Kulturgeografiska institutionen
Hezbollah as a Reconstruction Leader
Participatory Planning in the Rebuilding of Haret
Hreik, Lebanon, Post-War 2006
Tag-Eldeen, Y. 2020. Hezbollah as a Reconstruction Leader: Participatory Planning in the Rebuilding of Haret Hreik, Post-War 2006. Kulturgeografiska institutionen, Uppsatser, Uppsala universitet.
This paper assesses the politicized nature of reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the Israeli-Lebanese July War of 2006. It illustrates the factors driving the polarized nature of Lebanese politics, as well as the reasons for which a faith-based non-governmental organization such as Hezbollah was able to take the leading role in the reconstruction of Haret Hreik, a southern suburb of Beirut. Through a literature review, the study will demonstrate that the power struggle to lead post-war reconstruction can be seen as a reflection of Lebanon’s internal political and religious divisions, often along sectarian lines, as well as a lack of democratic accountability and the retreat of the state. Finally, in examining the implications for participatory planning when faith-based, non-state actors serve as reconstruction leaders in a politicized post-war context, the study contributes to the literature on citizen participation, power in urban planning and non-state actors within neoliberal urban governance.
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 5
1.2 Definitions 5
1.3 Outlining 7
2. BACKGROUND 8
2.1 The July War of 2006 8
2.2 Aftermath of the War 8
2.3 Lebanon’s Political Landscape 9
2.4 History and Ideology of Hezbollah 10
2.5 Reconstruction and Hezbollah as a Reconstruction Leader 12
2.6 Project Wa’d 13
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 17
3.1 Post-War Reconstruction 17
3.2 Neoliberalism and Non-State Actors 18
3.3 A Ladder of Citizen Participation 21
3.4 Operationalization 24
4. METHOD 26
4.1 Case study design 26
4.2 Qualitative Literature Study 26
5. ANALYSIS 28
5.1 Ladder of Participation in Project Wa’d: Tokenism and Non-Participation 29 5.2 Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts: A Neoliberal Project? 33
6. CONCLUSION 36
First and foremost, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my loving and caring mother, Zeinab Noureddine Tag-Eldeen, who passed away one month before this essay was completed. One of the many things we shared in common was our interest in politics within the Middle East region, specifically Lebanon, her homeland. Together, we discussed this essay thoroughly, where she shared her guidance and comments, since she herself was an Associate Professor at The Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. The loss of my beautiful mother will forever be the toughest sorrow for me to carry.
This essay is also dedicated to my loving father and the wisest, most hard working man I know, Mustafa Tag-Eldeen, who worked within Disaster Risk Management in over 50 countries, and who also passed away one year ago. They are my greatest motivation in all that I do, present and future.
Thanks to my devoted parents I have experienced love, support and care beyond what this world will ever know. They have taught me generosity, commitment, ambition, thrive, hard work, warmth, gratitude, love and happiness. No words will ever be enough to explain the emptiness they have left in our hearts, nor will there be enough words to explain the love we as a family shared for each other.
I would like to show my deepest gratitude and love for all those who have supported me and my sister Yara Tag-Eldeen, specifically during the loss of our lovely parents. Thank you to my closest friends; Julia Jokiaho and Mila Stieglitz-Courtney for not only giving me love, support and care, but assisting me in accomplishing this study with great interest, engagement and dedication from start, together with: Frida Nordlander and Maya Bushell; my supervisor Professor Donald Mitchell, for his patience, inspiration, and guidance; my twin sister Yara Tag-Eldeen for being my other half, supporting and holding my hand through every step; my childhood friends Sarah Gligoric, Lanna Gligoric, Ivana Gligoric and Yasmeen Ainholm for being the closest thing to family; and my loving aunties in Lebanon, Laila and Fatmeh Noureddine, who share the great loss of their sister and our mother.
1. INTRODUCTION
In July 2006, the capture of two Israeli soldiers by the Lebanese Shia-Islamist organization Hezbollah ignited an armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon that would go on to last 34 days. The conflict, that would come to be known as the July War, resulted in 1,200 Lebanese casualties, more than 3 billion USD in damage to civil infrastructure, and irreparable economic damage to a country already struggling to recover from a Civil War only fifteen years prior. By August 2006, over 2 billion USD had flowed into the country for the purpose of helping its reconstruction efforts, coming from a range of international and regional actors including the United Nations, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (The Presidency of the Council of Ministers 2007).
1.1 Purpose and Research Question
The purpose of this thesis thus seeks to study post-war planning when it occurs within a complex power structure and highly politicized context. More specifically, an analysis will be given of the post-war rebuilding efforts of Hezbollah within the aftermath of the July War, with a specific focus on the reconstruction of Haret Hreik through “Project Wa’d,” that was taken up by the faith-based organization’s construction wing Jihad al-Bina’. As such, this paper will contribute to the literature on participatory planning by focusing on a specific case-study wherein a non-governmental and faith-based organization is one of the leading actors in a post-war recovery context. Drawing primarily on Arnstein’s (1969) A Ladder of Citizen Participation, the case will, first and foremost, be studied within the framework of participation within citizen decision-making processes. It will focus on the literature relating to reconstruction efforts in sectarian societies, as well as that of non-state actors within neoliberal urban regimes. This work will set out specifically to answer the following research question:
What are the implications for participatory planning when faith-based non-governmental organizations serve as actors in a highly politicized post-war recovery context?
1.2 Definitions
In order to study the implications of participatory planning in Hezbollah’s reconstruction of Haret Hreik, the definitions and meanings of the relevant terminology must first be outlined.
Neoliberalism can be defined as both an economic and political philosophy, one which believes that markets should have a dominant and controlling role in all, or nearly all, aspects of life, promoting privatization and economic efficiency above other values, such as wealth redistribution, conservation, and social justice (Goldstein 2007, p. 388). In this paper, neoliberalism helps contextualize the extent to which Hezbollah, as an NGO, was able to supercede the state in reconstruction efforts post-2006, insofar as neoliberal policies such as the deregulation of the market and the retreat of the state — in the form of reduced government expenditure and redistribution and for the sake of greater “economic efficiency” — help give rise to non-state actors seeking to fill the void left by the state in social service provisions.
Finally, it is also necessary to outline the reasons for which this thesis views Hezbollah as a faith-based organization (FBO), as opposed to a terrorist entity, a category designated to the group by Israel and the United States. It will be argued that, given the context of our study — a Shia community in southern Beirut whose neighborhood was intentionally attacked during the 2006 war and in which Hezbollah is highly regarded — it is logical to view the group as motivated by, or acting in conjunction with, its faith-based underpinnings. The thesis will follow in the tradition of Lob (2018) and others, whose research departs less from a concern with normative and semantic debates over whether [Hezbollah] respectively constitute[s] a so-called rogue state and designated terrorist organisation, but rather takes into account Hezbollah’s military wing, political bureau, welfare network and media arm, among other institutions, which allow it to be characterized as a “state-builder” (Ibid, p. 2104). A broader definition of an FBO has proven difficult to construct among scholars, and has led to some divergence in how these groups are understood. This thesis will draw upon Berger (2003, p. 16), who defines religious, non-governmental organizations as:
1.3 Outlining
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, an overview of the conflict will be given in order to contextualize the reconstruction of Haret Hreik within its socio-political and historical backdrop. Firstly, an overview of the causes and consequences of the war will be presented. Secondly, the political context of Lebanon in the years preceding the war will be discussed, with a focus on how this contributed to events in the aftermath of the conflict. Thirdly, a detailed outline of the post war-reconstruction efforts will be given. Finally, there will be an overview of Hezbollah and a presentation of “Project Wa’d”, the specific case-study of interest.
2.1 The July War of 2006
On July 12th, 2006, in an operation titled “Truthful Promise”, two Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah in an effort to negotiate the exchange of Lebanese prisoners. Their efforts failed, however, and, viewing the events as a provocation of war, Israel responded with a full-scale armed conflict. Massive air strikes, alongside air and naval blockades, began that same day, and on July 13th, 2006, Israel targeted Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport. The war would continue for 34 days, until a cease-fire was formally declared on September 8th, 2006, with Israel lifting its naval blockade of Lebanon (Al-Harithy 2010). While the conflict impacted the entire country, and the Israeli government viewed all Lebanese officials responsible for Hezbollah’s actions (Ibid), the areas of Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon and Beirut were undoubtedly hardest hit by air strikes, blockades and ground invasions (Al-Harithy 2010). Given the force of the Israeli response, and the extent of the damages, many have come to understand the war as an explicit effort to eradicate, or at least minimize, Hezbollah:
Israel transformed a relatively minor border skirmish with Hezbollah - of the kind that had been taking place intermittently since Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 - into a full scale war on Lebanon. Its objective was to neutralize Hezbollah once and for all, and to assist in the imposition of a Pax Americana in the Middle East (Makdisi 2006, p. 20).
2.2 Aftermath of the War
permanently displaced (Fattouh & Kolb 2006). Over 125,000 residential properties and 850 commercial enterprises were destroyed (Al-Harithy 2010), and, eventually, 100,000 people emigrated from the country (Ibid). According to the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the direct damage to civilian businesses and national infrastructure alone totalled 3.6 billion USD (Dibeh 2008), not accounting other indirect economic losses linked to the naval and air blockade such as lost tourism income, trade imbalances, decreased government revenue, lowered foreign direct investment (FDI) and the cost of currency stabilization (Fattouh & Kolb 2006). In southern Lebanon, predominantly the Shia areas, physical destruction was the most extensive, having been hit with over a third of the 12,000 total air strikes. Similarly, the southern suburbs of Beirut were particularly impacted, at least when compared to the northern part of the city, which received less direct physical destruction. Overall, these attacks led to an estimated reconstruction cost of around 2.8 billion USD (Al-Harithy, 2010).
Among the economic consequences of blockades, during which the Lebanese government lost revenue from tariffs, customs and trade, unemployment increased by nearly 50%, with over 120,000 people losing their jobs or being at risk of falling into poverty (Ibid). Having already been one of the most heavily indebted countries, globally, before the conflict erupted, the 2006 war resulted in a major economic downturn. Despite donations from international organizations and other nations, these were unable to address the more fundamental, long-term developmental and macroeconomic challenges the war had caused ((Mercy Corps International, 2006).
2.3 Lebanon’s Political Landscape
Shias and Sunnis that had ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1991. In the wake of Hariri’s death, elections were held from May 29th to June 19th, 2005, ushering in an anti-Syrian majority into the Lebanese parliament (Dibeh 2007). In Shia-dominated areas, however, mainly southern Lebanon, Syrian allies such as Hezbollah and Amal won a solid victory (Haddad 2006), signalling a large spatial and social polarization of the electorate.
The tensions within the Lebanese population in the aftermath of 2005 revealed a stark polarization between pro-Syrian and pro-American factions, with Rafiq Hariri’s assassination splitting the country into one group that believed Syria and Hezbollah were behind his death (March 14 Coalition), and the other considering Israel to be responsible (March 8 Coalition), supporting both Syria and Iran. Most importantly, though, this politicized context made it such that Lebanon had barely any time to recover from their 15-year-long Civil War (1975-1990), as well as from other Israeli attacks and the occupation of southern Lebanon between 1978 and 2000. As such, the economic, social and environmental damages of the July War were particularly devastating (Al-Harithy 2010).
2.4 History and Ideology of Hezbollah
In 1948, the end of World War II marked the beginning of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, bringing 110,000 Palestinian refugees to Lebanon. By 1970, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had established itself within Lebanon, as the number of Palestinian refugees in the country reached as many as 300,000. During this time, numerous Israeli attacks began to occur in Lebanon as well. In 1982, the PLO exited the country (Al-Harithy 2010), and instead, Israel invaded Lebanon, attacking west Beirut and occupying parts of southern Lebanon. The invasion resulted in the destruction of homes and businesses, alongside mass displacements and civilian casualties. These circumstances have been attributed to the rise, in 1985, of an Islamist group dedicated to fighting Israeli troops, which would later become known as the faith-based resistance movement “Hezbollah” (Naber 2006).
de facto Shia welfare state, Hezbollah is the country’s leading political party and Shia group. Beyond military and political operations, the organization is also estimated to use half of their budget for social services such as education, health, veteran services and reconstruction projects, being affiliated with 19 schools and two training institutes, al-Imdad and al-Mahdi, 15 medical centers and four hospitals. Hezbollah also allocates significant funds toward advertising and providing services from specialists free of charge. The extension of the group’s activity into the realm of service provision has since resulted in strong gratitude and support from the Shia community, helping the faith-based movement gain a strong political foothold in the Lebanese government, perhaps best demonstrated in the Lebanese election of May 2018 in which the group won more than half of all parliamentary seats together with allies (Perry 2018). Interestingly, when compared to the overall size of the Shia community, which comprises 40% of Lebanon’s population or roughly 1.5 million people, the scope of Hezbollah’s social activities is, in fact, quite small—only a small percentage of Shia Muslims directly benefit from Hezbollah’s financial investments (Daher 2019).
Often referred to as the “Resistance Movement”, Hezbollah is in part financed through direct donations from the country’s minority Shia community, though the group also receives financial support from other transnational actors, such as Syria, Iran and Qatar, of which Iran and its affiliates are by far the largest donors (Levitt 2007).
In sum, the party’s support and trust relied upon their success to operate across multiple domains, including religious education, military resistance, social welfare and political activity (Azani 2013). It is of particular importance to understand Hezbollah not only as a group operating as a religious militia, but also a welfare organization, given that Shia Muslims were, for a long period of time, a marginalized and politically underrepresented community in Lebanon (Saad-Ghorayeb 2006). The vacuum left by the Lebanese state in the provision of social services in the Shia community in particular has undoubtedly been filled by Hezbollah, posing a threat to the legitimacy of the state all while increasing their credibility as strong actors taking necessary measures in turn. Beyond the representation of Hezbollah as a violent group, the role they play as a de facto welfare state is of importance, especially as it relates to the purpose of studying the group as a faith-based welfare organization.
2.5 Reconstruction and Hezbollah as a Reconstruction Leader
Infrastructure and the civilian population were hardest hit during the July War, especially in the Southern regions of the nation of Hezbollah’s stronghold, with damages to water pumping stations, power plants and roads among those bombed. Targeting civilian infrastructure was a strategic tactic: Israel hoped to hamper Hezbollah’s mobility and impede arm supplies funneling in from Syria and Iran (Amnesty International 2006). Furthermore, attacks on residential neighborhoods in the southern region was a means of countering Hezbollah’s stronghold in that area (Al-Harithy 2010). As Deeb (2006) articulates:
[The] attack on Lebanon [was] clearly [...] a selective civilian targeting. While Lebanon and its population as a whole suffered tremendously during this attack, and continue to bear the burdens of environmental hazards and rebuilding, the brunt of civilian deaths and infrastructural destruction took place in the south of the country, the Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. The purported reasoning behind this selective wreckage was that these regions [were] ‘Hezbollah strongholds’ (Deeb 2006, p. 115).
Reconstruction were the main actors involved. Operating on the local level were Hezbollah and its construction wing, Jihad al-Bina’, as well as municipal agencies (Fawaz 2009).
In comparison to other regions, it took longer for these government efforts to start in Lebanon’s southern areas. While Southern Lebanon’s landscape faced the majority of destruction—many undetected grenades had been identified—foreign aid efforts also had difficulty reaching the areas most in need. Thus, Hezbollah, who had strong ties to the area, established a committee that enabled machinery to be rented, rubble to be removed and local damages to be surveyed (Fawaz 2000). Jihad al-Bina’, the non-governmental construction wing of Hezbollah, founded in 1988 with the purpose of aiding reconstruction of buildings post-Civil War, was also crucial in redevelopment projects in predominantly Shia regions (Fawaz, 2009). As Meier (2018, p. 11) writes, the slow response of the government in helping victims of Israeli attacks was starkly contrasted by Hezbollah’s salient measures taken [...] starting the first day after the war to residents of the bombed southern regions and suburbs, solidified by its proximity and connection these populations, as well as its ability to address their primary needs.
2.6 Project Wa’d
million USD for compensation to residents (Presidency of the Council of Ministers Lebanon, 2007, p. 77).
By August 2006, Jihad al-Bina’ had created a three-step plan to underline the reconstruction efforts:
(i) Providing immediate shelter for the displaced, moving families from schools and the public gardens that had housed them during the war, and giving them 12,000 dollars for one-year’s rent and furniture;
(ii) Starting non-structural repairs of the partially damaged buildings; and
(iii) Looking into the issues of a rebuilding project for the southern part (Jeshi 2008, p. 49).
The project was then run on behalf of the legal owners and consisted of two components: an administrative and technical team dealing with the technical and organizational aspects of the reconstruction; [and a] liaison office to deal with the stakeholders (Fayyad 2006, p. 11).
In November 2006, the architect Hassan Jeshi was appointed to lead the project, alongside eight members appointed to the Advisory Board selected by Nasrallah, chosen under the following criteria: interest and commitment to the reconstruction project, a mixed academic and professional background, and diversity of background so that the project [can] embody a national dimension (Al-Harithy 2010; Interview with Jeshi 2009, p. 53). The Advisory Board was comprised of a General Manager, the President of the Association of Architects at the Lebanese Order of Engineers, an urban design consultant and five academics from different Lebanese universities, tasked collectively with authorizing all displaced people to return to their homes as quickly as possible, and fulfilling Hezbollah’s vision of refining the area without neglecting owners’ and stakeholders’ rights (Al-Harithy 2010).
purpose of giving advice regarding methods and techniques to be used within rebuilding efforts in the demolished southern suburbs of Beirut.
Hezbollah closely studied potential reconstruction options and blocked various state efforts to partake in the rebuilding of Haret Hreik, in order to lead the efforts themselves. Eventually, the state was limited to monetary compensation packages for each lost residence in the neighborhood. Despite the fact that the party’s rebuilding efforts were exercised in violation of urban and building regulations, with neither a legal framework nor building permits, a legal proposition later passed within the parliament that gave permission to property owners to rebuild their apartment buildings as they existed prior to the war (Ibid). On October 14th, 2006, the Lebanese prime minister, Fouad Siniora, appropriated one of the propositions known as the “Reparcelization” or “Large Project Law”, which states that any land over 20,0000 square feet should be given the ability to set up its own planning regulations, albeit submitting them to the Higher Council of Urbanism for approval.
On November 14th, 2006, a community meeting was held by Hezbollah to discuss the project, with around 5,000 residents in attendance. Surveys were handed out in which residents were given the choice of either collecting compensation from the government with the purpose of reconstructing their houses, together with the Party [making] up the difference in cost, or delegat[ing] the responsibility to the NGO Jihad al-Bina’ and [letting] them carry out the reconstruction on their behalf (Jeshi 2008, p. 52). In these surveys, 70% of residents asked the NGO to take over responsibility (Ibid), though later an even greater number of residents entrusted Jihad al-Bina’ with the process in the form of notarized authorization, in part due to strong encouragement by Nasrallah, seen as a charismatic figure and even a hero within the Shia community (Fawaz 2009).
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, a theoretical framework will be established in which the literature will later be analyzed. This thesis seek to understand the extent to which urban planning can be viewed as truly participatory, if and when the leading actor in reconstruction efforts is one that was both implicated in the conflict that caused the destruction, and remains a highly contested, politicized organization who might be positioned to gain from rebuilding efforts. It will be argued that Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts, though promoted publicly by the organization as a collaborative and participatory process, corresponds instead to a process of Tokenism and Non-Participation when viewed through the framework of A Ladder of Citizen Participation. Furthermore, participatory planning will be argued as a means in which an organization can reinforce its territorial power, all while contesting the power of other actors, which is illuminated in our case by the power struggle between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, the latter of which has capitalized off the vacuum left by the former.
3.1 Post-War Reconstruction
‘facilitators’ instead, building bridges between communities and authorities, making it a complex task.
A secondary, albeit equally important, focus of the literature within post-war reconstruction, notably within urban geography, relates to the dynamics between actors’ ambitions following a demolition, in light of reconstruction needs. Areas in post-war recovery are theorized as spaces in which a pre-existing status quo or novel ideals seek implementation by different actors. Notably, reconstruction spaces might lead to the emergence of new actors that seek to implement projects that correspond to certain visions of society or ideological positions, generating new uneven power relations, which may explain the contrasted evolution of these projects (Farah & Majed 2019, p.111). This is particularly relevant when new actors arise following the withdrawal of the central State for which the inhabitants have shown distrust (Ibid). Hence, reconstruction efforts in a post-war context are highly political in their nature, and can be understood by both the politics of reconstruction and cultures of urbanism in a given context: war and destruction [create] lasting alterations of social relations through migrations, impoverishment, and other factors, all while the urban space becomes an area wherein political forces materialize across local, national or international scales (Verdeil 2012, p. 2). With respect to Project Wa’d, the literature on bottom-up planning will prove relevant for studying the politics of reconstruction, and the extent to which Hezbollah facilitated citizens’ ideas or, rather, implemented the project to serve their ideological objectives.
3.2 Neoliberalism and Non-State Actors
Lebanon has also witnessed more than two decades of deregulation and privatization of social services, creating institutions [that] frequently [appear] powerless (Farah & Majed 2019, p. 110) and political voids that Hezbollah is quick to capitalize on.
In its simplest form, neoliberalism can be characterized by deregulation, privatization and the withdrawal of the state from areas of social provision (Harvey 2005, p. 187) alongside the rolling out of market mechanisms and competitiveness to achieve economic growth, corresponding to an economic school of thought that rose to prominence in the 1970s (Wright 2013, p. 2). Harvey (2005) goes further, however, and argues that neoliberalism has not only shifted the role of government in the provision of public goods, but has entailed a process of “creative destruction” as well, transforming prior divisions of labor, social relations, welfare provisions [and] ways of life and thought (Ibid, p. 3). This process fits in line with the literature that views neoliberal economic transformations, namely “marketization”, as a precursor to important cultural shifts in the body politic, and wherein such cultural ideals are actively pursued maintained by economic elites who benefit from the neoliberal order:
Neoliberal [policies] unmistakably [lead] to the marketization of social identities and
relations. The idea of public goods and services is all but non-existent in this [model, and] the process of [individualization wherein] each has to build his/her capacities to access the marketplace reduces the concept of public welfare to private interest. In this discourse, public welfare is reduced to an aggregate of individual gains, and the social democratic notion that public welfare is something that must prevail over and above private gain ceases to exist (Kamat 2004, p. 170).
poverty, result in an increasing role of NGOs and civil society in alleviating problems the state was previously responsible for (see: Pectu 2017; Polloni 2016). According to Kamat (2004), the rise in the prominence of NGOs on the global scale can also be seen as a result of changing conceptions of the private and public sphere:
Given expanding market economies, and shrinking states, NGOs are stepping in to respond to the needs and demands of the poor and marginalized sections of society. [...] The NGO phenomena [thus] must be theorized in relation to the global economic and political process that involves an overall restructuring of public good and private interest. At stake is not the struggle between state and civil society, but a revaluation of private interest and public good. (Kamat 2004, p. 156)
These shifting power relations are also applicable in the context of urban planning, in that neoliberalism results in a restructuring [of] relationships between the public, private and third sectors, [in order] to rationalise and promote a growth first approach to urban change (Wright 2013, p. 20). The urban policy settings under neoliberalism and globalization of decentralization and marketization, wherein decision-making and the provision of services is delegated or outsourced to the private sector or civil society, leads to four main changes in the urban landscape: reduced social cohesion; increased social exclusion; infrastructure and services failures and; the exclusion of the poor or other marginalized groups to peripheral areas (Ibid).
In the urban planning paradigms of Lebanon, these trends are also of great importance, and have undoubtedly shaped the nature of Hezbollah’s post-war reconstruction in 2006 as discussed in Section 5.3. Namely, the rollback of the Lebanese state as part deregulation and privatization in the aftermath of the Civil War post-1990 allowed for religious-political organizations to take over [the] space left vacant by the government, (Akar 2015, p. 272) of which Hezbollah was undoubtedly the most prominent group to do so, aided by heavy investments from Iran and Syria. That the post-war period of late 1990s coincided with global economic restructurings, such as structural adjustment programs, helps explain why the Lebanese government followed within the global economic and political neoliberalization rationale by promoting privatization policies, (Ibid, p. 271) seeking to attract global financial services and companies in reconstruction efforts.
to a profit-oriented strategy, leant itself to the weakened legitimacy of the Lebanese government, and hence the rise of other actors in urban development (in e.g. social services) in its place. That the marginalization and exclusion of groups took place primarily along religious lines was the main driver of increased power among religious para- or non-state actors such as Hebzollah.
3.3 A Ladder of Citizen Participation
Hoping to encourage a more refined dialogue concerning citizen participation and participatory planning, Arnstein (1969) created the so-called “ladder of participation” to identify the different steps of citizen participation and their corresponding levels of citizen power, now an important mechanism through which to analyze participatory planning. The ladder of citizen participation is a means of visualizing the extent of citizens’ power when influencing the outcome of a program or plan. Per Arnstein’s (1969) definition, citizen participation is merely a categorical term for citizen power, serving as a redistributional tool, giving power from the “haves” to the “have-nots,” i.e. citizens who are excluded from political and economic decision-making. Within this process, citizens are deliberately included in the ongoing process and, in doing so, are able to promote social reform and take part in the societal benefits by creating egalitarian policy-making. When conducting participatory planning, however, it is important to note the risk of participation becoming an empty ritual without an effect on the outcome, thus redistribution of power becomes critical for successful results (Ibid).
manipulation of participation since these groups had no legitimate function or power. Instead, these groups were mainly used to prove that have-nots and grassroot citizens were involved in the program, and participants would, at most, be informed of the action that the constructor wished to implement, before being required to sign off on proposals. The second lowest rung, Therapy, is a process where instead of including citizens in planning, individuals are subjected to group therapy that is masked as citizen participation. These “therapy sessions” are administered by social workers, for example, to participants within meetings or sessions solely because of their lack of high social standing and political power. This type of non-participation has been used to prohibit the inhabitants discussing subjects such as arbitrary evictions.
Figure 1: A visual representation of the eight rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation, as defined by Arnstein (1969)
More specifically, the third rung of the ladder, Informing, is primarily characterized by informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities. These actions are crucial first steps of moving towards legitimate citizen participation. This type of participation, though, is often focused on a one-way flow of information from power holders to citizens — rarely the other way around — with information providing no room for citizens to negotiate terms or give feedback to officials. To exemplify this rung, Arnstein takes an example from Rhode Island. wherein a group of citizens were elected to discuss the modeling of six playgrounds in an area populated by equally white and black populations. When several of the black participants noted that four playgrounds were proposed for the white district and only two were allocated to the black neighborhood, city officials gave a highly technical and complex explanation about costs that could defend the proposal that residents did not understand his explanation. Intimidated by the officials, citizens came to accept the proposal to build a greater number of playgrounds in the white neighborhood (Arnstein 1969).
The fourth rung of the participation ladder, Consultation, also prohibits citizens from any reassurance that their input will be taken into account. Frequent methods used for this type of participation include attitude surveys, neighborhood meetings and public hearings. This illusion of legitimate citizen participation restricts citizen’s ideas, as the participation is measured by the number of participants and the number of brochures distributed. Through this process, power holders achieve evidence of involving citizens and the “have-nots”, even though they merely “participated in participation” (Ibid). The fifth rung of the participation ladder is Placation. At this stage, citizens begin to have some degree of power, although tokenism is still present. An example of Placation given by Arstein (1969) is when power holders select a few deserving, or “worthy,” participants onto boards. These participants can nonetheless be replaced or outvoted by the power holders if they hold a majority.
negotiation between citizens and power holders. Through these negotiations all actors agree to share decision-making and responsibilities. Partnership works best when there is an organized base for power, and citizen groups have the financial resources to pay its members for their efforts and hire human resources such as technicians, layers or community organisers (Arnstein 1969).
The seventh rung of the ladder is Delegated Power. This rung is characterized by citizens and public officials engaging in negotiations that result in citizens having the authority to decide on a particular program or plan. Delegated Power means that participating citizens have the right tools to assure accountability of power holders, and the plan or program, to them. In order to resolve differences the parties use bargaining as a part of the planning process. The eighth and final rung of the ladder of citizen participation is Citizen Control. This type of citizen participation is often associated with an increase in community controlled schools and neighborhood control, for example. In this stage, participants are able to demand the level of power required to govern a program or institution, be partially in charge of policy making, or negotiate conditions where citizens will be able to change them (Arnstein 1969).
As is the case in most models, the ladder of citizen participation is a rough generalization of reality. A perspective to keep in mind when utilizing this kind of model is that in any given real-world context, there might be hundreds of different rungs with unique combinations of characteristics, with less obvious distinctions between one another. The ladder also juxtaposes powerless citizens with power holders to highlight the differences between them, evidently an abstraction or simplification of more complex institutional and social settings. Finally, the ladder does not include examples or specific actions to achieve successful and true citizen participation.
3.4 Operationalization
when using the “ideal types” analysis is to keep each ideal type unique so that they are distinguishable from each other (Esaiasson et al. 2017). The ladder of citizen participation will henceforth be viewed through three degrees of participation in which the secondary material will later be analysed.
Table 1: Operationalization scheme of Three Categories within the “Ladder of Citizen Participation” (Arnstein 1969).
Citizen Power Tokenism Non-participation
Citizen power is characterized by “have-not” citizens who comprise a majority within decision-making, therefore giving them the highest level of power in the ladder of citizen participation.
In tokenism, participation allows “have-not” citizens to be heard during the planning process. Citizens, however, lack the power to ensure that their perspective will be heeded by those in power. In this setting there is no way for citizens to follow through and ensure that their perspectives are included in the outcome of the planning process. In some cases, citizens are allowed to advise certain decisions, but they are still unable to limit the power holder's right to decide.
In non-participation, the objective is to restrict citizens from participating in planning, with those already in power “educating” participants instead, serving as a substitute for genuine participation. These participants will, at most, be informed of the action that rebuilding actors want to implement, and are required to sign proposals.
Operalization of Citizen Power Operalization of Tokenism Operalization of Non-Participation Residents in Haret Hreik
negotiate in trade offs with the rebuilding actor(s), and citizens are equally involved in the decision-making process. Residents have the power to hold the party accountable through bargaining processes, indicated by residents also sitting on boards alongside Hezbollah.
Residents in Haret Hreik are informed and heard within public hearings or neighborhood meetings. Citizens are asked for advice, but with no ultimate decision-making power, indicated through methods such as opinion surveys.
4. METHOD
4.1 Case study design
For this thesis, a case-study design will be applied, meaning that a single case will be studied intensively and in a detailed manner (Bryman 2016). In case-study research, this design is chosen to address the complex and particular nature of the case in question (Ibid), which applies to the study of post-war reconstruction through the lens of power, which is an inherently contextual phenomena. It is worth acknowledging that case studies are widely debated within academia, as it has been argued that single cases are unable to provide insights about the causes and effects of larger phenomena. Thus, this thesis aims to give insights into the contextual phenomena operating within the specific case of Project Wa’d.
4.2 Qualitative Literature Study
To respond to the purpose of this thesis, a general literature study was conducted using qualitative methods, wherein the author systematically searched for empirical material within academic journals, reviewed and critically studied the empirical content, and compiled current knowledge in the field of interest (Bryman 2016). This method is relevant for the study given the context in which it was written, namely that collecting empirical data in Lebanon was not possible. The purpose of this section is not only to distinguish texts that concern the subject matter, but also to analyze and examine their implications within the theoretical framework outlined in Section 3. Data collection did not rely on any specific journals, rather specific keywords were used in search engines, such as: Participatory Planning, Post-War Reconstruction, Project Wa’d, Hezbollah and Non-State Actors under Neoliberalism. The greatest limitations of this method is the fact that the case has, previously, not been written about extensively, and that the analysis relied on secondary data.
5. ANALYSIS
In the aftermath of the 2006 war, Hezbollah and Jihad al-Bina’ were not only swift in their efforts to rebuild Southern Lebanon (Haret Hreik), the area of their headquarters that had experienced the greatest extent of damages during the conflict, but also quick to emphasize that the reconstruction of the neighborhood was highly participatory. This was demonstrated in numerous interviews with the organization and its leaders. This is substantiated by the literature, wherein scholars have devoted their attention to understanding the proceedings, motivations and outcomes of the project (see: Ghandour & Fawaz 2008; Harb 2008; Fawaz 2009; Al-Harithy 2010, Verdeil 2011, Verdeil 2007). Across these studies, in which interviews and documents form the basis of their analysis, it becomes evident that Hezbollah had depicted Project Wa’d on numerous occasions as a means for implementing dwellers’ preferences for reconstruction, made possible by the group’s intimate knowledge and belonging to the community. In the words of Project Wa’d representatives, Hezbollah was “part and parcel” of the Haret Hreik community (Fawaz 2009). Press releases from Hezbollah reinforced the notion that Wa’d served as a direct response to the neighborhood’s aspirations, namely prompt, on-site resettlement and respect of the pre-war spatial organization, further indicating an eagerness to portray rebuilding efforts as participatory (al-Akhbar 2007; Fawaz 2009).
overarching goal of understanding the implications for participatory planning when a faith-based organization is the leading actor of reconstruction efforts in a highly politicized context.
5.1 Ladder of Participation in Project Wa’d: Tokenism and
Non-Participation
In order to frame the process of reconstruction deliberations within the categories of Arnstein’s A Ladder of Citizen Participation, an overview of the central ways in which the literature argues that Project Wa’d was not, in fact, participatory will be presented. A survey of the main research highlights three main trends as characteristic of the project: (i) a lack of information given to, and limited discussions with, residents of Haret Hreik; (ii) non-elected expert committees, appointed by Hezbollah, which operated behind closed doors and superseding residents desires when designing plans; (iii) the outcomes of the reconstruction failing to correspond with the desires citizens vocalized, namely greater livability and open space. Describing these factors will help give way to the argument that citizens were only symbolically included or briefly informed, as well as manipulated, rather than having been fully implicated in decision making in the ways publicized by Hezbollah.
In the bottom two categories of the ladder of participation, Non-Participation and Tokenism, the five lowest rungs include, in ascending order, Manipulation, Therapy, Transforming, Consultation and Placation. Within Non-Participation, citizens are restricted from participating in planning, and those already in power “educate” participants through the means of Manipulation and Therapy. In contrast, Tokenism allows “have-not” citizens to vocalize their opinions during the planning process, yet nonetheless lacks the ability to ensure that their perspective will be implemented by those in power. Furthermore, while have-nots can advise power holder’s decision-making under Tokenism, they cannot limit their right to decide, thus there is no way to ensure that citizens’ perspectives are fully included in the outcomes of the planning process.
formal and informal ways, namely community meetings, between the residents themselves, or between members from the party. Hezbollah also organized a large community meeting shortly after the cease-fire in 2006 to inform citizens about how the project would proceed. Following the highly-mediatized launch of Project Wa’d, however, information regarding the project became limited, and interviews with actors involved in the project went exclusively through the party’s media office (Arnstein, 1969).
Through the literature, one can discern that while the party played a crucial role in spreading important information to the public, the absence of other public information channels made it such that information could be manipulated. This is corroborated in interviews with dwellers, where it was said that state compensation was depicted as insufficient to cover all reconstruction costs, and that Hezbollah’s subsidies were crucial for the reconstruction procedures in order to cover the rest, despite developers from the area estimating the state funds to be enough (Fawaz 2009). Similarly, apartment options in other areas were concealed from former residents, while on-site relocations were emphasized (Hilal 2008). According to Fawaz (2009), the most telling process of manipulation in the participatory process of reconstruction was the party’s general caution surrounding public debate:
Hezbollah’s political leadership has been generally very wary of public debate. Aside from the highly-mediatized launching of the Wa’d project, there has been very little information disbursement about the project and all interviews with Wa‘d actors are channeled through the company’s information officer and cleared by the political party’s media office. Wa‘d has also not shown or shared the final master plan of the neighborhood. (Fawaz 2009, p. 328)
The spread of misinformation and limitations of discussion have been argued as strategic means for Hezbollah to ensure that reconstruction would be delegated to the group (Ibid), relating directly to Arnstein’s conception of non-participation (1969).
questionable from a participatory planning perspective, in that there was either a choice to comply or not to comply, and the survey was not anonymous:
There were some concerns that Hezbollah was engaged in an exercise of social control via the Waad initiative. Once 70 per cent of residents indicated their approval for the Waad scheme, the remainder may have been under significant pressure to conform. Given the semi-communal nature of apartment living, dissenting would have been a very public exercise. A final limit on participation may come in the zero sum nature of the options presented by the Hezbollah leadership. Residents had to accept one option and reject the other, a stark choice that overlooks possible gradations of opinion. (Ginty & Hamieh 2010 p. 58)
The second process through which Project Wa’d can be viewed as not truly participatory relates to the “closed door” meetings held, wherein plans were developed by a non-elected committee of experts, architects and engineers who deliberated amongst themselves about the best approaches to upgrade the neighborhood’s physical conditions, within the confines and priorities imposed by the party’s leadership (Fawaz 2009, p. 327). This behaviour fits into the category of Tokenism, and relates both to the complexity of a project being used to “scare off” residents’ participation, or information being strictly limited to experts to begin with. Ginty & Hamieh (2010) and Fawaz (2009) found that the only true deliberation with residents following initial discussions in August of 2006 was to allow residents to choose certain interior finishes, such as color schemes, while larger questions around the re-building projects were left to committees. While Ginty (2012) argues that this was, in part, due to necessity, as large-scale reconstruction often requires “highly technical considerations” that can only be done using expertise from architects, planners and engineers (irregardless of the emphasis on consultation), research nonetheless points out a lack of deliberation in Haret Hreik regarding other non-technical, neighborhood wide considerations:
Space left for dwellers’ opinions [was] limited to consultations once the full apartment design [was] completed, [and they were] not involved in the decision-making concerning the scale of the neighborhood rehabilitation, the potential choices of rebuilding in the original form or in new ones, or [...] in the selection of the architectural office that develops their apartment plans. (Fawaz 2009, p. 327)
It is worth noting that some scholars argue that given the “local way” of doing things, i.e. the prevalence of urban planning in Lebanon relying on a delegation of committees and “expert” boards with little means of accountability, that Hezbollah’s planning style was not particularly different. Al-Harithy (2010) argues, for example, that, given the lack of tradition of participatory planning in Lebanon, Hezbollah's “centralization of [efforts] hardly broke with local planning traditions.” Nonetheless, the lack of break in tradition from Lebanese planning does not obscure the fact that the group might have intentionally “tokenized” residents, perhaps due to some political aim.
The third way it becomes evident that planning within Project Wa’d was not as participatory as the party’s leaders had promoted relates to the divergence between residents’ desires for the new settlement and how it was actually rebuilt. The literature suggests that, with prompt resettlement being prioritized over all other interests, there was no room for improvement in livability, making the neighborhood’s poor living conditions— congestion; high density —marginal. Instead of addressing problems related to the car-oriented design before the war, for example, Project Wa’d allowed for road widenings and the opening of throughways. Analysis of the urban fabric prior to the war also showed that barely any sunlight entered many apartments year round (Ghandour & Fawaz 2007), yet Jihad al-Bina’ chose to oppose simple propositions and solutions, such as relocating taller buildings to street corners where lightning often is more generous, in order to avoid potential negotiations with the locals or public authorities regarding new urban regulations.
It becomes clear that prioritizing the speed of recovery trumped citizens’ interests, and can perhaps be seen as the main explanation of the lack of full citizen power or participation as defined by Arnstein, as well as the lost opportunity to reorganize a very densely populated suburb marked by a disorganized urban fabric (Verdeil et al. 2019, p. 110). As such, it is worth investigating the interests of Hezbollah that would have motivated a fast reconstruction over other considerations. While many have written that the the planning intervention sacrificed the needs of residents in favor of political prerogatives, failing to provide avenues for participation to those who do not comply with its vision (Fawaz 2009, p. 330) and relying on mechanisms of Non-Participation and Tokenism, it must be investigated what those political prerogatives could be, and how the context of Lebanese political divides may have fostered this.
5.2 Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts: A Neoliberal Project?
leading reconstruction efforts, regardless of whether the project was ultimately participatory or not.
A study of the reconstruction of downtown Beirut post-1991 through the Solidere project (see: Höckel 2007; Verdeil 2011), an undertaking of urban redevelopment using a neoliberal corporatist logic that relied upon private companies and resulted in social exclusion (see: Section 3.2), Höckel demonstrates the aforementioned trends:
The very concentration of post-conflict reconstruction in Beirut’s Central District [post-1991] pursuing a profit-oriented urban development strategy alongside the failure to cater to and integrate the city’s periphery and hinterland led to a loss of government legitimacy and credibility among its citizens and weakened state control in the marginalized regions. This allowed para-state actors (Hezbollah) to use reconstruction politics as a means to [...] establish powerful autonomous governance structures outside the reach of the weak state institutions. (Höckel 2007, p.1)
Furthermore, Verdeil (2007) reinforces the notion that isolation and neglect of Shia communities by the Lebanese state burgeoned Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a reconstruction actor, perhaps best evidenced by the fact that over 90% of residents signed over the rights to reconstruction to the party. He argued that Hezbollah was able to garner and capitalize on the confidence among the “fringe” Shia community in the aftermath of 2006 by offering assistance to victims at a much more rapid pace than the slow mobilization and response of the State (Ibid). Thus, while it becomes hard to delineate between Hezbollah’s territorial power as a result of sectarian divides or exclusionary neoliberal policies, the outcomes and implications for Project Wa’d nonetheless remain the same:
[Project Wa’d] has shown that the current neoliberal policy turn that delegates social services to non-state actors may witness and even strengthen the role of actors other than those expected by market proponents. In this case, the post-war reconstruction policy in Lebanon [provided] an opportunity [for Hezbollah] to strengthen its hold over its constituency and reaffirm its role as a mediator between the community it claims to represent and the state. (Fawaz 2009, p. 330)
rebuilt homes were on shaky legal ground, [...] residents [were kept] politically dependent on Hezbollah (Ibid, p. 2). Ginty & Hamieh (2010) continue, writing that not only did Hezbollah bypass the state in Wa’d, but that, despite the unplanned nature of some of the buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs [which] meant that a number of buildings were deemed ‘illegal’ (Ibid, p 60). Hezbollah was nonetheless able to successfully negotiate with the Lebanese government to secure funds for the reconstruction.
While the literature seems to be in consensus on the fact that Project Wa’d took place in a unique context wherein the state failure of the Lebanese government allowed for little recourse of residents to choose other options, there are some debates on the extent to which Project Wa’d itself fits into neoliberal planning ideologies. Verdeil (2012) takes the stance that the party’s approach to reconstruction efforts strictly refute the neoliberal logic associated with globalized urban development:
On a larger scope, the project managers intend to preserve and rebuild the “resistance society”. Through this act, the reconstruction takes a geopolitical sense of opposition to Israel and, consequently, to their American allies, and an ideological sense of refusal of neoliberal globalization- which is another way to mark the difference between Solidere and Waad, by refusing for example a real estate company and the project funding by the real estate market. (Verdeil 2012, p. 14)
6. CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to investigate the aftermath of the July War in Lebanon with regard to its reconstruction efforts. More specifically, it wished to analyze and discuss the implications for participatory planning in a reconstruction project when a faith-based organization takes the lead and operates within a highly politicized post-war context. Drawing upon A Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1969) and Harvey’s conceptualization of neoliberalism as a political project (2005), the conclusions of this study were threefold: (i) the reconstruction of Haret Hreik through Project Wa’d was by no means participatory, and Hezbollah’s project corresponded instead to categories of Non-Participation and Tokenism when viewed through Arnstein (1969); (ii) citizen participation when used by a non-governmental, faith-based actor in a deeply divided society becomes problematic, relevant in Lebanon where stark sectarian divisions are apparent; (iii) the neoliberalization of the Lebanese state, which left a vacuum that Hezbollah was able to fill and allowed it to gain a stronger political foothold, made it such that the organization was able to surpass the government in reconstruction efforts in 2006, further weakening the state insofar as it helped reinforce their territorial control within Shia communities in turn.
nature was a means of consolidating territorial power, both over Shia Muslims and against Israel and the state.
While this paper drew upon a very specific case-study, we believe that the study of participatory planning in Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts when viewed through Arstein’s (1969) A Ladder of Participation has a number of implications for urban planning under sectarian or neoliberal governance, providing various avenues for future research. Firstly, this case-study gives way to the notion that the phenomenon of faith-based, NGOs may only become increasingly apparent as globalization expands and, consequently, the state continues to roll back. This could arguably lead to a number of implications from a welfare perspective, and might be interesting to study with regard to the historical role that the Christian Church played throughout economic development in providing welfare services to the poor. Perhaps in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, where state governments succumb to multinational corporations (MNCs) or other private actors, faith-based organizations will emerge once again as some of the most important actors in welfare provision, with important implications for social cohesion or conflict. This unanticipated, alternative outcome to neoliberal governance, and the quest for marketization and “economic efficiency”, might prove interesting for the literature within economic geography, development studies and international relations.
Secondly, this paper could have important implications for the increasingly accepted view that bottom-up, local efforts are, normatively and exhaustively, always better. In this case study, bottom-up efforts served to reinforce the power structure and territorial control of local elites by giving credibility to Hezbollah and furthering their autonomous governance structure that operated outside the confines of traditional institutional settings (Höckel 2007). As such, it could lead to the view that a more nuanced understanding of participation in urban planning is required, and that there might exist a trade-off between community-based solutions and reinforced political control in cases when groups use local knowledge.
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