hobbes say about current practices of citizenship deprivation? Is citizenship deprivation justified from a security perspective? This section will proceed to analyse that question by using an interpretative approach to Hobbes’ main work, “Leviathan”.

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21 5.1 Liberty of citizens as silence of the law

In chapter 13, 14 and 15 in the Leviathan, Hobbes discusses man’s natural condition of war, natural rights, laws of nature, covenants and the birth of justice. In the natural condition it is every man against every man and all men have a right to all things. Life is “…solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.” (Hobbes, 2012, p 192). The right of nature is hence; “By all means we can, to defend our selves” (ibid, p 220). By laying down the natural right to all things and transferring this right to the sovereign, one has given up some of the liberty to all things the natural condition offers. One should now be “…contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe”(ibid, p 200). One also gains peace, which Hobbes deems to be the fundamental law of nature, “…to seek peace, and follow it”

(ibid, p 220). Humans are inclined to seek peace according to Hobbes, mainly because they fear violent death (ibid, p 196).

However, contrary to absolute power, laws can be seen to be what constitute the powers of the sovereign. According to Jaede (2016) Hobbes’ sovereign rules by law. I argue that the

purpose of Hobbes’ sovereign ruling by law also is related to an ideal of ruling justly.

According to Hobbes (2012, p 196, 220) nothing before the birth of the commonwealth can be unjust, since every man has a right to everything by the right of nature. Hence, it’s only after the erection of a state, where the breaking of covenant is unjust, there is something that can be just, which is the keeping of covenant. Justice then demands a coercive power to propel men to keep their covenants where the fear of punishment is greater than the benefit they expect.

To Hobbes keeping of covenant can be equated to following the law. He argues that; “Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice.” (ibid, pp 196).

Hobbes also connects the civil law to man’s conscience meaning that the civil law in a commonwealth represents the public’s conscience and hence the decider of right and wrong, good and evil (ibid, p 502). To Hobbes, the civil law is not just important to the concept of justice but also to liberty.

When Hobbes talks about liberty of subjects in chapter 21 (Hobbes, 2012, pp 324-347), he likens the commonwealth with an artificial man and the law with artificial chains. The liberty of citizens is then is what is left. What is not restricted by law, the subjects are free to do.

Hobbes says; “The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law” (ibid, p

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22 340) However, this does not mean that there are limitations to the sovereign’s power of life and death, although a man has liberty to resist such an injury inflicted by the authority, since the right to protect one’s life is not transferable.

When looking at current citizenship deprivation practices one can problematise what the liberty of citizens really means. If there is no law against travelling to a certain place or adhering a certain doctrine, can citizens justly be excluded by revocation of their citizenships from a Hobbesian perspective? Take the example of the United Kingdom. It is now enough to be considered a potential threat to become a target of citizenship revocation. It is at the

discretion of the Home Secretary to judge what is conducive to the public good. Presumably, this can mean many things. How are citizens supposed to know of what boundaries to stay within and what artificial chains to put around one’s ankles? According to Hobbesian thought, it would not be wrong per se, to revoke someone’s citizenship if the law is clear and the boundaries are set, as in the case of Canada and France that use deprivation of citizenship in a punitive rather than a preventative rationale. But if the boundaries are not clear, Hobbes could have a problem with that. He is also not sure about using exile as punishment, as we shall see.

5.2 The long-term security of the state

In chapter 18 of Leviathan, Hobbes goes through the rights of the sovereign. In Hobbes’ view, the sovereign power once instated through covenant, cannot be forfeited. Since everyone is the creator of such a power, the sovereign’s decisions will be the same as one’s own. The sovereign has a right to judge what is best for the common good. If the subject therefore complains of the actions taken by the sovereign, he in effect accuse himself. Nothing the sovereign does can be punishable by the subject. (Hobbes, 2012, pp 268, 270).

“And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all, and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man,

Assembly that hath the Sovereignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence, and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same, and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by

prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.” (Hobbes, 2012, p 270).

In this passage Hobbes prescribes the sovereign large powers in the protection of the peace and security of the commonwealth. Since every man is also author of the creation of the

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23 institution, he has also given away the power to the sovereign to be used for security as he thinks fit. Hobbes gives the sovereign mandate to protect the state both with preventative and punitive measures for the preservation of peace.

When just looking at revocation of citizenship in the fight against terrorism it would seem like there are no limits to the state’s power to decide on how to best protect the state. But this thought is too simplistic. Even though the sovereign can do anything without being punished by his subjects, he has a responsibility of protection to uphold legitimacy (Skinner, 2008).

Hence, his actions need to be in the best interest of all his subjects and not himself only. The sovereign cannot rule by any law but need to rule by good laws. Hobbes (2012, p 540) says;

“A good law is that, which is Needfull, for the Good of the People, and withall Perspicuous.”

Therefore, laws made need to serve the purpose of the people and be clear and easily

understood. However, this is not separated from what is good for the sovereign, since what is good for the sovereign is good for the people (i.e. in the sense that the sovereign is there for people’s protection not for himself).

So, if we accept Spiro’s (2015) argument of citizenship deprivation being a show for voters rather than increasing real protection, would it be a valid measure to take? By looking at Hobbes’ sovereign as an objective protector with the best interest of his subjects in mind, I claim that it is not. The sovereign is not in it for himself, but for all. For the measure to be valid it needs to have a robust protective element.

Hobbes Leviathan is made up of all the subjects and it’s their common power that is

transferred to a representative of them all, the sovereign. Hobbes’ theory of the state can be viewed as the machinery of a clock, where all the parts are of equal importance to make the clock work. Hobbes himself talk about the artificial person of the state (Hobbes, 2012, p 16ff).

To understand the sovereign’s task and power, Hobbes’ concept of the artificial person serves an important illustration. Arguably, by likening the state to an artificial person one can better understand the idea that crimes committed and hurt inflicted upon a subject of the

commonwealth is hurt inflicted on the state since people make up the artificial person of the state. It is therefore vital that the sovereign protects the person of the state, since a wound inflicted on him is a wound inflicted on all.

The longevity and peace and security of the commonwealth is as Skinner argues (2008, p 347f) the aim of the sovereign and where he derives his legitimacy from. For Hobbes, it would then seem likely that contemporary governments are within their rights to decide on

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24 matters regarding the safety of the state as they think fit if it works as a protective element, not just in the present but in the future sense as well.

One can argue that from a Hobbesian perspective, government actions should stem from a long-term idea of protection. Hobbes states that the final goal of the commonwealth is security for all. By choosing to live under rule, men enter the state of society and leave the state of war behind, to secure their own preservation and to live a more comfortable life. If the promise of security is not held on the other hand, the covenant is void and the following of civil laws is no longer obligatory (Hobbes, 2012, p 254).

The question raised about the efficacy of contemporary deprivation policies is important for Hobbes. It needs to be in the state’s immediate as well as long term interest to be a justified action. This is where opinions of scholars differ as previously shown. For Hobbes to agree to such a measure there need to be real protective element to the decision to take away

someone’s citizenship and therefore effectively banish the person from entering the state. In today’s globalised world, deprivation policies could rather constitute a transfer of risk, as Macklin (2015) argues. She argues that incarceration through the criminal justice system is a better way to assure security.

5.3 The right to punishment and equal distribution of justice

In chapter 27 in “Leviathan”, Hobbes distinguishes between what constitutes a sin and what is a breach of the law and therefore constitutes a crime. He states that every crime is a sin, but every sin is not a crime. A crime is something that appears in word or deed. Intent is only a sin if it is not executed by deed or word. If one only intends to do something but it does not result in an act of any kind, then it cannot be punishable by a judge. The sovereign derives the right to punishment from the citizens and the social contract. By laying down their own right to execute punishment, the sovereign gained his right to do so, with the aim of ‘the

preservation of them all’. This right belongs only to the sovereign authority and no one else.

The aim of punishment is also deterrence of transgressions of the law and therefore obedience of the sovereign authority (Hobbes, 2012, p 452ff, 482ff). Hobbes defines punishment as;

“…is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.” (Hobbes, 2012, p 482).

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25 This passage indicates that Hobbes thought that there needed to be a transgression of the law to be punished. And that punishment should further act as a deterrent to other citizens from committing crimes. This is not, for example, in contradiction with the UK’s denationalisation practices since the law gives the government the right to revoke people’s citizenship on the grounds of not being ‘conducive to the public good’. It is however questionable if citizens can be fully aware of where the line is drawn of what is ok and not. When are the actions no longer ‘conducive to the public good’? But to be punished with denationalization over something one might do in the future, is arguably problematic to Hobbes, since one has not officially transgressed the law yet. One can question if the potential arbitrariness of the Executive warrants the punishment of citizenship deprivation if the person in question, in Hobbesian terms, only has committed sin not a crime. As soon as the threat is uttered however, it could constitute a transgression of the law, therefore a crime, and punishment would no longer be a problem. But if citizenship deprivation constitutes a punishment in Hobbes eyes is not clear.

Hobbes (ibid, pp 484, 492, 534) asserts in his discussion regarding punishments that if one is punished without given a public hearing, it is not punishment but hostility One can therefore argue that to be able to be punished one should get a free trial, where one’s action are judged to be a transgression of the law. To Hobbes, if one has overstepped and transgressed the law, one is not innocent. But if there has been no such transgression it is a mistake for the

commonwealth to punish those who have not faulted. No good thing can come out of the punishment of innocents according to Hobbes. It is merely giving in to evil and a hostile act.

It also violates the equal distribution of justice. Equality before the law, is important to secure

‘the safety of the people’ and hence, that justice is administered equally “to all degrees of people” (ibid, p 534).

Thus, it is of utmost importance that the person condemned has been proven to have transgressed the law and given a public hearing. Looking again at the UK’s preventative rationale for citizenship deprivation, it would seemingly pose a problem to Hobbes. The burden of evidence must be such, therefore, to establish a transgression of the law by public authority. The possibility of arbitrary punishment in this regard is problematic and the state might ‘give in to evil’ and possibly punish someone who does not deserve it. This, I argue would go against Hobbesian thought and is not conducive from a security perspective. By also treating citizens differently, as is the case with mono and dual-nationals, or birth-right or

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26 naturalised citizens, states might fall into the unequal distribution of justice trap. In this

respect the UK law is more right from a Hobbesian perspective since even birth-right citizens (with a second nationality) can be subject to the law.

Hobbes (2012, p 492) is also critical to exile or banishment used as punishment. He asserts that exile does not really constitute a proper punishment, since the subject is still free to enjoy other lands. It is more of an escape of punishment by flight or the public’s command to avoid punishment. Hobbes also seems to be of the opinion that nor does it neither serve the second purpose of punishment, namely to act as a deterrent for others. However, if the punishment of exile is combined with another such as depriving the person of his goods, then it may well be a punishment indeed, but not on its own. However, as previously shown, citizenship plays an important role in the contemporary condition. Therefore, one can argue that it can constitute a punishment especially if one is rendered stateless, as the possibility with the law in the UK.

Canada also uses deprivation of citizenship in conjunction with other punishments, which to Hobbes would make more sense. But not if the deprivation is done retroactively for a crime one committed before the law was instated, as the Canadian law permits.

Hobbes (ibid, p 486) deems that punishment for something that was not illegal when it was done, is no punishment but an act of hostility. He says: “Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a law that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law…”(ibid).

To Hobbes, the question of the law to be known to subjects is very important. A civil law, in Hobbes’ definition; “ Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath

Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right and Wrong, that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.”.(Hobbes, 2012, p 414). Hobbes also states that any law that is made but not made known in a sufficient way, is no law. Subjects need to understand the command of the commonwealth, which is the law, to be given a chance to follow it. Ignorance of the law can therefore sometimes be an excuse for a crime, if the person committing the crime hadn’t been made aware of the law (ibid, pp 422, 456). This is an important point Hobbes is making. One

What Can We Learn from Hobbes?: An Interpretative Approach to Contemporary Citizenship Deprivation Practices