The Nascent Peace
Exploring the
Inclusion of Violent Extremist Offenders in
Author: Gertruda Uleviciute
Supervisor: Tomas Poletti Lundström
Uppsala University Department of Theology
Master Programme in Religion in Peace and Conflict Master thesis, 30 credits
Spring, 2020
Keywords: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ( Extremist Offenders (VEOs);
Salafi-Sudan.
The Nascent Peace
the Relationship between DDR and
nclusion of Violent Extremist Offenders in
and South Sudan
Author: Gertruda Uleviciute
Supervisor: Tomas Poletti Lundström
Programme in Religion in Peace and Conflict
mobilization and Reintegration (DDR); Third Generation DDR; - jihadism; United Nations; Identity; Reconciliation;
The Nascent Peace
Relationship between DDR and
nclusion of Violent Extremist Offenders in Somalia
ii
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all the wonderful people who helped me
throughout this process. First and foremost, I thank my supervisor Tomas Poletti Lundström for his patience, guidance and support. I am grateful to my teachers and classmates who read and critiqued the beginnings of this paper, and who helped me learn and grow these past two years. For their companionship, guidance and proofreading services, I would like to thank my amazing friends. I am thankful to my sister and my parents for their wholehearted support in these
iii
Abstract
A growing amount of research suggests that contemporary Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives struggle with successfully targeting Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs). However, there is no clear theoretical argument explaining why DDR is unable to neutralize and reintegrate these ex-combatants. To answer this dilemma, this study proposes a theoretical framework, which analyzes decision makers’ identity in relation to violent extremism. Specifically, it argues that governmental actors have a very strong distinction between their social group and that of VEOs. This separation dictates a group divide, which is reinforced throughout the DDR process. Consequently, governmental actors consciously or unconsciously sabotage the success of DDR. To test this line of arguing, a comparison between Somalia and South Sudan is carried out. The empirical evidence shows a moderately strong relationship between the inclusion of VEOs and success of DDR. However, it clearly establishes that inclusion of VEOs leads to more human rights violations and a poorer acknowledgement of disadvantaged groups’ needs in DDR programmes. The analysis also shows robust support for the proposed theoretical argument. Finally, this thesis contributes to the growing field of research on Third Generation DDR.
1
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ... ii Abstract ... iii Table of Figures... 3 List of Abbreviations ... 41. Introduction: DDR, Contemporary Conflicts and Violent Extremist Offenders ... 5
2. Previous Research ... 8
2.1. Concepts and Definitions ... 8
2.1.1. DDR ... 8
2.1.2. VEOs ... 9
2.2. Literature Review... 9
2.2.1. Success of DDR ... 10
2.2.2. DDR and VEOs... 12
2.2.3. DDR Theory and Schools of Thought ... 15
2.3. Research Gaps and Problem ... 16
3. Theory ... 17
3.1. Theory Building Blocks ... 18
3.1.1. Identity ... 18 3.1.2. Political Reconciliation ... 20 3.1.3. International Norms ... 22 3.1.4. Constructivism ... 24 3.2. Theoretical Argument ... 25 3.3. Hypothesis... 27 4. Research Design ... 28 4.1. Methodology ... 28
4.1.1. Structure Focused Comparison ... 28
4.1.2. Process Tracing ... 29
4.1.3. Combining the Two Methods ... 30
4.2. Case Selection ... 30
2
4.3. Operationalization and Measurements ... 35
4.3.1. Dependent Variable: Success of DDR Programmes ... 35
4.3.2. Causal Mechanism ... 38
4.4. Sources, Data and Triangulation ... 40
4.5. Validity, Reliability and Limitations ... 41
5. Case Studies ... 43
5.1. Somalia ... 43
5.1.1. Conflict Background ... 43
5.1.2. Results on the Dependent Variable ... 44
5.1.3. Results on the Causal Mechanism ... 54
5.2. South Sudan ... 60
5.2.1. Conflict Background ... 60
5.2.2. Results on the Dependent Variable ... 61
6. Analysis ... 69
6.1. Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variables ... 69
6.2. Causal Mechanism ... 73
6.3. Extended Analysis ... 74
7. Conclusions and Recommendations ... 77
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Table of Figures
Figure 1: Theoretical Argument... 17
Figure 2: Map of Al-Shabaab's Activity Areas ... 44
Figure 3: Map of DDR Camps in Somalia... 45
Figure 4: Map of Fatalities in Somalia, 2013 ... 46
Figure 5: Map of Fatalities in Somalia, 2018 ... 46
Figure 6: Map of DDR Camps in South Sudan ... 61
Figure 7: Map of Fatalities in South Sudan, 2009 ... 62
Figure 8: Map of Fatalities in South Sudan, 2013 ... 62
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List of Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ANSA Armed Non-Statutory Actor
AU African Union
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDVE Demobilization and Disengagement of Violent Extremists
IDDRS Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards IOM International Organization for Migration
ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America
SNA Somali National Army
SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army
UN The United Nations
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNDPO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations UNU United Nations University
UNU-CPR United Nations University Centre for Policy Research UNSOA United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
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1.
Introduction: DDR, Contemporary Conflicts and Violent Extremist
Offenders
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is one of the primary responses in the transition from war to peace. It is used by local governments and international actors to establish security and stability in post-war countries. The main goal of this tool is to take away arms from ex-combatants and allow them to successfully reintegrate into communities.1 In 1989 the United Nations (UN) carried out their first DDR initiative as a part of United Nations Observer Group in Central America’s (ONUCA) mandate. Tasked to voluntary demobilize soldiers in post-war Nicaragua and Honduras, ONUCA successfully engaged approximately 22,000 resistance fighters.2 Considered to have a significant impact, DDR has since become a standard tool included in peacekeeping operations both by the UN and other actors.3
Throughout the years, however, warfare has changed. The past decade has marked a rise in major and minor civil wars with death rate multiplying by six between 2011 and 2015. Organized crime, involvement of external parties (e.g. military interventions by neighbors), fragmentation, a myriad of actors that are shifting (within themselves and their alliances), and most importantly the expansion of the Islamic State and increase in violent extremist offenders (VEOs) define contemporary war.4
That is why when another DDR mission was deployed in Somalia, in 2007, it faced a completely different environment than ONUCA. The mission was deployed within an ongoing conflict without a peace accord.5 It involved a number of regional, international, and national
organizations and focused on reintegration of Salafi jihadist group Al-Shabaab.6 Meanwhile, other guerilla fighters that were active in Somalia were excluded from the programme. This example is a very accurate description of current DDR environment and the new, challenging conditions international actors face when trying to solve insurrectionist intra-state conflicts.
1 Wellenstein (2019).
2 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a): 23. 3 UN (N.D.).
4 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a): 21; Von Einsiedel et al. (2017): 4. 5 Felbab-Brown (2015): 108.
6 Actors involved: UNSOM, AMISOM, UNSOA, the Somali government, and other bilateral partners.
6
As a result of these changes, the UN mission in Haiti (between 2005 and 2006) became a breaking point that led to the redevelopment of DDR.7 It was the first time since 1989 that existing practices were majorly altered and reshaped, giving birth to Second Generation DDR.8 What was originally seen as a linear three-step process that began with a peace agreement and finalized with reintegration, has become a more comprehensive approach.9 Second Generation DDR is system-centric, it takes into account community dynamics as well as the uncertainties of war. It acknowledges grey zones between absolute peace and war and approaches conflict in a holistic manner.10
However, a rising number of scholars argue that such an approach is still insufficient. A study initiated by United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) and DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPO) has argued for a Third Generation DDR.11 Written by specialists and academics, the study addresses issues that DDR is facing in modern conflicts and proposes a new framework that would be better built to last in current conflict environment as well as neutralize VEOs. It uses practical examples of failed DDR in the context of violent extremism to prove the need for change.12 It has also fueled a handful of other academic papers and research and is the departing point of this thesis.
One common feature of the studies that argue for the Third Generation DDR is a lack of comparative evaluation that would explore whether violent extremism is really the main contributing factor to the failure of DDR. This thesis seeks to address this puzzle by answering the following question: to what extent does the inclusion of violent extremist offenders in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programmes affect the success of such programmes?
In accordance with the already established academic narrative, I too argue that current DDR is unequipped to deal with VEOs and is more successful in reintegrating ‘traditional’ guerilla fighters. I build a theoretical argument that departs from Social Identity Theory and incorporates
7 Molloy (2017): 7. 8 Ibid.
9 Ibid: 109. 10 Ibid: 109.
7
concepts of reconciliation, international political norms and constructivism. I propose that decision makers in post-conflict zones have a very strong distinction between their social group and VEOs. This black and white identity dichotomy is further reinforced by international anti-terrorism norms. In addition, I argue that post-conflict reconciliation is not effective in on-going wars that include VEOs. Failure to reconcile reestablishes preexisting group divides and
prejudices. As a result, governmental actors consciously or unconsciously make decisions that hinder the progress of DDR.
Based on this theoretical reasoning,I hypothesize that: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programmes are likely to be less effective if they include high numbers of violent extremist offenders relative to other Armed Non-Statutory Actors.To test my theory, I carry out a mix of structured focused comparison and process tracing, and assess two DDR cases in
Somalia and South Sudan.13 Using this methodology, I am able to evaluate both the hypothesis and the causal mechanism.
Empirical findings show a moderate correlation between the inclusion of VEOs and the success of DDR overall. However, it clearly establishes that DDR programmes that involve VEOs are much more likely to violate human rights and fail to address disadvantaged groups’ needs. At the same time, there is solid empirical support for the causal mechanism. General application of these findings is limited to the number of cases analyzed as well as their context. Nonetheless, inferences can be used as potential departure points for future research.
Finally, in conducting this study, I begin with presenting main concepts and definitions, evaluate previous research, identify research gaps, and formulate research problem (2. Previous
Research). I continue with building the theoretical argument, causal mechanism and hypothesis (3. Theory). Subsequently, I explain methodology, case selection and study limitations (4. Research Design). I then gather empirical results (5. Case Studies), carry out an analytical comparison (6. Analysis) and finalize the study by drawing conclusions and providing suggestions for further research (7. Conclusions and Recommendations).
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2.
Previous Research
2.1. Concepts and Definitions
2.1.1. DDR
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) consists of three parts: disarmament, which removes participants’ weapons, demobilization, which takes ex-combatants away from their military networks, and reintegration, which helps the participants to rejoin society as civilians. Besides focusing on armed actors (both governmental and non-statutory), DDR also “lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities to which these
individuals return, while building capacity for long-term peace, security and development.”14 According to the UN, it is an essential tool to control violence and prevent resurgence of conflict.15
The UN carries out DDR through its peacekeeping operations as well as political support missions.16 However, an array of regional, national, international actors and private contractors are increasingly willing to implement programmes of their own.17 This leads to fragmentation and inconsistencies. Overall, current programmes (particularly ones by the UN) are guided by Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). These guidelines were developed by the UN and are intended for all DDR practitioners. They were created out of the need to unify frameworks and lessons learned from a number of previous DDR initiatives. Most importantly it also establishes priorities for Second Generation DDR in writing.18
IDDRS emphasizes that DDR is a political process depended on national ownership and parties’ willingness to cooperate. It has five overarching principles, suggesting that DDR should be “people-centered; flexible; transparent and accountable; nationally owned; integrated and well planned.19 Interestingly, IDDRS emphasizes the need of a peacekeeping (post-conflict) setting for DDR to take place.20 However, as discussed above, that is not the reality anymore. More and
14 UN (N.D.); UN (2014): 25. 15 Munive and Stepputat (2015). 16 UN (N.D.).
17 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a): 10. 18 Muggah and O’Donnell (2015). 19 UN (2014): 26.
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more programmes are deployed during conflicts, making them a part of peace establishment process instead.21
2.1.2. VEOs
Synonymous to terrorists and radical fighters, violent extremist offenders (VEOs) do not have a clear cut definition. In recent conflicts, violent extremists (particularly militant Salafi groups) have been one of the main causes of increased civilian suffering.22 The UN sees violent extremism as the antithesis to their key values: peace, security, human rights and sustainable development.23 VEOs are not defined by any particular religion, belong to a specific region or rise from a certain political system.24
It must be underlined that within this particular study, VEOs refer to Armed Non-Statutory Actors (ANSAs) who have violent (extremist) religious beliefs and operate in conflict areas.25 The distinction must be made between VEOs in conflict zones, who are the focus of this study, and Foreign Terrorist Fighters as well as VEOs operating in non-conflict zones.
2.2. Literature Review
As a critical security issue, violent extremism has grasped attention from practitioners and academics alike. Exploring the relationship between violent extremism and DDR, however, is a relatively new topic. One that gained spotlight after previously mentioned study from 2015 by UNU-CPR and a section of UNDPO.26
To provide a purposeful and in-depth literature review, three key areas are explored in this chapter. First of all, I review studies that analyze the success of DDR programmes. I then look into research that focuses on interaction between DDR programmes and violent extremist offenders. Finally, I examine development of theories within Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Having these three focal points allows me to make a holistic overview of what is
21 Muggah and O’Donnell (2015). 22 Von Einsiedel et al. (2017): 6. 23 UNODC (2016): 3.
24 Ibid.
25 ANSA terminology is proposed by Munive and Stepputat, 2015.
10
known practically and theoretically about successful DDR initiatives and VEOs’ involvement in DDR, as well as identify relevant gaps within the literature.
2.2.1. Success of DDR
It can be both very simple as well as incredibly hard to define DDR’s success. Evaluating it greatly depends on the goals and expectations that are set. The main aims of these programmes are as the three name letters spell out: disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants. However, throughout the years additional expectations have been added to the list. Muggah and O’Donnell explain that current programmes are expected to “promote reconciliation between erstwhile soldiers and communities, rebuild and reinforce social institutions, and promote economic livelihoods for combatants, their dependents, and neighborhoods”.27 A task, some might argue, unrealistic, given the timeframe (2-3 years) and limited financing of DDR. In addition, the programmes might be deployed as a substitute for investment in state recovery and reconstruction. In such cases, it is practically impossible for DDR to successfully meet its social, political and economic expectations.28
Furthermore, the outcome of the evaluation will vary based on metrics that are chosen and questions that are asked. For years, quantitative results have been prioritized over qualitative ones as they made more sense for donors and program evaluators. According to Molloy, easy to grasp concepts like “the number of guns collected, the number of combatants demobilized, and the number of former combatants securing livelihoods as a result of reintegration support” were key in evaluating DDR programmes.29 As Bowd and Özerdem argue, these figures are
undeniably important, yet they hardly measure the socio-economic success of peace initiatives, which paint a more realistic picture of their impact.30 IDDRS was built to include a more comprehensive and in-depth framework to evaluate DDR. It combines a variety of qualitative and quantitative indicators, such as percentage of weapons disabled, percentage of
ex-combatants that receive training as well as communities’ response.31
27 Muggah and O’Donnell (2015). 28 Ibid.
29 Molloy (2017): 1.
11
What is more, the assumption that young unemployed men are primary targets of insurgent recruitment means that employment and improved living standards are used as the main
reintegration tactic. By doing so, DDR overlooks grievances and programme’s essential role in transitional justice. At the same time, these employment initiatives often lack long-term financial commitment, while vocational training does not always meet specific needs of the market and the demand for technologically skilled workers.32 McMullin suggests that combining poorly planned DDR with ex-fighters’ lack of motivation often leads to actors reintegrating back to poverty, which strengthens the circle of civil war.33
Continuingly, as ANSAs vary in forms and dynamics, it is hard to use a cookie-cutter approach in addressing them. Munive and Stepputat argue that employing a one programme fits all tactics can create adverse outcomes. For example, it can induce a power vacuum as has happened in Afghanistan where Taliban and other insurgents rose to power after DDR.34
It is also important to challenge any underlying assumptions about reintegration which, according to Muggah and O’Donnell, is the weakest point of DDR.35 Assuming that once belligerents are mobilized they leave their local communities is incorrect. Such theory leads to beliefs that ex-combatants will easily reintegrate to society by coming back to their pre-war homes. It also presumes that local communities will not need support throughout the
reintegration process.36 However, the fact is that most combatants who join insurgency continue to operate in the place of their recruitment, which most often is their home neighborhood.37 They push civilians into life with ANSAs and violence next-door. Consequently, once the war is over both the communities and the ex-combatants need to be reintegrated into a peaceful life with each other.38
Furthermore, Muggah and O’Donnell’s work shows that focusing on ex-combatants alone tends to lead to communities feeling excluded from international help, which can create further
32 Munive and Stepputat (2015). 33 McMullin (2013).
34 Munive and Stepputat (2015). 35 Muggah and O’Donnell (2015). 36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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grievances.39 Özerdem agrees with this view suggesting that if civilian needs are left
unaddressed, a wedge is drawn between the society and former fighters. Ex-combatants receiving vocational training or money incentives can be seen as an unjust reward for their violent
behavior. 40 It also provides them with an advantage in the scarce world of conflict-torn countries where getting any support can be the difference between life and death.41
Another issue with reintegration is that it is seen as a process for individual demobilized actors. Munive and Stepputat argue that this way group identity and family relationships are overlooked, even though they are important parts of a successful DDR.42 Failing to acknowledge
ex-combatants’ networks and relationships might lead to unexplored tracks within social and economic reintegration. Such failure can result in resurgence of violence years after DDR takes place as has happened in Mozambique.43
Finally, it is important for DDR to recognize historical circumstances. Podder discusses the case of Liberia, which failed to take history into account. Consequently, Liberian DDR
re-marginalized and disempowered groups, creating new grievances.44 As Grip and Kotajoki explain, DDR programmes do not function in a vacuum. It is essential for these initiatives to address past events, acknowledge role of communities, and take into account current economic demands as well as the needs of local civilians. Most importantly, they should make reintegration communities active agents of peacekeeping/building initiatives.45 Paying attention to
circumstances could lead to understanding how different actors disengage and de-radicalize which is essential for neutralizing VEOs.46
2.2.2. DDR and VEOs
Just because a DDR programme is deployed in a country does not mean that all ANSAs will be addressed through it. Some DDR initiatives choose to exclude VEOs all together as they deem these combatants unlikely to compromise. Such a decision comes from an assumption that VEOs
39 Muggah and O’Donnell (2015). 40 Özerdem (2015): 455.
41 Molloy (2017).
42 Munive and Stepputat (2015). 43 Wiegink (2015).
44 Podder (2012).
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(particularly Salafi jihadist groups) are only motivated by religious reasons.47 Van der Lijn and Hickendorff propose that as a result of their beliefs, VEOs are separated from political and economic realm within which other armed parties are seen to be operating.48 In this scenario, DDR fails to address a whole section of rebels who drive the conflict.49
On the other hand, some DDR programmes prioritize VEOs alone, which also generates issues in post-conflict states. A field report by Felbab-Brown shows that focusing the majority of
reintegration efforts on Al-Shabaab has left a chunk of problematic actors outside of the support circle in Somalia.50 Consequently, their grievances and economic incentives to join the war have not been met, which increases their likelihood to continue fighting or rejoin insurgency later on.51
At the same time, involvement of VEOs in DDR hinders the main principles of these
programmes, as outlined in IDDRS. First of all, according to Felbab-Brown, DDR becomes less accountable and significantly less transparent.52 Governments tend to classify information on VEOs as they are an immense security threat. By doing so, states prevent the international community from evaluating the status quo of peacebuilding and humanitarian initiatives that involve violent extremists.
What is more, as counterinsurgency/counterterrorism is mixed with DDR, it becomes impossible to avoid detaining fighters for the safety of themselves or others.53 Most reintegration activities are carried out in voluntary DDR camps, which are special facilities where ex-combatants live and undergo vocational training before their return to the society.54 However, due to a high level of threat when dealing with Salafi jihadist organizations, some of these camps become detention centers.55 As Felbab-Brown and Oswald explain, there is often a lack of legal ground and clarity in such detentions, which means that DDR programmes directly violate human rights.56
47 Van der Lijn and Hickendorff (2017). 48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Felbab-Brown (2015). 51 Ibid
52 Ibid.
53 Oswald (2015); Taylor et al. (2019): 9. 54 Felbab-Brown (2015).
55 Ibid.
14
Furthermore, there is usually a lack of distinction between high and low-risk groups when dealing with VEOs. Such classification is essential as it determines who needs detention, who should be trialed and who are free to rejoin the society.57 Current risk assessment attempts in Sri Lanka and Somalia have failed to create clear distinctions between these groups.58 In addition, based on Taylor et al. and Felbab-Brown’s work we know that some ex- fighters might be forced to join DDR programmes. Sometimes they are pushed into a situation where the alternative to not joining is death (either by state or by the group they have left), which undermines another one of key principles in IDDRS: voluntary involvement.59
Cockayne and O’Neil argue that continuing on the current path of Second Generation DDR would impose “many legal, reputational, human rights-related, and security risks for the UN, its staff, partners, and donors”.60 The solution, they suggest, could be Demobilization and
Disengagement of Violent Extremists (DDVE) framework.It rests on three main ‘legs’: (1) incorporation of relevant lessons from DDR and Countering Violent Extremism, (2)
development of detention and internment guidelines, and (3) improving case and risk management to increase transparency.61
Richards further elaborates this proposal by designing additional steps to develop DDVE. He suggests providing security to deserters who surrender voluntary; having a better small arms control for seized weapons; creating better tools to asses high and low-risk of potential re-offenders; having clear deradicalisation guidelines in relation to religious freedom; establishing reintegration strategies within hostile communities and cooperating with prison programs.62 The author also proposes to incorporate tools used by criminal psychologists in DDR. He argues that they might be the answer to having clear guidelines in distinguishing between high and low risk offenders. According to Richards, structured professional judgment approach could help DDR evolve its practices in risk assessments. Such tools incorporate both a score system and a holistic
57 Felbab-Brown (2018).
58 Felbab-Brown (2015): 119; Richards (2018): 388. 59 Felbab-Brown (2015); Taylor et al. (2019): 9. 60 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a): 143.
15
view of each case, helping practitioners make better decisions.63 However, it also requires resources and training, which are always restricted in post-conflict settings.
2.2.3. DDR Theory and Schools of Thought
In his work Molloy overviews the theoretical development of DDR. He explains that the core of DDR theory is based on confidence building.64 It focuses on non-confrontational military capacities to intervene in post-conflict areas. In essence, confidence building bridges DDR staff and local communities. It helps building mutual understanding, defining acceptable norms and behavior, conveying goals and intentions as well as fighting fears and suspicions.65 Transparency and information dissemination are vital to secure trust, mutual respect and understanding
between parties. Only in such an environment, can fighters disarm and demobilize.66 While this theory gives a foundation to understanding why DDR works, it is rather simplistic and one-dimensional. It fails to acknowledge the varying needs of actors and post-conflict societies. Therefore, according to Molloy, another theory has evolved over the years. Called the community security approach, it relates to Second Generation DDR and is based on conflict management and small arms control.67 It rests on five pillars: legal institutions, armed groups, community, youth and women.68 To achieve overarching security all five groups need to be addressed through community engagement projects. Such projects depend on cooperation between local authorities and civil society organizations, which can target local communities.69 Consequently, enhanced security and communal engagement build a strong foundation for ex-combatants to reintegrate into society in a peaceful way.70 Unfortunately, this theory is built on the assumption that all pillar groups are willing to cooperate. In practice, the dynamics between them seem to be more complicated, which requires a deeper, multifaceted theoretical
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2.3. Research Gaps and Problem
There are three main research gaps in the existing literature. First of all, the majority of current studies only address individual factors that affect the success of DDR. Simultaneously,
evaluation guidelines proposed within IDDRS are difficult to translate to academic studies. They are heavily reliant on information that is either classified or not available until years after a mission ends. This means that there is no easily applicable qualitative framework that could be used in comparing both ongoing and finished DDR initiatives and that utilizes available data and resources without requiring classified or hardly attainable information. Secondly, there is a lack of comparative DDR studies. It is therefore unknown to what extent the inclusion of VEOs really determines the success of DDR programmes. Grip and Kotajoki echo this by suggesting that comparison should be in the heart of DDR research.71 Finally, existing literature does not provide a theoretical mechanism that would explain why DDR is unsuccessful in disarming,
demobilizing and reintegrating VEOs.
To address these shortages, I aim to make a theoretical and empirical contribution. To do so, this thesis is centered on the following question: to what extent does the inclusion of violent extremist offenders in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programmes affect the success of such programmes? Here inclusion of violent extremist offenders is the independent variable, while success of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programmes is the dependent variable.
17
3.
Theory
Theory of this study is centered on the construction and evolution of social identity within a post-conflict setting. It uses four main concepts: identity, political reconciliation, international norms and constructivism as the building blocks for its theoretical argument. Nevin Aiken’s research on identity, reconciliation and transitional justice is the main departing point and foundation for the framework that is presented.72
In the parts below, I proceed to explain the four main concepts. They are followed by an explanation of different steps in the theoretical argument and concluded with a hypothesis. Figure 1 presents a summary of the argument/causal mechanism and its steps.
72 Aiken (2013).
Independent Variable: Inclusion of VEOs
Affected Dependent Variable: Lower success rate of DDR Reconciliation process
does not penetrate deep enough
Step 1: Decision makers’ identity dictates negative perception of
VEOs
Step 2: Negative perception is reinforced by the environment
Step 3: Decision makers consciously and unconsciously sabotage DDR involving VEOs
International norms and western political standards influence local
politicians
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3.1. Theory Building Blocks
3.1.1. Identity
Understanding social, group and collective identities is the key explanatory variable in the dynamics of peace and conflict.73 “Sense of identity” is what “largely determines how people behave politically and in turn view their own political environment.”74 According to Aiken, Social Identity Theory (SIT) is commonly used to explain actors’ behaviors. It focuses on “the group in the individual” to assess how people’s associations to social structures explain and define the identities they take up.75
At its core SIT approach is psychological, focused on personal cognition. However, it also stretches beyond individuals to explain society and societal structures. Most importantly, it suggests that sharing an identity promotes conformity to the idea of how one should behave. The normative expectations of behavior are circular: they provide both rules of acceptable conduct as well as define the criteria of what it means to be included in a particular group.76 At the same time, identities are not monolithic. They are fluid and adaptable, meaning that relationships across and between groups are not primordial, but changing according to time and
circumstances.77 An individual can belong to many groups, importance and priority order of which shift and change continuously.
Furthermore, groups’ identity can be determined by a number of factors, like ethnicity, culture, religion or citizenship.78 Through these associations, individuals form bonds with others around them who share the same perception of themselves. It groups people into social categories based on personal knowledge that they, as people, belong together which carries intrinsic “emotional and value significance”.79 This identity is usually assigned by oneself and it creates ties across societies. It is also an essential part of the social universe as it is the way individuals perceive the world around them.
19
Naturally, strong identities also produce a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ allowing conflict lines to be drawn.80 ‘Us’ and ‘them’ or the ‘ingroup’ and the ‘outgroup’ is a contrasting force, yet it enables self-affirmation. For their own well-being, individuals will extend positive ideas of their identity to other members within their social group.81 This does not necessarily mean that the ‘outgroup’ is immediately prescribed negative connotations. The relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ depends on surrounding factors like “structural, environmental and situational
conditions” as well as historical circumstances.82 Hence hostility and violence between groups is not a predetermined route but one of possible outcomes. It is important to note, however, that identity politics tend to lead to negative polarization between groups with perceived superiority and inferiority.83
What is more, the relations between varying ethnic, religious or national identities are created through social constructions. This means that in most settings people act within pre-existing patterns.84 Previous injustice, violence and sense of threat between groups tend to contribute negatively to their relationships. These interactions can become self-fulfilling as they form and reinforce expectations, stereotypes and prejudices of the ‘others’ over time. This consequently leads to cracks and divisions in the communities, with distrust, animosity and resentment characterizing societies.85
In such a setting violence means that already fragile links are shattered even further. Conflicts destroy ‘social capital’, virtually eliminating the small communication space that existed before, and consequently disabling networks and cooperation potential.86 In addition, as the stereotypes of ‘others’ are reinforced, so is the understanding of oneself. It is easy to adopt a narrative of villains and victims, further de-humanizing the ‘others’ as barbarians who promote violence. Even if a social group has won a conflict, they can still see themselves as victims to the ‘others’. The injustice that has been done leads to human, social and material costs that need to be carried
20
by both groups.87 However, winners will focus on and emphasize the cost that their group had to pay. Subsequently, once the winners achieve a position of power, they have an upper hand to promote identity politics, embracing inequality as retribution and further deepening the losses of the ‘outgroup’.88
3.1.2. Political Reconciliation Reconciliation
In essence, reconciliation means “the restoration of a wrongdoer to community”.89 According to the psychology of social identity, it is essential to transform the understanding of ‘us’ and the ‘others’ in order to achieve such acceptance, move away from conflict and reconcile.90 Invoking a collective ‘we’ relies on the hope that communities can arrive to a mutual agreement about their past.91 It demands war-torn societies to alter perceptions among each other and historical group animosity to find links that can build understanding and shift from conflict to dialogue.92 These processes require active effort, commitment and political input. Signing a peace agreement and ending hostilities do not by themselves equal intentional efforts to overcome war.93 Here ‘time does not heal’ the wounds of conflicts and violence but planned and deliberate process of reconciliation does.
As a part of conflict transformation, reconciliation depends on social learning, which leads to former enemies reinterpreting and redefining their reality. This, in turn, helps to restructure identities that individuals take up, which helps to create a more positive system of interactions. In addition, while such changes begin with politicians and elites, they have to ripple through the whole society or at least the majority of it for transition to take place.94
Aiken identifies five essential aspects of successful social learning: (1) mutual trust, (2) development of a broader sense of collective identity, (3) changes in antagonistic beliefs about
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enemies, (4) perception of violence as illegitimate and unthinkable, (5) changes in structural and material conditions.95
For this study and its theoretical framework, two aspects are crucial: the second and third one. First of all, widening and accepting a broader collective identity is incredibly important for DDR, which relies on communities (both political and personal) to allow ex-combatants back into society. Such acceptance does not require previous social identities to be eliminated. However, the understanding of oneself needs to be expanded to include ‘others’. Having an umbrella political and moral community that includes former rivals opens a space to see national welfare and security as dependent on all members of the group. In other words, all different identities within a nation (or a region) have a responsibility to each other to preserve social, economic and political welfare.96
The third aspect of successful social learning goes hand in hand with the second one, though it focuses more deeply on transforming “corrupted ideologies, normative structures and value systems”.97 If such systems and beliefs are not addressed, they will reinforce themselves and reinstate the stereotypes and perceptions of the ‘other’ over time. Therefore, maintaining the ‘outgroup’ as a justifiable target of violence. The goal here is to re-humanize enemies, bringing a common moral ground to former belligerents. This re-humanization process is based on two aspects: fostering of empathy and replacing violence with a culture of human rights where both enemies are equal and entitled to the same, just treatment.98
Political Reconciliation
Even though a single societal process, reconciliation operates in two domains: public and
political. While both are essential for sustainable peace, this study focuses on the latter. Political reconciliation has a significant importance for DDR as local governments and their initiatives drive the programmes. It also has the potential to affect public reconciliation through identity politics. Nonetheless, actors and scholars of DDR often overlook it, with the majority of attention given to the public domain.
95 Aiken (2013): 20-23. 96 Ibid: 21.
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While there are different views on how to define political reconciliation, du Toit’s work provides a valuable insight that is used in this thesis.99 The author focuses on leadership and decision maker’s ability to create a platform for cooperation between former rivals. Using South Africa as an example, we can see that the reconciliation after apartheid was highly dependent on unique leadership figures: Mandela and De Klerk.100 Treating each other as equals and with respect is a practical example of how previously mentioned transformation of social identity takes place in a political field.
Another aspect of political reconciliation is that it tends to be public and visible. Vocally and openly talking about the past and airing grievances of conflict injustices, allows perpetrators to apologize and victims to forgive in the public eye. Even though that does not replace individual reconciliation, it helps eliminating electoral demand towards leaders to keep punishing the wrongdoers.101
Finally, the majority of reconciliation processes happen in peace time. It is nearly impossible that reconstruction of identities can take place during conflict. Hostile environment and a clear notion of enemy groups make it very hard to redefine ‘others’ as a part of oneself. Shifting to a different mindset while accepting on-going losses is a tall task for politicians and societies torn by modern conflict.
3.1.3. International Norms
Based on Gopin, I chose two main assumptions within international relations practices that needed to be addressed in regards to this study: strong democratic states are secular and respectable states do not negotiate with terrorists.102
First and foremost, international relations and political practices are based on Western views and experiences. Fox and Sandler argue that it is one of the main reasons why religion has been vastly excluded from the subject, its theories and methodologies.103 While religion is not, and should not be the main motivating force behind foreign policy, it is an important aspect of the international system. It carries its own normative values and “is one of the basic elements of
99 Du Toit (2018): 17. 100 Ibid: 19.
101 Kohen et al. (2011): 96. 102 Gopin (2015).
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many people’s worldviews.”104 It is not monolithic and it works on different alleys, which cumulate to create an effect on national and international levels. It does not cause international relations, however it is a significant intervening variable.105 Yet in modern politics there is a prevailing myth that strong democratic states are secular. Such ideas have rippled through to peacebuilding, creating an implicit binary world where religious practices are separated from secular policies.106
One of the best ways to describe this school of thought and practice is the rise of liberal or secular peace. Such peace is “achieved through commitment to the idea of a social contract for all citizens of a state (and by extension in current day and age to all citizens of the world), regardless of religious affiliation, belief, or commitments”.107 In practice this means that
religious bodies and leaders should not be given space to intervene in state apparatus and policy making. Evidently, such a situation could be positive. For many of peace actors, religion is imbedded in the problems they are trying to solve.108 However, throughout the years we have seen that exclusion of religious institutions in peace processes do not always yield desired results.109 It creates a bias against incorporating religious organizations and leaders into conflict resolution. Following this “Judeo-Christian Western legacy” can be especially detrimental in Middle Eastern contexts, where religious institutions are a significant part of the state.110 The second assumption that needs to be addressed in regards to this thesis is terrorism,
particularly one that has religious connotations (like Salafi jihadist groups). VEOs also fall in the broad spectrum of terrorism linked to religion due to their disregard of humanitarian values and tendencies to cause immense human suffering. Haynes argues that failed states often create environments that are encouraging “conflicts linked to religious terrorism”.111 The lack of central government leads to feelings of insecurity and instability. This pushes some individuals to seek answers in religion, which sometimes results in radicalization and violent pursuit of one’s
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truths.112 Lack of authority and structure also allow terrorist organizations to establish themselves easier within local communities as there is no counteracting power.113
Moreover, there is a political notion that democratic states do not negotiate with terrorists. Due to their actions, terrorist groups put themselves outside of realm of compromise and mutual understanding.114 Pursuing talks with such agents would legitimize their actions, which fall out of the international notion of ‘acceptable violence’. Such a view is once again deeply rooted in Western international thought, which centuries ago decided that it is justifiable to put aside traditional rules of conflict resolution in some cases.115 Essentially, this means that some acts of war eradicate perpetrator’s rights to explain themselves and receive a just treatment. Historically, we have seen this situation between Europeans and non-Christian, non-European people, who faced a debate of what rights they should enjoy. Later on, the USA has evoked a similar view in Reagan’s era when dealing with communist states.116 Nowadays certain countries and certain groups face a similar dilemma when it comes to VEOs, FTFs and other actors that fall under a broad umbrella of terrorism.
3.1.4. Constructivism
As mentioned previously, social identities are constructions based on the foundations of territory, ethnicity or religion etc.117 Over time these constructions become social truths and facts of everyday reality, meaning that they have the capacity to reinforce themselves. The aim of this ‘building block’ is to explore the mechanism behind social constructivism within national and international political realm in more depth.
There are two essential parts of constructivism: identity and environment of actors. By focusing on their interaction, scholars are able to explain processes behind national and international political decisions.118 As identity has already been explored, we shift our focus to environment. Guzzini explains that environment or ‘field’ is a product of collective history.119 There are a number of different fields ranging from artistic to political, all of which have varying
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accumulations of power and capital (social, economic and cultural).120 These fields tend to have set norms and beliefs which dictate actors’ actions. Actors also draw from these fields to
associate with others and their identities. Fields are malleable by time and overall shifts in power and capital.121
What this means for war-torn nations is that they are exposed to the international field with its pre-existing norms and expectations. DDR and overall peacebuilding’s aim is to achieve both reconciliation between two parts of society and, on broader terms, introduce secular
liberalism.122 In essence, peace initiatives bring and impose a set of international rules on the war-torn countries. However, just because it is imposed it does not mean that it is inherently negative. Entering the international system as a new democracy tends to benefit actors by enhancing their overall capital. This means that rational choice will push post-conflict states to accept these new norms.123 At the same time, global community will expect this acceptance, which might also be a prerequisite to receiving humanitarian help and support.124
3.2. Theoretical Argument
As in any international development theory, the biggest hurdle for this study is to present a framework that is neither too complicated to translate to a reader, nor too oversimplified to reflect the nuanced and complex nature of societies. Striking this balance between generality and parsimony is essential for the explanatory value of any theory.
This is the reason why the four building blocks presented above are essential in designing a clear theoretical argument. SIT lays a foundation to understanding how different groups perceive the reality around them. It also explains how a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is created. Furthermore, the reconciliation section clarifies how social learning and public efforts can reconstruct the behavior patterns in post-war countries, bridging groups together.
Simultaneously, explaining international norms allows painting a picture of a global system within which countries operate and humanitarian aid is provided. Constructivism bridges all of
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these mechanisms together. It describes how identities and environments can interact with each other and change human behaviors.
Departing from these four blocks, I aim to mould a clear theoretical argument/causal mechanism which could explain how DDR is affected by robust prejudices against VEOs. Three steps below explain this mechanism in detail.
Step 1. Decision makers’ identity dictates negative perceptions of VEOs:
As explained previously, two rival actors in a war have a highly negative image of each other. They do not regard themselves as belonging to the same social identity group. In addition, there tends to be a deep historical animosity between the two parties. In conflicts involving VEOs, government sees itself as a complete opposite to rebel militias. Their identity dictates prejudices that exclude any humanizing qualities from VEOs, dichotomizing their social reality into
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ or ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Step 2. Negative perceptions are reinforced by the environment:
Two environmental factors affect governmental perception of VEOs in the transition from war to peace: absence of political reconciliation and arrival of international norms. First of all, as
mentioned previously, modern DDR begins within on-going conflicts. In this setting political reconciliation (and public) does not have the desired effect of creating an inclusive national identity. Continued losses on both sides reinforce the truths and stereotypes about enemies. Moreover, incoming humanitarian missions mean that national actors are continuously exposed to international peacebuilding practices. While DDR is initiated by state governments, they receive help from international bodies, particularly the UN, to implement the programmes. This support carries secular liberal norms.125 At the same time, young democracies seek to learn from the international system to become a part of their ‘field’, which would help them gain more power.
These two streams of international values deem VEOs as unworthy of fundamental rights and fair treatment, which strengthen government’s negative perceptions of them. In addition,
international norms promote the exclusion of religious actors in state- building. This is due to the
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fact that religious institutions do not have space to operate in secular and liberal peace.126 As a consequence, reconciliation and social learning that could be powered by religious actors are not carried out.
Overall, identities are not broadened to include all members of the society, enemies are not re-humanized, reconciliation fails, and government’s negative views on VEOs are continually reinforced.
Step 3. Decision makers consciously and unconsciously sabotage DDR involving VEOs:
As the winners of a conflict, governmental actors have the opportunity to decide what happens to their opponents. In the case of DDR, this becomes an essential part of the treatment that ex-combatants receive. Without strong political reconciliation, it becomes hard for decision makers to move away from the past and implement DDR policies that would truly reintegrate VEOs into society. There is a strong urge to achieve retribution, disregarding the need for forgiveness and healing between the groups. Thus, due to their identity, which is the opposite to the one of VEOs, governments will consciously or unconsciously make decisions that hinder DDR’s success.
3.4. Hypothesis
The three-step argument /causal mechanism explains the interaction between dependent (success of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programmes) and independent (inclusion of violent extremist offenders) variables. The theoretical framework and its steps can be
summarized as follows: decision makers’ existing negative identities on VEOs are reinforced by incoming international norms. Failed reconciliation and social learning lead to further
strengthening of divided identities. As a result governmental actors obstruct the progress of DDR.
Based on this argument, I hypothesize that: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programmes are likely to be less effective if they include high numbers of violent extremist offenders relative to other Armed Non-Statutory Actors.
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4.
Research Design
This chapter is divided into five main parts. I first explain the methods of structured focused comparison and process tracing, which are used in the analysis. Afterwards, I present case selection, which is followed by operationalization and measurement of variables and the
theoretical argument. I then introduce empirical sources and data that are used. Finally, I discuss validity, reliability and limitations of this study.
4.1. Methodology
To answer the research question this study is designed as a qualitative, small-n case comparison. This means that in order to arrive to conclusions, value-based in-depth observations are used to compare a small number of cases. There are three reasons for choosing such a design. To begin with, this study is hypothesis generating. 127 Hereby it seeks to identify a type of a (presumed) relationship between independent and dependent variables, using measurements on an individual (micro) level.128 Secondly, the study aims to produce a precise causal mechanism. A small-n qualitative case study is best suited for such an endeavor as it allows testing individual steps within the mechanism.129 Finally, the availability of data has also led to the choice of qualitative methodology. As DDR that includes VEOs does not appear in large numbers, there is a limited amount of existing cases that can be tested.130
4.1.1. Structure Focused Comparison
The method of structured focused comparison (SFC) is a between-case study focused on establishing a relationship between two variables. It requires case selection to be purposeful, based on theoretical interest.131 In this study, the theoretical interest is defined by the presence or absence of an independent variable as well as a present dependent variable.
The method is ‘structured’ as it uses a pre-establish set of questions in all of the cases, making data collection systematic and easily comparable. These questions are devised to capture the
127 Gerring (2007): 42. 128 Ibid.
129 Ibid: 47.
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research interest. 132 It is ‘focused’ as it zooms into one particular phenomenon within the cases. Both Somalia and South Sudan, which are analyzed in this study, could be used in a variety of other studies. However, focusing on the relationship between VEOs and DDR, eliminates the surrounding noise, producing a reliable comparison.133 Self explanatory, the method is comparative as it involves two or more cases.
4.1.2. Process Tracing
In essence, process tracing allows making inferences on the absence or presence of causal mechanism based on an in-case analysis.134 Contrary to SFC, this method uses a single case where both variables (independent and dependent) are present. Using evidence, researcher then evaluates whether the hypothesized causal mechanism is functioning as theorized.135 The goal of applying this type of process tracing is to create theories that are applicable in a more general population of cases.
Beach and Pedersen propose the following three steps in process tracing: conceptualizing causal mechanism, operationalizing causal mechanism and collecting the evidence.136 The
conceptualization means dividing the causal mechanism into logical steps, a chain of reactions which reveal how an independent variable affects a dependent variable.137 In this thesis, the conceptualization step was carried out in the previous chapter, where three main steps of the theoretical argument were presented. Departing from here, the pieces of a logical chain are operationalized, gaining an observational value. 138 This means that case specific predictions of how a theory manifests itself in the real world are made. Here inductive elements are used, as the expectations are grounded in previous research.139 Finally, evidence is gathered, allowing a researcher to make inferences whether the hypothesized causal mechanism was present and functioned as predicted.140
132 Powner (2014): 105; George and Bennett (2005): 102-103. 133 George and Bennett (2005): 103.
134 Beach and Pedersen (2013): 11. 135 Ibid.
136 Beach and Pedersen (2013): 15. 137 Ibid: 14.
30 4.1.3. Combining the Two Methods
While both methods belong to case study methodology, they have a very different purpose and execution. Most notably, SFC relies on a comparison between multiple cases and aims to establish whether and to what extent variables interact. Process tracing, on the other hand, is executed within a single case and is used to determine how the variables interact. Combining both methods allows for a better understanding of both causal effect (causation) and causal mechanism.
To perform the analysis, I will use a set of value driven questions for both cases (Somalia and South Sudan) based on SFC to establish causation. I will then use another set of questions devised using process tracing and investigate a single case that has the presence of both dependent and independent variables (Somalia). By doing so, I will be able to see whether the inclusion VEOs determines a poorer execution of DDR initiatives. And if so, does my theoretical argument explain this phenomenon?
I come back to explaining the execution of both methods in more depth in operationalization and measurements part. However, I first address case selection as it also relates to methodological choices.
4.2. Case Selection
To choose a sample from the general case population, this study uses purposive selection as dictated by SFC. This selection is made based on the following criteria: independent variable, control variables and availability of data.
First of all, by eliminating the element of randomness, I introduce a selection bias. This demands a counteractive strategy. One of such approaches is choosing cases based on the independent variable. By doing so, I am limiting the cherry-picking that would disregard study’s
inferences.141 As I am not aware of the outcome (dependent variable), I purposefully choose two studies with a variation in VEOs’ inclusion and then through analysis see whether the success of DDR programmes differs from case to case.
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Secondly, I rely on Mill’s method of difference, or most-similar design, to control for variables that could otherwise affect the dependent variable.142 This means that selected cases are as close as possible in their characteristics, except for the independent variable. Such an approach allows seeing whether the proposed hypothesis does in fact represent social reality of post-conflict zones.143 Using the most-similar design, nine variables are controlled for: (1) DDR follows IDDRS standards, (2) DDR is executed by the UN or one of its partners, (3) DDR is deployed during an ongoing conflict, (4) DDR duration is at least three years, (5) amount of funding directed to DDR, (6) type of conflict, (7) governing system, (8) country’s economy and (9) ethnic as well as cultural diversity.
Finally, the availability of data has also influenced the selection process. DDR programmes that involve the UN, its umbrella organizations or its partners (for example IOM or AU) tend to have the highest amount of available reports and articles describing and evaluating the missions. That is due to institutional transparency, reporting practices as well as overall interest from the
academic community on such peacekeeping efforts. Therefore selected cases are executed by the UN or one of its associates.
To author’s knowledge, there is no extensive up-to-date list of all DDR programmes carried out by the UN or its associates. Therefore, different lists from IOM, Folke Bernadotte’s Academy and the UN were cross-referenced to identify the general population.144 A decision was then made to first of all focus on programmes that have taken place around 2015, as they are most likely to involve VEOs.145 If no successful matches were found, cases dating back to 2006 (release of IDDRS) would be evaluated to find the best match for analysis.
4.2.1. Selected Cases: Somalia and South Sudan
Somalia is usually described as a bellwether when it comes to involving VEOs in DDR. The country almost exclusively prioritizes reintegration of Al-Shabaab fighters over other ANSAs, which makes it a natural choice for this study.146 At the same time, South Sudan has a lot of similar qualities related to the context of conflict and its DDR programme. Most importantly,
142 Powner (2015): 124. 143 Gerring (2008): 669.
144 IOM (2019): 8; Schulhofer-Wohl et al. (2010): 44; UN (N.D.). 145 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a).
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actors that are active in South Sudan are not classified as VEOs.147 The main priority of South Sudanese DDR is reintegration of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), though a few other organized groups have been involved in the programme too.148
What is more, in both Somalia and South Sudan peacekeeping interventions began when there was no peace to keep, meaning that DDR was launched on-going conflicts.149 In Somalia DDR officially started in 2010. However, it did not pick up until 2013-2015.150 South Sudan has had an ongoing DDR programme since 2009, which consists of two phases. Phase one was launched in 2009, it split in 2011 across new country lines as South Sudan gained its independence.151 The first phase finished in 2012 and was picked-up by phase two in 2013.152 According to the United Nations, as of 2018 both initiatives were on-going.153 However, there is a lack of information on South Sudanese DDR post-2014, meaning that this study focuses on the years 2009-2014 in South Sudan and 2013-2018 in Somalia.
Another important similarity is that both Somalia and South Sudan rely on the UN as their partner to carry out DDR initiatives. The programmes are implemented with the help of UNSOM (as a Special Political Mission) and UNMISS (as a part of the Peacekeeping Operations). Hereby Second Generation or IDDRS standards are present in these post-conflict contexts.154
When it comes to funding, there are no clear figures that sum-up all of the expenses in Somalia and South Sudan. One of the reasons why it is particularly difficult to have a financial overview is that DDR is sponsored by a variety of donors. However, it is reported that Somalia has received limited funding from international organizations and individual actors.155 Similarly, South Sudan does not fall into the category of main receivers of DDR aid.156 As the funding is
147 CFR (2020); BBC (2016).
148 UNMISS (2013a); Bara and Haile (2013): 11.
149 The years 2010-2013 for Somalia and 2013 for South Sudan are cross-referenced with UCDP database. Here,
according to UCDP definition of an ongoing conflict (25 battled related deaths/year), both countries were in an active conflict when DDR programmes started. UCDP (N.D.); (PCR (N.D.).
150 Felbab-Brown (2015): 110-114. 151 Lamb and Stainer (2018).
152 Ibid; UNMISS (2013a.); UNMISS (2013b.); HSBA (2012); Haile and Bara (2013): 5. 153 UN (N.D.).
154 Ibid.
155 Felbab-Brown (2015): 113; Morse (2005).
156 Haile and Bara (2013): 25; HSBA (2011); Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section,
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limited in both cases, it is possible to compare them. However, it needs to be taken into account in the analysis. Limited funding means that the potential of DDR programmes is also restricted. Furthermore, both intra-state wars broke out over power and military monopoly. In other words, both Somali and South Sudanese governments have been fighting opposition’s claims to rule the country.157 Albeit South Sudan also faces competition over natural resources as it is an oil rich country, which implies a bit different conflict dynamic than in Somalia.158 However, control of the government determines oil revenue flow. Therefore, I argue that it is fair to compare the two conflicts in the context of DDR.
In addition, both countries are aspiring democracies. Unfortunately, they are still very unstable, topping the Fragile States Index.159 The Index measures a variety of social, political, economic and cohesion indicators within countries to provide an overall score.160 Separate economic measurements also show that both Somalia and South Sudan are one of the most vulnerable countries in the world. Over half of each population lives in poverty, with 82% in South Sudan, and a variation from 26% to 70% (depending on the region) in Somalia as of 2016.161
Moreover, while from the outside Somalia could be seen as one of the more homogenous countries in Africa (15% of minorities), it is still very culturally and socially diverse.162 The presence of clans and sub-clans define the society and its fragmentation in Somalia, fueling the beginning of conflict decades ago.163 In comparison, South Sudan has a more ethnically
fragmented society. The majority group takes up only 35, 8% of the population, while the remainder is divided between a number of minorities. This division is cited as one of the leading causes of South Sudan’s civil war.164
Finally, both Somalia and South Sudan present complex, yet typical modern intra-state conflicts. Based on identity divisions, they are defined by groups fighting over the right to govern. While it
157 BBC (2011); ICR (2020). 158 Nyadera (2018).
159 FSI (2020). 160 FSI (N.D.).
161 Pape and Finn (2019); Pape (2017). 162 CIA (N.D.a.).
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is certain that such post-conflict states are hard to pacify, these examples can help discovering whether the presence of VEOs really affects the success of DDR.
Variable Somalia South Sudan
Independent: inclusion of VEOs. Yes, a high number of VEOs compared to other ANSAs.165
No VEOs, only other ANSAs.166
Control: DDR follows IDDRS. Yes. 167 Yes.168
Control: executed by UN or partners. Yes. 169 Yes. 170
Control: DDR in ongoing conflict Yes. 171 Yes.172
Control: duration over three years. Yes.173 Yes.174
Control: funding. Limited.175 Limited.176
Control: type of conflict. Over government.177 Mainly over government.178
Control: governing system. Federal parliamentary republic.179
2nd on Fragile States Index.180
Presidential republic.181
3rd on Fragile States Index.182
Control: economy. High poverty.183 High poverty.184
Control: ethnic and cultural diversity. Less diverse.185 Diverse.186
Table 1: Case Selection.
165 Felbab-Brown (2015): 105. 166 UNMISS (2013a).
167 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a). 168 UNMISS (2013).
169 Cockayne and O’Neil (2015a). 170 UNMISS (2013a).
171 UCDP (N.D.). 172 Ibid.
173 Felbab-Brown (2015): 110-114.
174 UNMISS (2013a.); UNMISS (2013b.); HSBA (2012); Haile and Bara (2013): 5. 175 Felbab-Brown (2015): 113; Morse (2005).
176 Haile and Bara (2013): 25; HSBA (2011); Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section,
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN (2018). 177 BBC (2011). 178 Nyadera (2018). 179 CIA (N.D.a.). 180 FSI (2020). 181 CIA (N.D.b.). 182 FSI (2020). 183 Pape (2017).
184 Pape and Finn (2019). 185 CIA (N.D.a.).
